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Melbourne in August. Another chill mid-winter day in prospect. An ‘energetic 
depression’ moving across the Great Australian Bight. The weather forecast: 
‘cold and cloudy with some further showers, but improving to chiefly fine’ — 
if you could believe it. With influenza and bronchitis rampant, not the kind of 
morning to choose for a flight to Canberra. But the newspapers on 13 August 
1940 made it clear why Australia’s Army Minister Geoffrey Street, the Minister 
for Air James Fairbairn, and their Cabinet colleague Sir Harry Gullett had no 
choice. ‘ELECTION PLANS CABINET TO MEET MANY RUMOURS’, The Argus 
said on page one. Prime Minister Robert Menzies, in office for barely 16 months 
since the death of the United Australia Party (UAP) leader Joe Lyons, was 
conspicuously evasive about when he would face the electorate. An election 
was due in not more than two months and a decision could not be long delayed.
To Sir Brudenell White, Chief of the General Staff, and his liaison officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Thornthwaite, there was also a summons to brief the 
Prime Minister. Not about politics, but about the war raging over the British 
Isles and Australia’s own preparations to assist the beleaguered heartland of the 
Empire and meet threats nearer home. For White, the more arresting news of the 
day was streamed across the front page of The Argus: ‘Some of the most terrific 
and spectacular fighting that has occurred since the outbreak of war.’ Far away 
though it was, the second successive day of a German aerial offensive that would 
soon be known as the Battle of Britain was an alarming portent. Headlines about 
‘THIRD SUCCESSIVE VICTORY GAINED BY R.A.F.’ and ‘attacks repulsed’ 
would not mask the peril understood by the General Staff and the War Cabinet.
There was a more worrying story for Dick Elford, the Minister for Air’s 
private secretary, and even more for the crew of the RAAF Lockheed Hudson 
aircraft on which the very important passengers were to be flown to Canberra. 
Since 5.00 p.m. the previous day, six of their comrades had been missing in a 
‘twin-engined aircraft’ off the coast near Brisbane. As Flight Lieutenant Bob 
Hitchcock and Pilot Officer Dick Wiesener of No. 2 Squadron knew, the lost 
plane was a Hudson, just like the one they were to be flying that morning. To 
the pilots and the airmen chosen to accompany them, fitter Charlie Crosdale and 
wireless operator Jack Palmer, there were disturbingly unanswered questions. 
Was there something they should know about the construction or maintenance 
of a frontline aeroplane that had disappeared without warning or explanation?
To each of these 10 men, vastly differing in their status and responsibilities, the 
realities of a world at war were inescapable. A patriotically optimistic editorial 
writer had asked that morning: ‘Is the much-vaunted German blitzkrieg yet to 
begin, or is it already in progress?’ The threat of invasion to the British Isles, 
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the presence of German raiders in local waters, Australia’s vulnerability if Japan 
were to enter the conflict, the urgent need to train manpower and enhance the 
nation’s defences — these were the daily preoccupations of government and 
Service life. For Army Minister Geoff Street, there had been announcements the 
day before about the internment and guarding of enemy aliens, a large number 
of them being sent from the United Kingdom. With his advisers, Brudenell 
White and Frank Thornthwaite, Street had also taken note of the preparations 
for ‘the greatest AIF march in Australian history’ from Ingleburn to Bathurst. 
There was publicity too for the call-up, on Monday, August 12, of the first 1400 
men — those with surnames beginning with A and B — for universal home-
defence training. Some employers, under an obligation to allow men time off 
to enrol but not to pay them while they were absent, had docked their men 
half a day’s pay. The Cs and Ds were due on Tuesday morning and afternoon. 
The Army Minister, hopeful though not confident, said he did not believe that 
employers would continue to penalise men who were called up in the service of 
their country.
Deeply perturbing as the war was to those privy to secret cables and Service 
briefings, for many Australians it was still little more than a disruptive influence 
on what would otherwise have been business or pleasure as usual. It was arguably 
not Australia’s concern at all. Melbourne University’s Professor A. R. Chisholm 
detected a resurgence of the old theory of ‘cutting the painter’. Dismayed also 
by the persistent pursuit of sectional interest, the poisonous bargaining and 
compromise of party politics, Chisholm had a message for readers of his Argus 
column on August 13:
In peaceful times one could agree that if Australia is to develop a national 
personality she must not slavishly imitate Britain. She does not want 
an Oxford accent or a secondhand literature. But such independence is 
not incompatible with Imperial unity; and, above all, it should not be 
antagonistic to the Imperial instinct of self-preservation.
Yet, directly or by implication, people are proclaiming that our interests 
lie purely in the Pacific; that Britain’s quarrels are not ours.
To Chisholm and other alarmed observers, parochialism, persistence in peace-
time work and leisure habits, and political disunity — the Labor Party had 
spurned overtures from the Prime Minister to create a national government 
— were jeopardising Australia’s safety. In Sydney, where Pilot Officer Dick 
Wiesener’s wife and young child remained close to Dick’s parents and her own 
wealthy family, plans were being made for a public demonstration in Martin 
Place on September 3, the first anniversary of the outbreak of hostilities with 
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Germany. The Governor of New South Wales and the Premier would be there 
to affirm the country’s determination to prosecute the war to a victorious 
conclusion.
It said something about a nation still secure and prosperous that men whose 
duty it was to understand Australia’s strategic position found it necessary to 
warn their seven million fellow citizens that they would soon be asked to make 
heavy sacrifices. As Professor Douglas Copland, the Commonwealth Prices 
Commissioner and economic adviser to the Prime Minister, had put it in a ‘Pleasant 
Sunday Afternoon’ talk at the Melbourne Central Mission, the sacrifice would 
not just be financial. This alone would be unwelcome news to thousands of 
families still suffering from the impoverishment of the Depression. Yet what had 
to be faced, Copland said, would be the sacrifice of ‘ideals of life, which would 
disturb the whole economic and social structure of the community’. It would 
not be long before about a quarter of Australia’s manpower would be in military 
uniforms or employed in munitions work. When that stage was reached, about 
a quarter of the national income would be devoted to the war effort. Copland 
did not mention the Australian Army Nursing Service on active duty; nor hint 
at the thousands of women now training in volunteer organisations as drivers 
and mechanics, signallers, despatch riders, clerks, and aerodrome ground staff.
Meanwhile newspaper and magazine social pages reported on proliferating 
charity concerts, funds launched to buy war planes and ambulances, appeals 
for tinned food, and clothing for evacuee and refugee children, and ‘comforts’ 
for the troops. ‘Women also Serve’ the Australian Women’s Weekly proclaimed 
regularly. In Sunshine, a few miles away from the RAAF base at Laverton, a 
week of ‘festivities to aid patriotic funds’ had just begun. There was to be a 
dance, a picture night, a concert, a euchre party, a massed band performance, 
and a debutantes’ ball. Hostesses in Melbourne and country districts had 
already arranged 525 house parties to raise money for Blamey House, a hostel 
for men on leave from the 2nd AIF. The Mothercraft Association was conducting 
a refreshment room at the Air Force Recruiting Depot in Brisbane. But amid 
the flowering of voluntary effort, the elimination of waste at home, and fund-
raising entertainment, there was a hint of different contributions that might be 
expected in future. Mrs R. G. Menzies’ appealed on radio for support for the 
British YWCA: ‘Women in England are working long hours at all sorts of jobs, 
some big, some little, but all important.’ The Prime Minister himself announced 
that the Commonwealth Government was setting up a special section of the 
Department of Defence Co-ordination to co-ordinate voluntary offers of help in 
the nation’s war effort.
A nation struggling to define its proper role in a war that threatened to engulf the 
Pacific as it had Europe, a public increasingly bewildered by party discord when 
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national unity seemed an imperative…this was a time for political leadership of 
the highest order. In Canberra, on 13 August 1940, Robert Menzies and his 
ministers would assemble to try once more to determine a way forward.
1
1. Augury
Jim Fairbairn loved flying. When still only 18, freshly released from Geelong 
Grammar School, he had sailed to Britain from Australia in 1916 to enlist for 
service in the Royal Flying Corps. He had been an instructor in England, a 
combat pilot in France, and a prisoner of war in Germany. Shot down and 
wounded, he carried the memory of his two months at the front in a crippled 
right arm. Three thousand flying hours later, his last 200 000 miles had been 
without an accident. Unusually for one so experienced, he had only once 
damaged an aeroplane. Today, 1 June 1940, in the Spirit of Flinders, the twin-
engine de Havilland Dragonfly (VH-ADG) that he cherished, there was to be a 
blemish on a happily undramatic logbook.
It began as a routine Saturday afternoon flight, one he had taken often with 
his neighbour and political colleague, the Minister for the Army, Geoff Street. 
Home to the Fairbairn property at Mount Elephant in the Western District of 
Victoria, where one of the first tasks of the new owner 16 years earlier had 
been to create an airstrip. After an exhausting month of attendance to Cabinet, 
departmental and parliamentary duties, the Minister for Air and his old friend 
would enjoy a short break together.
The two men had left Essendon airport at 3.30 p.m. Approaching Rokewood, 
60 kilometres west of Geelong and some 50 kilometres from their destination, 
they ran into a rain squall. With severely reduced visibility, an emergency 
landing was prudent. Fairbairn guided his aircraft towards a field at the Walton 
family’s Wurrook South sheep property. As his wheels touched the ground it 
was obvious that the plane was landing in the wrong paddock and running 
downhill. The prescribed action, instinctive for an experienced aviator, was to 
take off again. The attempt almost succeeded. But a wheel clipped a fence. After 
straddling a creek, the aircraft came to rest in a ditch. One of the wheel fairings 
was bent, the press reported; a propeller had lost a tip, and there was a slit in 
the cabin three-ply.
The sturdy Dragonfly was quickly repaired and flown back to Melbourne 
on Monday morning. The pilot and passenger also returned to work, shaken 
but otherwise none the worse for wear apart from Fairbairn’s lacerated finger. 
There was a war on. And men who were young enough to have experienced the 
ghastly realities of an earlier European conflict were not likely to be kept from 
their duties by a few cuts or bruises.1
1 Sydney Morning Herald, Sun News Pictorial, 4 June 1940. I am grateful to Shane Finch and Rene Pompe for 
assistance in locating the scene of the crash.
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2. Leadership, politics, and war
The political world to which Jim Fairbairn and Geoff Street returned in June 
1940 had been transformed in the last 15 months. In April 1939 the Prime 
Minister, Joe Lyons, had died suddenly, precipitating the United Australia Party 
into an extraordinary leadership contest. The former Deputy Leader of the UAP, 
Robert Menzies, self-exiled to the backbenches only weeks before, emerged 
narrowly victorious. A frantic but futile move by the Treasurer Dick Casey and 
Country Party leader Sir Earle Page to persuade the ex-Prime Minister Stanley 
Bruce to declare himself a candidate had fizzled out.
The Melbourne and Sydney power brokers of the UAP — the National Union 
and the Consultative Council — had come to believe that Bob Menzies was too 
independent for their taste. Even Errol Knox, managing editor of The Argus, 
hitherto a strong Menzies supporter, had urged the return of Bruce. But, in Los 
Angeles en route to Washington and London where he was High Commissioner, 
Bruce had no desire to return to Australia; he set conditions that he was sure 
were unacceptable.1 If Bruce could not be persuaded, then his protégé Casey 
was the next best thing. Casey belatedly threw his own hat into the ring but, 
never a mingler with the rank and file, he had little support. His best hope 
had been to succeed Bruce some years into the future. Billy Hughes, Prime 
Minister a quarter of a century earlier, but at 76 still driven by self-belief and 
determination not to be bested by a man who mimicked and mocked him, was 
the last man for Menzies to beat.
Although the leadership ballots had been conducted in secret, informed 
observers thought that Hughes garnered most of his support from Queensland 
and New South Wales. There had been a last-minute bid to get all the NSW 
members to swing behind him. At least three men were reportedly offered the 
Defence Ministry in return for their vote. At the funeral service for Lyons at St 
Mary’s Cathedral in Sydney, Hughes had men placed at each of the entrances 
to lobby UAP members on his behalf. The 31-year-old member for Martin, Bill 
McCall, was Hughes’ ‘hatchet man in the party room’.2 The former independent 
Percy Spender, who sat next to Sir Harry Gullett in the House of Representatives 
and owed his place in the parliamentary UAP to Menzies, identified some of 
‘Hughes’s boys’. They included J. A. Perkins and the highly decorated soldier 
and former minister Sir Charles Marr (who would have preferred Bruce if he had 
been prepared to stand).3
1 Bruce told the journalist Irvine Douglas, Joe Lyons’ former private secretary, of the impossible terms he 
had set (interview, Irvine Douglas, 15 June 1972, transcript, National Library of Australia, TRC 121/36).
2 Harold Cox, interview, 27 Sept. 1978; interview with Mel Pratt, 6 April 1973, transcript, NLA TRC 
121/43/12; Alan Reid, interview with Mel Pratt, 9 Oct. 1972, transcript, NLA TRC 121/40, p.36.
3 Sir Percy Spender, interview, 16 Aug. 1977; Sydney Morning Herald, 18 April 1939. Spender, standing as 
an Independent, defeated the sitting UAP member, Sir Archdale Parkhill, in the 1937 general election. Happily 
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A handful of other New South Welshmen, including Sir Frederick Stewart (MHR 
for Parramatta and ex-Minister for Commerce), and John Lawson, whose lack of 
tact and discretion were outweighed for Menzies by his ‘cutting edge’ mind, 
held out for Menzies.4 But Menzies’ strength was in Victoria and South Australia. 
Among them were ambitious backbenchers with an eye to advancement, like 
the 30-year-old Melbourne solicitor Harold Holt and the millionaire grazier 
Senator Philip McBride. In the final ballot the men of the Victorian Western 
District were almost certainly behind Menzies. But there are good reasons for 
supposing that their conspicuously ambitious colleague might not have been 
their first choice.
Some heart searching had been caused by Menzies’ resignation after Cabinet 
decided in March not to proceed with the national insurance scheme with 
which both he and Casey, as Treasurer, were strongly identified. The decision 
had deeply distressed Joe Lyons: ‘It’s gone, it’s wrecked, it’s finished’, a tearful 
Prime Minister told two Sun journalists.5 Casey, who had repeatedly said ‘if the 
scheme goes out, I go out’, had acquiesced in its abandonment and remained 
in the Cabinet. Politically embarrassed that the Treasurer ‘suddenly sponsored 
the idea to repeal it’, Jim Fairbairn poured scorn on those members who had 
gone ‘jelly-spined’ in the face of orchestrated letter writing.6 Alarmed by the 
apparent unpopularity of national insurance in his electorate, Casey might also 
have feared that the restless star of NSW politics, B. S. B. Stevens, would come 
to Canberra and succeed him as Treasurer. Menzies, proclaiming that he was 
pledged to support the scheme, had left the ministry, alluding as well to other 
policy differences. This, recalled Sir Cecil (‘Peter’) Looker who was private 
secretary to both Casey and Menzies in succession, was the beginning of a ‘great 
hatred’ between them. Menzies was angry at a retreat brought on in large part 
by Country Party recalcitrance and the belatedly awakened opposition of the 
Melbourne finance and business interests known as the Temple Court group.7 
Casey felt betrayed by Menzies’ grandstanding, sensing that the time had 
rid of a possible rival for party leadership, Menzies had invited Spender to join the UAP, welcoming him 
into the fold in October 1938. (M. R. McNarn, ‘Sir Robert Archdale Parkhill and Defence Policy 1934–1937’, 
BA Hons thesis, Department of History, Faculty of Military Studies, University of New South Wales, Royal 
Military College, Duntroon, 1979, pp.66–7). Perkins, dropped from Cabinet at Menzies’ behest, had been 
re-instated later by Lyons (Dame Enid Lyons, Among the Carrion Crows, Rigby, Adelaide, 1972, p.56). He 
recorded his vote for Hughes, his appointment as an hon. minister by Menzies, and withdrawal, in his diary, 
18, 24 April 1939, 13 March 1940, Perkins MSS, NLA MS 936/3/37–8.
4 Lawson, Menzies’ parliamentary secretary, had pledged his support ‘to the last ditch’ when his chief 
resigned (Lawson to Menzies, telegram, 15 March 1939, Menzies MSS NLA MS 4936/579/3). Menzies to Casey, 
8 Dec. 1940, copy, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/582/31.
5 Alan Reid, interview with Mel Pratt, 4 Oct. 1972, transcript, NLA TRC 121/40, p.27.
6 The Argus, 23 March 1939.
7 Frank C. Green, Servant of The House, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1969 p.114. Rob Watts, The Foundations 
of the National Welfare State, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987, pp.1–24 is a valuable account of the national 
insurance debacle. Watts, accepting the thrust of Philip Hart’s argument (‘The Piper and the Tune’, in 
Cameron Hazlehurst ed., Australian Conservatism: Essays in Twentieth Century Political History, pp.111–48), 
doubts Green’s view of the influence of the Temple Court group.
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arrived when his colleague was going to make a long-expected bid for the party 
leadership. The anticipated move was soon signalled when Menzies broached 
with him the idea of a coup against Lyons. Casey’s refusal to ‘have a bar of it’ 
was fatal to their relationship.8
‘…how feeble and futile our leadership is’
For weeks after the national insurance debacle and the rejected coup 
proposal, Casey and Menzies did not speak to each other, even if they met 
in the parliamentary lobby. Loyalties were now being put to the test. Harold 
Holt expressed his support for the former deputy leader. Fairbairn, growing 
impatient with the Lyons government’s tardy defence preparations, also went 
on the public record affirming how refreshing it was that Menzies had given 
a lead ‘to those who put personal integrity before political advancement’. This 
was a gesture of solidarity with someone who was about to join voluntarily 
those whose presence on the backbenches was not of their own choosing. It 
perhaps also signalled Fairbairn’s genuine surprise that the ambitious ‘coming 
man’ was prepared to defer his coming on a point of principle.
Since their earliest days together in Victorian politics, as leaders in what became 
the Young Nationalist movement, Geoff Street and Jim Fairbairn had watched 
the evolution of Robert Gordon Menzies from precocious celebrity barrister 
and vibrant street-corner orator to self-esteeming state and federal minister. 
They respected his persuasive ingenuity in the courts, his masterful dexterity in 
parliamentary debate, his withering ripostes on the platform. Bob Menzies was 
an awesome political force. But he was not one of them. He was a scholarship 
boy from a dusty country town. Not born to inherit great wealth or vast estates. 
Not a returned serviceman. Not a man of the land. Not a sportsman. True, his 
father and uncle had been parliamentarians. And he had made his own way, 
rising through state politics to Cabinet rank before making the transition to 
Canberra. For such application and political talent there was admiration. But 
there was little empathy, still less affection.
Like all their colleagues, Fairbairn and Street were always in danger of being 
the butt of Menzies’ cruel wit. They could not be unaware, as Percy Joske, his 
Wesley College, university, and courtroom contemporary remembered, that ‘in 
his early days in Parliament Menzies ingratiated himself with the squattocracy, 
8 Sir Cecil ‘Peter’ Looker, interview, 25 March 1976; Allan W. Dawes diary, 8 Nov.―15 Dec. 1938, Frances 
McNicoll MSS, NLA MS 9246, Box 12; Diane Langmore, Glittering Surfaces: A Life of Maie Casey, Allen 
& Unwin, Sydney, 1997, pp.61–2. On 17 Feb. 1947, Sir Owen Dixon recorded in his diary Casey’s version 
of a similar incident that had supposedly, and improbably, occurred ‘abt 1935’ (Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon, 
Miegunyah Press, Melbourne, 2003, p.342, fn. 4).
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while forming a poor opinion of the intellectual capacity of their wives, whom 
he caustically described as sleeping partners’.9 The Western District gentry 
endured his moods, the days, one in seven, as one of his private secretaries 
put it, when he was ‘touchy and difficult…different from his normal ebullient 
self’.10 They did not often go out of their way to be in his company.
Geoff Street was observed to be friendly with Menzies early in his federal 
political career. But Street had in fact been closer to Casey, whom he had known 
since Gallipoli, being frequently in and out of his office in Canberra.11 Jim 
Fairbairn’s fiercest loyalties were with men who had placed themselves in harm’s 
way when the nation was at war. His dearest friend, the grievously wounded 
Charles Hawker, killed in an aircraft crash late in 1938, had been his hope for 
the political future. He had written to Hawker’s mother that for those ‘who 
know what Charles could have done for Australia during the difficult dangerous 
years ahead, and who realise how feeble and futile our leadership is, it is hard 
not to give way to a feeling of bitterness against Fate’. Street wrote of Hawker: 
‘I always looked upon him as my guide, philosopher, and friend in all political 
matters.’12 As the erstwhile Cabinet minister Tommy White observed, Hawker 
was ‘the spiritual leader of the “squatter” group in the House ― McBride, 
Fairbairn, and others following him always slavishly’.13 Sir Harry Gullett, too, 
himself a former senior minister, had ‘always admired and applauded’ Hawker 
in spite of Hawker’s sustained opposition to his trade policy. After an ‘irritable 
and unpardonable outburst’ in Canberra one vexing day in 1936, Gullett had 
told Hawker: ‘This House has very little attraction for me and I could not face 
any disturbance in a friendship which I value more than I can put into words.’14
With Hawker dead, the ‘squatters’ had more in common with Casey, who had 
served in Gallipoli and France albeit in staff posts, than with the notorious 
‘stay at home’ Menzies. Those who knew Casey well recognised his vitality and 
diligence; they appreciated, too, a side of him that was rarely revealed. As Harry 
Gullett’s son Jo put it, ‘he really didn’t mind making a fool of himself a bit’. He 
9 Sir Percy Joske, Sir Robert Menzies 1894–1978 — a new, informal memoir, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 
1978, p.96.
10 Sir Peter Heydon, interview with Mel Pratt, Nov. 1970, NLA TRC121/2.
11 Alfred Stirling, interview, 14 May 1976, for Street and Menzies; Colin Moodie, interview, 28 Sept. 1977, 
and Lt Gen. E. K. Squires diary, 30 Aug. 1938, Australian Defence Force Academy (UNSW@ADFA) Library, MS 
184 folder 1; on Street and Casey, Sir Peter Looker, interview, 25 March 1976, and Casey diary, 8 June 1915, 
Casey MSS NLA MS 6150.
12 Lilias Needham, Charles Hawker: Soldier ― Pastoralist ― Statesman, privately published, Adelaide, 
1970 (1st ed. 1969), pp.160, 168.
13 White diary, 25 Oct. 1938, by courtesy of the late Lady White, in Cameron Hazlehurst, Menzies Observed, 
George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1979, p.152. Allan Martin (A. W. Martin assisted by Patsy Hardy, Robert 
Menzies A Life, vol. 1 1894–1943, Melbourne UP, 1993, p.245), makes Hawker a ‘spirited’ leader, which he 
was; but White was making a different point.
14 Gullett to Hawker, 1 April 1936, typescript copy from Hawker MSS, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/3/16. For 
Gullett’s fondness for Hawker: H. B. ‘Jo’ Gullett, interview, 7 Aug. 1978.
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was not a good horseman and would try to get out of riding. But ‘if you were 
cleaning out, off would come his trousers and he would get in up to his knees 
in mud and laugh’. To the young Gulletts he was ‘a terribly outgoing vigorous 
slightly non-conforming chap, forward looking, unorthodox’.15 In the days after 
Lyons’ death there was ‘a very strong movement’ in Melbourne UAP circles 
to elevate Casey. One alarmed Menzies supporter detected ‘much underground 
work’ going on.16 
R. G. Casey 1938 by Gordon Furlee Brown: ‘he really didn’t mind making 
a fool of himself’
(Courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, Canberra)
Casey survived the first leadership ballot when the lightweight former Minister 
for Trade and Customs, Tommy White, an Australian Flying Corps pilot and 
famous escapee from Turkish captivity, was easily eliminated. But Casey’s 
supporters could not get him past the next round. Only when he was clearly out 
15 H. B. ‘Jo’ Gullett, interview, 7 Aug. 1978.
16 F. H. Wright to W. D. Gillespie, 14 April 1939, Wright MSS, NLA MS 8119 Series 2, Box 15.
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of the running did the even less palatable prospect of a Billy Hughes government 
persuade not only the squatters but others, like Senator Hattil ‘Harry’ Foll, into 
the Menzies camp.17 Their switch of allegiance was crucial.
Hughes’s 19 votes reflected a continuing public regard for the wartime ‘little 
Digger’ as well as the widespread unpopularity of Menzies in the parliamentary 
party. A few days later Menzies was to try to laugh off publicly the ‘fantastic 
ideas’ that circulated in current gossip, accusations of ‘grave defects, aloofness, 
superiority and what not’.18 Yet apart from those of his family who idolised him 
— his loyal brother Frank, his elderly parents, and his devoted wife — there 
were few believers. Nothing much had changed since Casey had told his mentor 
Bruce after the 1937 election that ‘People have the idea that he has a contempt for 
the average man, and they don’t like it.’19 As the astute Governor-General, Lord 
Gowrie, had observed only days before Menzies had resigned in March, ‘Mr. 
Menzies with his great ability lacks the art of keeping his colleagues together 
and extracting loyal service from them.’20
In the final ballot, there were 23 votes for Menzies — among the earliest of 
them almost certainly the South Australian Senator George McLeay, the social 
reformer and national insurance advocate Sir Frederick Stewart, and Harry 
Gullett, long disenchanted with the Country Party in general and Sir Earle Page 
in particular. The majority reflected a rush of last-minute threats, promises, and 
second-best choices. Some NSW party insiders, including the chairman of the 
powerful Consultative Council, Telford Simpson, and the UAP NSW secretary, 
Bert Horsfield, were to say a year later that when the vote was taken Hughes had 
a majority of two among members of the House of Representatives. Menzies had 
risen to power on the votes of senators.21 The scorn of the thwarted wire-pullers 
was undisguised and enduring.
After the leadership ballot there had followed the most extraordinary personal 
attack on a major political figure in Australian history. Earle Page, enraged 
by what he saw as Menzies’ blatant undermining of Lyons in the preceding 
year, blamed him for the Prime Minister’s death. As Lyons lay dying, Page 
was observed sitting in the hospital reception room in the early hours of the 
morning with a group of ministers, local MPs, and newspaper men ‘in the most 
objective, unemotional, coldblooded way possible…tracing the course of Lyons’ 
17 Hattil S. Foll to CH, 27 Feb. 1976.
18 R. G. Menzies, ‘To the Australian People’, broadcast talk, 26 April 1939, transcript, NAA: A981, Australia 94.
19 Casey to Bruce, 17 Nov. 1937, Bruce Papers, NAA: A1421, (4).
20 Lord Gowrie to the King, 9 March 1939, copy, Gowrie MSS, NLA MS 2852/8/2.
21 ‘Notes Relative to Lobbying Preceding Conference, May 25th, 1940’, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/581/25. 
The notes were evidently compiled by Stanley Perry and J. J. Simons from Perth who were reporting the 
continuing hostility to Menzies of Simpson and Horsfield. For Simons’ allegations in 1943 against the National 
Union, ‘working under cover’: L. F. Crisp, Australian National Government, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
4th ed. 1978, p.242.
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heart condition as a doctor and linking its development to the attacks which he 
alleged Menzies had made on Lyons’.22 Menzies’ resignation from the ministry 
— ostensibly over national insurance, yet with enigmatic reference to finding 
himself repeatedly at variance with the majority of the Cabinet on ‘matters 
of great moment and in particular upon important aspects of our Defence 
preparedness’23 — was construed as a stroke of opportunistic destabilisation. 
The departed minister was not going to be credited with adherence to principle. 
A pointed public speech about deficiencies in national leadership, and his poorly 
concealed clandestine negotiations with the press and party financiers, made it 
seem obvious that Menzies had intended to strike. His ambition was the worst-
kept secret in Canberra. As one of his private secretaries would remember: ‘He 
thought he would be a good Prime Minister of Australia, he wanted to be Prime 
Minister of Australia, and all his political actions were largely tested against 
that particular framework of reference.’ In the succinct judgement of his former 
Cabinet colleague Jack McEwen, ‘he was rather a man in a hurry’.24
In the days after Lyons’ death, Page was wooed by Billy Hughes into a pact of 
mutual support. ‘Doc, you know I have always admired you…’; the blandishing 
was overheard by the minister’s private secretary.25 At Hughes’ suggestion the 
Governor-General appointed Page as Prime Minister pending the UAP’s election 
of a new leader. The Country Party leader was determined to prevent Menzies 
from securing the highest prize. He made it known that he would not serve 
in a Menzies ministry. Anonymous Country Party MPs floated the idea that a 
joint party meeting should elect the new Prime Minister. The field of candidates 
would consist only of UAP members, several of whom, including one minister, 
were said to strongly support the suggestion.26 Both Page and Hughes had 
been victims of Menzies’ indiscriminate condescension. Neither could expect 
a position of real power in a Menzies government. After Menzies had won 
the UAP ballot their last best hope was to discredit him sufficiently to make 
it impossible for him to form a viable Cabinet. Thus Page rose in Parliament to 
excoriate the man of naked ambition, disloyal to his dead chief. Menzies, an 
officer in the Melbourne University Regiment, Page reminded the House, did 
not volunteer throughout 1914–18, instead advancing his university and legal 
career while fellow students, lawyers, young men of all professions and of none, 
were shedding blood at Gallipoli and on the Somme.
22 Harold Cox, interview, 27 Sept. 1978; with Mel Pratt, 6 April 1973, NLA TRC 121/43.
23 R. G. Menzies to Prime Minister, 14 March 1939, copy, Gowrie MSS, NLA MS 2852/5/10.
24 Sir Peter Heydon, interview with Mel Pratt, 2 Dec. 1970, NLA TRC 121/2; Sir John McEwen, interview, 
14 May 1976.
25 Sir Keith Waller, interview, 21 June 1977. Waller heard the critical meeting via an accidentally open 
intercom.
26 The Argus, 19 April 1939.
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Robert Menzies: more than ‘the slightest desire to be Prime Minister’
(Courtesy of the National Library of Australia)
Page’s attack was unprecedented in destructively personal intent but, as 
Menzies responded with dignity, inaccurate in detail. Though even some of 
Page’s own party colleagues were offended by his vehemence — Arthur Fadden 
and three others distanced themselves from the personal assault — the Country 
Party followed their leader in refusing to serve with Menzies. Undeterred, 
Menzies therefore formed a ministry solely of United Australia Party members. 
(With two additional men in the Cabinet, skilled tradesmen had to work over 
a weekend to widen the massive maple Cabinet table by two feet, and adjust 
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electrical wiring linked via push buttons on each seat to telephones, radio, an 
overseas radiotelephone, and an amplifier installed to assist Billy Hughes).27 
Ironically Page had achieved by his ill-judged invective what Menzies might not 
have contrived for himself; a united UAP front bench. It was, as Menzies was 
soon to boast, a ministry ‘unique in Australia because it contained an amazing 
proportion of young and what might be called untried men’. (In later years he 
would confide that the absence of veterans like Sir George Pearce, defeated in 
1937, was ‘the greatest defect of his Cabinet’.)28 ‘There is no doubt,’ Stanley 
Bruce wrote later from London, ‘that Page was your fairy godfather, if you had 
the slightest desire to be Prime Minister.’29
Menzies would never be thought ‘warm and likeable’ like the departed Lyons. His 
arrogance and self-belief were in sharp contrast to the ‘mild infusion of ambition 
and egoism’ which Lyons so adeptly cloaked beneath ‘unbearable amiability’.30 
But he had put himself through the leadership challenge, defended his honour, 
and earned a grudging respect. Jim Fairbairn, for one, was disgusted by the 
attack on his elected chief. It was known that Fairbairn had been working for 
some months on getting Stanley Bruce to come back to Australia; and he had 
publicly offered to give up his seat of Flinders if Bruce should return to take up 
the party leadership. He had even made the mischievous suggestion that the 
High Commissioner’s job in London could be capably carried out by ‘such men 
as Mr Casey and Mr Menzies’.31 So he was certainly not in the Menzies camp. 
Yet five years earlier he had said in Parliament that it was not right for those 
without intimate knowledge of particular circumstances to criticise those who 
had not served in 1914–18. ‘Some were too young, some were too old, and some 
others physically or mentally unfit for service.’32 Menzies was not encompassed 
by any of these categories but that did not diminish the egregiousness of the 
calumny. Realising the distress it must have caused his colleague’s wife, Fairbairn 
followed Pattie Menzies out of the House and walked consolingly with her in 
the parliamentary rose gardens.33
The eight United Australia Party ministers from the Lyons Cabinet, including 
Hughes, then gathered in Casey’s room and agreed on a letter dissociating 
themselves from Page. The man whom Harry Gullett had once dubbed ‘the most 
27 The Mail (Adelaide), 13 May 1939.
28 Peter Heydon, Quiet Decision: A Study of George Foster Pearce, Melbourne UP, 1965, p.211.
29 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 May 1939; Bruce to Menzies, 4 Oct. 1939, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936 in 
Hazlehurst, Menzies Observed, p.166.
30 Don Whitington, Twelfth Man?, Jacaranda Press, Milton, 1972, pp.74–5; Frank. C. Browne, They Called 
Him Billy: A Biography of the Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes PC MP, Peter Huston, Sydney, [1948?], p.191.
31 Sydney Morning Herald, 18 April 1939.
32 CPD, House of Representatives, 1 Aug. 1934, p.1047.
33 Dame Pattie Menzies, interview with Allan Martin, 1 Oct. 1987, in Martin, Robert Menzies A Life, vol. 1 
1894–1943, p.300.
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tragic Treasurer’ that Australia had ever known had become a political pariah.34 
The location of the meeting was significant. Casey’s hopes of leadership had 
been dashed. He admired Page, his regular tennis partner, as a man of energy 
and ideas. In supporting the bid to bring back Bruce, Page was by implication 
recognising Casey as next after Bruce in line of succession as Prime Minister. 
But the assault on Menzies was a step too far. Typed by Casey’s secretary, Jean 
Francis, the document repudiating Page was brought in for signature by Casey’s 
private secretary, Colin Moodie, who delivered it to the new leader.35 Menzies 
was able to assure the Governor-General of sufficient support both from the UAP 
and from the Country Party to carry on. Lord Gowrie was conscious of ‘treading 
on rather delicate Constitution [sic] grounds’ as Labor had a majority of two 
over the UAP. But he believed that no party wanted an election so that ‘although 
they may harass Menzies they would take very good care that he should not be 
defeated on a major question’.36 And so it proved.
War government
Barely five months later Menzies had the ‘melancholy duty’ of announcing that 
Australia was at war with Germany. At a hastily convened Federal Executive 
Council meeting in the rarely used Governor-General’s room in Melbourne’s 
Treasury Place, the Prime Minister had been joined to authorise the formalities 
by Fairbairn (now in the Cabinet as Minister for Civil Aviation), Holt (Minister 
without Portfolio assisting the Minister for Supply), Gullett, and Casey. There 
they advised Sir Winston Dugan, acting as Deputy for Lord Gowrie, that a 
proclamation of ‘the existence of danger of war’ was to be issued.37 A War Cabinet 
had been formed a few weeks after the declaration of war. Its initial members 
were Hughes (Deputy Leader of the UAP, Attorney General, and Minister for 
Industry), Casey (Minister for Supply and Development), Street (Minister for 
Defence), Gullett (Minister for External Affairs and Minister for Information), 
and McLeay (Minister for Commerce).
Menzies’ vanquished rival Dick Casey, spurred on by his wife Maie, had soon 
accepted the post of inaugural Ambassador to Washington. He was attracted 
to the job, and vulnerable to a Prime Minister who shamelessly kept him 
on tenterhooks about the appointment. Casey, with Bruce concurring, had 
34 S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia, Melbourne UP, 2nd ed. 1974, pp.74–5; K. R. Ingram (journalist 
and Parliamentary reporter), interview, 1978.
35 Moodie, interview, 28 Sept. 1977. For Page and Casey as tennis partners, see Sir Alan Watt, Australian 
Diplomat, Memoirs, Angus & Robertson in association with Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
Sydney, 1972, p.21. On Menzies’ military service and the background to Page’s attack see Cameron Hazlehurst, 
‘Young Menzies’, in Hazlehurst (ed.), Australian Conservatism, pp.10–20.
36 Lord Gowrie to Walter Hore-Ruthven, 22 May 1939, copy, Gowrie MSS, NLA MS2852/5/10.
37 N. C. Tritton, interview, 7 June 1977.
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considered that his own departure from the political arena would leave no one 
suitable to act as Prime Minister if Menzies were to go to London or ‘came to 
grief’. Casey’s reservations, spoken and unspoken, were swept aside. ‘I hope 
no one here underestimates the importance of the appointment,’ the Prime 
Minister told Casey’s Corio Young Nationalist constituents, ‘for it was with some 
reluctance that I abandoned the idea of asking for the appointment myself.’ 
There was less humbug and even less charity in a later private account of the 
circumstances. ‘If ever a man had his tongue hanging out to go to America it was 
Casey,’ Menzies was to recall, his colleague’s clearly expressed desire to stay in 
Canberra conveniently erased from the story.38
The coalition War Cabinet in the old Legislative Council Chamber, 
Parliament House, Victoria. Left to right around the table: J. McEwen, 
External Affairs; Sir F. Stewart, Supply and Development; G. A. Street, 
Army; A. G. Cameron, Navy;  R. G. Menzies, Prime Minister; the Secretary 
to the War Cabinet,  F. G. Shedden;  W. M. Hughes, Attorney General; P. 
C. Spender, Treasurer and Senator H. S. Foll, Minister for the Interior; (J. V. 
Fairbairn, Minister for Air, absent)
(Argus Collection of Newspaper Photographs, State Library of Victoria, H99.201/2584)
38 Sir Cecil Looker, interview with Alan Hodgart, 1975, NLA Oral TRC 370, p.20; The Argus, 15 Jan. 1940; 
David McNicoll, Luck’s A Fortune, Wildcat Press, Sydney, 1979, p.219; W. J. Hudson, Casey, Oxford UP, 
Melbourne, pp.115–6; Casey to Menzies, 1 Nov. 1939, NAA: CP 290/6, item 1, in R. G. Neale (ed.), Documents 
on Australian Foreign Policy [DAFP], vol. II, Canberra, 1976, p.366; Note by S. M. Bruce of conversation with 
Casey, 8 Nov, 1939, DAFP, vol. I, 1975, p.381.
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As the war progressed, with little but bad news from the European theatre, 
amid growing discontent and criticism, Menzies had come to rely increasingly 
on the Victorian duo of Fairbairn and Street. Their responsibilities for military 
and Air Force affairs were expanded. Fairbairn was promoted from Minister for 
Civil Aviation to Minister for Air in November 1939, joining the War Cabinet 
along with Harry Foll and Sir Frederick Stewart in a re-organisation that saw 
Street become Minister for the Army and Menzies assume greater control as 
Minister for Defence Co-ordination as well as Prime Minister. In March 1940, 
the Country Party, now under the leadership of Archie Cameron, accepted a 
proposal to form a new coalition. It was a lifeline for a Prime Minister who was 
privately admitting that his difficulties ‘on all war matters are great and growing 
and defeat of Government by no means improbable’.39
In the ministerial re-shuffle some of Menzies’ party colleagues had to stand 
down. While their friend Harry Gullett was dropped from the inner group to 
make way for Country Party representatives, Fairbairn and Street kept their 
places. They were now in almost daily contact with the Prime Minister. If 
their influence was less than the ubiquitous and secretive Secretary of the 
War Cabinet, Frederick Shedden, they were clearly now in the first rank of the 
nation’s political leadership.
Defending the Empire
In the early days of the war, the government realised that a great national effort 
would be required if Australia was to be a help to the British homeland. As 
Street had put it in a Cabinet paper on 11 September 1939:
Each part of the Empire accepts responsibility for its own local defence 
and the adequacy of these preparations is important lest any Dominion 
should become a burden on the United Kingdom strength in the event 
of a crisis.40
Recognising the priority to defend the heart of the Empire, and accepting 
assurances of British readiness to come to Australia’s aid should she be threatened, 
the Australian commitment soon entailed the deployment of naval forces far 
from their home bases under Royal Navy command, and the development of the 
RAAF as an incubator of crew for the RAF.
39 Menzies to Bruce, 21 Feb. 1940, NAA: A3196, O. 1038. In March the UAP lost the seat of Corio vacated 
by Dick Casey (Mal Harrop, ‘Corio 1940: Triumph for John Curtin but Stillbirth for an Australian Motor Car’, 
Labour History, No. 91, Nov. 2006, pp.131–49).
40 Cabinet agendum 6/1939, 11 Sept. 1939, NAA: A2697, 146/1939, quoted in John McCarthy, A last call of 
empire: Australian aircrew, Britain and the Empire Air Training Scheme, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 
1988, p.2.
2 . Leadership, politics, and war
15
The Australian Chiefs of Staff had no choice but to acknowledge the limited 
operational capability of the chronically under-funded RAAF. The Air Force was 
only half way through a three-year expansion plan, with about two-thirds of its 
aircraft already obsolete. Japan’s declaration of neutrality relieved immediate 
anxieties — and encouraged the quixotic thought that perhaps training aircraft 
could be acquired from the Japanese. While they awaited the delivery of modern 
aircraft, the RAAF would be fully stretched in meeting the threat posed by 
armed German merchant vessels, submarines, and a lone cruiser in the Pacific. 
Australian Air Force squadrons were in due course to operate in Britain and the 
Middle East; and infantry divisions, a second Australian Imperial Force (AIF), 
would also eventually be despatched to North Africa and the Mediterranean.
Initially it had been thought that Australia would send an air expeditionary 
force to augment the RAF. But British planners had long mooted the idea that the 
Dominions would better serve the imperial cause by training the vast numbers 
of air crew that would be needed to fly against the Luftwaffe. In spite of naïve 
pronouncements to the contrary, Australia did not have the resources for an 
expeditionary force as well as a massive training undertaking. Negotiations 
to establish such a scheme — approved in principle by the War Cabinet on 5 
October 1939 without reference to their professional advisers, the Air Board — 
began at long range. South Africa declined to participate, and both Australia 
and Canada resisted British ambit requests. New Zealand also had reservations. 
If basic agreement was to be reached, and arrangements made for what would 
be an immensely complex and costly program, face-to-face talks were essential. 
The venue was to be Ottawa.
While still only Minister for Civil Aviation and Minister assisting the Minister 
for Defence, Jim Fairbairn was sent to Canada with a small delegation to 
represent Australia in developing the Empire Air Training Scheme. Recognising 
the fragility of the government’s parliamentary majority both Fairbairn and 
Dick Casey, who had left earlier for London, had taken the precaution of leaving 
signed nomination papers for their electorates in case an election was called 
in their absence.41 On the way to the Canadian capital, Fairbairn took the 
opportunity to call in to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation factory at Burbank 
to check on the progress of Australia’s recent order for 100 Hudson bombers. 
The aircraft were to form the RAAF’s principal reconnaissance and home defence 
units. Their speedy acquisition was vital. But Fairbairn’s main focus was on 
Ottawa. The stakes there were high and this was his first international mission. 
The British had sent a large and powerful team; and the Canadians, on their 
home soil, had all of their defence and departmental advisers at hand. Menzies 
clearly had doubts about Fairbairn’s ability to achieve a favourable result against 
the imperial ministers and mandarins with whom he was matched. The minister 
41 The Argus, 25 Oct. 1939.
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had told reporters before he left that no limit had been set on the extent to 
which he was authorised to commit Australia ‘except our ability to fulfil that 
commitment’.42 However, War Cabinet’s prior decisions, surviving cables, and 
transcripts of telephone conversations reveal a representative on a short leash.43
The Australian Air Mission greeted at Ottawa Railway Station by British 
and Canadian representatives, 1 November 1939. Left to right R. E. Elford 
(Secretary, Australian Air Mission), WCdr G. Jones (Asst Chief of Staff 
RAAF), Norman McL. Rogers (Canadian Minister of National Defence), 
C. V. Kellway (A/g Asst Trade Commissioner, New York), AM Sir C. L. 
Courtney (UK Air Mission), AVM G. M. Croll (Chief of Air Staff, Canadian 
Department of National Defence)
(Courtesy of Hugh Elford)
Fairbairn himself was confident. He took the initiative in saying that Australia 
would train half of the local recruits rather than bear the cost of training them all 
in Canada. Stiffened by instruction from Menzies not to commit Australia in any 
way, he pressed the argument that the quotas of men to be delivered should be 
42 ‘National Defence [Fairbairn and air recruits]’, Movietone News, vol. 10, no. 44, 21 Oct. 1939, AWM: 
F01912.
43 ‘Report of the Australian Air Mission…November 1939’, War Cabinet Agendum No. 20/1940 (6/2/40), 
Secret, NAA: A5954, 235/9.
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based on population rather than the arbitrary and excessive numbers presented 
by Britain. Realising that neither the Canadians nor the British delegation could 
afford to have the whole plan founder, he gave them the impression that he was 
prepared to leave if the negotiations drifted inconclusively. Speaking on the 
radio on November 24 he surprised the Canadian Prime Minister with a ‘voice 
and delivery [that] was remarkably good’. But it was the content more than the 
performance that caught Mackenzie King’s attention:
Substance good but I was horrified to hear him say that Australia had 
adopted plan suggested at outset and was prepared to exceed it. As a 
matter of fact the whole scheme has had to be revised twice because 
of Australia’s unwillingness to adopt plan suggested and agreed to by 
others.44
When the British conceded the fundamental quota principle and agreed that 
seven of nine service training schools be set up in Australia, Fairbairn seized the 
moment to sign an agreement with them on 27 November 1939. It was another 
three days before the Australian Cabinet was briefed on what had been decided. 
Their representative had done well. Eighty-three staff officers in every branch of 
the RAAF had been asked whether Australia could do what the scheme required. 
None of them, the then RAAF liaison officer to the secretary of the Department 
of Defence, John McCauley, remembered, said they could. All said ‘Let’s try 
it.’45 While the Canadians were especially cautious, and there were details still 
to be settled between all the parties including New Zealand, Fairbairn moved on 
to London where he was to assist in finding a new Chief of the Air Staff before 
returning to Australia.46 The Prime Minister announced the signing of the ‘vast 
Empire Scheme of Air Training’ with Britain on December 15.
On the role to be played by the graduates of the Empire Air Training Scheme 
(EATS), Fairbairn and Street shared a wish to preserve the national identity 
of the Australians in the United Kingdom. Street, a fervent nationalist, had 
put it to Cabinet when recommending an air expeditionary force in September 
1939 that a unified Australian force would ‘appeal to the national spirit of the 
country and accord with those tendencies towards independence inherent in 
the Australian character’. Menzies had given public assurances that fears of the 
loss of Australian identity were groundless. Fairbairn, with the growing status 
of Minister for Air, was to remind Menzies in March 1940 that he had always had 
in mind that ‘the personnel would remain RAAF, wearing RAAF uniforms or a 
distinguishing badge, and be grouped in squadrons which would bear the name 
44 W. L. Mackenzie King diary, 24 Nov. 1939, William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, Library and Archives 
Canada, www.collectionscanada.gc.ca.
45 AM Sir John McCauley, interview, 6 Jan. 1978.
46 Kent Fedorowich, ‘Sir Gerald Campbell and the British High Commission in Wartime Ottawa, 1938–1940’, 
War in History, vol. 18, no. 3, 2011, pp.357–85, for the Canadian and British record of the negotiations.
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Australia’. But the British refused to contemplate the formation of more than 
the limited number of ‘Australian’ squadrons agreed under Article XV of the 
EATS agreement. They routinely appointed RAF officers to command positions 
over Australians. And the vast majority of EATS graduates were eventually to 
be dispersed into RAF units. Fairbairn had not foreseen the extent to which 
the connivance and compliance of his British Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles 
Burnett, would ensure that RAF, not RAAF, wishes would prevail.47
In the War Cabinet as the war continued, the two Victorian ministers with 
defence portfolios found themselves in continual discussion over strategy, 
manpower, recruitment, command, and organisation of military forces, and 
industrial mobilisation issues. When Treasury tried in March 1940 to solve a 
RAAF trades recruiting problem that was accentuated by differential rates of 
pay being offered to pre-war and current recruits, Street, Fairbairn, and Harry 
Gullett were as one in rejecting a Treasury Finance Committee formula (endorsed 
by Menzies) that would have increased separation allowances rather than the 
basic pay rates. Fairbairn argued that peacetime rates of pay should be restored. 
He agreed with the Chief of Air Staff and the Air Board who warned of ‘the 
discontent that will arise from having men on every station doing similar work 
at different rates of pay’. Street forecast that a complete reversion to RAAF rates 
could bring demands from the Army for similar treatment. Gullett, a former 
journalist and war historian, was alert to public opinion. He urged ‘an immediate 
strong appeal to the patriotism of those who are wanted for this class of home 
service’. No such appeal had yet been made. Gullett articulated his agreement 
with the view that the Prime Minister had ‘many times expressed that when the 
war actually commences on a grand scale in Europe the response to all kinds of 
our recruiting effort will be incomparably more satisfactory than it is now’.48
In many ways there was an air of unreality about ‘the war’ for Australians well 
into the first half of 1940. It was largely a distant conflict, the stuff of censored 
news stories, tales of heroism, and reassuring domestic propaganda about 
surging growth in munitions production and military expansion. In a speech 
early in March Menzies found himself talking of ‘a struggle which at present is 
but a faint rumble on the horizon…we have been able to continue to go about 
our ordinary business, having a look at the races, and talking about the crops. 
This is possible only because the world is still ruled by the British Navy.’49 
47 Douglas Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939–1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1962, 
pp.79–89 is a good guide to the establishment of the EATS. See also McCarthy, A last call, pp.15–23; Air 
Marshal Sir Richard Williams, These Are Facts, The Autobiography, Australian War Memorial and AGPS, 
Canberra, 1977, pp.248–9, 267–9; Chris Clark, ‘The Empire Air Training Scheme’, Australian War Memorial 
2003 History Conference — Air War Europe, http://www.awm.gov.au/events/conference/2003/clark.asp.
48 The Herald, 3 March 1940. Melanie Oppenheimer persuasively rebuts the view that apathy was 
widespread during the first year of the war (All Work No Pay: Australian Civilian Volunteers in War, Ohio 
Productions, Walcha, 2002, pp.76–122).
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Prime Ministerial encomiums about Australians appreciating ‘the magnificent 
response which the British people can make to any challenge that threatens 
their future’ struck the wrong note. After the Cabinet had attended a special 
Canberra screening of Alexander Korda’s simplistic drama documentary The Lion 
Has Wings, Menzies would say that it showed ‘the Empire moving irresistibly 
towards supremacy in the air’. But a schoolboy knowledge of recent history, 
geography, and aviation would have been enough to expose the film’s errors, 
lies, and half-truths. Many adults who saw it in the coming months would echo 
the bemusement of British audiences at the patronising propaganda.50
Strident adversarial politics was unmuted. Unions were fractious. The press 
showed little patriotic restraint. A concerned Chief of the General Staff, 
Lieutenant General Ernest Squires, captured the mood from his minister early in 
December 1939 when the government was on the verge of a decision about pay 
rates and conditions of service for the Australian Imperial Force and the Militia:
A long talk with Street ― the Govt are very anxious about their own 
position, which is precarious owing to the very unfair attack by the 
other two parties — in unholy alliance — over the question of the 
soldier’s pay. They are also sore because they feel that their hands have 
been unduly forced by Casey, in consultation with the Home Govt.51
Such economic controls as were imposed brought no great hardships to most of 
the population. At a time of burgeoning expenditure, interest rates had actually 
fallen. ‘All the really difficult things are unspectacular, and could not produce 
a cheer from anybody,’ the Prime Minister told a sympathetic Commonwealth 
Institute of Accountants ‘smoke social’ early in March. He had announced on 
the same day the expansion of the AIF with a seventh division and 16 000 
extra troops to make up an army corps. A few weeks later he asked rhetorically: 
‘What did the people of Australia know of food rationing, of import reductions 
in any real sense, of reduced standards of living, or of reduced standards of 
industrial progress?’
A prolonged coal strike from March to May 1940 was a major distraction for 
the government. And the prospect of petrol rationing was beginning to alarm 
the minority who owned their own cars. ‘The rationing of petrol’, a defiant 
Menzies told a hostile audience in Camberwell, ‘is as inevitable as the rising and 
setting of the sun.’52 The collapse of France, the entry of Italy into the war, and 
the evacuation of British forces from Dunkirk in May and June 1940 brought 
50 Notes from the Mass Observation Report, No. 15, Dec 1939, (www.powell-pressburger.org/Reviews/39_
Lion/Lion01.html); Sydney Morning Herald, 5 Dec. 1939; The Lion Has Wings, adapted by John Ware from the 
film written by Ian Dalrymple, Collins, London, 1940.
51 Squires diary, 2 Dec. 1939, Australian Defence Force Academy (UNSW@ADFA) Library, MS 184 folder 3; 
Sun News Pictorial, 6 Dec. 1939.
52 The Age, 6 March 1940; Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March, 25 July 1940.
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the beginning of an understanding that this was to be a war ‘on a grand scale’. 
Germany had invaded Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Surely she must now 
be preparing to invade Britain. The Army Minister held a long Saturday morning 
conference with Sir Brudenell White, recalled as Chief of the General Staff on 
the death of Lieutenant General Squires in March, to consider the implications 
of the German invasion of the Low Countries (which they had learned about 
from the press). Street then joined Menzies and Air Minister Fairbairn — to 
all intents and purposes now an inner war cabinet — for a discussion of the 
disturbing position before the full War Cabinet met.53
‘A full participation in the war’
With the Empire in peril, Australia’s contribution to the war effort was overdue 
for re-assessment. The Treasurer, Percy Spender, was expressing frustration with 
his colleagues at ‘piecemeal submissions’ and the absence of a ‘comprehensive 
statement of requirements for defence expenditure’. On 3 June 1940 Service 
departments were instructed to provide the Prime Minister ‘within the next 48 
hours and in the most concentrated form’ information that would ‘enable him to 
answer the statement which is now being given great currency — “that nothing 
has been done to get Australia ready for a full participation in the war”’.54 
Outraged by rumours that he had sent his children to safe haven in the United 
States, an angry Prime Minister used a speech to the NSW Commercial Travellers’ 
Association to condemn the ‘false, miserable allegation’ that Australia was not 
playing her part: ‘there must be a silence of the dogs that bark’.55 War Cabinet 
discussed a counter-propaganda campaign against false rumour and criticism of 
war organisation. Menzies asked for a list of instances to cite to editors: ‘Failing 
response will have to put censors into offices.’56
By July 1940 the prospect of hostilities with Japan was also real and alarming. 
As Menzies said in a cable to Stanley Bruce, Australia’s High Commissioner in 
London:
…the necessity to reconstitute our ideas in the light of what we are now 
told is the inability of Great Britain to send Naval forces to Singapore 
53 The Mail (Adelaide), 11 May 1940.
54 War Cabinet Minutes, 2 July 1940, NAA: A2673, 373; A1196, 36/501/92.
55 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1940.
56 The full War Cabinet discussed ‘spreading of dangerous rumours’ including ‘PM’s children sent to USA’, 
(War Cabinet Notes, vol. 2, 10, 16 July 1940, NAA: A5954, 729/2). Charles Bean had been appointed early in 
July as liaison officer, by authority of the Prime Minister, to ‘keep the editorial staffs of press and broadcasting 
services prudently informed as to the strategical background of the war’ (NAA: A705, 168/1/170).
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has occasioned a degree of anxiety among the Members of the Cabinet 
which can only be increased by any approach to Japan which stops 
short of being realistic and comprehensive.57
The closure of the Burma Road, potential wool sales to Japan, and a decision 
about the ultimate destination of the Australian seventh division were on a 
cascading War Cabinet agenda. War with an increasingly bellicose Japan seemed 
more and more likely. As late as early June general staff officers were expressing 
alarm at the absence of ‘a satisfactory plan for the defence of Australia’. Army 
Headquarters ‘have been somewhat handicapped in planning as Government 
policy in the past would not permit arrangements to be made against invasion 
on any scale’.58 The United States could not be relied upon to come to Australia’s 
aid. Dick Casey’s first personal message from Washington to the Minister for 
External Affairs, Harry Gullett, had reported a conversation with Franklin 
Roosevelt in which the President reminded Casey of advice given to Joe Lyons 
some years earlier. The United States Cabinet, when asked to consider what the 
US attitude should be to hypothetical attacks on Canada, the South American 
republics, and Australia and New Zealand, ‘believed that the element of distance 
denoted a declining interest’ in Australia.59 Casey repeatedly warned from 
Washington that no appeal other than self-interest would move the Americans. 
Menzies’ entreaty to Roosevelt for a ‘magnificent and immortal gesture’ of 
making available all of America’s ‘financial and material resources’ welding 
the whole English-speaking world at one stroke ‘into a brotherhood of world 
salvation’ was plainly an embarrassment.60
As war anxieties increased, there were growing calls for greater national 
unity. Broadcasting to the nation on June 15 Menzies announced new defence 
plans and appealed to the union movement for co-operation in industrial and 
manpower mobilisation. A home defence force of 250 000 would be trained; 
government would take unlimited powers to tax, acquire property, direct 
employers and labour; but there would be no conscription for overseas service.61 
At a special conference of the Labor Party in Melbourne on June 18 and 19 it 
was resolved that a National War Council should be established. Menzies seized 
on this suggestion to propose the formation of a genuine national government. 
He offered five or possibly six seats in the Cabinet to Labor, including a new 
Labour ministry. Although he professed not to believe that his own continuation 
57 Cablegram, unnumbered, 9 July 1940, Most Secret, NAA: A3196, 1940, 0.4583; cablegram Prime Minister 
to High Commissioner London, 8 Aug. 1940, NAA: A981, Far East 20b, 1.
58 ‘Memorandum on employment of A.M.F. for defence of Australia in event of Japanese attack April May 
1940’, ‘Most secret’. AWM: 54 243/6/160.
59 Casey to Sir Henry Gullett, 9 March 1940, copy, Casey MSS, NLA MS 6150/1.
60 Menzies to Casey, cablegram, 14 June 1940, NAA: A3196, O.3829. For the ‘ambivalent relationship’ 
between Australia and the USA: Augustine Meaher IV, The Australian Road to Singapore: The Myth of British 
Betrayal, Australian Scholarly Publishing, North Melbourne, 2010, pp.75–83.
61 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 June 1940.
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as Prime Minister was an obstacle, he would not, he said, let his occupation of 
the post stand in the way of agreement. The formal offer was made in a letter 
on 12 July 1940. It was not until August 6 that John Curtin was able to inform 
the Prime Minister that a meeting of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party had 
rejected the proposal.62 The Labor leader had already emphatically rejected the 
notion, floated by Menzies, that the life of Parliament might be extended should 
‘exigencies’ warrant it. Curtin saw no reason why the government should not 
face the electorate as they were due to do later in the year.
There being no prospect of a national unity government, a fact that Menzies 
publicly deplored, an election was now clearly in view; or as the Prime Minister 
put it ‘not entirely absent from the government’s mind’. There was speculation 
that he planned ‘a lightning aerial tour’ of the country.63 Frustrated by his 
isolation from the centre of imperial power, Menzies’ mind was actually turning 
to the idea of taking himself to London where the ‘whole conduct’ of the war 
should, he argued, receive ‘early consideration by appropriate Empire body 
so that we may make our plans, intelligently and not merely day by day’.64 
This had been his ambition since the beginning of the war. In October 1939 
he had been forced to deny as a misunderstanding a report in morning papers 
that he expected to attend a special meeting of the British War Cabinet early in 
the New Year. The Melbourne Herald stood by the story: there had been ‘no 
misunderstanding on the part of the two Herald representatives who saw Mr 
Menzies yesterday as to what he said’. No one in the inner circles of government 
— certainly not the key ministers, Street and Fairbairn — could doubt that the 
Prime Minister yearned for a bigger stage.65
Aware of Australian political developments and concerns about the progress of 
the war, Winston Churchill sent an eloquent ‘IMMEDIATE PERSONAL AND 
MOST SECRET’ message to Menzies on August 11. It followed by a few hours 
a lengthy ‘appreciation’ of the situation in the Far East by the British Chiefs of 
Staff. Point by point Churchill addressed the anxieties he knew were weighing 
on the Australian government. Britain was trying to avoid war with Japan. 
Japan was unlikely to declare war unless Germany successfully invaded Britain. 
If Japan did declare war, Britain would defend Singapore which ‘ought to stand 
a long siege’. The Eastern Mediterranean fleet could be sent to relieve Singapore 
if it was vital to Australia’s safety. If, ‘contrary to prudence and self-interest 
Japan set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale…[Britain 
would] proceed to your aid sacrificing every interest except only defence 
62 Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/581/27.
63 Canberra Times, 8 Aug. 1940, p.2.
64 Prime Minister to High Commissioner, London, Cypher Cablegram, 22 July 1940, Secret and Personal, 
NAA: A3196, 1940, 0.5030; Bruce Papers NAA: M100, July 1940; War Cabinet Minutes, 10 July 1940, NAA: 
A2673, 401.
65 The Age, The Herald, 6 Oct. 1939.
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position of this island on which all depends’.  And so it went on — the RAF was 
showing ‘individual superiority over the enemy’, Lord Beaverbrook was making 
‘astounding’ progress in aircraft manufacture, the Navy was getting stronger. If 
Hitler were to fail to invade and conquer Britain ‘before the weather breaks’ he 
would have received his ‘first and probably his fatal check…We therefore feel 
a sober and growing conviction of our power to persevere through the year or 
two that may be necessary to gain victory.’66
What credence could be given to the British Prime Minister’s forecasts and 
personal assurances? Menzies and his colleagues had minuted doubts as early 
as June about the likelihood that a British ‘squadron’, let alone a fleet, of capital 
ships would proceed to Singapore if hostilities began in the Pacific. It was 
scarcely coincidental that they had decided shortly afterwards to increase the 
home defence forces to 250 000, a somewhat rag-tag combination of Militia and 
AIF in training, and Militia reserves, including returned soldiers.67 In mid-July 
the Chiefs of Staff had concluded that the ‘strategical situation’ had changed 
considerably for the worse and that defensive plans should assume the ‘heaviest 
scale of attack’. A Joint Planning Committee of the deputy chiefs of each Service 
had prepared its first report on August 6. Recommending that the Chiefs of Staff 
should make plans against invasion, they also proposed the establishment of a 
Central War Room containing a ‘combined operation intelligence centre’.68 War 
Cabinet had secretly agreed on ‘the desirability of expanding local air defence 
to greatest degree prac. from whatever sources are available, any adjustment 
being made in Empire Air Scheme’. The matter was left to the Prime Minister 
and Service Ministers.69
Newspapers were headlining German preparations for an invasion of Britain. 
With early signs that Germany was mounting a massive aerial offensive on Britain 
it was imperative that the Australian War Cabinet undertake a comprehensive 
review. When last asked to consider the ‘basis of defence policy’ on July 10, the 
full War Cabinet had concluded that the Navy had all the ships it could obtain 
or build; the Army had authority to grow to 200 000; any further expansion of 
the Air Force depended on the supply of aircraft, ‘regarding which enquiries 
are being made’; and the Director-General of Munitions had been told ‘the sky 
is the limit’. Summing up, as the minutes rather tepidly put it, the government 
decided that:
66 Lord Caldecote, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, U.K. High Commissioner 
in Australia, Cablegram 262 LONDON, 11 August 1940, 6.48 p.m. rec’d  Aug. 12, NAA: A1608, A41/1/1, xii; also in 
‘Assurance of Assistance to Australia by Mr Churchill. 11/8/40–29/11/42’, NAA: A5954, 581/2.
67 NAA: A2671, 133/1940. 12 June 1940; ‘Notes of Discussion in War Cabinet Room, Melbourne, Evening 
of 12th June 1940, Secret’, [Present: the PM; Sir Brudenell White, Sir Keith Murdoch, Sir Carl Jess, Essington 
Lewis, J. B. Brigden, F. G. Shedden], Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/40/21; Paul Hasluck, The Government and 
the People, 1939–1941, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, p.221.
68 Joint Planning Committee, First Report, 6 Aug. 1940, NAA: A816, 31/301/121.
69 ‘Ag[endum] 151/1940 Expansion of R.A.F.[sic]’, War Cabinet Notes, vol. 2, NAA: A5954, 729/2.
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defence preparations…are not to be limited by formula but are to 
be governed by the most practicable form of defence in each arm of 
the Services that can be provided from the nature and extent of the 
resources available.70
Briefed with this knowledge, and soon to be informed by qualified Churchillian 
pledges and optimistic conjectures, ministers and the Chiefs of Staff were to re-
assemble in Canberra on Tuesday August 13 to discuss once again where and how 
Australian men and resources should be deployed. For a month they had been 
deferring a decision on the British request for a division to be sent to Malaya 
pending the new appreciation of the Far East. The Prime Minister now had 
the document. Meanwhile, a fresh and relevant issue was the fear of Japanese 
action against the Netherlands East Indies. In answer to an enquiry from the 
British, the Dutch government had indicated that it would resist the Japanese. 
But the British had failed to respond to an understandable Dutch question about 
whether they could expect British assistance if they were defending themselves 
against Japanese aggression. The reply was obviously important for Australia. 
Menzies wanted to bring the matter before the Cabinet at its next meeting and 
on August 8 sought urgent advice about British intentions. The answer was 
enveloped in equivocation.71
Parliament had sat in the second week of August. It would be sitting again on 
Wednesday August 14. Since the beginning of the war the Cabinet and War 
Cabinet had been on a relentless schedule of meetings — once every two-and-
a-half days, the Canberra Times reported on August 5. From its formation in 
September 1939 to the end of July 1940, a government spokesman said, the 
War Cabinet alone had sat 70 times — 46 in Melbourne, 20 in Canberra, and 
four in Sydney. (He could have added that they had met in Brisbane three 
days earlier and that there was to be a two-day Cabinet meeting in Melbourne 
on August 6–7). Now once again members of the House of Representatives, 
senators, ministers, and their staffs, senior public servants, and defence chiefs 
would converge on the national capital from around the country. Cabinet would 
meet on August 13 before facing the Opposition in Parliament the next day. 
The morning papers on August 12 carried the news that, following ‘a searching 
survey by legal officers of the constitutional position’, ministerial plans for a 
federal election had been ‘maturing’. An election was predicted for September 
14. If the international situation made it necessary to postpone polling day after 
Parliament had been dissolved, legal authorities had advised that government 
could continue by executive authority during an emergency.72
70 War Cabinet Minutes, Agendum 403, 10 July 1940, NAA: A2673, 291.
71 War Cabinet Minutes, Agenda 426, 442, 23 July, 2 Aug. 1940, NAA: A2673; Prime Minister to High 
Commissioner, secret cable (recyphered) 8 Aug. 1940, Bruce Papers, NAA: M100, Aug. 1940; Sec. of State for 
Dominion Affairs to High Commissioner in Australia, 11 Aug. 1940 (rec’d Aug 12), NAA: A1608, A41/1/1, xii.
72 The Argus, 12 Aug. 2012.
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From Melbourne, the nerve centre of the military establishment, the RAAF would 
provide a designated aircraft to convey the Minister for Air, Jim Fairbairn, and 
five other colleagues or associates of his choice to Canberra: Army Minister and 
close friend Geoff Street; senior Cabinet member Sir Harry Gullett; the Chief 
of the General Staff, Sir Brudenell White; White’s right-hand man, Lieutenant 
Colonel Frank Thornthwaite; and Fairbairn’s private secretary, Dick Elford. One 
specially fitted Lockheed Hudson light bomber, two pilots, two airmen, and six 
important passengers. A simple flight from Essendon aerodrome to Canberra. 
This is their story.
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3. A crew assembles: Charlie 
Crosdale and Jack Palmer
It was Squadron Leader A. D. Carey’s job. The Station Administrative Officer 
at RAAF Station Laverton initiated preparations on Friday, 9 August 1940 
for a flight on Tuesday, August 13 to ‘Convey Minister for Air and five other 
passengers to Canberra A.C.T.’ Alfred Carey’s Flying Operation Instruction No. 
111 advised that the aircraft would be one of No. 2 Squadron’s latest acquisitions, 
a Lockheed Hudson bomber, A16-97. The captain and crew for the flight to 
Canberra were to be detailed by No. 2 Squadron’s commanding officer. When 
their delivery of important people to the capital was completed the intention 
was that, in the absence of alternative orders, A16-97 should return to Laverton, 
empty save for ballast and its crew of four.1
A16-97 was one of the second batch of 50 Hudsons delivered to the RAAF from 
the Lockheed plant in California. Of the 100 Hudsons in the country at the 
end of July 1940 two had already been ‘written off by conversion’ as a result 
of crashes. One was undergoing ‘major repair owing to crash’, and another 
two had been ‘robbed of various parts’. The last four machines in the second 
group were fitted with seven passenger seats as well as dual controls. These 
specially fitted Hudsons were to be dispersed to bases around the country. 
They would form part of a Hudson squadron reserve at Richmond, Pearce, 
Darwin, and Laverton, and be available to transport ‘essential maintenance 
stores and personnel to advanced operational bases’. The Air Board was also 
hopeful that the modified machines might provide the ‘much-felt need’ for 
wireless telegraphy school aircraft. When required, and the Minister for Air 
saw this as an essential function, they would take members of the Cabinet and 
their entourages wherever and whenever they were needed. Ministerial traffic 
between Melbourne and Canberra was expected to be greatest. A16-97, the 
first of the four Hudsons to be furnished with passenger accommodation, was 
therefore allocated to No. 2 Squadron at Laverton. Received at 1 Aircraft Depot 
on 20 June 1940 along with eight others, A16-97 was assembled and tested over 
the next six weeks. It was a sound machine. There was plenty of room for the 
six passengers in what was the fastest and most comfortable aeroplane the RAAF 
could then offer.2
1 NAA: A11094, 5/6/Air Part B; copy attached to ‘Report No. 4 of August 1940: Report of Accident to 
Lockheed Hudson Aircraft A16-97, Reference Air Accident Report No. 39 of 1940/41’, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729.
2 ‘Re-arming with Hudson Aircraft (Policy)’, NAA A1196, 1/501/317. Much of the information in this 
paragraph is conveniently assembled and documented in David Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book Two, 
2010, Vincent Aviation Publications, Highbury, 2010, pp.246–7.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm
30
No. 2 Squadron was one of the original Australian Flying Corps and RAAF 
squadrons. Its distinguished past remembered through the lean depression 
years, it was re-formed as a Citizen Air Force (CAF) squadron at Laverton in 
May 1937 under the command of Squadron Leader J. H. Summers. Two Hawker 
Demon aircraft, three officers, and 38 airmen were its starting complement.3 
Johnny Summers was promoted Wing Commander in February 1938 and was 
succeeded in March 1939 by Wing Commander Alan Charlesworth. The unit 
had been designated a general reconnaissance squadron in which extended 
courses in navigation training could be given. By then there were seven officers, 
three sergeant pilots, and 70 other ranks. The squadron was being re-equipped 
with the new British maritime reconnaissance aircraft, the Avro Anson. A twin-
engine monoplane, the first in RAAF service, with an enclosed cockpit, also 
a first, the Anson had several unique features. Some had dual controls. All 
had a cumbersome hand-wound retractable undercarriage. And, as operations 
over Bass Strait soon established, its range was limited — not least because of 
maintenance shortcomings resulting from administrative parsimony.4
Fred Thomas’s squadron
Three months after war broke out Alan Charlesworth was replaced by Squadron 
Leader Fred Thomas, a 33-year-old former CAF and Reserve officer. Thomas had 
been a Melbourne University accountancy student who had served two years in 
the Melbourne University Regiment when he enlisted as an Air Force cadet in 
1926. Taking readily to flying, Thomas topped the course, just beating another 
bright student, Ray Garrett, whom he was delighted to find at No. 2 Squadron as 
a flight lieutenant recalled to active duty from his own successful photographic 
business at the outbreak of war. Thomas’s steady advance in the Service had 
been matched in his civilian life as he assumed managerial roles in a flourishing 
family company, W. C. Thomas & Sons Pty Ltd, grain merchants and flour 
millers. The Thomases had been prominent in Melbourne commercial and social 
life for several generations. Fred, smart and well-connected, standing over five 
feet ten inches tall and with what one of his seniors, Harry Cobby, was later to 
call ‘regimental bearing’, was appointed in 1934 honorary ADC to the recently 
arrived Governor of Victoria, Lord Huntingfield. Two years later, the link with 
Huntingfield was extended when the Governor became Honorary Commodore 
3 Operations Record Book, No. 2 (General Reconnaissance) Squadron, NAA: A9186/5; Richard S. Gunter, 
‘No. 2 (General Reconnaissance) Squadron Royal Australian Air Force: A Brief History’, RAAF War History 
Section Albert Park Barracks, Jan. 1950 (cyclostyled document furnished by the RAAF Historical Branch, 
Nov. 1979); ‘History of No. 2 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force 1916-1952’, RAAF Historical Section, n.d.
4 Stewart Wilson, Anson, Hudson and Sunderland in Australian Service, Aerospace Publications, Weston 
Creek ACT, 1992, pp.25-7; ACdre Sir Raymond Garrett, taped reminiscences, transcribed and edited by Anne 
Kelly, Garrett MSS; A. J. Jackson, Avro Aircraft Since 1908, Putnam, London, 1965, pp.319-23.
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of the new No. 21 Squadron to which Thomas, a flight lieutenant since 1932, 
was posted. Thomas was then the most senior flight lieutenant in the CAF; but 
the Air Board baulked at the Air Member for Personnel’s recommendation that 
he be promoted to squadron leader. Officers of equal rank, but higher seniority 
in the Permanent Force, were awaiting promotion. As a compromise he was 
granted honorary rank as squadron leader, with no extra pay. In what appears 
to have been a transient enthusiasm, Thomas applied to join the newly formed 
2nd Light Tank Company of the Australian Tank Corps in March 1939 three 
weeks after transferring to the RAAF Reserve and being promoted temporary 
squadron leader.5
Fred Thomas, confident in command
(From National Archives of Australia, A9300 Thomas FW)
By mid-1940, under Fred Thomas’s leadership, No. 2 Squadron’s 10 already 
obsolescent Ansons were mainly engaged in reconnaissance, navigation training, 
5 NAA: A9300, THOMAS FW.
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searches for enemy raiders, and exercises in co-operation with the Navy, 
operations which were being taken over by the superior Lockheed Hudsons 
as they were progressively delivered. Like other similarly equipped units No. 
2 Squadron was receiving its allotment of Hudsons at intervals to allow for 
the maintenance of operational efficiency with Ansons while pilots were being 
converted to the new type.6 Dispersing the new aircraft around the country, 
together with at least one instructor for each unit, using the limited number of 
trained pilots without simultaneously crippling the pilot conversion program, 
had challenged headquarters logistical ingenuity.7
By the time A16-97 was assigned to them on 2 August 1940 Fred Thomas’s 
squadron had 11 Hudsons, seven of them delivered within the last month.8 
A secret ‘Warstand’ report on August 1 had noted that one of the Hudsons 
was ‘unserviceable’. If required as reinforcements, five aircraft could ‘move 
at short notice’ with second pilots, W/T operator, and two air gunners. But 
lack of armament equipment and spares would render them ‘operationally 
unserviceable’.9 Most of the squadron’s Ansons had been returned for use in 
training establishments. One instructor, Flight Lieutenant John P. Ryland, had 
been assigned to lead the squadron’s conversion, starting with the CO and the 
flight commanders. As other Hudson squadrons were being sent for duty in 
Darwin and Sembawang, Singapore, Fred Thomas could reasonably aspire to 
lead his men into more hazardous zones. For the time being, however, as the 
Director of Operations and Intelligence had pointed out to a staff conference 
at the end of April, Hudsons lacking guns and bomb racks could be regarded 
only as general reconnaissance aircraft, not bombers.10 But the unpleasant 
inoculations for typhoid, smallpox, and tetanus that No. 2 Squadron personnel 
were all receiving were the promise of action to come. Meanwhile, it was a life 
of routine operations and training at home.
During the May sittings of Parliament, No. 8 Squadron in Canberra had used 
DC-3s to provide a weekly shuttle to and from Melbourne, leaving Laverton at 
8.15 a.m. each Tuesday morning and returning on Fridays. These arrangements 
had been requested by the Minister for Air, who evidently expected that a 
similar service would be provided when Parliament resumed in August. As 
No. 8 Squadron was preparing to move to Singapore, and the chartered DC-
3s it had been using had been returned to their owners, the only operational 
squadron with a suitable aircraft for a passenger flight to Canberra was No. 2. 
With a gathering of dignitaries to be carried, the Service would want to ensure 
6 DOI (GpCpt. T. A. Swinbourne) for CAS to HQ Southern and Central Areas and RAAF Stations Darwin and 
Pearce, ‘Rearming with Hudsons — Operational Efficiency’, 15 June 1940, NAA: A1196, 1/501/317.
7 NAA: A1196,1/501/317.
8 Ron Cuskelly to CH, 15 July 1978.
9 ‘Service Training Report Southern Area’, NAA: A1196, 37/501/20 Pt 1.
10 ‘Report of Staff Conference No. 32…’, 30 April 1940, NAA: AA1977/635.
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a smoothly professional trip. In the previous two months, No. 2 Squadron had 
transported the Chief of the Air Staff to Sydney, Cambridge in Tasmania, and 
Archerfield in Queensland; and the Air Officer Commanding had been flown to 
Parafield in South Australia. On June 13 and 14 the Air Minister and the Chief 
of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Burnett, had been flown from Laverton to and from 
Mascot. In the first week of August, the new Hudson A16-97 had been taken 
to Canberra by Flying Officer W. P. Heath with five passengers, one of them the 
Air Minister.11 Bill Heath was an experienced commercial flyer. Before the war 
he had served five years in the CAF as an airman pilot (sergeant) while flying 
for Australian National Airways. Appointed a temporary flying officer at the 
outbreak of war, he had been mustered for General Duties with No. 1 Squadron 
before joining No. 2 Squadron on 1 June 1940.12 Heath would have seemed a 
natural choice for the next flight to Canberra. But there were other possibilities.
At the end of July there were, according to the No. 2 Squadron Operations Record 
Book monthly report, ‘five captains fully operational’ on the recently arrived 
Hudson aircraft.13 Ensuring that senior pilots could handle the new aircraft was 
a high priority. The CO and the three flight commanders, Flight Lieutenants 
Bob Hitchcock, Ray Garrett, and Jack Ryland, had all been converted. Ryland 
was the first, instructed at Richmond in February and March by Lockheed’s 
field service representative, L. D. ‘Swede’ Parker. Garrett had also spent several 
eventful weeks with the respected company test pilot Parker at Richmond and 
had just completed his training under Ryland at Laverton, passing his final 
‘crew’ and ‘full load’ tests on August 3. On August 6, Garrett had flown Air 
Commodore Harry Wrigley and a crew of five to Adelaide, returning on August 
8. Although he had less than 57 hours as a Hudson first pilot, Garrett’s ability 
and long commercial flying record made him a suitable man to take the flight to 
Canberra. But his expertise as a Hudson instructor was of more value. Almost 
every day since July 16 he had been taking a group of pilots up for training in 
airmanship and emergency procedures.14
Bill Heath was a more likely choice for the Canberra assignment. He had a great 
deal of experience as an airline captain. In 1939 he had been detailed to teach 
RAAF pilots to fly DC-2s. Though relatively junior in rank, Heath was mature 
(approaching his thirty-first birthday) and had ferried the group including the 
Minister for Air to Canberra the previous week.15 He had accompanied Ryland in 
A16-32 when the Chief of the Air Staff was taken to Tasmania on July 17. But, even 
11 Flying Operation Instruction, [106], 5 Aug. 1940, signed by S/Ldr Thomas, NAA: A11094, 5/6/AIR PART B.
12 NAA: A9300, HEATH WP.
13 No. 2 Squadron Operations Record Book, 1 Aug. 1940, NAA: A1980, 599. In fact four were fully trained 
as captains; the fifth, 90 per cent trained, was expected to complete conversion on Aug. 4. (‘Service Training 
Report — Southern Area Pt 1’, NAA: A1196, 37/501/20 Pt 1).
14 W. R. Garrett, Flying Log Book, courtesy of Anne Kelly.
15 Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book Two, p.248, referring to an unnamed ‘junior officer’, overlooks 
Heath’s extensive experience as a commercial airline pilot. 
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more than Garrett, he had been occupied since his arrival at No. 2 Squadron in 
putting new pilots through their paces. And since August 3, when he too completed 
his Hudson conversion with Ryland on the dual-control A16-6 (the first Hudson to 
be assembled in Australia), he had spent almost every day in second-pilot training 
in Hudsons working through the airmanship syllabus and occasionally testing 
engines, instructing on full load flying and use of wireless telegraphy.
Bill Heath in Australian National Airways uniform
(Courtesy of Daryl Heath)
‘A very able pilot was detailed…but he went sick at the last moment,’ Sir George 
Jones recalled.16 Jones, then Director of Training, knew that the Laverton 
base was in the grip of an outbreak of a debilitating illness — described as a 
cross between influenza and bronchitis — that was frazzling doctors. Flight 
16 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
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Lieutenant Peter Delamothe, commanding the recently opened 200-bed RAAF 
hospital, with only four nurses to assist, had his hands full.17 Heath’s absence on 
‘special leave’ without pay ‘in hospital or sick quarters or sick at home’ for 82 
days between mid-March and the end of May could indicate fragile health. He 
is recorded as relinquishing his commission, only to have it re-instated a couple 
of months later.18 But if anyone was too ill to fly that day it was not Heath.19 His 
log book records that he flew to Mount Gambier with Pilot Officer Bill White 
and a crew of four, returning the next day. Garrett, Heath’s flight commander, 
was also detailed to fly to Mount Gambier and Adelaide on August 13.20 Ryland 
was not ill. And he was the senior man, apart from the commanding officer, Fred 
Thomas, who had less Hudson flying experience. Ryland had flown the Chief 
of the Air Staff Sir Charles Burnett around the country several times in recent 
months. He had taken both Burnett and Jim Fairbairn to Mascot on June 13 in 
A16-20 and returned with the Air Minister the next day in another Hudson, 
A16-21. Nevertheless, for Ryland the conversion of recently arrived pilots was 
his primary role, a far more effective use of his time than a routine transport 
assignment. In fact, since spending a day with Burnett flying to Archerfield 
and Mascot and back on August 2, Ryland had spent most of the next 10 days 
with a very young and venturesome Pilot Officer, Wilbur Wackett, son of the 
head of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation Lawrence Wackett, taking him 
through his conversion course. On August 13 he and Wackett were on a three-
hour ‘seaward patrol’ to Mount Gambier, returning the following day.21
Whoever was actually available, on the afternoon of Monday, August 12 the 
task was assigned to Bob Hitchcock, commander of No. 2 Squadron’s A Flight. 
Though he would only have learned it after the event, George Jones might have 
been right in remembering that ‘the only other man available was Hitchcock’.22 
The selection, forced though it may have been, was the responsibility of Fred 
Thomas. Thomas, when an honorary squadron leader, had first known the then 
Flying Officer Hitchcock in 1938 as his flight commander in No. 21 Squadron. 
Hitchcock had completed his own conversion course on the Hudson under the 
instruction of Ryland three weeks earlier. Thomas had been in the group with 
17 Joan Delamothe and Brian Stevenson (ed. Tony Delamothe), The Delamothe Story, Boolarong Publications, 
Brisbane, 1989, p.40; Gay Halstead, Story of the RAAF Nursing Service 1940–1990, Nungurner Press, Metung, 
1994, pp.3–4. Sir Hubert Opperman recalled arriving at ‘cold wet Laverton’ that August, and encountering 
‘a wide spectrum of human behaviour’ among the drill instructors; while many strict but just applicants 
were trained and appointed, there also slipped through unwanted flotsam and jetsam from guard house and 
kitchen’. Humiliation and hazing, ‘diabolical perversity’ by swaggering bullies, was not uncommon. (H. F. 
Opperman, Pedals, Politics and People, Haldane Publishing Co, Sydney, 1977, Ch. XIII).
18 For Heath’s background: NAA: A9300, HEATH WP.
19 By Sept. 1, one of the squadron’s captains had been ‘placed medically unfit’. (NAA: A1196, 37/501/20 Pt 1).
20 W. P. Heath, Flying Log Book, Aug. 1940, Heath Papers, courtesy of Daryl Heath; Garrett’s Flying Log 
Book, Aug 1940.
21 J. P. Ryland, Flying Log Book, Aug. 1940, Ryland Papers, NLA MS 5020 Box 1.
22 Thomas, Service Court of Inquiry, p.14, 13 Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 3210/2729; AM Sir George Jones, 
interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
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him along with Bill Heath, Jack Sharp, and Phil Howson who had just been 
promoted to temporary flight lieutenant at the age of 21 and was scheduled 
to leave No. 2 Squadron for No. 6 Squadron in the first week of July. The last 
member of the cohort was A. B. ‘Tich’ McFarlane who had graduated as a CAF 
pilot officer in No. 21 Squadron in December 1937 and was now completing a law 
degree. During the conversion course Hitchcock had nearly 70 hours experience 
in the type, 49 of them solo practice, before taking the crew test on July 21.23 
Since then he had flown Hudsons almost every day, seven different aircraft, 
passing on what he knew, and testing equipment. He was, ‘Tich’ McFarlane 
remembered, ‘an average pilot who flew by the book’.24
The chosen
With Hitchcock detailed by his CO as first pilot, and no passengers to bring 
back to Melbourne, another return path was suggested. Next to his fellow flight 
commander Ray Garrett, a pioneer of aerial photography, Hitchcock was now 
the squadron’s senior photographic expert (the former squadron commander 
Alan Charlesworth, with whom neither Garrett nor Hitchcock had ever been 
close, had been trained in the RAF aerial photography school). Hitchcock 
and his crew could go on patrol for two days and undertake a photographic 
survey of Woodside, South Australia. Such a survey would no doubt have been 
welcomed by the General Reconnaissance School at Laverton where, according 
to one of their instructors, they ‘had to use a map of South Australia made on 
some strange projection for the agriculture department, which showed stock 
routes and suitable waterholes for cattle’.25
An extended period in the air would also give whoever was chosen to sit in the 
second pilot’s seat of the Hudson an excellent opportunity to become familiar 
with the aeroplane. So, early on Monday, August 12, a place was reserved for LAC 
Frank Jefferies, the squadron photographer. Jefferies had flown with Hitchcock 
several times in Hudsons on similar missions in recent weeks. On August 1 
they had been up twice in A16-34 doing oblique and vertical photography. 
They went up together again on the next two days in A16-9 and A16-80 as 
well as A16-34. On August 7 they went up twice. But Jefferies, whose twenty-
eighth birthday was just three days away, learned later on August 12 that the 
photographic task for the next day had been re-assigned. He was to yield his 
berth to Dick Elford, James Fairbairn’s private secretary.26 The minister wanted 
his principal assistant close by on the trip to Canberra.
23 Ryland, Service Court of Inquiry, p.37, NAA: A705, 32/10/2739; NAA: A9845, 318/123. 
24 GpCpt. A. B. McFarlane, interview, 18 April 1978.
25 Brett Hilder, Navigator in the South Seas, Percival Marshall & Co., London, 1961, p.85.
26 John Bennett, Highest Traditions: The History of No 2 Squadron, RAAF, Australian Government 
Publishing Service [AGPS], Canberra, 1995, p.112, citing Jefferies’ written memoir. It had been known since 
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In the normal course, Hitchcock’s crew would be a second pilot and a wireless 
operator; a fitter might be added. For the airmen, being rostered to fly was 
usually a welcome duty; it brought them an additional two shillings a day in 
crew pay and the chance to get away from the routine of the squadron. The 
choice of wireless operator and fitter was straightforward, especially the latter, 
as each new aircraft became part of a particular ground crew’s family. Among 
No. 2 Squadron’s other ranks were experienced airmen with pre-war service, 
like Jack Palmer as well as recently enlisted men like Charles Crosdale. The 
wireless operator, Corporal John Frederick Palmer (Service number 2130), was 
born in Maryborough in Victoria, where his father was a farmer. Frederick and 
Mabel Palmer had moved to the Melbourne suburb of Malvern by the time 
Jack’s two younger brothers, Max and Laurie, were born in 1914 and 1915. Jack 
was in his mid-20s, and had previously spent 18 months as a private in the AMF, 
when he enlisted in the RAAF for six years in April 1936 as an AC1 aircraft hand 
general. He had been encouraged to join by a friend already in the Service. Ron 
Curtain, a radio telegraphist, urged Palmer to apply for the wireless telegraphy 
operators’ course. By coincidence, Curtain was a good friend of Bob Hitchcock, 
having known him since his early days in the ranks.27
Jack Palmer had been educated at Coburg Primary and Coburg High School. For 
eight years he had been employed as a ‘letter carrier’ in the Postmaster General’s 
Department. Striving to improve his prospects he became a salesman, first with 
the clothing manufacturers Thompson F. Davies of Flinders Lane and, in the 
year before he enlisted, with the Standard Insurance Company of Market Street. 
Having decided to join up, for 12 months he attended night classes in wireless at 
Melbourne Technical College. Privately he was practising Morse and studying 
the standard textbook, The Admiralty Handbook of Wireless Telegraphy 1931. He 
impressed the recruiters and was set on the path he had chosen. In July 1937, 
having obtained a 76 per cent pass in No. 3 W/T course, he was re-mustered 
and posted to No. 21 Squadron at Laverton depot as a freshly minted wireless 
operator. ‘Average, should make a good operator,’ his commanding officer’s 
report remarked, concluding that he was not suitable to be an instructor. Trade-
tested for the rank of LAC the following month, he scored an 82 per cent pass. 
‘Appears to have studied the work,’ was the bemusing assessment signed by 
Wing Commander A. W. ‘Spud’ Murphy, President of the Trade Test Board.
Palmer had married Ron Curtain’s sister Sheila at St Margaret Mary’s Roman 
Catholic Church, Brunswick North, in May 1939. Jack and Sheila, now living 
in Gardiner Parade, Glen Iris, had first met four years earlier when he was the 
local postman and friendly with Ron and her other brothers. Sheila was the 
Aug. 9 that there were to be six passengers but it seems to have been hoped until late on Aug. 12 that there 
would be a vacant seat for Jefferies.
27 Sqn Ldr Ron Curtain to CH, 1 Dec. 1982.
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eighth of nine surviving children of John and Ellen Curtain. Jack Curtain, a no-
nonsense stolid senior police constable in Donald in the Wimmera at the time 
of Sheila’s birth, had retired on health grounds in 1915. His last posting had 
been as the sergeant in Coburg and there the family stayed. Jack’s oldest son, 
William Basil ‘Bas’, after defying his anti-British parents and volunteering for 
the Royal Australian Navy as soon as he turned twenty-one, had continued to 
serve in the fleet reserve after the war as an engine room artificer. When his time 
expired he had followed his father into the Victoria Police. Like many of their 
co-religionists, Jack and Bas Curtain found the police force a congenial employer 
for Roman Catholics.
Jack Palmer and Sheila Curtain, December 1938
(Courtesy of John Foley and S/Ldr J. R Curtain)
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In a family that traced its history from the Irish famine in Limerick to the 
Ballarat goldfields and the Eureka rebellion, Sheila Curtain and her siblings 
were enveloped in fiercely anti-monarchist sentiment at home. Their father, 
though Australian born, had an unmistakeable brogue. Her brother Bas seemed 
destined to be caught up in the 1923 Melbourne police strike. Though he 
stayed home in bed during the most violent confrontations, he was one of the 
hundreds expelled from the force.28 A marked man, there was a note on his file 
that he was never to be re-employed. As Jack Curtain’s health continued to 
deteriorate, the younger children, especially Sheila, increasingly looked to their 
older brothers for guidance and support. The second son, Cyril, had become a 
successful country solicitor, and eventually a partner in the Melbourne legal 
firm of McInerny, Williams, and Curtain. But respectable as his professional 
life was, Cyril had married a committed Irish republican, Helen Butler. His 
wife’s brothers had been in the famous St Patrick’s Day march in 1920 when 
Archbishop Mannix was escorted by 14 Victoria Cross winners mounted on 
grey chargers.29 Cyril and Helen Curtain’s house at 17 Howard Street, Kew, a 
stone’s throw from Robert and Pattie Menzies, was a salon for visiting Irish 
celebrities, Catholic luminaries, and clergy.
It would not have taken long for Jack Palmer to be immersed in the republican 
passions of the family that was embracing him. The Christian names of two 
of Sheila’s brothers, Daniel Mannix Curtain, born in 1917, and Robert Emmet 
(who died as an infant the year before), bespoke their parents’ fervent Irish 
nationalism. Helen Curtain and her sister Rita O’Brien thought nothing of 
embarrassing their lawyer husbands and less resolute cousins and nieces by 
remaining firmly seated in cinemas when the national anthem was played. 
Sheila Curtain herself, known as ‘Bub’ even after younger children arrived, 
was tall, attractive, and sociable. She had passed the Merit Certificate and at 
thirteen began work as a junior shop assistant at the Mutual Store in Flinders 
Street. Later she moved to the lingerie department of Buckley and Nunn, the 
fashionable emporium next to Myers in Bourke Street. By 1940 she had found a 
job with the Air Force in Collins St as a comptometer operator preparing RAAF 
wages and pay records.
Sheila was an independent young woman, especially popular with her nieces 
who vowed to emulate her elegant smoking as soon as they were old enough 
to be seen with cigarettes. Protected though she was by a phalanx of brothers, 
Sheila somehow contrived to see Jack at church dances and weekend trysts in 
the city. Romance blossomed. It was a love match. Fortunately, the tall, rangy, 
28 Gavin Brown & Robert Haldane, Days of Violence: The 1923 police strike in Melbourne, Hybrid Publishers, 
Melbourne, 1998, p.175.
29 AWM: POI383.018 for a composite photograph of the VC winners, the Archbishop, and John Wren, the 
reputed organiser of the ride.
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quietly spoken Palmer impressed all of the Curtains with his sincerity. If their 
sister loved Jack Palmer, that was good enough for the Curtain brothers. But 
his willingness to ‘take instruction’ and convert from the Anglican faith to his 
fiancée’s Catholicism undoubtedly helped his cause. Sheila and Jack would 
marry proudly in front of the altar, not as a mixed-marriage couple at the side 
or behind the altar, or even more ignominiously in the sacristy or an adjacent 
presbytery.30
Jack Palmer’s prospective brother-in-law, Bas Curtain, a fitter and turner whose 
skills were at a premium, had joined the Air Force in 1924. He had previously 
been sacked from two jobs when his ‘striking’ past as a plain-clothes policeman 
had been discovered. Afraid that the same thing would happen with the RAAF, 
he was assured by Squadron Leader Frank McNamara VC, his new CO, that his 
involuntary severance from the police force would not be held against him. 
‘Dilb’ McNamara was well aware of Curtain’s record. He shared the Curtains’ 
Irish Catholic heritage but as a serving officer he had refused to take part in 
the VCs’ escort to Dr Mannix in 1920. A notoriously bad pilot, McNamara 
had his own reasons for encouraging the young man. It was said that when he 
appeared on the tarmac with a set of flying goggles ‘mechanics disappeared like 
snowflakes in the Sahara’.31 A mechanic who owed him a favour was more than 
welcome. Ron Curtain had followed his older brother into the RAAF four years 
later, accepted into the first wireless operators’ course.
The Curtain brothers were close to their sister’s fiancé. They could well have 
known of the single blip on Jack Palmer’s General Conduct Sheet — five days 
confined to barracks, awarded by Squadron Leader Charles Eaton for ‘conduct 
to the prejudice of good order & Air Force discipline’. Evidently, Palmer had 
not appeared one morning in April 1938 ‘at his place of parade appointed by 
his CO’ and ‘failed to open W/T watch with Richmond’.32 As a W/T operator 
Palmer’s duties were not confined to operating and maintaining aircraft radio 
equipment. He was required to run signals office watches on ground point-to-
point links and watches with aircraft, and maintaining and tuning transmitters 
at transmitting stations. He could even be asked to work on a telephone 
switchboard at weekends.33 There were still a very small number of qualified 
30 Siobhan McHugh, ‘Not in front of the altar: Mixed marriages and sectarian tensions between Catholics 
and Protestants in pre-multicultural Australia’, History Australia, vol. 6, no. 2, Aug. 2009, DOI: 10.2104/
ha090042.
31 C. D. Coulthard-Clark, McNamara VC: a hero’s dilemma, Air Power Studies Centre, Fairbairn ACT, 1997, 
pp.60, 66.
32 Palmer’s Service record, NAA: A9301, 2130/30,32,45,48; The Argus, 14 Aug. 1940; H. J. Manning, ‘Air 
Disaster at Canberra’, Stand-To, Jan.–Feb. 1962, pp.6–22; Coronial papers, NAA: A1378, P8903; biographical 
notes about his mother and the Curtain family kindly furnished by John Foley, 23 and 27 July 2009; 
reminiscences of WCdr W. ‘Bas’ Curtain, 1977: and Curtain’s memories on www.shermanjungle.com/_curtain_
website/williambasil/index.htm.
33 GpCpt E. R. Hall (Retd.), A Saga of Achievement, Bonall Publishing, Box Hill North, 1978, pp.45–56.
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operators; so a failure to turn up on time could have significant consequences.34 
Apart from this one episode, the result perhaps of an entirely understandable 
boisterous night out away from home, his sheet was clean. By the time of his 
marriage Palmer was assimilated into the Curtain family; they were all what 
Father Ken Morrison, then the Roman Catholic chaplain at Laverton, called 
‘practical Catholics’.35
Finding Jack Palmer on the same plane as Bob Hitchcock was no surprise. They 
had served together in No. 21 Squadron, with Palmer frequently accompanying 
Hitchcock as junior pilots were put through their ‘airmanship’ paces on 
Ansons. In October and November 1938 they had both been part of a team that 
flew to Richmond, Brisbane, Charleville, Cloncurry, and Darwin to meet the 
much publicised RAF long-range development flight. In the ‘sociable seating 
arrangement’ of the front end of an Anson, the pilot’s seat was not separated 
from the rest of the crew; and the fuel gauges were positioned closer to the 
wireless operator than the pilot. As the historian of the aircraft cockpit puts it:
The pilot could check these gauges only by craning round to the right. 
Near the end of a long flight, when fuel was at a premium, the fuel 
gauge selector button would be surreptitiously pressed by the anxious 
wireless operator or even by the navigator. Peripheral vision being very 
acute, the pilot was usually made aware of his crew’s concerns.36
Hitchcock and his wireless operator saw eye to eye. In October the following 
year, Palmer was promoted LAC (W/T Op) and attached to Station HQ at 
Laverton. There he was one of a team responsible for manning the recently 
installed Marconi-Adcock direction-finding station. In addition to guiding Air 
Force machines, the Laverton DF station passed bearings to the civil airliners 
flying into Essendon at night from Adelaide and Sydney. They assisted the 
RAAF aircraft carrying out reconnaissance and, as fears of German raiders grew, 
convoy protection over Bass Strait. Five months after war was declared — and 
now a corporal — Palmer was posted to No. 2 Squadron. On 22 July 1940 he 
was one of 11 men who went up with Hitchcock to practise full-load flying 
in Hudson A16-32. Two days later he flew with Hitchcock to Richmond and 
Canberra. They returned from Canberra to Laverton via Wagga on the same day. 
On August 10, Jack Palmer celebrated his twenty-ninth birthday.
34 At the beginning of Aug. 1940, No. 2 Squadron reported 11 fully trained W/T operators available for 
crew work; a month later they admitted that after work on operations three required more experience (NAA: 
A1196, 37/501/20 Pt 1).
35 Msgnr K. R. Morrison to CH, 6 June 1983. I am grateful to John Foley for information about the Curtain 
family; and to the family history website www.shermanjungle.com/_curtain_website.
36 L. F. E. Coombs, The Aircraft Cockpit: from stick-and-string to fly-by-wire, Patrick Stephens Ltd, 
Wellingborough, 1990, pp.122–3.
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‘We were moving Mum’
Joining Palmer on the morning of 13 August 1940 was another 29-year-old, 
Aircraftman Charles Joseph Crosdale (Service number 6673), mustered as aircraft 
hand mechanic. Vital parts of the nearly pristine A16-97 were in Crosdale’s care, 
although on this trip he was as likely to spend time loading and unloading 
ballast, emptying the Elsan dry chemical toilet, perhaps serving coffee and 
sandwiches and collecting sick bags, as assisting with re-fuelling, servicing, 
and minor repairs. Born in Merriwa, in the Upper Hunter Valley of New South 
Wales, in November 1910, Charlie Crosdale was the second-oldest in a Catholic 
family of 17 children. He was to grow up sturdily amid a forest of relatives. His 
paternal grandfather, twice married, had 15 children, Charlie’s father George 
being the eldest. George Crosdale had been a coal miner at the Maitland Main 
Colliery until his retirement. Charlie and his older brother Sidney both followed 
their father into the mine when they turned 16.
Charlie Crosdale, cycling medallist
(Courtesy of Alice McDonald)
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Charlie Crosdale, local explorer
(Courtesy of Alice McDonald)
When George opened a garage in Congewai, about 18 kilometres southwest of 
Cessnock, Charlie joined him and had his earliest experience of motor repairs. 
He was later to describe his six months there as an apprenticeship. When George 
Crosdale was bankrupted in 1925, Charlie had to look elsewhere for work. A job 
as a conductor with Rover Motors, a private bus company, followed until he 
was laid off and replaced by a younger man. Mostly unemployed thereafter, 
he could truthfully tell the RAAF recruiters that he had been running his own 
business. He had work a couple of days a fortnight as a lorry driver, and as a 
mechanic based in Paxton, a private village sub-divided in the 1920s by the East 
Greta Coal Mining Company, seven kilometres closer to Cessnock. With his spare 
cash he bought books, moving on from the study of motor mechanics to the 
theory of aircraft construction. He was fascinated as well with Aboriginal art, 
and explored the Watagan Mountains by the Congewai Valley, finding a number 
of cave paintings. For fun, he also swam in local creeks, paddling down them 
when they were flooded in a canoe he had made himself. He was a competitive 
cyclist. For a faster and noisier thrill he raced motor bikes at the speedway track 
in Newcastle.
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From the mid-1930s, Charlie Crosdale’s gaze had been firmly on the RAAF. He 
repeatedly sought to enlist, but his qualifications never matched the vacancies. 
Finally an open door was glimpsed early in 1939. He had undertaken a trade test 
and, at 5'6″ and 10 stone, with a 36″ chest and three inches of expansion, he was 
certified as medically fit in June 1939. To his disappointment, however, he failed 
to meet the standard required for mustering as a ‘fitter driver motor transport’. 
The president of the RAAF Selection Board at Victoria Barracks did nothing to 
alleviate the sense of failure. He wrote: ‘…it is not possible to give any detailed 
information as to the reasons for your being unsuccessful.’ The applicant was 
not to know that he had failed the practical test as a fitter and scored only 10 
per cent in the theory test.
It seemed that the RAAF was an impossible dream. Charlie Crosdale had 
previously enquired about the possibility of joining in the photography section, 
then as a draughtsman or even as a sign writer, if such posts existed. There were 
62 separate mustering categories but he could find no advertised vacancies for 
which his qualifications were compelling. If he could not get into the Air Force, 
he contemplated seeking employment with the new Commonwealth Aircraft 
Factory at Fisherman’s Bend. Failing that, he wondered about the transport 
bus service. But, just as all looked lost, hope was revived by a letter from the 
Secretary of the Air Board on 2 August 1939 advising that he would be placed 
on the waiting list of applicants considered suitable for entry to the Air Force 
as an aircraft hand. With RAAF recruitment in New South Wales suspended 
but due to be resumed in September, he looked forward to an early change 
of fortune. Frustratingly, it was not till December, and the nation was at war, 
that Charlie was called again for interview. Like many thousands of applicants, 
he simply had to wait while the RAAF Directorate of Manning developed the 
machinery to cope with a massive influx of ground crew recruits.37 In the 
interim the conditions of service had changed and he was obliged to indicate his 
acceptance of the revised terms. Instead of a weekly wage of £3.19.4 he would 
be entitled only to five shillings a day, with an extra three shillings a day if he 
were married and another shilling per child. Charlie did not hesitate.
There was one last hurdle. Unlike the Royal Australian Navy which offered free 
dental treatment to recruits to render them fit for service, the RAAF obliged 
them to become dentally fit at their own expense. Nearly 17 per cent of recruits 
in Melbourne, thought to be typical of all centres, had been rejected on dental 
grounds in the first two months of the war. Very few of them were willing to 
pay for or could afford the required treatment.38 Thus, having also furnished 
certification from a Newcastle dental surgeon that he had ‘all necessary fillings 
37 Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939–1942, pp.68–9.
38 Air Board Agenda 2634, [Nov. 1939], NAA: A4181, 17. Dental health requirements for RAAF applicants 
were eliminated in May 1940.
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and prophylactic treatment’ and was ‘dentally fit for enlistment’, Charlie 
Crosdale entered the Richmond (NSW) depot as an ‘aircraft hand mechanic’, 
enlisted just before Christmas ‘for the duration of the war & up to 12 months 
thereafter’. His older brother Sidney was to enlist seven months later.
What Charlie Crosdale knew, though probably most of his fellow mechanics did 
not, was the extent to which his presence among them was a result of political 
influence. By early 1940 RAAF recruitment literature carried a warning that 
representations from members of Parliament or ‘influential citizens’ would 
be regarded as ‘an indication that the candidate lacks confidence in his own 
merits’.39 Yet, had it not been for two of the ministerial passengers about to board 
his Hudson on 13 August 1940, the frustrated volunteer might still have been 
waiting to be called to service. For two-and-a-half years he had sought entry 
to the RAAF. Letter after letter in his own hand found a home on Department 
of Defence files. He had been aided in his quest by a man who had known him 
since he was a boy, Rowley James, the ALP MHR for the federal seat of Hunter. 
James had concluded that the only way for constituents — even one as ‘honest, 
sober and industrious’ as he averred Charlie Crosdale was — to be called up to 
the glamorous Air Force from his severely depressed coal mining region was 
to use their political connections. At Crosdale’s request, James had repeatedly 
approached Geoff Street, the Minister for Defence. Charlie’s local state MP, the 
union leader and deputy leader of the New South Wales Labor Party, the bullet-
headed Jack Baddeley, added his voice.
There was enormous inertia to overcome. Street’s officials ensured that the 
courtesies were observed; the minister kept James, a pugnacious political 
opponent, abreast of developments in his constituent’s case. Minutes passed back 
and forth between the Secretaries of the Air Department and the Air Board. The 
Air Member for Personnel’s initials were spattered across an ever-growing file. 
Eventually when Street’s friend Jim Fairbairn became Air Minister he referred 
the matter to him. It was all that was necessary. Fairbairn had actually flown 
Street, with James and another Labor MP, to Cessnock, Singleton, and Newcastle 
in May 1939.40 Ever the optimist, James had hoped to persuade ministers of the 
strategic value of developing Cessnock aerodrome. He did not help his cause by 
appointing himself navigator so that he could hunt for his own chimney pots at 
Kurri Kurri. Over-shooting Cessnock by seven miles compounded the merriment 
of the mission. Happily, James’s advocacy for his eager constituent was more 
successful than his aerial navigation. As was noted on Crosdale’s file, he was 
‘Enlisted under instructions from Air Board’. The Director of Recruiting, Harry 
Cobby, had personally signed the ‘important’ cypher message on 19 December 
1939 directing his enlistment. Australia had been at war for three months.
39 ‘Royal Australian Air Force, Conditions of Service in the Ranks — Airmen, Ground Personnel’, revised 
April 1940, p.7.
40 The Argus, 24 May, 3 June 1939; Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1939.
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Like many others entering as ground crew, Charlie Crosdale had aspired to fly 
with the RAAF. In fact since leaving school he had been ambitious to work in 
aviation in any capacity. He had approached both the famed Charles Ulm and 
the Qantas company without success. While picking up such work as he could 
in and around Paxton as a motor mechanic and lorry driver delivering logs 
to a sawmill near Newcastle, he had two main diversions. He had passed the 
Leaving Certificate at school ― the only one of his family to do so ― and studied 
mechanical engineering for a year with the International Correspondence 
School. With an aptitude for drawing, he had earned 16 commercial art diplomas 
at the Art Training Institute in Melbourne as well as two certificates from the 
Australian Sketching School in Sydney. He was a talented amateur artist whose 
pictures, mostly pencil sketches, won him awards in art shows as far afield as 
Wollongong, Newcastle, Bega, Tamworth, and even the Sydney Royal Show. His 
works adorned his parents’ walls. His drawing of a magpie won a prize from the 
Gould League of Bird Lovers and was featured on one of the League’s membership 
cards. He was proud as well of his caricatures of Sir Charles Kingsford-Smith 
and Australia’s courageous cricket captain, W. M. Woodfull.
Charlie Crosdale, yearning to go solo
(Courtesy of Alice McDonald)
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As soon as he could afford it Charlie had begun learning to fly. An aero club had 
been formed in Newcastle in 1934 and from 1936 had assumed responsibility 
for flying training in country towns to the north and northwest. The RAAF 
did its bit to encourage the local enthusiasts. In May 1937, No. 3 Squadron at 
Richmond sent three Hawker Demons to the Cessnock Aero Club to put on a 
display of formation flying, ‘message picking up’, and aerobatics. Exciting as 
the thought of emulating the daring Air Force pilots was, the costs of flying 
lessons were a dispiriting hurdle. Jack Palmer had also started flying lessons in 
Melbourne but had to give up as his funds ran out. As Jim Fairbairn, the MP 
for Flinders, was to tell the House of Representatives in June 1937: ‘It is most 
disconcerting to me every week or two to be asked by some young man if I 
know of a cheap way of learning to fly. I am unable to give him any advice.’ The 
fact was that the government’s subsidies to the aero clubs were spread thinly 
and, in Fairbairn’s estimation, some 75 per cent of the pupils were learning ‘for 
the sport of it, just as they join golf or tennis clubs’.41
Over four years Charlie Crosdale had managed only 20 hours and 50 minutes dual 
flying time with the Newcastle Aero Club. As Rowley James pointed out to the 
Minister for Defence, because of conditions prevailing at Cessnock Aerodrome 
he had been unable to undertake training there. Nevertheless he had been close 
to going solo when he ran out of cash. With some help from his mother he had 
spent £200, more than he could expect to earn in most years.42
Interviewed at RAAF Station Richmond in 1938, Charlie had been assessed by the 
‘Staff Officer Administrative’ as a ‘very good type of applicant — exceptionally 
keen to become a member of this Service’. He ticked all the boxes. He played 
tennis and cricket, was a cyclist and swimmer. He would serve anywhere and, 
in the language of the interview form, would ‘sleep in barrack room’ and ‘rough 
it’. He had no police record and needed only a week’s notice to present himself 
for duty. It was, he said, his life’s ambition to join the Air Force. All of which 
earned him a score of 75 per cent.
On 16 September 1939, the RAAF Recruiting Centre in Melbourne forwarded 
C. J. Crosdale’s file to their Sydney counterparts. Impressed by his keenness 
and his partial training as a pilot, they had placed him on a waiting list for 
enlistment as a mechanic six weeks earlier. Charlie Crosdale’s flying aspirations 
necessarily were on hold. But he could reasonably expect that his time had come 
when war was declared. He had not allowed for the congestion and memory 
lapses of bureaucracy. It was to take another political intervention, and another 
interstate transfer of files, before he was called up a week before Christmas. 
41 CPD, House of Representatives, 14 Aug. 1940, p.377; minutes, forms, and correspondence in Crosdale’s 
RAAF Record of Service, NAA: A9301/2.
42 Instruction at the Victorian Flying School was £8 an hour (J. D. Balfe, War Without Glory: Australians in 
the air war with Japan 1941–45, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1984, p.15).
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Many others were still waiting to be summoned. A few days later, Jim Fairbairn 
was to appeal to young men not to be disheartened if they were not called up 
immediately. The war would go on, the Air Minister assured them. It was ‘only 
tripe’ to suggest that Germany would ‘crack up’ before long.43
After a brief period at Richmond, Crosdale went to the Engineering School at 
Ascot Vale Showgrounds in Melbourne for four months. Then, after passing yet 
another trade test with a score of 68 per cent, he was sent to No. 21 Squadron at 
Laverton, re-mustered as a flight mechanic in May 1940. Finally he was posted 
as aircraftman 1 to No. 2 Squadron on 4 July 1940.44 In that month the Minister 
for Air announced that the number of men serving or being trained as fitters in 
the RAAF had increased four-fold since September 1939. There were now 2048 
fitters on duty and another 2828 at the Engineering School or technical schools. 
The total was greater than the entire strength of the Air Force, including officers, 
cadets, and airmen, when war began.45
A/C Crosdale under instruction, with S. Graham and Gipsy Major at the 
Nicholas Building, Melbourne Showground, April 1940
(Courtesy of Alice McDonald)
43 Canberra Times, 3 Jan. 1940.
44 Biographical information about Palmer and Crosdale, The Argus, 14 Aug. 1940; Manning, ‘Air Disaster at 
Canberra’, Stand-To, Jan.–Feb. 1962, pp.6–22; Coronial papers, NAA: A1378, P8903; RAAF Record of Service, 
Charles Joseph Crosdale, NAA: A9301/2; Cessnock Eagle, 16 Aug. 1940.
45 Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1940, p.28a.
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Three days before starting in Melbourne in January 1940 Charlie Crosdale had 
married Rita Pearl Ling. Rita was from the tiny township of Ellalong, a few 
kilometres down the road from Paxton. She was one of six children of Benjamin 
and Mary Ling. ‘Everyone seemed to know each other from one village to another,’ 
as one of Charlie’s younger brothers, Norman, and his wife Jan remembered. 
Rita’s brother Mervyn had married Charlie’s sister Cecilia (known as May) in 
1932. Her own honeymoon was short; nothing could impede Charlie’s progress 
now that he had at last achieved his ambition. The Air Force made no provision 
for the travel of airmen’s families or the removal of their furniture and effects.46 
So the new bride had initially remained behind in Paxton, staying with her 
parents-in-law. But soon a happily pregnant Rita had found accommodation in 
Princes Street, Newmarket. By the end of April, with no relatives in Melbourne 
and his wife experiencing ill health, Charlie was granted permission to live ‘off 
station’.
At last the obstacles that had delayed Charlie Crosdale’s enlistment and impeded 
his progress seemed to be surmounted. He had been determined to wear his 
country’s uniform and his mechanical talent was now finding expression in 
servicing the RAAF’s most formidable new aircraft. His wife was receiving £4.4.0 
a fortnight, with another £1.0.0 per fortnight due to be paid for the child on 
the way. Charlie’s service record was impeccable. There was not a single blemish 
on his general conduct sheet, on which ‘Cases of drunkenness (in red ink)’ and 
punishments awarded were routinely entered in the columns provided. He was 
fit, well behaved, and chirpily in his element. ‘He was like a boy who got a toy 
he really wanted,’ a fond sister recalled. To another sister and brother-in-law, 
May and Merv Ling, he had written on Sunday, 28 July 1940: ‘I am in No 2 
Squadron now working on those big Lockheed Hudson bombers. They have 14 
cylinders twin bank radial each motor. They have 2 motors 28 cylinders and boy 
say do them [sic] hum and go.’
He had felt the ‘hum and go’ of the Hudson’s Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp 
1050 hp SC-3G engines in the air. ‘I went to Geelong on Tuesday in mine. We 
went down the bay Port Philip and then flew across the bay to Geelong back 
down the coast home’ through heavy clouds. ‘Hell the scene was wonderful 
up above them.’ Flying at 3500 feet most of the way at 180 miles an hour, as he 
told his mother two weeks later, they could see the Ford manufacturing plant 
at Geelong where the British Fairey Battle light bombers were being assembled. 
He had flown over Melbourne: ‘small from the air I know every inch of it Mum’. 
The new Hudsons were being put through their paces and Charlie delighted 
in telling the family of his flights in A16-97, which had arrived at Laverton on 
August 2:
46 ‘Conditions Governing Enlistment, Promotion, Re-Muster, Transfer and Discharge’, RAAF Form P/P. 30, 
revised Nov. 1939.
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I was up photographing with the photographers in my plane on Monday 
[August 5].47 We were taking photos of all the petrol dumps from 6000 
ft to 2000 ft. Clouds were fairly troublesome but they secured them all 
I think…
When we were coming down from photographing the pilot said hang on 
I am going into a vertical dive and hell we were moving. He pulled out 
at 300 m. p. hour. We were moving Mum.
With Bob Hitchcock at the controls of A16-34, they really were moving. Not as 
fast as Alec Barlow and his crew who had ‘swooped down on Ceduna at over 
330 mph at about 300 feet and scared the devil out of the town’.48 But definitely 
pushing the aircraft. At 6500 feet the Mark I Hudson’s recommended cruising 
speed was 220 mph; maximum speed was supposed to be 246 mph. The air speed 
indicator was calibrated to 300 knots (345 mph) but the highest diving speed 
to which the aircraft had been tested in Lockheed and official trials was 295 
knots (339 mph). The Mark II Hudsons, those numbered from 51 to 100, already 
had enhanced performance; they were faster, carried more weight; had a higher 
service ceiling, and a greater range.49 When Crosdale was not being exhilarated 
in the air or undertaking his normal duties on the ground he was exercising 
some of his other talents. ‘I am doing all the jobs of signing and drawings and 
draughtsman here when they want them.’ The squadron leader had discovered 
his artistic ability. In the intervals between official tasks he found time to do a 
drawing for his father of a miner with a gas mask. He took photos of the planes 
he was tending but was cautious about sending them to his younger brother 
Douglas, known to all as ‘Tiger’, who wanted to show them to his Air League 
friends. If caught, Charlie said, he could be court-martialled and imprisoned 
for five years. ‘Tell him if I send them not to say where he got them but do you 
think Mum it’s worth the risk?’
No such fear inhibited him from sending up a lamp to his parents, He had intended 
to use it for photography but realised that it would make a good reading light if his 
father rigged it up on the bedroom wall. ‘I will draw up a little plan how it works. 
You will not need to get up out of bed to switch the lamp off when it’s fixed up.’ 
Best though that no-one mentioned where the lamp came from: ‘It’s off a Hudson 
Mum. Don’t let on.’ His mother could also look forward to receiving a chrome-
plated butter knife made from a .303 bullet shell. It awaited only engraving. ‘It’s 
wonderful all the machines to work with. I have made myself a nice kit of tools for 
my plane. You would think they were bought.’
47 Hitchcock’s log shows a series of photography sessions in August with Crosdale aboard on the seventh, 
not Monday the fifth.
48 Charles Learmonth diary, quoted in Charles Page, Wings of Destiny: Wing Commander Charles Learmonth 
DFC and Bar and the Air War in New Guinea, Rosenberg, Dural, 2008, p.64.
49 Information from Rich Stadler, Office of Public Information, Lockheed-California Company; ‘Diving 
Speed of Lockheed Hudson Aircraft’, A.F.C.O. 69, 12 July 1940, NAA: A7674, 1/115.
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On August 13, Charlie Crosdale was about to take to the air again, this time with 
some of the most famous and powerful men in the country. He had been laid low 
for five weeks with the new strain of influenza and bronchitis that had swept 
through the Laverton base defying medical remedies. He was clearly suffering, 
as he told May and Merv Ling, from exposure to the ‘cold bleak wind howling 
in…straight into our hangars from the direction of Ballarat and by hell we know 
it’. But he was determined to take his place that day. On Monday night he 
finished a long letter to his mother, ‘it’s 8.30 and I have to work in the morning’. 
If he was lucky, his cough would not keep him awake and he would travel down 
to Laverton refreshed to begin the preparations for the trip to Canberra. But he 
had not counted on the premature arrival of his first child. In the early hours of 
Tuesday morning, Rita’s labour began. He took her to Queen Victoria Memorial 
Hospital in the city, the hospital established by women and run by women. 
Should he leave his wife there with no family to support her? Would he in any 
case be able to make it to the base in time?
Rita Crosdale had no doubt what her husband’s priority should be. As she 
later told her sister-in-law, she said: ‘Look, you are so intent on going on this 
important flight with all those ministers, you go. I’ll be alright.’ With mixed 
feelings the anxious father-to-be rushed to Laverton. There his best friend 
offered to take his place. But there was no time for the necessary change of 
clothes, approval, and paperwork. Joining Jack Palmer, the wireless operator, in 
a greatcoat over his Air Force blues to keep out the chill morning wind, Charlie 
was to climb aboard and complete the final checks before confirming that his 
aircraft, A16-97, was ready for the flight.50
50 Biographical information about Crosdale, The Argus, 14 Aug. 1940; Manning, ‘Air Disaster at Canberra’, 
Stand-To, Jan.–Feb. 1962, pp.6–22; Coronial papers, NAA: A1378 P8903; RAAF Record of Service, Charles 
Joseph Crosdale, NAA: A9301/2. C. Crosdale to Mrs G. Crosdale, 12 Aug. 1940, Crosdale MSS. I have silently 
inserted punctuation where its absence would be distracting. Mrs R. McDonald to CH, 6 Sept., 14 Oct. 1977, 
24 May, 7 June, 27 June 1978. I am particularly grateful to Charlie Crosdale’s brother and sister-in-law Norman 
and Jan Crosdale for compiling genealogical information, and to his sister, Alice McDonald, for allowing me 
to see and copy family letters and photographs, and for her recollections of her brother’s employment history.
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4. Second seat: Dick Wiesener
The clutch of new pilot officers who presented themselves for duty at No. 2 
Squadron on Monday, 12 August 1940 exemplified the varied backgrounds and 
destinies of the RAAF’s wartime officer recruits. All but one appeared to meet 
the threshold criterion of being under 28 years of age when he enlisted — before 
war broke out they would need to have been under 26 and unmarried. All must 
have been found by an examining medical officer to be free of scrofula, phthisis, 
syphilis, defective intelligence, defects of vision, voice or hearing, traces of 
corporal punishment, marked varicocele ‘with unusually pendent testicle’, ‘or 
any other disease or physical defect calculated to unfit him for the duties of a 
soldier [sic]’. All would be deemed to be of ‘pure European descent’. All would 
have survived a discreet enquiry to their local constabulary as to their good 
character, criminal record, or ‘blameless life’ after any serious offences ‘many 
years ago’.1 Their seniority would be based on the date of their appointment as 
an officer. If graduated from a course of flying training they would be ranked 
on the results obtained in the practical tests during the course and the final 
graduation examination. They would be on probation for six months, after 
which — if their copy books were clean — they could expect promotion to 
flying officer.2
The first of the group parading themselves before Squadron Leader Fred 
Thomas at Laverton was Peter Fowler, of the Sydney earthenware, pottery, and 
stoneware family. Almost 23 years old, a quiet, slightly prickly character, as his 
contemporary Bob Dalkin recalled, his reserve was perhaps a reaction to years 
of ragging about wash basins, toilets, and urinals. After being posted to No. 1 
Squadron in Malaya, ‘Chook’ Fowler was to be captured by the Japanese and 
spend much of the war in a Thai prison camp. William Vyner Duckett White, a 
hard-drinking company manager, Inverell born, had farmed and been engaged 
in mining in Kenya, learned to fly in Sydney, and served in Shanghai with the 
1 Air Board Agenda 2714, 5 Feb. 1940, NAA: A4181, 17. Pre-war ‘candidates for entry’ were screened by the 
Fingerprint Office and the City Watchhouse as well as their local police station; for example, R. L. Peverell (NAA: 
A9301). The Secretary of the Air Board was appalled at the suggestion by the Air Member for Personnel that 
men with recent convictions might be recruited: ‘Can’t we get enough without resorting to these types?’ Within 
weeks, the War Cabinet had decided that ‘in view of the heavy personnel commitments under the Empire Air 
Scheme, aliens and British subjects of non-European origin or descent should be permitted, at the discretion 
of the Air Board, to serve in the RAAF during the war’ (Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting, 29 Feb. 1940, NAA: 
A2673). Confidential enquiries (Form P/P 35) were made as to whether candidates were ‘sober, honest and 
respectable’, or were recorded by the Special Branch as members of ‘any Communist organization’ (W. E. Belfield, 
NAA: A9301, 13041).
2 ‘Conditions of Entry to Commissioned Rank in the RAAF’, RAAF Publication No. 3, revised July 1939. 
Bizarre as the list of disqualifying conditions might seem, the American authority H. G. Armstrong’s standard 
treatise, Principles and Practice of Aviation Medicine (1939), stated that candidates for pilot training should be 
rejected if they had elephantiasis, Hodgkin’s disease, or hydrocephalus. ‘Why’, the Medical Journal of Australia 
reviewer asked, ‘did he not add leprosy and yaws while he was at it?’ (MJA, I, 25, 22 June 1940, p.868).
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
54
British militia force and Chiang Kai-shek, before returning finally to Sydney. 
Determined to fly with the RAAF, he put his age down by four years. ‘Dark, 
handsome and tough, with a shining personality’, as Bob Dalkin recorded after 
his death, Bill ‘VD’ White was to be the first in his squadron to be awarded the 
DFC; he too was captured, and executed by the Japanese in February 1942.3 
David Campbell, thinking himself only 15 months White’s junior, arrived at 
No. 2 Squadron later in the month and remembered a man apparently ‘quite 
a lot older than the rest’. He especially remembered White’s daily bottle of 
whisky that may have contributed to the prematurely aged appearance of a 
man with a colourful past. Campbell himself was a Cambridge graduate and 
rugby international with a NSW grazing background. He had learned to fly in 
Cambridge. Joining the RAAF as a cadet in November 1939, he was commissioned 
in February 1940, and was to end the war as a temporary Wing Commander 
with a DFC and bar of which he rarely spoke, and to become one of Australia’s 
most admired poets.4 The third man was a professional pilot. Robert Nixon ‘Bob’ 
Dalkin, who had just earned his unrestricted commercial pilot’s licence with the 
W. R. Carpenter company in New Guinea before joining the RAAF aged 26 at the 
beginning of 1940, was to serve with distinction north of Australia and in RAF 
Bomber Command, eventually retiring as an RAAF Air Commodore.5
Dalkin, White, and Fowler were accompanied by Dick Wiesener, a 29-year-old 
accountant from Sydney, enlisted by special authority nine days after the birthday 
that in ordinary circumstances would have disqualified him.6 Making friends 
with the even older Bill White during intermediate flying training at No. 26 
Flying Training School, Wiesener had done his share of carousing and stunting, 
and waving the wings of small aircraft over family in Edgecliff and Strathfield. 
He and the others, as well as Noel Quinn and Paul Metzler, had all — to their 
3 James Affleck (ed.), Geelong Grammarians at World War Two, Old Geelong Grammarians Inc., 2002, 
pp.91–2, evidently confusing him with someone  else, states that White returned to Australia in Nov. 1940 to 
join the RAAF. Cf. R. N. Dalkin diary, Feb. 1942, RAAF Hudson Squadrons Association Newsletter, 49, May 
2002, p.5. Dalkin and the Ambon Memorial Roll of Honour described William Vyner Duckett White as 32 at 
the time of his death but his RAAF personnel record shows his date of birth as Oct. 1913. On White’s hard 
drinking and appearing hale and hearty after 90 minutes’ sleep: Kym Bonython, Ladies’ Legs & Lemonade, 
Rigby, Adelaide, 1979, p.44. I am grateful to Geoffrey White (interview, 29 Jan. 2010) for information about 
his uncle. White, Dalkin, and John Ryland appear in the Department of  Information film, ‘Keeping our Sea 
Lanes Open’. White’s active service is recounted in Balfe, War Without Glory, passim.
4 David Campbell, telephone interview, 24 May 1978; Leonie Kramer, ‘Campbell, David Watt Ian (1915–
1979)’, John Ritchie and Christopher Cunneen (eds.), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 13, Melbourne 
UP, 1993, pp.356–7.
5 J. C. Waters, Valiant Youth: The Men of the R.A.A.F., F. H. Johnston Publishing Co., Sydney, 1945, pp.58–
60; for Dalkin’s experiences as a Hudson pilot see Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book Two, passim.
6 ACdre R. N. Dalkin, interview, 18 April 1978, recalled the arrival of the four new pilot officers whose 
postings are shown in Station Routine Orders No. 98, 2 Sept. 1940, NAA: A10605/8 Box 503, vol. 7/HQ 
Laverton. Dalkin erred in his later recollection (quoted in David Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book 
One, Highbury, 1999, p.152) that Campbell was one of the group arriving on 12 Aug. 1940. Campbell himself 
recalled arriving ‘a week or two later’ (telephone interview, 24 May 1978). Campbell does not appear in the 
Aug. 1940 group photograph of officers in Bennett, Highest Traditions, pp.108, 112. R. A. Dunne and N. G. 
Hemsworth, who are in the photo, were posted as flying officers on 26 Aug. 1940.
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disappointment — been posted to the navigation reconnaissance school at 
Point Cook. Navigational skills, more than ever essential for the RAAF’s newer 
bomber aircraft, larger and with longer ranges, were increasingly understood 
to require special training. The days of a lone pilot, sometimes with a jack-of-
all-trades observer, were passing. In the United Kingdom in April 1938 it had 
been calculated that in the previous two years Bomber Command pilots had 
lost their way and made forced landings on 478 occasions. Just over a year later 
a senior RAF officer reported that even in daylight flying, above clouds, dead-
reckoning navigation could not be relied upon to get an aircraft closer than 50 
miles from its destination.7 The establishment of the General Reconnaissance 
School as a separate unit on 29 April 1940, initially at Point Cook, was a step 
towards meeting the need for specialist navigation officers as well as enhancing 
the skills of all of the RAAF’s general duty pilots.8
No. 8 Navigation Reconnaissance Course, RAAF. From left: back row: 
Pilot Officers Bill White, Dick Wiesener, Bob Dalkin, Tom Skillman, Ron 
Cornfort; front row: Peter Fowler, Barry Hack, Harold Croker, Noel Quinn, 
Lin Hurt, Paul Metzler
(Courtesy of Geoffrey White and the Australian War Memorial, No. P00946.004)
7 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939–1945, vol. 1: 
Preparation Parts 1, 2, and 3, HMSO, 1961, pp.110–2.
8 Tim Coyle, ‘Track Made Good: A history of air navigation in the Royal Australian Air Force and its 
predecessor, the Australian Flying Corps 1914 to 1945’, PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, Australian 
Defence Force Academy, 2006, Ch. 2 is a comprehensive account of developments 1938–40.
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Demand for Hudson pilots
Although later they were to appreciate the value of their work on astro navigation 
and spherical trigonometry, maps, charts, sextants, and compasses, the navigation 
reconnaissance group envied their peers who had been posted direct to flying 
duties. Some, like Bill White and his wealthy friend Ron Cornfoot, ‘took our 
flying seriously but the academic side bored us, so we drank beer and played 
billiards in the mess every night instead of studying’.9 Like his other drinking 
companion, Wiesener, White had qualified in accountancy and worked as an 
auditor. They also had the celebrated swashbuckling miscreant Errol Flynn in 
common ― briefly, before he was expelled, a pupil with Wiesener at Shore 
(Sydney Church of England Grammar School); and in White’s case as a fellow 
junior at Dalgety’s headquarters in Sydney whence Flynn had been dismissed 
after trying to shift blame to the innocent White for the disappearance of £50 
from petty cash.10
What the happy bunch graduating from the navigation reconnaissance school 
were probably only dimly aware of was the dilemma that their superiors at Central 
Area in Point Piper and Air Force headquarters in Toorak were struggling with. 
The RAAF had to balance the urgent need for qualified pilots to captain and 
navigate the newly arrived Hudsons as well as meet the demand for general 
flying instruction. The Air Minister himself had been quoted at the end of 
1939 as saying that flying had changed so much since he earned his wings that 
he was amazed that competent pilots could be trained to fly such complicated 
modern machines in six months.11 Jim Fairbairn’s observation had a concerning 
undertone. On July 2, in the very week Dalkin, Wiesener, and the others began 
their navigation course at Laverton, the commanding officer of Central Area, 
Air Commodore Adrian ‘King’ Cole, wrote personally to Group Captain George 
Jones, Director of Training:
Mr Parker, of the Lockheed Aircraft Factory, tells me, after observing 
the training and general flying in conversion course at RICHMOND, that 
it is his opinion that the pilots for Lockheed aircraft should be seeded 
in such a way as to provide for those whose records show that they 
9 R. G. Cornfoot to Anthony White, 13 July 1984, courtesy of Geoffrey White. Cornfoot, son of a dairy 
products manufacturer, Geelong Grammar educated, became an outstanding Hudson squadron leader (Balfe, 
War Without Glory, passim).
10 Note by Geoffrey D. White, enclosed with letter to Bob Dalkin, 4 May 1988, copy, courtesy Geoffrey 
White; John Hammond Moore, The Young Errol: Flynn Before Hollywood, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 
1975, pp.23–8. According to the boy whose bed was next to Flynn’s, the expulsion from Shore was a result of 
repeated stealing, not the boasted dalliances with a maid in the coal heap (Kate Riseley [Shore School archivist] 
to CH, 24 Jan. 2012).
11 The Argus, 20 Dec. 1939.
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are above the average. In this connection, it has come to notice that 
some of the pilots posted to Lockheed squadrons have the following 
endorsements on their passing-out report:
“Weak at instrument flying”
“Generally slow, mentally” &c &c
Cole then alluded to another sensitive issue:
In view of the extreme necessity of saving equipment, it would seem 
better to employ this type on instructing, where, during the six months 
they would be so employed, there would be a chance of their picking up 
leeway in the aspects in which they are weak.
To make up for a reduced flow of Hudson pilots Cole suggested that a number 
of first-class pilots, particularly those from civil life who had been posted to 
instructing, would be better able to successfully fly the more challenging 
machines. Such experienced men could be relied upon, ‘observing the economy 
necessary in equipment…to take the extreme care which is necessary on the 
controls to save petrol consumption and protect the engine’.
Knowingly or not, Cole was about to touch off a paper war at headquarters. 
He announced that, pending further instructions, he had already ‘arranged’ 
with Wing Commander Alan Charlesworth to ‘seed the Hudson squadrons’ in 
his Area and was recommending to Melbourne the alterations in postings that 
would give effect to his recommendations. Two days later, Cole wrote formally to 
the Secretary of the Air Board: ‘…it is considered that unless Hudson squadrons 
are given better material from which to train Captains, the accident rate will 
increase out of all proportion, or else the squadron will spend an indefinite 
period on training, in an attempt to produce a qualified pilot.’
Speaking specifically to his own Area’s concern, he said that too many experienced 
pilots had been posted away, leaving his No. 6 Squadron with only three officers, 
including the CO, qualified to captain Hudsons. There were three more partly 
trained, and a cluster of 15 young pilot officers or air cadets with some 100 
flying hours each on Demons and Wirraways. Cole accepted the conventional 
view that the Service should not be producing a cadre of ‘specialised’ pilots. 
But Hudson pilots should, he argued, be capable and experienced, not young 
men who had only just finished their flying course. ‘Fundamentally the flying 
of one type is the same as any other, but it is in the temperament, reliability, and 
ability to handle modern engines that experience plays such an important part.’
What followed in Cole’s submission was that a number of the men currently 
employed in flying training were potential Hudson pilots and should be re-
assigned for this priority role without delay. Five of them should be replaced by 
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the inexperienced second pilots who ‘after a period on flying training, would 
be infinitely better material for training on Hudsons’. By taking action as well 
as minuting his ideas, Cole was displaying the inherent tension in the RAAF’s 
devolved command structure. If his recommendations were to be followed 
they would entail closer co-operation not only between Area commands and 
headquarters but between the Training and Personal Services branches. George 
Jones, Director of Training, bluntly disagreed ‘that ex civil pilots should be 
posted to Hudson squadrons and that those who have recently graduated from 
our own schools should be employed on instructing. One cannot generalise in 
this way.’ The policy should be that the posting of individuals must depend 
on their qualifications. In fact, Jones went on in a minute to the Director of 
Personal Services, sensing an opportunity to expand the influence of his 
training domain, ‘there should be closer liaison between us in…selecting pilots 
for different units. I suggest that the proposed posting of pilots might be passed 
to this branch for comment before issue of Orders.’
A battle for organisational territory was under way. Jones, an introvert, trusting 
no-one, was not going to have his carefully drawn plans subverted.12 The Sydney 
démarche had to be crushed. With a file created, and views invited, branch 
heads scrambled. Group Captain F. M. ‘Dad’ Bladin, Director of Operations and 
Intelligence, mischievously pointed out that the Deputy Director of Postings 
had ‘always shown him his intentions’ about postings from units, and he in 
turn left postings to units to the good sense of the DPS ‘hoping that pilots were 
posted in accordance with recommendations from their S. F. T. S.[Service Flying 
Training School]’. Bladin was confident that if the right people were chosen 
for the navigation reconnaissance course, from which all first pilots would now 
be coming, ‘we should automatically get the better class pilots for 1st pilot in 
Hudsons’. One of Jones’s staff, Squadron Leader Joshua McDonald, head of 
flying training (and contemporary of Bob Hitchcock at No. 21 Squadron in 1936), 
dutifully opposed the idea of sending below-average pilots from Service flying 
training schools to be instructors. The result, he sensibly concluded, would be 
‘their poor standard being reflected throughout the service’. McDonald noted 
that pilots who were selected for the navigation reconnaissance school would 
not normally get more than 15 hours as a pilot during the course. They would 
be ‘scarcely more experienced in the handling of an aircraft as pilot, than one 
who goes to a Squadron direct from the S. F. T. S.’.
Determined not to concede, Jones reiterated on July 26 that no general rule 
should determine postings. He reminded colleagues that he had asked the 
Director of Recruiting to appoint as many experienced civil pilots as possible. 
He agreed that comparatively inexperienced pilots, whatever their background, 
12 Peter Helson, The Private Air Marshal: A Biography of Air Marshal Sir George Jones, Air Power 
Development Centre, Canberra, 2010, passim.
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should be sent to bombing and gunnery schools, air observers’ schools, and 
wireless air gunners’ schools before posting to service units, particularly those 
equipped with Hudsons. But he did not agree that a pilot who had reached ‘a 
satisfactory standard’ on the locally built Wirraways could not be converted in 
a ‘reasonable period’ to fly Hudsons. Jones’s conclusion was emphatic:
There is definitely a tendency to over state the difficulties and standard 
required for piloting this type of aircraft. The only general principle 
that I can agree to is that our more experienced pilots should be 
posted to service units, particularly Hudsons, on account of the heavy 
responsibility involved. It will be necessary, however, to make exceptions 
to even this rule, and I feel that we must endeavour to hold the balance 
by giving careful consideration to each individual’s qualifications.
Reviewing all the documented information about accidents, Jones did not need 
to be reminded of the dangers of inexperience and lack of vigilance by young 
junior officers. He knew too that even a seasoned Hudson instructor like Alec 
Barlow, an ex-Australian National Airways captain and Lockheed 14 pilot with 
over 7 000 hours flying time, might not always anticipate a lapse of judgment 
by a pupil.13 And Jones had the ear of his chief. Overseeing these exchanges, 
and privy to the internal reports on accidents, had been Air Commodore W. 
H. Anderson, the Air Member for Personnel. One of his subordinates was to 
write of Anderson, an outstanding Melbourne Grammar student, artillery 
officer, AFC and RAAF veteran, that ‘he was slow and so immersed in the 
minutiae of administration that some important policy matters languished’.14 
The languishing was now over. Anderson concurred with Jones and called for 
a reply to Cole to be drafted. There was to be no recall of men already posted.15
For pilots like Dalkin, Fowler, and White — experienced civil flyers of modern 
aircraft — and even Wiesener, who was a licensed pilot before enlistment, 
posting to a Hudson squadron was likely under whatever policy was adopted. 
Having moved to Laverton on July 4 and completed their navigation assignment 
with the brilliant 24-year-old Flight Lieutenant Deryck Kingwell and Squadron 
Leader Dallas Charlton on Friday August 9, they transferred into No. 2 
Squadron that weekend and prepared to present themselves on Monday to their 
commanding officer Fred Thomas. They were all excited about the prospect 
of getting to know the Hudsons after spending three months in Ansons and 
previously converting at Richmond in New South Wales on Hawker Demons. 
None of them had as much as been up in a Hudson. As soon as they arrived, 
Dalkin said, ‘we all sort of crawled over the aeroplane’.
13 Barlow: Examiner (Launceston), 8 August 1935.
14 J. E. Hewitt, Adversity in Success, Langate Publishing, South Yarra, 1980, p.3.
15 The lively exchange is documented in ‘Policy of training First Pilots — Lockheed Hudson aircraft — 
Posting of inexperienced pilots to Units equipped with’, NAA: A705, 208/1/1533/1–19.
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Later, while Dalkin, White, and Fowler were poring over manuals, Wiesener 
stole a march on his friends. Someone, probably Wilbur Wackett, gave him a ride 
behind the pilots during an instruction flight.16 Nothing he had experienced 
before had prepared him for the sensation. ‘God, you’ve never seen anything 
like it,’ he told the other three; ‘the belt in the back when you open the 
throttles.’ Dalkin later elaborated on Wiesener’s report: ‘He commented on the 
“tremendous power” available to the pilot on take-off from the two 900 [sic] 
horsepower twin-row Pratt and Whitney engines; the mass of instruments and 
ancillaries, the modern layout, the effectiveness of the hydraulic undercarriage, 
bomb doors and Fowler flaps…’17
‘One of you chaps has got to come with me to 
Canberra tomorrow.’
After lunch on Monday afternoon, although they had been dispersed into 
different flights, the four newcomers were together listening to Wiesener recount 
the joy of the Hudson he had been in that morning, when Bob Hitchcock came 
into the room. It was time to nominate from among the new arrivals someone to 
sit in the second pilot’s seat on the flight to Canberra and begin to learn about 
the Air Force’s front line machine. Bob Dalkin recalled the scene:
I don’t remember ever seeing Hitchcock before that moment…And he 
came in very smartly. He was a small man. He said ‘One of you chaps 
has got to come with me to Canberra tomorrow.’ And we all, you know, 
thought ‘this is big stuff, this is really getting close to things.’ Bear in 
mind none of us were qualified in any way. But I have always thought 
that when he said that he knew who he was going to take.
Whatever the impulse ― perhaps Thomas had made the suggestion to his C 
Flight Commander ― there was no hesitation: ‘Wiesener, you’d better come. Get 
your gear.’ Whereupon Wiesener ‘scurried round, got his gear and went off, not 
with Hitchcock but after him’.18
16 Wiesener’s presence is not recorded in the log books of Ryland, Garrett, Heath, Thomas or Hitchcock. I 
have not traced the log book of Wilbur Wackett.
17 ACdre Bob Dalkin, typescript ‘The 13th August 1940’, July 1991, courtesy Peter Dalkin, quoted in 
Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book Two, p.249. The Hudson provided over 1000 hp on take-off; 900 hp 
at 12 000 feet.
18 I quote here from Dalkin’s 1978 interview with me rather than the more polished 1991 typescript. 
Andrew Tink (Air Disaster Canberra: the plane crash that destroyed a government, Newsouth, Sydney, 2013, 
pp.152–3) says that S/Ldr Thomas directed who the crew should be. The copy of Carey’s flying operation 
instruction given to the president of the Service Court (WCdr Lachal) on Aug. 13 contains a list of the crew 
and other notes about the route, ballast, parachutes, etc., in Thomas’s hand (Service Court, Appendix E). 
Thomas  told the Air Court of Inquiry that he had added ‘remarks, with my instructions’; but the crew list 
might have been a record of what had been discussed and agreed with Hitchcock rather than a decision given 
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Pilot Officer Dick Wiesener, the only surviving portrait
(Courtesy of Margot Buttrose)
It seems Wiesener’s glowing reputation as the head of the order of merit in 
No. 27 Flying Training Course had preceded him. Appearing perhaps a little 
more polished than the other newcomers, there was more to his background 
than his personnel file would have revealed. He was formerly an accountant 
with the Sydney office of Sorenson, Purves, and Co. He was married with 
a son and daughter, and his wife was carrying a third child. Grandson of a 
German emigrant clockmaker who became a prominent optical, mathematical, 
and surveying instrument maker; son of a prosperous Macquarie Street eye 
specialist, Richard Frederick Wiesener was born on the last day of 1910.19 He was 
educated initially at a small local private school, Strathfield Grammar. Founded 
to the pilot. There is some confusion here: Thomas also tendered a copy of the flying operation instruction 
to the Air Court (Exhibit No. 1) stating that it was the one, with his additions, ‘handed to the captain of the 
aircraft’ on Aug. 12. It would appear therefore that Hitchcock did not carry ‘his’ copy with him the next day.
19 Bennett, Highest Traditions, p.108 has Wiesener born in 1920. For Wiesener’s education and employment: 
Annex to Department of Air Press Release, 13 Aug. 1940, NAA: A98451, 318/43.
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in 1917 by a group of Congregationalists with just 19 boys, Strathfield Grammar 
proudly proclaimed its aim to ‘establish strong Christian character’ and ‘develop 
a sound physique and a healthy interest in games’, while preparing boys for 
the Intermediate Certificate examination ‘or for the Intermediate Classes of the 
Great Public Schools’.
Dick Wiesener and his fellow students — 100 were enrolled along with him by 
1919 — enjoyed the environs of the splendid mansion ‘Llandilo’, built in 1878 
by the eminent consulting physician Sir Philip Sydney Jones. Jones had died 
in 1918; his property was sub-divided, and the new school bought his house 
on one of the highest points in what were then Sydney’s western suburbs. 
As the school prospectus shamelessly confided, ‘Many cultured and wealthy 
people’ had followed Jones, son of the founder of the Sydney retail emporium, 
to Strathfield. Seven miles from the ‘enervating moist sea-air’ of central Sydney, 
‘Strathfield became, and remains, one of the leading residential suburbs.’ The 
school was just 12 minutes’ walk to the junction of four suburban railway lines, 
and a stopping place for country trains. Trams from surrounding areas passed 
close by. Thus it was convenient and safe for boarders, and day boys could 
‘avoid the dangers of changing trains or of passing through the City’.
Offering tuition in English Grammar and Literature, Latin, French, Arithmetic, 
Algebra, Geometry, History, Geography and Elementary Science, at eight levels, 
and meeting the extra-curricular expectations of the city’s mercantile elite, 
must have demanded a great deal of the five teachers who assisted Strathfield’s 
principal proprietor and headmaster. F. F. Wheaton, who had earned his B.A. 
(Syd.) as an evening student, began each day with prayers and scripture 
readings. His school provided for football, cricket, tennis and swimming, as 
well as a physical culture class with Robert Rae Turner, a partner in the rapidly 
growing Bjelke-Petersen Bros School of Physical Culture. A music tutor was 
available. All pupils had 15 minutes of exercise and drill every morning; and 
older boys like Dick fulfilled their compulsory military training requirements 
as junior cadets. At £5.15.6 per term for tuition for students over 12, and six 
guineas for the Intermediate candidates, it was a barely viable enterprise. The 
boarding option was terminated after three years and the school was bought 
by nearby Trinity Grammar in 1926, losing its separate identity six years later.
Strathfield Grammar’s records have not survived. All we know of Dick’s brief 
time there is that he competed in heat three of the under-14 100 yards handicap in 
the fifth annual sports meeting in 1923. More auspiciously, at the same meeting, 
competing in the under-14 220 yards championship, was a young member of 
the neighbouring Beale family, a son of Ronald Matthew Beale, scion of the 
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Sydney piano and sewing machine manufacturing firm.20 Dick was soon to meet 
and be smitten by his school friend’s sister, Elizabeth Joan, a pupil at Meriden, 
Strathfield’s private school for girls. Betty Beale, as she was then known, was tall 
and fair-haired with two long plaits. Always full of fun, her friend Betty Kessell 
remembered, and a good tennis player, she knew Dick’s own sisters, Mollie and 
Betty. They too were Meriden girls, and their youngest sister Patricia would 
follow. By 1924 there were so many Bettys in one of the Meriden senior classes 
that it was agreed that some of them would change their names. Betty Kessell 
became Bettina. Betty Beale became Joan. As they grew older, past and present 
Bettys, their friends, brothers and brothers’ friends enjoyed weekend tennis 
parties on family courts, afternoon teas, and dancing to gramophone records.
Agreeable as the after-hours and weekend company was, Dick outgrew the Rev. 
Wheaton’s establishment. To complete his schooling he moved in 1924 to the 
more prestigious Sydney Church of England Grammar School on the North 
Shore. Mysteriously, his new school’s register records that at that time he was 
a ‘ward of E. C. Mackay Westhoven Bancroft Ave Roseville’. Both his parents 
were alive and Edward Mackay’s identity has proved elusive. Neither school 
archives nor family memory provide an explanation for the wardship. But it 
was not uncommon for boys at Shore, as the school was familiarly known, to 
live out. As Bancroft Avenue is just around the corner from Roseville railway 
station it would have been a convenient place to board and travel to North 
Sydney station. Conceivably, Dick’s parents had left him with a guardian while 
travelling overseas, his father having completed his medical course in 1923 and 
been appointed to an honorary post as an ophthalmic surgeon at St Vincent’s 
Hospital.
At Shore, Dick encountered some of the brightest boys in Sydney. The school 
had recently appointed Leonard Robson, a 28-year-old mathematics master 
from Geelong Grammar, as its headmaster; and the young broom, a Rhodes 
Scholar with an MC earned as an AIF lieutenant, was sweeping out moribund 
masters and himself taking the senior maths classes.21 Under the guidance of 
enthusiastic new staff, Dick was to compete with the gifted classics scholar Tom 
Dunbabin, who would become Reader in Classical Archaeology in Oxford, a 
Fellow of All Souls, and a decorated wartime intelligence officer and resistance 
leader in Crete; Laurie Fitzhardinge, a historian and versifier whose heart was 
to be in ancient Sparta but who was chosen by ex-Prime Minister Billy Hughes 
20 I am grateful to Alison Field, Trinity College archivist, for information about Strathfield Grammar School; 
to Diana Tilley-Winyard (archivist), Bettina Gowing, and Anne Cooke, Visions of Parnassus: Meriden’s first 
100 years, Meriden School, 1997, for details of Meriden in the 1920s; and to Welwyn Petersen and Kate Riseley 
for material from Shore Archives. 
21 G. E. Sherington, ‘Robson, Leonard Charles (1894–1964)’, John Ritchie and Di Langmore (eds), Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, vol. 16, MUP, 2002, pp.115–7; Peter Taylor, A Celebration of Shore, Sydney Church of 
England Grammar School in assoc. with Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988, pp.31–3.
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to write his biography; and the brilliant mathematician and physics student 
David Myers, whose glittering career in electrical engineering would culminate 
in his appointment as the first Vice-Chancellor of Latrobe University. Between 
them these four carried off most of the school prizes in their final year, with 
Fitzhardinge and Dunbabin scooping the major state awards in the Leaving 
Certificate examinations.
When he left Shore at the end of 1927, shortly after his libidinous rascal 
contemporary Errol Flynn was expelled, Wiesener had topped Form VIb and 
had passed seven Leaving Certificate subjects, with first-class honours in English 
and second-class honours in Physics.22 Having beaten David Myers for the school 
Physics prize, the second-class honour would have been a disappointment. Yet 
it may have been that Dick’s competitive motivation was diminished as he had 
already determined on a non-academic future. Unlike his clever peers he did 
not go on to Sydney University. Instead, in a step that might have puzzled those 
who did not know his family connections, at the age of 18 he took up a five-
year apprenticeship in Wollongong as an electrical fitter. In this step he would 
have enjoyed the support of his headmaster who had declared that ‘the national 
prosperity depends more than ever before upon a high level of efficiency and 
endeavour in productive industrial and commercial life’.23
Transferring after three years to special electrical welding work, Dick was 
employed at Australian Iron and Steel’s Port Kembla steelworks. His introduction 
to AI&S was through his mother, Wilmot, daughter of Charles and Emily 
Hoskins. His maternal grandfather was the founder of AI&S. His uncles, Cecil 
and Sid, were joint managing directors of the AI&S enterprise, owner of mines, 
quarries, and foundries as well as the iron and steel works, and employer of 
over 3000 people. The company, possibly the largest private company in the 
nation until it went public in 1928, was hurt by the Depression. Its reliance on 
government contracts made it especially vulnerable to the collapsing economy 
of New South Wales. Yet even when fortunes were low there was always a place 
for a talented nephew in the family business.24
Dick had worked his way up from the shop floor but was evidently on the 
fast track to promotion. He was sent away for two periods of six months in 
22 When Wiesener filled in his application for the RAAF he remembered only six Leaving Certificate 
subjects but doubled his number of first-class honours.
23 Geoffrey Sherington, Shore: A History of Sydney Church of England Grammar School, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, 1983, p.114.
24 George Parsons, ‘Hoskins, Charles Henry (1851–1926)’, Nairn and Serle (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 9, pp.371–3; Sir Cecil Hoskins, The Hoskins Saga, Halstead Press, Sydney, 1969, p.119; Jim 
Hagan & Henry Lee (eds), A History of Work and Community in Wollongong, Halstead Press in assoc. with 
Wollongong UP, Sydney, 2001, p.82; Donald G. Hoskins, The Ironmaster: The Life of Charles Hoskins 1851–
1926, University of Wollongong Press, 1995; E. M. Johnston-Liik, George Liik, R. G. Ward, A Measure of 
Greatness: The Origins of the Australian Iron and Steel Industry, Melbourne UP, 1998.
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the United States investigating steel pipe plants and new processes in the steel 
industry. But he had other ambitions. Port Kembla’s grim environment and 
industrial strife held little appeal. By the time the family company was acquired 
by BHP in 1935 his heart was set on marriage, moving back to Sydney, and 
becoming a chartered accountant. He and his childhood sweetheart Joan, who 
had been born a day before him, were engaged late in 1933 and married in 
March 1935. Their first son, Richard Antony, was born in July 1937. Margot 
Abbey followed in November 1938.
Dick soon passed the intermediate examination and final law examination of 
the Chartered Institute of Accountants, and joined the firm of Halberg, Parsons, 
and Anderson as an audit clerk. After further experience with Smith, Johnson 
and Co., he moved as a fully-fledged cost accountant to become an audit clerk 
with Sorenson, Purves. There he became close to Ray Purves, the head of 
the Sydney office of the firm, who was only six months older than his new 
recruit. Meanwhile Dick had served three years in the Militia (19th and 34th 
battalions), reaching the rank of corporal. But like so many of his generation 
of independently wealthy professional men he also caught the flying bug. He 
was one of the earliest applicants under the pre-war civil air reserve plan. He 
had earned a civil ‘A’ pilot’s licence a few months before joining the RAAF 
as an Air Cadet in January 1940 (Service number 607). Beginning at Mascot 
in No. 28 Flying Training Course A with C Flight, No. 4 Elementary Flying 
Training School, he completed his Service flying training with No. 22 Squadron 
at Richmond and was awarded a Distinguished Pass with a score of 85.14 per 
cent.25 He was granted a commission as a pilot officer on probation in the Citizen 
Air Force on 4 May 1940.
The generally available record of Wiesener’s training told a story that culminated 
in brilliant achievement. But before passing out at the top of No. 28 Flying 
Training Course A he had some inglorious moments. On his arrival at Mascot on 
9 January 1940, he was taken into the care of W. E. Clarke, an instructor with 
Airflite (Training) Pty Ltd. Sixteen cadets under the command of Squadron 
Leader Alfred Ellis had been distributed between the Royal Aero Club, the 
Kingsford Smith Air Services Co., and Airflite. Six more went to Newcastle Aero 
Club. Subsidies to aero clubs having been abolished, cadets were being trained 
(unprofitably it was claimed) for £2.12.6 an hour. Clarke noted that his new 
pupil already had 25 hours solo but had not previously been in a DH82 (Tiger 
Moth). It was soon apparent that Dick’s skills were only ‘fair’ at best. And he 
was suffering from air-sickness, for which the remedy was more spins. Allowed 
to go solo after seven hours, he was given a progress test after 11 days. Flight 
Lieutenant George Coleman, the chief flying instructor, was unflattering: 
25 AOC Laverton to Secretary Air Board, 9 May 1940, NAA: A705, 208/17/44. Wiesener’s name is consistently 
misspelled in the course reports. The score is given elsewhere as 81 per cent.
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Thinks very slowly and not very deeply. Generally an erratic and 
inconsistent pupil who will have to be watched carefully & prevented 
from developing wrong conclusions in his rather unusual train of 
thought. Reactions slow. Progress to be watched carefully.
Three hours and 40 minutes solo flying later, Airflite’s chief flying instructor 
found the pupil’s ‘Judgement in landing not too good. Turns uncertain. Sideslips 
ditto. Unless improvement very soon, recommend cease flying Solo Practice.’ 
The instructor persevered, recording slow improvement and ‘indications of 
absorbing previous lessons’. But he adjudged the cadet ‘Generally erratic…will 
fly well one day & bad the next.’
Flight Lieutenant Coleman did not mince words. He judged that Wiesener’s 
‘airmanship is bad’, recording that he had always been ‘a difficult subject’ for his 
instructors. As a pilot, Dick was awarded 67 out of 100: ‘a free & easy outlook…
prevented him from being higher than below average’. It was not that he did not 
try. But he was ‘adversely affected by possessing what he considered more than 
average ability at other pursuits’. Elaborating, Coleman commented that Dick 
was a ‘good type’ inclined to be overconfident. Possessing an ‘uncanny, retentive 
memory’, he had secured the highest points in the ‘progressive paper’. But to 
the evident irritation of the instructors he did not ‘apply the same attentiveness’ 
on the parade ground as he did in the lecture room.
While highlighting his faults, the final assessment from the flying training course 
acknowledged that with discipline Dick would ‘probably make a good officer’. 
Attention needed to be paid to ‘improvement of general bearing and outlook’.26 
There was perhaps a hint of resentment in the character assessments of the 
self-confident scion of a prosperous upper-middle class family. Dick’s service 
pay of 21/- a day (including 2/- ‘flying margin’ and 5/- dependants’ allowance) 
was a welcome income supplement. But he and Joan had other financial 
resources. Dick’s grandfather, Theodore Frederick Wiesener, had left Goslar in 
Lower Saxony with his brother in 1869. He made a great name in Sydney as an 
entrepreneurial master craftsman, most renowned for the design of the internal 
workings of the Sydney Town Hall clock.27 Wiesener’s instrument-making 
business in George Street was across the street from Gowings, the drapers, and 
next door to W. Abbey & Co., boot and shoemakers. T. F. Wiesener had married 
his neighbour’s daughter, Annie.
26 Inexplicably, the record of Wiesener’s flying training course is attached to a file of the Committee of 
Adjustment ‘for the purpose of dealing with the public and private effects’ of the personnel who died on 13 
Aug. 1940 (NAA: A705,  53/1/739, viewed on 12 Dec. 2012).
27 Julian Holland, ‘T. F. Wiesener’, in Chris Pratten (ed.), Summer Hill, Ashfield and District Historical 
Society, 1999, pp.83–9.
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Dick’s father, Frederick Abbey Wiesener, had stood aside when the world war 
ended to allow his younger brother George, discharged from the AIF, to take 
over the family firm. Frederick established himself instead in an optometry 
practice. Successful as he was, he was not satisfied by the professional limitations 
constraining optometrists. With medical qualifications finally achieved at the 
age of 46 he became a fashionable ophthalmologist and ophthalmic surgeon. 
It was perhaps a tribute to his mother’s Abbey ancestry that he appeared in 
university calendars as ‘Abbey-Wiesener, Frederick’. Sometimes there was a 
comma rather than a hyphen. In either case it might have deflected some of the 
lingering wartime ‘lies & calumnies disseminated by competitors’ that the family 
had suffered. (Rumours that their proprietary company, registered in 1910, was 
an enemy business, flew in the face of the fact that its co-director, Frederick’s 
35-year-old widower brother, had enlisted in the Field Ambulance, contributing 
a fully equipped motor ambulance; and had served in motor transport and supply 
columns in Gallipoli, France, and Flanders for four years, earning a mention 
in despatches, promotion to sergeant, and a Meritorious Service Medal).28 It 
certainly did Frederick no disservice commercially to be listed in Knox’s Medical 
Directory for Australia as the first name in the book. Neither he nor his son 
seems to have used a hyphenated form in official documents.
If Dick was only a hyphen removed from a craft and merchant background, the 
Beales were also ‘in trade’. With a business employing over 500 people, theirs 
too was a recent urban fortune rather than a landed inheritance. However, 
following the triumphant showing of their wares at the Wembley Exhibition 
in London in 1924, Queen Mary had bought a Beale piano. This was a coup, 
commercially valuable, but also conferring a social cachet that could not be 
ignored in the outer reaches of the Empire. By the mid-1920s, although Joan’s 
grandfather Octavius could be an embarrassment with his extreme views on 
racial and eugenic themes, the Beale family had scaled the heights of Sydney 
society. Joan’s parents, Ronald and Gertrude Beale, were the object of local 
curiosity and envy as the owners of a croquet green, though it was no match 
for the miniature zoo with a peacock, monkeys, and other exotic denizens on 
parade with Dick’s grandfather, Charles Hoskins.
Royal patronage of the Beale company, a priceless business advantage and a 
feature of their newspaper advertising, could not fail to be noticed in fashionable 
circles. Politically, more discretion was called for. Through both of their families 
Dick and Joan were connected to the smoke-filled rooms of conservative 
politics. Dick’s uncle, Cecil Hoskins, had been an executive member of the 
All for Australia League, the movement that in 1931 had brought together 
Joe Lyons and other ALP defectors and dissident Nationalists. Membership of 
the League by their employees was strongly supported by the AMP Society 
28 NAA: A1 1917/17660; NAA: B2455 WIESENER WG.
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on whose prestigious board Hoskins was an influential member. Hoskins was 
chairman of the Consultative Council, controlling conservative political purse-
strings in New South Wales, and was an early member of the United Australia 
Party into which the All for Australia League merged along with the National 
Party. Critical ‘unity conference’ meetings were held in the AI&S boardroom.29 
Octavius Beale had been a vocal advocate of conscription in 1916, a pillar of 
right-wing politics and Masonic affairs in New South Wales.30 Joan Beale’s uncle 
Rupert was also active in the All for Australia League. Although there were 
radical suspicions of Hoskins family involvement in the leadership of the anti-
communist paramilitary New Guard in Wollongong, no such activities have 
been documented.31
Ronald Beale, one of 10 children who survived their father, was fully occupied 
in the offices of the Beale family business. He succeeded as head of the company 
on his father’s death in 1930. In a little-known collaboration in Sydney with 
the Marks Motor Construction Company, the Beale piano workshops had 
produced in 1933 a prototype car body of Queensland pine and walnut, glued 
under pressure with aircraft casein glue. The chassis was integral to a venture 
to produce an Australian car, largely financed by the recently knighted Sir 
Charles Kingsford-Smith, to be called after his famous aircraft, the ‘Southern 
Cross’. Like many of Smithy’s business schemes, notwithstanding the initial 
support of well-known Sydney business and political figures like Sir Charles 
Marr and Richard Windeyer KC, it struggled for lack of capital. Dick Wiesener 
did not need the connection with his fiancée’s family to be fascinated by the 
celebrated aviator whose disappearance and presumed death in 1935 ended the 
motor vehicle project.32 But it is easy to believe that he would have seized any 
opportunity to be in the great man’s presence. For an eager young flyer there 
could be no more desirable company.
29 Strictly speaking, the AFA and the National Association ceased to exist after their members joined 
together in the new party in April 1932 (C. L. A. Abbott to J. A. Lyons, 19 Nov. 1931; J. P. McDonald to M. M. 
Threlfall, 24 Jan. 1933, Lyons MSS, NLA MS4851, Box 1, folder 8).
30 Andrew Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier: Conservative Paramilitary Organisations in New South 
Wales 1930–32, NSWU Press, Sydney, 1989, pp.133–4. For the AMP’s attitude to the All for Australia League, 
see Michael Cathcart, Defending the National Tuckshop: Australia’s Secret Army Intrigue of 1931, McPhee 
Gribble/Penguin, Fitzroy and Ringwood, 1988, p.47; Geoffrey Blainey, A History of the AMP 1848–1998, 
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999, pp.189–90, 238.
31 Len Richardson, The Bitter Years: Wollongong during the Great Depression, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 
1984, p.91. Charles Hoskins, on whom Richardson speculates, had died in 1926. Sid Hoskins, who managed 
the steel works, is a more likely candidate (Jim Hagan & Henry Lee eds, A History of Work and Community in 
Wollongong, Halstead Press in assoc. with Wollongong UP, Sydney, 2001, p.82).
32 Pedr Davis, Charles Kingsford Smith, The World’s Greatest Aviator, Lansdowne Press, Sydney, 1985 (1st 
ed. Summit Press 1977), p.115; The Argus, 5 Jan. 1934.
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Pilot officer
When Dick went down to Melbourne in May 1940 in his new uniform as a 
pilot officer, Joan stayed back in Sydney in ‘Endymion’, their rented Ethel 
Street, Burwood home, awaiting the birth of their third child.33 Her parents 
lived just across the road. It would be time to decide where the growing young 
family might live when Dick had completed his training and the baby was born. 
Anticipating some leisure, Dick had taken his golf clubs and his Zeiss camera. 
But now the Service adventure was gathering momentum.
Making his first serious flight in a Hudson with a cabin full of brass hats 
and Cabinet ministers was the beginning of what promised to be the RAAF 
experience Dick Wiesener had been hoping for. He had seen the Hudsons being 
put through their paces at Richmond and for the last month or so in the air 
above Laverton. He had felt their power in a short flight and had regaled his 
friends with the thrill of it. Dalkin, White, and Fowler already knew him as the 
best mind among them. They all had a lot more serious flying time than his 87 
hours 40 minutes (less than half of them solo). But when they needed guidance 
with mathematics and trigonometry, it was the former engineer and accountant 
they turned to. When the class passed out together from the navigation course 
on Friday August 9, he was the only one of 11 graduates awarded a ‘special 
distinction’.34 Bob Dalkin was to recall Dick Wiesener, only a few years older 
than some of the others in the group, as almost a father figure to the unruly 
knockabout types on the course with him. ‘Although,’ Dalkin admitted, ‘we 
were a bit hard to control.’
Perhaps feeling that it would be sensible to spend some more time with the 
manual and charts, and get a good night’s sleep, Wiesener did not show up 
in the mess on Monday evening. Anticipating some navigational chores when 
he sat next to Hitchcock in the morning, he borrowed Dalkin’s brass divider 
before turning in. He did not join the others for a drink. Peter Fowler, who 
had been told he was to fly the next day to Mount Gambier and Adelaide in 
another Hudson with Ray Garrett and the photographer Frank Jefferies, had 
also retreated to prepare himself for taking the second seat. ‘We always had a 
couple of beers, we always had dinner, and it was the custom if you went flying,’ 
said Dalkin. ‘I talked to Hitchcock that night, I think with White, over a cup 
of coffee, and I remember we were quizzing Hitchcock about the aeroplane and 
this sort of thing.’35
33 E. Joan Wiesener to CH, 19 Sept. 1977.
34 No. 8 NR course, NAA: A705, 208/14/58.
35 Dalkin, interview, 18 April 1978.
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Next morning, as Dalkin and the others were wandering down to morning 
parade, A16-97 was already in the air. Charlie Crosdale was perched in the 
cabin, with Jack Palmer attending to the wireless apparatus in his cramped 
niche immediately behind the pilot’s seat, and Dick Wiesener alongside the pilot 
in the cockpit. Bob Hitchcock was in command and about to display for the 
most distinguished passengers he had ever flown just what his powerful new 
aircraft could do.
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5. His father’s son: Bob Hitchcock
In August 1940 anyone familiar with Australia’s recent aviation history would 
probably recognise the name Bob Hitchcock. Not the 28-year-old Flight 
Lieutenant Hitchcock who was trained to take the controls of the latest Hudson 
bombers to be delivered to the RAAF’s No. 2 Squadron. But his father, the 
tragedy of whose death while searching for Charles Kingsford-Smith’s missing 
Southern Cross had been on every Australian front page and silent cinema 
newsreel in 1929, and in books and countless articles in the years that followed. 
Henry Smith ‘Bob’ Hitchcock had perished with Keith Anderson in a futile 
attempt to find the aviation heroes Charles Kingsford-Smith and Charles Ulm. 
His name was perpetually inscribed alongside those of some of Australia’s most 
celebrated aviators.1
Bob Hitchcock senior was born in Broken Hill in 1891. With his mother and 12 
siblings he followed his father Harry in search of work to Adelaide and further 
west to Kalgoorlie, Perth, and Fremantle. Little is recorded of his childhood. 
He attended South Kalgoorlie Primary School until he was 12 or 13. His sister 
Pretoria remembered him about this time occasionally disappearing into his 
father’s workshop and reappearing with a tiny wooden aeroplane fashioned 
from a clothes peg. Other accounts suggest a continuing fascination with 
building model aircraft. Apprenticed as a bricklayer (his father’s trade), Bob 
― as he preferred to be known ― did not complete the apprenticeship. By the 
time he married Violet Bourne in 1911 his parents had separated and his mother 
had settled in Perth with the younger children. Bobbie, as many people were 
wont to call him then, had worked briefly as a barber while hankering after a 
job that would use his mechanical talent. He found a position as a buggy driver 
for a mine manager’s family in Kalgoorlie and, when his employer, Ralph Nichols 
of the Great Boulder Perseverance, bought the town’s first motor car, he took 
the chauffeur’s seat. Later, according to Army records, he was a ‘labourer’ and 
a ‘blacksmith’s striker’.
When war came, Bob left Violet and two boys behind in Boulder City and enlisted 
early in 1915 for service abroad. Posted to C Company, the 28th Battalion, 7th 
Brigade, he was with the ANZACs at Gallipoli in the autumn. But within a few 
months he was stricken with bouts of fever, jaundice, and endocarditis. Several 
hospital stays brought no relief from ‘valvular heart disease’. He had suffered 
a minor wound but his condition was described as ‘Constitutional. Aggravated 
by Active Service.’ Poor nutrition and pneumonia from prolonged exposure 
had severely weakened him. He had hopes of being accepted for the Royal 
1 I am persuaded by Keith Raymond Meggs, Australian-Built Aircraft and the Industry, Vol. One: 1884 to 1939 
Book 1, Finger-Four Publishing, Seymour, Vic., 2009, pp.161–3, that Kingsford-Smith should be hyphenated.
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Flying Corps but allegedly ‘owing to his weight’ that was not to be. Pronounced 
‘permanently unfit for service’ and totally incapacitated from earning ‘a full 
livelihood in the general labour market’, he was shipped home from Egypt in 
April 1916. His luck was in. By war’s end the 28th Battalion had the fifth-highest 
casualty rate in the AIF.2 Further medical examination in Fremantle confirmed 
the Cairo diagnosis but concluded that Hitchcock was now fit for less-strenuous 
occupations. He was discharged in May 1916 and awarded a pension of 16 
shillings a fortnight. Eventually Bob found work at the Ivanhoe Gold Mine 
in Kalgoorlie then drove trucks for the Salvation Army Hope Service in Perth. 
Building on some experience he had enjoyed with the Atlas Engineering 
Company in Fremantle and occasional workshop repairs in Kalgoorlie, he was to 
become a largely self-taught but exceptionally skilled and creative mechanic.3
Records, recriminations, and rescues 
In 1922 Hitchcock found employment as a ground engineer in Major Norman 
Brearley’s Western Australian Airways, a ‘small & economical’ venture according 
to Lieutenant General Sir Brudenell White who visited the workshops in April 
1923.4 There Bob would meet two young war flyers in search of work and fortune, 
Keith Anderson and Charles Kingsford-Smith. His destiny was inextricably 
linked thereafter with the two men whose record-seeking adventures were to 
fascinate Australia in the years that followed. Caught up in the enthusiasms of 
Smithy and Anderson, in 1926 he drew on his slender savings to join them in 
attempting to start a new air service from Port Moresby further into the New 
Guinea highlands where gold had been discovered. The New Guinea venture 
was Bob’s idea. While his two associates were vainly attempting to break the 
Perth to Sydney flying record, he had done much of the organising and had even 
secured his miner’s right. Sadly it came to nothing. Smithy, at first keen, was 
deterred by photographs of the unfriendly terrain.5 Moving across the country 
2 Neville Browning, The Blue & White Diamond: The History of the 28th Battalion 1915–1919, Advance 
Press, Ballajura W. A., 2002, p.589.
3 Bob Hitchcock’s life and his role in the search for Kingsford-Smith’s party is outlined in Dick Smith and Pedr 
Davis, Kookaburra: the most compelling story in Australia’s aviation history, Lansdowne Press, Sydney, 1980. 
Additional details from war service records (NAA: B2455 HITCHCOCK H 441), Harry Hitchcock to GpCpt Eric 
Douglas, 28 Aug. 1957 (courtesy Dr Charles Eaton), and interviews with his nephews Barley and Lyle Hitchcock 
(sons of Bob’s brother Stan), 22 Sept. 1992, and niece Gwen Bliss (daughter of Pretoria Hitchcock), 19 Sept. 1992, 
transcripts courtesy of Ian Mackersey. Peter Fitzsimons has Hitchcock born in Kalgoorlie and ‘badly wounded’ 
at Gallipoli (Charles Kingsford Smith and Those Magnificent Men, Harper Collins, Sydney, 2009, p.240).
4 White diary, 20 April 1923, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/9.
5 Norman Ellison, Flying Matilda: Early Days in Australian Aviation, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1957, 
pp.302–3. Ellison MSS NLA MS 1882 3/31 for Kingsford-Smith’s sister Elsie recalling ‘Bobby simply bursting 
with a splendid project’.
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to Sydney with two superseded Bristol Tourers bought from Norman Brearley 
in January 1927, the three men had thoughts of running a transcontinental air 
service.
Smithy, Anderson and Bobby Hitchcock with the Marshalls of Smith’s 
Weekly, Maylands Aerodrome, Perth
(Courtesy of Ian Hitchcock)
Later that year Kingsford-Smith flew around the country in a record-making 
attempt with a new associate, Charles Ulm, who had displaced Anderson. 
Hitchcock happily accompanied a disgruntled Anderson and an observer, 
Charles Vivian, in the second Bristol. Their passenger was the representative of 
George A. Bond & Co., hosiery manufacturers, with whom Ulm had secured a 
sponsorship deal.
In the days that followed, Bob was to have a devastating shock. He had given 
up his job on the understanding that he was to take part in the world’s first 
east-west trans-Pacific flight. But when it came time to depart for the United 
States he was dropped from the team to make room for Ulm. Anderson too was 
eventually dumped. Believing themselves to have been the victims of broken 
promises, depriving them of places in the epic 1928 flight and the fame and 
financial reward that followed, both Hitchcock and Anderson had a bitter falling 
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out with ‘Smithy’ and Ulm, now Smithy’s business partner. After prolonged 
recrimination and litigation the fractured relations remained unhealed. A 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ and a cheque for ₤1000 ― repayment of what he had 
invested in the enterprise ― had helped soften Anderson’s pain. Hitchcock 
was not so fortunate, eventually in March 1929 losing a costly and humiliating 
court battle over Smithy’s alleged and subsequently denied pledge that ‘on our 
return to Sydney we’ll pay you a thousand pounds for dropping you out’. The 
two teams went their separate ways.6 Bob scratched a living in Sydney with 
casual work as a mechanic. He boarded in a room at the Customs House Hotel in 
Macquarie Place. Whenever he could, he sent money back to support the family 
in Western Australia. In 1928 he and Anderson had set out on their own attempt 
to fly to Britain in record-breaking time. They got as far as Darwin, where they 
crash landed their Bristol. Hitchcock’s left leg was badly gashed and the wound, 
slow to heal, became infected.7
On 30 March 1929, Kingsford-Smith, Ulm, and two companions took off from 
Sydney in their famous aircraft, the Southern Cross, to fly across the continent on 
the first leg of a round-the-world flight. Meanwhile Anderson, with Hitchcock’s 
aid, had been secretly planning a record-breaking 24-hour solo endurance flight 
in his own small aircraft, a Westland Widgeon III, which he had christened the 
Kookaburra. At the RAAF base at Richmond in New South Wales they were ready 
to set off when news came that the Southern Cross had disappeared somewhere 
in northwest Australia. Whatever their differences had been, Anderson ― ‘the 
Dreamer’ as he was known at Mascot ― had an abiding affection for Smithy.8 
While others dithered over the organisation of a search he was sure he could 
find his old friends. After a whip-around, Jack Cantor, publican of the Customs 
House Hotel and former business associate of Smithy’s, made up an offer of £500 
to defray the cost of a search.9
6 The falling out between Kingsford-Smith and Ulm, Anderson and Hitchcock, is best recounted in Ian 
Mackersey, Smithy: The Life of Sir Charles Kingsford Smith, Little Brown & Company, London, 1998, pp.81–
101,179–82.
7 According to Dick Smith, nurses at Alice Springs hospital had told Charles Eaton, the RAAF officer 
heading the search for the lost flyers, of a blood-poisoned arm. Fitzsimons, citing no authority, refers to a 
bandaged right arm. But Nurse Annie Inglis deposed that she treated and bandaged Hitchcock’s leg; and 
Sgt Eric Douglas, second in command of F/Lt Charles Eaton’s RAAF search party, referred to a bandaged 
left leg. (‘Report on Operations in Connection with Search for, and Burial of, Lieutenant Anderson and Mr. 
Hitchcock’, Apps VIII and IX, NAA: A705, 21/1/84 Pt 3; ‘Final Version of the Search 1958’, unpublished MS, 
courtesy of Sally Douglas).
8 Milton Kent to Eric Douglas, 19 June 1958, courtesy Dr Charles Eaton.
9 A £500 contract between Anderson and Cantor, requiring private progress reports, was found among 
Anderson’s papers (The Mercury, 28 May 1929).
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Bobby Hitchcock, Keith Anderson, and the Kookaburra
(Photo by Milton Kent, Sydney, courtesy of Sally E. Douglas)
Anderson was on the verge of launching a new career with Hitchcock as a 
roving promotional team for a suit of flying gear designed and manufactured by 
George Bond. There was another sponsorship agreement with Smith’s Weekly. 
For Hitchcock the job with the American businessman meant the chance of 
some financial security for the first time in his life. But a quick telephone call 
from Anderson and the offer of a fee of £100 changed his priorities. Though 
still nursing his injured leg, and weakened by blood poisoning, he did not 
hesitate. They would search for the men they still thought of, in spite of 
their acrimonious recent history, as friends. Bond, the managing director of 
a firm soon to be nationally renowned for its ‘Chesty’ Bond brand, had given 
Kingsford-Smith and Ulm athletic singlets and woollen underwear the previous 
year for their Pacific flight. Bond had used the endorsements of the famous 
flyers in his advertising. He was happy to give Hitchcock and Anderson, who 
had made the first ‘commercial’ flight with his advertising manager in 1927, 
leave to defer taking up their appointment as company ambassadors. Perhaps 
unwilling to let it be known how desperately poor he was, on March 13 Bobby 
had already pawned his only valuable possession, a gold watch and chain 
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with a small nugget pendant, for £2.10.0.10 Jack Cantor had paid £100, to be 
treated as a loan, covering Hitchcock’s arrears at the Customs House Hotel. 
The loan probably would have been discharged had Bobby forgone his fee for 
accompanying Anderson on the rescue mission. Still he could not afford a warm 
coat; he left Richmond in a shabby woollen suit, scarf, and flying helmet.
The extra fuel tank Anderson had installed in the front cockpit of the Kookaburra 
meant that they could cover the long distances. But to reduce the time it would 
take to reach the supposed location of the Southern Cross, Anderson departed 
from the safe overland telegraph route and took a shorter course over the Tanami 
Desert. He could not foresee the navigational error in seven hours flying from 
Alice Springs with Hitchcock’s second-hand compass ― the instrument, poorly 
adjusted, further affected by the theft of spare parts and tools that had been 
stowed close to it. Perhaps he should have planned for a mechanical failure, 
such as a faulty push-rod coming loose, and a forced landing in the desert. 
Ultimately, not carrying a radio or enough water, or an axe or shovel, sealed the 
would-be rescuers’ fate. Unable to clear the scrub that surrounded them, they 
could not take off again or tell anyone of their plight.
The Southern Cross and its crew were eventually found, relatively unharmed, 
though allegations that their disappearance had been a publicity stunt persisted 
in spite of a subsequent inquiry into the ‘Coffee Royal’ affair that cleared Smithy 
and Ulm. Anderson and Hitchcock were lost somewhere in the spinifex and 
termite mounds of the Tanami Desert where they had made an emergency 
landing on April 10. Hitchcock had repaired the engine, but they could not 
get the aircraft back into the air. An unsuccessful RAAF search for the missing 
men led by Flight Lieutenant Charles Eaton resulted in the loss of three out of 
five obsolete World War 1 D.H.9a aircraft. Eaton’s own plane, A1-1, the RAAF’s 
first, had caught fire in the air and crash landed at Tennant Creek. Not till April 
21 did Lester Brain, an RAAF reserve pilot working for the fledgling outback 
airline QANTAS, locate the tiny Kookaburra. The Sydney Citizens Relief 
Committee had raised £7000 with which to compensate a reluctant Hudson Fysh 
of Qantas for the use of an aircraft and Brain’s services. Brain had met Hitchcock 
and Anderson in Townsville on their round-Australia flight. He could scarcely 
believe the recklessness of their rescue mission. He knew the Tanami area well, 
having flown an American gold hunter there a few years earlier. With the benefit 
of his directions, a group on horseback guided by RAAF aircraft and Aboriginal 
trackers reached the scene over a week later.11
10 Believing the watch to have been stolen, the Commonwealth Investigation Department located it three 
months later in a Paddington pawnshop (Barrier Miner, 2 Aug. 1929, The Mercury, 3 Aug. 1929).
11 For Brain’s remarkable career, see Cameron Hazlehurst, ‘Brain, Lester Joseph (1903–1980)’, in Ritchie 
and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 13, pp.247–8 and Neil Cadigan, A Man Among 
Mavericks. Lester Brain: Australia’s Greatest Aviator, ABC Books, Sydney 2008. Dr Charles Eaton’s forthcoming 
biography of his father, The Cross in the Sky, is the most authoritative account of the RAAF searches.
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Eaton’s party, who had themselves been fortunate to survive an appalling 
journey, buried the two men where they found them. The harrowing final days of 
Anderson and Hitchcock were partly recorded by Anderson in a diary scrawled 
on the aircraft’s rudder. Hitchcock’s Bible, found on the starboard wing under 
which he lay in his underpants and singlet, gave some hope that, as a devout 
member of the Church of Christ, he had not perished without consolation.
The 37-year-old ‘Air Mechanic H. S. Hitchcock’, as the newspapers described 
Lieutenant Anderson’s companion, left a widow, Violet, living in Victoria Park, 
Perth with three sons: Robert Edward (almost seventeen), Albert Leslie (fifteen), 
and Henry Smith (fourteen, named after his father).
The Hitchcock boys: Bob, Les, and Harry, 1928
(Courtesy of Les Hitchcock)
In the words of the Register News Pictorial, Bob Hitchcock’s widow and children 
were ‘not in good circumstances’. There were also two surviving brothers and 
five married sisters to mourn Bob. Although there were tensions between Violet 
and her in-laws, they were united in rejecting the idea of erecting a memorial to 
the two Kookaburra heroes in central Australia. If there were to be a memorial, 
they said, far better that it be in Perth, where both men had relatives and friends.
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But first the families understandably wished that the bodies should be brought 
home for re-burial. While arrangements were made for Anderson, it was not at 
first clear who would bear the cost of repatriating Hitchcock’s body or, indeed, 
whether it might not be necessary initially for an inquest to be held, perhaps 
in Alice Springs. From Canberra came the insensitive news that no action had 
been taken by the Commonwealth government which was awaiting information 
about the financial position of the families. Nothing would be promised ‘unless 
it is informed they are in necessitous circumstances’.12 The Perth Aero Club 
promptly sent a telegram to the Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce, affirming that 
the Hitchcock family was in need of assistance. Bob’s brother Stan had already 
written on behalf of his siblings and parents asking that ‘our hero brother and 
son’s body’ be brought back to Perth as soon as possible ‘so that we will be able 
to pay our dear one last respects’.
After a week of deliberation, the Prime Minister’s public service advisers 
concluded on 2 May 1929 that there was nothing to distinguish this case from 
many similar ones in which lives had been lost in an attempt to save others. The 
Commonwealth had not granted assistance previously. To do so now would be 
to establish a precedent that ‘might be attended by embarrassing consequences 
in the future’. Government indifference to the plight of the widow and her three 
sons presumably would be attended only by tolerable embarrassment. If help 
were to be given from Canberra it would have to be without publicity. These 
were the same advisers who had earlier issued a press release over the Prime 
Minister’s name announcing that the government would, if funds from private 
subscription were insufficient, provide assistance for a search for Lieutenant 
Anderson ‘and his mechanic’.13 Eventually, pressed by MPs, especially John 
Curtin from Fremantle, and shamed by public reaction, the government sent an 
expedition to exhume the bodies and return them to their families. Anderson 
was in due course given a magnificent state funeral in Sydney with military 
honours and an aerial salute. Bob Hitchcock, at his widow’s request, was buried 
quietly and privately at Karrakatta Cemetery in Perth. Kingsford-Smith had 
already left for England the day after the Committee of Inquiry had cleared him, 
his absence never to be forgotten by the Hitchcock family.14
Unbeknown to the government and to the public at large, Violet Hitchcock had 
long been estranged from her husband. Although she had let it be thought by 
relatives that Bob had deserted her and left her destitute, the truth was that she 
had formed another relationship while he was pursuing business ventures in 
eastern Australia. News of his wife’s changed circumstances had come to Bob in 
a shocking way. He received a letter from her doctor asking for his permission 
12  Register News Pictorial, 25 April 1929 (courtesy of Ian Hitchcock).
13 NAA: A461, H 344/1/13; A458, AH314/4.
14 Joyce Batty, unpublished memoirs, Been There Done That, Ch. 15, p.45, courtesy of Bob Landt.
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for her to have a hysterectomy. Realising the seriousness of the operation he 
travelled back to Perth by train only to discover Violet at the hospital in the 
company of another man. A distressed Bob, mindful of his church’s teachings on 
the sanctity of marriage, would not agree to a divorce. He went back to Sydney.
A photograph of an unidentified dark-haired young woman, found with his 
Bible near his body, suggests that Bob might have found happiness there.15 
Nevertheless he continued, whenever he could, to send remittances to Violet to 
support the boys. Les would say in later years that money from his father came 
‘seldom’. But, although his income was unpredictable and never substantial, 
Bob had always done his best to provide for his family. When he filled in his 
Army enlistment form in 1915, he had struck out the required standard three-
fifths allocation of his pay to wife and children and inserted four-fifths.16 After 
the war and until his death, Violet had drawn Bob’s partial Service pension of 
about a guinea a week, as well as the seventeen shillings she was entitled to for 
herself and the children. Now she faced the prospect of caring for her children 
with the primary source of funds from an honourable husband greatly reduced.
The will to succeed 
Violet Hitchcock could not rely on government to meet her needs. On seeking to 
collect her family’s pension a week after Bob disappeared, she had been refused 
his money because she declined to certify that to the best of her belief he was 
alive. The Repatriation Commissioner had intervened to insist that she receive 
the money until her husband’s death was proved. It was a short reprieve.17 And 
for a widow in Perth there would be no other pension. In New South Wales 
a widows’ pension scheme (restricted to widowed mothers of children under 
fourteen) had been introduced in 1926. Western Australia had not followed suit; 
and it was not until 1942 that the Commonwealth legislated for the nation as 
a whole.18 In time Violet found work with the Perth Electric Tramways Office. 
But a way in which the family’s circumstances could be improved immediately 
15 Eaton’s inventory of items found in and around the Kookaburra records these words on the back of 
the photograph in the Bible: ‘No 233. Madigans Pharmacy, Bondi Junction.’ A second photograph found at 
the scene was of a child, taken in Hill St, Blayney in March 1929, and inscribed ‘Wishing you the best of 
luck.’ Bob Muir, the Blayney garage proprietor, had refuelled the Kookaburra free of charge; Dick Jackson, 
one of Muir’s salesmen, lent Anderson and Hitchcock a leather coat (‘Royal Australian Air Force — Report 
on operations in connection with search for, and burial of, Lieutenant Anderson and Mr Hitchcock’, NAA: 
A9376, 48; and see http://www.janesoceania.com/australia_historical_truestories, accessed 31 March 2012).
16 Attestation Paper, 4 March 1915, NAA: B2455 HITCHCOCK H 441. The background to the Hitchcocks’ 
separation was provided to Ian Mackersey by Bobby’s nephews.
17 The Advocate, 29 April 1929.
18 Joy Damousi, ‘The State and the Widow: Pension Debates in Inter-War Australia’, in Lynne Haney 
and Lisa Pollard (eds), Families of a New World: Gender, Politics, and State Development in a Global Context, 
Routledge, New York, 2003, pp.99–118.
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was by securing the employment and prospects of the boys. Norman Brearley, 
Hitchcock’s unashamedly parsimonious former employer, was to recall that Bob 
was, like many other employees in the company, ‘reliable and efficient, but I 
knew nothing of their family affairs’.19 Brearley, sensitive to public opinion, had 
sent up a number of his own aircraft in the search for Bob and Keith Anderson. 
However, the surviving widow and her sons, none of whom he had met, were 
not his problem.
Fortunately friends and neighbours rallied to support the bereaved family. The 
local baker instructed his bread carter to leave loaves at the Hitchcock house 
every day whether Mrs Hitchcock said she needed them or not. And there was to 
be no charge. Bob, the oldest boy, born on 19 June 1912, had earlier been taken 
under the wing of Bob Pritchard, a meat-carting contractor who lived several 
doors away in Victoria Park. Pritchard had three school-age sons of his own but 
sympathised with the Hitchcocks’ precarious financial situation. ‘The job was 
a sinecure,’ Bob’s brother Les, 15 months younger and the inheritor of the seat 
on the cart, recalled, ‘because all Bob had to do was sit on the contractor’s truck 
and keep the contractor company and listen to his amateur singing while they 
travelled between the abattoir and Perth’s butcher shops.’
The diminutive Les (5 feet 6½ inches and 8½ stone), incapable of lifting, let 
alone carrying, a 150 to 200 pound quarter of beef, was being paid £2 a week 
for accompanying the meat truck. It was time for Bob to move on.
Employment as a delivery boy with Perth’s Bon Marché department store came 
first. Then the manager of the Yellow Cab company took him on as a messenger. 
Harry too was working for Yellow Cabs. The boys quickly showed their mettle 
in declining to accept their workmates’ proposal to launch a memorial fund 
in honour of their father: ‘…dad left us mum to look after. We will work and 
do what he wanted’.20 Happily for Bob, within a short time he was given the 
chance to exchange his office clothes for overalls. He could therefore properly 
be described as a garage hand (greaser) when, the day before his eighteenth 
birthday, he enlisted for six years in the RAAF.21
With his father’s technical prowess as example, and the encouragement of his 
mother, herself once a keen passenger on flights to the northwest with her 
husband, he had set his sights on joining the Air Force. Shortly after his father’s 
death he had asked his local MP, John Curtin, for help. Curtin’s friendship with 
the Scullin government’s Minister for Defence, A. E. ‘Texas’ Green, MP for 
Kalgoorlie, may have been crucial. Green had been instrumental in securing 
19 Sir Norman Brearley to CH, 30 March, 9 April 1982.
20 Barrier Miner, 2 May 1929.
21 NAA: A9300, HITCHCOCK RE Unless otherwise indicated, details of Hitchcock’s service record are from 
this file.
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a training scheme for RAAF pilots and in adding to the Air Force’s exiguous 
complement of aircraft. More important, he earned the gratitude of Air 
Commodore Richard ‘Dicky’ Williams, the Chief of the Air Staff, for resisting 
the push, led by the influential former Chief of the General Staff Sir Brudenell 
White, to end the RAAF’s autonomous existence and amalgamate separate 
elements with the Navy and the Army.22
Bob Hitchcock was later to tell fellow airmen that his mother had been assured 
that he and his brothers, who were both to follow him, would be taken into the 
RAAF when they were old enough. Initially he applied for a cadetship but he 
was informed that he did not possess the necessary educational qualifications. 
It was not for want of effort. He had already been motivated to learn carpentry, 
blacksmithing, tin-smithing, and mechanical drawing. Then at Perth Technical 
College he had passed a day engineering apprenticeship course. In his free time 
he was an active member of the Perth Rover Crew. In January 1929, with his 
friend Les Lingwood he attended an All Australian Scout Corroboree celebrating 
the centenary of the settlement of Western Australia, including a four-day camp 
and hike at Dwellingup in the state’s southwest.
The practised photographer Bob Hitchcock ensures the sun is on his face, 
with friends at Scout Jamboretta, Dwellingup, January 1929 
(Courtesy of Les Lingwood)
22 G. C. Bolton, ‘Green, Albert Ernest (1869–1940)’, Nairn and Serle (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
vol. 9, pp.89–90; C. D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother: The Royal Australian Air Force 1921–39, Allen & 
Unwin in association with The Royal Australian Air Force, Sydney, 1991, pp.72–4.
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This was a youth determined to better himself. Finally he augmented his 
credentials for a Service career during a year as a senior cadet in the Citizen 
Military Force, 28th (infantry) Battalion, his father’s old unit. John Curtin, who 
continued to take a close interest in young Bob’s progress, had no hesitation in 
pulling the strings necessary to ensure that his application to the Air Force was 
successful.23 The recruit’s attestation form noted that he was enlisted by ‘special 
authority’ number AS. 9139 on 18 June 1930.24
Past the doorstep of the service at last, like all new recruits Bob Hitchcock was 
numbered (115), then measured and medically scrutinised in Perth by a military 
doctor, Colonel Douglas McWhae. Fair complexion, light brown hair, blue eyes, 
and a small mole right of the lower end of the spine were noted. At 5' 5¾" and 
120 lbs, with a 32" chest, he was shorter and no heavier than his puny younger 
brother. But a five-inch chest expansion suggested vigorous good health.25 In 
fact it was testimony to a regime of jogging, press-ups, knee bends, and other 
exercises prescribed by the American mail-order body-building expert Earle 
E. Liederman. The results were achieved by adherence to the philosophy and 
techniques embodied in Liederman’s best-selling illustrated booklet, Muscular 
Development, assisted by repetitive use of a chest expander. Whatever else he 
would become, Bob was not going to be a despised weakling.
Starting as an aircraft hand 1 labourer, recruit Hitchcock completed his initial 
training and obtained a trade certificate. He was awarded a special distinction 
pass in the storekeepers’ ammunition course in February 1932. Then, with 
acceptance as an officer cadet in mind, he embarked on the long academic 
journey to achieve the requisite mathematical and language qualifications. 
Harry and then Les Hitchcock, who enlisted in June 1938 and July 1940 
respectively, heard of Bob’s progress during the next three years. Officers and 
men at Laverton:
used to take bets and run sweepstakes on just when Hitchcock would 
crack up or, if not, which of his three major activities he would relinquish. 
They were (a) his HEAVY job as an AHG [aircraft hand general], stacking 
bombs, unloading tenders, etc.; and (b) his university studies; or (c) his 
personal campaign for physical fitness.
There were no sweepstake winners. After three years of part-time study, Bob 
earned an intermediate certificate at the examination conducted by Melbourne 
23 CPD, House of Representatives, 14 Aug. 1940.
24 The ‘magic words’: ‘Son of late “Bobby” Hitchcock who lost his life with Lieutenant Anderson whilst 
searching for Sir Charles Kingsford-Smith’ which Tink (Air Disaster, p.133) suggests would have explained 
Hitchcock’s successful passage through the cadet course to his supposedly puzzled contemporaries were not 
‘endorsed’ on his personnel file. They were remarks added in a posthumously compiled record of service 
(NAA: A9300, HITCHCOCK RE).
25 NAA: A9300, HITCHCOCK RE, A1979, 337/1544.
5 . His father’s son: Bob Hitchcock
83
University, passing in mathematics and French, and was advanced to a general 
classification in February 1933. He had worked hard with the aid of the RAAF 
education officer.26 Eighteen months later he was promoted to corporal and 
mustered as an AC 1 storekeeper in the tool store at No. 1 Aircraft Depot, 
Technical Squadron.27 It was there that Bob met Rex Taylor who was to become 
for a while his room-mate and his closest friend for the next five years. Rex was 
himself a fitter destined for a stellar Air Force career. When he arrived in early 
1934 he found that because ‘the majority of the other airmen were much older, 
Bob and I and a few others tended to seek each other’s company’. Bob was ‘a 
likeable and pleasant fellow but extremely quiet and reserved…even within 
this relatively small group these characteristics were noticeable. Nevertheless, 
he remained popular because his inherent honesty and integrity far outweighed 
any minor shortcomings.’
Among the Melbourne circle were Len Bacon (later a Squadron Leader and 
armaments specialist), Ben Kennedy whose 10/12 Harley-Davidson was greatly 
envied, and Les Lingwood, the friend of Bob’s brother Les, who had attended 
the Scout Corroboree with Bob in 1929. Lingwood’s brothers-in-law, the Hirons 
brothers, also welcomed the new recruit. Jack Hirons, sharing Bob’s enthusiasm 
for photography, would himself soon enlist as an RAAF airman. When Bob had 
come to Victoria, his mother had asked family friends in Perth who had relatives 
in the Brunswick district (now part of Moreland), John and Olive Darlison, to 
look out for her son. He became a frequent weekend visitor at the Darlisons, 
befriending their two sons and two daughters. When his roommate Rex Taylor 
joined him there one day he was smitten by the Darlisons’ younger daughter, 
Nancy. Rex also came to meet Bob’s mother, ‘a kindly and affectionate person’, 
who was staying with the Darlisons while visiting Melbourne for a national 
conference of a ‘ladies’ fraternal order’. He was struck by the evident ‘warm 
and caring’ bond between Violet and Bob.28 Never having known his itinerant 
father well, Bob had drawn even closer to his widowed mother. He would travel 
back to Western Australia whenever he could. And as a permanent reminder of 
how much he cared for her, he would fashion the framework for a clock from the 
airscrew of an unserviceable Tiger Moth.29
26 Dr Richard Hosking, then the RAAF’s only education officer, was attached to No. 1 FTS at Point Cook (Air 
Board Agenda 1880, [April 1936] NAA: A4181, 13); Chris Clark, ‘Hosking, Richard (1877–1971)’, John Ritchie 
and Christopher Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 14. MUP, 1996, p.501.
27 For much information about the Hitchcock family and Bob Hitchcock’s youth I have benefited from the 
guidance of the late Les Hitchcock (A. L. Hitchcock to CH, 20 Oct., 10 Nov., 24 Nov., 1977).
28 ACdre C. R. Taylor to CH, 25 Sept. 1983.
29 Joyce Batty to CH, 7 April 1982. The clock was passed on to Les Hitchcock and eventually the treasured 
keepsake was presented to Joyce Batty’s son Christopher, who had flown a 50th anniversary flight of the 
Kookaburra.
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Violet Hitchcock and her airman son, Victoria Quay 1931
(Courtesy of Les Hitchcock)
While Rex was courting Nancy, Bob met and fell in love with the Darlisons’ 
friend Olive Blanche Beecroft. He was soon to learn of a family history very 
different from his own. Olive’s father Wilfred Beecroft, an emigrant from a 
coastal village in east Yorkshire, ran a small dairy farm at Koonwarra in South 
Gippsland. ‘It is rare to find a dairy farmer of any kind who is not prosperous’, 
the journalist and propagandist of emigration Harry Gullett had written in 
1914.30 The son of a farm labourer and a domestic servant, Wilfred had certainly 
bettered himself in Australia. He had arrived in Australia as an infant in 1887 
with his parents, a brother and a sister. Among the youngest of 17 children, 
one of whom died on the voyage, he moved with his father (also Wilfred) from 
30 H. S. Gullett, The Opportunity in Australia, The Field & Queen (Horace Cox), London, 1914, p.81.
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Maryborough in Queensland, to Colac in Victoria, until they eventually settled 
at Koonwarra in 1899. On a small selection, the Beecroft family built a log house, 
extended it many times, grew onions, peas, and potatoes, and milked 100 cows.
It was to the tiny township of Koonwarra in 1909 that young Wilfred brought 
his 20-yearold bride, Olive Blanche Hoskings, the oldest of 12 children from 
Grantville, the tiny port town on Westernport Bay. Wilfred had also bought a 
farm and would follow his father in growing onions and milking a small dairy 
herd. A granddaughter, Joan Richardson, tells their story:
My grandfather was a very short small framed man, very quietly 
spoken. Aunt Mavis [Olive Hitchcock’s younger sister] once said she 
had never heard her father swear even having had 5 sons or amongst 
the roughest of men. I think my grandmother was a strong woman…My 
father would tell stories of how she rode horses side saddle or bare back, 
of attending the local women in childbirth, even swimming the horse 
through flooded rivers to do so (they were unsure when they would 
see their mother next). I gather being the eldest of a large family my 
grandmother had practical childbirth and mothercraft skills. (All of us 
were born at home on the kitchen floor my father would say).
All the children rode horses as soon as they could walk (which was 
the only way really for them to go to the local store, school, church) 
although grandma did have a horse and jinker.
Dad [Olive Beecroft’s brother Don] and his brother shared a pair of good 
boots, so only one could go to a dance/church at a time (although one 
never wore the boots the whole way for fear they would wear out too 
soon ― you walked barefoot until you could see the building through 
the trees) ― after all there were 3 pairs of feet to still grow into them.
Wilfred and Olive Blanche had seven children, five of them boys. The third 
child, named after her remarkable mother, was born in Leongatha in 1912. She 
had moved to Melbourne in search of work, probably boarding with an aunt, 
Emily Musicka. Olive was a regular visitor to the Taylor household. Tall and 
beautiful, as a young cousin remembered her, she was Bob Hitchcock’s first 
serious girlfriend, and his last. ‘We were not playboys by any means’, Rex 
Taylor recalled.31
31 Beryl Noske to CH, 25 Aug. 2009; Joan Richardson to CH, (email), 5 Oct. 2009; interview, ACdre C. R. 
Taylor, with Chris Clark, 21 Jan. 1988, transcript courtesy of Dr Clark. I am indebted to the late ACdre Taylor 
for extensive written recollections, 25 Sept. 1983; and to Peter Rickard and Graeme and Carol Bancroft for 
information about the Darlison and Taylor families.
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Air cadet
Barely a month after his twenty-third birthday, six months after he re-applied 
for a cadetship, Bob Hitchcock was enlisted on 15 July 1935 as an Air Force 
Cadet, No. 1544. He had been passed fit by Squadron Leader E. A. Daley in 
March, and attested his willingness to serve for two years in the presence of 
the commanding officer of No. 1 Flight Training School, Point Cook, Wing 
Commander H. F. (‘Kanga’) De La Rue.32 He had confided in Rex Taylor his 
ambition to ‘endeavour to justify his father’s sacrifice, and untimely death, 
by aiming to qualify as a pilot through a flying cadetship’. His mother had 
spoken to the press about how he had ‘abstained from parties and smoking 
and drinking lest they unfit him for flying’.33 To have got so far was a notable 
achievement. He was among 22 candidates originally chosen from more than 
800 applicants. There were other men with a trade background who were 
accepted for flying training but most remained in the ranks and in due course 
would graduate as sergeant pilots. There was one other conspicuous exception 
in this intake, Charles Houston, who had also come from Perth. As The Argus 
reported delicately, ‘Messrs Hitchcock and Houston are employed at present in 
junior positions at Laverton.’ Bob himself, exempted from the normal education 
test apart from map reading, had been passed for promotion to sergeant. But 
his ambition had always been commissioned rank. And if all went well in due 
course, after successfully completing a short service commission, possibly with 
the RAF, appointment to a permanent commission. In September 1935 there 
were just 88 men in the General Duties (aircrew) branch of the Permanent Air 
Force.34 As he began his training to join the branch, Bob Hitchcock was on the 
way with 27 fellow cadets to becoming one of a tiny elite.35
Hitchcock’s personal file does not contain the cyclostyled ‘R.A.A.F. Interview 
Form (for cadetships)’ on which he would have been marked on ‘appearance 
and manners’, ‘intelligence, accuracy, general alertness, quickness observation,’ 
and ‘general promise of fitness for service’. Nor are the customary references 
on file. However, thanks to the ‘Flying Pupil’s Record of Progress’ (RAAF 
Form P/T 3), which has been retained, we have valuable information about the 
trainee’s year of instruction. After five years in the Service, with more practical 
32 ‘Proceedings of Court of Inquiry–Flying Accidents, Master Copy, Vol. 1’, NAA: A98451, 318/42.
33 Sunday Times, 2 June 1935.
34 Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921–
1991, AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p.40.
35 Sources differ on the number of cadets in this course. Of the 22 first selected, several appear to have 
withdrawn before the course began (The Argus, 14 May 1935). Others were added. The Daily Routine Orders 
of No. 1 Flying Training school list 24 being posted to the Training Squadron 17 July 1935 (NAA: A10605, 
521/2). I rely on Air Board Agenda 1901 which records 26 plus two, including Colin Hannah who had been 
hospitalised and had not completed the previous course. There are 33 in the course photograph, five of whom 
are NCOs (NAA: A4181, 13; A12372, R/338/P). Twenty-seven Air Cadets and five airmen graduated from the 
course (Aircraft, 1 July 1936, p.26).
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experience and local knowledge than many of the younger recruits, Hitchcock 
evidently had some difficulty adjusting to his new status. Class snobbery was 
rampant in the Air Force. As a former Cabinet minister was told two years 
later: ‘young pilots of 20 are being taught to look down upon mechanics as 
belonging to an inferior social caste’.36 A month after he embarked on No. 18 
Flying Training Course ‘A’, the former aircraftman’s ‘Record of Progress’ notes 
under the heading ‘Qualities as Officer’: ‘Inclined to be of the “old soldier” 
type, who might be inclined to lead the remainder of the cadets astray. Keeps 
to himself.’37 Possibly a little perplexed by the internal inconsistency in these 
comments the commanding officer concluded: ‘Must be interviewed in view 
of these remarks.’ The interview had more than the desired effect. A definite 
improvement was noted a month later: ‘has lost the “troop” complex…’ But 
now he was adjudged ‘timid’. By October, though he was ‘improving slowly’ 
and ‘reliable’, he showed ‘no outward signs of taking responsibility’. It was 
about this time that a mischievous Bob sent his mother a photograph of himself 
in the bush in an Earle Liederman body-building pose, wearing only a jockstrap 
and a smile. ‘Mum thought this unfunny but forgave him as he was the first-
born’, the second-born son recorded.
Hitchcock’s instructors and lecturers found him an average pupil, attentive, 
hardworking, but slow to learn. ‘Thinks slowly’, his instructor, Flying Officer 
Ernie Hey, commented in March 1936. The contrast with some others in the 
group could not have been more marked. Robbie Watson from Adelaide, for 
example, six foot three and over 14 stone, a wrestler, apprenticed as a motor 
fitter: ‘an above average pilot…of above average intelligence with a fine 
intellect’, but ‘too many ideas of his own which do not fit into Service life…Has 
developed a know-all complex. Has been checked.’ Still, the bumptious Watson 
went solo on August 20.38 Hitchcock was nearly three weeks behind, going solo 
on 9 September 1935, and passing the landing test on October 15. Before then 
his flying was assessed as slightly below average, then average. He was ‘timid’ it 
was again recorded. ‘Approaching & landing is his trouble’ but then ‘consistent 
improvement’ was noted. ‘Has good hands & feet. Lacks judgment of distance & 
height during a forced landing approach.’
The official language described a young man straining to keep up with the 
expectations of those who were responsible for his training. Gipsy Moths and 
then Westland Wapitis, obsolete light bombers that were being replaced as 
frontline aircraft by Hawker Demons, submitted reluctantly to his touch. Some 
36 F. S. Alford to Charles Hawker, 9 Dec. 1937, Hawker MSS, NLA MS 4848/2/4.
37 Hitchcock (b.1912) was several years older than most of the cadets: eg. T. H. Davies (b. 1917), R. F. Wiley 
and E. V. Read (b.1915).
38 Watson and fellow South Australian Phil Ford were flown home on leave when a group of Point Cook 
flight instructors took seven Moths to Adelaide in Dec. 1935 (The Advertiser, 16 Dec. 1935; www.sealikeglass.
com/the-mystery/38-who-is-robbie/164-robert-arthur-mclister-watson, accessed on 1 Oct. 2011).
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of his class, like Bill Keenan and Don Ashton-Shorter, were lucky enough to 
learn about the Wapiti with Eric Douglas. Sergeant Douglas, who had buried 
Bob’s father in the Tanami seven years earlier, was now an AI instructor who 
had taught some of the RAAF’s best young pupils like Dixie Chapman, Tony 
Carr, Sam Balmer, and Brian Walker.39
In his own struggle for mastery Hitchcock was not alone. Hughie Edwards, 
a 20-year-old former office boy and Army private from Fremantle, had the 
minimum necessary educational qualifications. He too found Point Cook a 
challenge. ‘Chemistry I had never touched, theory of heat, theory of flight, 
engineering, signals ― all this was black magic to me.’ Edwards had never before 
seen an aeroplane at close quarters; they were, he would recollect, ‘contraptions 
beyond my comprehension’.40 But his clumsy landings were far outweighed in 
RAAF evaluations by his prowess at cricket and Australian Rules football. And 
perhaps there was a glimpse of the dash and valour that was to make him a 
decade later Australia’s most decorated airman.41
Another fellow cadet, 19-year-old Julius ‘Dick’ Cohen, remembered that Bob 
Hitchcock was very tentative, not careless, but cautious:
Half way through the first half of the course, that is about three or four 
months in, he told me that his instructor was not very happy with him, 
and was considering scrubbing him from the course. And I said: ‘Why 
was that?’ And he said he can’t apparently co-ordinate well enough for 
my [sic] very demanding instructor.
Cohen asked for an example. The answer was his ‘aerobatic insufficiency’. 
Hoping to help, and with the advantage of all he had learned at Randwick 
Public School, the selective Sydney boys’ high school, and many nights and 
weekends in the NSW Public Library, Cohen tried to teach Hitchcock what he 
knew. Cohen himself had been slow to master the elements of flying and, sensing 
that he too might be scrubbed off the course, had begun to scrutinise civilian 
job advertisements. It was ‘the blind leading the blind’, as he was to admit 62 
years later, ‘teaching him the mechanics of a slow roll where the surfaces of the 
aeroplane rudder change function…To see me instructing him on the floor of 
my room, trying to explain how these change their function as we roll, I think 
would have won an Oscar these days.’42
39 Eric Douglas, ‘Pupils’ 1929–37, Douglas MSS courtesy Sally E. Douglas.
40 Hughie Edwards, typescript memoir, AWM: PR82/193.
41 Peter Firkins, The Golden Eagles, St George Books, Perth, 1980, pp.133–5.
42 Sir Richard Kingsland, interview, 19 April 2007, transcript courtesy Geoff Crane; Into the Midst of Things: 
The Autobiography of Sir Richard Kingsland, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra. 2010, pp.17–23. Cohen 
changed his name by deed poll in 1947 taking his mother’s new married name of Kingsland. For his wartime 
exploits see Gerald Pynt (ed.), Australian Jewry’s Book of Honour World War II, Australian Federation of 
Jewish Ex-Servicemen & Women, Netley (S.A.), [1974], pp.7–14.
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Dramatically diverting though this assistance may have been, it seems to have 
made a difference, or at least coincided with improved performance. By February 
1936, believing that he ‘is now a cadet whom it would be wise to polish up’, the 
instructing staff found Bob ‘considerably smarter’. He was trying to understand 
and overcome his faults, a lack of common sense, they said, and little initiative. 
What was manifest in the record of progress was that this was a working-class 
youngster with a simple Christian faith struggling to be comfortable in an 
environment that was both intellectually challenging and socially unfamiliar.
As an officer cadet Hitchcock was separated from the 10 airmen cadets on his 
course, many of them former workmates, LACs and one temporary corporal, 
Reginald Peverell, who were quartered together while undergoing training. 
Surrounded by the polished products of Wesley College, Scotch College, or 
Melbourne Grammar, he could scarcely have been at ease in the dinner jacket, 
starched dress shirt, and bow tie at the Thursday night mess dinners described 
by cadet Geoff Hartnell to his mother: after dinner, wine, a toast to the King, 
and fruit, all adjourned to the ante room ‘where black coffee is served & no one 
is supposed to talk shop, women or politics’. Cadets were expected to stay for 
at least three-quarters of an hour, and the talk was in practice mostly ‘shop’.43 
And that was the expurgated version for parents. No hint of what Hughie 
Edwards would describe as ‘unloosed inhibitions’ at Guest Nights when the 
throng ‘prompted by Bacchus became real aces’. What went on, and was so 
challenging to an abstemious church-goer who could not afford to supplement 
his clothing allowance, is vividly depicted by Sir Richard Kingsland (as Dickie 
Cohen would become):
On Mess nights we cadets all felt under pressure to excel in boisterous 
behaviour, in order to demonstrate to each other, and to the staff and 
instructors, that none of us was a sissy. We used to engage in the usual 
silly games, ‘cock-fighting’ and so on. Worse than that, we’d risk life and 
limb by climbing up on the ceiling and over the rafters, at midnight, 
after we had consumed quite a few beers. There were other dangerous 
practices, such as having motorcycle races around the block or the oval 
in the early hours of the morning, at high speed, and all without helmets 
or protective clothing. Inevitably there were some casualties — never 
deaths, but certainly injuries.44
43 G. C. Hartnell to his mother, 23 Jan. 1936, Hartnell MSS, courtesy of AVM Hartnell. For the Point Cook 
regime as experienced by one of the immediately following intake, see Gordon Olive and Dennis Newton, 
The Devil at 6 O’Clock: An Australian Ace in the Battle of Britain, Australian Military History Publications, 
Loftus 2001, pp.1–12. For the wardrobe and other requisites (‘including evening dress if in your possession’) 
to be brought by a cadet when reporting to commence duty, see Secretary, Air Board to N. Ford Jr, 29 May 
1935 (Ford, Norman Philip 0339 NAA A12372, R/339/P). On the cadets’ mess in 1938: Rollo Kingsford-Smith, 
I Wouldn’t Have Missed it for Quids, self-published, Exeter (NSW), 1999, p.17; R. Kingsford-Smith, telephone 
interview, 15 March 2009.
44 Edwards memoir, AWM: PR82/193; Kingsland, Into the Midst, p.19.
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Amid all this roistering Hitchcock was, it was observed, ‘very quiet and 
reserved. Keeps apart from other cadets.’ His practical instructors had reported 
at the beginning that he worked very well but was ‘inclined to be shy’. If 
aeronautical theory was taxing his brain, and solo flying was testing his skill 
and courage, staying awake during Wing Commander Fred Knight’s Friday 
afternoon class on ‘Discipline and Law’ was another big challenge. What the 
instructing staff, including the redoubtable Sergeant R. J. Parker, observed in 
class and in the air, Bob’s peers experienced in the mess. Their language was 
identical. Colin Hannah, another contemporary, found him ‘very quiet reserved 
and studious’.45 By contrast Hughie Edwards, who had arrived from Western 
Australia as a gangling loner, would shrug off his Methodist inhibitions and 
forge strong friendships with fellow cadets Joe Godsell and Dick Cohen. 
Edwards was soon enjoying weekends in their company, even ‘holding up the 
bar’ at the Hotel London in Elizabeth Street. On one unforgettable occasion 
Edwards, Godsell, and three other miscreants (Tom Harvey, R. K. Hedrick, and 
B. G. Braithwaite), transgressed by carousing in a bedroom after a guest night 
and earned themselves seven days confinement to barracks. For their mess mate 
Bob Hitchcock, a communicant member of the Church of Christ, both the crime 
and the penalty were nigh unthinkable.46
Graduate blues
Hitchcock’s personal file does not contain the ‘Report on a Pupil Pilot on Passing 
out from an “ab initio” Flying Training Course’ which would have provided full 
details of his examination performance and his evaluation by the commander 
of the Cadet Squadron, ‘Dad’ Bladin. We know, however, that he was awarded 
his flying badge on 16 June 1936, discarded the cadet’s white band around 
his cap, and was posted along with seven of his fellow graduates to No. 3 
(Army Co-operation) Squadron at Richmond in New South Wales. There he 
emerged as a pilot officer on 11 July 1936. Others in the class of 1936 at No. 3 
Squadron were Pilot Officers Gerry Buscombe, Don Ashton-Shorter, Phil Ford, 
Bill Allshorn, Thomas Davies, and Geoff Quinan. Seven of their cohort: Wally 
Williams, Harry Daish, Robbie Watson, Alan Sisley, Alan Pitfield, Tom Harvey, 
45 F. F. Knight, These Things Happened: Unrecorded History 1895–1946, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1975, 
p.314; AM Sir Colin Hannah to CH, 31 Mar. 1978.
46 Edwards’s memoir suggests that the group forfeited Christmas leave. No.1 FTS…Daily Routine Orders 
Part 2 Personnel 1/1936 -65/1936 shows that it was seven days CB (NAA A10605, 521/3), served from Dec. 12 
(NAA: A9300, BRAITHWAITE BG); Arthur Hoyle, Sir Hughie Edwards VC DSO DFC: The Fortunate Airman, 
A. R. Hoyle, Canberra, 1999, pp.3-8.
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and Hughie Edwards embarked for the United Kingdom for a two-year spell in 
the RAF.47 Colin Hannah, assessed as above the average ‘particularly in powers 
of leadership and command’, went to No. 22 Squadron.48
At No. 3 Squadron the new pilots would in theory be learning dive-bombing 
and gunnery, assisting with anti-aircraft gun co-operation, and undertaking 
photographic reconnaissance and survey, mostly the latter.49 As the neophytes 
began their lives as operational flyers it was not long before Hitchcock came to 
notice. Rex Taylor told the story that his friend ‘celebrated his graduation by 
putting an aircraft across the Geelong Road fence on his first flight on his first 
posting’. Unfortunately Taylor appears to have conflated an accident eight weeks 
after Bob’s arrival at Richmond with another rather later incident. The official 
records show that on 10 September 1936 Pilot Officer Hitchcock was at the 
controls of a Demon (A1-10) that came to grief on landing. Hitchcock emerged 
unscathed but his companion AC1 E. S. Banks suffered abrasions and shock as the 
aircraft swung to port and turned over, landing on its nose and causing extensive 
damage to the airframe and tearing the reduction gear from the engine.50
It seems that there was real concern about the new pilot’s flying. As Dick Cohen 
remembered hearing from friends in No. 3 Squadron:
…it was common knowledge that Hitchcock had been taken off flying 
and it was recommended by his flight commander and squadron 
commander and Group Captain Cole that he should go off flying…
And I thought that this would probably save his life, because he was 
apparently so appallingly bad.51
47 ACdre (Sir) H. I. Edwards VC etc., Australia’s most decorated airman, retired from the RAF in 1963. H. 
C. Daish also stayed with the RAF, becoming a key member of the Photographic Development Unit flying 
reconnaissance Spitfires, then CO 27 (Beaufighter) Squadron in India, retiring as a Group Captain in 1954 
(Dennis Newton, A Few of ‘The Few’, Australians and the Battle of Britain, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 
1990, pp.22–3, 117–8). A/g S/Ldr W. C. Williams relinquished his RAF commission in March 1943 and re-
joined the RAAF until discharged in 1946. F/O T. F. Harvey (Sch. of Air Nav., No. 23 Trg Grp) relinquished his 
commission because of ill-health. F/Lt A. L. Pitfield, in a Fairey Battle of 88 Squadron attacking the pontoon 
bridges at St Valery in June 1940, was shot down from the ground and killed. P/O R. A. McL. Watson crashed 
and died on a night training flight in bad weather in Jan. 1937. WCdr A. F. M. Sisley was killed in Aug. 
1944 in the crash of an RAF No. 550 Squadron Lancaster, on a mission to bomb a V-2 rocket store (www.
ww2chat.com/biographies/5833-raf-australians-wing-commander-alan-francis-moir-sisley.html). Much of 
this information is drawn from Ann Brech’s splendid website www.sealikeglass.com (accessed 1 Oct. 2011).
48 Hannah, Colin Thomas: Service Number 0338, NAA: A12372, R/338/P,H.
49 John Bennett, ‘Flexibility in Air Power: No. 3 Squadron AFC/RAAF: The Direct and Effective Operational 
Application of Air Power’, MA (Hons) thesis, [Australian Defence Force Academy], 2001, p.87; RAAF Unit 
History sheets (Form A50) [Operations Record Book — Forms A50 and A51] Number 3 Squadron Jul 25–Aug 
43, NAA: A9186, 8.
50 NAA: MP187/3, Box 1, reference courtesy Dr Chris Clark. A search by Leslie Weatherall reveals no 
reference to E. S. Banks in the control records for casualty reports (A2408, 32/3, subject registration booklets 
for the Department of Air correspondence files [CRS A705, 1922-1960]: Casualties Airmen, 32/3/1 to 32/3/815). 
Banks, like Hitchcock a member of the Church of Christ, appears to have been discharged from the RAAF and 
re-enlisted in June 1935 (NAA: A9301, 205436; A10605, 78/1). A1-10 was damaged beyond repair on 19 Dec. 
1936 when the engine failed at 8000 feet (www.adf-serials.com/2a1.shtml).
51 Kingsland, interview, 3 April 2007, transcript courtesy Geoff Crane.
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Wilfred Compagnoni, then a flight lieutenant in No. 3 Squadron and 
acknowledged as ‘a highly qualified flight instructor’, would recount how serious 
matters were. ‘After spending quite a few hours with him I realised that he would 
not make a pilot. It would have taken many hours and patience to make him even 
reasonably safe in an aeroplane.’ Although the exact circumstances are unclear, 
Compagnoni was to recall that Flight Lieutenant Bertie Simms, temporarily in 
command of No. 3 Squadron, had told him to do what he could with Hitchcock. It 
was an unwanted brief from an officer not known for his patience.52
With the squadron reduced to one flight as a result of reorganisation of the 
Richmond base, Compagnoni had been the station signals officer for a year while 
nominally commanding the inactive B flight. Given the command of A flight in 
April 1936, he was charged with Hitchcock’s further training. ‘After spending many 
sessions with him trying to get him to approach and land,’ Compagnoni said, ‘he 
came in downwind one day and about 30 miles too fast and tried to put the aircraft 
down.’ The result, summarised in a table of accidents prepared for the Director of 
Training, was a ‘slightly injured’ aircraftman and an ‘extensively damaged’ aircraft 
that had swung and overturned.53 It was too much for the flight commander, himself 
a talented and exacting flyer who had just won the annual bombing competition 
at Laverton on behalf of the squadron as well as the NSW aerial derby in a Demon 
the previous year.54 He reported that he was not prepared to continue. ‘We were 
paraded to the Station Commander and he said that he would report the matter.’
On 10 September 1936 Pilot Officer Robert Edward Hitchcock was charged 
with ‘Neglecting to obey an order in that he did land Demon A1-10 contrary to 
orders’. Notwithstanding the vagueness of the charge ― was he acting contrary 
to a specific order or a standing order by landing downwind and too fast, or 
to a signal from the ground to go around again? ― he was reprimanded by 
the Station Commander, Group Captain Adrian Cole MC DFC, and forfeited 
one day’s pay. Hitchcock was badly shaken by the whole experience. Found 
wanting by ‘King’ Cole, a wartime ace and one of the RAAF’s founding fathers, 
his confidence in himself as a pilot was shattered. Cole had been the CO at 
No. 1 Aircraft Depot when the fatherless recruit joined the Air Force five years 
earlier. Perhaps Cole had never been happy about the way in which the young 
tradesman had been foisted upon him. Was this a problem that he had long 
predicted, and an opportunity to rid the Service of someone whom he believed 
should never have been admitted in the first place? Someone who certainly 
should not have been allowed to advance into the ranks of the cadets.
52 Jeffrey Watson, Killer Caldwell: Australia’s Greatest Fighter Pilot, Hodder, Sydney, 2005, p.227.
53 F/Lt I. D. McLachlan, ‘Demon aircraft accidents involving injury to personnel’, [Dec. 1937], NAA: A705, 32/101915.
54 Compagnoni’s activities are documented in No. 3 Squadron Operations Record Book, NAA: A9186, 1; 
his personnel file in the A9300 series; Air Board Agenda 1898 [June 1936], NAA: A4181, 13; and Derek 
Roylance, Air Base Richmond: The Story of the RAAF base on the Hawkesbury, RAAF Base Richmond, 1991, 
p.47. His foresight as Director of Signals in 1938 in preparing specifications for Australian production of radio 
equipment is documented in Hall, A Saga of Achievement, p.285.
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‘King’ Cole reprimanded Hitchcock and recommended his termination
(Ellison MSS, National Library of Australia MS1882/7/216)
Whatever Cole’s motives, Hitchcock felt that he had been unfairly treated. 
Intimidated as he must have been in the authoritative and assured presence of 
Cole, towering over him at 6' 4½", it was Compagnoni whom he held directly 
responsible for his misfortune. His flight commander, whom he could look 
directly in the eye, was just two years older but five years his senior in the 
Service. From an Italian-Danish immigrant farming family settled at Wondai, 
150 miles west of Brisbane, Compagnoni had moved to the city to complete his 
high school education before enlisting in 1930. He had done well in the RAAF 
and had recently been granted a permanent commission. Twice in the past few 
months he had been temporary CO of the squadron, and he was soon to begin a 
succession of staff and command appointments.
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As retired Group Captain Compagnoni was later to admit, Hitchcock ‘pointed 
the bone at me. I was on his back.’ But there was no hint that Compagnoni might 
bear some of the responsibility for the novice pilot officer’s poor performance 
when the commanding officer at Richmond forwarded an adverse report to the 
Air Member for Personnel. Air Commodore Hazleton Nicholl, an RAF officer 
on exchange with the RAAF’s Air Commodore S. J. Goble, recommended to the 
Air Board that Hitchcock’s probationary appointment be terminated with effect 
from 9 October 1936. Nicholl’s submission was terse and damning. Hitchcock, 
he wrote:
…is reported to have stated that he knows himself to be incapable of 
piloting Demon aircraft successfully, in spite of the fact that he was 
warned that such a statement might affect his future employment in the 
Royal Australian Air Force. He has had 15 hours flying on this type.
The Station Commander, Richmond, recommends that he is 
temperamentally unsuited to become an efficient pilot. After examination 
of this officer’s training reports, I accept this view, and concur with the 
recommendation.
A Hawker Demon over Port Melbourne: an aircraft Bob Hitchcock thought 
himself incapable of piloting 
(The Jack McNally collection, courtesy of Wendy Coultas)
Normally, the Air Board might be expected to endorse such an unequivocal 
recommendation about the fate of an individual officer. It came from a respected 
and responsible Board member. ‘Daddy’ Nicholl was an RAF veteran. Allowed 
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into the Royal Flying Corps at the late age of 33 through the influence of the 
GOC, his relative Sir David Henderson, he had served in a series of post-war 
senior training and personnel posts.55 Yet when the Board met on 29 September 
1936 they were not of a mind to agree with their British colleague. With Dicky 
Williams, now an Air Vice Marshal, in the chair, supported by Air Commodore 
W. H. ‘Mucker’ Anderson, it was decided ‘to defer consideration of the A. M. 
P’s recommendation for the present’. The deferment formula was in character 
for the ‘nice’ but habitually indecisive Anderson who was seen by one of his 
senior staff as generally ‘loath to take disciplinary action’.56 It was no doubt a 
surprise for ‘King’ Cole, who would have expected his old friend and fellow 
Naval and Military Club member Anderson to endorse his judgment. It was a 
face saver for Nicholl. But the CAS would have had the decisive voice. Williams 
knew very well who Hitchcock was and had made some enquiries of his own. 
He might well have caught a whiff of concoction about a disciplinary charge 
being brought against a young pilot whose accident was by no means unique. 
He was not persuaded that Hitchcock was a lost cause. If he could not be saved, 
then he would at least be allowed a more dignified exit than an involuntary 
termination.
In a minute paper prepared nearly six months later, P. E. ‘Johnnie’ Coleman, the 
long-serving Secretary of the Air Board, recorded the thinking underlying the 
decisions that were taken:
The Board noted that P/O HITCHCOCK obtained better than an average 
pass at No. 1 F. T. S., and in qualities as a pilot was awarded 68%, also 
that the crash in question, due to a bad landing, was his first in the 
service. In ordinary circumstances, an officer with a similar record 
would be given another chance before considering the serious step 
of terminating his appointment. Pilot Officer HITCHCOCK has stated, 
however, that he does not wish to fly Demon aircraft, and it is contrary 
to the policy of the Air Board to force an officer to continue flying if he 
has lost his nerve.57
Visible in this preamble was a wordless rebuke to those who had recommended 
termination: the unforgiving Compagnoni and Simms, and their too readily 
acquiescent if not complicit superior, ‘King’ Cole. Cole should have known better. 
As a member of the Air Board until May 1936, Cole would have been aware of 
the Board’s rejection of a recommendation by the Air Accidents Investigation 
55 For AVM Sir H. R. Nicholl’s career see ‘Air of Authority — A History of RAF Organisation’,  http://www.
rafweb.org/Biographies/Nicholl.htm.
56 Hewitt, Adversity in Success, p.3.
57 Air Board Agenda 1945, NAA: A4181, 13. Coleman is often referred to as ‘Johnny’ but he is ‘Johnnie’ in 
a letter from his senior colleague Mel Langslow to Sir Frederick Shedden, 27 March 1944, copy, NAA: A5954, 
1568/6.
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Committee, following the death of Air Cadet N. L. Chaplin in April 1936, that 
consideration be given to abolishing aerobatics for pupils early in their flying 
courses. Perhaps he had been influenced by testimony that Chaplin had thought 
he was losing his nerve, although it was a structural failure that led to his death. 
Chaplin’s parachute had failed to open, or possibly become entangled in his 
machine when he lost control and attempted to bail out. Within days, another 
cadet, Leslie Clisby, had parachuted from his own Moth, abandoning it in flight, 
evidently not appreciating that his loss of control was occurring because he 
was in the slipstream of the aircraft ahead of him in formation.58 Certainly Cole 
had seen recent evidence that the flying training course for Air Cadets which 
Hitchcock had passed was fraught with obstacles and stumbles that could lead 
to discharge from the Service.
In the immediately preceding course to Hitchcock’s, four cadets had indeed 
been discharged, one was killed, and two had deferred because of illness or 
injury. Brian Walker, better known in later years as ‘Black Jack’, hospitalised 
after a major crash at Echuca in October 1935, missed his final exams and was 
not awarded his Pilot’s Flying Badge until February 1936. Court-martialled the 
following year, he lost six months’ seniority.59 One of Hitchcock’s immediate 
predecessors was appointed with one day’s loss of seniority as a disciplinary 
measure for low flying endangering the public, and another was discharged 
from the Permanent Air Force for two similar offences and ‘most undesirable 
tendencies’, with a recommendation that he be appointed to the reserve as a 
sergeant.60 From his own class, a cadet with several years military experience 
was released at the end of the course, ‘services no longer required’, having 
spent twelve days confined to barracks for, ‘to the prejudice of good order 
and discipline’, obtaining bottles of beer from an officers’ mess steward and 
consuming them, contrary to orders, in a bedroom.61 By implication Hitchcock, 
with a ‘better than average pass’, was someone worth persevering with. He 
could be given another chance.62 It was agreed that he should be interviewed in 
Melbourne by the Air Member for Personnel. If the AMP thought it necessary, 
58 NAA: MP187/4, 160, 161. ‘The accident was due to structural failure in the port lower front spar on 
the out board side of the interplane strut…reasonably attributed to faulty technique in the execution of 
a loop.’ S/Ldr F. M. Bladin of the Cadet Squadron had testified to the Coroner that Chaplin’s crash was due 
to mishandling of the aircraft by the pupil doing the loop rather than to a structural defect. Re Clisby’s 
‘completely wrecked’ Moth: NAA: MP187/3; MP116/1 vol. 6. By May 1940, when he was shot down and 
killed, RAF F/O Clisby DFC was credited with bringing down at least 14 enemy aircraft (Lex McAulay, ‘Clisby, 
Leslie Redford (1914–1940)’, Ritchie and Cunneen, eds, Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 13, pp.445–6).
59 NAA: A9300, WALKER BR; NAA: A10605, 521/3.
60 Air Member for Personnel, ‘Appointments to Short Service Commissions’, [17 Dec. 1935], Air Board 
Agenda 1827, NAA: A4181, 13.
61 After becoming a Lieutenant in the Militia and rejoining the RAAF in July 1941, the former cadet’s 
probationary appointment was terminated a year later (NAA: A9300, HEDRICK RK).
62 NAA: MP187/3 RAAF 1936. I am indebted to Dr Chris Clark for sending me a copy  of the late GpCpt 
John McKenzie’s compelling analysis of the 10 Sept. 1936 incident  and its aftermath.
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medical advice would be sought. Following this, Nicholl would make ‘a further 
recommendation as to whether Pilot Officer Hitchcock should be given a further 
trial with another unit or be allowed to resign his commission’.63
The message that came back to Richmond about the Air Board’s decision was 
relayed to Compagnoni by Cole. Recalled by Compagnoni many years after the 
event, the story showed signs of subtle editing. The impression Cole seems to 
have created was that his advice would have been followed by the Board were 
it not that there was ‘a political direction that Hitchcock was to be taught to 
fly…The Minister had directed that we were to persist with him.’64 The inherent 
improbability of this self-serving explanation does not seem to have troubled 
Compagnoni.65 The UAP Defence Minister in 1936, Sir Archdale Parkhill, had 
not been a minister at the time of Hitchcock’s father’s death in 1929. He might 
not even have known of the assurances given to the Hitchcocks by his Labor 
predecessor. True he had been deep in negotiations over Kingsford-Smith’s 
trans-Tasman commercial ambitions during 1935; and when Kingsford-Smith 
disappeared in November, this time forever, the events of 1929 were once again 
resonant in the headlines. Moreover, Parkhill had visited No. 3 Squadron during 
Hitchcock’s first week at Richmond to view the Squadron’s ‘normal routine’. But 
there is no evidence to suggest that he knew anything of Hitchcock or that a 
junior officer’s possible severance from the Service was brought to his attention 
a few months later.
Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Chief of the Air Staff would have 
needed a reminder of the special circumstances surrounding Hitchcock’s presence 
in the RAAF. ‘King’ Cole, too, almost certainly knew Hitchcock’s background, 
having known of him since he arrived at Laverton from Western Australia in 
1930 under the protection of Dicky Williams. No renewed ministerial direction 
was necessary to ensure that Bob Hitchcock would get a second chance. He was 
not one of Cole’s private school, golfing, and clubland chums. But, whether Cole 
63 ‘Pilot Officer R. E. Hitchcock’, minute by Secretary, Air Board, 25 March 1937, RAAF 59/1/585, copy 
courtesy Chris Clark.
64 GpCpt W. G. Compagnoni, taped memoir, cited in Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, p.206; Clark 
interview, 6 Jan. 2008, courtesy G. Crane. Compagnoni’s recollection that Allan Walters, as his flight 
commander, recommended Hitchcock’s termination cannot be correct as Walters was at the RAF Staff College 
and Navigation Reconnaissance courses between Nov. 1935 and June 1937, and then CO of 22 Squadron. 
Walters became Director of Staff Duties at Air Force HQ in June 1939. Compagnoni had been temporary CO of 
No. 3 Squadron for five days in June 1936 and a week in Aug. 1936; he was posted as Director of Signals at HQ 
at the end of May 1937. (NAA: A9300, COMPAGNONI WG; Ray Funnell, ‘Walters, Allan Leslie (1905–1968)’, 
Ritchie and Langmore (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 16, pp.482–3; http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Allan_Walters).
65 In June 1937, the Chief of the Air Staff rejected as ‘dangerous’ the finding of a Court of Inquiry into 
the death of Donald Ashton-Shorter presided over by Cole. The court had concluded that by disregarding 
standing orders the pilot had placed himself ‘not on duty’ (‘Pilot Officer D. Ashton-Shorter. Criticisms by 
Brother’, NAA: A705, 32/10/1785).
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liked it or not, the Scullin government’s commitment to the Hitchcock family 
endured because it was entrusted to a decent and compassionate Chief of the 
Air Staff.66
66 Cole’s career is well summarised in a Wikipedia article, ‘Adrian Cole (RAAF officer)’, and more blandly in 
Brian Eaton, ‘Cole, Adrian Lindley Trevor (1895–1966)’, Ritchie and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 13, pp.459–60. His reputation, embarrassing behaviour (‘irregular conduct’) at a RAAF officers’ 
mess general meeting, and consequent removal as Air Member for Personnel in Dec. 1944 are documented 
in a top-secret file (NAA: M2740, 259). For AVM J. E. Hewitt’s report of USAAF General Kenney’s comment, 
‘that man is a fool’, see Hewitt’s ‘Diary for my daughter Part II Sept 1939–December 1948’, p.97, Hewitt MSS, 
AWM: 3DRL/4141; this passage is omitted from Hewitt’s Adversity in Success.
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6. ‘A very sound pilot?’: Bob 
Hitchcock (II)
Pilot Officer Robert Hitchcock, protected by an honoured pledge, was transferred 
to the recently formed Citizen Air Force No. 21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron in 
October 1936. At his interview with the Air Member for Personnel, Hitchcock 
had ‘agreed voluntarily to have another try’. Away from the harshly judgmental 
atmosphere of Richmond he grasped at the chance to redeem himself. With the 
voluntary nature of the arrangement on the record, Air Commodore Nicholl 
had satisfied himself that a ‘further trial’ was in everyone’s interests. Initially 
Hitchcock would be under the supervision of No. 21 Squadron’s CO, Squadron 
Leader Johnny Summers. But Summers left the squadron at the end of the 
month and was replaced by Flight Lieutenant Robert Dalton. A former fitter, 
the 29-year-old Dalton ― known to his friends as ‘Dorothy’, after the American 
silent film actress ― had risen rapidly from the ranks. Only temporarily in 
command and preoccupied with providing continuity of flying opportunities on 
alternate weekends for demanding citizen flyers, he was not the man to restore 
Hitchcock’s confidence.1 The sensitive assignment was taken on by Group 
Captain H. N. Wrigley, the most senior officer at Laverton. Informed of the 
reports from Richmond and the decision to allow Hitchcock time to overcome 
his fears, Harry Wrigley sensed there was something that was not being said. 
Someone, he thought, had been giving an unsettled probationer the ‘thick end 
of the stick’.
If Wrigley had been curious enough to acquaint himself with Hitchcock’s 
performance at the Initial Flying Training School he might have wondered 
what had happened in the next few months. Twenty-seven men had passed 
out from the course. The average mark for the graduates was 71.3 per cent. 
Twenty-one-year-old Colin Hannah, later an Air Marshal and Chief of the Air 
Staff, had been eighth in the class. Hughie Edwards, later Air Commodore 
with a VC, DSO, and DFC, was seventeenth, closely followed by Dick Cohen, 
who would finish the coming war as an Air Commodore with a DFC attesting 
to his outstanding service. These distinctions of course lay in the future. But 
Wrigley, a school teacher before he was a pilot, could see there and then that 
Hitchcock had finished in the upper half of the course, in thirteenth place with 
a score of 73.5 per cent, comfortably ahead of Edwards on 69.7 per cent and 
1 A decade later, as a WCdr temporarily commanding Northern Area HQ, Dalton was assessed by his CO, 
GpCpt. C. W. Pearce, as needing ‘constant direction and frequent reminders of his duties’. After a general 
court-martial under Section 4 AFA in December 1944 he lost two years’ seniority as a temporary GpCpt (NAA: 
A9300, DALTON RFM).
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Cohen on 69.2 per cent.2 Of the young men who went from Point Cook to No. 3 
Squadron, Hitchcock had been third on the list. His student tutor Cohen, who 
later recounted his friend’s difficulties, had failed the final Gipsy Moth test at 
the end of the basic phase. In the advanced phase he received more pre-solo 
dual instruction in the Wapiti than the cadet who finished at the bottom of the 
course. After he successfully went solo, Cohen became overconfident, taking 
upon himself ‘the task of demonstrating to his fellow cadets that he could be as 
dashing as they declared they were’. He blotted his copybook by getting caught 
low flying as a cadet ― or rather by being falsely charged and convicted after 
the one exercise when, tipped off by fellow cadet Joe Godsell that he was going 
to be watched, he was punctiliously following regulations; and then on one 
later occasion terrorising the residents of Corowa by diving and barnstorming a 
few feet above the main street. While Hitchcock was managing to keep his nose 
clean, Cohen would barely survive the course with, by his own account, the 
lowest mark ever recorded for ‘Qualities as an Officer’.3
Perhaps, too, Wrigley knew that two weeks after Hitchcock’s accident at 
Richmond his former course-mate Hannah, now with No. 22 Squadron at 
Richmond, had written off a Demon in a crash officially attributed to ‘Pilot’s 
error of judgment’. Hannah had incurred no disciplinary action as a result of 
his error. He was it seems already marked for higher things as he had been 
appointed senior under-officer during his cadet course and was soon to become 
No. 22 Squadron adjutant.4 The official preliminary report on Hitchcock’s 
accident had actually been less critical. It referred not to pilot error but to 
‘inexperience of pilot’. The Air Accidents Investigation Committee had made a 
similar finding. The treatment of Hitchcock looked all the more disproportionate 
when set against an accident which everyone at RAAF headquarters would have 
known about. The man who had escaped retribution after what he characterised 
in his own log book as a ‘major crash’ in a Demon in August 1935 was the 
Director of Training, Squadron Leader George Jones. If a man with 989 hours’ 
flying could overturn a Demon in the middle of the Laverton airfield, was it not 
understandable that a tyro like Hitchcock might find it hard to quickly master 
the new type?5
2 Hoyle, Sir Hughie Edwards, p.8 places Edwards thirteenth of 33. Phil Ford, ex St Peter’s College, and Bank 
of Adelaide clerk, who scored 77.1 per cent, would soon be chastised for ‘low flying whilst on detached duty’ 
but within a year appeared to ‘realise his responsibilities and is considered to be reliable’ (Ford, Norman Philip 
0339 NAA: A12372, R/339/H).
3 Kingsland, Into the Midst, pp.23–6.
4 NAA: A12372, R/338/P.
5 I was alerted to information about the course and flying records of Hitchcock and his contemporaries by 
the invaluable research of the late GpCpt. John J. McKenzie summarised in a letter to Chris Coulthard-Clark, 
28 Sept. 1999, generously made available by Dr Clark. Preliminary reports of 1936 flying accidents and forced 
landings are at NAA: MP187/3.
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In any event, Wrigley made it his business to see for himself what was going on 
with the young man over whose future there was a large question mark.
Shortly after he came to me at Laverton, I got him into the office one 
day. I said to him ‘you seem to be very timid about some aspects of 
flying,’ and…had a sort of homely chat with him. ‘You want to tell me 
anything…,’ I said, ‘this is perfectly confidential between you and I.’ 
And he said there had been occasions when he had been a bit scared of 
flying but he said it had mainly been when he had moved from one type 
of aircraft to another he had not known about.
Wrigley was a legendary decorated wartime pilot and record-breaking aviator. 
With A. W. ‘Spud’ Murphy in 1919 he had made the first crossing of Australia 
from Point Cook to Darwin. They had surveyed the route for the first England 
to Australia air race. He was also a student of RAAF history and a thinker about 
strategy and policy.6 This was the time for the avuncular assurance that only 
someone of his experience could give. If, Wrigley noted, Hitchcock had:
…timid tendencies…he just wanted a little bit of sympathetic handling 
to grow out of ― he got it. I said ‘well now you are on the station here’ 
— we had some Demons there at the time — I said ‘What don’t you 
like?’ And he said ‘Well they are a bit bigger than what I have been used 
to, and I don’t know that I know as much about them as I ought to.’
If Hitchcock felt under-trained on the two-seater single-engine biplane he was 
not alone. When the Demon had been introduced in May 1935 the RAAF had 
declared a policy that no-one could go solo in them unless they first had dual 
instruction. Policy was one thing, practice another. At No. 3 Squadron there 
was a shortage of qualified pilots to usher the new charges in. It seems that a 
single sortie in an aircraft with dual controls was not unusual. Donald Ashton-
Shorter, the pilot who topped Hitchcock’s cadet course, and was among those 
who went with him to No. 3 Squadron, was sent solo after only 35 minutes’ 
dual instruction. A confident and well-regarded young flyer like Ashton-
Shorter could safely be waved through. More experienced pilots like the then 
Flying Officer Val Hancock, irked by the conversion requirement, might also 
have got away with a quick circuit of the aerodrome sitting in the back seat of 
6 WCdr H. N. Wrigley, ‘History of the Royal Australian Air Force’, Royal Air Force Quarterly, vol. VI, no. 3, 
July 1935, pp.301–11; WCdr H. N. Wrigley, The Battle Below: being the history of No. 3 Squadron, Australian 
Flying Corps, Errol G. Knox, Sydney, 1935. ACdre Brendan O’Loghlin and WCdr Alan Stephens, ‘The Air 
Power Notebooks of Air Vice-Marshal H. N. Wrigley’, Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 86 Jan./Feb. 1991, 
pp.43–50. Alan Stephens and Brendan O’Loghlin, The Decisive Factor: Air Power Doctrine by Air Vice-Marshal 
H. N. Wrigley, AGPS, 1990. AM Sir Valston Hancock lamented that Wrigley, ‘a really inspired and a gifted 
airman’, kept his thinking to himself (interview with Ken Llewellyn, 30 June 1993, AWM: S01657).
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm
102
the aircraft listening to an explanation from the instructor.7 But others needed 
more guidance. And records show that both Ashton-Shorter and at least one 
more of those who arrived in July 1936 were checked out in a flight that lasted a 
barely credible five minutes. Their log books were signed by 22-year-old Ronald 
Hubert Cox, himself a graduate of the immediately preceding course whose 
promotion to flying officer coincided with their arrival. Cox had emerged from 
Point Cook nineteenth out of 21 in his class. It was hardly to be wondered that 
there was some shakiness among the most recent graduates at No. 3 Squadron.
Wrigley, astute and aware of training deficiencies, seized the moment and took 
Hitchcock down to the aircraft. ‘I just want you to get into the aircraft and sit 
in it and fiddle around with everything until you get to know where this is 
and where that is…don’t hesitate…do anything you like in the cockpit. Get 
used to it.’ Wrigley recalled doing the same thing with the Anson, a larger, 
heavier aircraft when the first batch was delivered to No. 21 Squadron at the 
end of 1936. And he believed Hitchcock had again used the same drill when 
the new Lockheed Hudsons arrived in mid-1940. Certainly the junior officer 
responded well to Wrigley’s advice. When he had finished ‘fiddling around’, he 
was encouraged to start the engines, ‘get the hang of it’, do a taxi around the 
airfield a couple of times; and then ‘when you are right, you can go off and do a 
few circuits and landings’.
The practical therapy worked. On 22 December 1936, Wrigley reported that:
Pilot Officer R. E. Hitchcock has shown steady progress and improved 
flying ability since joining this command.
He has developed greater confidence in himself and now handles 
Demon aircraft with average ability. Pilot Officer HITCHCOCK shows 
considerable keenness in his Air Service duties, and it is considered that 
he will develop into a useful officer.8
It was a cheering Christmas present. Perhaps it was influenced by the outcome 
of the just completed flying training course. Nine cadets had been discharged 
as ‘not likely to become efficient Air Force pilots’, another had ‘claimed a free 
discharge within three months of attestation’, one had been killed, and 25 of the 
remaining 31 graduates were proceeding to the United Kingdom in accordance 
with an agreement that Australia would supply 50 pilots a year to the RAF. 
7 Sir Valston Hancock, Challenge, Access Press, Northbridge, Western Australia, 1990, p.48; AVM Ernie Hey 
spoke of a similar experience (Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, pp.348, 510).
8 AVM H. N. Wrigley, interview, [1978]; Air Board Agenda 1945, NAA: A4181, 13. Hitchcock had been one 
of six pilots accompanying F/Lt Dalton for an Aerial Pageant with four Demons at Bordertown in October 1936 
(Kevin O’Reilly, Flyers of Time: Pioneer Aviation in Country Victoria, 2012, pp.232–3).
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In this context, with the number of pilots ‘considerably below Establishment’, 
Hitchcock’s performance looked strong enough to warrant patience and remedial 
attention.9
Hitchcock’s rehabilitation was well under way. At No. 21 Squadron, he is 
recorded as participating in the full range of the squadron’s activities. He is first 
noted taking up a Moth in December 1936 to join the search for a Bulldog from 
No. 1 Squadron, a single-seater all-metal biplane, lost on a meteorological flight 
over the Brisbane Ranges, southwest of Bacchus Marsh. On New Year’s Day 1937 
he was again up in a Moth searching unsuccessfully with CAF Flying Officer 
John Ryland in another Moth for four men who had disappeared in hilly and 
heavily wooded terrain near Gisborne. Over the next three weeks he had two 
attempts at photographing the Barwon Heads golf course from a Demon flying 
at 3000 and 4000 feet. The resulting mosaic, required by Station Headquarters, 
proved ‘an excellent job’, the squadron commander reported. It was as close as 
Bob Hitchcock would get to the club that was the playground of the Fairbairns, 
Manifolds, Russells, and Curries of the Western District and his wealthy Citizen 
Air Force contemporaries, the weekend and holiday flyers who constituted two-
thirds of No. 21 Squadron’s officer complement.10
Although detached observers might correctly assess the RAAF as a negligible 
fighting force in the mid-1930s, it was, as Bob Hitchcock’s mentor Harry Wrigley 
had written, ‘most profitably employed for the benefit of the Commonwealth’ 
in its aerial survey and forest fire-fighting roles. In February 1937 at the Forests 
Commission in Melbourne, Hitchcock accompanied his CO, Flight Lieutenant 
‘Dorothy’ Dalton, on behalf of the RAAF Air Patrol at a Fire Patrol Conference 
with representatives of the Forestry Commission and Australian Paper 
Manufacturers. They were there to discuss substitution of ‘a substance called 
“bitterns” for water for fire fighting purposes, various methods of distributing 
same and the provision of operational bases nearer the bush fire area’. Further 
experiments were to be undertaken with bitterns — concentrated seawater with 
approximately 70 per cent of the sodium chloride removed, high in magnesium 
and potassium salts. The squadron itself received a visit from the Forest Fire 
Commission Conference a few weeks later and two of Hitchcock’s colleagues, 
Pilot Officers Bill Keenan and John Eagerty, gave an exhibition of air-to-ground 
communication with borrowed portable radio equipment.11
9 Air Board Agenda 1974, 1979, NAA: A4181, 13; No.1 FTS Daily Routine Orders…Personnel, 6 March 
1936, NAA: A10605, 521/3. Only 24 of Deryck Kingwell’s 1935 class volunteered for the RAF; the bottom two 
graduates drew straws to make up the number (ACdre D. Kingwell, interview, 31 Oct 1981, NLA TRC 1108 
Tape 1). It would not have escaped Wrigley’s notice early in Dec. 1936 that the well-regarded cadet squadron 
adjutant and flying instructor F/Lt Doug Candy had written off a Moth and extensively damaged his own 
Avro Cadet by an ‘error of judgment’ in a collision while approaching to land (NAA: A12372 R/327/P).
10 Weston Bate, Heads, You Win! A History of the Barwon Heads Golf Club, Barwon Heads, 2007.
11 No. 21 Squadron Operations Record Book, Jan. 1937, NAA: A9186, 42/16.
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Exhausted on manoeuvres, Yanakie, 1937
(Courtesy of Les Hitchcock)
Several months elapsed before the Air Board reviewed the Hitchcock case. On 
25 March 1937, in the light of the recommendation from the Laverton Station 
Commander, ‘it was decided to take no further action on this Agenda’.12 In 
December 1937 Hitchcock flew Wrigley from Laverton to Essendon where the 
Laverton base commander was to officiate at the opening of the Royal Victorian 
Aero Club clubhouse enclosure followed by a ‘smoke night’ at the Drill Hall in 
North Melbourne with the Governor in attendance. He caught the attention of 
a photographer for Aircraft magazine.
12 ‘Pilot Officer R. E. Hitchcock’, minute by Secretary, Air Board (P. E. Coleman), 25 Mar. 1937, RAAF 
59/1/585, courtesy Dr Chris Clark.
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F/O Hitchcock with Hubert Boss-Walker (Chief Instructor) and James Bell 
(committeeman) at the Royal Victorian Aero Club, December 1937
(Aircraft, January 1938, p.17, courtesy of David Vincent)
His confidence substantially restored, Hitchcock became, in Wrigley’s words, 
‘a very sound pilot’.13 Wrigley’s conclusion was justified. Given the number of 
accidents reported in the next couple of years, Hitchcock’s record appears to 
have been different more in degree than essential character from that of most of 
his contemporaries.
The late Group Captain John McKenzie, a former Staff Officer Air Training, 
made a detailed study of the archives. He concluded:
Within fourteen months after Hitchcock’s course finished at 1FTS, three 
of the graduates had been killed in flying accidents together with a pilot 
from the following course who was in one of the aircraft. Accidents 
caused by pilots from Hitchcock’s course within this fourteen month 
period resulted in Air Board formally writing off nine (9) aircraft; 
Hitchcock’s accident to the Demon is not on this list.
What McKenzie’s research points to is a very different story from the one 
that later gained credence about the supposedly singular inadequacy of 
Hitchcock. Slips, scrapes, and minor accidents, usually characterised as errors 
13 AVM H. N. Wrigley, interview, [1977].
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of judgment but sometimes found to be the result of ignoring instructions, were 
commonplace. Pilot Officer Cohen, for example, marred a display of aerobatics 
and formation flying at Somers Camp when the port wing tip flare bracket on 
his Bulldog struck the starboard elevator of the accompanying Bulldog. The 
damage was minor and only pride was hurt. Ironically Cohen had been brought 
in from No. 1 Squadron as it was thought that only one pilot available in No. 21 
Squadron was experienced enough to take part in the display. More seriously, 
Cohen was held responsible by the Air Accidents Investigation Committee for 
one of a series of Demon accidents occurring within a week late in 1937 that 
provoked a press and parliamentary clamour. Prior to take-off at Archerfield his 
‘faulty operation of the aircraft brakes’ swung him across the path of another 
Demon that braked violently to avoid a collision, tilted on to its nose, and 
broke its airscrew. That Cohen, along with Eric Read and Brian Eaton, was one 
of the RAAF’s aerobatic display team that went on show in Bulldogs around 
Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia, puts the performance of Hitchcock’s 
contemporaries into perspective.14
Among the most notable of the casualties in the year and a half after the class 
of 1936 passed out was a university graduate and the star of the course, Donald 
Ashton-Shorter. Awarded a ‘pass with special distinction’ with a score of 85 
per cent, Ashton-Shorter received the sword of honour. Within eighteen days 
of joining No. 3 Squadron he ‘crashed [Major]’ (sic) in a Wapiti while practising 
for a display for Royal Military College cadets. In February 1937, inadvisedly 
pushing through bad weather between Laverton and Tasmania, he and Gerry 
Buscombe wrote off their Demons in forced landings in ‘strange and difficult 
country.’ The Air Accidents Investigation Committee had pronounced the 
incident ‘an error of judgment…attributed to lack of experience’. By May that 
year Ashton-Shorter had a total of 190 hours at No. 3 (Army Co-operation) 
Squadron. Recognised as an officer of great promise ― he had won the Mannock 
Cup for best pilot 10 months earlier ― he was probably allowed greater latitude 
than some of his contemporaries. He had dazzled troops of the 31st Battalion 
on exercises around Townsville, manoeuvring between trees and a telephone 
pole to pick up message bags suspended between two sticks six feet high and 
10 feet apart. But his skill could not save him when a farewell aerobatic display 
― at an angle and height contrary to instructions ― put a strain on his aircraft 
that it was not able to take. Pulling out of a dive-bombing demonstration at 
14 NAA: A5954, 869/8; MP187/4/173, 184A; Kingsland, Into the Midst, p.36. The Special Technical 
Committee that examined this incident could not see ‘any reason for the failure of F/O. Cohen’s brakes…other 
than their misuse by the pilot, or that they were inoperative at the time, owing to failure of the pilot to release 
the parking cock before taxying out’. For minor accidents involving others from Hitchcock’s cadet cohort, A. 
N. Hick (fined £10 for damages to his Seagull), N. P. Ford, D. J. Macpherson, B. G. Braithwaite, W. F. Allshorn, 
T. H. Davies, R. F. Wiley, and W. J. Keenan, see NAA: MP187/3 and MP116/1. For Eric Read’s mangling of a 
Bulldog and himself in December 1936, see A705, 32/10/1704 and Dick Kingsland, ‘Weather on my mind’, 
Canberra Times, 14 Aug. 1981.
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250 feet the Demon’s upper port wing and then the lower wing sheared off.15 
Pilot Officer Ashton-Shorter, already signing his own log book as ‘OC B Flight 3 
Squadron’, would not live to fulfil the hopes of those who rated him so highly. 
Six days after his death his log book was signed by the acting commander of the 
squadron, Flight Lieutenant Wilfred Compagnoni.
A nice young man with a good future
Uncertain though his beginning had been, Bob Hitchcock survived his own year 
as a pilot officer unscathed. Almost a year after he had received his wings, having 
passed the requisite examination and with routine promotion to flying officer 
imminent, Bob was married to his first and only sweetheart, Olive Beecroft. It 
was just six weeks since he had taken part in a Coronation ceremonial fly-past 
of 36 aircraft and a spectacular formation dive over the Victorian Governor’s 
saluting base. The occasion was capped when he joined a select group of pilots 
including Flying Officers Jack Ryland and Jack Graham, and Squadron Leader 
Fred Thomas at a levee at Parliament House and was presented to the Governor, 
Lord Huntingfield. Memorable as these ceremonies were, they were no more 
than a prologue to the transformation of his personal life. The wedding on 
Saturday 26 June 1937 was a big event at the Swanston Street Church of Christ 
conducted by the church’s celebrated minister, Thomas Henry Scambler. The 
bride, attended by her 14-year-old sister Mavis, was ‘charmingly gowned in 
deep creamy satin cut on unusual lines with a deep pleated panel on either 
side falling gracefully into a train at the hips’. A veil of lace lined with creamy 
satin was surmounted by a coronet of tiny magnolias. As the couple left the 
church they passed through a guard of honour of RAAF officers. The bride was 
handed a model aeroplane as a mascot. The bride’s mother received guests at the 
afternoon reception held at The Green Door, 229 Collins Street.16
15 ‘Biplane pilot sees an old friend restored’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 Feb. 1987; NAA: MP187/3; 
MP187/4/176B; Henry Darwen, ‘The Kissing Point Camp — 1937’, The Whispering Boomerang: News Bulletin 
of the 31st Infantry Battalion Association, vol. 4, no. 8, March 1988, pp.5–7, courtesy Loftus Dun; Coulthard-
Clark, The Third Brother, pp.327–8.
16 Unidentified press cutting courtesy of Joan Richardson.
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Bob and Olive Hitchcock
(Courtesy of Joan Richardson and Helen Gregg)
Along with Hitchcock family and friends, a flotilla of Olive’s Beecroft and 
Hoskings relations from Gippsland was in attendance. Bob’s friend Rex Taylor 
was there with Nancy Darlison (they were to be married in the same church in 
April 1939). There were other RAAF comrades as well, including Bill Keenan 
and notably Bob’s new commanding officer, Charles Eaton, who had taken over 
No. 21 Squadron in May. Ever since he had led the ground party that found and 
buried the bodies of Keith Anderson and Bob’s father in 1929, ‘Moth’ Eaton had 
taken a kindly interest in Bob’s affairs. He spoke of him to his own son as a ‘nice 
young man’ with a ‘good future’.17 In a squadron photograph of Permanent Air 
Force members Hitchcock sits comfortably in the front row at his CO’s left.18
17 ACdre C.R. Taylor to CH, 25 Sept 1983; Dr Charles Eaton to CH, (email), 6 April 2008.
18 SLdr W. H. Brook RAAFAR, Demon to Vampire: The Story of No. 21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron, 
DemonVamp Publications, Glen Waverly, 1986, p.27.
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No. 21 Squadron CO and Permanent Air Force officers. Back row left to 
right: F/O D. T. Forsyth, F/O W. J. Candler, F/O W. J. Keenan  
(Adjutant), Cadet Campbell; front row left to right: F/Lt Dallas Scott, S/Ldr 
Charles Eaton, CO, F/O R. E. Hitchcock
(Courtesy of Dr Charles Eaton)
Among the ‘absent friends’ from No. 21 Squadron not present at the wedding 
was a fellow graduate from the July 1936 Point Cook Flying Training School. 
John Eagerty, a Xavier College boy, had completed a diploma of agriculture at 
Dookie College before he joined at Point Cook. He had lived just nine months 
after gaining his wings. At the controls of a Bulldog undertaking camera gun 
practice against a drogue target in March, Eagerty had inexplicably failed to 
pull out of a dive and crashed to his death in Port Philip Bay. It was the same 
aircraft (A12-8), supposedly undamaged, in which Dick Cohen had clipped 
another Bulldog during the display of formation flying at Somers Camp six 
months earlier.19 Hitchcock might not have known that Eagerty, who had been 
transferred to No. 21 Squadron at the same time as himself, had been moved for 
similar reasons. Classed ‘below average’ as a pilot in his ‘A’ course, Eagerty had 
19 NAA: MP187/4/176; No. 21 Squadron Operations Record Book, Jan. 1937, NAA: A9186, 42/18.
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no recorded accidents. He had subsequently been ‘very erratic in his flying, 
very heavy on controls, and dangerous in landings’ of his Seagull V aircraft. 
In submitting the adverse report from the Richmond CO to the Air Board, the 
Air Member for Personnel had expressed the opinion that, ‘although slow in 
learning’, Eagerty would eventually become a satisfactory pilot. A further trial 
in a landplane squadron, ‘preferably at Laverton’, had been approved.20 In his 
case, though not in Hitchcock’s, the Air Board had made a fatal misjudgement.
On the day of the wedding Bob moved out of single quarters and began to 
draw full married rates of allowances. Following a honeymoon at Healesville the 
couple were to set up house in Williamstown. After a year together, Olive became 
pregnant. A son, Robert Gordon (named in honour of his grandfather, not the 
headline-making parliamentarian), was born in March 1939. The growth of the 
infant provided Bob with an ideal subject for his main hobby of photography. 
Now a family man, taking the customary steps in his profession, his career was 
settling into a predictable pattern and trajectory.
Over the next few years at Laverton, Hitchcock flew regularly in shadowing 
patrols and exercises in naval co-operation, bombing practice, searches for 
lost ‘overlanders’, displays ― all the normal duties of a peacetime Air Force 
preparing for an apprehended war. He spent two months in 1938 with No. 2 
Squadron undergoing a navigation reconnaissance course. In Eaton’s No. 21 
Squadron he undertook a variety of appointments: member of the fire committee, 
armaments officer, signals officer, photographic officer, officer in charge of the 
bar in the officers’ mess (perhaps a little embarrassing for a tee-total Church of 
Christ communicant though Eaton himself drank sparingly). He was even acting 
commander of the squadron for a week before Christmas 1937.
Eaton thought well of Hitchcock, assessing him in February 1939 as average in 
navigation, bombing, and air gunnery but ‘above average’ in flying ability. In 
the language of RAAF form A.18A there was nothing in his flying or airmanship 
that ‘should be watched’.21 No-one knew of the incident he mentioned to his 
younger brother Les when he just missed flying into a freshly erected radio 
mast in southwest Victoria. If he had been ‘involved’, as the RAAF historian 
Dr Chris Clark thought, in the collision of two Ansons on take-off from Curry 
Aerodrome at King Island on 23 August 1938, Eaton’s opinion might have been 
thought excessively kind. But, as it happened, Bob Hitchcock and his friend 
Bill ‘Dilly’ Keenan had captained the aircraft on the way to King Island and 
20 Air Board Agenda 1944, NAA: A4181, 13. The Air Board presumably had not been told of the incident 
in May 1936 when Eagerty lost his way on a cross-country flight in a Wapiti and made a forced landing in 
Wodonga (NAA: A9300, EAGERTY EJ).
21 R. E. Hitchcock Flying Log Book, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729 Attachment 1.
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then handed them over to two recently graduated pilot officers. Hitchcock was 
not mentioned in the official accident investigation files or the reports to the 
Secretary of the Defence Department and the minister.22
Flying Officer Hitchcock, helmet, goggles, and intercom lead in hand, with 
DH 60 Gipsy Moth trainer and trainee, March 1938
(Courtesy of Les Hitchcock)
In February 1939 Hitchcock was transferred to No. 1 (Bomber) Squadron and 
promoted to officer in charge of C flight and O/C photographic section. For six 
weeks he was temporary commander of the squadron pending the arrival of P. 
G. ‘Paddy’ Heffernan from the United Kingdom. The promotions of Heffernan to 
squadron leader and Hitchcock to flight lieutenant were gazetted on the same 
day, 27 April 1939. They were two of the 10 (sometimes only eight or nine) 
officers in the unit, with 109 airmen, in charge of 12 Demons, an NA-16 and an 
NA-33. In mid-1939 No. 1 Squadron won the AFC Memorial Trophy for the best 
Victorian Service squadron. Only 20 per cent of the marks were for flying and 
22 A. L. Hitchcock to CH, 10 Nov. 1977; NAA: MP187/3 RAAF 1937/1938, reference courtesy Dr Chris Clark; 
Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, p.206; GpCpt. J. J. McKenzie to Dr C. Coulthard-Clark, 28 Sept. 1999.
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operational efficiency; but in this category, in which Hitchcock’s contribution 
would have been important, they scored 166 out of a possible 200. Heffernan had 
assessed him at the end of June as above the average for both flying ability and 
bombing. Intermittently since April the increasingly assured flying officer had 
been engaged in testing of the two American NA-16 and NA-33 aircraft brought 
in as construction examples by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation.
The North American Aviation NA-16-1A (A20-1), flown by Bob Hitchcock 
seven times between May and August 1939 
(RAAF Photograph, courtesy of Gordon Birkett)
When the first three of the new CAC Wirraways, developed under licence from 
the NA16, were ready for acceptance in July 1939 it was Hitchcock together with 
Heffernan and one of the RAAF’s top pilots, Squadron Leader Fred Scherger, 
who joined the CAC’s test pilot Flight Lieutenant Hubert Boss-Walker to show 
off the new machines to the press and celebrating ministers.23 The RAAF needed 
good publicity after a year in which five Avro Ansons had crashed with the 
loss of 15 men. No publicity was given to Heffernan’s opinion that Lawrence 
Wackett had taken ‘the worst design features’ of the two American NA-16s ‘and 
called the result the Wirraway’.24
23 Hitchcock had ‘completed successfully a conversion course’ on Wirraways on 3 July 1939. (Air Force 
Court of Inquiry…’, attachment forms A 18A, AFO 10/A/9, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729); Brian L. Hill, Wirraway 
to Hornet: A History of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation Pty Ltd 1936 to 1985, Southern Cross 
Publications, 1998, pp.28–9.
24 Heffernan in conversation recalled by John Hopton, email message to Aviation Historical Society of 
Australia, 12 May 2012.
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Officers and gentlemen
The normally spare language of No. 1 Squadron’s operations record book 
suddenly took a new tone in the spring of 1939. Paddy Heffernan noted that 
his unit was converted to a bomber reconnaissance squadron on August 28 and 
29. Their Hawker Demons were transferred to No. 21 Squadron, the Wirraways 
to No. 12 Squadron. They were replaced by nine Ansons, gathered from No. 22 
Squadron, 1 Aircraft Depot, and No. 21 Squadron. ‘This change over,’ Heffernan 
said, ‘took place during the war crisis and this Squadron was placed in a very 
precarious position.’ In a frank declaration, Heffernan was to report the next 
month that the outbreak of war ‘found this unit unprepared for the role it would 
have to fulfil if called upon’.25 It was not just the change of equipment that left 
his squadron so vulnerable but the departure of fully trained captains, leaving 
only three who had completed the navigation reconnaissance course. On August 
28, five days before war broke out, Hitchcock had left No. 1 Squadron, assigned 
to No. 2 Squadron as O/C of A flight.
Bob Hitchcock ready for take-off in an Anson
(Photograph by Frank Jefferies, courtesy of Paul and Helen Struc]
When Bob Hitchcock arrived at No. 2 Squadron, war fears gripped Laverton. 
Aircraft were grounded amid an intense period of equipment checking and 
maintenance. Wing Commander Charlesworth reported at the end of August 
that the preparation of mobilisation orders had been completed and the 
squadron was ‘being maintained in a state of readiness for any eventuality’. 
25 No. 1 Squadron Operations Record Book, NAA: A9186.
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With 11 officers and 130 airmen, the squadron had 10 Ansons ‘fully equipped 
for War Operations’. They began immediately diverging searches to seaward. As 
no enemy vessels had been sighted after two days, the patrols were suspended. 
For several weeks two aircraft and crews were placed on standby every second 
day. Then a system of duty flights in conjunction with No. 1 Squadron and No. 
21 Squadron began. Occasional patrols up to 150 miles eastward from refuelling 
bases established at Yanakie on Wilson’s Promontory and Pat’s River aerodrome 
on Flinders Island followed in October and November. Under a new CO, Fred 
Thomas, the squadron also undertook parallel track searches from Mount 
Gambier to Parafield under instructions from the Central Operations Room. As 
the months wore on, the search for enemy submarines, raiders, and mine-layers 
continued, with occasional interruptions to protect 2nd AIF troop convoys.26
The bare formalities of Hitchcock’s service progress are on record. Some, though 
by no means all, of the evaluations of those whose job it was to judge him 
and measure him against his peers are preserved. The report on a pupil pilot 
passing out from an ‘ab initio’ flying training course (Form F/T.4), for example, 
is missing from his file. So too are some of the annual confidential reports on 
officers. Thus we are more than usually reliant less on contemporary official 
judgements than on the later private observations and impressions of those who 
saw him at work and in the mess. One of the young pilot officers in his flight at 
No. 1 Squadron was Lindsay Trewren, who made the following observations:
From my lowly position he was regarded as quite a good pilot, having 
survived the Bulldog, Demon, Anson eras of the Sqdn then finally 
Hudsons.
He was of smallish stature, quite efficient and had a bright & very likeable 
personality and very popular with all ranks in the Sqdn, although a 
little reserved at times.
Never flamboyant or over-confident ― in fact quite the opposite ― 
more retiring and quite modest.27
Father Ken Morrison, a popular Roman Catholic priest, knew Hitchcock in the 
mess at Laverton. Morrison had been commissioned to the RAAF in 1936 to act 
as part-time chaplain to No. 21 Squadron. When war came, he was called to full-
time duty and lived on the base until the beginning of September 1940 (initially, 
in order to keep him more fully occupied, he was made a cypher officer).28 
Morrison recalled Hitchcock as:
26 No. 2 (General Reconnaissance) Squadron Operations Record Book, NAA: A9186.
27 L. R. Trewren to CH, 3 June 1978. Trewren recalled landing a badly damaged Hudson in June 1942 (Sid 
Grantham, The 13 Squadron Story, Dee Why, 1991, pp.68–9).
28 Msgnr K. Morrison to CH, 14 Oct. 1982; Fr John McNamara, ‘The Role of the R.A.A.F. Chaplains in the 
Middle East’, in Peter Alexander, We Find and Destroy: History of 458 Squadron, The 458 Squadron Council, 
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…a somewhat rugged person, not big but solidly made, slightly russet 
in colouring, balding or suggesting that he was going that way. He was 
by no means a recessive or negative character though could have been 
something of a loner and not socially successful type.29
David Colquhoun, who was to leave Australia for Singapore as a Hudson captain 
with No. 1 Squadron in June 1940, remembered a ‘short stockily built pleasant 
chap who seemed to have a somewhat shy and retiring disposition’. Though 
he did not know him well, Colquhoun had ‘a vague recollection that Bob was 
not terribly keen about flying but was following in his father’s footsteps’.30 
Clarence ‘Spud’ Spurgeon, a young pilot officer in No. 21 Squadron, noted that 
Hitchcock ‘didn’t booze much’. Not that, as a very junior 20-year-old, Spurgeon 
would himself have mixed much socially with a flight commander. ‘I probably 
would never have spoken to him except on the stairs…hierarchy was maintained 
strictly.’31 Another colleague who knew Hitchcock better was Deryck Kingwell. 
Kingwell had arrived as a 20-year-old cadet at Point Cook just as Hitchcock 
graduated. He was to win the sword of honour in July 1937 and the Mannock 
Cup as best pilot. Later at Laverton, then a flight lieutenant, Kingwell was chief 
instructor at the General Reconnaissance School. The Hitchcock he remembered 
was ‘a quiet good looking chap who mixed well with his fellow officers’.32 As a 
cadet and young officer, ‘Tich’ McFarlane, later to rise to Secretary of the Air 
Department and Public Service Board Commissioner, found him ‘not the typical 
aristocratic Air Force type, the superior type’. McFarlane, a self-improver 
educated at Scotch College and Melbourne University, remembered a man who 
was ‘courteous, very generous with his time’. Hitchcock’s good relations with 
his fellows were perceptively noted by Kingwell, a natural leader who was soon 
to become the youngest Group Captain in the Air Force.
Whatever was beneath the mask of reserve, maybe lingering uneasiness about 
his own ability, Bob Hitchcock was making a success of his Service life. He was 
an accepted member of the flying fraternity. None of those who testified in later 
years about his personality, vague as their memories might be, connected his 
shyness and reserve to his past. If they knew, they did not relate his behaviour 
to the feelings of a boy who might have thought ― contrary to the evidence 
known to his uncles, aunts, and cousins ― that his father had abandoned his 
beloved mother years before he died. They did not speculate on the effect of 
being thrust into national spotlights as the son of a tragic hero about whom an 
1979, p.275.
29 Msgnr K. Morrison to CH, 14 Oct. 1982.
30 ACdre D. W. Colquhoun to CH, 7 June 1978.
31 ACdre C. H. Spurgeon, telephone interview, 16 Nov. 1982.
32 ACdre D. W. Kingwell to CH, 18 April, 31 May 1978; interview with Fred Morton, 31 Oct. 1981, NLA TRC 
1108. Kingwell spoke of being a flying instructor at Point Cook when he knew cadet Hitchcock; but Hitchcock 
had graduated a year earlier.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm
116
important truth was never publicly disclosed. The fact was that young Bob, from 
the age of 16, was labelled as his father’s son. The Argus, presumably primed by 
an Air Force press release, had singled him out when his name appeared in the 
list of successful applicants for the cadet course. He knew, as he must have 
suspected all those who commanded him knew, that he owed his continuing 
place in the Air Force to compassion, with perhaps a tincture of guilt, over his 
father’s fate.
Unwisely, he had told some fellow recruits that his mother had been promised 
that the Service would look after him and his brothers. They knew that his 
father had died in 1929 because he followed the lead of Keith Anderson, a man 
of repute but poor judgment, trying to save their friend Charles Kingsford-
Smith, a charismatic, courageous but feckless and reckless glory-seeker. It had 
seemed like the least the Air Force could do. Contemporary trainees recalled 
hearing that when he arrived in Melbourne by train from Western Australia 
Bob Hitchcock had spent his first night in the home of the Chief of the Air Staff. 
Dicky Williams did not routinely provide shelter for recruits. But as the son of a 
copper miner in Moonta, South Australia, and former telegraph messenger, the 
abstemious Williams knew what it meant to make the journey from a working 
man’s world to the officers’ mess.
At Laverton in the early days of the war, Bob remained very much a private 
man. His fellow flight commander Ray Garrett saw him as ‘a very good type of 
young man and very popular in the Squadron though of a very shy and retiring 
disposition.’33 Garrett, also a flight lieutenant though some 12 years older than 
Hitchcock, had been a Citizen Air Force instructor ― the only certified CAF 
instructor in the 1930s ― and a commercial pilot. He, like Bob, had lost his 
father at an early age. As his daughter recounts, Garrett left school at 14 to work 
at Watson’s and Son, pioneers in X-ray and optical equipment. He studied part-
time with Professor T. H. Laby, the dean of the science faculty at Melbourne 
University:
He was involved in various projects from importing cars to installing 
lifts which weren’t very successful so when the Depression came and he 
was engaged to mum her brothers finally asked him what his intentions 
were. This is when he decided to fly the Airmail Route in Northern 
Aust. for Jimmy Larkin to try and earn enough money to get married.
33 ACdre Sir Raymond Garrett to CH, 26 April 1978.
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Ray Garrett in an SE5a, 1926
(Courtesy of Anne Kelly)
After their marriage the Garretts lived in his mother’s home in East Kew, where 
Ray set up a photographic business in the laundry.34 While running the business 
Garrett had continued in the active Reserve and was called up at the outbreak 
of war. Like Bob, Ray lived off the base with his wife and young family. Both 
Ray and Vera Garrett were Methodists. Like Bob and other Church of Christ 
parishioners, they were teetotallers and non-smokers. Yet, for all that he made 
his own way in the world, and friendly as he was with Hitchcock, there was 
some social distance between the Garretts and the Hitchcocks. Affluent East 
Kew was a world away from the inner south-western working class suburb of 
Newport where Bob, Olive, and their little boy Robert had settled.
Bob was probably more at ease with his other fellow flight commander Jack 
Ryland. Ryland, a year older than Hitchcock, was the son of a Mallee farmer. 
A Roman Catholic, educated in the country, and then at Xavier College where 
he was captain of boats and the Australian Rules football team, he had earned 
a degree in agricultural science while learning to fly and serving in the Citizen 
34 Anne Kelly to CH, (email), 29 April 2009.
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Bob and Olive Hitchcock with baby Robert: a stroll by the Yarra
(Courtesy of Les Hitchcock)
Air Force. He worked briefly in the Victorian Department of Agriculture before 
joining Ansett Airways in 1937. Ryland had been in the Air Force Reserve from 
1938. Called up in October 1939, he was the most experienced of the three 
flight commanders on Hudsons. He converted both Garrett and Hitchcock in 
July 1940. Ryland, as David Campbell testified, ‘had no side to him…he didn’t 
pretend to belong to the Toorak lot’. ‘Tich’ McFarlane, who liked him, would 
say: ‘nothing terribly brilliant about John, nothing terribly imaginative…but a 
very solid, sound fellow’.35 In 19 hours dual and check-dual flying as Ryland’s 
35 A. B. McFarlane, interview, 18 April 1978.
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pupil, and a subsequent crew test, learning the particularities and peculiarities 
of the new aircraft, Hitchcock had come to know the ‘very solid, sound fellow’ 
well.
Wing Commander J. H. Glasscock, then a Flying Officer in No. 1 Squadron, 
remembered Hitchcock early in the war as a popular officer with ‘a pleasing 
personality’. Ivon Black, later Wing Commander, DFC and CO of No. 21 
Squadron, but then another flying officer in No. 1 Squadron, found Hitchcock 
a ‘likeable fellow’. Professionally, he thought him ‘quite a safe pilot…definitely 
a cautious type’. But as a single man living on the base Black did not mix much 
with Hitchcock.36
If Hitchcock kept to himself it was understandable that he wanted to be with 
his family each evening or at weekends. Reliant on his service pay of £1.7.6 a 
day he certainly could not afford the entertainment and leisure pursuits that 
so many of his contemporaries took for granted.37 But there was in any case 
another element in his life that seems to have eluded his peers and superiors: his 
church affiliation.
‘I don’t want to seem a snob…’
From his earliest enlistment documents Bob Hitchcock acknowledged that 
he was a member of the Church of Christ. It was the faith of his parents. 
But it identified him among an austere religious minority that deplored the 
‘tendencies of modern life’. A census of religions in the RAAF conducted in 
July 1940 found 223 airmen in the Church of Christ and just five air crew. 
When the RAAF began to appoint full-time chaplains at the beginning of the 
war it recognised only the four largest groups: Anglicans (49 per cent), Roman 
Catholics (17 per cent), Methodists (14.5 per cent), and Presbyterians (12.5 per 
cent). The Church of Christ was one of an undifferentiated aggregation of ‘Other 
Protestant Denominations’ (7.5 per cent).38 Closest in doctrine and practice to 
the Welsh Baptists, though with early nineteenth century American roots in 
Methodism and Presbyterianism as well, the Church of Christ proclaimed ‘no 
creed but Christ’. Membership of the church followed a public confession of 
36 J. H. Glasscock to CH, 5 June 1978; Ivon O. Black to CH, 24 June 1978.
37 Standard rate of pay for married RAAF flying officers, inclusive of allowances, in April 1936 was £533–
570 a year (Air Board Agenda 1860, NAA: A4181, 13).
38 Peter A. Davidson, Sky Pilot: A History of Chaplaincy in the RAAF 1926–1990, Dept of Defence, Canberra, 
1990, p.1/9. The census figures for 18 July 1940 were: Anglican (51 per cent) 7215 airmen, 467 air crew; 
Roman Catholic (17 per cent) 2642 airmen, 92 air crew; Methodist (14 per cent) 2016 airmen, 101 air crew; 
Presbyterian (10 per cent) 1438 airmen, 119 air crew; Baptist 289 airmen, four air crew; Congregational 207 
airmen, 17 air crew. There were 51 Salvation Army in the ranks, 38 Jewish and four Jewish air crew. Of the 
other faiths, only Christian Science had more than 25 adherents. There were three Mormons, one Mahomedan, 
three agnostics and two atheists (NAA: A705, 36/1/99).
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm
120
faith. Penitent believers were baptised by full immersion. Congregations were 
autonomous. There was no priesthood, though those who hoped to serve as 
ministers were trained in Bible colleges and ordained. Individual churches 
‘called’ their own ‘preachers’. Their principal belief was a passion for church 
unity. Each congregation celebrated the ‘breaking of bread’ every Sunday. 
Through the rest of the week members were enjoined to temperance; card play 
and gambling were discouraged; smoking was frowned upon; and they were 
frequently reminded of the moral dangers of dancing.
When Bob was 12 years old, a Church of Christ had begun in Victoria Park, 
Perth. A handful of adherents met at first in a rented library hall. Two years 
later, evangelists from eastern Australia, the Hinrichson-Brooker tent ‘mission’, 
had elicited 75 ‘decisions’ and a ‘thank offering’ sum of £300. Bobby Hitchcock, 
a Wesleyan when he enlisted in 1915, and Violet were baptised by the minister 
F. A. Youens early in 1926. With the funds raised by the mission a chapel was 
erected in 1928 and the congregation flourished.39 In Western Australia as a 
whole the church had nearly 3000 members in 1930. By 1939 it had fallen 
to 2600. In Victoria, where the church was strongest, there were over 13 000 
members in 1939, a figure virtually unchanged since 1930.40 Membership was 
not a matter of nominal adherence. Regular attendance at worship services and 
participation in family ‘socials’ were expected. It is hard to imagine the young 
RAAF officer, rugged and fit as he was, not being drawn into local church tennis 
teams or youth activities, especially the Boys’ Explorer Club, which combined 
moral instruction and calisthenics. We know that Bob often spent weekends 
out of barracks in Moreland with the ‘lovely lady’ who knew his mother. It was 
there that his fellow trainee and pal Rex Taylor had met his future wife. And 
Olive Beecroft was a constant visitor to the Taylor household.
In 1940, Bob and Olive with their infant son Robert were living in Newport. 
Although he had previously been a member of the Hampton Church of Christ, 
Bob now seems to have drifted away from the church. Without a building of 
its own, the Newport congregation was reporting ‘splendid meetings’ in the 
Scouts’ Hall. But Bob, having left Hampton to be ‘nearer his place of work’, as 
39 Information from the Silver Jubilee Souvenir History of Churches of Christ in Western Australia 1890–1940 
and Gordon A. Ewers, A Century of Worship and Witness 1890–1990: Churches of Christ in Western Australia, 
supplied by Don Parker; Australian Christian, 1925–26. See also Roy Raymond, A Preacher’s Progress: An 
Autobiography, Perth, 2002; Australian Christian, 25 April 1929. The preacher, E. C. Hinrichson, and song 
leader, Les Brooker, had recently completed a six-month mission in country Queensland, where a youthful 
future Premier had been a convert (Cameron Hazlehurst, Gordon Chalk, A Political Life, Darling Downs 
Institute Press, Toowoomba, 1987, p.25).
40 Graeme Chapman, One Lord, One Faith, One Baptism: A History of Churches of Christ in Australia, Vital 
Publications, Melbourne, 2nd ed. 1989, pp.111ff; A. W. Stephenson, Pioneering for Christian Unity In Australia 
and New Zealand, Being an Outline of the History of Churches of Christ in Australia and New Zealand and a Brief 
Study of their Teachings and Ideals, Austral Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd,  Melbourne, 1940, p.91.
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the church journal would put it, was not among those present.41 The Hitchcocks’ 
two-bedroom weatherboard worker’s cottage at 43 Agg Street, was five minutes’ 
walk to the Newport railway station through which trains went to Laverton, 
Aircraft Siding, and Geelong.42 Not that most of Hitchcock’s colleagues were 
patrons of the Victorian railways. Not for them the weekend rail concession 
fares granted to men in uniform from mid-June 1940.43 ‘The flying people were a 
coterie somewhat removed from all other sections of the personnel,’ Monsignor 
Ken Morrison recalled, more likely to be seen in a jaunty sports car than a railway 
carriage. If they did use the train for return journeys between Melbourne and 
Laverton or Point Cook, for an extra threepence they could travel first class. 
Someone who had risen from the ranks with a trade background might be able to 
afford the first-class fare; but he could rarely hide his origins. If he was a Roman 
Catholic he had overcome a double handicap in the selection process, thanks to 
the presence among the selectors of ‘Dad’ Bladin (who was married to a Catholic 
and was received into the faith after his retirement) and John Joseph Swift, a 
medical administration officer with honorary commissioned rank, specifically 
chosen to ensure Catholic representation. Those affiliated with the smaller 
dissenting Christian churches faced less obvious but no less real discrimination. 
According to Monsignor Morrison, Bladin ‘expounded his theory of selection 
& made no apology for it’:
…there was a super-abundance of applications and the responsibility 
was on the candidates to present themselves in a manner that was 
known and accepted by the selectors. Consequently if a lad was in the 
cricket XI or the 100 yards at Scotch or Xavier it was to his credit but if 
he had the same achievements at one of the lesser known colleges…it 
did not mark him so highly.
Within the coterie, ‘the Toorak lot’, as David Campbell recalled them, were a 
class apart. These were men with pastoral backgrounds, men from the legal and 
medical professions, a handful of commercial pilots, men of business, whose 
families had known little of the privations of the Depression. At their head 
in No. 2 Squadron was Fred (Freddie to his intimates) Thomas, the affluent 
businessman, committee member of the Naval and Military Club, honorary 
ADC to Victoria’s Governor, Lord Huntingfield, himself a flying enthusiast. The 
squadron’s popular adjutant was a young man about town, well off and well 
liked. A few brother officers at Laverton came from the two leading Catholic 
41 Australian Christian, 24 Jan., 12 June, 21 Aug. 1940. In July 1940 the church in Victoria counted 
23 Explorer Clubs for some 2000 boys aged between 11 and 15. As a young teenager in the mid-1950s, I 
attended the Church of Christ in Footscray, an adjoining suburb to Newport, where Newport members then 
worshipped. The Boys’ Explorer Club met weekly in the church hall, making good use of a vaulting horse and 
roman rings suspended from the ceiling.
42 I am grateful to Brian Haynes and Jane Ridley of the Williamstown Historical Society for information 
about Agg Street, and to my former Monash University colleague Sid Ingham for his recollections of Newport.
43 NAA: AA1966/5/226.
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private schools, Xavier and Riverview. But more were educated at Geelong 
Grammar, St Peter’s (Adelaide), Wesley, Scotch, Melbourne Grammar, Sydney 
Grammar, Brisbane Grammar, or perhaps at Fort Street in Sydney or Melbourne 
High, Victoria’s premier selective high school.
There were rare exceptions. Bill Heath, whose father was a Collins Street 
doctor, was unusual in having earned a diploma of agriculture at Longerenong 
College in the Wimmera, a qualification for farmers’ sons. But even he grew 
up in South Yarra as well as the family farm at Freshwater Creek near Torquay. 
What Heath really wanted to be, as his RAAF enlistment form described his 
‘civil trade or profession’, was an ‘aviator’. He was to learn to fly in Geelong, 
his ambition undiminished by his father’s Depression misfortunes. As another 
contemporary with similar status put it, hesitating to express his opinion of 
Hitchcock to me, ‘I don’t want to seem a snob…’ The unspoken words said it 
all. If the ‘otherness’ was ever articulated it was in the snooty shorthand of a 
senior officer’s wife remembered by Paddy Heffernan: ‘N.O.C.’ (Not Our Class).44 
He would not rub shoulders at the Naval and Military Club with his superiors 
like Anderson, Thomas, and the Laverton base commander and club president, 
Frank Lukis. Nor was Hitchcock ever completely comfortable with many of his 
flying peers, or they with him. Although he needed no reminder of the social 
distance between them, he could see it any morning on the way to work as his 
train pulled out of Newport station ― a four-storey brick flour mill bearing the 
name ‘W. C. Thomas & Sons Pty Ltd’, his CO’s family firm.45
That said, whatever Hitchcock may have felt, Father Morrison who was familiar 
with the Laverton milieu, ‘never saw anything in the attitudes of his fellow 
officers, snobbishness, caste, scorn for inferior ability’. While the social barriers 
may have been barely perceptible to the young priest, he was impressed with 
a strong professional bond discernible in the mess. ‘The flying course with its 
attendant training in discipline and intercourse with other people, always put 
a stamp on those who went through it.’46 What Father Morrison had not seen 
before the war was the subtle condescension, and occasional irritation, of some 
of the Citizen Air Force weekend flyers. These were the part-timers, driving 
down for a Saturday night sleep-over, who were learning about reconnaissance, 
naval co-operation, and bombing. The exercises were instructive but there was 
more fun to be had in pageants, air displays, and excursions to the Bass Strait 
islands, often with family friends clandestinely on board.
44 P. G. Heffernan, ‘TOC and Cork’, The Duntroon Society Newsletter, 2/1990, p.12.
45 Major Warren Perry, The Naval and Military Club Melbourne: A History of its First Hundred years, 1881–
1981, Lothian Publishing, Melbourne, 1981, pp.178, 190, 387–8; Lewis and Peggy Jones, The Flour Mills of 
Victoria 1840–1990: An Historical Record, Flour Millers’ Council of Victoria, 1990, pp.137–8.
46 Msgnr K. R. Morrison to CH, 6 June 1983.
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Until the middle of 1939, as Rollo Kingsford-Smith, nephew of Sir Charles, 
put it, ‘for officers the RAAF was a combination of a gentleman’s country club 
associated with a flying club for enthusiastic amateurs’.47 There was no exact 
counterpart of the RAF’s No. 601 (County of London) Auxiliary Squadron, 
the ‘Millionaires Squadron’ created in 1925 at White’s Club by Lord Edward 
Grosvenor who selected members to serve under him after assuring himself 
that copious quantities of gin and port would not incapacitate them. London’s 
aristocratic clubmen lined their uniform tunics with red silk and played polo 
on Brough Superior motor cycles.48 But Australia’s elite flyers, though a tad less 
flamboyant, unashamedly indulged the perquisites of their wealth and status. 
Thus the hard-drinking Bertie Simms, CO of No. 6 Squadron at Richmond in 
1939, would occasionally summon Pilot Officer John Murphy for a ‘few holes 
this afternoon’ taking him to the golf course in his staff car.49 ‘Moth’ Eaton 
was widely believed to have told his pilots to keep their eyes open for trout 
streams which he could share with his fishing companions Frank Lukis, Sir Tom 
Blamey, and Blamey’s friend, the businessman Major (later Brigadier) Lionel 
Lemaire. Eaton’s son Peter remembered how one of his father’s young pilots, 
‘Johnny’ Lerew, a Scotch college old boy, sportsman, racing motorist, and civil 
engineering graduate, told him to ‘jump in the old Wapiti’. They proceeded on 
‘a hedge-hopping joy ride, buzzing farm houses at tree height as they flew en 
route to Geelong where Lerew dive-bombed his girl-friend’s home’.50 Many a 
young woman, like Dick Cohen’s acquaintance holidaying in the path of one 
of his meteorological flights, was the recipient of a message from on high with 
a streamer attached. ‘There was a bombing range on a property at Cressy,’ the 
meteorologist Allen Cornish recalled, ‘and sometimes Dick would land and taxi 
to the homestead where we would have morning tea in the Demon.’51
In all the recollections of Bob Hitchcock’s character and behaviour, frivolity, 
spontaneity, and exuberant leisure pursuits are rarely part of the story. Witness 
Jack Graham, a Cambridge law graduate, who had been put through a complete 
flying training course at Point Cook in 1932 in spite of his three years with the 
Cambridge University Air Squadron. Graham joined the new No. 21 City of 
Melbourne Squadron in 1936. There, where Hitchcock was one of the nucleus 
47 Kingsford-Smith, I Wouldn’t Have Missed it for Quids, p.24; Michael Molkentin, ‘“Unconscious of any 
distinction”? Social and vocational quality in the Australian Flying Corps, 1914–18’, Journal of the Australian 
War Memorial, no. 40, Feb. 2007 (http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j40/molkentin.htm).
48 Tom Moulson, The Flying Sword: The Story of 601 Squadron, Macdonald, London, 1964. As Commodore of 
No. 21 Squadron, Lord Huntingfield arranged an affiliation with the RAuxAF 600 (City of London) Squadron 
(Lord Lloyd to Huntingfield, 2 Jan. 1938, Huntingfield MSS, NLA AJCP M2821).
49 Steve Eather, Blue Lightning: The Story of 6 Squadron 1917–2005, Australian Military History Publications, 
Loftus [NSW], 2007, p.17; A. B. McFarlane, interview, 18 April 1978.
50 Charles Eaton, The Cross in the Air, Ch. XIII (draft courtesy of Dr Eaton). Blamey’s son F/O Charles Blamey 
had been killed when his Moth stalled and crashed in Dec. 1932 (Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, p.323).
51 Allan Cornish, Memories of the Bureau of Meteorology 1929–1946, pp.512–3; http://wark.austehc.
unimelb.edu.au/fam/0512.html.
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of permanent officers, he encountered someone he recalled was considered to be 
‘a very over-confident pilot’. Not a man looking for fun but thought by some to 
be flirting with danger. Flying in formation with Hitchcock, Graham found him 
‘taking the most awful risks…very easy to collide in formation especially in the 
aircraft we were flying then, the Anson which was like a flying cow, sloppy sort 
of aircraft’.
Graham’s personal experience of this risk taking was only one isolated incident. 
It could hardly have been otherwise:
We were a very friendly happy mob in the mess at 21 and I don’t 
recall any sort of people being left out of our activities there. In fact, 
at weekends ― we used to go down every second weekend ― arrived 
down there midday Saturday…and we stayed down to late Sunday and 
we had a whale of a time…
Quite often we would go down there and find that the permanent people 
had flown the guts out of the aircraft and they were all unserviceable, 
and that used to make us mad, naturally.52
Bob’s contribution to wear and tear on the aircraft included an occasional 
unadvertised diversion to south Gippsland. He would drop parcels into a 
Koonwarra paddock where Olive’s younger brother, Don Beecroft, was working. 
On one surprise run he swooped over a group of men weeding an onion field. 
Flying low over the pine trees straight toward them he was unaware that one of 
the older workers was a shell-shocked Flanders veteran. As he learned later, the 
terrified man threw himself on the ground screaming, ‘The Bastard’s got us!’53
This was not the kind of tale to be shared with CAF officers who might take 
umbrage or seek retribution. Later, when at No. 1 Squadron, his CO Paddy 
Heffernan was impressed by a quite different side of Hitchcock’s personality. 
He was not an overconfident pilot Heffernan thought ― rather ‘he may not 
have been a confident pilot’. ‘Although he flew satisfactorily, I never really felt 
happy about him.’ Heffernan would recall ‘a silly thing’ he did while flying in 
formation:
I was leading and had my aerial out, some 200 feet of wire trailing 
below the aircraft. For some reason known only to himself, he decided 
52 GpCpt. J. E. Graham, interview, 11 May 1978. Graham might have been recalling a ‘most awful risk’ 
during a display by a flight of five Ansons at a graduation parade for No 1 Flying Training School in December 
1937 (No. 21 Squadron Operations Record Book, NAA: A9186/42/46). Philip Russell (comp.), Old Geelong 
Grammarians at War, Ocean Grove, 1996, pp.190–1.
53 Joan Richardson to CH, (email), 5 Oct. 2009. Hitchcock’s flying log book records a flight in an Anson to 
Koonwarra on 13 July 1938.
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to change from port to starboard and ended up with the aerial wrapped 
round his aircraft. He could not give any satisfactory reason for this 
stupid antic when I took him to task later.
Apart from this, according to Heffernan, his flight commander never did 
anything wrong: ‘BUT I was always waiting for him to do something wrong.’54 
It was this kind of incident, uncommon as it may have been, that could have 
reinforced Jack Graham’s perception of Hitchcock as a risk taker. Graham, law 
partner of the recently elected youthful federal MP Harold Holt, and secretary 
of the Cinematograph Exhibitors Association, may not have noticed or more 
likely had just forgotten that Hitchcock was not actually at Laverton on many a 
Sunday. Paddy Heffernan on the other hand did notice:
I knew Bob Hitchcock quite well, he was a pilot with me when I was 
commanding No. 1 Squadron at Laverton in 1939 and I found him to be 
a good average type of lad. Not particularly outstanding in any field, but 
generally reliable and did what tasks were allotted to him. Generally in 
a Squadron, there are always some lads…coming forward with bright 
ideas to improve either the technical aspects or flying standard of the 
unit, but Bob did not appear to be one of this type, maybe because 
of his somewhat reticent nature. He married early in his career and 
consequently ‘lived out’ and by so doing I think he missed out on what 
I would call ‘mess life’. Usually after the day’s flying, we would get 
together over a beer and have a ‘hate session’ on some aspect of the day’s 
work, but Bob always appeared to want to get home to his family.
Heffernan gave an illustration. In October and November 1938, while still 
Chief Flying Instructor at No. 1 Flying Training School, he led a flight of four 
Ansons from No. 21 Squadron to Darwin to act as the supporting aircraft to 
three RAF Wellesleys which were about to take part in the 150th Anniversary 
of the ‘founding’ of Australia after completing an attempt to break the world 
long-distance record. While they waited at Darwin for the Wellesleys of the 
British Long Range Development Unit to be serviced, the other pilots (including 
Flight Lieutenant Peter Lavarack, the son of the Chief of the General Staff, Major 
General J. D. Lavarack), were untroubled by having to sit around. They enjoyed 
the free time. But Hitchcock was restless. He approached Heffernan several 
times with the question: ‘When are we likely to get away?’55
54 ACdre P. G. Heffernan to CH, 20 July 1978.
55 ACdre P. G. Heffernan to CH, 7 April 1978; Brook, Demon to Vampire, pp.38-9.
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‘A serious business’
As early as the end of February 1940, when he was taken for a return flight to 
Sydney in a Lockheed 12 for ‘Lockheed experience’, it was clear that Flight 
Lieutenant Hitchcock was going to be one of the early pilots converted to fly 
the newly acquired Hudsons. This was an acknowledgement of proficiency and 
aptitude different from some of his peers. Phil Ford, for example, who had been 
posted as a flying instructor at No. 1 FTS, originally graded by Fred Scherger as 
an instructor ‘of fair ability’, was about to become Chief Flying Instructor at the 
Central Flying School. Considered well above average in flying in January 1940, 
he would spend less than two hours in a Hudson as a second pilot.56 On June 26 
Hitchcock began dual instruction with Jack Ryland in A16-6.
A16-6, the first RAAF dual control Hudson
(Courtesy of ACdre Bob Dalkin)
He went solo a week later. Over the next six weeks Hitchcock gathered 
confidence in the new Hudsons, going up in eight different machines, practising 
everything from landings to emergency gear operation. For much of July and 
early August he put a succession of young second pilots through the routines 
of landing, re-take-offs, instrument and engine flying, gyro-pilot, single and 
cloud flying, and flight formation.57 Among those who went up with him were 
Pilot Officer Jim Shackell, a member of the Toorak and Collins House ‘Shackell-
Baillieu clan’, and Pilot Officer Stanley Prowd, educated at Scotch College and 
56 Ford, Norman Philip 0339 NAA A12372, R/339/H.
57 WCdr Sam Wood recalled that as a second pilot he really knew more about Hudsons than his ‘skipper’ 
Hitchcock but his name does not appear in Hitchcock’s log book (Mike Hayes, Angry Skies: Recollections of 
Australian Combat Fliers, ABC Books, Sydney, 2003, p.70).
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a pharmacist before joining the RAAF in January 1940. Prowd would be killed 
almost exactly a year later when he failed to bring a training aircraft out of a 
spin.58 Another of those under instruction was the gregarious 6'3" Canberran 
Keith Eddison, son of a soldier-settler but with a small farm of his own, styling 
himself a ‘grazier’. Eddison had been entranced by the Hudsons, ‘beautiful 
machines, all green upholstery inside with a nice little bunk’ and enjoyed the 
company of Hitchcock, ‘a hell of a nice chap’.59 Eventually flying Beaufighters 
with No. 30 Squadron, Eddison would die in battle at sea off Lae in May 1943.
Herb Plenty, previously put through his paces in Ansons, would later say that he 
sensed that Hitchcock was not relaxed in the cockpit. But Plenty acknowledged 
that unlike some instructors he was not an arrogant person: ‘he was a gentle 
type of bloke…he’d coax people along’.60 If Hitchcock was a little on edge it 
might have had something to do with his mounting realisation that he was one 
of a diminishing few. His brother Les would recall a letter around this time 
saying that ‘there were only a couple of the boys left and that he now regarded 
flying as a serious business especially as another of his mates had just “bought 
it”’.61 What made for an even more serious attitude were missives about flying 
discipline emanating from on high. ‘An unsatisfactorily high accident rate’ was 
disclosed by the analyses demanded by the Chief of the Air Staff. Burnett let it 
be known that the loss of an aircraft was serious because it meant ‘the loss of 
six or more pilots who might otherwise have been trained’. Moreover accidents 
undermined public confidence in the Air Force. Concern at headquarters 
was being communicated to every unit of the Service. ‘An atmosphere must 
be created by all grades of commanders,’ the Air Member for Personnel had 
enjoined, ‘in which any departure from orders, no matter how slight, is regarded 
as an indication of inefficiency and entirely reprehensible.’ ‘Mucker’ Anderson 
ruminated a few weeks before No. 2 Squadron began to receive its Hudsons:
It has also been noticed that practically all pilots are still under the 
impression that their flying ability is centred in and judged by their 
landing of the aircraft. Modern technique for landing does not demand 
constant special practice and after the completion of a conversion 
course, there should be no need for pilots to spend complete periods on 
practising landings or forced landings unless the Squadron Commander 
is of the opinion that a particular pilot requires landing practice, and 
in such cases the particular practices should be specially ordered by 
58 NAA: A9300, SHACKELL JB; The Argus, 4 Aug. 1941.
59 E. K. Eddison to M. L. Eddison, 1 April, 16 Aug., 1940, ACT Heritage Library, Eddison MSS 19400, 
194016.
60 GpCpt. H. C. Plenty, interview, 19 April 2007, transcript courtesy Geoff Crane. For Plenty’s DFC earned 
by gallantry and resourcefulness: These Eagles: Story of the R.A.A.F. at War, R.A.A.F Directorate of Public 
Relations, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1942, p.141.
61 A. L. Hitchcock to CH, 10 Nov. 1977.
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the Squadron and not the Flight Commander unless the Squadron 
Commander is of the opinion that the Flight Commander is sufficiently 
experienced to assume the responsibility.62
Bob Hitchcock’s own flying may not have been flawless. He did not hide his fears 
as well as some. He had no old school tie. He was never the life and soul of the 
mess. But in 1940 Hitchcock was a maturing and respected flight commander, 
trusted with the training of able young men on the most challenging of the 
RAAF’s aircraft, and happy in his work. Though still showing the benefit of 
his youthful exercise regime he could not completely hide the ageing signs of 
baldness under his peaked cap. The cheeky if occasionally wistful curiosity of 
his first days in uniform had long since given way to an earnest dedication to 
the profession in which he was determined to succeed. Never afflicted by the 
devil-may-care disposition so common in the Citizen Air Force he would take 
seriously the AMP’s advice that ‘the cost of each hour’s flying in a modern 
type of aircraft is very high (in a Hudson it is approximately £25 inclusive of 
depreciation, fuel, etc)’.63 He was an officer moulded in a modernising Air Force 
that was growing bigger and faster than any of its senior leaders had imagined 
it could.
If all went well in the coming months of Air Force expansion it might not be long 
before Hitchcock had his own squadron.64 Although the Air Board had decreed 
otherwise, he might still harbour the ambition along with other short-service 
officers that he might join the shrinking group of General Duties permanent 
officers.65 In the meantime he had taken a crucial step towards bridging the social 
distance that separated him from too many of his colleagues and superiors. There 
was a new bond, transcending rank, with Ray Garrett, Harry Wrigley, Charles 
Eaton, Alan Charlesworth, and others. In December 1939 he was initiated as 
a Freemason in Verdon Lodge No. 395 in Williamstown. The Lodge, in Electra 
Street near the Beach railway station, was now the place he would be found on 
62 Chief of the Air Staff, ‘Prevention of Flying Accidents’, confidential, 7 June 1940; Air Member for 
Personnel, ‘Flying Discipline’, confidential, 11, 29 May 1940, NAA: A705, 231/8/7 Pt 1.
63 Inexplicably I have lost this reference.
64 Eric Lansell, from the immediately preceding cadet course, had been promoted temporary S/Ldr at 
the beginning of June, a fatal accident in Tasmania evidently long since forgiven (see Chapter 24, ‘Cockpit 
Secrets’, particularly footnote 52). Hitchcock’s own contemporary Donald Macpherson had also been acting 
S/Ldr from June.
65 The Air Member for Personnel’s recommendation 9 Nov. 1939 that around 50 officers appointed to short 
service commissions before May 1938 should join the 78 permanent officers among the 436 General Duties 
officers was rejected by the Air Board. The Board decided, evidently without reference to the Air Minister, to 
defer granting permanent commissions for the duration of the war (Air  Board Agenda 2620, NAA: A4181, 17). 
ABO N.98/40, 8 March 1940: ‘It has been decided for the time being not to effect transfers of members from 
the Citizen Air Force or from members appointed or enlisted for the duration of the war to the Permanent Air 
Force.’ (NAA: A705, 163/1/177).
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the second Thursday evening of the month. Brother Hitchcock, demonstrating 
sufficient merit in his oral examination, passed to 2nd Degree in February and 
was raised to 3rd Degree on 4 March 1940.
F/Lt Hitchcock commands a RAAF guard of honour, GpCpt ‘King’ Cole in 
attendance
(Courtesy of Les Hitchcock)
On the evening of 12 August 1940, the home-loving Bob Hitchcock was sleeping 
on the base at Laverton. Before retiring, he took time over a cup of coffee to 
talk to two of the new arrivals at No. 2 Squadron, Bob Dalkin and Bill White, 
about the Hudsons they were due to climb into the next morning. For these 
pilot officers, junior in rank but with years of flying experience, it would be 
familiarisation flights at first, prior to a decision being made about whether or 
not they were suitable for conversion. At first they were to go up in the second 
seat but without dual controls.
So stretched was the squadron for converted Hudson pilots that Bob Dalkin 
was assigned to fly with 19-year-old Pilot Officer Wilbur Wackett, who himself 
had only about five hours since going solo in a Hudson.66 Dalkin, who went 
on to be an outstanding Hudson pilot, would never forget his first time on 
66 Wilbur Wackett’s personal file indicates that by the time of his death in 1944 he had acquired over 400 
hours as a Hudson captain although his form P/P 64 omits to mention that he had flown Hudsons at all (NAA: 
A9300, WACKETT WL); Lawrence James Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer: an autobiography, Angus and Robertson, 
Sydney, 1972, pp.206–9. For Wackett’s intrepid survival after crash-landing at sea, swimming for nine hours, 
and crossing the Papuan Peninsula from north to south, see Mark Johnston, Whispering Death, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 2011, p.164. Leon Kane-Maguire, Lost Without Trace. Squadron Leader Wilbur Wackett 
RAAF. A Story of Bravery and Tragedy in the Pacific, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2011, was 
published after this book was drafted.
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August 13. Wackett, son of Wing Commander Lawrence Wackett, manager of 
the Commonwealth Aircraft Factory, had been told by his own instructor Jack 
Ryland that he was to practise stalls and recovery ‘under the hood’:
He handled the aircraft competently enough. He was a very young and 
brash young man. Anyway he’d done his homework as you sometimes 
do especially on instruments…He got to the stage where the aircraft 
wasn’t completely in a stall. He’d done about 20 minutes of this and was 
a bit fed up with it, and he suddenly said ‘Oh I’ll make the damn thing 
stall’ and with one hand he swept the curtain to one side and with the 
other pulled the stick right back…the next thing we were in a spin.
Dalkin was pitched forward out of his jump seat and ‘disappeared down the 
front’. By the time he managed to claw himself back, the aeroplane was still 
spinning. Wackett had been thrown forward and was still trying to sort himself 
out. Dalkin took the initiative and put on one-third throttle, then half throttle. 
They came out of the spin at about 2000 feet and ‘went back very white faced, 
and landed’.67 It was a chastening experience: something to enliven an after-
dinner session in the mess with his friend Dick Wiesener after he returned more 
sedately from Canberra with Flight Lieutenant Bob Hitchcock later that day.
67 Dalkin, interview, 18 April 1978.
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When the new Parliament House opened in Canberra in 1927 many departmental 
offices remained in Melbourne. Ministers and their staffs had quarters in both 
cities. They trekked up and down for parliamentary sittings, changing trains 
at the Victoria/New South Wales border or Goulburn, regularly reminded of 
the colonial folly of non-standard rail gauges as they transferred four to six 
steel cases of classified papers from one train to the other.1 As commercial air 
services improved in reliability, the journey would sometimes be made by air. 
Regular schedules with DH-86s were inaugurated by Ivan Holyman’s Australian 
National Airways in 1936. In 1940 there was one flight daily. Douglas airliners 
left Melbourne at 3.00 p.m., arriving in Canberra two hours later. An 11.45 
a.m. flight from Canberra reached Melbourne at 1.50 p.m. Ministers living in 
Melbourne increasingly patronised these services: Dick Casey, Jim Fairbairn, 
Harold Holt, even the Prime Minister would be caught by photographers at 
Essendon airport striding across the tarmac, brief cases and portmanteaux in 
hand. As The Argus had commented in May 1939: ‘If the new Cabinet is not air-
minded it will not be the fault of the Victorian members.’2
Passionate private airmen like Jim Fairbairn and Dick Casey would, when they 
could, fly themselves. Colin Moodie, Dick Casey’s private secretary, recalled 
several occasions late in 1938 and early 1939 when the Treasurer asked if he 
would like to fly down to Melbourne with him. Moodie, who much preferred 
the train, was relieved when bad weather kept them on the ground. Casey had 
disturbed Moodie by the casual revelation that on a previous trip he had almost 
hit a hill. ‘He told me he was a bit shaken. He said “I almost did it.”’3 Early in 
March 1939 Dick and Maie Casey had twice been forced down on a trip from 
Canberra to Melbourne, reportedly rather enjoying ‘the thrill’. Casey’s interest 
in flying and aviation safety was long standing. He had flown before 1914 and 
as a passenger during the European war. After an Imperial Airways Handley 
Page W10 had come down in the English Channel in June 1929, leading to the 
drowning of seven men, he had told the Prime Minister Stanley Bruce that he 
had refused for two years to fly in the old two-engined Handley Pages. Casey 
had by then flown across the Channel about 20 times and confessed that he had 
been ‘considerably scared at times’, mostly by low flying.4 A decade later, after 
1 Agnes Hannan, Victoria Barracks Melbourne: A Social History, Australian Defence Force Journal 
Publication, 1995, pp.111–2.
2 The Argus, 2 May 1939.
3 C. T. Moodie, interview, 28 Sept. 1977.
4 Casey to Bruce, 20 June 1929, W. J. Hudson and Jane North (eds), My Dear P.M.: R. G. Casey’s Letters to S. 
M. Bruce 1924–1929, AGPS, Canberra, 1980, p.528; Langmore, Glittering Surfaces, pp.56–7. Casey’s thinking 
on aviation policy and prospects in the 1920s is reported in My Dear P.M., pp.68, 95, 171, 208-11, 426, 431–2, 
516, 520, 532, 534–5.
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successfully completing flying training, he and his wife had flown to central 
Australia in mid-1938, prudently accompanied by P. G. ‘Bill’ Taylor of trans-
Pacific fame.5 In later years he had taken a keen interest in aviation policy. As 
Minister for Supply and Development his portfolio included the Department of 
Aircraft Production; it was he who had given the belated go-ahead to Lawrence 
Wackett to expand production of the Wirraway after war began. In September 
1939, he had consulted Fred Scherger secretly about the proposed Empire 
Air Training Scheme and was drawn by Scherger into a desperate bid to stop 
the planned air expeditionary force.6 In the USA he was featuring in cinema 
newsreels as ‘the flying diplomat’, and had made headlines by having his wife 
and children come by air to join him in Washington a few weeks after his own 
arrival.7
If there were more convenient commercial flights even the most dedicated of 
private flyers would take them. But there was no doubting their preference 
for the air. An emphatic reminder of Jim Fairbairn’s commitment to flying had 
found its way into the newspapers in August 1939 when he publicly apologised 
for having taken a train to get to a morning meeting in Sydney with the Prime 
Minister and senior colleagues. ‘I personally do not use the railways,’ he had 
once averred.8 But on this occasion there was no scheduled flight that would get 
there in time. A picture in next morning’s Sun of Defence Minister Geoff Street 
posed on the steps of the afternoon mail plane explained Fairbairn’s sensitivity. 
His friend had made a 900-mile round trip to the conference ― eight hours 
in the air ― by Avro Anson ‘bomber’ and Douglas airliner. The story in the 
Herald later in the day rubbed it in: ‘Snow in the cockpit and blind flying in 
bad weather’, swooping low to pick up the railway line to Cootamundra, had 
made the flight from Melbourne one of the most exciting in Street’s experience.9
There were good reasons to be worried about the danger of air travel. Newspapers 
were frequently telling of hazardous bad weather, abandoned flights, fatal 
accidents, and of the inquiries that followed. The RAAF was just emerging from 
a distressing phase of fatal crashes and a severely critical report on their training 
and procedures by a British Air Marshal. The death of the MP and former 
minister Charles Hawker late in 1938 had occasioned a shake-up of civil aviation. 
Ministers had frightening experiences of their own to tell: in Geoff Street’s 
case, not only persevering through zero visibility, but the forced landing of an 
Anson in northern New South Wales. He had also been with Jim Fairbairn over 
rugged mountains in May 1938 when a plug in one of the engines of Fairbairn’s 
5 W. J. Hudson, Casey, Oxford UP, Melbourne, 1986, p.97.
6 ACM Sir Frederick Scherger, interview, 2 Sept. 1978.
7 Carl Bridge,  ‘R. G. Casey, Australia’s First Washington Legation, and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1940–
42’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 28 (2) Aug. 1982, pp.181–9.
8 CPD, House of Representatives, 2 Oct. 1935, p.452.
9 Sydney Morning Herald, 18 Aug. 1939; The Sun, 19 Aug. 1939; The Herald, 19 Aug. 1939.
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Dragonfly blew out and they had been forced to return to Canberra on one 
motor. Six weeks later, this time on the way back from Melbourne, Fairbairn 
was forced to detour far to the west to dodge electrical storms, and fly through 
hail in sight of the ground to avoid collision with the hills around Canberra.10 
In 1936 Billy Hughes, Minister for Health in the Lyons government, had been a 
passenger in an airliner that crash-landed near Beaudesert en route to Brisbane. 
Unfazed by the experience and the consequential broken collar bone, Hughes 
continued to fly around the country when speed was essential.11 At least one 
of Hughes’s colleagues owed his life to the skill of an RAAF pilot. Vic Thorby, 
then Minister for Defence, en route from Canberra to Melbourne on 9 May 1938 
had the courageous 23-year-old Flying Officer Harry Durant to thank for his. 
Durant, less than 18 months from earning his wings, had managed to bring their 
Anson down safely near Albury when disaster threatened. He was soon a flying 
instructor and was awarded the AFC in the 1939 New Year’s Honours List.
If it was not an Australian story of tragedy or providential escapes it was one 
involving friends or colleagues overseas. In June 1940, Norman Rogers, Canadian 
Minister of National Defence, had been killed in a crash of a Defence Department 
aircraft on a flight from Ottawa to Toronto. Jim Fairbairn, who had met Rogers 
just six months before, had cabled the Canadian Prime Minister, William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, expressing his shock and sympathy. Mackenzie King, who had 
never flown, had long been apprehensive about air travel and had advised his 
ministers against it.12 In Europe there were no such inhibitions. Newsreels of 
the 1930s memorably showed Adolf Hitler campaigning and the British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain embarking on successive peace missions by air.
Australian cinema audiences too had seen Joe Lyons becoming a regular aircraft 
passenger. ‘Without the assistance of air travel I would not have been able to 
cover so much ground or to have kept so fit,’ he told an Adelaide audience 
in 1937.13 He had flown several times during the 1931 election campaign. 
Facing his first election as Prime Minister in 1934 he travelled extensively 
in a private plane provided and co-piloted by Charles Ulm. Irvine Douglas, 
then Commonwealth Government Publicity Officer accompanying the Prime 
Minister’s party, recorded that there was a leaflet drop over Lyons’ electorate. 
A sofa had been installed in the aircraft for Lyons’ comfort. The Prime Minister 
had insisted that Ulm fly the plane. Unwilling to admit that he was a little 
10 John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918–39: A Study in Air and Sea Power, UQP, St Lucia, 
1976, p.85; Sydney Morning Herald, 6 May, 29 June 1938.
11 The Argus, 12 June 1936; L. F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger 1914–1952: William Morris Hughes A 
Political Biography, vol. II, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1979, p.640.
12 Fairbairn to W. L. Mackenzie King, 12 June 1940, Mackenzie King Papers, MG26-J1 vol. 287, p.242971; 
Mackenzie King diary, 10 June 1940, Library and Archives Canada; Sholto Watt, I’ll Take the High Road: A 
History of the Beginning of the Atlantic Air Ferry Service in Wartime, Brunswick Press, Fredericton, 1960, p.136.
13 The Advertiser, 15 Oct. 1937, quoted in C. J.  Lloyd, ‘The Formation and Development of the United 
Australia Party, 1929–37’, PhD thesis, ANU, July 1984, p.357.
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unreliable on landings and take-offs, Ulm had brought along another pilot.14 
The following year, in Britain for the King’s Silver Jubilee, Lyons and his wife 
flew from London to Brussels. It was Enid Lyons’ first flight. Thereafter the 
couple would frequently take to the air as they made their way around Australia 
to public functions. Six of his family flew around Tasmania in 1935.
By the beginning of the 1937 federal election campaign Lyons was described 
as a ‘thoroughly seasoned air traveller’ with almost as many flying hours as 
a qualified pilot. ‘Of course,’ electors were reassured, ‘he does not handle the 
controls himself.’15 Seventeen-year-old Sheila Lyons was soon announcing her 
ambition to be an air hostess; and her brother Desmond was to join the Air Force 
in October 1939.16 On the Sydney to Melbourne route, the Lyons entourage 
would fly in an Australian National Airways DH-86. A regular pilot of these 
12-seater fabric-covered bi-planes was Harry Purvis. Purvis, whose expertise 
the RAAF was to call upon in March 1940 as a Hudson instructor, was always 
uneasy in a DH-86. So too were other pilots. Lawrence Wackett believed the 
machines had structural flaws. But after a series of crashes and disappearances, 
the temporary grounding of all of them, and exhaustive flight tests, they were 
declared airworthy by the Department of Civil Aviation. Dick Casey and Harry 
Gullett, as well as Lyons, continued to use them until they were superseded by 
DC-2s.17
Joe Lyons had said at the beginning of July 1936 that an aeroplane for the 
exclusive use of Cabinet ministers was inevitable but not imminent. Such an 
exclusive machine might have been even less imminent if the Prime Minister 
or his colleagues had taken seriously the announcement of a Mr Penny of 
Auckland that he had developed a ray that could stop aeroplane engines.18 
When controversy erupted following a Demon accident in which the son of a 
Labor MP was killed, various ministers had made a show of travelling in Service 
aircraft. The Chief of the Air Staff expressed his gratitude to the newly licensed 
Dick Casey: ‘however confident one is in one’s organization, these incidents 
have their moral effect on all members of the Service.’19 Frequent patronage 
of ANA’s Melbourne–Sydney route demonstrated the ‘air-mindedness’ of the 
Victorian members of the government. On at least one occasion the flight made 
14 Irvine Douglas, interview, 15–19 June 1972, NLA 766383 ORAL TRC 121/36. Lyons would secure 
unanimous Cabinet approval to guarantee an £8000 bank overdraft for Ulm’s final flight (John Ulm with Bill 
Bunbury, ABC Radio, 27 Oct. 1987).
15 Sunday Times (Perth), 19 Sept. 1937.
16 Alan Fewster (ed.), Capital Correspondent: The Canberra letters of Edwin Charles 1936–37, Ginninderra 
Press, Charnwood ACT, 2002, p.32.
17 Kate White, A Political Love Story: Joe and Enid Lyons, Penguin Books, Melbourne, 1987, pp.164, 173–4, 
178; Harry Purvis with Joan Priest, Outback Airman, Rigby, Adelaide, 1979, pp.75–6; Peter Yule, The Forgotten 
Giant of Australian Aviation: Australian National Airways, Hyland House, Melbourne, 2001, pp.66–106; J. L. 
Kepert, Aircraft Accident Investigation at ARL: The First 50 Years, DSTO Australia, 1993, pp.7–10.
18 Canberra Times, 2 July, 20 Mar. 1936.
19 AVM R. Williams to Major R. G. Casey, 24 Jan. 1938, copy, Williams MSS, RAAF Museum.
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a special stop at Canberra to disembark Menzies, Casey, Fairbairn, Street, Holt 
and several secretarial staff. By August 1940 ANA’s 3.00 p.m. weekday service 
to Sydney was via Canberra.20
No dedicated aircraft had been allocated for ministerial use by 1940. When Geoff 
Street had to be in Sydney on January 18 for a conference with the New Zealand 
Defence Minister he was forced to borrow BHP’s Lockheed 12A, Silver City, for 
the day. Repeated requests had been made unavailingly by Jim Fairbairn while 
still a backbencher, for the creation of a travel allowance ‘to enable Ministers 
and members to travel by air, or to utilize other forms of transport which may 
suit them better than the railways’. Even an appeal to the ‘100 per cent air-
minded’ Treasurer Dick Casey ― he had flown his dog, reportedly yawning 
with boredom, to Canberra in November 1938 ― had brought no joy. There 
were reports in mid-1939 that the government had ordered an aeroplane with a 
seating capacity of six for ministers travelling to and from Canberra. The Civil 
Aviation Board had recommended the purchase of a Lockheed machine in 1938 
but the government insisted on a British plane.21 Shortly before the outbreak of 
war, Geoff Street as Defence Minister had foreshadowed that for ‘transport of 
Ministers and senior officials between Canberra and Melbourne, special flying 
arrangements might be necessary for urgent movements which do not fit in 
with the timetable of the air services. This could be decided by the demands of 
experience.’22
The demands of experience, confirming his own predilections, soon convinced 
Jim Fairbairn that ‘special flying arrangements’ were necessary. The Civil 
Aviation Board’s Percival Q6, operational from August 1939, was inadequate for 
the purpose, too small and under-powered.23 He had determined that some of 
the RAAF’s new Hudsons would be fitted out and reserved for use as required 
for ministerial transport. In its original civil configuration the Lockheed 14 
offered a comfortable insulated cabin with five rows of reclining and swivelling 
passenger chairs, reading lights, ‘ash receptacles’, and safety belts. An attractive 
interior trim with the promise of a low sound level was important. With Seapak 
flame-proofed sound absorption, and air introduced and exhausted from the 
cabin through sound traps, Lockheed boasted that the noise level with full open 
throttle was maintained ‘lower than that of a railway sleeping coach’.24 It was as 
well that it should be so.
20 The Argus, 2 May 1939; The Age, 6 Aug. 1940.
21 The Argus, 23 Nov. 1938; Sydney Morning Herald, 19 Jan. 1940; CPD, House of Representatives, 9 Oct. 
1935, p.452; 10 Nov. 1938, p.1443; The Sun, 3 May 1939.
22 G. A. Street (Minister for Defence), ‘Machinery for Higher Direction of War’, Cabinet Submission, 28 
Aug. 1939, considered by Cabinet 26 Sept. 1939, NAA: A2671, 12/1939.
23 http://www.airwaysmuseum.com/Percival%20Q6%20VH-ABY.htm accessed 21 Sept. 2012.
24 ‘Aviation: Purchase of Lockheed Bombers Part 1’, NAA: A1608,  F17/1/2/249–77.
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For it was not fear alone ― Mr Penny’s death ray, or just understandable 
anxiety about heavier-than-air machines staying in the sky ― that kept people 
out of the air. For MPs, cost was a consideration. A proposal to allow airline 
travel concessions had been rejected in December 1938 ‘in view of the state of 
Commonwealth finances’; revived on a more modest scale by the Minister of the 
Interior in April 1940 it was still undecided.25 For the public servants whose 
job it was to ensure that the War Cabinet was able to function away from the 
Melbourne defence headquarters there was the regular chore of loading and 
accompanying secure containers of files by rail or road. For those less burdened, 
the railway had long been a preferred alternative to flying. Harry Gullett’s son 
Jo, who had made the journey with his father, and was to enter the House of 
Representatives in 1946, would say: ‘air services in those days were unreliable, 
often uncomfortable and every now and then unpleasantly rough’.26 By contrast, 
bad weather would rarely deflect a locomotive on Australian tracks. Noise and 
smells were at a more acceptable level. Since the launch in November 1937 of 
the streamlined and air-conditioned Art Deco express, the ‘Spirit of Progress’, 
there was a new level of comfort, a tinge of glamour. In mid-winter even the 
most passionate flyers like Jim Fairbairn, Geoff Street, Dick Casey, and Harry 
Holt might be happy to take the night train together.27
The overnight journey to Canberra had become a kind of rolling social club, 
‘the old train dining car network’ as one regular described it.28 Over dinner, 
between Melbourne and Albury, ministers, public servants, private office staff, 
and occasionally wives would while away the hours convivially. Drinks were 
available with the meal, and there was access to an observation or ‘parlor’ car 
by ministerial gold pass or a premium for others who were prepared to pay. For 
senior public servants, the capacity to pay was enhanced by a travel allowance 
of 10 pence an hour. (Colonel Harry Jones of the Intelligence Bureau, claiming 
at the rate of 20/- a day, could pocket over 13/- when the train ran late).29 Labor 
MPs and government supporters would suspend hostilities for the duration of 
the trip. Cards might be brought out. A War Cabinet minister might hand round 
cigars, more than likely ‘Admiral’ or ‘Cubanola Principes’ purloined from the 
box provided at meetings in the Defence Committee room at Victoria Barracks.30 
The powerful War Cabinet Secretary and head of the Department of Defence 
Co-ordination, Frederick Shedden, might unbend a little with his assistant Sam 
25 Hattil S. Foll, ‘Air Transport for Senators and Members’, Cabinet Agenda 27, NAA: A2697, roll 2.
26 Henry ‘Jo’ Gullett, Good Company: Horseman, soldier, politician, University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucia, 1992, p.221.
27 The Argus, 14, 21, 27 June 1939.
28 Sir Keith Waller, interview, 21 June 1977.
29 C. T. Moodie, interview, 28 Sept. 1977; Travel expenses claim, July 1940, Lieutenant Colonel H. E. Jones 
[Personal file], NAA: A367, C17200.
30 Sam Landau, interview, 27 May 1977; Agnes Hannan, Victoria Barracks Melbourne: A Social History, 
Australian Defence Force Journal Publication, 1995, p.132.
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Landau. The reserved Shedden knew this was the not the time or place for 
business. Billy Hughes, a frequent traveller with his wife Dame Mary, would 
entertain with a stream of anecdotes.
Often Robert Menzies would also be there, not in Hughes’s orbit but exchanging 
mildly malicious banter with his private secretary, the brilliant but troubled 
Anglophile Catholic Theo Mathew, or later the bright, witty, eccentric Corby 
Tritton.31 A journey of up to 18 hours gave Menzies respite from the plague 
of advisers and supplicants that gathered outside the Prime Minister’s office. 
Distant from domestic cares as well, Menzies enjoyed train travel. The normally 
omnipresent Shedden, who had no small talk and who couldn’t take a ribbing, 
would retreat to avoid being teased. His chief would linger, the centre of an 
admiring circle of acolytes and ambitious colleagues, eager to please and exhibit 
their talent to amuse. The Monday night service from Melbourne departing at 
6.24 p.m. was scheduled to arrive in Canberra conveniently just before nine the 
next morning. After alighting at Albury around 10.24 p.m. there was a half-
hour wait to change trains. Then the possibility of retreat to a sleeping berth, 
sometimes shared with a colleague, in a through carriage on the Melbourne 
Express, time to digest the papers for meetings ahead, perhaps a soothing pipe or 
another cigar. The carriage would be detached at Goulburn to join a train from 
Sydney and complete the winding rattle to Canberra on the narrower gauge.32 
The return journey could be just as diverting. Coming home to Melbourne 
as Prime Minister-designate in April 1939, Menzies was heard in earnest 
conversation with the Minister for Defence debating whether Ironmonger or 
Blackie was the better bowler.33
Not everyone spent the trip so agreeably. The Country Party’s John McEwen, 
intermittently Minister for the Interior from late 1937 to March 1940 when he 
became External Affairs Minister, used the journey to catch up on accumulated 
work with his staff. It was not that McEwen had anything in principle against air 
travel. He had taken it up enthusiastically when he became a minister. Around 
a campfire in the Northern Territory in 1938 he had ‘sold’ Eddie Connellan on 
the notion of connecting remote outback stations by air. In July 1939 Connellan 
Airways had begun a subsidised airmail service between Alice Springs, Mount 
Doreen, Tanami, Victoria River Downs, and Wyndham with two Percival Gull 
31 Moodie recalled that ‘things went wrong’ in Mathew’s private life; intemperance led to his departure from 
the External Affairs Department. Menzies had been rebuffed by Colonel Hodgson, the punctiliously tactless 
head of External Affairs, when seeking Mathew’s services in 1938. When Hodgson discharged Mathew on 
medical grounds Menzies did not hesitate to offer him employment (Moodie, interview, 28 Sept. 1977; Peter 
Heydon’s recollections in Hazlehurst, Menzies Observed, p.135). Sir Laurence McIntyre, interview, 28 Feb. 
1978. For Tritton’s personality I rely in part on the recollections of Sam Landau and my own conversations 
with Tritton, 7 June and 5 July 1977.
32 I am grateful to Victor Isaacs and Geoff Lambert of the Australian Association of Time Table Collectors for 
details of the train services from Melbourne to Canberra.
33 The Argus, 22 April 1939.
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VIs. McEwen had been supported in encouraging Connellan by Jim Fairbairn 
whose influence as a director of the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney 
ensured the vital bank overdraft.34 Yet on the regular journeys between Canberra 
and Melbourne the train was McEwen’s chosen mode. With his two private 
secretaries, Roy Rowe and Fred Hill, and a stenographer in tow, he always ensured 
they had a compartment to themselves. ‘We carried a portable typewriter and 
virtually a portable filing system, set up an office in the compartment and 
worked all the way.’35 The ambitious Jack McEwen, a self-made soldier-settler, 
who had been acting Minister for Air while Fairbairn was overseas, was a harder 
task master than the Western District gentleman graziers.
Whatever personal preferences or official priorities determined who was to 
fly to Canberra on August 13, by late on the previous day six men had been 
chosen to make the trip. The Minister for Air of course was at the top of the 
list. Jim Fairbairn’s friend Geoff Street, as Minister for the Army, was his almost 
inevitable companion. The government’s principal military adviser, General 
Sir Brudenell White, accompanied by his staff officer Lieutenant Colonel 
Frank Thornthwaite, was required along with the other Chiefs of Staff. Sir 
Harry Gullett, Vice-President of the Executive Council, his Cabinet experience 
stretching back to the late 1920s, had ministerial seniority. And the last seat 
would go to the man upon whom Fairbairn relied perhaps more than anyone 
else; his private secretary, Dick Elford. Together they would join the aircraft at 
Essendon when it arrived from Laverton after breakfast.
34 Stanley Brogden, The History of Australian Aviation, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1960, p.127; Purvis 
with Priest, Outback Airman, pp.92–3; E. J. Connellan, Failure of Triumph: the story of Connellan Airways, 
Paradigm Investments, [NT], 1992, pp.110, 157.
35 F. T. Hill, interview, 20 June 1978.
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8. The General: Brudenell White (I)
Silver-haired, lean, and erect, shielded from the chill air by a Service 
greatcoat, the figure striding across to the waiting aircraft was Australia’s most 
distinguished living soldier. Garlanded with military decorations and imperial 
honours ― DSO, CB, CMG, KCMG, KCVO, KCB, as well as a quiver of foreign 
awards ― General Sir Cyril Brudenell Bingham White’s reputation was made as 
the nation’s most senior and accomplished wartime staff officer. So valuable had 
he been to the Allied cause as a tactician and organiser that he was denied the 
commands that would have tested his capacity for operational leadership at the 
very highest level. His praise as the genius of the evacuation from Gallipoli had 
been sung in official histories, biographies, and memoirs. After the war he had 
served in Australia as the Chief of the General Staff and then, applying his gifts 
to civilian administration, as chairman of the Commonwealth Public Service 
Board.
Although his military and administrative background qualified him uniquely 
for further public service posts, Brudenell White had been a businessman and 
grazier for more than a decade before war broke out in 1939. Declining the offer 
of a second term as the chairman of the Public Service Board, he had settled 
in 1928 on a 2000-acre property, ‘Woodnaggerak’ near Buangor, 20 kilometres 
west of Beaufort, on the edge of the Western District and the Wimmera. Staying 
with the Board would have meant working in the nascent national capital in 
Canberra. Nurturing fine wool merinos far from the clatter and clamour of 
politics held more appeal. Thus, when still in his early 50s, White had opted 
for the life of a company director and pastoralist not far from the country he 
had known as a child. As he gradually improved his financial position, he 
added another 500 acres to his holding and bought a second farm nearby. As 
supervisor for Australia and chairman of the New Zealand Loan and Mercantile 
Agency Co. Ltd, and vice-chairman of the National Mutual Life Association of 
Australasia Ltd, and of the Trustees, Executors, and Agency Co. Ltd, he was 
closely connected to some of the nation’s leading businessmen. He was selective 
in responding to invitations to other appointments. With commitments to 
the Alfred Hospital, the AIF Trust, the Rhodes Trust, several other trusts, as 
well as the committee of the Australian War Memorial, he had a full diary; 
he declined the stockbroker Staniforth Ricketson’s offer of a seat on the board 
of the reconstructed Argus and Australasian company. Believing himself to be 
out of touch with contemporary military affairs, he had not sought a return to 
active service in 1939. But in March 1940 the death of Lieutenant General E. 
K. Squires, the British officer who had been made Chief of the General Staff in 
September 1939, brought an invitation he could not refuse. He was to take up 
once again the post he had held immediately after the First World War.
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Born in September 1876 in St Arnaud, a gold mining town 132 kilometres 
northwest of Ballarat, White had moved to Queensland at the age of five with 
his Anglo-Irish emigrant parents and six siblings. His father having failed as a 
pastoralist, his business interests in a parlous state, Brudenell (the name by which 
he was always known) left school at 15. He worked as a clerk in the Australian 
Joint Stock Bank in Brisbane, Gympie, Gladstone, and Charters Towers. His 
ambition was to follow his paternal grandfather into the law but after several 
years of private study and saving he turned in a different direction. His friend 
Thomas ‘Bill’ Glasgow was soldiering with the Queensland Mounted Infantry. 
His older brother Dudley had been serving in the Queensland Land Forces 
since 1889. Brudenell was provisionally commissioned in the 2nd Queensland 
Regiment in 1896 and joined the Queensland Permanent Artillery in 1899. It 
seemed clear from very early days that he was an outstanding young officer. 
Diligent and disciplined, his rise in the military was rapid. After an unhappy 
posting to Thursday Island, he served briefly with the Commonwealth Horse 
in the South African War and in 1904 was appointed aide-de-camp to Major 
General Sir Edward Hutton, the head of the Australian Military Forces. He was 
the first Australian officer to go to the Staff College at Camberley in England, 
in 1906. By the outbreak of war in 1914 only six Australians had attended the 
College, among them Tom Blamey and John Lavarack whose careers would 
march forward a few steps behind his own.
Late in 1905 at the age of 29, shortly before travelling to take up his Staff College 
course, White married Ethel Davidson, the eldest of nine children of W. H. 
Davidson of the historic Coliban Park, a 5000-acre sheep station at Elphinstone 
in north-eastern Victoria. He had first delicately extricated himself from an 
engagement to the daughter of a senior officer. Ethel, tall, slender, and elegant, 
belonged, her daughter Rosemary would say, ‘to a world of wide acres and 
prosperity which Brudenell’s father had always sought and always lost’. It was 
a powerful love match. Three children followed at four-year intervals: Margaret 
Clamina, James Edward, and Patrick Fitzmaurice. After his return to Australia 
from the European war came a fourth, Rosemary Joan. All of them carried 
forward Brudenell as their third forename. By all accounts, the deeply religious 
Anglican White was a devoted family man. He knew about the loneliness of 
separation. Never happier than when in the company of his wife and children, 
he was especially fond of the youngest, Rosemary. On the verge of womanhood, 
Rosemary White shared her father’s love of riding, and was a cheerful distraction 
from business preoccupations and in due course the sombre news of another 
world war.
From his earliest days in the Army, Brudenell White’s progress was tracked 
by the Australian press. When still a lieutenant in 1901 his departure for 
Melbourne with his brother, Police Inspector J. Warren White, was recorded 
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in The Queenslander’s ‘Personal Notes’. The Brisbane Courier reported on his 
social engagements in Ireland in 1906. In April 1908 he was shown in the 
Adelaide Observer acting as ‘classification officer’ at the Nairne encampment 
where the local field artillery were undergoing training and assessment of 
their proficiency. A cable message from London told of his passing of the Staff 
College examination. He had impressed Brigadier General Henry Wilson, the 
commandant, who noted not only his ability but his popularity. Though ‘modest 
and unassuming’ his opinions carried weight with the other students. He is 
reported in 1909 lecturing in Ireland on ‘The Military Forces of the Dominions’. 
These and many other references testify to a family’s shrewd appreciation of the 
social and professional value of publicity.1
After two years at Camberley, White returned to Australia to an intelligence 
staff appointment at Army headquarters working under Colonel W. T. Bridges. 
Like Bridges, and unlike other senior officers whose cast of mind was local 
and national, he was a proponent of closer co-operation with an Imperial 
General Staff. At the request of the War Office, late in 1908 he was posted to 
London, where he served until 1912.2 Serving in Henry Wilson’s Directorate of 
Military Operations he was involved in the development of the new Territorial 
Force. Sitting alongside Britain’s war planners provided incidental strategic 
and administrative insights on a daily basis. The young Australian saw and 
was seen. He worked hard but also found time for other activities. The local 
Buckinghamshire newspaper reported in July 1910 that Captain White was 
among the leading citizens organising the establishment of a Boy Scout brigade 
in Beaconsfield. He was to have a lifelong commitment to scouting, carrying 
with him in later years a presentation swastika in a silver matchbox.3
Perhaps the most important element of White’s War Office assignment was the 
perceptions he gleaned of the attitudes, prejudices, and personal relations of 
the Empire’s most senior military officers, and of the interplay between the 
Service and departmental officials and ministers. He attended the 1911 Imperial 
Conference as military secretary to the Commonwealth Minister for Defence, 
George Pearce; and at meetings with the Chief of the General Staff, Sir William 
Nicholson, became privy to the most secret planning for an expected war 
against Germany. Back in Australia as Director of Military Operations at Army 
1 Guy Verney, ‘General Sir Brudenell White; The Staff Officer as Commander’, in D. M. Horner (ed.), The 
Commanders: Australian military leadership in the twentieth century, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p.29.
2 For extended accounts of White’s family background and early career: Rosemary Derham, The Silence 
Ruse: Escape from Gallipoli, Oryx Publishing, 1998; John Bentley, ‘Champion of Anzac: General Sir Brudenell 
White, the First Australian Imperial Force and the emergence of the Australian military culture 1914–18’, 
PhD thesis, University of Wollongong, 2003, pp.47ff. Jeffrey Grey, ‘White, Sir Cyril Brudenell Bingham 
(1876–1940)’, John Ritchie and Christopher Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 12, MUP, 
1990, pp.460–3, is a comprehensive and authoritative summary. Mark Derham’s unpublished essay on his 
grandfather, kindly made available by the author, is informed and judicious.
3 The swastika symbol was abandoned by the Boy Scout movement in 1940.
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Headquarters from the beginning of 1912 Major White, as he had become the 
previous year, was entrusted with the task of planning to raise and organise an 
expeditionary force of volunteers ready to embark within six weeks. Ostensibly 
the role of such a force would be to co-operate with New Zealand if Australia’s 
neighbour should be invaded. But the real purpose of the plan, agreed to secretly 
by Pearce at the Imperial Conference, was to ensure that Australia was able to 
respond promptly if Britain were involved in a European war. Such an objective, 
at odds with the limitations placed by the Defence Act on the employment of 
Australian troops overseas, would have to be undertaken quietly if it were not 
to arouse nationalist opposition. White had nailed his colours to the mast of 
imperial military consolidation.4
When not engaged in the desk work at which he was recognised as the most 
competent of Australia’s staff officers, Major White of the Royal Australian 
Garrison Artillery attended the final day of the annual camps of most battalions. 
It was at the camp of the 73rd Battalion, Victorian Rangers, at Burrumbeet in the 
summer of 1913 that he first met Richard Williams, the future head of the RAAF. 
Then the battalion adjutant and assistant brigade major of the 18th Brigade, 
Williams was to become little more than a year later one of the first four officers, 
the only member of the permanent forces, to begin flying instruction at Point 
Cook.5 In the meantime White, as Director of Military Operations, had been 
one of the small inspection party which had travelled to George Chirnside’s 
Werribee Park Estate in July 1913 and there decided to purchase a sub-division 
of 734 acres on which to establish a central flying school.
Although he was still a major, White’s time in England had given him unique 
knowledge and authority on current military thinking. He was acting Chief of 
the General Staff when war was declared in 1914. By then his work in preparing 
Australia’s defence plans, including the secret scheme for a mixed Australian/
New Zealand expeditionary force, was well in hand. Within six weeks of the 
outbreak of war, the nation was in a position to send a substantial contingent 
overseas.6 Defying the British preference for smaller units that could be absorbed 
4 John Mordike, An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880–1914, Allen 
& Unwin in assoc. with the Directorate of Army Studies, Department of Defence, Sydney, 1992, pp.196–8, 
244–5; ‘We Should Do This Thing Quietly’, Japan and the great deception in Australian defence policy 1911–1914, 
Aerospace Centre, RAAF Base Fairbairn ACT, 2002, Part IV; Bentley, ‘Champion of Anzac’, pp.134–6. For a 
different perspective on Pearce’s insistence on secrecy, see John Connor, Anzac and Empire: George Foster 
Pearce and the Foundations of Australian Defence, Cambridge UP, Melbourne 2011, p.37.
5 Williams’ fellow trainees were Lt David Manwell of the Light Horse, Capt. Tommy White of the 60th 
(Princes Hill) Battalion, and Lt George Merz, a medical graduate and brother officer of Robert Gordon Menzies 
in the Melbourne University Rifles, who in 1915 was the first Australian military pilot killed in action, by 
hostile Bedouin after a forced landing near Basra (T. L. Smart. ‘Remembering Lieutenant Merz: Australia’s 
military aviation medical officer pioneer’, Journal of the Australasian Society of Aerospace Medicine, 2 [1], 
2005. pp.9–15).
6 Bruce Douglas Faraday, ‘Half the battle: the administration and higher organisation of the AIF 1914–1918’, 
PhD thesis, University of New South Wales — Australian Defence Force Academy, 1997, pp.29–30.
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into larger British formations, the Australian Imperial Force would comprise an 
infantry division and a light horse brigade. White was appointed Chief of Staff 
to the commander of the AIF, Major General William Bridges. With Bridges he 
selected the senior officers for the division and was, with Bridges, one of the first 
of those to leave with Australian forces for the developing European conflict. 
When the ANZAC contingent was diverted to Egypt, in due course to attack the 
Dardanelles, White would be among those who landed at Gallipoli early on the 
first day of the campaign. Wherever Australian troops were to be found over the 
next four years he was to be one of the most significant guiding hands. Less well 
known at home during the war than his celebrated contemporary John Monash, 
he was nonetheless one of the nation’s most admired soldiers, and was to emerge 
to even greater prominence soon afterwards.
Staff, 1st Australian Division, Mena House, Egypt, February 1915
(The Australasian, 3 April 1915, from Ethel White’s scrapbook, courtesy of Mark Derham)
Reputation
When the first volume of Charles Bean’s official history of Australia in the war 
of 1914–1918 appeared in 1921, White’s reputation soared.7 Bean could find 
7 In 1936 the Professor of History at Melbourne University, Ernest Scott, would embellish the portrait of 
‘one of the most brilliant officers in the British forces…Beneath a gentle mien and imperturbable politeness…
maintained a soldier’s keenness and firmness; the sword in the velvet scabbard…gifted with a swift and 
comprehensive intelligence…’ (Australia During the War, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1936, p.200).
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no fault in the Chief of Staff to Lieutenant General William Birdwood, the 
commander of the ANZACs from September 1915 to the end of the war. As 
one newspaper reviewer wrote: ‘The great staff-officer appears throughout a 
far more lovable character than Birdwood. The impression is that Birdwood was 
self-consciously pleasant while White was kind; that Birdwood had personal 
ambitions whereas White’s whole effort was centred on the army with which he 
was serving.’ Whatever the justice of this observation, Birdwood’s high esteem 
for White was evidenced by his recommendation to Sir Douglas Haig that White 
should be his Chief of Staff and his own appointment of White as Major General, 
General Staff of the 5th Army. Personally, Birdwood was to write: ‘He was the 
most delightful of companions ― always so cheery, so full of life and of real 
human sympathy…He was not only a great man, but a God-fearing man: indeed 
he was great because he trusted in God.’8
Charles Bean’s admiration for White can be traced in his private diaries long 
before the official volumes on the war were to inscribe his hero’s name indelibly 
in Australia’s history. While still waiting in Egypt, seeking permission to 
travel with the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, Bean noted that White 
‘has more genuine sense in his little finger than many War Officials have in 
their small minds’. White’s advocacy on Bean’s behalf prevailed over War Office 
obscurantism. Bean was not a mere newspaper correspondent but the accredited 
representative of the Australian government. He would be attached to General 
Bridges’ 1st Division staff, liaising with Major Tom Blamey of intelligence. On 10 
April 1915 Bean recorded a ‘yarn with Colonel White’:
He tells me he thinks it is an extraordinary compliment the Australian 
troops being chosen to make the present attempt on the Dardanelles. 
They have got the very best British regular troops they could ― the 
29th Division…and here are the first Australian Division and the New 
Zealand and Australian Division chosen to start the ball. ‘They wouldn’t 
send us unless they thought we were competent,’ he said.
To Bean we owe a glimpse of White as he was about to embark on April 23 ‘with 
his pistol in its case on his belt, his haversack packed, and a little blue enamelled 
pannikin tied onto the end of his swag’. A few days after the landing Bean 
was there when White was hit ‘by a shrapnel pellet pretty hard and laughed 
as he was hit’. The Age correspondent Phil Schuler noticed White at this time 
‘indefatigable, never perturbed, always ready to remedy a defect’.9 But the most 
revealing of conversations came with Bean on 2 November 1915 as the Gallipoli 
campaign was drawing to a close:
8 Field Marshal Lord Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, An Autobiography, Ward, Lock, London, 1941, pp.325, 437.
9 Phillip F. E. Schuler, Australia in Arms: A Narrative of the Australasian Imperial Force and their 
Achievement at ANZAC, T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1916, p.136.
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Had a yarn with White last night over matters in general. He was 
charming as usual. We both notice that the Australians here can be picked 
out on the instant by their faces — a little hard, but the strong, lined, 
individual faces which men get who stand and think by themselves. The 
Australian discipline is for orderliness — to get an operation through in 
an organised manner. The British discipline has a different reason — to 
make men go forward because they are told to do so. Our men we have 
to send forward trusting to quite a different principle — we rely on the 
strong, independent willed men carrying on the weak ones…
White evidently wanted to give me the benefit of an idea which had 
been strongly impressed on him. ‘What I had seen since Suvla,’ I had 
said, ‘is making me a Socialist.’
‘It’s not making me that,’ he said, ‘but I’ll tell what I should like to tell 
the people of Australia — what, if I get the chance, I shall tell them 
some day — and that is that they are right in the main thing: they may 
be wrong in the details — I’m no politician as you know, but I’m sure 
they’re right in this — in giving every man a chance, a good, equal 
chance.’
White’s character was shown not only in his willingness to speak truth to his 
chiefs but in his readiness to listen attentively and deal sympathetically with 
those he commanded. In Cairo early in 1915 John Treloar, his confidential clerk, 
had confided to his diary that Colonel White ‘looks after us boys like a father’. 
On Gallipoli he was to write that ‘one could never serve a more gentlemanly 
and considerate officer’.10 A junior officer who was with White at 5.00 a.m. 
on 25 April 1915 as they approached land just north of Gaba Tepe recorded a 
conversation with him a month later:
I asked Colonel White today what wd happen to me if (& when) the 
new General (if he came) brought an ADC with him & whether I wd be 
allowed to go as O. O. to the 7th Bgd with General Walker. He was kind 
enough to say that if I moved he had a better job for me than that, & that 
the G had been good enough to say that he thought I had a pretty good 
grip of things here.11
Thus did Lieutenant Richard G. Casey also learn to appreciate the wisdom and 
sympathy of an extraordinary commander in embryo. White allowed Casey to 
photograph him sitting in his shirt sleeves at his collapsible table at the front 
10 J. L. Treloar diary, 8 Jan. 1915, J. L. Treloar, An ANZAC Diary, Armidale, 1993, pp.72, 142; for an 
appreciation in the memoirs of a young field-ambulance unit private of ‘one of our few favourites among the 
top brass’, see Roy Ramsay, Hell, Hope and Heroes, Rosenberg, Dural, 2005, p.109.
11 R. G. Casey diary, 29 May 1915, Casey MSS, NAA:  M1141/0/2a.
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of his dugout. Files were stacked on adjacent sandbags. With tie in place, boots 
brilliantly shined, jacket neatly folded at his feet, White was calmly going about 
his business, his pipe held slackly between his lips.12 Casey, always attracted to, 
and at times in awe of, older men of influence, would often recall White’s lines: 
‘After this war a lot of old maids will die wondering’ and ‘Eating veal is like 
kissing one’s sister ― insipid.’13
Colonel C. B. B. White at Gallipoli May 1915
(Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial PO4340.001)
It had not taken long for White to impress the senior commanders. As his chief 
General Bridges lay dying, after once too often exposing himself to enemy 
snipers, General Birdwood had taken comfort in the fact that he had in White, 
senior General Staff Officer of the Division, ‘a man who is worth anything, and 
one of the best and most capable soldiers I have met for a long time...full of 
common sense and has much detailed knowledge and sound judgment’.14 It 
was not so much the fighting at Gallipoli that made White’s reputation ― in 
the larger force there his influence was reduced at least until July 1915 ― but 
12 Kevin Fewster (ed.), Bean’s Gallipoli: The diaries of Australia’s official war correspondent, 3rd ed. (1st 
ed. 1983), Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2007, pp.52, 59, 66, 96, 221–2. I have followed the original diary where 
Fewster’s transcription errs (AWM38, 3DRL606/3/1,5/1 19/1).
13 W. J. Hudson, ‘A Foreign Minister’s Qualifications’, seminar paper, Dept of International Relations, 
Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 29 March [1984?].
14 Birdwood to Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, 17 May 1915, copy, Birdwood MSS, AWM: 3DRL 3376/31, 
quoted in John Dermot Millar, ‘A study in the limitations of command: General Sir William Birdwood and the 
A.I.F., 1914–1918’, PhD thesis, University of New South Wales – Australian Defence Force Academy, 1993, 
p.60.
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the detailed planning of the evacuation in December 1915. The logistics and 
timetables, and the concealment of the thinning of the Australian forces from the 
Turks, were devised with imagination and precision. This was staff work of the 
highest order. The story of the ‘silent ruse’ was to be told and retold wherever 
ANZACs foregathered in the years to come. When the second volume of Charles 
Bean’s war history was published late in 1924 White was disappointed at being 
given only ‘subdued credit for the evacuation’. Truth to tell, however, Bean’s 
version of White’s role diminished the responsibility of Birdwood and of the 
acting GOC ANZAC, Alexander Godley, who commended ‘the thoroughness and 
excellence of his Staff work, which resulted in the success of the operation’. If 
the operation had not been successful it was their reputations more than White’s 
that were in jeopardy. But they were big men who were happy to give credit to 
a remarkably able subordinate.15 In retrospect it should also be observed that 
White had recognised that being a confidant of a well-connected and influential 
publicist was a vital element in shaping perceptions at the highest levels. It was 
all the more valuable for someone who was believed to eschew publicity.
John Monash, himself understanding the value of ‘advertisement’, was 
appreciative of White’s ability. He wrote to his wife in April 1916: ‘He is far and 
away the ablest soldier Australia has ever turned out…He is also a charming 
good fellow.’16 In the innermost thoughts that he shared with his own wife, 
White had said after three weeks at Gallipoli ‘I am obviously not a soldier ― 
that is to say a war soldier. I confess to any quantity of obsolete notions of 
peacetime soldiering of which I am no longer proud or boastful!’ At root the 
trouble was, he said, that he just did not like war, at any rate ‘modern war’.17 
There was no escaping the fact, however, that notwithstanding illness, bouts 
of depression, and occasional tension with his superiors, he was exceptionally 
good at it. As an anonymous newspaper correspondent wrote in April 1916:
…saw General Brudenell White, of the Australian army, looking as 
young and boyish as ever. He is regarded as the man of the war, as far 
as this part of the world is concerned. They say that if he had been in 
supreme command the Suvla Bay tragedy would never have happened.18
If the extraordinary success of the Dardanelles withdrawal had not made 
his name, his next remarkable achievement ― the organisation and transfer 
to France of an Australian force twice its former size ― demonstrated his 
15 Derham, The Silence Ruse, p.215; Millar, ‘A study in the limitations of command: General Sir William 
Birdwood and the A.I.F., 1914–1918’, p.112; Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth, UNSW Press, Sydney, 
2009, p.227; David W. Cameron, Gallipoli: The Final Battles and Evacuation of Anzac, Big Sky Publishing, 
Newport (NSW), 2011.
16 F. M. Cutlack, War Letters of General Monash, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1934, pp.xii, 112.
17 Bentley, ‘Champion of Anzac’, p.215. Bentley’s excellent thesis provides the material that refutes White’s 
self-deprecation.
18 The West Australian, 24 April 1916.
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unmatched administrative capacity. As modern military historians, no less than 
Bean, have shown, it is impossible to write the story of Australia’s role in the 
European theatre without White’s role being at its heart. His offensive planning 
was not faultless. He could be chastised by his superiors for being too optimistic 
about the prospects of success for certain operations. His own chief Birdwood 
would express irritation that subordinates would take matters to White that 
should have come to him. But White’s reputation with the high command 
continued to rise. After the failure of the Australian attack at Pozières, Sir 
Douglas Haig visited the Australian Corps HQ at Contay on 29 July 1916 where 
he saw Birdwood and White. White remembered the occasion in an interview 
24 years later:
This failure drew upon the Anzac Corps Staff an informal but emphatic 
reprimand from Haig who thought it due to over-confidence engendered 
by success at Gallipoli [sic].
‘You are not fighting Bashi-Bazouks now,’ he said to Birdwood and me 
in our office at Contay. ‘This is serious scientific war, and you are up 
against the most scientific and military nation in Europe.’ And pointing 
to a map on the wall he explained a number of alleged omissions in 
artillery and other arrangements and said that he would have no such 
rough-and-ready methods in France.
But as a matter of fact, any errors that were made were not of the crude 
nature indicated by Haig, who had made many mis-statements. I felt 
myself getting hot all over until at last I could stand it no longer. In spite 
of Birdie’s protest I dragged Haig back to the map and said: ‘Look here, 
Sir, I may be a damned interfering colonial, but you were wrong!’ And 
I took him back over his accusations and showed him that it was not all 
Birdie’s fault at all. I was in such a state I really didn’t care, but Haig was 
splendid. He just looked at me with kindly blue eyes and said: ‘Perhaps 
you’re right, young fellow.’19
The eruption did White no harm. ‘The latter seems a very sound capable fellow,’ 
Haig noted that day in his diary of Birdwood’s Chief of Staff, ‘and assured me 
that they had learned a lesson, and would be more thorough in future.’ Charles 
Bean reflected privately in November 1916: ‘This chronicle seems to contain a 
great deal more of White than of anyone else. But really he is the AIF & has been 
since Bridges died & even before.’20
19 The Mercury, 26 March 1940.
20 Martin Gilbert, The Somme: the Heroism and Horror of War, John Murray, London, 2006, p.136; Bean 
diary, 8 Nov. 1916, Bean MSS, AWM: 38, 3DRL606/66/1. White’s contribution is set authoritatively in context 
in Peter Pedersen, The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the Western Front, Penguin Books, Camberwell, 2007.
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Sent from Heaven
With 1st ANZAC in September 1917 was another Australian war correspondent, 
the Sydney journalist Harry Gullett. After the ‘great show’ on September 20, 
Gullett wrote to his wife Penelope about the work behind the scenes:
The genius of the Australian Army is a man of our own — Major General 
White a Queenslander — once a bank clerk who took to soldiering 
before the war as a profession, did brilliantly in the military colleges 
in England, & left Australia for Gallipoli at the outset as a staff captain. 
His fame is all thro France: many count him as possibly the master of 
them all. His work goes far beyond our force. Certainly he has not nearly 
finished. He is now Chief of our Staff. Isn’t it good to have produced 
him? And he is the most modest & charming man alive: a delightful easy 
manner, & he radiates light & intelligence. He is one of those rare big 
personalities that always have a lot in hand. He always has a minute to 
spare for everybody. In the midst of the show today he greeted me with 
a cordiality that was a revelation of his size. I believe he comes from a 
good old squatting family which lost its cash & he is practically self-
educated. He has very fine kindly blue eyes & a long fair face runs to a 
huge strong Roman nose. He rides a horse in a curious way with a hump 
in his back & at the Haig review he sat away behind the smaller fry — 
an aloof, shy & intensely interesting figure. I enthuse about him because 
if he is not the man we think he is sent from heaven.21
Not every Australian in France thought White sent from heaven. As the 
historian Ross Mallett points out, Brigadiers Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliott and John 
Gellibrand ignored his tactical caution in the advance to the Hindenburg Line. 
His misgivings about the first Bullecourt attack were not heeded; and his scheme 
for the second Bullecourt battle was flawed. His planning was generally more 
successful.22 But that did nothing to mollify the particularly aggrieved brigade 
commander, ‘Pompey’ Elliott. Revered by the troops, who knew him as a 
fearless leader whose tactical decisions were informed by frontline observation, 
Elliott was frequently at odds with headquarters. Overruled by White on the 
appointment of his own battalion commanders, he was even more chagrined at 
being passed over for promotion when Thomas Glasgow and John Gellibrand 
were given divisions in May 1918. Foreshadowing an appeal to the Australian 
Minister of Defence about being unjustifiably overlooked, Elliott provoked a 
masterly response from White:
21 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, 20 Sept. 1917, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/5/13. Decades later, Gullett’s 
son would write that his father admired White — was ‘in some awe of him’ — but did not much like him (J. 
Gullett, notes for Lord Casey, 7 Oct. 1972, NAA: M1129 WHITE/C B).
22 www.aif.adfa.edu.au:8888/Generals/index.html accessed 26 June 2011.
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Do you think anyone doubts your courage? No one in the AIF, I assure 
you. Or yr ability? It is well known; but — you mar it by not keeping 
your judgment under complete control…Finally you actually threaten 
me with political influence. You have obviously written hurriedly and I 
am therefore not going to regard yr letter as written. But let me say this: 
if the decision rested with me I should send you off to Australia without 
the least hesitation if calmly and deliberately you repeated yr assertion 
to seek political aid — and if you managed to raise a dozen ‘politico-
military’ enquiries I wd fight you to a standstill on them!
‘Traveller’, the horse White rode ‘in a curious way’ throughout the war, 
sold for 86 guineas, May 1919
(Ethel White’s scrapbook, courtesy of Mark Derham)
What Elliott’s biographer describes as an ‘astute blend of intimidation and 
inducement’ ― a hint that he was next in line for a divisional command ― 
subdued the unbalanced brigadier. When it was known that White was to 
follow Birdwood from the Australian Corps to the Fifth Army, Elliott’s judgment 
was that White:
…is undoubtedly a very able man but he is now completely under 
General Birdwood’s thumb, as he sees his future being made by sticking 
close to him and this is natural under the circumstances. But I cannot 
help thinking that it has more than once led to the betrayal of Australian 
interests.23
23 White to Brig. H. Elliott, 22 May 1918, Elliott diary, 29 May 1918, Elliott Papers, quoted in Ross 
McMullin, Pompey Elliott, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2002, pp.427, 437; Elliott to his wife, 24 May 
1918, Elliott Papers, AWM: 2DRL/0513. Series 3 Wallet 10.
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King George V, flanked by Sir William Birdwood, visits Australian troops 
at play, White in close attendance
(Ethel White’s scrapbook, courtesy of Mark Derham)
 In France, White was indeed at Birdwood’s right hand throughout. Some 
scholars were later to suggest that he was in fact doing much of the work more 
properly done by his chief. Certainly, as his own daily diary shows, he was 
organisational architect, planner, trouble shooter, adviser, and emissary. If Bean 
exaggerated his role and achievements, diminishing those of Sir John Monash 
and others like Robert McCheyne Anderson, the Sydney businessman sent to 
England to manage the AIF’s supplies and finances, White was undoubtedly 
one of the outstanding successes of the war. Whether some of the spectacular 
victories attributed to Monash in 1918 would have been his if he had been given 
the command of the Australian Corps in succession to Birdwood or to Monash 
can never be known. Bean and Keith Murdoch conspired unsuccessfully to 
thwart and then overturn the Monash appointment; but White himself, though 
never an uncritical admirer of Monash, had doubts that he was himself the right 
man for the post.24
24 Roland Perry, Monash: The Outsider Who Won A War, Random House Australia, Sydney, 2004, pp.329–
39, 385–6; Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: A Biography, MUP, 1982, pp.318–28, 375. Bean’s laudatory character 
sketch of White, datelined 4 March 1918, was published in Murdoch’s Herald, 23 May 1918, and quoted again 
at length in the Herald (‘A Wonderful Record…Brilliance Manifested’), 18 June 1918.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm
152
The war provided White with unrivalled experience, not simply of the 
thinking and performance of the Australian and imperial high command, but 
of the labyrinthine intrigues of generals and politicians. He was privy to, and 
unimpressed by, much of the ambition for promotion and honours that animated 
many of his peers. However, he was not above manoeuvring to influence the 
organisational and command choices of his superiors. His hand had been evident 
in the undermining of Major General J. G. Legge’s appointment to lead the 
AIF in 1915 and the transfer of the GOC’s powers to Birdwood. In subsequent 
years he had developed considerable distaste for the propensity of government 
leaders to subordinate military priorities to political interests. Decisions about 
the deployment of the Australian third division in late 1916, for example, 
were, he thought, contrived to influence the soldiers’ vote in the conscription 
campaign. Though he deprecated this he was unabashed in urging Bean to 
persuade Birdwood to come out publicly in favour of conscription. Whispering 
campaigns for and against candidates for corps and divisional commands 
swirled around him. Rumours of negotiated peace and of rifts between the high 
command and the War Cabinet were an intermittent distraction. When news 
came late in 1918 that Germany had accepted President Wilson’s peace terms, 
his profound scepticism about all things political found expression: ‘Great 
discussions on Peace. Army a little mistrustful.’25
Although as the war progressed he was largely detached from the trench and 
training worlds, White had thought deeply about problems of command in the 
field, and the difference between British and Australian forces: ‘the moment you 
get inexperienced British commanding officers administering Australian troops 
you find the differences’. He was a strong supporter of promoting officers from 
the ranks and ensuring that they remained close to the regiment or at least the 
brigade in which they had served. As he told Bean: ‘You want them with the CO 
who knew them and often with the men they knew. That is a concrete difference 
that the British don’t realise.’26
That the war took its toll on White, as for all of his contemporaries, scarcely needs 
to be acknowledged. Perhaps only Bean, in whom he regularly confided, sensed 
how fragile was his temperament. ‘An ounce of enmity worries him more than a 
ton of work.’27 Sent to spend time in the London General Hospital late in 1917 he 
was enjoined by his good friend Neville Howse, Director of Medical Services, to 
keep his bed and sitting rooms well ventilated. ‘Walking or riding exercise every 
day (weather is no bar to a healthy man), five minutes exercise before first meal, 
25 Bean diary, 15 Oct. 1916, Bean MSS, AWM: 38, 3DRL606/61/1; White diary, 12, 13 Oct. 1918, White MSS, 
NLA MS 5172/7.
26 Bean diary, 2 March 1916, Bean MSS, AWM: 38, 3DRL606/40/1, quoted in Faraday, ‘Half the battle…’, 
pp.156–7.
27 Bean diary, 17 Feb. 1917, Bean MSS, AWM: 38, 3DRL606/70/1.
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preferably in the open air.’28 It was a sensible regimen if not a cure-all. In a letter 
of commiseration to the then troubled brigade commander John Gellibrand in 
June 1917, White had spoken of demands that were ‘wearing & for how long it 
is possible is a doubtful business…We both suffer from a certain lack of those 
Apollo like qualities which make hard physical work, & privation & discomfort 
of small account.’ More serious was the emotional and psychological strain ― 
‘a certain amount of rest and freedom from responsibility’ would be necessary 
before it was possible to ‘see the world in correct perspective again’.29
One thing White did see in a particular perspective that even his greatest 
advocate did not appreciate was the need for the hard-pressed British Army to 
take credit for some successes in the autumn of 1918. He had previously been 
unenthusiastic about an idea of Bean’s ‘to write something wh. wd force the 
British to treat Australia as a separate distinct (tho’ kindred) nation’. With the 
British Commander in Chief failing to acknowledge the role of Australian and 
Canadian troops, White told Bean that in Haig’s position he would have done 
the same. The value to British morale of the victory that freed Amiens would 
have been lost if it had been attributed to Dominion forces. To Bean, this was to 
miss the larger strategic picture: that one day Australia’s future might depend 
on the perception of the Americans of ‘how far we had put the civilised world 
under an obligation to us in this war. Our existence may depend on it.’30 But 
then and later White remained an admirer of Haig. It was to Haig more than any 
other commander, he affirmed on the Field Marshal’s death in 1928, that victory 
was owed. It was Haig’s character, ‘a character without a flaw’, that saved the 
British Army in March 1918: ‘The belief that the men had in him undoubtedly 
kept them from rout.’31
White had ended the war as a Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff of the Australian 
Imperial Force and Chief of Staff of the British Fifth Army. When the shooting 
stopped he was tasked with establishing a repatriation and demobilisation 
branch of the AIF in London. Four days after the Armistice, White saw Billy 
Hughes in London. Realising that he lacked sufficient knowledge of education 
and industrial employment he recommended that John Monash should be 
given the industrial responsibility or, almost certainly his less-preferred option, 
put in charge of the whole organisation. The Prime Minister, he discovered, 
‘evidently wants Monash for Demob job’. Within days Monash had taken over. 
White it seemed had been out-manoeuvred. To White’s astonishment, when he 
28 Michael B. Tyquin, Neville Howse: Australia’s First Victoria Cross Winner, Oxford UP, South Melbourne, 
1999, p.109.
29 Peter S. Sadler, The Paladin: A Life of Major-General Sir John Gellibrand, Oxford UP, Melbourne, 2000, 
p.139.
30 Bean diary, 22, 29 Feb. 1917, 18 Aug. 1918, AWM: 38 3DRL606/70/1;116/1; John F. Williams, Anzacs, The 
Media and The Great War, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1999, p.246.
31 The Argus, 23 Nov. 1936; Brisbane Courier, 1 Feb. 1928.
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offered his services to Monash he was turned down. Emerging from a private 
meeting with Monash, he stunned Bean with an uncharacteristic expletive.32 On 
Monday, December 16 the now-unemployed general recorded: ‘Drove a car for a 
couple of hours for practice.’33
While he spoke warmly of Monash publicly, White for the most part kept his 
own counsel about his real feelings. But a private letter in 1937 revealed his 
lukewarm appreciation of a man whom he said had ‘an easier war on the whole 
than many of the other higher Commanders’. The unpopular J. W. McCay, he 
said, was an abler soldier. Monash ‘like so many of his race was quick to grasp 
and quick to learn; even if the knowledge was without depth’. White professed 
to be quite certain that if Monash, like Birdwood, had ‘been subject to the test 
of a 4 years command he would have failed’.34 ‘Brudenell did not discuss the war 
with his family,’ his daughter wrote, ‘and it is doubtful if he ever mentioned his 
feelings about it to them…It had been a time of such agony for him and for Ethel 
that they tried to forget it.’35
Finding a new role
Sir Cyril Brudenell White KCMG, as he had been since the beginning of 1919, 
returned home in HMAS Australia at the end of May 1919. He was elated at 
seeing the Southern Cross for the first time in five years. Acclaimed as a hero, he 
was given a civic reception at Melbourne Town Hall and fêted wherever he went 
in the next few weeks. In a warm pen-portrait in The Argus, the acting Minister 
of Defence was quoted as saying that White was considered ‘the greatest and 
most capable soldier that Australia has produced’.36 Before setting sail he had 
represented Australia on a War Office Reorganisation Committee considering 
the future of cavalry. His return to Australia saw him immediately engaged in 
defence planning as a member of a committee chaired by George Swinburne. 
The committee reported in August 1919 in favour of the creation of an air force 
and of maintaining a citizen army with the capability of putting 180 000 men 
32 Clem Lloyd and Jacqui Rees, The Last Shilling: A History of Repatriation in Australia, MUP, 1994, 
p.115. C. E. W. Bean evidently did not know that the job had first been offered to White (Two Men I Knew, 
William Bridges and Brudenell White Founders of the A.I.F., Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1957, p.181). 
The announced demobilisation and repatriation arrangements entailed the creation of a mixed civilian and 
military board and a department headed by a minister, initially Hughes and then Senator Pearce; Monash 
would be director-general and White would sit ex-officio as the connecting link with General Birdwood (The 
Argus, 25 Nov., 24 Dec. 1918; The Herald, 26 Dec. 1918 for objections to demobilisation delays and to sending 
Pearce to London).
33 White diary, 14–20 Nov., 16 Dec. 1918, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/7.
34 White to J. Black RSSILA (Vic), 7 April 1937, AWM: 38 DRL606, item 276 (1), in Williams, Anzacs, The 
Media and The Great War, p.235.
35 Derham, The Silence Ruse, p. 213.
36 The Argus, 5 June 1919.
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into the field if war were to come. Early the next year he participated with 
Generals Monash, McCay, and Hobbs in a Senior Officers’ conference chaired by 
Sir Harry Chauvel. In a two-volume Report on the Military Defence of Australia, 
the nation’s military elite concluded that the safety of Australia depended on 
her ability to thwart an invading enemy long enough for help to arrive from 
other parts of the British Empire. The only enemy in mind, then and in the next 
two decades, was Japan.37
A gathering of generals to meet Lord Birdwood
(Photograph by T. Humphrey, The Australasian, 21 Jan. 1920, from Ethel White’s scrapbook, courtesy of 
Mark Derham)
Appointed Chief of the General Staff in April 1920 in succession to Major General 
J. G. Legge, White took responsibility for developing the structure, recruitment, 
and training of the Militia. It was a task for which his meticulous mind was 
well suited. And his fervent belief in the value of a citizen army had only been 
confirmed by his wartime experience. Speaking at a farewell dinner as his period 
as CGS ended, White averred that he had refused to act as a propagandist. The 
Army realised that its strength was a matter for ‘statesmen’ after careful review 
by a foreign office and a military department. He was to note then and again 
that the absence of a foreign office was ‘somewhat of a handicap to Australia’.38 
White’s great admirer, Bean, was to write of him that ‘the war swung him to a 
belief in democracy which, though at first almost reluctant, became firmer as 
37 Claude Neumann, ‘Australia’s Citizen Soldiers, 1919–1939: A Study of Organization, Command, 
Recruiting, Training and Equipment’, MA thesis, University of New South Wales at Duntroon, 1978, pp.37–9.
38 ‘General Sir Brudenell White: Notes’, Official Historian’s Misc. Research Notes, AWM: 3 DRL 419/45/13.
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his experience of it increased’. He was no natural democrat. But he believed it 
to be ‘right in principle’. And when it seemed that Australia’s democracy was 
threatened by Bolshevism he would not be a mere spectator.  Democrat though 
he was, White was also a monarchist and, after successfully organising the visit 
of the Prince of Wales in 1920, he was made KCVO ― Knight of the Royal 
Victorian Order ― an honour in the gift of the sovereign. It was no secret that 
in 1921 he was elected a member of the general council of the League of Nations 
Union of which J. G. Latham was president. Eighteen months later, while still 
CGS, he revealed his political sympathies by appearing on the platform with 
other ‘representative men’ when Prime Minister Hughes delivered his policy 
speech at Chatswood Town Hall. Patriotism and Christianity were inseparable, 
White would tell an audience at St Paul’s Cathedral in 1925, as long as patriotism 
was subordinate.39
In May 1923, Stanley Bruce prevailed upon White to become Chairman of the 
newly established Board of Commonwealth Public Service Commissioners. He 
had not been an applicant. He was still considering an offer to become secretary 
of the Victoria Racing Club, where his brother Jack (John Warren White) had 
been appointed chairman of the stipendiary stewards in 1920. Nor it seems, 
notwithstanding a substantial salary of £2500 a year, did he find the Public 
Service Board a particularly congenial task. He had necessarily resigned his 
appointment in the Permanent Force and was transferred to the unattached list 
of the Citizen Forces. He would retain his seat on the Council of Defence but in 
an honorary capacity. 
Many officers who had not long since been urged by White to show loyalty to the 
Army while it went through the difficulties of retrenchment were unimpressed 
by his departure: ‘there was a common phrase about Victoria Barracks that “the 
penny was mightier than the sword”’. There were comparisons with General 
Chauvel’s steadfastness, much to White’s disadvantage, Sir Sydney Rowell would 
remember.40 If there was a loss of esteem among old colleagues and subordinates, 
a growing intimacy with the Prime Minister was some compensation ― he was 
consulted on ‘probable new Govr Genls (??Allenby; recomdd Plumer)’ in 1925.41 
But the Public Service Board proved a wearying chore. The public service was 
practised and purposeful in resisting change. And nothing in his military life had 
prepared the general for dealing with recalcitrant staff associations, arbitrated 
39 Carolyn Rasmussen, The Lesser Evil? Opposition to War and Fascism in Australia, 1920–1941, History 
Dept, University of Melbourne, 1992, p.12; Brisbane Courier, 25 Oct. 1922; The Argus, 11 April 1925.
40 Rowell to Lord Casey, 25 Oct. 1972, NAA: M1129 WHITE/C B.
41 White diary, 6 April 1925, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/10; Derham, The Silence Ruse, p.215 quotes an 
earlier diary entry which does not disclose White’s queries about Allenby and support for Plumer. Sir John 
Baird Bt, a former Conservative Cabinet minister, was appointed and created Lord Stonehaven. 
8 . The General: Brudenell White (I)
157
wage settlements, formal appeals over promotions, calculated defiance that fell 
short of sanctionable transgression, or abusive character assessments under 
parliamentary privilege.42
White understood well enough that the Prime Minister’s objectives of economy 
and efficiency could not be achieved simply by careful planning and command 
decisions. He sought co-operation and was willing to negotiate. Promotion 
purely by seniority having been abolished, his remit was to smooth the path 
for the new criteria of efficiency, merit, and good and diligent conduct. A 
revised position classification scheme was achieved after prolonged wrangling. 
Unhappily, there was a poor response to his attempts to engage departments 
in initiatives to identify and reward officers whose skill or inventive capacity 
brought savings or efficiencies.43 As his term came to an end there was nothing 
to attract him to continue in a job which would have entailed moving his family 
from the comfort of the grazing property near Beaufort they had bought in 
1925, to the unappealing environment of the nascent national capital.
It was a frustrating time at the Public Service Board, interrupted by illness, 
confrontation with Prime Minister Bruce over economies that threatened the 
viability of the defence forces, and the long distraction in 1926–27 of arranging 
the visit of the Duke and Duchess of York and the opening of the new Parliament 
House. Unfulfilling as the five years as Commissioner had been, they had been 
preceded by a more consequential disappointment. White had failed to ensure 
the succession he wished in his place at the head of the Army. On stepping 
down as Chief of the General Staff in 1923 he was succeeded by Harry Gullett’s 
friend Sir Harry Chauvel, characterised that year in Gullett’s history of the 
exploits of the Light Horse in the Middle East as ‘a sound administrator and 
a wise and far-seeing commander’, and ‘a leader of broad Imperial sympathies 
and infinite tact’.44 White had hoped that Brigadier General Tom Blamey would 
be appointed; but the best he could achieve was a splitting of the CGS’s role into 
two, with Blamey designated to assume a new position as second CGS in charge 
of peace organisation, peace establishments, and training. A disappointed 
Blamey was enticed by Monash and encouraged by Chauvel to accept an offer 
from the Victorian government to become its Chief Commissioner of Police.45
42 The Bulletin, 29 Jan. 1925, quoting a Labor MP: ‘an old conservative, dust-laden, brainless idiot…a 
troglodyte whose principal characteristics are ignorance, arrogance and egotism…pitchforked into a high 
position by social influence and patronage’.
43 Gerald E. Caiden, Career Service: An Introduction to the History of Personnel Administration in the 
Commonwealth Public Service of Australia, MUP, 1965, pp.14–15, 173–7, 199.
44 H. S. Gullett, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine 1914–1918, Angus & Robertson, 
Sydney, 1923, pp.59, 61.
45 David Horner, Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998, pp.70–3; A. J. Hill, 
Chauvel of the Light Horse: A Biography of General Sir Harry Chauvel, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., MUP, 1979, pp.207–9.
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White was more successful in arranging the transition to his favoured successor 
at the Public Service Board. His term over in June 1928, White was ready to 
make home, family, and a limited portfolio of business and voluntary service 
interests his priorities. In 1925 he had turned down an offer from Sir John 
Grice of £2500 a year to become general manager of the Trustees Executors 
and Agency Company Ltd. Two years later he declined the Prime Minister’s 
proposal of a safe seat in the House of Representatives. Then, forewarned of an 
approach about the High Commissionership in London ― widely canvassed in 
the press ― he made sure that Stanley Bruce knew he was not interested. Now 
he accepted an offer from Grice of £3000–4000 a year to become chairman of the 
local board and superintendent of the Australian business of the New Zealand 
Loan and Mercantile Agency Company Ltd.46 He sat on the boards of the Alfred 
Hospital and the Australian War Memorial, the Rhodes Scholarship selection 
committee, and the council of Trinity College at the University of Melbourne, 
where his ‘very long, very slow’ first meeting was an uninspiring introduction 
to the contrasting decision-making conventions of the university, military, and 
commercial worlds. But at various times he was brought into counsel by the 
federal government.47 His generally laconic diary occasionally gives a glimpse of 
a man unafraid to speak his mind. A three-hour Council for Defence meeting in 
November 1929 was one such occasion ‘whereat I definitely stated some views’. 
The matters were rehashed at a lunch with newly promoted fellow Generals 
Chauvel and Monash; and followed the next day after further consultation with 
Monash by a telegram to the Prime Minister ‘demurring at terms of his press 
notification’.48 It was not coincidental that there were no further Council of 
Defence meetings for five years.49
Military matters and echoes of the war were never far away. In early August 
1927 he dined with Monash ― ‘a jolly party’ ― and found himself sitting next 
to Pompey Elliott. ‘We had a reconciliation ― but not before I had told him 
what I thought of him.’ On 2 June 1930 there was an ‘extraordinary letter from 
Genl Elliott’. ‘Another strange letter’ from Elliott, a Nationalist Senator since 
1919, arrived on June 10.50 Elliott’s resentment at his wartime ‘supersession’ by 
Generals Glasgow and Gellibrand had been re-ignited after the war when White 
was CGS. He had imprudently taken his personal grievances against White and 
Birdwood into public arenas. Never appeased in spite of being promoted Major 
46 Derham, The Silence Ruse, pp.215, 254–5; Sydney Morning Herald, 2 Feb. 1927; White diary, 1 March 
1928, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/11.
47 For some of the Council of Defence meetings he attended and his sharp comments on secret documents, 
see White Papers, AWM: 3DRL?1400, Series 5 Wallet 5.
48 White diary, 12–13 Nov. 1929, 25 June 1930 (re Trinity College) White MSS, NLA MS 5172/12.
49 Neumann, ‘Australia’s Citizen Soldiers’, p.107.
50 White diary, 8 Aug. 1927, 2, 10, June 1930, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/11.
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General and given a divisional command in 1928, and still seeking vindication 
even from White, Elliott fell ill a few months later, and took his own life in 
March 1931.
Since Elliott had ‘ventilated his supersession’ in the Senate in 1921 and 
‘apparently condemned no one but himself’, he had been a nuisance.51 But for 
White, his own reputation secured in the imposing volumes of Charles Bean’s 
history of Australia in the war, there were more compelling contemporary 
concerns.
51 White diary, 22 April, 6 May 1921, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/9.
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9. Call and recall: Brudenell White (II)
Brudenell White was on the verge of being drawn into the vortex of politics. 
On 12 February 1930 he records ‘Visit 12/15 from a Mr Armstrong with a new 
code book.’ On March 17 ‘C. R. Murphy called on behalf of Pastl Vigilance Cttee 
& wanted me to go to Canberra re Fed Land Tax Bill. Lobbying!!’ C. R. Murphy, 
an influential grazier who made no secret of his Nationalist associations, was a 
fellow director of the Trustees, Executors, & Agency Co. along with Sir John 
Grice. The Graziers’ Vigilance Committee, as Murphy’s group was properly 
called, was campaigning against the federal land tax that burdened many 
graziers who were not even making working expenses. This ‘iniquitous capital 
tax’, as the Victorian grazier MP, James Fairbairn, was to dub it, was to remain 
in place until a more sympathetic Lyons government eventually reduced it by 
half in ‘one of its most progressive steps towards creating employment’.1
Economic conditions and the political temper of the times now began to 
interrupt White’s placid journal entries on theatre outings, AIF Trust meetings, 
quiet dinners at the Melbourne Club or the Naval and Military. He was angered 
by the rising tide of anti-war literature, ‘the works of degenerates, whose war 
experiences, if put to the test, would be found to be mainly imaginative; and 
they have been made the tools of profit-seeking publishers’.2 ‘Who, with a clean 
mind,’ he asked the NSW RSL Reveille’s readers in March 1930, ‘from so much 
pure gold, would wish to throw the light upon the inevitable dross?’ There was 
dross looming ahead as well ― base contaminants in the body politic. The mood 
in conservative circles was sombre. Thus at a National Mutual board meeting on 
27 May 1930 he found fellow director Sir Robert Gibson, the powerful chairman 
of the Commonwealth Bank Board, ‘very gloomy’. The day before, the private 
secretary to the New South Wales Governor Sir Philip Game had tried to arrange 
a dinner; but a ‘troublesome’ cold meant a telephone conversation instead.
By July 16 White was attending a ‘most impressive meeting of Citizens in 
protest of budget at Melbourne Town Hall. A wonderful gathering.’ August 14 
was another cheerful day when he presided at the 75th anniversary meeting of 
the Melbourne City Mission and heard a good speech by the rising Victorian 
politician R. G. Menzies. There was another ‘excellent & interesting speech’ four 
days later, this time by the British Treasury official Sir Otto Niemeyer. White 
had met Niemeyer at dinner at the Melbourne Club with Sir John Higgins, the 
former chairman and now liquidator of the British-Australian Wool Realisation 
1 CPD, House of Representatives, 25 Sept. 1935, p.165.
2 The federal executive of the RSSILA urged in March 1930 that the official war historian should be 
authorised to censor all war books (Peter Coleman, Obscenity Blasphemy Sedition: Censorship in Australia, 
Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1974, pp.37–8).
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Association. Higgins was shortly to be one of the key members of a small group 
that eased the passage of Joe Lyons from the Labor Party into the leadership of 
a new political force, the United Australia Party.
Another of those whose minds were turning towards a fundamental political 
re-alignment, with Robert Menzies as one of the moving spirits, was the chief 
executive of the National Mutual, Charles Norris. At the National Mutual on 
September 9, Sir Robert Gibson was ‘very pessimistic re amendt present adverse 
conditions’. As chairman of the Commonwealth Bank, Gibson had joined 
Niemeyer in pressing the Commonwealth government and state premiers to 
reduce government borrowing and spending in an attempt to improve Australia’s 
economic position. Without pronouncing directly on the programs and policies 
of political parties, White did find occasion to declare his belief that Australia 
needed ‘a lot less cant in our political, business, and social life’. The ‘greatest 
wrong’ in contemporary Australia he asserted was the fostering of a class spirit 
which encouraged envy, hatred, and malice towards those who possessed what 
others coveted. It was to be this class spirit that would deter him from advocating 
the formation of an Officer Training Corps for young men who had the benefit of 
a higher education ― because it might be thought undemocratic.3
Secret leagues
Uninterested in party politics, White played no discernible part in the secret 
conversations of Menzies, Norris, and Higgins, and their associates, Staniforth 
Ricketson, the journalist Ambrose Pratt, the prominent architect Kingsley 
Henderson, and later, Keith Murdoch. He would rub shoulders with Menzies 
and some of the others at the Savage Club. And an occasional discreet dinner 
with R. W. Knox, and confabulations with bankers and economists, kept him au 
fait with political and financial developments.4 But he could not easily remain 
unmoved by the actions that many of his former Army friends were taking 
during the turbulent Depression years. Whether he knew it or not, he came 
incidentally, and maybe purposely, to the notice of intelligence agencies.5
Informants reported that White was involved with a group of Victorian Militia 
officers in a League of National Security loosely linked with the secretive citizens’ 
groups in New South Wales, often referred to as the Old Guard. The League was 
perhaps a re-incarnation of the White Army of the early 1920s. It was known 
to many as the White Guard. This was not apparently an acknowledgement 
3 Brisbane Courier, 6 Dec. 1930; F. H. Wright to General D. Wynter, 30 Dec. 1941, copy, White MSS, NLA 
MS 8119 Series 2 Box 15.
4 White diary, 13, 26 May 1931, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/13.
5 Richard Hall, The Secret State: Australia’s Spy Industry, Cassell Australia, Stanmore, 1978, pp.20–2.
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of White’s leadership. Indeed there are good reasons for believing that Major 
General Tom Blamey was more actively involved in the shadowy Victorian 
League. As head of the Victoria Police, Blamey took the threat of Communist 
subversion more seriously than the Commonwealth Investigation Branch. 
Although contemporaries were unequivocal that Blamey ‘was the boss’, the 
precise nature of Blamey’s and White’s roles has never been conclusively 
established.6
Both British and American intelligence sources reported the formation of a 
secret army ‘X Force’ sometime between October and December 1930.7 Around 
this period there are suggestive entries in White’s diary. A Sunday morning (9 
November 1930) visit by ‘Frank De Crespigny, Richardson, McKay & Bastin’ 
might well have been merely a friendly gathering of neighbours. But the shared 
backgrounds and military associations of the men suggest the possibility of 
another purpose. Dr Frank Champion de Crespigny had been a captain in the 
Australian Army Medical Corps in England and France in the last year of the 
war; practising in nearby Ararat he was serving in the Army Reserve. Colonel 
J. D. Richardson had led the 7th Light Horse regiment 1918–19 with success 
against the Turks in the final battles of the war. Now a grazier, he commanded 
the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, AMF.8 Charles McKay, from Beaufort, was a former 
Light Horseman and AIF officer promoted from the ranks, a stalwart of Ararat 
local government and the RSSILA.9 Lieutenant Colonel Hector Bastin had risen 
from sergeant to major in the war, serving in Egypt, Gallipoli, and France, was 
awarded the MC and was then commissioned into the Indian Army. In India he 
had commanded the Viceroy’s bodyguard of the Bengal Lancers and served as a 
staff officer. Since late 1924 he had been in the Australian Army Reserve.10 He 
was now farming 3800 acres near the White property at Woodnaggarak.
Did White and these local friends usher in the birth of a league of national 
security? The evidence, nothing but their Sunday morning meeting, permits no 
more than conjecture. We do know, however, that among White’s key associates 
at this time were the solicitor and citizen soldier Colonel Francis P. Derham, who 
brought ‘Colonel’ Roach with him to a meeting in February 1931. On 2 July 
1931, White noted in his diary: ‘Saw Col. Derham re Secret League.’11 It was the 
only reference he made to the organisation, by now active, and penetrated by 
the Secret Service. But other scholars have established that, in addition to Frank 
6 Cathcart, Defending the National Tuckshop, pp.56–7.
7 ‘Evidence of secret army uncovered’, Canberra Times, 8 May 1980; Keith Amos, ABC Radio AM, 9 May 
1980.
8 Richardson’s The History of the 7th Light Horse Regiment A.I.F. was published in 1923.
9 McKay, Charles Holly NAA: B2455.
10 Bastin, Hector Ernest VX29296, NAA: B883; Ronald J. Austin, Our Dear Old Battalion: The Story of the 7th 
Battalion, AIF, 1914–1919, Slouch Hat Publications, McCrae, 2004, pp.27, 179, 208.
11 Rosemary Derham, The Silence Ruse: Escape from Gallipoli, A record and memories of the life of General Sir 
Brudenell White,Oryx Publishing, Melbourne, 1998, p.258.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
164
Derham, a decorated wartime artillery officer, the leaders of the ‘Secret League’ 
included several Militia officers ― the barrister, Lieutenant Colonel E. F. ‘Ned’ 
Herring, who had been active in the White Guard which crystallised after the 
Victorian police strike in 1923, and the pharmacist, Lieutenant Colonel Colin 
Simpson, soon to found Allied Master Chemists of Australia Ltd (AMCAL), a 
confidant of Tom Blamey. Major General Harold Grimwade, related by marriage 
to the Fairbairns and Manifolds of Victoria’s Western District, was also of the 
group.12
Charles Bean’s reminder about ‘The maker of the A.I.F.’ 
(Reveille, 31 March 1931,  Ethel White’s scrapbook, courtesy of Mark Derham)
12 Andrew Moore, ‘Guns across the Yarra: Secret armies and the 1923 Melbourne Police Strike’, Sydney 
Labour History Group, What Rough Beast: The State and Social Order in Australian History, George Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 1982, pp.220–33, 265–9; Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, pp.89, 135, and sources 
cited in p.260 fn 53; Stuart Sayers, Ned Herring: A Life of Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Edmund 
Herring, Hyland House Melbourne in association with Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1980, pp.91–2; 
David Horner, Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998, pp.94–8; Paul de Serville, The 
Australian Club Melbourne 1878–1998, Australian Club, Melbourne, 1998, p.126.
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There appears to be little doubt that the League of National Security in Victoria, 
and the Old Guard groups in New South Wales, like the Country Defence 
Organisations and the metropolitan Citizens Reserve Corps, were looked 
upon officially as potential auxiliaries if government were to be faced with 
revolutionary disorder. White’s diaries give only fragmentary clues: a telegram 
from NSW Governor Sir Philip Game on 21 July 1931 and a conversation with 
the Governor’s ADC two days later, then a National Mutual board meeting on 
August 11 at which Sir Robert Gibson was ‘very overwrought’ look innocent 
enough. So too on 25 November 1931: ‘A. S. Rogers in to see me re politics.’ Yet 
there is something about the casual crypticness of these entries that suggests 
they conceal more than they reveal. Arthur Rogers, for example, was a former 
Minister for Trade and Customs, now moving away from his Liberal and 
Nationalist origins towards the Country Party; soon he would co-found the 
Primary Producers’ Restoration League to pursue debt adjustment for farmers 
and graziers. In January 1932, a fortnight after the Lyons ministry was sworn 
in, we find White invited by Sir George Fairbairn of the National Union to dine 
with Latham and Stanley Bruce who spoke, and the new Prime Minister ‘who 
spoke well, & impressed me’. Early in April White himself spoke ― ‘did very 
badly’ ― against the federal land tax at a town hall meeting organised by the 
Taxpayers’ Association. Later that month, he dined with Sir John Higgins in 
a large party to meet Lyons, who spoke ‘admirably’. But by September he was 
railing against a ‘stupid meeting re Communism in Gibson’s office’.13
Eric Roberts, who had flown with the AFC in the war, and served later in the 
Citizen Force Army, was told by a friend in early 1931 of ‘a secret organisation 
being formed by World War I officers, with the objective of countering any 
moves which might be made by subversive forces to exploit the unemployment 
situation’. Roberts’ friend, a wartime staff captain in France, said that he and 
a major had been asked by ‘some leading businessmen’ to lead the volunteers. 
They were told, Roberts recalled, that the Chief Commissioner of Police, the 
Army Commander, the Director of Civil Aviation, and the President of the Royal 
Victorian Aero Club all knew of the organisation. The group, which Roberts 
offered to assist, was charged with liaising with CMF Militia commanders to 
ensure that arms and ammunition stores were secure. They were only to be 
called into action if the police were overwhelmed. ‘No publicity could be given 
to building an organisation of this nature and everything had to be done by 
personal contact.’14
13 White diary, 21 Jan., 7, 14 April, 6 Sept. 1932, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/13; Geoff Browne, ‘Rodgers, 
Arthur Stanislaus (1876–1936),’ Geoffrey Serle and Christopher Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 11, MUP, 1988, pp.435–6.
14 E. G. Roberts, RAAF (Retd), Box Kites and Beyond, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1976, pp.63–4.
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One of those entrusted with crucial personal contacts was a 41-year-old Warrant 
Officer (honorary lieutenant), H. H. Downey MC, a master gunner attached to 
the Ordnance Department, 2nd District, at Victoria Barracks in Sydney. Herbert 
Hamilton Downey was a professional soldier, with two years in the Victorian 
Rangers and five years in the Royal Australian Garrison Artillery before 
enlisting in the AIF in 1916. He had been granted a commission, and had served 
latterly in the 36th Australian Brigade, Royal Australian Artillery, 2nd Siege 
Battery. He earned his MC for conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in 
the field in mid-1918. After advanced ordnance training in England in 1919 and 
termination of his AIF commission in March 1920, he was repeatedly re-engaged 
in the Instructional Corps through the next decade as a warrant officer.15
In a confidential statement to his superiors on 6 February 1933 Downey said:
Having been a student of International Politics for many years and alive 
to menace of Communistic Activity in British Empire and actuated by 
sentiments of loyalty to my King and Constitutional Govt. I, in company 
with several others in 1930 concerned ourselves in the formation of a 
body for the purpose of maintaining Constitutional Govt. against the 
attack of Communism or other disloyal elements.
Downey, then in Melbourne, had taken an oath of loyalty to the King and was 
sworn to secrecy ― never to mention the existence of the organisation or to 
discuss its members or affairs with anyone other than proven members. In July 
1932 Downey had been appointed Quartermaster and honorary Lieutenant (on 
probation).16 In December he met Lieutenant Colonel Eric Campbell with whom 
he had served in the war, and subsequently held a meeting with leaders of the 
proto-fascist New Guard. As early as October the previous year, intelligence 
sources had believed that the ‘virile and youthful’ New Guard had a ‘working 
agreement’ with the ‘White Guard’ in Victoria. No evidence was adduced in 
support of this belief. If indeed there had been such a working agreement, 
Downey’s mission seems to have been a response to rapidly changing conditions. 
At the meeting Downey reportedly claimed to represent a Melbourne-based 
organisation over which Sir Brudenell White ‘presided’ with a ‘Major’ Roach as 
his chief of intelligence. Len Roach ― the ‘Colonel’ Roach who had accompanied 
Frank Derham on his visit to White in July 1931 ― was indeed the League of 
National Security’s intelligence chief, a role he somehow combined with his 
duties on secondment as a staff captain at 10th Brigade headquarters. Roach had 
served in Gallipoli and France where he earned an MC.
15 For the character and role of the Instructional Corps: Roland Millbank, ‘Out of Empire: an introduction 
to the story of the Australian Instructional Corps, 1921-1955’, Sabretache, 1 Dec. 2004.
16 NAA: B883/VX13547 for Downey’s Army career.
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Commonwealth and NSW police officers in Sydney knew that Downey had 
found and exploited divisions among the leadership of the New Guard. Captain 
Frank De Groot, notorious for his ribbon-slashing at the opening of the Sydney 
Harbour Bridge six months earlier, had been at odds with the founder Eric 
Campbell. There are discrepancies in various accounts but it appears that De 
Groot resigned from the New Guard late in November 1932 and with Brigadier 
General H. W. Lloyd reached out to Downey. Downey had therefore taken the 
initiative ― or had been given the task ― of setting up a new organisation 
separate from the New Guard, with De Groot as its chief of intelligence. (Another 
account makes Downey De Groot’s right-hand man). As the Commonwealth 
Intelligence Bureau knew, Downey had subsequently approached an unnamed 
Sydney businessman allegedly seeking ‘interest and assistance in forming three 
brigades of private individuals, these formations to be classified as (a) Mobile 
Brigade; (b) Police Brigade; and (c) Reserve Brigade’.
So secretive were the Melbourne and Sydney conservative coteries that Downey 
appears to have been led unwittingly into indiscretion. Thinking to link De 
Groot with the existing organisation in Sydney which he understood to be allied 
to the ‘Melbourne organisation’, he approached first Major Blair Wark VC DSO. 
Wark he knew as a member of the organisation in Sydney which he believed 
operated under the ‘aegis’ of the Commonwealth government. At Wark’s 
suggestion he then saw Major W. J. R. Scott DSO, a militia officer who was, Wark 
said, the leader. Jack Scott was a man whose influence outstripped his nominal 
rank. An insurance broker by profession, son of a director of the Commercial 
Banking Company of Sydney, cousin of the aspiring Victorian politician 
Geoffrey Street, he had long been close to very senior military figures, especially 
Major General Sir Charles Rosenthal, who was re-appointed to command the 2nd 
Division, Australian Military Force, in 1932. In 1918–19 Scott had been deputy 
to Rosenthal in organising the repatriation of Australian troops from France 
and England. Rosenthal had led the 2nd Division from 1921 to 1926 and with 
Scott at his side had been active in organising resistance to ‘bolshevism’ in the 
immediate post-war years. He had a long-standing interest in aviation, dating 
from his pioneering use of an aeroplane in military manoeuvres in 1912. Twice 
in the 1920s he had been associated with companies bidding unsuccessfully 
for airmail service contracts, latterly with Charles Ulm, Smithy, and Keith 
Anderson. Rosenthal’s wartime rise from artillery commands to Major General 
at the head of the AIF 2nd Division, and his post-war appointments, reflected 
White’s respect for a bold and intelligent leader. An unabashed Nationalist, he 
had sat in the New South Wales Parliament and would do so again.17
17 A. J. Hill, ‘Rosenthal, Sir Charles (1875–1954)’, Serle and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 11, pp.451–3; Ellison, Flying Matilda, p.303; C. E. W. Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in 
France During the Main German Offensive, 1918, [The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, 
vol. V, The A. I. F. in France December 1917–May 1918], Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1937, pp.300–1.
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Scott had worked with Eric Campbell in 1925 in assembling 500 ex-servicemen 
to support the Commonwealth government in breaking the shipping strike. He 
already knew Major Roach; and both he and Wark understood that ‘General 
White presided over’ the Melbourne organisation. But before the talks with 
Scott could take shape, reports from the Commonwealth Intelligence Bureau 
and the NSW CIB about Downey’s contacts with the New Guard reached Army 
headquarters. The reaction was immediate. Military Intelligence had noted in 
August 1932 that branches of the League of National Security were dormant.18 
The Minister for Defence, on the advice of the Chief of the General Staff, 
had not long since denied that members of the Defence forces were involved 
with private ‘defensive ― or offensive’ — organisations. Downey’s activities 
therefore constituted a serious breach of discipline. They had the potential 
for huge embarrassment to the government. They had even greater possible 
consequences for Downey.
The Military Board had promulgated a direction in March 1931 that members 
of the Staff Corps and Instructional Corps were ‘in no manner…to associate 
themselves’ with any organisation enrolling members for the purpose of 
assisting police in an emergency’. Any member of the Permanent Forces who was 
‘inadvertently’ associated with such an association was to rescind his association 
or membership immediately. As recently as May 1932, the Prime Minister had 
been obliged to rebut charges of collusion between the Defence Department 
and the New Guard.19 When questioned at Victoria Barracks, Downey at first 
denied but then admitted his activities. In a written response demanded by the 
military authorities, Downey trod delicately around the question of whether he 
had breached the signed undertaking not to participate in organisations that 
were to be avoided. He had not claimed to act as an emissary for Brudenell 
White’s Victorian group, he said. But he had undertaken to find out whether it 
was permissible for him to pass on information about its structure to interested 
parties in New South Wales. He had not said that the Victorians were anxious 
about the lack of a similar organisation in New South Wales.
The documentation reeked of hair splitting and backside covering. Conceivably, 
there had been some coaching from sympathisers, possibly Major Bertrand ‘Boz’ 
Combes, head of military intelligence, later a senior member of White’s staff, who 
would bring Scott in to head military intelligence in the 2nd Military District in 
1935.20 Colonel H. E. Jones, the head of the CIB, had reported these developments 
18 Keith Amos, The New Guard Movement 1931–1935, MUP, 1976, p.16; Cathcart, Defending the National 
Tuckshop, p.203.
19 Richard Hall, ‘The Secret Army’, National Times, 23–28 Jan. 1978, pp.12–3, quoting unreferenced 
documents from the Australian Archives. For the Defence Minister’s proposed response to a parliamentary 
question from Jack Beasley, NAA: A5954, 973/6.
20 Desmond Ball and David Horner, Breaking the Codes: Australia’s KGB network, 1944–1950, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 1998, p.16.
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to the Attorney-General who in turn informed the Prime Minister. As long as 
Labor was in power in Canberra, Jones had been sparing in the information he 
provided to his minister. But he was increasingly frustrated by the inaction of 
the Military Board. Now he forwarded a secret memorandum from his associate 
in Sydney, Major Longfield Lloyd, on Downey’s attempt to form an organisation 
in New South Wales; his covering letter advised the Attorney that there was no 
need for any further organisation as the one that had been in readiness early in 
1931 could be brought into operation at short notice if necessary. At Latham’s 
request Jones sent the memorandum to the Prime Minister. Having digested 
all this, Lyons instructed that the relevant papers be copied to the Minister 
for Defence ‘with an intimation that I suggest action be taken by him to deal 
with the officer concerned’.21 Downey, whose activities had been reported to 
the Chief of the General Staff, evidently escaped with a reprimand and a delay 
of six months in gazetting his promotion to honorary lieutenant. As no other 
action seems to have been taken against him it appears that this was a man who 
enjoyed protection at high levels.
How deeply involved in the Melbourne League White had become is impossible 
to say. Frank De Groot himself, in a handwritten draft of his unpublished 
memoirs, refers to a meeting with White in Melbourne in 1932. But, as Andrew 
Moore, the foremost scholar in this field, established, the passage is omitted 
from a later typescript version. Was White a leading figure in a clandestine 
organisation known and welcomed by the federal government? The evidence is 
slender. But in all of the discussions of the credibility of Downey’s denials and 
evasions one thing stands out. Not one of the military intelligence officers or 
base commanders questioned the references to Brudenell White as the leader of 
the Victorian group. White’s daughter, Rosemary Derham, in a valuable work on 
her father published in 1998, concluded after consulting several scholars that 
‘it would be entirely out of character for Brudenell White to lead a secret and 
illicit organisation’.22 Major Harold Jones had written to the Attorney General:
It is actions like those of Downey that brings Commonwealth 
Administration under very adverse criticism and makes for 
misunderstandings with those loyal and highly influential citizens upon 
whom we have to rely in emergency, and at times the position becomes 
very embarrassing to those upon whom responsibility is vested.23
21 NAA: A367, C94121; Lyons MSS, NLA MS4851 Box 1, folder 4.
22 Derham, The Silence Ruse, p.297.
23 H. E. Jones to J. G. Latham, 22 Dec. 1932, enclosing ‘a secret report from Sydney,’ NAA: A367, C94121. 
I have drawn information about the New and Old Guards and related groups from ‘Para-military groups of 
the 1920s and 1930s: Documents copied from ASIO files’, NAA: A12393, 7/99; ‘The Association (Post War) 
and the New Guard (Pre War), Vol. 1 1931–1949’,  NAA: A6122, 40; ‘The New Guard and “The Association”’, 
NAA: A367, C94121; ‘The New Guard 1931–48’, A432, 1931/1871; ‘Activities of Hon. Lieutenant HH Downey, 
MC, AIC, in regards to disloyalty due to association with New Guard and Communism 1933’, NAA: SP1141/1, 
S33/1/30. Andrew Moore’s The Secret Army and the Premier is valuable and complemented by his subsequent 
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That White was one of the ‘loyal and highly influential citizens’ who could be 
relied upon in an emergency is hard to doubt. He was informed of the plans 
that were made in Victoria. It seems unlikely that they could have proceeded as 
effectively as they did had he withheld his blessing.
What may be safely assumed is that White was known to have countenanced the 
work of others who were creating the framework for an emergency mobilisation 
in support of the civil power. In doing so he filled a role that had been rejected 
by his great contemporary John Monash. In November and December 1930, 
approached by Kingsley Henderson, Robert Knox, and Len Roach, closely 
followed by Harold Grimwade, Monash had dismissed their fears. He was 
unwilling to take a lead privately, still less publicly, and insisted that ‘the 
only hope for Australia is the ballot-box and an educated electorate’.24 White, 
evidently sought out as the default choice of figurehead, was cautious but not 
dismissive. He had less confidence in popular sovereignty: ‘Democracy as a 
machine,’ he told the Carey Baptist Grammar School speech night in December 
1932, ‘is entirely out of control.’25 The fact that the Secret League’s activities 
could be legitimised under the Commonwealth Peace Officers Act of 1925 would 
remove any taint of illegality. And, as one police investigator noted, the ‘High 
Council’ of the ‘White Army’ had taken steps to minimise any overt association 
between themselves and such inordinately robust anti-communist activities as 
might attract unwelcome official attention to their rank and file.26
It would have been natural for patriots in Melbourne to put out feelers to their 
supposed counterparts in Sydney. White could not have been unconcerned 
about indications that elements of the New Guard might themselves have 
contemplated a coup d’état. As the threat of civil disorder receded, Eric 
Campbell became more engaged with European fascism, alienating many of his 
followers. He launched his own ‘Centre Party’ but threw his weight behind the 
United Australia Party in the 1934 federal election. White’s role ― whatever it 
had been, it was always spoken in a whisper behind a veil of discretion ― was 
in diminuendo. With secure conservative governments in the Commonwealth, 
New South Wales, and Victoria, he settled into an essentially private life.
However much he might eschew the limelight, White was too respected and 
connected a figure to avoid participation in public affairs altogether. As a leading 
figure in the pastoral industry he would return from time to time to warnings 
work (which unfortunately I saw only after I had completed my own research on Downey) including Francis 
de Groot Irish Fascist Australian Legend, Federation Press, Sydney, 2005 and ‘Loyal lieutenant or spy? Frank 
De Groot and the intelligence services’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. 96, Pt 2, Dec. 
2010, pp.201–20, and ‘Superintendent MacKay and the curious case of the vanishing secret army: A response 
to Richard Evans’, History Australia, vol. 6, (3), Dec. 2009. DOI: 10.2104/ha090072.
24 Serle, John Monash, pp.518–20.
25 The Argus, 14 Dec. 1932.
26 ‘Extract from Memorandum from Inspector R. S. Browne 17/11/31’, NAA: A367, C94121.
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about the impact of heavy taxation on struggling wool growers. Appearing as 
a witness before the Royal Commission on Banking he renewed his lamentation 
about ‘oppressive taxation’, musing that creating an open market for Treasury 
Bills might lead to a reduction in government expenditure.27 Defending the 
interests of the international wool-broking and quasi-banking business he led 
was unavoidable. His faith brought him often to church platforms where he 
would affirm the virtue of family prayers, more responsible parenting, and the 
example of ‘cheerful and useful labour’.28 He had more choice about invitations 
to speak to Service and voluntary organisations. Many of these he accepted 
as a duty, revealing on occasion his views on the contemporary world. In the 
year Hitler came to power, for example, he reflected for a Legacy Armistice Day 
meeting on the Versailles peace settlement, ‘in which lay the germ of future 
revenge’.29 An enterprising journalist would occasionally elicit a quotable 
comment as did a Courier-Mail reporter who caught him on a visit to Brisbane 
in August 1936 and asked for his thoughts on the possibility that the ‘Spanish 
revolution’ would turn into a wider conflict. ‘There is no chance of another 
big war developing,’ White said, ‘because the will of the people of France, and 
of England, is entirely opposed to war.’ Without endorsing either the Popular 
Front government or the ‘rebels’, he concluded enigmatically: ‘This revolution 
is most unfortunate, and it is to be hoped that other nations will be wise in their 
attitude towards it.’30
But the public stage, especially page 17 of a Brisbane newspaper, was not where 
White’s real influence was felt. The Northcote Children’s Emigration Trust, 
the Alfred Hospital, the Fourth Victoria Permanent Building Society, and the 
Melbourne Sunday Christian Observance Council all sought his counsel. He 
had sat on the board of the National Mutual Life Association since 1928 and 
became vice-chairman in 1935. When Sir John Latham stepped down as leader 
of the federal conservative parliamentary forces, White was one of a select 
group invited by Sir George Fairbairn to a farewell lunch.31 He was quietly 
consulted from time to time by successive Defence ministers. When the Council 
of Defence was reconstructed in 1935, Archdale Parkhill asked him to act in an 
advisory capacity in accordance with its new constitution; the invitation might 
have seemed more gracious had White not already learned from the press that 
his previous formal connection with the Council had ended.32 In March 1938 
we find him at the Melbourne Club, of which he had been president in 1934, 
in conversation with James Darling of Geelong Grammar School and Raymond 
27 The Argus, 24 June 1932; Morning Bulletin (Rockhampton), 15 July 1937; The West Australian, 26 Feb. 
1936.
28 The Argus, 30 Oct. 1930.
29 The Argus, 15 Nov. 1933.
30 Courier-Mail, 18 Aug. 1936.
31 White diary, 14 March 1934, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/14.
32 CPD, House of Representatives, 11 April 1935, p.1273.
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Priestley about possible candidates to succeed Priestley as Vice-Chancellor of 
Melbourne University.33 Seven months later, when the future of the Chief of 
the Air Staff, Richard Williams, was in the balance, Williams had suspicions of 
subterranean influence by ‘Chauvel, White and the G-G ― but I expect I am 
hardly likely to know’. What Williams did know was that the RAF’s Sir Edward 
Ellington, sent to report on the RAAF, had discussed with White the proposal 
that the Australian CAS should be posted to the UK on exchange with a senior 
British officer.34 The fact was that White, without really trying, was an eminence 
grise.
War clouds
As an anxious sense of impending war in Europe took hold of the Australian 
government in 1939, White was summoned once again to the Council of Defence 
in July. The increasingly influential Acting Chief of the General Staff, Ernest 
Squires, was pushing for national service and the raising of a force of 7500 
regulars. White it appears was not opposed to this, much to the disgust of his 
old comrade John Gellibrand. For Harry Gullett, like Gellibrand a champion of 
the Militia, the only remedy was prayer. To Gullett, the true nemesis was the 
British General: Squires, he told Gellibrand, was ‘entirely unscrupulous & a bad 
swine’, but he could have been stopped if it were not for the fact that ‘Chauvel, 
White & Street are nincompoops & Squires’ “Yes men”’. The truth was rather 
that the retired generals were yesterday’s men; and Geoff Street, now Defence 
Minister, actually saw merit in his principal advisor’s argument. Nevertheless, 
by early August the balance of opinion had swung again. Menzies announced 
that a permanent mobile force would not be created, and that the nation must 
make the voluntary system work, ‘training and equipping ordinary citizens to 
defend Australia’.35
As if to signify that, no matter what might issue from the deepening troubles 
in Europe, White’s military service had come to an end, he was placed on the 
retired list on 17 August 1939, with the honorary rank of Lieutenant General. 
Not long after war was declared he also stepped down as superintendent of 
the New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency, remaining as chairman of the 
company. As his friend Charles Bean later wrote, ‘he came as near to a retirement 
from public life as ever since 1914’.36 He would now spend less time in the 
33 Priestley diary, 7 March 1938, Ronald Ridley (ed.), The Diary of a Vice-Chancellor University of Melbourne 
1935–1938 Raymond Priestley, MUP, 2002, p.428.
34 GpCpt. F. H McNamara to AVM R. Williams, 7 Oct. 1938, Williams to McNamara, 26 Oct. 1938, copy, 
Williams MSS, RAAF Museum.
35 John and Elsie Gellibrand’s diaries, 8 July 1939; Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Aug. 1939 quoted in Sadler, 
The Paladin, p.247.
36 Bean, Two Men I Knew, p.201.
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city and more on the farm. The rhythm of his life had perceptibly changed. He 
was largely a spectator on great events. His wartime comrade, Major General 
(now UAP Senator) Charles Brand, had urged his appointment as Commander-
in-Chief to relieve the Military Board of its responsibilities for training and 
administration. The call had gone unheeded. At 63, as Brand admitted, White 
was a year over the regulation retirement age.37 On September 18, White 
recorded: ‘War news is most disturbing…Dick Casey rang me in the aftn ― but 
only to say that had I been in town he wanted to have a talk to me.’ Casey, once 
a junior officer on White’s staff in wartime France and as a part-time soldier in 
post-war Melbourne, had abiding admiration for White. Evidently he did not 
chase his old mentor.38
In retirement, and with no expectation of a recall to service, the marginalised 
general had been co-opted to the Australian Comforts Fund committee. Now a 
commentator rather than a participant, he responded to a request from the editor 
of Reveille to provide a short piece on the ascendant Tom Blamey. ‘A man of the 
world…a leader as well as a staff officer; he likes his fellow man and gets on with 
him…If called upon for war service, the 6th Division under Blamey’s command 
will render a good account of itself.’39 A fortnight later The Argus sought his 
opinion on what the as yet ‘unnamed war’ should be called. Humourists abroad 
had already dubbed it the ‘Confetti War’, because of the R.A.F. ‘pamphlet raids’ 
over Germany. The Americans were using the ‘scientific’ label ‘World War II’. 
Other titles were the ‘War for Decency’, the ‘War for World Freedom’, the ‘War 
for Liberty’, ‘The War of the Air’, ‘The Totalitarian War’, ‘The Machine War’, 
and ‘The War of Words’.
Since the last war was called the ‘Great War,’ that appellation is barred. 
‘The Greater War,’ military leaders say is too cumbersome for an age that 
demands snappy titles.
‘Hitler’s War’ is rejected as a possible title on the ground that nothing 
should be done to perpetuate the name of one who is a menace to 
civilisation.
White was cautious: ‘Names for wars just grow. Time must pass before we find a 
name for this one. It must be a name that is simple and with world-wide appeal.’
So distant was White from the levers of power that he was to learn from the 
newspapers on 29 November 1939 of the decision to send the AIF 6th Division 
overseas. Although he could not escape awareness of the long-running and 
37 The West Australian, 14 Sept. 1939.
38 White diary, 18 Sept. 1939, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/16. Casey would tell Sir Sydney Rowell in 1972 he 
had developed ‘almost a passion’ for White in the first war (NAA: M1129 WHITE/C B).
39 The Argus, 4 Oct. 1939; Reveille, 5 Oct. 1939, in Derham, The Silence Ruse, p. 264.
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unresolved debate about whether the Army should be configured to repel a 
Japanese invasion or mere ‘raids’, he would have been hard pressed to deny that 
Australian troops were needed to augment the British forces facing formidable 
German threats. As 1940 began, White’s regime of a morning ride in the city, 
office work, board meetings in Collins Street, lunch at the Melbourne Club 
(where he was a trustee and still kept a bedroom), seemed undisturbed.40 Early 
in January, with Australian troops now embarking for service abroad, the Chief 
of the General Staff sought to draw on his unique experience. ‘Brudenell White 
very kindly came in during the afternoon,’ Ernest Squires wrote, ‘to advise 
about the control of the A. I. F. when overseas ― most helpful, as one might 
expect.’41 On January 23 White dined at the club with Keith Murdoch, Squires 
and others to farewell Dick Casey, who was about to leave for Washington. On 
February 7 he and Ethel dined at Government House in honour of Lieutenant 
General Sir Thomas Blamey, designated since late September to command the 
6th Division 2nd AIF. Before Christmas the previous year Blamey had sent a 
car to bring him to his Headquarters for what turned out to be a ‘pleasant & 
useful conversation’.42 He had prepared a memorandum for Blamey which after 
further consultation with Squires, an intervention by Charles Bean, and final 
revision, was to be promulgated by the Army Minister Geoff Street as the AIF 
commander’s charter.
On February 13, White talked to Street after dinner and was ‘grieved to hear 
that Genl Squires is very very ill’. He called on the Squires family the next 
day. It was a week later that a letter from Blamey brought an idea to the Prime 
Minister that was to change the course of White’s life. Acknowledging that it 
was ‘right outside my line of suggestion’, Blamey wrote that if had the personal 
opportunity to ask the Prime Minister to consider it he would not hesitate to 
do so:
And that is, if you think it desirable for someone else to take up General 
Squires work, to give very earnest consideration to Lt.-Gen. Sir Cyril 
White. He is the only man in Australia who has handled war on a big 
scale. His military knowledge is wide, and his experience has been 
greatly deepened by the last few years in his business life. It would 
give a sense of satisfaction to the Army that no other appointment could 
give. Personally, on going away I would feel the utmost confidence in 
the support that I would receive, because I am quite certain that even 
if my views do not always co-incide with his, his would be entirely dis-
interested and in the best interests of the country.
40 Ronald McNicoll, Number 36 Collins Street: Melbourne Club 1838–1988, Allen & Unwin/Haynes in 
conjunction with the Melbourne Club, Sydney, 1988, p.180.
41 Squires diary, 10 Jan. 1940, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 3.
42 White diary, 13 Dec. 1939, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/16.
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Such a ringing endorsement from the chosen commander of Australian forces 
in the field could not be ignored. ‘I am grateful to you for your suggestion of 
Brudenell White,’ Menzies replied, ‘which I will follow up vigorously.’43 Menzies 
needed little encouragement to recruit the one general whom he believed 
had any brains.44 Army Minister Geoffrey Street sent the Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff, John Northcott, to sound White out. Northcott reported White’s 
misgivings: he had been out of the Army for the best part of two decades; 
he was not in robust health, and he had doubts about his own capacity. In 
the interim, Menzies had spoken on February 21 at a lunch of the Carry on 
Club in Melbourne, a meeting attended by White who earlier that day had a 
conversation with the Chief of the Air Staff Sir Charles Burnett.
A week passed. At the Melbourne Club on Wednesday night February 28, White 
dined with the financier W. S. Robinson to ‘meet Sir Charles Burnett’. As the 
head of the RAAF, Air Chief Marshal Burnett was now the government’s principal 
defence advisor. An ‘interesting evening’ became even more interesting: ‘P.M. 
approached me as to whether my services wd be available if required.’ Three 
days later the question was no longer hypothetical. Squires died on March 3. 
Consultation with the Army Minister was now imperative. They could meet 
discreetly at the Melbourne Club. ‘Discussed problem of CGS with him’ on 
Monday, March 4, and had a further talk after dinner. White attended the 
funeral of General Squires on the fifth. The next day there was another long talk 
with Street after dinner. By the seventh the press were beginning to speculate 
on White’s appointment as CGS. On Sunday, March 10 Geoff Street announced 
the appointment of the 63-year-old general ‘to act for a time’. It was reported 
the next morning that White had been given indefinite leave of absence from 
New Zealand Loan & Mercantile by his chairman in London; and the letters 
of congratulation began to arrive as he called at Victoria Barracks for a formal 
meeting with the Army Minister and the Military Board.45
Street was happy to report to the Prime Minister on March 11 that the ‘reaction 
to Sir Brudenell White’s appointment is very good’. Apart from Communist 
reminders that the ‘New Brass Hat has fingers in Capitalism’ being ‘one of the 
privileged members of the financial oligarchy’, there was little that anyone in 
the press could find to say against him.46 The Herald in Melbourne had raced to 
Beaufort that morning and obtained a statement:
43 Blamey to Menzies, 20 Feb. 1940, Menzies to Blamey, ‘Private and Unofficial’, copy, 22 Feb. 1940, Menzies 
MSS, NLA MS 4936/579/4.
44 Jon Chittleborough to CH, 24 March 2013, (email), reporting an interview with Menzies in 1975.
45 White diary, Feb.–March 1940, White MSS, NLA MS 5172/16; Sydney Morning Herald, 11 March 1940.
46 M. H. Ellis, ‘The Garden Path: The Story of the saturation of the Labour Movement by Communism’, The 
Land Newspaper, Sydney, 1949, p.390.
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…may I say that I much prefer being Cincinnatus at the plough, though 
I do appreciate the honour paid to me…I do want it to be fully realized, 
however, that I am not taking up any appointment for a fixed term but 
only to fill a gap. I do not want to act to the detriment of any permanent 
staff officer, and as soon as my services are unnecessary I want to return 
to the farm.47
The following day Menzies advised Street that the recommendation of the 
Military Board and the Army Minister that Honorary Lieutenant General White 
be promoted to full General was approved. He was to be restored to the Active 
List. The promotion was necessary ‘owing to the legal difficulties’ that might 
arise if he was not superior in rank to the commander in the field.48
Cincinnatus leaves his plough
That White took up the appointment as a matter of duty is plain from his 
testimony to those who knew him best. ‘The return to soldiering involved me in 
very mixed feelings. I had planned a much more peaceful autumn of my days,’ 
he told an old comrade.49 His attitude was summed up in a brief note to Chief 
Justice Sir John Latham who had written to congratulate him: ‘I could wish 
to have been spared the task ― & can only pray for the necessary strength & 
wisdom.’ It was symbolic of the deep tensions already placing strains on the 
relationship between Britain and Australia that this message was on notepaper 
headed ‘Imperial General Staff (Australian Section).’ He had in fact been 
gazetted as from March 18 not only Chief of the General Staff but also ‘First 
Military Member of the Military Board and Chief of the Australian Section of 
the Imperial General Staff’.50 As the Governor-General would write privately to 
the British Secretary of State for War: ‘while Squires was here one knew that he 
kept in close touch with the War Office as most of those holding important posts 
there were old colleagues and friends…and of course Brudenell White will not 
have quite the same contacts’.51
47 Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, answering Rome’s call in 458 BC, routed the besieging Aequians and 
returned to his farm after 15 days as ‘Dictator’.
48 Street to Menzies, 11 March 1940; Menzies to Street, 12 March 1940, copy, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 
4936/579/5.
49 Maj.-Gen. S. S. Butler to Editor, The Argus, 5 Sept. 1940.
50 J. F. Ramsbotham to R. G. Menzies, 16 Aug. 1940, NAA: A461, 700/1/391; White to Latham, 29 March 
1940, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/5424.
51 Gowrie to Lord Stanley, 18 March 1940, Gowrie MSS NLA MS2852/5/11.
9 . Call and recall: Brudenell White (II)
177
A general out of retirement, a photograph from the archives
(The Australian Women’s Weekly, 30 March 1940, from  Ethel White’s scrapbook, courtesy of Mark Derham)
It was true that there had been a generational change in Whitehall and the 
British high command. In Australia as well, as Menzies was advised by his 
friend Henry (‘Ferdie’) Wright, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Militia, ‘it will 
take him some time to work back a knowledge of personnel’.52 With the 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Northcott, at his side the 
new Australian Chief of the General Staff stepped smoothly into the routines 
established by his predecessor and ordained by the Army Minister and Prime 
Minister. Each week, the Chiefs of Staff submitted a progress report to the War 
Cabinet and spent an hour or two most Monday mornings briefing the Prime 
Minister. White would soon discover that the man who was closest to the Prime 
Minister on all military matters was the Secretary of the War Cabinet, Frederick 
Shedden. Defence planning and operations were on a vastly different scale from 
the Army-dominated world White had known intimately two decades earlier. 
Fred Shedden had designed much of the administrative machinery for war and 
sat at the centre of a network of handpicked subordinates. White had neither 
52 [F. H. Wright notes for Prime Minister], ‘Confidential: Proposed Divisional Command’, [March 1940], 
Wright MSS, NLA MS 8119, Series 5/8.
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the aptitude nor the appetite to engage in the kind of bureaucratic finessing 
and finagling at which Shedden excelled.53 However, a weekly meeting with 
Shedden would diminish opportunities and excuses for miscommunication.
In his own domain, White was vested with very considerable authority and he 
was prepared to use it. A significant early decision was to affirm his support 
for the promotion of Blamey to command the AIF. Another was to exercise a 
quiet veto over an AIF post for the unattached senior Major General Gordon 
Bennett whose outspoken criticism of the Military Board and the Staff Corps had 
ensured he had no friends at the top.54 At less exalted heights there was a queue 
of applicants and posts to be filled. Within a month or so of his appointment, 
White had been approached by Menzies’ friend Henry Wright asking that he 
be transferred from the Reserve to A. H. Q. ‘and attached for duty to the P.M.’:
The appointment would be in the nature of honorary Military Secretary 
carrying out the duties, say, of an A. D. C…Personally and confidentially, 
I know that the P.M. desires to use me in a very general manner, and my 
liaison duty with you, is not the major point in his mind.55
Wright’s attachment to the Prime Minister was not difficult to arrange, 
notwithstanding his role as honorary consul for the Netherlands in Victoria. He 
was a fellow club man, a Freemason, with a record of service at Gallipoli.
Nor was there any problem for White in securing the services as his own liaison 
officer of Lieutenant Colonel Frank Thornthwaite. This was a critically sensitive 
role, perfect for a friend who was related by marriage to the Minister for the 
Army, and was already at Victoria Barracks, recalled to service as a General Staff 
officer. Others with past connections also found billets. The trusted Herbert 
Downey, now a captain and soon to be a major, gave the required ‘voluntary 
undertaking to serve beyond the limits of the Commonwealth’ six weeks after 
White arrived at Victoria Barracks. Downey was assigned to staff duties before 
being sent to the Middle East and Greece where he died of wounds in April 
1941. Colonel Colin Simpson became chief signals officer when the 1st Australian 
Corps was formed in April 1940.
It did Jack Playfair’s prospects no detriment to have been one of the founders 
of the UAP and its state president (1932–39), as well as a member of the NSW 
53 A. T. Ross, Armed & Ready: The Industrial Development & Defence of Australia, 1900–1945, Turton & 
Armstrong, Wahroonga N.S.W. [1995?], Chapter 8.
54 Frank Legg, The Gordon Bennett Story, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1965, pp.160–1. ‘I was senior to 
Blamey, Laverack, Sturdee, and the rest when this war started and was penalized because I was foolish enough 
to draw attention to our unpreparedness, especially on the industrial side’ (Bennett to S. Ricketson, 11 Aug. 
1941, copy from Ricketson to F. H. Wright and Menzies, 23 Oct. 1941, Wright MSS, NLA MS 8119, Series 5/8).
55 F. H. Wright to White, 18 April 1940, copy, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/579/5. Wright would later state 
to Central Army Records that he had been a confidential liaison officer with every CGS from 8 Nov. 1939 to 15 
April 1947 (Wright MSS, NLA MS 8119 Series 8/5).
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Legislative Council. Wounded at Gallipoli, an artillery brigade major in France, 
and more recently an influential politician, he was just the man to command 
the 21st Field Brigade, Royal Australian Artillery (militia) and to be appointed 
artillery commander of the 2nd Division as a temporary colonel in August.56 
In May 1940 Bertie Lloyd, former deputy commander of the New Guard and 
since 1932 NSW state MP for Mosman, was appointed to the civilian post 
(unpaid) of Director-General of Army Recruiting. At the beginning of August, 
Lloyd became Deputy Adjutant General at Army Headquarters with the rank 
of brigadier (he was still an honorary brigadier general). Francis Derham was 
promoted temporary major general on 2 May 1940, and given command of the 
4th Division. Blair Wark, a prosperous quantity surveyor, re-enlisted in April 
and was soon promoted lieutenant colonel and given command of 1st Battalion, 
City of Sydney’s Own. White’s grazier neighbour at Buangor, Hec Bastin, who 
had resumed active service at the end of 1936 and was now commanding the 
4/19th Light Horse Regiment, was ‘taken on strength’ of the AIF and arrived 
in mid-July 1940 as lieutenant colonel commanding the 8th Division Cavalry 
Regiment.57
Among the others whose fortunes rose with White was Major Jack Scott, 
sometime chief of staff of the Old Guard and since 1935 a military counter-
intelligence officer working in collaboration with the NSW police. Through his 
uncle the late Sir Philip Street, previously Chief Justice of New South Wales, 
Scott was related to the Army Minister, Geoff Street. In the early 1930s he 
wrote articles in the Sydney Morning Herald that were supportive of Japanese 
expansionism and he was active in the Australia–Japan Society. In April 1939 he 
was appointed to head the NSW section of Military Police Intelligence. To this 
day, some of what he was assigned to do both in the peacetime militia and security 
service and on the wartime intelligence staff remains mysterious. In any event, 
an inveterate gambler and ladies’ man was fortunate to have friends in high 
places.58 He joined his former commanding officer, Colonel ‘Boz’ Combes, now 
Director of Military Operations and Intelligence in Melbourne, at the centre of 
action at Victoria Barracks. Len Roach, too, White’s principal conduit a decade 
ago to the League of National Security, found his career prospering. Joining 
the second AIF, promoted to temporary lieutenant colonel, Roach was given 
command successively of the 14th Battalion and from July 1940 the 2/21st.59 And 
56 G. P. Walsh, ‘Playfair, Thomas Alfred John (Jack) (1890–1966)’, Serle and Cunneen (eds), Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, vol. 11, pp.244–5.
57 R. Clark, ‘Lieutenant-Colonel Hector Ernest Bastin, M.C., M.I.D.’, Sabretache, vol. XVIII, No. 3, July 
1977, pp.182–3.
58 Ball and Horner, Breaking the Codes, p.17.
59 Roach and Scott are now best remembered for their roles as successive commanders of the ill-fated Gull 
Force (Joan Beaumont, Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity 1941–1945, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 
1988, pp.97–100 and passim; Courtney T. Harrison, Ambon Island of Mist: 2/21st Battalion AIF [Gull Force] 
Prisoners of War 1941–45, T. W. & C. T. Harrison, Geelong, 1988; Andrew Moore, ‘Scott, William John 
Rendell (1888–1956)’, Serle and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 11, pp.550–2). Drew 
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it did not escape notice that Combes had ‘surrounded himself by henchmen’ 
some of whom ‘openly or under cover, were at one time active members of the 
New Guard’.60
As CGS, White struggled to define his own role. None of the functions in which 
he had made his military reputation were his. Logistics and planning for battle 
were in other hands. The deployment of new divisions was an essentially political 
domain. It seemed sometimes as though he was rambling around the periphery 
of the defence establishment seeking meaningful work. Thus he was drawn into 
discussion with Essington Lewis and Sir John Latham to consider a proposal 
prepared by Latham to mobilise universities for the war effort.61 In May he sat 
down with Geoff Street to meet a delegation from the Returned Servicemen’s 
League to begin the process of setting up the RSL Volunteer Defence Corps. 
‘Happily,’ he had told, Sir Gilbert Dyett, ‘Australia is not threatened on land.’
In consequence, there is no need for an organized citizen force capable 
of expansion…There is no need therefore for national guards, legions, 
or such like organizations. But…even after such an explanation, 
the pent up feelings of the community will not be satisfied and this, 
perhaps, applies particularly to returned soldiers. If their desires are not 
harnessed, they may be given voice which would be embarrassing both 
to the Government and those charged with advising them.62
In this matter White knew of what he spoke. It was just 10 years since ex-
servicemen with pent up feelings in ‘national guards, legions, or such like 
organizations’ had looked to him for leadership in responding to the threat of 
communist subversion and civil disorder.
Irrespective of rank or status, the CGS could impress with a serene humanity. 
To some he seemed ‘cold though courteous…one who never under any 
circumstances unbends…often mistaken for an Englishman’. Others caught 
glimpses of a ‘modest, gentlemanly, and distinguished’ leader.63 Before the war, 
the young architect Balcombe Griffiths saw him regularly ‘on a “family friend” 
basis, perhaps a chat in Collins Street or at other meetings. He was always so 
Cottle, The Brisbane Line: A Reappraisal, Upfront, Leicestershire, 2002, contends that Scott might have been 
a Japanese spy and prospective collaborator. Others imply that his friendliness to Japan was a pose (Jacqui 
Murray, Watching the Sun Rise: Australian Reporting of Japan, 1931 to the Fall of Singapore, Lexington Books, 
Lanham MD, 2004, pp.109, 218).
60 Lt Col. J. Mawhood to Solicitor General (Sir G. Knowles), 18 Oct. 1941, NAA: A432, 15 55/4432, cited Ball 
and Horner, Breaking the Codes, pp.22–3.
61 ‘Universities and War Effort (University of Melbourne)’, 19 June 1940, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 
4936/579/26.
62 G. L. Kristianson, The Politics of Persuasion: The Pressure Group Activities of the Returned Servicemen’s 
League, ANU Press, Canberra, 1966, pp.73–4.
63 Australian Women’s Weekly, 23 March 1940; The Register (Adelaide), 12 Jul 1923.
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generous of time, and thought for a young chap 30 years his junior.’64 Frederick 
Howard, a much-travelled Melbourne Herald journalist serving as an AIF 
captain, ‘had one brief appearance in the presence of Sir Brudenell White at 
Victoria Barracks, and remember him as a twinkling-eyed quiet spoken man 
who showed more courtesy than the normal military brusqueness in addressing 
a low form of life’.65
The CGS and his liaison officer, Lt Col. Frank Thornthwaite, posed for Pix 
July 1940
(Cover photo, Pix, 17 Aug. 1940, courtesy Inez Thornthwaite) 
After a quarter of a century of dealing with the nation’s political leaders 
White was not afraid to give frank advice privately. Discussing senior Army 
appointments one day there was what Sir Robert Menzies recalled as a ‘spirited 
64 Balcombe Griffiths to CH, 8 May 1982.
65 F. J. Howard to CH, 25 May 1982.
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argument’, with one nominee being criticised as too young. After the meeting 
White walked back into the city from Victoria Barracks with Menzies who later 
paraphrased the general’s remarks:
You know, Prime Minister, compared to me you are a young man. And 
I want to say to you, never dispose of anybody, otherwise qualified, by 
the argument that he is too young. I was a very young man when the AIF 
was operating in France…very young indeed, and yet, I was made the 
Chief of Staff to the whole AIF. And there have been those sufficiently 
charitably minded to think that I didn’t do a bad job. Now the moral of 
this is that I couldn’t have succeeded unless I had qualifications of mind 
and imagination, and age had nothing to do with it. My advice to you 
is never reject the best qualified man because somebody thinks he is too 
young.
Confident as he was in giving advice to a Prime Minister nearly 20 years his 
junior, White had genuine misgivings about his own capacity to lead in a very 
different military environment from the one in which he had once flourished. 
There had been major changes in the nature of warfare, in weapons technology, 
and battlefield tactics. At the strategic level it was not long before his judgment 
was being called into question. Early in June he had told the War Cabinet 
that a German offensive could not occur without another six to nine months’ 
preparation. When the Germans crossed the Somme in force the next day his 
credibility understandably plunged. His assessment a short time later that Japan 
could ‘bring the Commonwealth to terms without the need for invasion’ if it 
had naval superiority was the kind of gloomy realism that some ministers found 
distinctly uncomfortable.
White was not alone in having to face challenging questions. Billy Hughes, 
no pessimist, was enjoying the licence to quiz the military chiefs. His direct 
question to Charles Burnett on June 5 about the adequacy of the Commonwealth’s 
air defences had the Air Marshal struggling for a form of words that would 
justify his barely reassuring conclusion that ‘a sufficient striking force would be 
available to make an aggressor think seriously before attacking…if we obtained 
the aircraft proposed we would be safe’. Burnett had hastened to add when 
he saw the draft War Cabinet minutes that he had meant in a safe position to 
implement Australia’s obligations under the training plan, ‘not “safe” from 
attack by a powerful enemy nation’. On hearing from the CGS that Australia’s 
strategy was based on Japan not entering the war, Billy Hughes confided to his 
neighbour at the Cabinet table: ‘Look at that man’s profile. Did you see it? He 
may have many things, but he has not got guts.’66
66 ‘Notes of Discussion in War Cabinet Room…’, 12 June 1940, secret, Menzies MSS NLA MS 4936/40/21; 
War Cabinet Minutes, 5, 18 June 1940, NAA: A2673, 218,253; Bean, Two Men I Knew, pp.24–5; Horner, High 
Command, p.36.
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Hughes was wrong. White did not lack courage. He had been appalled at the 
June 5 meeting, ‘much of it’, as he wrote in his diary that night, ‘a shocking 
waste of time’. But he was clearly struggling for understanding and inspiration 
about how to lift Australia out of its enfeebled vulnerability. He had been ill 
at ease at a high-level conclave on munitions and manpower questions in mid-
June. He seemed out of touch and bereft of new ideas. Some things, however, 
were obvious. His admission to the War Cabinet in June, under persistent 
questioning from Sir Keith Murdoch, that Australia could not rely on Britain 
and would last barely a month if invaded produced the blunt response from the 
new Director-General of Information that these were not predictions to be shared 
with the public. He was happy to accept Murdoch’s proposal that Charles Bean 
become the link between the Chiefs of Staff and the press ― what the Deputy 
Chief of the Air Staff would sceptically call ‘a rather nebulous commission…
to act as liaison, and philosopher and guide to editors’.67 Yet no matter how 
professionally war news was managed, there were more fundamental questions 
to be answered. As the months wore on White found himself wrestling as well 
with a range of unresolved conflicts over what was called for the War Cabinet 
‘the higher direction of the Army’. Should there be a Commander-in-Chief? 
Should there be one C-in-C for Home Defence and another for command and 
training of the Militia Forces? Should there be direct Militia representation 
on the Military Board or at Army Headquarters? At least he and Geoff Street 
were at one on these questions when they were raised for ‘discussion without 
agendum’ on July 11. But both could hardly have been happy with the Cabinet’s 
failure to reach a decision on any of them.
It was becoming obvious that White was finding the War Cabinet an uncongenial 
forum. A concerned Menzies had taken him aside on July 2: ‘PM dined with me 
and very tactfully criticised my methods at War Cabinet meetings ― insufficient 
strength!! This is a hard blow.’ The blow might have been harder if Menzies 
had added that some of the CGS’s views were bemusing ministers. He had first 
recommended sending troops to bolster the French when they were already on 
the point of capitulation. Then he ‘emphasised the desirability of the despatch 
of forces raised for service overseas’, not for strategic reasons but because the 
Australian ‘was a much more manageable soldier when separated from his family 
and political and other influences’.68
67 Murray, Watching the Sun Rise:, p.210; Day, The Politics of War, pp.58–9; Bean, Two Men I Knew, p.217; 
Bill Bostock to Norman Ellison, 16 Aug. 1940, Ellison MSS NLA MS 1882,2/22.
68 Record of Decisions of War Cabinet, 13 June 1940, Annex A, NAA: A2673, 247.
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The CGS with his mare ‘Jenny’, July 1940
(Courtesy of Mark Derham)
When Cabinet was called to meet in Canberra on Tuesday, 13 August 1940, 
White had to be there. He had thought of taking the deputy CGS with him 
but decided it was better that Northcott should stay at headquarters. In wet 
and windy Melbourne on Monday, he shuttled between Victoria Barracks 
and the Melbourne Club for lunch, returning late to the club to dine, sleep, 
and write a letter home.69 He had intended to travel overnight by train but 
he and his right-hand man Lieutenant Colonel Frank Thornthwaite had been 
delayed in conference. In characteristically unassuming manner ― though well 
69 Bean, Two Men I Knew, p.221; Derham, The Silence Ruse, p.269.
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aware that his wish would be close to a command ― the nation’s most senior 
soldier telephoned the man he knew disposed of places on the Air Minister’s 
transport aircraft. Jim Fairbairn’s assistant private secretary Murray Tyrrell, 
then 26-years-old and fourteen months in the position, remembered:
I had a call from Brudenell White, who said he had been summoned to 
Canberra to be there the following morning for a Cabinet meeting with 
Prime Minister Menzies. Could he have a seat in the aircraft? Well I’d 
filled the aircraft by then but in the circumstances I said ‘Of course you 
can sir. You can have my seat.’ So I gave him my seat and I arranged there 
and then…to travel to Canberra that same night by train.70
Prepared as he had learned to be for an uncertain number of days away from 
home, White carried with him in his suitcase a Travalarm clock that folded into 
a steel case, a fine set of hairbrushes, and a miniature bar of medals that he 
always kept at hand.71 As he stepped out of his staff car at Essendon, a greatcoat 
protected his spare frame from the searching wind. Perennially suffering from 
respiratory distress and digestive troubles, he was ‘thin as a wisp’ from months 
of stress and frugality ― having taken a large pay cut shortly before he became 
CGS, he had been saving money by going without lunch. With his uniform 
and insignia covered, his rank was concealed as he walked past onlookers to 
the waiting aircraft. His red-banded cap, of course, signified that he was a staff 
officer. To those who knew his face, the soft eyes, the noble Roman nose made 
even more prominent by a long-forgotten car accident, the neatly trimmed 
moustache and matching silver sideburns, the Chief of the General Staff was 
instantly recognisable.72
70 Sir M. Tyrrell, interview with Mel Pratt, 27 May 1974, NLA Oral TRC 121/54, p.6.
71 ‘Aeroplane Crash at Canberra on 13th August, 1940’, Commonwealth Police file P8903, NAA: A1378, ff. 
185-6,177.
72 Derham, The Silence Ruse, p.232. White had overturned his T Model Ford en route to Duntroon from Yass 
in Dec. 1913 (Rowell to Casey, 25 Oct. 1972, NAA: M1129 WHITE/C B).
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10. The Brigadier: Geoff Street
No one in Australian federal politics in 1940 was more deeply rooted in the land 
than the Army Minister, Geoffrey Austin Street. His great-grandfather John 
Street, of Birtley in Surrey, had emigrated in 1822, bringing with him merino 
sheep from Thomas Henty’s flock at West Tarring in Sussex. Taking up property 
at Woodlands, Bathurst, John Street corresponded with Henty over several years 
as he worked to improve the breed. A century later Major Geoff Street, back in 
Australia after five years at war, maintained his forebear’s pastoral tradition, 
breeding prize Polwarths at his own Victorian property ‘Eildon’ in Lismore.
Born in Sydney on 21 January 1894, Geoff Street was the second of four children 
of John William Street, a prosperous city solicitor, and Mary Veronica Austin, 
daughter of Henry Austin, chairman of directors of the Perpetual Trustee 
Company. Henry Austin’s brother, Alfred, had been appointed by Lord Salisbury 
in 1896 to succeed Lord Tennyson as Britain’s Poet Laureate ― a distinction 
of which the Australian family were unashamedly proud. They were happy 
too to acknowledge that John W. Street was for a decade in partnership with 
Australia’s own popular writer and poet A. B. ‘Banjo’ Patterson. Geoff had an 
older brother, John Austin, born in 1891 and a younger, Anthony Austin, four 
years his junior. A sister, Mary Veronica, was born in August 1902. John Street, 
probably assisted by his father’s business connections with shipping companies, 
went to sea at an early age, earned his master’s certificate, and joined P. & O. 
He served at sea throughout the 1914–18 war. After the war he joined BHP in 
Newcastle which had created its own small shipping fleet. With both John and 
Geoff in uniform, Anthony had enlisted at the age of 19 only to succumb to the 
influenza epidemic that swept England in the autumn of 1918.1
Like his father and cousins, Geoff Street attended Sydney Grammar School. He 
was captain of the cricket 1st XI and a prefect in 1912, also representing the 
school at rugby ‘football’, athletics, and swimming. Among his contemporaries 
were Len Robson, who was to become headmaster of Shore in 1922 after a 
‘good’ war and a Rhodes Scholarship; and Robert Rainy Harper, who would 
go on with him to university, interrupt his studies, and earn a DSO at Pozières. 
Street scraped through his senior examinations in December 1912 with a C in 
Ancient History, English, French, and Greek and a B in Latin.2 Enrolled in law 
at Sydney University, he was more likely to be found on a sports field than in a 
library. He played representative cricket and hockey and competed in athletics. 
1 Kenneth Whistler Street, Annals of the Street Family of Birtley, Fine Arts Press, Sydney, 1988 (1st ed. 1941), 
pp.126–9: Cameron Hazlehurst, ‘Street, Geoffrey Austin (1894–1940)’, Ritchie and Cunneen (eds), Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, vol. 12, pp.117–8.
2 The Sydneian, vol. CCXV, March 1913, p.5.
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His multiple office-holding in sporting clubs was an indicator of his priorities: 
the committee of the sports union and athletics club, treasurer of the hockey 
club, cricket 2nd XI selection committee. An undistinguished academic record 
did not reflect the exceptionally accurate memory, rapid grasp of detail, ability 
to marshal masses of facts, and fluency in French, admired by those who knew 
him well in later years. However, it was a fair return for the limited time he 
spent immersed in books. Compelled like all law students to take a Bachelor of 
Arts degree, he passed English I in December 1913, Geology, Latin and Greek I 
in March 1914. But when war was declared six months later he did not hesitate 
to abandon his studies.
Street was among a number of Sydney University law students who enlisted 
immediately in August 1914.3 His Sydney Grammar contemporary Wilfred 
Robert Dovey joined the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force to 
fight in New Guinea, sailing away a fortnight after war was declared. Street had 
joined the same force on August 5. But just before embarkation, the realisation 
came to him, prompted by his father, that the real war was going to be fought 
in Europe. The first New South Wales Infantry Brigade had been formed under 
Colonel Henry MacLaurin, a 36-year-old Sydney lawyer. Together with Major 
Charles Macnaghten, a city solicitor, MacLaurin had considerable influence 
over the selection of company and platoon officers. The first of the brigade’s four 
battalions was led by Colonel Leonard Dobbin, another Sydney solicitor. Legal 
connections and militia experience made law graduates, and even students, 
prime candidates for commissions. Thus, after four days as a private in the 
Australian Imperial Force, 20-year-old Geoffrey Street of ‘Enniskillin’, Ithaca 
Road, Elizabeth Bay, was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in Dobbin’s battalion and 
sailed with F Company from Sydney in the Afric on October 18.4 He had, if there 
was no mistake on the form, attested as a Roman Catholic.5
3 The absence of Street’s name from an official Honour Roll of law graduates and undergraduates who served 
overseas suggests that, as he had not actually begun his law studies, he was not technically a law student 
although he was always so described in the press during his lifetime (Vernon Treatt, ‘The Law School and 
the War’, Sir Thomas Bavin [ed.], The Jubilee Book of the Law School of the University of Sydney 1890–1940, 
Sydney, 1940, p.137).
4 The 1st Battalion’s story was chronicled in The History of the First Battalion, A.I.F., 1914–1919, 1st 
Battalion, A.I.F., History Committee, Sydney, 1931.
5 Street had filled in the attestation form himself; and was embarked as ‘RC’ (www.awm.gov.au/collection/
records/awm8/23/18/awm8-23-18-1- 4.pdf).
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Sydney Grammar School Prefects 1913
(The Sydneian, CCXV, March 1913, p.15, Courtesy of Sydney Grammar School)
Sydney Grammar School 1st XI 1913
(The Sydneian, CCXV, March 1913, p.14, courtesy of Sydney Grammar School)
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Arriving at Alexandria early in December, Street went with his men via Cairo 
to Mena for training. The 1st Battalion was reorganised on a four-company basis 
and he became platoon commander of D company. The battalion, part of the 
Middle East Expeditionary Force, embarked on the transport Minnewaska on 
April 5 en route for Gallipoli via Lemnos. Street would recount 25 years later 
his vivid recollection of the extraordinary gallantry of the young Royal Navy 
midshipmen who were in command of the boats from which they landed. He 
had gone ashore at Gallipoli with his company on the morning of April 25. 
‘These youngsters,’ he said, ‘showed an entire absence of fear.’6 Discarding their 
packs, Street and his men went up Russell’s Top to a hill named Baby 700. The 
Australians they found already on the hill at 11.00 a.m. were barely holding 
their own against encircling Turks. Street’s company charged the enemy, driving 
them back over the top of the hill. For days they held the position. Street was 
wounded in the head and, ‘slight’ as the wound was, he was evacuated to 
Alexandria. His cousin, Laurence Street, reported home that a Major Millard 
whom he had met in the trenches had seen Geoff in Alexandria ‘well and 
cheerful’.7 He was back leading his men a month later. Charles Bean records 
that the youthful lieutenant ― he had been promoted with effect from April 
26 ― took a party of eight men from Steele’s Post on June 4 to try to silence an 
enemy machine-gun position. Unexpectedly stumbling into Turkish troops in a 
supposedly unoccupied ‘sniper’s trench’ he had to turn back. His sergeant, the 
flamboyant scout Harry Freame, remained to hold off the enemy. The two men 
would become lifelong friends.8
Before long, Street had been made acting adjutant of the 1st Battalion, with 
which he was to spend a rest period on Lemnos in September and October. It 
was perhaps at this time that he committed to memory the regimental number 
of every man in the battalion, a feat reported in awe many years later by Smith’s 
Weekly.9 At the beginning of November he wrote to his mother that he had just 
heard that ‘all our letters have been sunk accidentally!’ But there were some 
good tidings:
I think I told you in my last letter that my appointment as adjutant had 
been confirmed in Divisional Orders and further news is that I am a 
Captain!
Unfortunately the present GOC Aust/Div has not the same power that 
General Bridges had so that one has to wait until the promotion is 
approved in Melbourne. Still I wear the three stars & draw Captain’s pay 
6 The Herald, [25] April 1940.
7 L. W. Street to Mrs P. W. Street, 16 May 1915, Sir David Gilbert Ferguson MSS, NSW State Library, ML 
MSS 2858.
8 Information from the Hon. Tony Street.
9 Smith’s Weekly, 30 July 1938.
10 . The Brigadier: Geoff Street
191
and have every privilege of the rank but although it is in Orders one 
has to wait till it is confirmed by letter. The only unfortunate, and really 
rather hard, part of it is that if one is wounded or goes sick then the rank 
lapses if it is not confirmed. So, as long as I am safe, I am a Captain. Nuff 
sed. I am sure you will be as pleased as I am and I will try hard to dodge 
shells & bullets.10
Successfully dodging enemy fire for the next month, Street was evacuated 
to Egypt with the 1st Battalion on December 20. After a brief spell at Tel-el-
Kebir and the Canal Zone, the battalion embarked for France where, after a few 
months, Captain Street resumed regimental duty. Within weeks he had been 
seconded to the 14th Infantry Brigade. During the Battle of Fromelles he was, 
as Staff Captain, in charge of the Brigade’s report centre. In February 1917 he 
was sent to Cambridge to No. 7 Staff Course. From late July 1917 to April 1918 
he was seconded by Major General Talbot Hobbs for duty as brigade major 
to Brigadier General H. E. ‘Pompey’ Elliot’s 15th Infantry Brigade. Gallant and 
willing as the young officer was, Elliott found him utterly unsuitable.
There is little doubt that the volatile Elliott, careless of appearances and 
unguarded in speech, resented having the charming and well-connected staff 
officer foisted upon him. Four years later, without naming him, Elliott was to 
describe Street as ‘a wealthy man, who was able to shout car trips for some of 
the senior officers in Paris…His thoughts were always with his best girl, and 
he could not sleep in anything rougher than silk pyjamas at ten guineas a suit.’ 
Frustrated by not being permitted to appoint his own man, a socially inferior 
but better qualified officer, Elliott acknowledged that Street was ‘a very decent 
boy’ and ‘a very lovable lad’. But the ‘social butterfly’ as he would later call 
him, just did not seem to measure up to the job:
I have to think of every mortal thing and suggest every single thing he 
does. In his spare time instead of…thinking of next day’s or next week’s 
work — unless he is actually doing a job of work I have set him — he 
goes playing bridge with the rest of my staff causing them to waste their 
time also…I cannot sack him and it is no use rowing with him all the 
time. He is only a boy after all, but I feel it very much.
By asking to be sacked himself, Elliott had in fact obtained from Brudenell 
White an agreement that Street could be transferred if it proved necessary. 
The unhappy arrangement lasted for nearly nine months. Street’s promotion 
as Major in the AIF and Honorary Major in the Australian Military Force came 
simultaneously at the beginning of October. It was April 1918, when the 15th 
10 G. A. Street to Mary Veronica Street, 19 Nov. 1915, Street MSS, courtesy the Hon. Tony Street.
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Brigade had just secured the village of Bouzencourt, north of Hamel, that his 
chief’s patience finally ran out. The denouement is best told in the words of 
Elliott’s biographer:
To enable the reserve battalion, the 57th, to be less exposed to enemy 
shellfire, Elliott decided to move it back across the Somme to more 
secure billets; he directed his brigade major to arrange it and to let all 
the battalions know. In an aberration, however, Street’s order to the 
other three front-line battalions was worded as if each of them was to 
withdraw across the Somme as well. Fortunately they queried it, and 
the error was corrected. Pompey was livid: ‘trying to retreat in broad 
daylight over narrow pontoon bridges almost in full view of the enemy’ 
would have produced ‘a tremendous disaster, if not a massacre of the 
Brigade’, as well as creating ‘a break in the line almost 3 miles long.’ 
Pompey felt that his longstanding misgivings about Street’s capacity had 
been vindicated. Hobbs agreed that, after a mistake of such magnitude, 
he would have to be replaced.11
Something definite in life
After more than three years of soldiering, and having just turned 24, Street 
was contemplating possible futures. He had fallen in love with Evora Frances 
‘Gyp’ Currie, daughter of Edwin Currie of ‘Gala’, Lismore, one of the Victorian 
properties in the extensive holdings accumulated by John Lang Currie.12 Evora 
Currie ― known always as Gyp because of her free spirited gypsy childhood 
― had arrived in England in 1916 with her friend Esther Fairbairn and Esther’s 
brother Jim (bound for the Royal Flying Corps). She had been working at the 
Australian headquarters in Horseferry Road, at railway station canteens and, 
from mid-1917, as a member of a Voluntary Aid Detachment. She stayed in a 
hotel with her mother, who had also come in the hope of seeing her son Clive 
when he was on leave from the Army in France.13 Among the thousands of men 
warmed by Gyp’s smile there were other serious suitors, none more so than 
Major Jack Scott, Geoff’s distant cousin, a Sydney insurance company manager 
in civil life. But it was Geoff, blue-eyed, tall, and trim, who won Gyp’s heart. 
Keen to marry ‘his best girl’ on his next leave in May 1918, he told his mother 
of the uncertainty he was facing:
11 Elliott’s comments on Street in letters to his wife are quoted in Ross McMullin, Pompey Elliott, Scribe, 
Melbourne, 2008 (1st ed. 2000), pp.335–6, 379, 544.
12 Alexander Henderson, Henderson’s Australian Families: A Genealogical and Biographical Record, vol. I, 
Melbourne, 1941 pp.171–4.
13 Tim Gillespie to CH, (email), 4 Feb. 2010. Australian women travelling to England to train as VADs are 
briefly noticed in Melanie Oppenheimer, ‘Gifts for France: Australian Red Cross Nurses in France, 1916–1919’, 
Journal of Australian Studies, vol.17. no.39, 1993, pp.66–7.
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I only wish I had something definite though in life. The authorities 
over here refuse point blank to tell me anything about the permanent 
Australian Forces though I believe something can be done in Australia. 
Dad once said that he thought he might be able to help & I wish he 
would try. I want to get on the A and I staff of the Australian Forces. 
It was very hard to write to Mr Currie for although as long as the war 
lasts I am alright as soon as it is over then I’m more or less stranded and 
without a job so to speak and no income at all. It is very hard isn’t it?14
By April 1918, with the Passchendaele offensive and the Messines sector 
behind him, Street returned to the 1st Battalion. He understood the reasons for 
his transfer but they were not something he would confide to his parents. For 
them the important news was the award of a Military Cross in the New Year’s 
Honours.15 ‘I am keeping very fit indeed,’ he would tell his mother, ‘and though 
a little “war worn” am still in love with soldiering and in fact find it hard to 
believe that there was a time that I did anything else’.16 In love with soldiering 
he may have been, but a different future beckoned. On June 29 in London, with 
his best friend Major Frank Thornthwaite at his side, he would marry Gyp 
Currie at St Columba’s Church of Scotland. The newly-wed couple had first met 
in 1912 when Gyp’s brother, Clive, was playing cricket for Melbourne Grammar 
against Street’s Sydney Grammar. The young ‘leg theory’ bowler, captain of the 
Sydney side, had left a vivid impression, taking 10 wickets in a match which 
Melbourne lost by an innings and 111 runs. His vivacious bride was herself a 
cricket devotee, her father having played for St Kilda and been president of the 
Victorian Country Cricket League. She was also a fine golfer, an accomplished 
horsewoman, and a remarkably good shot. Her sporting prowess mirrored 
that of her husband. Geoff Street himself, broad-shouldered, lean, arrestingly 
handsome in build and carriage, radiated energy and good humour.17 It was an 
ideal match.
Geoff Street would survive the war, wounded twice ― the second time in 
September 1918 ― but intact. After his marriage he had returned to France 
as OC of the 1st Battalion A Company in operations against the Hindenburg 
Outpost Line. In a brief biography published 44 years later, H. J. Manning 
summarised the ensuing months:
Rejoining the 1st Battalion at Pradelles, in Flanders, shortly after the 
1st Division’s sudden turnabout from Amiens to help meet the new 
14 Street to Mary Street, 27 Jan. 1918, Street MSS.
15 Brig.-Gen. C. J. Hobkirk’s recommendation spoke of his ‘excellent and capable work’ with the 14th 
Infantry Brigade in 1916–17: ‘The cheerful way in which he carried out his work was very helpful’ (NAA: 
B2455 Street Geoffrey Austin).
16 Street to Mary Street, 16 May 1918, Street MSS.
17 The Referee, 10 Nov. 1938; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 22 Nov. 1938.
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German threat, through Hazebrouck, to the Channel ports, Street was 
given command of ‘A’ Company. Four months later, after holding the line 
at Meteren and Strazeele, the 1st Division came south again to join the 
Australian Corps on the Somme to take part in the victorious offensive 
that began on 8th August. Street led his company in the fighting at 
Chuignolles on 23rd August, and also in the battalion’s last battle of the 
war at Hargicourt, on September 18th. Later that day he was wounded in 
the right wrist by a machine-gun bullet.18
He did not dwell on it in later years but Street had received a ‘mild’ gunshot 
wound that threatened to close his cricket career. The bullet passed through 
the middle of his right wrist. It put an immediate end to the fun he had been 
having with Captain Charles Kelleway, the Test all-rounder with whom he had 
been playing behind the lines on ‘matting’ wickets spread with hessian. Asked 
20 years later by the editor of Reveille to recall ‘the circumstances of both your 
woundings’ he replied laconically: ‘Just happened to be in the wrong place.’19
Friends and relatives also in the wrong place were less fortunate. Of the 1796 
Sydney Grammar men who would appear on the 1914–18 Honour Board in the 
‘Big School’, 313 did not return.20 Geoff’s cousin, Laurence Whistler Street, two 
years ahead of him at school, and associate to his father, Justice Philip Whistler 
Street, when he enlisted, had been posted to the 3rd Battalion. He was shot and 
died at Gallipoli on 19 May 1915. Frederick Muir, a fellow law student who had 
joined as a private, was evacuated from the Peninsula in late November 1915 
with wounds in the head and face; he died and was buried at sea three days 
later. At Pozières in July 1916, another cousin twice Geoff’s age, John Rendell 
Street, was severely wounded. Rather than be taken prisoner, the immobilised 
Street took his rifle and shot himself under the chin. It was months before his 
family confirmed their suspicions that the Red Cross report of a ‘fatal wound’ 
concealed the manner of his death.21 Humphrey Scott, yet another cousin, and a 
27-year-old Lieutenant Colonel when he died in October 1917, fell to a sniper’s 
bullet near Polygon Wood. There was nothing unusual about these losses. Many 
families could tell of similar suffering. But they signified that young Geoff Street 
had shared to the full the war experiences and grief of his generation.
18 Manning, ‘Air Disaster at Canberra’, Stand-To, Jan.–Feb. 1962, p.7; C. E. W. Bean, The Australian Imperial 
Force in France: During the Allied Offensive, 1918, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1942, pp.751–2.
19 Street to Mary Street, 21, 28 Sept 1918, Street MSS; Street to J. Black, 17 Dec. 1938, AWM: 43 A843.
20 Gordon Cooper (Sydney Grammar School Archivist) to CH, 12 Oct. 2011.
21 The context of Street’s service, 1914–16, is illuminated by Tony Cunneen in his unpublished papers 
at www.forbessociety.org.au/documents/law_war.pdf (downloaded 7 May 2009): ‘A Social History of the 
New South Wales Supreme Court Judges in the First World War’, and ‘Engaged to Act on Another Front: A 
Working Paper describing the actions of Members of the New South Wales Legal Profession on Gallipoli’, and 
‘The Law at War (1916): A Social History of the New South Wales Legal Profession in 1916’.
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In Victor Trumper’s image
(Courtesy of the Hon. Tony Street)
Street’s AIF appointment was terminated on 2 August 1919. He had spent four 
months after the end of the war on furlough (75 days’ sick leave) but attached 
to General Monash’s Demobilisation and Repatriation depot in Horseferry Road. 
Returning from Europe, he bought a portion of his father-in-law’s Western 
District estate and in January 1920 settled near Lismore at a property he called 
‘Eildon’. There he bred and successfully exhibited Polwarth sheep. But the 
life of a pastoralist was not enough to contain him. He was soon to be seen 
contributing to the work of local organisations such as the Lismore Agricultural 
and Pastoral Society and the Australian Sheep Breeders’ Association. And there 
was an undeniable sense that he ought to be playing a part on a bigger stage. 
Sport was, as it had always been, an outlet for his surplus energies. If he had 
any passion outside the Army, family, the land, and eventually politics, it was 
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cricket. He came late to golf, challenged by the fact that his wife and her brother 
played it so well. Eventually he got his handicap down to seven; but to those 
more adept he never really looked like a golfer.
Cricket was the sport Street loved. Gyp’s own interest ― she even took an 
umpire’s course ― made for a joyful bond with her husband.22 Unlike the portly 
Bob Menzies, whose appreciation of the game was from beyond the boundary, 
preferably in the Members’ Pavilion, Street was to play in the middle against 
some of the best. His wounded wrist had been substantially restored by massage 
and exercise. Though he could never bend it back as far as in his youth, he 
could still bowl the googlies that he had made his own. For six years he was in 
the Melbourne Cricket Club first XI playing on occasion under the great Test 
captain Warwick Armstrong. 
In the country he turned out whenever he could with other devotees like ‘Ford’ 
Guthrie and Henry Bolte in the Lismore and Western Plains teams. Friends and 
neighbours were also likely to be caught up in his military enthusiasms. On 
the Reserve of Officers from 1920, he joined the AMF 4th Light Horse Regiment 
in 1931. Late in 1932, as Guthrie remembered, ‘he persuaded me and others to 
join the 4th Light Horse, which he was commanding at the time before being 
promoted to Brigadier’ in the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.23
When still in his twenties, Major Street MC was drawn into public life, first as 
a member of the Hampden Shire Council on which he eventually served for 16 
years. Together with his friend Frank Thornthwaite he had rallied to the side 
of his old chief Pompey Elliott when special constables were being enlisted to 
patrol the streets during the Victorian police strike in 1923. Although he was 
close to Ned Herring and other militia leaders associated with the League of 
National Security, he seems to have held aloof from the secret army organisations 
of those years.24 He was, however, an early member of the Young Nationalist 
Organisation that was reviving conservative political morale and fortunes. In 
1929, assisted by Bob and Pattie Menzies, he had been campaign secretary 
for Chester Manifold in Manifold’s run for the Legislative Assembly seat of 
Hampden.25 A competent administrator, approachable, free from prejudice and 
snobbery, Street was president of the Hampden council in 1931–32. A reporter 
who first heard him in 1934 was immediately struck by the councillor’s ‘freely-
flowing and flawless English’. Wherever he was called upon, at civic receptions 
for visiting dignitaries, at council meetings, at smoke nights, Street spoke 
22 In a novel charity game in 1927, Gyp Street opened the batting for a ladies’ team, top scoring with 25 
before being bowled by her husband who went on to take 6 for 3 for the losing men’s team, who wore women’s 
clothes and batted wrong-handed (Camperdown Chronicle, 19 Feb. 1927).
23 The Hon. A. A. (Tony) Street, interview, 24 May 1983; Sir Rutherford Guthrie to CH, 15 June 1983.
24 Smith’s Weekly, 30 July 1938; Gavin Brown & Robert Haldane, Days of Violence: The 1923 police strike in 
Melbourne, p.211; Sayers, Ned Herring, pp.112–3.
25 J. Marjorie Butler, Talindert and the Chester Manifolds, privately printed, Mount Eliza, 1983, p.20.
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impromptu, easily, humorous, and polished.26 This was a man made for politics. 
In 1933 he was appointed a member of the Victorian Transport Regulation Board 
by his friend Bob Menzies. As Minister for Railways, Menzies acknowledged that 
Street was ‘largely responsible’ for the Board’s ‘masterly report’ into transport 
regulation. A year later, at the 1934 federal general election, Street took the seat 
of Corangamite for the United Australia Party. He had displayed reluctance and 
diffidence before agreeing to stand in the electorate held by the Country Party; 
but once elected he never looked back. Like Menzies, who moved from the state 
to the national political arena in the same year, he retained his seat at the next 
election.
There were threats before the 1937 election that the Corangamite electorate 
would be abolished. However, a boundary redistribution in the end favoured the 
sitting member. Sensitive to the concerns of his constituents, Street was diligent 
in attendance to his parliamentary duties, tireless in visiting local communities. 
He covered 60 000 miles in three years. He was quickly on record pressing for 
half-yearly telephone directories and more frequent mail deliveries and, with his 
neighbour Jim Fairbairn, for action on rural rehabilitation. He was heard too on 
matters of national as well as parochial importance. Taking a keen interest in the 
treatment of infantile paralysis victims, he was an advocate of support for the 
controversial Sister Elizabeth Kenny. From his earliest days in Parliament, he also 
put down his marker on defence matters. In a triple-barrelled question bristling 
with innuendo, he asked Archdale Parkhill in November 1934 whether the Minister 
for Defence dealt directly with members of the Military Board on matters affecting 
their departments: how many times since 1919 had the Council of Defence met and 
when was the last time; and how was the allocation of the defence vote amongst the 
various services determined? He returned to the subject six months later, expressing 
his incredulity that the Council of Defence, whose statutory powers were extensive, had 
not met since November 1929.27 An embarrassed minister announced the reconstruction 
of the Council a few days later.
In answer to what looked very much like an invited question, Street was told 
late in November 1935 by the Attorney-General Robert Menzies, representing 
the Minister for External Affairs, that the government was looking into ways 
in which the staff of the Department of External Affairs might be increased 
to ‘adequate proportions’.28 These and other queries and pinpricks showed 
the member for Corangamite to be an adroit parliamentary performer. He trod 
carefully around the trade diversion minefield, making plain in an unplanned 
intervention in praise of the hard-pressed Trade Negotiations Minister, Harry 
26 Terang Express, 16 Aug. 1940.
27 CPD, House of Representatives, 14 Nov. 1934, p.249; 9 April 1935, p.1088; Sydney Morning Herald, 2 
Sept. 1937.
28 Canberra Times, 21 Nov. 1935.
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Gullett, that he and other wool growers had loyally obeyed the request of the Prime 
Minister to refrain from taking part in the dispute. He was careful to distance 
himself from Labor’s schemes for banking reform and rural rehabilitation, but 
argued that defence should be above party politics. On set-piece occasions he 
was accomplished, authoritative, and courteous, seen to particular advantage 
for example in the 1936–37 Budget debate; then he advanced the case for a 
strong Air Force and an increase in the Army’s Permanent Forces to two cavalry 
regiments and a brigade of infantry. He would reiterate this theme the following 
year, urging the addition of a brigade of field artillery, and the expansion of the 
Royal Military College at Duntroon.29 Many observers were convinced that he 
would have made his way into the Cabinet after the 1937 election had the Prime 
Minister not been obliged to find places for representatives of the smaller states.
Into the inner circle
In July 1938 Lyons attempted to lighten the load of two of his most overburdened 
ministers, the Treasurer and the Defence Minister. J. N. Lawson was added to R. 
G. Casey’s Treasury team in the innovative capacity of Parliamentary Secretary. 
At Defence, whose role was growing rapidly as the government began to realise 
its unpreparedness in the face of the worsening European situation, H. V. 
Thorby, deputy leader of the Country Party, was increasingly weighed down 
with responsibility for all three services as well as Civil Aviation; but he was 
unwilling to delegate. More seriously, as General Squires told the New South 
Wales Governor, Lord Wakehurst, a few months later, Thorby ‘has no ideas 
on defence of much wider scope than the W.C.s he began life by building’.30 
Lyons, prompted by Fred Shedden, appointed Geoff Street to the same novel 
role as Jack Lawson. Neither man would be permitted to answer parliamentary 
questions. They were to be unpaid assistant ministers, a position unknown to 
the constitution.31 The case for creating a separate ministry of civil aviation, also 
a transport department, was strong.32 Soon to be embarking on an even larger 
role, ‘terrifying at first’, Street would tell Charles Hawker: ‘My one regret is 
Jim. I feel that he is being wasted and I don’t know why.’33
Jim Fairbairn’s turn was still to come. Meanwhile, pending a major reshuffle, 
which was widely believed to await the return of Sir Earle Page, Robert 
Menzies, and Tommy White from a mission to London, the promotion of Street 
29 CPD, House of Representatives, 30 Sept., 26 Nov. 1936, pp.708–11, 2438–9.
30 Wakehurst diary, 17 Nov. 1938, in Lord Wakehurst, ts memoirs, n.d. (ca 1966–71), John de Vere Wakehurst 
Papers, NSW State Library ML MSS 1788 Add-on 1043.
31 Crisp, Australian National Government, pp.383–6.
32 David Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the making of Australian defence policy, Allen 
& Unwin, Sydney, 2000, pp.61–5; Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, 15 July 1938.
33 Street to Hawker, n.d., Hawker MSS, NLA MS 4848/2/4.
10 . The Brigadier: Geoff Street
199
brought into the government someone whom the Sydney Morning Herald called 
‘a discerning advocate of the strengthening of the national defence’. His support 
for a small, well-trained, permanent Army was well known. His military 
background and current post as colonel commanding the 3rd Cavalry Brigade 
would give credibility to his views. Privately he had made clear his support for 
the idea of appointing a commander-in-chief, and it was not long before Tom 
Blamey was being sounded out.34
In late October and early November, following the Munich crisis, Street was 
on the periphery as a divided Cabinet debated and rejected the introduction 
of universal training, announcing instead that the Militia would be increased 
to 70 000 men, ‘if possible’ by voluntary enlistment. A well-publicised threat 
of resignation by Menzies came to nothing. He had support in Cabinet from 
Casey and Tommy White and probably two others.35 From outside, the Young 
Nationalist Organisation president, Ned Herring, was pressing the Prime 
Minister for a separate Army minister and the appointment of a commander-
in-chief as well as ‘universal physical and military training for home defence’.36 
But it was not enough. The principal stumbling block was Lyons, who was 
pledged not to introduce ‘conscription’. Lieutenant General Ernest Squires, 
the distinguished British officer recently installed as ‘Inspector-General’ of the 
Australian Army, was a close observer of the political aftermath:
A secret session this morning [7 November 1938] with Shedden, the 
Chiefs of Staff, & Munitions people, to consider possible re-organization 
of the Defence Dept — what the upshot will be, we don’t yet know — 
but we fear that a new & forceful Defence Minister will probably not be 
the P. M.’s solution of the difficulty.
The next day brought a surprise:
Street has been made Minister for Defence — with Civil Aviation 
removed — & Thorby Minister for Works & Civil Aviation: a sheer piece 
of face-saving as far as Thorby is concerned, & Street’s appointment has 
largely been stultified by his non-inclusion in the newly-invented ‘Inner 
Cabinet’ — a monstrous business, on the strength of which Tommy 
White has resigned the Ministry of Customs.
The ‘monstrous business’ of an ‘inner Cabinet’ did not in fact materialise, 
although Street’s name was hastily added to the senior Cabinet group. His 
appointment was widely commended, even by those like Sir Harry Gullett 
34 Gavin Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job: Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Savige as a Military 
Commander, Oxford UP, Melbourne, 2006, pp.31–2.
35 The Sun, 31 Oct. 1938.
36 ‘Young Nationalist Conference — Correspondence — PM & Minister’, Shedden MSS, NAA: A5954, 895/5.
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who thought Tommy White had been badly treated. As Gullett put it in a 
character sketch of Street for Sir Keith Murdoch’s Herald on November 8: ‘He 
has advanced himself neither by intrigue nor by making himself a conspicuous 
nuisance to the administration of the day. His speeches have been relatively 
few and have been marked by earnestness rather than by any dramatic quality.’ 
Wishing the new minister well, Gullett warned that with responsibility for all 
three of the fighting services he faced ‘a task of a heartbreaking and almost 
impossible kind’.37
A popular appointment: advanced neither by intrigue nor by making 
himself a conspicuous nuisance
(Courtesy of the Hon. Tony Street)
37 Squires diary, 7, 8, 11 Nov. 1938, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 1; Wakehurst diary, 17 Nov. 
1938, in Lord Wakehurst, ts memoirs [ca 1966–71], John de Vere Wakehurst Papers, NSW State Library ML 
MSS 1788 Add-on 1043. Noting Street’s lack of ministerial experience and alleged lack of ‘standing’, Eric 
Andrews says that Street’s appointment, like that of Thorby, rather than Menzies or Casey, ‘reveals Lyons’s 
pre-occupation with internal politics and an amazing failure to realise the overriding importance of the 
Defence portfolio at the time’ (The Department of Defence: The Australian Centenary History of Defence, vol. 5, 
Oxford UP, 2001, pp.88–9, 106). Andrews appears to have followed Paul Hasluck’s condescending assessment 
of Street’s ‘enthusiasm and a knowledge of soldiering…together with the frank and agreeable manners of an 
honest and manly character’ (The Government and the People 1939–1941, p.107).
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General Squires already knew the heartbreak. But he quickly found himself 
cheered by the new minister. Whereas under Thorby, he told Lord Wakehurst, 
there had been ‘a lack of thinking things out and too many piece-meal 
announcements…made without consulting the soldiers’, Squires had hopes 
that ‘things will be better co-ordinated under Street who has commanded a 
militia brigade and knows what’s what’. ‘I have great hopes that, under him, 
we shall really be able to get a move on ― &, I gather, he’s prepared to go large 
in putting the A. M. F. on a proper footing.’ Street did indeed ‘go large’ and, 
after ‘a tremendous battle’ in Cabinet, got his defence program through with 
only a very small cut.38 Eight days after his appointment, Street brought to 
Cabinet proposals for an expanded defence program. Increased funding, from 
₤43 million to ₤62.5 million, was announced in December. In the week before 
Street’s promotion Lyons had stated the government’s intention to order 50 of 
the Lockheed company’s new Hudson bombers. This was a precaution in case 
an order for British Beaufort torpedo bombers ― which a misleadingly-advised 
Cabinet was in effect foisting on an unwilling Air Board ― failed to materialise. 
The British had initially urged the Australian government to set up its own 
manufacturing plant to build Beauforts; they finally decided to allow Australian 
production only of components. Anxious to protect the Commonwealth Aircraft 
Corporation (CAC), but under pressure from the British, Geoff Street took an 
implausible compromise proposal to Cabinet: the CAC should produce as the 
power plant for the Hudsons the unproven British Taurus engines as well as 
the Pratt and Whitney Twin Wasps for which the CAC was already tooling up. 
This was the beginning rather than the end of a process of indecision and policy 
reversal that would beset the Beaufort project for the next two years.39
Barely a month after he came into office Street moved to remedy what he saw as 
one of the defects of peacetime military organisation ― the lack of opportunity for 
Citizen Force officers to gain the experience of staff duties that would be expected 
of future senior commanders. He approved the creation of over a dozen staff 
appointments for Militia officers. But, while he could ensure the existence of posts 
for the Militia, what he could not do was quell the rampant jealousies between 
permanent and citizen officers, Staff Corps and Militia. Many regular Army officers 
who had endured long hours and low pay through the 1930s were not pleased to 
see changes benefiting what they considered to be an already favoured Militia. For 
Staff Corps officers who had felt excluded from operational commands this was in 
fact a backward step. The rifts were too deep, affecting too many individuals with 
accumulated resentments and suspicions of unfair treatment.40
38 Squires diary, 3 Dec. 1938, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 1.
39 Peter Ewer, Wounded Eagle: The bombing of Darwin and Australia’s air defence scandal, New Holland 
Publishing, Sydney, 2009, pp.122–58; Hill, Wirraway to Hornet, pp.45–6.
40 Claude Neumann, ‘Australia’s Citizen Soldiers, 1919–1939: A Study of Organization, Command, 
Recruiting, Training and Equipment’, MA thesis, University of New South Wales at Duntroon, 1978, pp.111ff; 
Peter J. Dean, ‘“The Making of a General: Lost Years, Forgotten Battles,” Lieutenant General Frank Berryman 
1894–1941’, PhD thesis, University of NSW, 2007, pp.171–3.
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The Defence Council poses, 25 January 1939. From left: Sir Ragnar Colvin, 
(1st member Naval Board), F. G. Shedden (Secretary of Defence Dept.), 
Brig. Street (Minister of Defence), J. A. Lyons (Prime Minister), S. M. Bruce, 
R. G. Casey (Federal Treasurer), Lt. Gen. Squires (Insp. Gen. of Australian 
Military Services); standing from left: Maj. Gen. Lavarack (Chief of General 
Staff), Air Vice Marshal Williams (Chief of Air Staff), Sir Harry Chauvel, A. 
E. Leighton, N. K. S. Brodribb (Controller of Munitions Supply), Sir Thomas 
Blamey (Director of Recruiting) and Sir Brudenell White
(Argus Newspaper Collection of Photographs, State Library of Victoria)
On 30 January 1939, refreshed from a game of cricket in which he took four 
for 56 for the Melbourne Cricket Club against a Southern Peninsula XI, Street 
sat down with the Chiefs of the Naval Staff, the Air Staff, and the Army’s 
General Staff, and the Chairman of the Principal Supply Officers’ Committee 
(also representing the Controller General of Munitions Supply), to discuss ‘The 
International Situation, Emergency Measures’. The Chiefs had been presented 
with information that the British had decided to ‘accelerate as far as possible 
the preparation with every defensive and counter-offensive measure’. Now 
Street made it clear to them that he required an urgent review of the state of 
preparedness, recommendations for immediate action, and steps that should be 
taken before the issue of the warning telegram if the situation continued to 
deteriorate. There was no room for complacency; and if anyone was tempted to 
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advance claims at the expense of the other Services they were forestalled by the 
instruction of Street’s departmental secretary, Fred Shedden, to exchange their 
statements and confer on the ‘joint Service relation of measures’.41
It was not long before Street was relying heavily on advice from General Squires. 
When Cabinet met in Hobart early in February 1939 the Inspector-General was 
asked to telephone and comment on what he called a ‘fantastic’ decision that 
no-one presenting to a recruiting centre was to be turned away whether they 
were needed or not. The requested comments were not complimentary. The 
British Inspector-General was not afraid to turn away willing volunteers. He was 
equally ready to dispense with redundant senior officers. The Defence Minister 
secured the Prime Minister’s support to act on a ‘most secret’ report from Squires 
urging a ‘drastic purge of senior S[taff]. C[orps]. officers.’ An unfortunate 12 
were eventually told they were to be removed in August, only to be reprieved 
a week after war broke out, and then in some cases advised shortly afterwards 
that it had only been a stay of execution after all. Squires’ more far-reaching 
recommendations on Army re-organisation, including creation of a permanent 
mobile force were for the most part adopted in mid-March. However, it was not 
until the eve of war that Cabinet approved proposals for the extended training 
of about 15 000 Militia and improved training for the Militia as a whole.42
Brought more closely into the orbit of the senior members of the party, Street 
found himself attracted to the coming men rather than the older figures whose 
great days belonged to a cobwebbed past. Menzies and Casey were of his own 
generation. And it was a severe blow when Menzies chose to resign in March 
1939, leaving Casey behind to bear the responsibility for the government’s 
abandonment of much of the scheme of national insurance to which they had 
both been strongly committed. At the Melbourne Club on Thursday night, 
March 16, two days after Menzies had left Canberra, Street sat down to write a 
letter that looked beyond the present severance:
Dear Bob
This is just a note to say how sorry I am about the position that has 
arisen.
I have been afraid for some time that it might arise but have always 
hoped against hope.
41 Minute by Secretary Department of Defence, approved by Minister, 31 Jan. 1939, ‘Emergency January–
February 1939. Emergency Measures & Plans’, NAA: A1196, 35/501/68.
42 Squires diary, 7, 13, 17 Feb., 16–17 March, 12, 17 Aug., 11, 28 Sept. 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 
184 folder 2.
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You will forgive me if I say that I believe that the country cannot spare 
one who has such gifts. You have a very clear thinking mind, you have 
exceptional gifts of expression, logic and concentration on essentials. 
These are too rare to be missed.
May I just say that during my short association with you I have learnt a 
lot from you; I had hoped to learn more.
…all I can say is that I hope that events will soon make it possible for 
Australia to have the enormous benefits of your gifts.
Yours
Geoff
The sudden death of Joe Lyons barely a month later was the tragic event 
that enabled Menzies to return to power, before he had time to launch the 
‘constructive and objective’ criticism of the government that he promised 
Street in his reply.43 Though not without misgivings, Street would have shared 
the opinion of the Governor-General that Menzies was ‘brilliantly clever, full 
of energy and will, I think, make a far better head of a government than a 
subordinate’.44 With Menzies at the head of the party and the government, and 
the Country Party refusing to join a Menzies Cabinet, Street found himself one of 
the inner circle. His popularity in the country ― enhanced by his twice having 
refused to accept an increase in his parliamentary salary ― was now matched 
by his position in the government. He was ranked fourth in the ministry behind 
only Billy Hughes and Dick Casey, neither of whom Menzies could afford to 
slight. It had been an exceptionally rapid rise.
Advanced in status, Street did not wait long before requesting the Chiefs of 
Staff to review defence policy. He now also had the opportunity to arrange the 
succession to Major General Lavarack as Chief of the General Staff. One of the 
moody Lavarack’s last significant moves was to endorse a proposal from the 
Military Board that Australia initiate preparations for defensive use of mustard 
gas ‘as spray or bombs’. This ‘Most Secret’ minute was not approved by Street 
until Lavarack had departed and his successor had been in place for over a 
month.45 In spite of fears that the appointment might turn out to be illegal, 
Lieutenant General Squires was gazetted as acting CGS on May 18.46 Almost his 
43 Street to Menzies, 16 March 1939; Menzies to Street, 18 March 1939, copy, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/579/6.
44 Lord Gowrie to Walter Hore-Ruthven, 22 May 1939, copy, Gowrie MSS, NLA MS 2852/5/10.
45 Secretary, Military Board to Secretary, Department of Defence, 5 April 1939, initialled by Lavarack, 4 
April 1939 and Street, 25 June 1939, NAA: A816, 9/301/89. The proposal did not gather momentum until the 
war was well advanced.
46 For the conflicting advice on the legality of Squires’ appointment as Inspector-General of the Army, and 
by implication his subsequent appointment as CGS, see Ronald J. Austin, ‘The appointment of Lieutenant-
General Squires: the role of Major General Sir Carl Jess in the conflict between the military board and the 
government’, Sabretache (1 March 2003).
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first major task was writing a paper for the minister on ‘the undesirability of 
introducing universal training at this time, when we have got an amply large 
enough, & very promising Militia (now over 75 000) & when we want to put every 
penny we can get into arms & equipment’.47 The government’s war preparations 
advanced with the creation of a national register of manpower accompanied 
without enthusiasm by a census of wealth, the latter ― a concession negotiated 
by Street ― appeasing Labor critics of a census of males that could facilitate 
industrial conscription.
In a brief interruption to the demands of office, the Streets and their friends 
had a reminder of the success of a partnership that had lasted more than two 
decades. On 29 June 1939, Geoff and Gyp celebrated their twenty-first wedding 
anniversary at a dinner at Menzies Hotel. The years had treated them well. They 
had been blessed with a son and a daughter. Gyp cut a striking figure, always 
elegant and vital in any company. Some observers thought Geoff had aged 
since he joined the Cabinet. But he was not merely the fittest minister, he had 
also gained a reputation as the best-dressed one. Bob Menzies was overheard 
remarking: ‘By heaven, Geoff, you make me look more like a gentleman’s 
gentleman every day.’ True, his principal sartorial rival Dick Casey was deemed 
the most handsome. But Geoff’s deeply furrowed forehead and cheeks were, as 
the Daily Telegraph had described this ‘typical Digger’, the frequently observed 
‘characteristic of the Australian who has worked hard and long under hot suns 
on the land’.48
The Minister’s new British friend, Ernest Squires, noted that the anniversary 
guests were ‘mostly Western District’.49 Among them was the man who had stood 
with Street at the altar 21 years before. Lieutenant Colonel Frank Thornthwaite, 
Street’s best man in 1918, was to report to Squires’ staff just two days later. 
Thornthwaite would have enjoyed the story of how the Defence Minister had 
just faced down a deputation in Newcastle representing 500 businessmen, bank 
employees and ‘men from the industries’ who were demanding the creation of a 
kilted regiment. Official policy was that there should be one Highland regiment 
in each capital city. ‘It is not considered desirable to encourage different types 
of national units, when after all this is Australia.’50
At a Defence Council meeting on 6 July 1939 the CGS recorded:
Backed by the ‘co-opted’ Generals, Street & I managed…to scotch a  
fantastic scheme of Gullett’s; & we’ve got permission to work out a new 
programme for raising 2½ quotas of the Permanent Force (about 3600 
47 Squires diary, 28 May 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 2.
48 Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 22 Nov. 1938; Courier-Mail, 22 Feb. 1940; The Argus, 2 Dec. 1939.
49 Squires diary, 29 June 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 2.
50 Unidentified press cutting, [June/July 1939], Street MSS.
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men) as quickly as possible, & as cheaply as possible. There seems to 
be no chance of our getting any substantial increase in the total money 
allotted to us…51
The news became increasingly gloomy from Squires’ point of view:
A rather depressing talk with Street, about the chances of getting 
the revised Permanent force scheme through the Cabinet: what with 
uncertainty about this, the delays in introducing the Supplementary 
List & the ‘Command’ organization, the failure to do anything about new 
conditions of service for the Staff Corps. & to spend any more money in 
essential munitions — in spite of the Chiefs of Staff review — I don’t 
know whether I’m really justified in staying on here.
So dispirited was Street’s chief advisor with the government’s procrastination 
and misleading public statements about the progress of the defence program 
that he was ‘left with the unpleasant feeling of betraying the Army’s confidence, 
& letting them down’.52 As for Street himself, he was rapidly coming to the same 
conclusion. After a ‘heart to heart talk’ on the afternoon of July 28 Squires 
recorded:
The Cabinet are, we believe, going to take a number of Defence questions 
next week — many of them very important — & we’re both feeling very 
anxious, & wondering whether we’d be justified in staying on in our 
jobs if the Cabinet were to turn down the things which we consider to 
be necessary. He’s going to have a very difficult time, I’m afraid.53
Street’s anxieties suggest either that he was not enjoying the full support of 
the Prime Minister or that Menzies himself was not strong enough to compel 
acquiescence in his Defence Minister’s plans. Whatever Menzies’ true position, 
the worst fears of Street and Squires were realised. The Permanent Force scheme 
approved by the Lyons Cabinet was now turned down. Street had summoned 
the CGS urgently to Canberra on Tuesday afternoon, August 1: ‘I knew it must 
be an S. O. S., so didn’t feel optimistic.’ Luckily for Squires it was the one night 
of the week when there was a quick train connection from Albury, enabling him 
to arrive two hours before he was due to appear before the Cabinet at 11.00 a.m.
Cross-examined with ‘surprisingly unintelligent questions’, Squires realised 
that the real reason the scheme was rejected was financial. There was some 
consolation in that ministers had been logical enough to decide to rely on 
training the Militia to a higher standard. And, after a talk with Menzies, 
the Prime Minister agreed to hold meetings of the Defence Council monthly. 
51 Squires diary, 6 July 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 2.
52 Squires diary, 24 July 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 2.
53 Squires diary, 28 July 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 2.
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However, it was not until the eve of war that Cabinet approved proposals for the 
extended training of about 15 000 Militia and improved training for the Militia 
as a whole. What they were not prepared to do as late as August 30, when the 
Prime Minister ‘harangued’ all the Service Boards together, was spend any more 
money than had already been allotted.54
Defence Councillors: Street, Menzies, and Casey
(Argus Newspaper Collection of Photographs, State Library of Victoria, H99. 201/20589)
War Minister
On Friday, 1 September 1939, Councillor Street was making one of his now 
rare appearances at a Hampden shire council meeting. Called from a committee 
room late in the afternoon he bounded down two flights of stairs, ran to his 
car, and sped to Melbourne. It was the last time he was to be seen at a council 
meeting.55 The next day a Federal Executive Council meeting, with the Governor 
of Victoria, Sir Winston Dugan, acting for the Governor-General, concluded that 
it was time to ‘proclaim the existence of danger of war’. The proclamation was 
signed by the Minister for Defence ‘G. A. Street’. In the terms of the Defence 
Act, ministers had in effect declared that they were now in ‘a time of war’. 
When ministers emerged from a long Cabinet meeting on Sunday, September 
3, alerted to the British government’s intention to set Germany a deadline 
for assurances that it would withdraw its forces from Poland, it was Street as 
Minister for Defence who communicated a simple message: the fighting services 
were ready; the public were calm.56 Later that night the Director of Military 
54 Squires diary, 1, 2, 3, 23, 30 Aug. 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 2.
55 The Lismore Advertiser, 21 Aug. 1940.
56 Canberra Times, 4 Sept. 1939, p.2.
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Intelligence, Colonel ‘Boz’ Combes, arrived outside the minister’s office where 
Street’s assistant private secretary, Garry Armstrong, was awaiting news from 
London of the declaration of war:
‘Can I see the minister?’ I opened the door and hesitated there, and 
Combes said to him, ‘well it’s on sir.’ With twinkling eyes the minister 
jumped up and said ‘Oh grand Boz. Have you got the signal from the 
War Office?’ ‘No sir,’ he said ‘I heard it on 3DB.’57
Meanwhile, in Treasury Place the group called to constitute the Federal Executive 
Council had heard the announcement from the BBC. With war declared, the 
Prime Minister’s ‘melancholy duty’ to inform the nation performed, Menzies 
suggested that there should be a toast to peace. Neither glasses nor anything 
to drink could be found at the Commonwealth offices, so the Prime Minister’s 
assistant private secretary, was dispatched to Jim Fairbairn’s nearby flat at 
Alcaston House on the corner of Spring Street and Collins Street. Within half 
an hour the assembled ministers, Sir Winston Dugan acting for the Governor-
General, and several private secretaries, had toasted peace. The Army Minister, 
at his desk in Victoria Barracks, was already prosecuting the war.58 At 10.25 
p.m. the Defence Department Secretary Fred Shedden sent a copy of the ‘War’ 
telegram received from the Dominions Office to the Secretary of the Military 
Board. Stamped ‘Most Immediate’, it was initialled by the Acting Chief of the 
General Staff 10 minutes later. In his excitement Shedden had signed and dated 
the covering minute ‘3/9/38’. It could not have been more immediate.59
The first few weeks of war brought rapid changes of organisation. As Defence 
Minister, Street brought to Cabinet a paper prepared by Fred Shedden on 
‘Machinery for Higher Direction of War’.60 As a member of the resulting War 
Cabinet, Street was an inevitable leading participant in conclaves with the Service 
chiefs and the Prime Minister. There was much hesitation and uncertainty 
about the way in which a manifestly ill-equipped and under-resourced Army, 
desperately short of trained officers, could best be put on a war footing. On 
September 15 Menzies announced a scheme for raising an expeditionary force 
of 20 000 and the call up of the Militia in two groups for a month’s continuous 
training.61 Three days later, after two hours with Squires who went with him 
57 Garry Armstrong, taped reminiscences, Nov.–Dec. 1982; Gavin Long, To Benghazi, Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra, 1961 (1st ed. 1952), pp.33–4.
58 Sir Cecil Looker, interview with Alan Hodgart, 1975, (NLA Oral TRC 370; nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn87421). 
Realising it was a historic moment, Looker souvenired one of the glasses.
59 ‘Record of Government decisions just prior to and after the outbreak of War 3rd September 1939’, AWM: 
54 243/6/153.
60 G. A. Street, ‘Machinery for Higher Direction of War’, Most Secret, 28 Aug. 1939, and Cabinet decision, 
26 Sept. 1939, NAA: A2671,12/1939.
61 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, vol. I, Oxford UP, South 
Melbourne, 2001, pp.107–22.
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to a conference with the Prime Minister, Shedden, and the other two Service 
chiefs, Street kept Squires back for a further talk with Menzies. Street intimated 
to the CGS that the government wanted him to stay on in Australia rather than 
return to Britain.
The next day in Canberra Street publicly explained the plans for the Militia and 
the proposed ‘Special force’. It was a good speech, Squires noted, ‘but that hasn’t 
& probably won’t silence the storm of abuse in certain papers, nor their fantastic 
suggestions, made quite regardless of facts’.62 The storm of abuse went to the 
fundamental policy of the maintenance of two armies. It was hoped that half of 
the volunteer army would be former militiamen, another quarter would have 
previous Militia service, and the rest would be from country areas where Militia 
training had been largely in abeyance since the early 1920s. They would be 
eligible for overseas service in the 6th Division. The residual Militia would not. 
The ensuing recruitment drive was lacklustre, and some Militia commanders 
openly discouraged their men from volunteering for the AIF.63
It would have been strange had the government, and the Defence Minister in 
particular, not been the focus of press criticism and discontent in the early 
months of the war. Although the announcement that Sir Thomas Blamey would 
command the troops being gathered to send overseas was popular, subsequent 
general officer appointments had a mixed reception. And alleged deficiencies 
and dilatoriness in mobilising resources made Street and Squires, who had 
moved his belongings into the room of the Chief of the General Staff on October 
14, easy targets. Late in October the government announced that compulsory 
military training ― three months for 20-year-olds ― would be introduced in 
January. The numbers called up, the CGS noted, would be those required ‘to 
fill gaps in the Militia caused by transfers to the 2nd AIF & the withdrawal (to a 
Militia reserve) of married & “key” men’. Street had discussed it with Squires 
several times. But the Military Board had not been consulted. ‘Strange people, 
these politicians,’ Squires commented.64
Stranger still were the political masters of the armed services as the months wore 
on. As Squires confided to his diary, ‘the position of the Chiefs of Staff vis-à vis 
the Cabinet is becoming quite impossible; & it’s becoming equally impossible to 
plan for the future without knowing what we are planning for’.65 Most vexing 
was the continuing delay in settling on the despatch of the 6th Division. For 
this, and many other frustrations, Squires realised that Street was not to blame. 
In a ‘personal and confidential’ letter to his predecessor John Lavarack he had 
explained a few weeks after the war began:
62 Squires diary, 18, 19, 23 Sept. 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 2.
63 Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge UP, Melbourne, 2008 (1st ed. 1990), pp.146–8.
64 Squires diary, 21 Oct. 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 2.
65 Squires diary, 28 Nov. [wrongly dated by Squires ‘Dec.’], 1939 UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 3.
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I’m terribly sorry for Street, he’s having an awfully difficult time, as 
he says the Cabinet contains 15 Defence Ministers, & their interference 
with what are purely domestic Army matters is becoming intolerable. 
They apparently regard themselves as entitled to decide everything 
for us — including appointments! Luckily Menzies is realizing at last 
the futility of the present method of conducting business, & the War 
Cabinet is to start functioning next week.66
A multiplicity of Defence ministers had its frustrations but it also had some 
benefits. In the early months of the war Street’s portfolio still embraced the 
RAAF. There were big decisions to be taken about the role of the Air Force and 
it quickly became obvious that the burden had to be shared. 
Getting down to war: the Ministers of Supply and Development and 
Defence, 30 September 1939
(Courtesy of the Hon. Tony Street)
Dick Casey, as Minister for Supply and Development, took up procurement 
and production, and Civil Aviation Minister Jim Fairbairn picked up questions 
of facilities and training. From mid-November all aviation issues would come 
within the purview of the new Air Ministry. But, in the meantime, some matters 
were unavoidably the responsibility of the Defence Minister. Street was thus 
embroiled in the conflict between the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal 
66 Squires to Lavarack, 22–24 Sept. 1939, Lavarack Papers, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 164 Box 4, folder 13.
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S. J. Goble, and the Air Member for Personnel, Air Commodore J. C. Russell, 
who was on secondment from the RAF. When taxed by Street on 11 November 
1939 with the Cabinet’s concern over a ‘reported lack of co-operation’ between 
members of the Air Staff and other branches, Goble had responded that Russell 
had been ‘a great hindrance to progress’ and had ‘stubbornly refused to adjust 
himself to local conditions and regulations and has shown marked inconsistency 
and unreliability in his opinions and statements on service matters’. Goble made 
the mistake of concluding that: ‘I find it impossible to carry on unless there is 
stability in the direction of the Branch of the Air Member for Personnel.’ His 
private and confidential letter was passed by Street to the Prime Minister.67
By the end of the year, Goble’s fate was sealed. The appointment as Chief of the 
Air Staff of 58-year-old Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, nominally one of 
two Inspector-Generals of the RAF, was announced by the Prime Minister on 5 
January 1940. Russell, who had blotted his copybook with Menzies as well, was 
shortly to return to the United Kingdom.68 After a period of leave, the hapless 
Goble was sent to Canada to look after the Empire Air Training Scheme there. 
As if to epitomise his propensity to make seriously poor choices, Goble and his 
wife were passengers on the ill-fated Niagara en route to Vancouver in June 
1940. They were lucky to be rescued when the ship, carrying a fortune in gold 
and a large quantity of small arms and ammunition, struck a mine and sank in 
the Hauraki Gulf, north of Auckland.
‘One of the most deceptive men in the Federal 
Cabinet’
Street, like the Prime Minister, as well as Fairbairn, Gullett, and the Country 
Party’s John McEwen, had homes in Victoria. Melbourne was the preferred 
venue for War Cabinet meetings. There were strong practical reasons for this 
since Canberra meetings, usually confined to periods when Parliament was 
sitting, entailed the transfer and accommodation of staff and the transport of 
voluminous files.69 Menzies had been determined that Canberra should not be 
a deserted village when Parliament was not in session. But the gravitational 
pull of Melbourne remained powerful. From mid-November 1939 the Defence 
ministry was split into separate Navy, Air, and Army departments. This ‘drastic 
re-arrangement’, as the Prime Minister described it, was ‘in no sense a reflection 
67 AVM S. J. Goble (CAS) to Minister for Defence (Street), 12 Nov. 1939, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/579/4.
68 The Russell–Goble affair is summarised in Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, pp.460–63.
69 Horner, Defence Supremo, pp.81–2.
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on my colleague…the best tribute I can pay to my colleague’s labours is implicit 
in the fact from now on there will be three Ministers busily employed in doing 
what he has been doing alone for some time past’.70
His labours now focused on Army matters, Street’s office at Victoria Barracks was 
on the first floor of the northern wing, across the corridor from Fred Shedden, 
now the Secretary of the Department of Defence Co-ordination and Secretary of 
the War Cabinet. The minister was close to the Chief of the General Staff. And 
to the evident approval of Squires he attended a meeting of the Military Board 
for the first time on 23 January 1940.71 It had been an auspicious day as 5000 
Victorian members of the 2nd AIF marched through a throng estimated at 500 
000, the largest crowd ever seen in the city streets. The ‘noble bearing’ of the 
men ‘has touched our hearts’, Street said. ‘Today’s great march was more than 
symbolical: it was proof that the spirit of the old A.I.F. has survived.’ There 
was something also more than symbolical in the Army Minister’s conclusion. 
The Prime Minister had praised the demeanour of men and onlookers for their 
‘quiet seriousness and determination which have really been the characteristics 
of the British people in this war’. Street, knowing his audience better, struck a 
different note, national not imperial: the men of the 6th Division were leading 
‘Australia’s crusade for justice and permanent peace’.72
‘Mr Street is one of the most deceptive men in the Federal Cabinet,’ the Sydney 
Morning Herald’s Canberra correspondent had written just before the outbreak 
of war. ‘He is almost invariably underestimated on first acquaintance, because of 
his restraint, courtesy, and unassuming manner.’ He was, recalled Frank Green 
who, as Clerk of the House of Representatives, observed him at close quarters, ‘a 
quiet man, but of the kind in whom ordinary people have confidence’.73 Owing 
much to unaffected geniality, Street’s public popularity also reflected skilful 
use of the press. ‘An unheard-of innovation’, the appointment of a press officer 
to the Defence Department, embodied the new minister’s belief that ‘as far as 
possible the people of Australia should be told what we are doing and how their 
money is being spent’.74 The ‘press and information officer’, Allan Dawes, made 
sure that editors were served with lively biographical material on his chief. Not 
that Street seemed to need much coaching on press relations. He instinctively 
knew what reporters and photographers needed. His cricket library, ‘a result of 
the activities of dealers and collectors all over the world’, made good copy as it 
grew from 500 to 600 volumes. He would happily pause in open-necked shirt 
70 CPD, vol.162, 15 Nov. 1939, p.1131.
71 Squires diary, 23 Jan. 1940, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 3.
72 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 Jan. 1940. In an Australia Day broadcast for England, Menzies made some amends: 
‘the major element in the British genius’ was that it had been able to ‘reconcile the unity of an Empire with the 
independent development of the individuality and character of each of its parts’ (The Age, 26 Jan. 1940).
73 Sydney Morning Herald, 26 Aug. 1939; Green, Servant of The House, p.118.
74 The Sun, 22 Nov. 1938.
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and shorts when caught on the Canberra golf course in hot weather. He would 
strike a Victor Trumper-like pose while getting some batting practice before 
going out to play for the MCC with the great Bill Ponsford and the brilliant 
Victorian batsman Percy Beames against a Fremantle XI.
The Minister’s cricket exploits were a source of endless fascination, whether 
it was his multi-wicket hauls with ‘vicious’ leg spin or bamboozling Arthur 
Mailey, Herbie Collins, his wartime friend Charles Kelleway, and others with his 
prodigious memory of their statistics and performances. Or simply the fact that 
he was chosen to play alongside Bill Woodfull and Jack Ryder in an Australia 
v. England night match organised for charity at the Exhibition Building by the 
Australasian Electric Light Cricket Association. Street’s comfort with the press 
contrasted with the Prime Minister’s indifference. Touring naval dockyards in 
Sydney in January 1940, the Defence Minister fretted as Menzies turned his 
back and covered his face with his hands when reporters saw him taking an 
interest in the chart room. The Prime Minister was ‘a nightmare to his publicity 
man’. Reporters noticed that Street persuaded Menzies to pose later in front 
of a gyro compass aboard a cruiser exercising with live shells outside Sydney 
Heads.75
As Army Minister it was Street’s responsibility and prerogative to recommend 
the officers to hold the most senior military appointments. Probably no minister 
before or since was so intimately acquainted with the candidates for promotion. 
He had served with many of them. Just over a year before war broke out, he 
had spent a week enrolled with 28 major generals, brigadiers, and colonels at 
the new Command and Staff School in Sydney.76 Resigning his commission on 
entering the Cabinet had been a sad moment. But it would not do to be his own 
superior yet junior to those whose futures were in his hands. With the expansion 
of the 2nd AIF into a Corps, and Blamey’s elevation as Corps Commander, there 
were two divisional commands to fill in March 1940. Conscious of the rivalries 
between Staff Corps and Militia officers, and personally acquainted with all 
those who were qualified, he opted for the former CGS, Lieutenant General 
John Lavarack, for the 6th Division and Major General Iven Mackay (under 
whom he served in 1918) for the 7th. The proposal of the volatile Lavarack for 
the 6th Division appalled Blamey, who catalogued Laverack’s ‘temperamental 
disqualifications’ both for the Army Minister and the Minister for Defence 
Co-ordination. (Writing to the Prime Minister in his capacity as Minister for 
Defence Co-ordination was a fig leaf of protocol to cover the inappropriateness 
75 C. J. Lloyd, Parliament and the Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery 1901–1988, MUP, 1988, 
p.127 citing The Journalist, Feb. 1940; Sun Pictorial, 31 Jan. 1940; The Herald, 4 Jan. 1939. For Menzies’ 
relations with the press at this time, see Warren Edward Denning, ‘Robert Gordon Menzies’, n.d. (1945?), 
Denning MSS, NLA MS5129; Allan Dawes’ ‘biographical sketch’ of the Defence Minister, Street MSS, courtesy 
the Hon. Tony Street.
76 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 Aug. 1938.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm
214
of going over Street’s head). ‘Uncontrolled outbreaks,’ he wrote, ‘have been all 
too frequent in his work, in the presence of junior officers, in private places, and 
in the sporting field.’ Blamey asked for the opportunity to discuss the matter 
with Street, Menzies, and ‘if you think fit, General White’.
Obviously afraid that Street would ignore his plea, Blamey sent a copy of his 
letter to Menzies with a covering letter damning Lavarack as not appearing 
to have ‘the necessary amount of stability and wisdom in his make-up to be 
entrusted with this responsibility practically away from all control’. Friction 
was inevitable, Blamey warned. The friction Menzies apprehended in the first 
instance was Street’s reaction if he read Blamey’s excuse for writing direct to 
the Prime Minister. Blamey explained that he was not sure that his letter, sent 
three days earlier, would have reached Street. In a pencilled note to his private 
secretary, Menzies instructed ‘Do not pass on!’ Blamey was firmly put in his 
place. Menzies would discuss the matter with his colleagues, and would treat 
his correspondence as confidential. Not content to rely on the ordinary mail 
to reach the Prime Minister in time, and having received no reply from Street, 
Blamey sent copies of the previous correspondence together with a second 
protest at an appointment that would be ‘terribly unwise’. Probably suspecting 
as well the malign hand of Fred Shedden, no friend of Lavarack, Street had 
already written to the Prime Minister in his own hand before Blamey’s second 
letter was despatched:
Both Squires & White agreed that Lavarack was the man for the job. The 
Military Board recommended Lavarack. I know his failings but I also 
recommend him.
Blamey does not like him & says ‘I fear greatly the cool judgment 
necessary in war will be lacking particularly when things are going 
wrong and the pressure is on.’
I have given very careful consideration to General Blamey’s viewpoint. 
Notwithstanding all he says I stick to my recommendation which is I am 
sure sound.
Both Sturdee and Wynter would do the job well — in fact there are 
others who could doubtless do the job well — but I think Laverack is 
the best. It will be well received in the Service & I think the only person 
who will not be satisfied will be Blamey (& perhaps Jess!).
Street rang Corby Tritton, the Prime Minister’s private secretary, urging him 
to ensure that the matter was dealt with promptly. Ministers needed to be 
consulted. Until the divisional commanders were named, no action could be 
taken on appointing the staffs to the Corps and divisional commands. ‘I also 
want to beat the press to any announcement that may be made!’ It was two 
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weeks before the appointments were confirmed by the War Cabinet, the minutes 
discreetly recording that ‘The Chief of the General Staff and the G. O. C. of the 
Australian Army Corps were consulted separately.’77 Blamey, apparently with 
Brudenell White’s support, succeeded in thwarting Laverack’s appointment to 
the 6th Division which went instead to Iven Mackay. Laverack, taking a step 
down in rank, went to the 7th Division.
Much as he was absorbed in the work of the Army and War Cabinet, Street chafed 
at the limits of his authority, attenuated by an unbounded Prime Ministerial ego 
and Fred Shedden’s unsleeping drive for control. He yearned to be closer to the 
battle front. When the British government indicated that it would like to have 
a Light Horse Brigade and attendant troops he made it clear to Menzies that he 
wanted to take his place at its head. His desire to escape and serve in uniform 
had clouded his judgment. As the Governor-General Lord Gowrie confided to 
the Prime Minister:
As regards the Command of the Brigade, you mention that Street was 
very anxious to obtain it, but do you think that would be altogether 
wise an appointment? I am sure he would make an excellent Commander 
in every way, but I am rather afraid his appointment might cause a good 
deal of heart-burning in Light Horse ranks. There are a splendid lot 
of men to choose from and don’t you think they might be a little bit 
annoyed if the Minister for the Army was instrumental in appointing 
himself to what may be the only Light Horse Command for foreign 
service? I know, of course, that the appointment would be made by the 
War Cabinet and not by Street himself, but he would always be accused 
of having influenced his own appointment.78
As it turned out, the idea of forming a Cavalry Brigade was dropped a few 
weeks later at almost exactly the same time as an article that looked like a job 
application ― ‘a vigorous vindication of the cavalry arm’ ― appeared under 
Street’s name in the Sydney Morning Herald.79 Two days later it became clear that 
destiny still had plans for him. Stopping on his way home to talk to an officer 
outside Victoria Barracks he stepped a few paces backwards just as a large pane 
of glass crashed to the ground from a third storey window. ‘It  might have killed 
me’, he told a reporter.80
77 Street to Prime Minister, 8 March 1940, ‘Most Confidential’; Blamey to Menzies, 11 March 1940, with 
enclosed copy Blamey to Street, 8 March 1940; Menzies to Blamey, 12 March 1940, copy, Blamey to Menzies, 
12 March 1940; Street to Menzies, 11 March 1940, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/579/5; Minutes of War Cabinet 
Meeting, 21 March 1940, NAA: A2673.
78 Lord Gowrie to Prime Minister, 25 March 1940, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/579/5.
79 Telegram, Prime Minister’s Dept to Sec. of State for Dominion Affairs, 6 April 1940, copy, Menzies MSS, 
NLA MS 4936/581/23; ‘The Light Horse in War’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 April 1940. The Military Board 
and senior officers had been debating the utility of various possible mounted infantry and mechanised cavalry 
units (Captain James C. Morrison, Mechanising an Army: Mechanisation Policy and the Conversion of the Light 
Horse 1920–1943, Study Paper No. 307, Land Warfare Studies Centre, June 2006, pp.57–68).
80 The Argus, 8 April 1940.
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Geoff Street and a ‘slightly de trop’ Prime Minister
(Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial)
Talking to Australian newspapermen in New York, Dick Casey heard of ‘a good 
remark of Geoff Street’s – Australia to Britain – “We remain, Yours faithfully”’.81 
The phrase was in fact the end of a robust speech Street had delivered at Avoca 
on 3 August 1940. He condemned rumour mongering and destructive criticism, 
‘not merely useless, it is noxious and even dangerous’. Contrary to German 
propaganda that Australia had declined to send more men abroad to aid the 
British cause: ‘We have refused nothing, and will refuse nothing, not a man, 
not a machine, not a shilling, not a shell, to Great Britain.’ Like everyone in the 
upper reaches of the Australian government, the Army Minister was attuned to 
the delicate balance of imperial and national interests. He also understood the 
need not only to maintain the morale of the population at large but also among 
the troops in training.
No one at the Puckapunyal camp would ever forget the day the minister turned 
up for an inspection, asked if a horse could be made available, and cantered 
around the installations in jodhpurs and a canary yellow shirt. Street’s jodhpurs, 
open necked shirts, and sports jackets served him well on visits to other camps, 
earning him press plaudits when the Prime Minister was thought to be ‘slightly 
de trop’ in a Homburg hat and ‘a great black overcoat worthy of the Archbishop 
of Canterbury’. 
81 Casey diary, 9 Aug. 1940, Casey MSS, NLA MS 6150.
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Reporting in detail on Street’s tireless visits to Service units around the country, 
his note-taking and recording of details on a miniature camera, the regional press 
and afternoon tabloids displayed unquenchable interest in the Army Minister. 
Their enthusiastic stories about ‘A.M.’, as the troops called him because of his 
early morning inspections, more than compensated for the occasional policy 
grumblings and chidings of the metropolitan broadsheets.82
Obliged to travel up and down to Canberra regularly, Street was one of the 
first ministers to experience the RAAF’s new Lockheed Hudsons. On April 29 
he joined Sir Charles Burnett in a Hudson of No 1 Squadron to fly to Canberra 
and back in one day.83 He was happy enough to take the train when there was 
no rush. If the Prime Minister was on board, they might swap cricket stories 
and statistics over dinner. Then he would retire to the compartment he shared 
with Garry Armstrong, the young officer, law graduate, and family friend of 
Brudenell White whose appointment to the minister’s office had been forced 
on Fred Shedden in April 1939. Armstrong knew he could expect to be woken 
early wherever they were and put through a set of exercises. When Street stayed 
in Canberra, Armstrong would be called out from his bed on the balcony of 
the Hotel Canberra at 6.00 a.m. for a three or four-mile run around the Royal 
Canberra golf links. Percy Spender and Bill McCall, the baby of the House of 
Representatives, would occasionally join them. To Armstrong, 20 years Street’s 
junior, his chief’s relentless physical fitness regime was balanced by ‘a lightning 
mind, a grand sense of humour’. In his mid-40s, at the height of his powers, 
Geoff Street was ‘a lean, virile, subtle man’ of boundless energy. In Melbourne, 
he lunched frugally at his Victoria Barracks desk, sometimes foregoing lunch 
altogether to go ice-skating. He rarely drank, and never smoked. Admired by 
public servants, he was trusted by senior military men who could rely on him to 
understand their point of view, tell them plainly if he disagreed, and fight their 
cause in the War Cabinet. ‘Soft voiced, and with a delightful boyish smile’, he 
was liked and respected on both sides of the House.84 
Next to the Prime Minister, Street was by mid-1940 the most prominent member 
of the government. With the AIF 6th Division raised, the 7th Division and the 
Corps Troops being recruited, the decision to form an eighth division announced 
by the Prime Minister late in May, and Bertie Lloyd freshly installed as Director-
General of Recruiting, Street knew the time had come for a major appeal for 
men: ‘As Minister for the Army it is I who should make his voice ring clearly.’ 
Newspapers in his electorate and around the nation published his speeches and 
radio broadcasts verbatim. They were replete with exhortations to the manhood 
82 The Argus, 28 Oct. 1939; The Herald, 29 June 1940; The Sun, 19 July 1940; The Stawell News, 20 July 1940.
83 No. 1 Squadron Operations Record Book, NAA: A9186, 1/176.
84 Garry Armstrong, taped reminiscences, Nov.–Dec. 1982; A. A. Street to CH, 31 March 2010; Sydney 
Morning Herald, 22 March, 14 Aug. 1940.
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of Australia to join the forces and resist the ‘mailed fist of the marauder thrust 
into our very faces…The march of the horde of the Huns must be stopped…We 
are fighting savages.’85
Uncomfortable as he might be with such rhetorical excess, Street was ever alert 
to opportunities to promote the ministry’s more prosaic activities. He announced 
on August 6 that the government was going to purchase 2000 Australian-made 
bicycles. The machines did not herald the formation of a cyclists’ corps. Rather, 
they were to be available for signallers and battalion runners in AIF and Citizen 
Force units.86 In the great scheme of things for which he was responsible, the 
2000 bicycles were a trivial diversion. More serious were the hospital matters 
brought to him in the evening of August 12 by Major General Rupert Downes, 
Director-General of Medical Services, who was pressing for membership of the 
Military Board. Discussion with Downes would continue late into the night over 
the vexed question of the Red Cross being the sole agent for gifts for medical 
services. But when Street excused himself to dine at the Melbourne Club with 
the Rutherford Guthries, the bicycles were at least something he could talk 
about without revealing too much of the strategic dilemmas that he and the 
Chief of the General Staff would be confronting in Canberra the next day.87
85 Colac Reformer, 25 May 1940.
86 Canberra Times, 7 Aug. 1940, p.4.
87 ‘Report of the DGMS 13/11/39 to 10/4/42 in the form of War Diary’, 12 Aug. 1940, AWM: 54 481/1/27 
PART1; Ian Howie-Willis, Surgeon and General: A Life of Major-General Rupert Downes 1885–1945, Australian 
Military History Publications, Loftus, 2008, pp.359–61 for Downes’ death in the crash of Hudson A16-118 in 
1945; Sir Rutherford Guthrie to CH, 15 June 1983.
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11. Best man: Frank Thornthwaite
As he crossed the Essendon tarmac to take his place in the waiting Hudson, 
Geoff Street was accompanied by another old friend. A very dear friend. A 
neighbouring pastoralist at Derrinallum. A wartime comrade in arms. The man 
who had stood at his side on his wedding day in London in 1918. The man 
for whom he himself was best man at St Columba’s Pont Street, London, on 23 
November 1918. The man married to his wife’s cousin and closest friend, Lorna 
Maud Inez Currie, always known as Inez.
Lieutenant Colonel Francis Thornthwaite, who had driven out to the aerodrome 
with the Army Minister, had been a career artillery officer with a distinguished 
record in the Great War.1 Recalled to service just before the German invasion 
of Poland, he was now a General Staff Officer I in the Department of the Army, 
assigned as Army Liaison Officer attached to the Department of Defence Co-
ordination. In practice he was the Chief of the General Staff’s right-hand man. 
Born in Launceston in February 1890,2 Francis Thornthwaite was the son of 
William Wright Thornthwaite, an immigrant from Manchester who had 
married Frances (Fanny) Stackhouse, only daughter of the rector of Longford, 
the Rev. Alfred Stackhouse of the Tasmanian early-settler family, in 1885. 
William Thornthwaite, almost blind from a childhood accident, was a leading 
light in Tasmanian musical circles. After training in London in piano, organ, 
and singing he had arrived in Hobart in 1880 and began at once advertising his 
services as a music teacher. Soon appointed organist at Hobart’s St Andrew’s 
Presbyterian Church he moved to Launceston in 1884 as organist at St John’s, 
then to Paterson Street Methodist Church, eventually becoming Launceston 
City Organist, conductor of the Launceston Philharmonic Society, and founder 
of the local branch of the Trinity College of Music.3
1 For Thornthwaite’s life and military career I rely, unless otherwise noted, on his service records (NAA: 
B884, V159753), the Australian War Records Section Biographical Details form he completed on 24 Feb. 1919 
(AWM: 181.11), notes in AWM: 43 A872, the Army List of officers of the Australian Military Force 1940, 
and newspaper reports. I have also drawn on information in an undated typescript ‘Canberra Air Disaster 
Recalled’, in the Thornthwaite MSS, apparently a draft of H. J. Manning’s article, ‘Air Disaster at Canberra’, 
Stand-To, Jan.–Feb. 1962, pp.6–22; and letters and recorded memoirs by the late Inez Thornthwaite.
2 Date of birth is given as 1891 on some Army records but is corrected on several to 1890, the year given in 
the ADFA AIF project. His school enrolment entry also shows 1890. I am grateful to Thomas Gunn, Archivist 
of Launceston Grammar School, for details of Thornthwaite’s school years.
3 The Examiner, 8 Jan. 1940. The ACT Coroner’s report on Francis Thornthwaite described the father of the 
deceased as a grazier but I have found no evidence to confirm this. At the time of his son Ralph’s enlistment 
in 1915 he was living in Kew in Melbourne (NAA: A1378, P8903; B2455). ‘The Rev. W. W. Thornthwaite’ was 
later minister in charge at the Catholic Apostolic Church in Redfern (Canberra Times, 21 Oct. 1927, The Argus, 
27 Sept. 1937). He died after being run over in a Sydney street in Dec. 1939, his wife having predeceased him 
in 1933.
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William, still in his twenties, and Fanny (10 years his senior) already had two 
children when Francis was born; and a fourth soon followed. Educated at 
Launceston High School ― a small independent establishment soon to hit hard 
times and merge with Launceston Grammar School ― Francis had dropped out 
of the Bachelor of Arts course at the University of Tasmania and enlisted in the 
Army a few months before his twentieth birthday.4 Commissioned as a lieutenant 
in the Royal Australian Garrison Artillery in December 1910, he completed a 
short course in gunnery and then a master gunner’s course, and transferred to 
No. 2 Battery, Royal Australian Field Artillery a year later.5
Within two weeks of the outbreak of war in August 1914 Frank Thornthwaite, 
as he came to be known, enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force. Army records 
noted that he was 5' 10" tall and weighed 12 stone; he had ‘good’ eyesight and 
a 36/38" chest. In October 1914 he left Australia on the Argyllshire with the 
AIF’s First Division Artillery. He was among the earliest to reach Gallipoli on 
25 April 1915 with the first Australian battery. But, in the ensuing chaos in 
finding suitable emplacements for the ANZAC Corps guns, all four Australian 
batteries spent the next two weeks watching the action from troopships. They 
were then sent to Cape Helles, attached to the British 29th Division. Hospitalised 
briefly in Malta, Thornthwaite returned as adjutant of the Australian First 
Division Artillery from October to December 1915. For six weeks, on flimsy 
sheets of graph paper, he kept diary notes of the daily routine of enemy 
shelling, ‘retaliation rounds’ on Turkish trenches, preparation of new gun pits, 
repositioning of guns, and construction of ‘funk pits’. The faithfully-listed 
names of sick, wounded, and killed, were punctuated by a rare ‘casualties nil’. 
From late November the gathering momentum of evacuation is recorded:
November 20:
Guns and limbers of 2nd Battery and all ammunition wagons less two of 
the 1st Battery moved from Shrapnel Valley to Reserve Gully ready to 
be embarked. All vehicles stripped and ammunition removed. Fatigue 
party manhandled vehicles from Rest Gully to bottom of Reserve Gully.
Vehicles were not embarked but were parked ready to be embarked at 
short notice.
4 Launceston High School, not to be confused with the later state school of the same name, amalgamated 
with Launceston Grammar in 1913 (Alison Alexander, Blue, Black and White: The history of Launceston Church 
Grammar School 1846–1996, Launceston, 1996, p.77).
5 For the context of Thornthwaite’s military career, David Horner, The Gunners: A History of Australian 
Artillery, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards NSW, 1995, and David Coombes, The Lionheart: A Life of Lieutenant-
General Sir Talbot Hobbs, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 2007, are invaluable.
11 . Best man: Frank Thornthwaite
221
Mentioned in Despatches, a belated appreciation
(Courtesy of Inez Thornthwaite)
The next day, 92 reinforcements arrived and were posted to units. Bad weather 
prevented the loading of the guns and wagons until the 23rd when they were 
embarked on lighters and placed on board H.T. Queen Louise. Then on November 
24 begins the laconic record of the operation that was to be synonymous with 
the name of Brudenell White: ‘a conference of Brigade commanders was held at 
Div. Arty Hd Qrs. It was decided that fire would be withheld from the artillery 
for the next three (3) days.’ After three days, with the batteries not firing:
Report received that the Turks were massing in their trenches at six (6) 
different points along the line. All precautions taken in case of attack. 
Nothing eventuated however. Owing to inclement weather embarkation 
of the remaining vehicles of the brigade was further postponed.
Then the final diary entry:
The silent ruse on the part of the artillery agreed to on the 24th inst. 
Ended at 24.00 27th/28th inst. Normal conditions now prevail.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm
222
Heavy fall of snow during the night — and today, making roads 
impassable for mule traffic. Reserve supply of rations brought into use.
Batteries did not fire.
After departing from the Gallipoli peninsula at the end of 1915, Thornthwaite 
was to serve in Egypt, France, and Flanders. He was adjutant of the First Field 
Brigade and Brigade Major of the Fifth Australian Divisional Artillery in Egypt. 
As the AIF was being vastly expanded, the artillery staffs of the Fourth and 
Fifth Divisions had the monumental task of increasing the number of batteries 
from 18 to 60. Thornthwaite was among a nucleus of experienced artillery men 
who would gather and train volunteers from the infantry and the Light Horse.
Promoted Major on 26 May 1916, he sailed from Alexandria for France a month 
later. News of his Military Cross ― ‘for distinguished service in the field’ ― 
had come through at the beginning of June. Among those who noticed and 
wrote personally to congratulate him on the MC ‘which your good service has 
so thoroughly well earned for you’, was General Birdwood with the 1st ANZAC 
Corps. ‘We shall be very glad to see the artillery of your division with us here,’ 
Birdwood wrote, ‘and I am quite sure it will do just as well as the old artillery 
we had with us on the Peninsula.’6
In France, Thornthwaite could reasonably hope for rather better outcomes than 
were possible on Gallipoli, where guns and ammunition were in short supply 
and the terrain frustrated the siting of the howitzers and the flat-trajectory 
18-pounder batteries. The gunners had learned valuable lessons summarised by 
a thoughtful modern scholar:
…the importance of camouflage; the value of counterbattery fire; the 
use of aerial observation; the relative merits of high explosive and 
shrapnel; and, most important of all, the need for centralised command 
and control of the guns.7
Soon in action at the battle of Fromelles, Thornthwaite endured the bitter 
winter of 1916–17 on the Somme, successively in the 15th and 13th Field Artillery 
Brigades, and the 5th Divisional Artillery Headquarters. He was evacuated sick 
to England at the end of February 1917. Transferred first to Fort Pitt Hospital 
at Chatham, he was soon moved to the Earl and Countess of Darnley’s Cobham 
Hall at Gravesend. A South Australian officer who arrived at Cobham Hall a few 
weeks earlier described the scene for his parents:
6 Sir W. R. Birdwood to Thornthwaite, 4 June 1916, Thornthwaite MSS.
7 Ross Mallett, ‘The Interplay between Technology, Tactics and Organisation in the First AIF’, MA thesis, 
University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy, 1999, pp.44–8.
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It is a fine old country house, and the owner, Lord Darnley, has handed 
over to the Australian Imperial Forces one wing of the building and the 
use of grounds as a convalescent home. You may remember, although it 
was before my time, that the Hon. Ivo Bligh took over a famous English 
cricket team to Australia, which I believe wiped the floor with the 
Australians. He married an Australian girl. They are the present Earl 
and Countess of Darnley. The ground floor of the wing the officers are 
in is the banqueting-room, and the floor above the ballroom. I am in 
the ballroom, where there are about 30 beds. The whole place is hung 
with valuable old paintings. I am sitting under a picture now which 
was painted by Rubens and is insured for £10,000. This portion of the 
building is the newest and was built I think in 1801, the oldest portion, 
having been built in the 15th century. Lord and Lady Darnley are still 
using the house, but are at present in London, so I have not met them yet. 
The district also is historical, inasmuch as Charles Dickens lived in and 
wrote much about this part of Kent. There is a little hotel in the village 
of Cobham called the Leather Bottle Inn, which figures prominently in 
Pickwick Papers. If Dickens were still alive he would, no doubt, write a 
book about the old chap who keeps it now.
The Darnleys had made space for 50 officers in their state rooms to be administered 
as an AIF hospital. The Countess, formerly Florence Morphy, daughter of the 
Beechworth Police Magistrate, helped in the nursing of the wounded, and bore 
a large share of the expenses. ‘Lord Darnley and I help in every way we can by 
giving comforts ― vegetables, fruit, milk, tobacco, etc. to these brave fellows’, 
she would tell an Australian correspondent.8 It was no hardship to return there 
after being gassed in November 1917 and again in August 1918. Still less for 
Thornthwaite to be able to tell his cricket-loving friend Geoff Street that he had 
stayed in the luxurious company of the aristocratic couple whose mantelpiece 
was adorned by the already legendary Ashes urn. It was the beautiful music 
teacher, Florence Morphy, who had won Ivo Bligh’s heart when the English 
cricketers sailed to Australia in 1892 intent on winning back the recently 
lamented ‘ashes’ of English cricket; she had been present when he was jestingly 
presented with an ash-filled urn at a Christmas Eve party, and the couple were 
married just over a year later.9
8 The Argus, 1 March 1917.
9 For Florence Morphy: Joy Munns, Beyond reasonable Doubt: The Birthplace of the Ashes, 1994. The Ashes 
story is distilled, with variations, in Rex Harcourt, The Origin of the Ashes: Which came first – The urn or 
the velvet bag? (www.mcc.org.au) and RIC (Richard Cashman), ‘Ashes’, Richard Cashman et al., The Oxford 
Companion to Australian Cricket, OUP, Melbourne, 1996, pp.33–5.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm
224
Cobham Hall, seat of the Earl of Darnley, who had dedicated a wing as 
a hospital for Australian officers. Thornthwaite was admitted ‘suffering 
from mild illness (not yet diagnosed)’ in March 1917; and again after 
being gassed in November 1917 and August 1918
(Courtesy Kent Photo Archive, Medway Council)
After a recuperative spell, Major Thornthwaite was back in France in May, 
commanding the 50th Battery, 5th Division, AIF. As H. J. Manning records, he 
served with the 50th Battery at Morchies, facing the Hindenburg Line until the 
beginning of July.
Then, while the Australian infantry was completing its training in the 
back areas as a prelude to participation in the Third Battle of Ypres, the 
1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisional Artilleries were moved up to the 
Ypres Salient to help support British divisions in the opening phases 
of this great offensive…The British and Australian batteries, crowded 
on to the Ypres flats, had to fire from almost naked positions, and the 
sufferings of the drivers and the gunners were, in general, beyond any 
in their previous experience, and their casualties such as they had never 
before suffered…
Thornthwaite’s battery was emplaced 1,000 yards forward from the 
Menin Gate, covering the right of the 15th (Scottish) Division. The initial 
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attack was fairly successful, but then the rain started and it continued to 
pour…turning the churned up battlefield into a morass into which men 
and animals simply floundered.10
Charlie Gatliff, a 35-year-old Lieutenant with the 50th Battery, provides an 
admiring glimpse of Major Thornthwaite and his environment in letters to his 
parents on 16 and 19 September 1917:
We have a very strong combination of officers in this battery now — 
Major Thornthwaite MC, who was Brigade Major for our Div. Arty for a 
long time & for a little while was B.C. for the 51st, is our B.C. & it would 
be hard to find a better one — he belongs to our permanent forces, is a 
good gunner & administrator & has a nice personality.
In a brief interval out of the line in France, Thornthwaite’s men were:
Situated right on the banks of a canal — billets & horse lines close 
together — with a large wood on a hill close behind us. The country 
is all green & is very picturesque & the view from the window of our 
officers’ mess is rather typical of Australia.
Frank Thornthwaite, away from the guns
(Courtesy of Inez Thornthwaite)
10 Manning, ‘Air Disaster at Canberra’, Stand-To, Jan.–Feb. 1962, p.17.
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A month later it was very different world in Belgium — worse, Gatliff said, than 
the Somme: ‘“no bon pour soldat” & winter hasn’t started.’11
Thornthwaite was slightly wounded in August 1917 but remained on duty 
until caught (for the second time) in a German gas attack in November. After 
10 days he returned to the line. Ypres ― Frezenberg Ridge, Westhoer Ridge, 
Passchendaele, Broodseine, Messines ― the names he recorded in the form he was 
later asked to complete for the Australian War Records Section, would resonate 
a century later. It was an unremittingly exhausting and nerve-wracking regime. 
Rare meetings with Geoff Street on Pompey Elliot’s 15th Victorian Brigade staff 
were among the few pleasant diversions.
The young artillery officer had impressed his superiors. In November 1917 
he was mentioned in despatches for the third time, on this occasion by Sir 
Douglas Haig. He was given temporary command of an artillery brigade for 
six weeks before being sent to England to a senior artillery officers’ school at 
Shoeburyness. Back in France at the end of January 1918, he was with the 
50th battery again for a few weeks before being transferred to command the 5th 
Divisional Ammunition Column.
Periodically his parents, who moved from Sydney to Melbourne in 1916 and 
back to Sydney again in 1918, were relieved and gratified to receive official 
letters telling them of Frank’s latest awards and mentions of his ‘distinguished 
and gallant services’ in despatches. Captain Thornthwaite had appeared 
alongside Colonels John Monash and Brudenell White, Captain Bean, the war 
correspondent, and others in General Monro’s April 1916 despatch about service 
on Gallipoli. Monro’s ANZAC list was not published till July 1916 because, as 
the press reports enigmatically noted, of the ‘miscarriage of the Australian 
portion which had been abroad for verification’.12
By mid-1916 Frank Thornthwaite had a brother in uniform. The Thornthwaites’ 
second son, Ralph, had left his job as a foreman in an explosives factory in July 
1915 to enlist as a bombardier. Ralph sailed from Australia in May 1916 and, 
after six months at Larkhill Camp, proceeded with the 8th Field Artillery Brigade 
to France. He was soon transferred to the 3rd Divisional Ammunition Column, 
and came through the war unscathed. Late in 1918 he had reverted to gunner 
at his own request in order to gain experience of gunnery in a battery.13 News 
of Ralph, who like his father now professed to be a member of the Catholic 
Apostolic church, was good. Less happily, in March 1918, the Thornthwaites at 
home read Frank’s name in a list of wounded published in the Sydney Evening 
News. They had not received any official notification. It was, the Army’s base 
11 Gatliff MSS, AWM: 1 DRL 309 Pt 2, 12/11/952.
12 The Argus, 14 July 1916, p.7.
13 NAA: B2455, B884  S68525 THORNTHWAITE RALPH.
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records office, said, ‘a Press error for which this Department is not responsible’. 
As friends had been telephoning to find out about their son, they made enquiries 
and discovered that the Army was right. The newspaper was publishing lists 
that were months old.
Life changes
As the war reached its climax, Major Thornthwaite was in the final Somme 
offensives including Villers-Bretonneux, the attack and capture of Peronne, and 
the advance to the Hindenburg Line. By then, more prayers than ever before 
were being offered for his safety. He had met, courted, and was engaged to Inez 
Currie who had been working as a ward VAD in a Red Cross hospital in Mayfair. 
Inez was a daughter of the Western District aristocracy. In 1898 her father, 
John Lang Currie Jr, had inherited the homestead portion of his father’s ‘Larra’ 
property near Camperdown which the pioneer family had been farming for 
over 50 years. With the associated properties, ‘Gala’ (leased and then bought by 
Edwin Currie) and ‘Titanga’, the Currie holdings were among the most valuable 
in western Victoria.14 Inez, John’s only child, had come to Europe and England 
with her mother in May 1914. Aged 17, she revelled in a summer of sight-seeing, 
visits to friends in Oxford and Cambridge, and theatre, parties, and dances in 
London. The ‘ripping’ times recorded in her diary included Ascot for the Gold 
Cup, Hendon for flying displays, and the trooping of the colours. A golfing and 
bathing holiday with family friends at Cruden Bay in Scotland was enlivened 
by a fascinating new acquaintance, Tryggve Gran, the young Norwegian polar 
explorer and ski instructor to the Antarctic expedition led by Robert Falcon 
Scott. Now an aviator, Gran was about to attempt the first flight across the North 
Sea. When cinema-photographers arrived to record Gran’s preparations and test 
flights in his Blériot XI-2 monoplane, Inez and another girl were enlisted to 
present him with British and Norwegian flags. She would look forward to seeing 
herself in ‘the halls’ at the side of the intrepid airman. A few weeks later she and 
her mother would know for themselves the elation of the air as they were flown 
up and down Lake Windermere.
Inez Currie had been struck by how many people she knew had been in Britain 
for the summer. Alice Ryan and her 22-year-old daughter Maie were much 
in evidence. Alex Russell became a frequent companion. In Edinburgh she 
bumped into Peggy Forrester ‘in great form’. The Curries, mother and daughter, 
would see almost every play and musical comedy of the season, and Inez 
14 Henderson, Henderson’s Australian Families: vol. I, p.171; Mary Turner Shaw, ‘Currie, Sir (Henry) Alan 
(1868–1942), and John Lang (1856–1935)’, Bede Nairn and Geoffrey Serle (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 8, MUP, 1981, pp.180–1; Leslie Gordon Lomax, ‘The Western District Farmer, 1914–1927’, 2 
vols, PhD thesis, Monash University, 1979.
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particularly admired performances of Pygmalion with Mrs Patrick Campbell and 
Sir Herbert Beerbohm Tree; La Bohème with Melba and Caruso; and the Russian 
Ballet at Drury Lane. The Futurist paintings at the Doré Gallery had to be seen 
but were ‘mad, quite mad’. Apart from the portraits and water colours, the 
Royal Academy paintings were ‘rotten’. But she loved the Turners and Corots 
at the National Gallery, and lots of ‘old friends’ at the Tait, ‘ones I have seen 
copies of from earliest infancy.’ An endless succession of social engagements 
and sophisticated entertainment was increasingly bemusing for the pastoralist’s 
daughter. ‘What is it I want, oh, I don’t know,’ Inez confessed to her diary, ‘life 
is an awful puzzle & I don’t quite know how to start & work it all out.’ Exactly 
a month later the German invasion of Belgium would supply an answer to the 
bad attacks of ‘discontents’ and the ‘blues’. ‘Mother says I do nothing but buy 
papers and read her awful things.’15
Within weeks of the outbreak of war, all Inez’s male Australian friends were 
volunteering. Alex Russell was soon in uniform. Ivo Whitton, the brilliant 
young golfer, was returning to Australia to enlist in the AIF. Although there 
were fears about the safety of sea travel, and it took some time to secure passages, 
Alice Currie and Inez, urged by her cousin Gyp, set sail for home on R. M. 
S. Orontes on October 9. Somewhere in the Indian Ocean, as Orontes steamed 
on towards Australia, the AIF’s First Division Artillery with Lieutenant Frank 
Thornthwaite, was en route to Egypt in the Argyllshire. Among her relatives, 
friends, and neighbours no family was untouched by the war. Sons and 
brothers, cousins, uncles, even fathers, were rushing to the colours. No sooner 
had she reached home than Inez was in conversation with Esther Fairbairn, 
whose brother Jim at Geelong Grammar was determined to get to England 
to join his older brother Osborne in the Royal Flying Corps. Anxious to ‘do 
their bit’, the young Currie girls, with Esther Fairbairn and Catherine Austin, 
raised over £1000 by subscription early in 1915 for the purchase in London 
for the Red Cross of two ‘Western District Motor Ambulances’. Inez herself 
was a whirlwind of charitable endeavour, organising a concert and auction for 
the Belgian Relief Fund, donating personally and publicly to the British Red 
Cross Society Australian branch and the Victorian Red Cross Fund for Sick and 
Wounded Soldiers.16 By the second year of hostilities, both Inez and Gyp Currie 
were in London with Esther Fairbairn making their own contribution to the 
war effort.
Inez had enrolled with the Red Cross in April 1916 for training in first aid and 
home nursing, hygiene, and cookery. She spent a week in August 1916 at the 
Red Cross’s Marylebone Auxiliary Hospital, a small private home in Weymouth 
Street, before finding a more congenial berth in the ‘Australian room’ at the Coulter 
15 Inez Currie’s diary, 3, 11, 12 July, 3 Aug. 1914, courtesy the Hon. Tony Street.
16 Camperdown Chronicle, 27 Mar., 1 May 1915; The Argus, 18 Feb., 29 July 1915.
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Hospital in Grosvenor Square. Founded by an American psychic, Mrs Charlotte 
Herbine, and run by titled socialites, the Coulter’s 85 or 90 beds were filled 
with seriously wounded men.17 The Australian connection of the hospital was 
nourished by the assistant commandant, the Hon. Mrs Cyril Ward, the wealthy 
Dutch-born sister-in-law of the pre-war Governor-General, Lord Dudley. Before 
her marriage Irene, better known as ‘Daisy’, Ward, was the Baroness de Brienen. 
She had accompanied her husband, a career naval officer, during his Australian 
posting as ADC to his brother. Daisy’s other life as a lover of The Times military 
correspondent Colonel Charles À Court Repington, and informal intelligence 
gatherer in the Netherlands, was a world apart from the circles of the young 
Australian VAD. So, too, was the political and literary domain of the honorary 
secretary of the hospital, Lady Juliet Duff. ‘Juliet’, Charles Repington recorded 
in January 1917, ‘said everything went back to love, even in her conversations 
with Cabinet Ministers.’ A year later she would confide: ‘that she cannot fall in 
love with anybody while she has hospital accounts to do’.18 Inez could glimpse 
the social stratosphere if not the romantic challenges of her superiors; but her 
head was not in the clouds and, when at last the carnage ended, she had every 
intention of returning home to Australia.
Towards home
It was not long before Inez was introduced by her cousin Gyp’s fiancé, Geoff 
Street, to his friend Frank Thornthwaite, then attending a senior officers’ 
school at Shoeburyness at the mouth of the river Thames. When Gyp Currie 
married Street in mid-1918, Frank and Inez, now his fiancée, were best man 
and bridesmaid. Frank’s respite in London was brief. In October 1918 he was 
supporting the Americans at Bohain, Le Cateau, and along the Sambre Canal. 
After commanding the 14th Field Brigade, he was in command of the 12th Field 
Brigade (in the place of Brigadier General H. W. ‘Bertie’ Lloyd) when the war 
ended, and was promoted Lieutenant Colonel five days after the armistice.
17 British Red Cross Museum and Archives (Sarah Cox) to CH, (email), 30 Sept., 4 Oct. 2011 (Inez 
Currie’s Red Cross VAD enrolment); hospital details at New York Times, 4 May 1916, www.redcross.org.uk/
museumandarchives, and www.scarletfinders.co.uk.
18 Maurice Baring (with an introduction by Margaret Fitzherbert), Dear Animated Bust: Letters to Lady 
Juliet Duff France 1915–1918, Michael Russell, Salisbury, 1981; Lady Cynthia Asquith, Diaries 1915–1918, 
Hutchinson of London, 1968, pp.223, 260, 263, 279, 282, 431, 455; C. À Court Repington, The First World 
War 1914–1918, 2 vols, Constable, 1920, vol. I, pp.199, 314–5, 402, 447, vol. II, pp.237, 295.
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Brigadier General H. J. Bessell-Browne, Commander Royal Artillery, 
and officers of the 13th Brigade, Australian Field Artillery, Boutillerie, 5 
November 1918: Maj. F. Thornthwaite MC, 5th DAC, front row second 
from left
(Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial, Photo ID no. E03695)
In the closing weeks of the war Thornthwaite had been working once again 
with Brudenell White. On his own staff during the last phase of hostilities was 
Major Eric Campbell who, with Bertie Lloyd, was later to achieve notoriety as 
the founder and deputy commander respectively of the Sydney-based patriotic 
anti-communist group, the New Guard.
The first order of business in London when the guns were silenced was marriage. 
With Geoff and Gyp Street at their side, Frank and Inez were married on 23 
November 1918. They had just a week together before Frank returned to France. 
It was to be another four months before they were reunited for the voyage back 
to Australia. Inez would travel with her husband in a troopship, together with 
what she was to describe as ‘a boat-load of married and single diggers’ wives’.
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Inez and Frank Thornthwaite
(Courtesy of Inez Thornthwaite)
The problem of how to ship home the spouses and children of the ‘colonial 
contingents’, some 20 000 of them Australian, had been exercising the Ministry 
of Shipping for months before the end of the war. One of the ministry’s senior 
men, Archibald Elford, had calculated the number of ships and voyages required 
to get all the Dominion troops and their dependents home.19 It was up to General 
Monash’s demobilisation team to determine the priorities for release and 
19 ‘Dependents [sic] of officers & men serving in Colonial Contingents’, undated note by A. S. Elford, Elford 
MSS, courtesy of Hugh Elford.
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arrangements for discipline on board. For the Thornthwaites’ passage, Frank 
was to be the CO, and his adjutant was the former journalist and stockbroker, 
Captain Stan Ricketson DSM, soon to be in business partnership with the young 
Melbourne barrister Robert Menzies.
Nothing in France or Flanders could have prepared Thornthwaite and Ricketson 
for the extraordinary social dislocations and distinctions of the seven-week 
voyage to Sydney across the Atlantic and the Pacific in a surrendered German 
liner renamed H.M.A.T. Wahehe. Inez Thornthwaite, leaving the elegant 
environs of a Knightsbridge apartment opposite Hyde Park, would never forget 
the distraught wives detached at the last moment from their husbands, childless 
couples allocated separate accommodation in different classes, segregation of 
shell-shocked troops and victims of venereal disease (discreetly housed behind 
a sign ‘which does not indicate its purpose’), alternating blankets of listlessness 
and frenetic gambling and drinking on pay-days.20 Shortly after they departed 
from Tilbury for Torquay, Teneriffe, and points south and west on May 10, 
Lieutenant Colonel Thornthwaite, as OC Troops, wrote the first editorial for 
The Wahehe Times. The ‘Ship’s general Nuisance’ as its sub-title advertised, was 
priced threepence with proceeds to go to the Soldiers’ Widows and Orphans 
Fund. Readers were reminded that it was the first paper on a ship making its 
maiden voyage ‘and which the Hun intended using as a transport to convey 
troops for his projected invasion of England and at the end of the War as one of 
his means of capturing the world trade’.
‘Of course,’ Inez wrote many years later, ‘most of the troops got drunk in 
Capetown and it took days to get them all rounded up again.’21 In addition 
to the demands of morale and discipline for the OC troops, a full program of 
entertainment and sport would keep both of the Thornthwaites on duty every 
day: dances on the promenade deck, performances by the Wahehe Pierrots, 
cricket matches (engineers v machine gunners, officers v sergeants, officers v 
engineers, First Saloon Ladies v Second Saloon ladies, officers v First Saloon 
Ladies), tug-o’-war (the engineers and machine gunners fought out the ‘pull 
off’). They took in good part the occasional jibe in the gossip column, ‘They 
Say’. The OC Troops had, it was said, ‘graciously allowed the Ladies an issue of 
Guinness every day. Is it true??’ the columnist mused. ‘That the Ladies who do 
not require same may pass it on to their husbands. I wonder ― ?’22
20 Peter Plowman, Australian Migrant Ships 1946–1977, Rosenberg Publishing, Dural, 2006, p.91; Clem 
Lloyd and Jacqui Rees, The Last Shilling, pp.128–32; Sydney Morning Herald, 2 July 1919.
21 Inez Thornthwaite, biographical notes on Lt Col. Thornthwaite, [22] April 1979.
22 The Wahehe Times, 1st ed. n.d., AWM: Troopship and Unit Serials, Folder 224.
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For the Thornthwaites it was a relief to be home, disembarking in Sydney on 
1 July 1919 along with 86 men and 64 women.23 Inez had become pregnant 
on the honeymoon and the baby was expected two months after the couple 
reached Australia. Alas, there were complications; tragedy not joy awaited them. 
On July 25 a little boy arrived, some six weeks prematurely. William Currie 
Thornthwaite lived just four days. He was buried in Lismore cemetery close by 
the Currie family home. Frank and Inez would never again have children.
William Currie Thornthwaite, Lismore cemetery
(Courtesy of Carol Judkins)
Returning to Australia with his wife, decorated with the DSO and Croix de 
Guerre, as well as the MC earned on Gallipoli, and four mentions in despatches, 
Thornthwaite was discharged from the AIF in September 1919. Like many of 
his contemporaries who had survived the war, he had been the beneficiary 
of the enormous expansion of the Australian military forces. He had seized 
the opportunities created by the massive growth of the artillery arm and 
served with distinction. Many of his contemporaries could not wait to get out 
of uniform and enjoy a civilian existence. But he was a soldier and wanted 
a soldier’s life. He re-joined the permanent Army. He was posted to the First 
Battery, RAFA, in Sydney. Then came an unforeseen interruption to the career 
23 I follow here the list published in the Sydney press, noting that it is inconsistent with Thornthwaite’s 
Army personnel file that has him disembarking in Melbourne on June 28 at ‘3 MD’ (the Australian Military 
Forces Third Military District).
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he had chosen. Following the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1922 and 
the Commonwealth government’s decision to reduce the permanent staff of the 
Army, he joined 71 of his rather more reluctant contemporaries on the half-pay 
list, and shortly afterwards on the unattached list. It gave some small hope of 
recall to active service that he was placed on the reserve of officers on 1 July 
1927.24
Major Thornthwaite’s appointment to the DSO 
(Courtesy of Inez Thornthwaite)
24 On the post-war retrenchment see Gavin Long, To Benghazi, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1961 
(1st ed. 1952), pp.2–5; Grey, A Military History of Australia, pp.125–6.
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Still in his early 30s, Thornthwaite now had to make a new life. Though he had 
little experience of the land he felt he could learn what he needed to know to 
succeed as a grazier. He was not, as was suggested by H. J. Manning many years 
later, distressed by having to leave the Army. Inez was undeniably happy to be 
returning to the station life of her youth. And there was never going to be any 
financial hardship. Frank went as a jackeroo to the famous Riverina merino stud 
Wanganella Station, where he enjoyed the tutelage of the redoubtable Otway 
Falkiner. A year later he bought a 9800-acre property, ‘Marong’, at nearby 
Conargo, some 30 kilometres north of Deniliquin, and over 700 kilometres 
southwest of Sydney. He and Inez ran the property, with the aid of a married 
couple and one boundary rider. They ‘loved the district and the life’, Inez said, 
having ‘a lot of fun’ with their horses and successfully entering picnic race 
meetings.
Frank had never taken any part in RSL activities and eschewed local government. 
Approached late in 1930 by the Country Party to consider standing for Riverina 
in the House of Representatives, he wrote to Inez’s friend Charles Hawker for 
advice. He did not feel ‘at all fitted for such a job’. Could he manage the property 
as well as fulfil parliamentary duties? To do the job well, how much more than 
the salary might it cost? More seriously, although all his interests were in the 
country, he doubted if he ‘agreed altogether with the tenets of the Country 
Party’. He wondered if the National Party might again contest the seat.
Hawker’s response confirmed him in the belief he had already been coming to: 
that he would not be able to cope with the constant travelling. ‘I am not a 
particularly strong man ― the knocking about of the war seems to have left its 
mark on me and both Inez and I think that I should never stand it.’25 There were 
other ways in which a gentleman farmer could contribute to community affairs. 
He took an active interest in the Southern Riverina Graziers’ Association, joined 
the council in 1935, and was re-elected in 1936 with Brudenell White.26 After 
the death in 1935 of Inez’s father John Lang Currie, the Thornthwaites sold their 
farm and 4700 merino ewes and moved to Victoria, to the Currie family’s ‘Larra’ 
at Derrinallum. There they were neighbours of Jim and Peggy Fairbairn across 
the lake at Mount Elephant.
Frank had been elected a member of the Melbourne Club on his return from the 
war; and Sydney’s Union Club had welcomed him as well. He was nominated 
for the Melbourne Club by the recently knighted Sir Charles Ryan, who had 
been on Birdwood’s staff at Gallipoli before becoming consulting surgeon to 
the medical headquarters staff in London and then honorary surgeon-general 
25 Thornthwaite to Hawker, 7 and 22 Nov. 1930, Hawker MSS, NLA MS 4848/2/4.
26 Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 29 March 1935; J. O Randell, Teamwork: A History of the Graziers’ 
Associations of Victoria and Riverina, (1983?), p.76.
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of the Australian Military Forces. The father of Inez’s friend Maie, still seven 
years from marrying Dick Casey, Ryan was an influential sponsor. But no more 
so than Frank’s seconder, Frederick Fairbairn, Jim Fairbairn’s uncle, who had 
headed the Australian Red Cross in London while Inez was serving there. 
Frank’s appearance in the new edition of Who’s Who in Australia, published in 
1935 after an interval of seven years, acknowledged the position in society he 
had acquired.
The polo-playing colonel and his wife, a tireless supporter of local charities and 
services like baby-health centres, as well as special occasions like a Flemington 
Oaks Day luncheon with her friend Mrs Neville Fairbairn Armytage, regularly 
made the social pages. In town for Cup Week in 1938, The Argus reported many 
of the Western District set stayed at the Hotel Windsor. But the Thornthwaites, 
endowed with the inexhaustible wealth of the Curries, had their own flat in 
the Melbourne Mansions, 99 Collins Street. Admittedly, a house-warming 
party in November 1938 at ‘Gala’, Lismore, which boasted a private links golf 
course, sounded a little more glamorous than it was. The Gala Golf Club course, 
on which Frank competed for the H. O. Nevett Cup in June 1939, wound its 
way through paddocks on Inez’s uncle’s property; the club house was an old 
tin shed with a stone fireplace, a gravel floor, and rough wooden tables and 
benches. Nevertheless, regularly reported events like this, and a farewell to the 
Alex Russells and the Ford Guthries who were about to sail to England, saw an 
assemblage of Fairbairns, Streets, Curries, Chirnsides, and others that confirmed 
Frank and Inez Thornthwaite’s place at the heart of the Victorian aristocracy.27
Intimations of war
Though he made a success of farming, Frank Thornthwaite’s heart was never 
divorced from the military life. He weathered the years of Depression and low 
wool prices and could be optimistic about the future. But the resurgent menace 
of Germany troubled him. Seeing Hitler’s world first hand in 1936, after a 
pilgrimage to the European cemeteries and battlefields he had known so well 20 
years earlier, his concern was heightened. Touring the Rhineland by car shortly 
after it had been re-occupied, he saw hundreds of young Germans marching with 
shovels on their shoulders, ‘quite obviously drilling’.  Inez would remember 
that he remarked almost every day that he felt certain war would come again in 
two or three years. Unhappy that his service training and knowledge had been 
so long neglected, he turned his mind to national defence. He wrote ‘arresting 
and practical’ articles on Australian military needs.
27 The Argus, 19 Feb., 29 Oct., 3 Dec. 1938; Camperdown Chronicle, 22 Sept. 1938; Virginia ‘Bardie’ Mercer, 
telephone interview, 19 Oct. 2009 and ‘Memories of J. V. Fairbairn’, [Dec. 2009].
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When his dearest friend Geoff Street ascended to Cabinet as Minister for Defence 
in the Lyons government late in 1938, it could only be a matter of time before 
a way was found to bring Frank Thornthwaite back into the Army fold. Seven 
months later, on 1 July 1939, he reported for duty as a General Staff Officer, 3rd 
grade in the Chief of the General Staff’s branch. He was raised to 2nd grade and 
a major’s pay on September 2. On November 1, he completed a mobilisation 
attestation form at Sturt Street, South Melbourne, a short walk from Victoria 
Barracks. In April 1940 he was appointed GSO to the Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff, Major General John Northcott. Northcott had been invalided out 
of action for most of the previous war but the two men had spent weeks in each 
other’s company in 1937 when they sailed across the Pacific together with their 
wives on the Aorangi.
Within months, Frank had been poached by the new Chief of the General Staff 
Sir Brudenell White. White was well acquainted with Thornthwaite’s ability 
and record of achievement. The fact that his friend was connected by marriage 
to the Minister for Defence, and was close to Rutherford Guthrie, and to others 
like Jim and Osborne Fairbairn, the Alex Russells, and the Chester Manifolds, 
in the interlocking family networks of the Western District, gave assurance to 
those who mattered that he was a sound man. Moreover, White knew that Frank 
Thornthwaite was more than sound. He had ideas and could express them. His 
own connections, too, were useful. A fellow wartime artillery commander, 
Bertie Lloyd, was recalled to active duty as Deputy Adjutant General at Army 
Headquarters on 1 August 1940.
In a very short time Thornthwaite himself had been noticed by the Prime 
Minister. Newspapers had reported on his attachment to Army intelligence and 
his attendance as an adviser at War Cabinet meetings.28 When the Cabinet was 
due to meet again in Canberra on August 13 he would as always accompany 
his chief, Brudenell White. Fairbairn’s assistant private secretary, Murray 
Tyrrell, was thought to be arranging the final allocation of seats for the flight 
to Canberra. When Pip Hayter, Geoff Street’s private secretary, was told on the 
afternoon of August 12 that he had to get White on to the plane, he telephoned 
Tyrrell at his office in Victoria Barracks. Tyrrell takes up the story:
Pip…said ‘Look Murray, I know it’s late but I want a seat on your aircraft 
in the morning’…And I said I hadn’t got one. He said ‘Well Menzies has 
called a Cabinet meeting for ten [sic] o’clock tomorrow. He wants the 
Chief of the General Staff there.’ And I said ‘Well, if it’s that important, 
28 According to the Courier-Mail and Townsville Bulletin, 30 April 1940, Thornthwaite of ‘the army 
intelligence section’ was among senior officers present as advisors at a War Cabinet meeting on 29 April 1940, 
which discussed defence measures in light of European and Middle Eastern developments, and received a 
report on communist penetration of the AIF and militia.
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it’s immaterial to me. I’ll go in the train tonight.’ My bag was alongside 
my desk, you see. ‘And Brudenell White can have my seat.’ And Pip said 
‘Well, thank you very much. I’m sure the minister will appreciate that.’
With that, Tyrrell rang his wife, Nell, and told her he would not be home as he 
was going to catch the train to Canberra. An hour later, Hayter rang again:
‘Menzies wants the chief of intelligence, Thornthwaite.29 Can you give 
him a seat in the aircraft?’ I said ‘I’ve told you, Pip, the bloody thing’s 
full. I’ve given up my seat.’ And I said ‘If he’s got to go you’re the next 
junior on the sheet. You give him your seat.’ Pip said ‘Oh, come off it.’ 
I said ‘All right, you’re the most junior left, off you go.’ He said ‘Well, 
when you’re booking your passage on the train tonight will you book me 
too?’ So Pip and I came to Canberra on the train, and I put Thornthwaite 
on.30
Bearing a briefcase with the papers that the CGS needed to assimilate before 
the next day’s meetings in Canberra with the other Service chiefs and the 
War Cabinet, Frank Thornthwaite was driven from his Melbourne Mansions 
apartment to join the group at Essendon waiting for Lockheed Hudson A16-97. 
Cheery as always, and recognisable by his uniform to RAAF personnel on the 
tarmac as a colonel on the staff, he boarded the aircraft and looked for a seat 
near his chief.
29 Thornthwaite had been ‘required’ at ‘AHQ M. I.’ in Oct. 1939 (NAA: B884, V159753). Tyrrell to Lord Casey, 
24 Oct. 1972, shows him guessing that Thornthwaite was chief of intelligence (NAA: M1129 WHITE/C B).
30 Sir Murray Tyrrell, interview, 5 April 1977. The Examiner (14 Aug. 1940) reported Hayter’s ‘protest’ at 
being bumped from the flight.
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12. Patriot: Harry Gullett
First of the passengers to arrive at Essendon aerodrome, a man whose chronicles 
of battle made him second only to Charles Bean as a historian of the war that 
Street, Fairbairn, Brudenell White, and Thornthwaite had fought, was Sir Henry 
Gullett. At 62, silver-haired, bespectacled, stooped a little below his measured 
five feet eleven, with years of stress, chain-smoking, and illness etched on his 
face, Gullett was in the twilight of a chequered political career. He had risen 
rapidly in the conservative ranks in the 1920s after making his name as a war 
historian and journalist. He was the son of Rose Somer and Charles Gullett, a 
farmer, his paternal grandfather having emigrated from Devon to Melbourne in 
1853.
Born in Harston in central Victoria in 1878 Harry, as he was known to his 
friends, started his working life on the family farm, leaving school at 12 to 
help his widowed mother. He was a keen reader and began to be attracted to 
a career in journalism. With the right connections it was not hard to get a foot 
in the door. (His sister Isabel would follow the same path.) He wrote articles on 
agricultural themes for the Geelong Advertiser until eventually in 1900 the call 
came to join his uncle Henry and brother-in-law, T. W. Heney, in Sydney. Henry 
Gullett had edited the Sydney Daily Telegraph, and now at the Sydney Morning 
Herald, he invited his nephew to join him. Young Harry learned quickly, and 
was well established by the time his uncle was given a comfortable retirement 
berth in the NSW Legislative Council in 1908.
Although his namesake and patron had been succeeded at the helm of the 
Herald by his brother-in-law, Gullett decided it was time to move on. For the 
next six years he made his base in London, working as a freelance journalist, 
sending articles back to the Sydney Daily Telegraph and The Sun. With a growing 
interest in emigration and development, he lectured and wrote pamphlets in 
association with Australia House. He travelled to the Continent and to the 
western hemisphere where he investigated innovations in irrigation. In 1914 
he published The Opportunity in Australia, a 150-page tract extolling his native 
land as a destination for British emigrants. A year earlier, at 35, he had married 
Penelope Frater in a London registry office.1 The autobiographical opening 
chapter of The Opportunity would help Harry’s bride ― ‘small, dark and full 
of enchantment’ as her grand-daughter would describe her ― to understand 
the elemental forces that had helped shape her husband.2 He was not the match 
1 A. J. Hill, ‘Gullett, Sir Henry Somer (Harry) (1878–1940)’, Nairn and Serle (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 9, MUP, 1983, pp.137–9; Ken Stewart, ‘Heney, Thomas William (1862–1928)’, Nairn and Serle 
(eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 9, pp.258–9.
2 Penne Hackforth-Jones, Barbara Baynton: Between Two Worlds, MUP, 1995 (1st ed. 1989), p.105.
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Penelope’s socially ambitious mother, the widowed writer of Bush Studies, 
Barbara Baynton, had hoped for her daughter. He had grown up in a world 
far removed from the society pages and the Parisian ballet school to which a 
20-year-old Penelope had been despatched. Barbara Baynton had drawn a 
fictional veil over her own youthful rural poverty. Not so Harry. As a child, he 
said, he had thought his life on the half-cleared 320-acre selection in Victoria’s 
Goulburn Valley quite rough and hard: ‘Only in after years, when I had taken 
to the soft life of the cities, did I realise what it was not to have worked with 
the pioneers.’ Now he urged the virtues of Australia’s paternal state, the land on 
offer, the possibilities for the man without capital: ‘Australia is the happiest of 
hunting grounds for the poor man.’3
War chronicler
Within months of the outbreak of war, Harry Gullett was accredited to the 
British and French armies as an Australian Official Correspondent. For the 
next two years he covered the conflict on the Western Front. He was seeing 
war at close quarters but was not happy to be a mere observer. A spell as an 
ambulance driver left him frustrated. Spurning an offered commission in the 
Grenadier Guards, he returned to Australia with Penelope and their infant son 
Joe (the ‘e’ would later be dropped) to enlist in the AIF. On 29 July 1916, aged 
38 years and two months, he went to the Royal Agricultural Showgrounds 
at Moore Park in Sydney and attested. Already known as a propagandist, he 
was before long engaged by Billy Hughes as a speaker in the Prime Minister’s 
conscription campaign. Then, drafted into the artillery, he was sent to England, 
accompanied by his family, on the troopship Osterley.4 Afflicted with pleurisy, 
and plainly not well enough to endure life at the front, his past caught up with 
him. His friend Charlie Bean sought him out to assist with the expanding task 
of collecting war records and preparing for the future creation of a war museum. 
As a Warrant Officer class 1 and Temporary Lieutenant, he was posted to the 
Audit Section, AIF HQ, in August 1917. There, with Bean, and occasionally in 
company with Will Dyson, Hubert Wilkins, Frank Hurley, and Keith Murdoch, 
he saw at first hand the Flanders terrain that was so familiar to the Australian 
infantry: Hill 60, Zonnebeek, Sanctuary Wood, Polygon Wood, the Menin Road, 
and Broodseinde.5
3 H. S. Gullett, The Opportunity in Australia, The Field & Queen (Horace Cox), 1914, pp.1–2, 37.
4 Hackforth-Jones, Barbara Baynton, pp.125–7.
5 Manning, ‘Air Disaster at Canberra,’ Stand-To, Jan.–Feb. 1962, p.8.
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Harry Gullett expresses his frustration to Charlie Bean, December 1917 
(Bean MSS, AWM38 3DRL606/97/1)
Seven weeks later, Gullett was detached and sent to AIF War Records Section in 
London. At Bean’s behest, in November 1917 he was attached ‘for administrative 
purposes’ to Australian HQ in Cairo. Belatedly, Bean had realised the need for an 
Australian war correspondent in Palestine. But there was a thicket of protocol to 
negotiate. The historian Alec Hill explained:
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Brudenell White, the Chief of Staff, refused to put the idea up to 
Birdwood, insisting that such a proposal must come from the Australian 
Government through the High Commissioner in London. It was agreed 
that it should be left for Gullett himself to decide after he had tested 
the feelings of the A.I.F. in Palestine. If he favoured it, Bean was to 
arrange the appointment through the High Commission who would ask 
the Australian Government to seek the approval of the War Office in 
London.6
Successive attachments saw him at the Desert Mounted Corps HQ in December 
1917 and early January 1918 ― ‘after France, a pleasant gentle silent campaign 
(although it is not tactful to say so here)’ ― then 10 days with the 67th Squadron 
Australian Flying Corps, and another 10 days each with the 3rd  and 4th Light 
Horse Brigades. He then had a month detached to ICC Brigade, followed by two 
months at the 2nd Light Horse Brigade HQ before being appointed OIC, sub-
section Australian War Records, in May 1918. 
His peripatetic existence in the new role Bean had envisaged was to continue 
for what turned out to be the last four months of the war. Relinquishing his 
war records post and the temporary rank of Lieutenant, Gullett was attached 
initially to the Desert Mounted Corps, and finally designated Assistant Official 
Correspondent, AIF in Egypt. His appointment was terminated late in September 
1919.7
While based in Cairo, taking notes and drafting historical chapters, Harry kept 
up a stream of informative letters to Penelope. His pen pictures, written in great 
haste, were vivid and warm in their appreciation of Australian endeavours. He 
had told of his admiration of Brudenell White in France in September 1917. In 
Palestine in November 1917 he wrote of a morning meeting with Major General 
Sir Harry Chauvel:
He gave me an hour & was most cordial & frank. A slight almost elegant 
man of scarcely average height: dried & wrinkled; a typical little 
horseman from Queensland, with a quiet confident manner; speech slow 
& diffident & occasionally a flashing smile of extraordinary charm. He 
is not as direct & humorous as White perhaps but there is capacity all 
over him & a gentleman of the rare kind. Queensland has been strangely 
rich in leadership. Nine of our generals come from there & this man & 
White are big fellows.8
6 A. J. Hill, ‘Introduction’, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914–1918: Official History 
of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, vol. VII, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1984 [1st ed. 1923].
7 Gullett to Bean, 7 Dec. 1917, Bean MSS, AWM: 38, 3DRL606/97/1; Notes compiled 1933, AWM: 43 A327.
8 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, 27 Nov. 1917, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/5/31.
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WCdr Dicky Williams: still a ‘fearsome disciplinarian’ ca 1925
(Courtesy of the RAAF Museum)
It was not only the senior officers who caught Gullett’s eye. He wrote from 
Jerusalem in July 1918 of a twilight visit to No. 1 Squadron AFC, where he 
pulled up outside the flight commander’s big tent:
You would have been gratified at the affectionate greeting. Of the three 
‘flyers’ one grabbed my baggage, another left for the mess for a large 
bottle of Bass & the third laid out his bath & filled it with water. Such 
charming boys. Ross Smith the star among them got two Huns in very 
brilliant fashion yesterday. They dived as he attacked & flew very low 
among some wadies [sic]. He downed them when they were within 50 
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feet of the ground by sheer pugnacious pursuit within a few yards of 
the ground. Then he photographed them…He is the South Australian I 
once said had the manners of a prince: he would stand very close to top 
in our gallery of young Australians…He is an inspiration to every man 
in the squadron both as a great airman & a personality.
Gullett’s status as historian in uniform enabled him to move freely among all 
ranks. It helped that his friend Major A. B. ‘Banjo’ Patterson, commanding the 
Australian Remount Squadron, entrusted him with good horses. Shortly after 
the memorable interlude with the former Light Horseman Ross Smith and his 
companions, he had tea with ‘Colonel Williams’, now commanding the wing, 
whom he described as: ‘Just a well grown goody goody schoolboy…A fearsome 
disciplinarian. He has made a great Australian squadron of this…Williams is 
capable of almost anything.’9 Richard ‘Dicky’ Williams didn’t drink, smoke, or 
swear but was ‘not only popular, but he was also deeply respected throughout 
his squadron’.10 He was to be a towering presence in Australian military aviation 
for another 25 years.
A week later, Gullett completed two articles on ‘the flying people’.11 When he 
came to write the official history of the Australians in Sinai and Palestine four 
years later, Gullett was to refer in passing to No. 1 Squadron and its commanding 
officer, ‘a young Australian of marked capacity’ and the reputation of Williams’ 
unit ‘recognised as a great battle-squadron, and…at the same time conspicuous 
as a model of efficiency in all mechanical work and administration’.12
By mid-1918 there were hopes that a way might be found to escape to London 
to join Penelope and their three-year-old son for a break from duty. He had been 
awarded a C. B.: not the decorations and mentions of his cousin Sid, nor the 
distinction in battle of Sid’s younger brother who was killed in action; but it was 
welcome recognition of the earnest and sometimes dangerous duties to which he 
had been summoned. He was already beginning to look forward to a post-war 
world. As he told his friend Jack Latham, who was ‘fully and usefully employed’ 
in naval intelligence in Melbourne, whatever they had done in the past few 
years would ‘be nothing to the employment that will lie before everybody at the 
conclusion of the War’. Looking back he lamented: ‘the pity of the business is 
that so much splendid work in 1915 was interrupted by irresponsible criticism, 
which can only be described as crazy. I have never yet been able to understand 
why Australian people swallowed such stuff, however that cannot be helped.’13
9 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, 21–24 July 1918, Gullett MSS, NLA MS  3078/5/190.
10 L. W. Sutherland in collaboration with Norman Ellison, Aces and Kings, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 
1935, p.57.
11 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, 31 July 1918, Gullett MSS, NLA MS  3078/5/364.
12 H. S. Gullett, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine 1914–1918, Angus & Robertson, 
Sydney, 1923, p.658.
13 Gullett to Latham, 17 June 1918, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/20/651A.
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The opportunity to better inform the Australian people about their ‘forgotten 
army’ in Palestine had been thrust upon Gullett in the closing stages of the 
war. As he explained to Penelope about the thwarting of their plans for a 
reunion in London: ‘There was nothing to stop it until they sprang the job as 
correspondent...The position is this. The whole force has resented having no 
publicity & there has been the strongest desire that I should do it.’ Badly as 
he felt, ‘it would be very questionable to go off for three months…there are 
some 15 000 to 20 000 men here & most of them have been away for years. They 
& their people at home will be greatly pleased to see the Light Horse written 
about.’14
A cataract of articles came from his typewriter over the next few months. Yet 
there was always time for a long bulletin of news for Penelope. At the end of 
August he once again visited the fighter squadron:
Young McGinness who already had two certain and one probable 
German to his credit this week yesterday got two more in a very brilliant 
fight over our lines. A more unlikely looking coot you never saw: very 
fair with wild straight fair hair hanging nearly to his eyes: hatchet faced 
round shouldered with upper teeth always showing. But such a nice 
modest boy. I congratulated him & he said ‘O I only steered the old bus 
while Fysh shot them.’ Fysh was the observer, a long innocuous pleasant-
faced Tasmanian not yet done growing. McGinty as the squadron call 
him gave me the compass from one of the Hun machines, or what was 
left of it after a fall of 12 000 feet. I said I would hand it in to Trophies. 
‘In that case,’ he said, ‘I’ll keep it. I want you to have it yourself.’ So I 
have it for Joe.15
The correspondent’s life was replete with surprises and excitements. None 
revealed more of his character than the aftermath of the Surafend incident, 
when some 200 men of the Anzac Mounted Division ‘cleaned up’ a village in 
which a New Zealand sergeant had been killed by an Arab caught in the act of 
stealing a rifle. The Anzacs had waited in vain for some action from GHQ before 
angrily taking the matter into their own hands. A rum-fuelled rampage left 
scores of dead Bedouin and a village in embers. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir 
Edmund Allenby, had the troops assembled and rebuked them as cowards and 
murderers. No culprits were identified or charged. But the entire division was 
sent to Rafa, a desolate semi-desert post, with all leave cancelled and those on 
leave recalled. As a further mark of displeasure, the forthcoming honours list 
contained no names from the offending division. When the Australian and New 
14 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, 26–28 July 1918, Gullett MSS, NLA MS  3078/5/205.
15 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, 1–4 Sept. 1918, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/5/259. Hudson Fysh and ‘Young 
McGinnis’ would become two of the founders of Qantas.
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Zealand troops were about to return home in June 1919, Gullett took it upon 
himself to warn Allenby of the unwisdom of allowing their deep resentment 
to fester. The general attempted to order Gullett to withdraw. But, no longer 
a mere lieutenant, and now in civilian clothes and holding an appointment 
from the Australian government, he stood his ground. Allenby at last saw the 
point. This was no time to hazard Imperial ill-will. The Anzacs had after all been 
instrumental in bringing him some considerable victories. A hastily concocted 
order of the day was printed and distributed throughout the departing division 
and to every Australian and New Zealander in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. It 
was typical of Gullett that when he wrote of this incident in his official history 
of the war he did not identify himself as the man who had confronted the 
Commander-in- Chief.16
Politics or nothing
When the war was almost over it was time for a fundamental decision. Before 
returning to England, Gullett had sent a long letter from Cairo to his ‘darling 
Penelope’ setting out his thoughts:
Have some writing to do. Hard to work: now the long strain is over I am 
panting to get back to work — this time constructive work I pray that 
you will be interested in.
The Labour people at home will be hard to swallow. And they must 
be swallowed whole: if I start there I must burn my boats & curb my 
restlessness & temper & go in for better or worse. It is that or no politics 
or ambition at all. I have flirted with the idea of the Other Side but it’s 
no use: I can’t see myself as the champion of Fat. Had I myself attained to 
Fatness it might have been different. But that I should spend the rest of 
my life working to make Fat still fatter is unthinkable. Even with riches 
I have I think been politically for Labour. Without riches the decision is 
easier. It will be hard to take sides against many good friends in the AIF 
who are uncompromising. But all in all we have few we care about as far 
as that. We are so independent & complete in our happiness.
16 Lieut.-Col. G. F. Langley DSO, ‘Sir Henry Gullett, A Tribute’, Reveille, Dec. 1940, p.8. Langley dined with 
Gullett immediately after the meeting with Allenby. The story is repeated in George F. and Edmée M. Langley, 
Sand, Sweat and Camels, Seal Books Sydney, 1980 (1st ed. Rigby 1976), pp.174–5; Gullett, The Australian 
Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, pp.790–1. Paul Daley, Beersheba: A journey through Australia’s forgotten 
war, MUP, 2009, pp.251–304, Terry Kinloch, Devils on Horses: in the words of the Anzacs in the Middle East 
1916–19, Exisle Publishers, Auckland, 2007, pp.329–34, and Peter Rees, Desert Boys: Australians at war 
from Beersheba to Tobruk and El Alamein, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2011, pp.285–90 examine the Surafend 
‘massacre’.
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Boats burned and heading towards politics
(Courtesy of Peter and Kate Gullett)
The way ahead, as Harry saw it, was if possible to join a new Labor newspaper, 
The World, in Sydney which would serve as a ‘good platform for my political 
apprenticeship’. Convinced in his bones that he could make a unique contribution 
to Labor, he knew that he needed to work on his public speaking. It might take 
three years before he could get into federal Parliament but, once in, he was sure 
his progress would not be slow. The only alternative was London:
I have no ambitions in journalism in Australia: it is politics or nothing 
for me & also I think for you. London would be a surrender — pleasant 
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm
248
but a surrender. Our lives would go gaily enough & we should live in a 
House Beautiful & rejoice in Joe. But feeling as I do today more confident 
& full of fight than I have ever been, London is not satisfying.17
While still in London he told Penelope: ‘I should give a fortune to be out on the 
Labour ticket next elections in Australia. With a good propagandist on their side 
they will sweep H & Co into the sea. The present administration is a hopeless 
thing & is not improving.’18 As Press Liaison Officer to the Prime Minister at 
the Paris Peace Conference, he had seen enough of Hughes to form a definite 
judgement. But needing to work and earn an income, and with a second child 
on the way, he did not vex his chief with unnecessary dissent. He was aware 
that if he were to start expressing political views on the platform or in the press 
his government work must cease. It had to be all government work or none. And 
the choice could not be long delayed.
Not yet swept into the sea, and oblivious to Gullett’s true sentiments, Billy 
Hughes invited Gullett to become director of the proposed Australian War 
Museum, relieving the over-burdened Bean. It was a creative job enlivened by 
good company, as his son remembered:
My father used to rise very early and work a couple of hours on his 
history. Then he set off to the Exhibition Building on the old cable tram. 
On Sunday mornings artists and soldiers would come to our house with 
notes, sketches, maps and battle pictures. General Chauvel and General 
White rode up on horses, while Generals Gellibrand and Glasgow came 
by taxi, because there were no trams on Sunday morning. Albert Jacka, 
the most famous of all Australian fighting soldiers with his VC, MC and 
Bar, rode a bicycle. Bill Dyson and George Lambert walked the mile or 
so from the railway station. Only our cousin Sid Gullett drove his own 
car.19
Enjoyable as his post at the War Museum was, Gullett still had a career in public 
life in mind. In 1920, he accepted an offer from Hughes to become director of 
the Australian Immigration Bureau, a role he seems to have devised for himself. 
Soon falling out with the Prime Minister over immigration policy (‘a wretched 
quarrel’ as he told his lawyer friend Jack Latham), he ‘left the work ― officially 
― with very deep regret, not impulsively but only after long consideration & 
when I was convinced that things must get worse before they could improve’.20 
A day after his resignation, a cable from Lord Northcliffe in London offered 
17 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, 3 Nov. 1918, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/5/301.
18 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, [n.d. ?1919], Gullett Family MSS.
19 Gullett, Good Company, pp.2–3.
20 Gullett to Latham, 5 March 1922, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/995.
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him a senior post on The Times. It was the kind of appointment few journalists 
would have resisted. His Army friend George Langley was with him when the 
message arrived:
…he quickly made up his mind to decline the offer — giving two 
reasons for so doing — he thought it would look like funking it if he left 
Australia then. He preferred to stay and resolved at once to try politics, 
entering the lists as a critic of the P.M. His second reason was that he 
wanted his son Joe…to ‘grow up an Australian’.21
There was a third reason. After prolonged editorial battles, his Official History 
volume was close to publication. His narrative of the Australian Light Horsemen 
at war in the Middle East was imbued with respect and admiration for ‘the very 
flower of their race’. In a book of almost 800 pages, he told a story of courage 
and achievement by ‘a remarkable band of brothers in arms…drawn from a wide 
and fragrant countryside, animated by a noble cause, thrilled and expectant 
with the sense of a grand adventure in foreign lands, and knit together by the 
common interest of their peace-time callings and the still closer ties of personal 
friendship and affection’. The lyrical portrait of the ‘Light Horseman and his 
Horse’, preceded a lengthy exposition of tactical insight, generous character 
assessment, and vivid action.
Some British experts in particular would find fault with what they thought 
‘fierce and unfair criticism’. But the book was an impressive effort, nearly 300 000 
words long, comparable in scope, if not quite in authority, with the works of 
Bean on the more popular themes of the Western Front and Gallipoli. Unlike 
Bean, however, Gullett did not invest his Desert Mounted Corps heroes with too 
grand a moral mission. Downplaying the indiscipline of the troops in the Holy 
Places that so troubled their superiors, he told Bean, ‘their campaign was to a 
remarkable extent one with a casual sporting purpose to which they bent all 
their high intelligence and endeavour’. His aim was to provide a ‘clear honest 
narrative’ that would serve both as a military textbook and a book for the general 
reader. Intentionally or not, it was to have the effect of making reputations for 
the commanders whose praises he sang. Much as he admired Sir Harry Chauvel, 
however, he resisted some of Chauvel’s strongly pressed suggestions. As Gullett 
himself noted, the usually un-self-congratulatory Chauvel saw the potential for 
‘a good deal of self-advertisement’ in the book.22
21 Langley, ‘Sir Henry Gullett…’, p.8.
22 Daley, Beersheba, p.298; The Times, 14 Aug. 1940; Christopher Lee, ‘“War is not a Christian Mission”: 
Racial Invasion and Religious Crusade’ in H. S. Gullett’s Official History of the Australian Imperial Force in 
Sinai and Palestine’, Journal of the Association for the Study of Australian Literature, vol. 7, 2007, pp.85–96; 
Hill, ‘Introduction’, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914–1918.
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In ill-health, and incensed at the criticism of his text from Angus and Robertson’s 
editors, Gullett had threatened to withdraw the manuscript, pay back his fee 
to the Defence Department, and publish the book himself. Dissuaded by Bean 
from extreme measures, he would soon enjoy public acclaim and qualified 
professional commendation. In what was generally regarded as an engaging 
if ‘over coloured’ journalistic account, clichés and banalities were noted by 
discerning reviewers, though there was little reaction to the assumption of racial 
inferiority implicit in passages about the peoples of Palestine and the Sinai. 
It would be many years before shifting cultural values and a new generation 
of military historians brought significant revision of a work that the author 
himself was glad to put behind him.23
On the hustings, with trade-mark bow tie
(Courtesy of Peter and Kate Gullett)
23 Suzanne Brugger, Australians and Egypt 1914–1919, MUP, 1980, pp.72–5; Graham Wilson, Bully Beef 
& Balderdash: Some Myths of the AIF Examined and Debunked, Big Sky Publishing, Newport NSW, 2012, 
pp.211–3 for Gullett’s failure to correct false stories of the fate of the horses of the Light Horse.
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Political intent
As his historical task was coming to an end, both Gullett and his friend Jack 
Latham stood for the House of Representatives. Latham succeeded as an anti-
Hughes candidate in 1922. It took Gullett, who had been working as news 
editor of the Melbourne Herald, a second attempt before he was elected in 1925 
as an Independent Nationalist for Henty, centred on the Melbourne bayside 
suburb of Brighton. Independent of Hughes, independent of Labor, Gullett cast 
himself into the fray as a Nationalist who would accept no party whip. George 
Langley, formerly of the Camel Corps and the 5th Light Horse Regiment and now 
back teaching in country Victoria, was at his side during the electioneering.24 In 
the meantime, Gullett had foreshadowed something of his own future political 
spirit and instincts in letters to Latham. Commending Latham on an independent 
vote, he wrote, ‘The rigid party line is an accursed thing.’25 While working at 
the Herald he confessed: ‘I find it extremely difficult to abstain from rebellion 
against the prolonged idleness of the men of big personality and ability…And I 
cannot escape the conviction that the Country Party fellows are playing a very 
selfish game.’ Gullett had seen a good deal of Stanley Bruce, ‘in a personal way’, 
and formed the opinion that the Prime Minister would have:
…broken the show up but for his difficulty in forming an all-Nationalist 
team which would have been in the least impressive. He has had an 
exceedingly trying time and is very anxious lest the continuation of the 
Composite Government should weaken Nationalists now holding rural 
seats.26
Almost from the beginning of his parliamentary career, Gullett found much 
about the life disagreeable. ‘God knows I am no saint,’ he told his wife in 
February 1928, ‘but I feel at least a little too decent to remain long in this dirty 
game.’ He felt as though he was ‘in the gun’ and would never get to the front 
bench in the absence of drastic change. Riding for a while with a small group of 
independent Nationalist backbenchers, he certainly did not advance his cause 
by characterising the Country Party leader Earle Page in November 1927 as ‘the 
most tragic Treasurer’ Australia had ever had.27 The defeat of Bruce and the loss 
of half a dozen of his supporters might, he thought, produce a different story 
after the next election.28 He had made up his mind to go his own way, ‘careless 
24 George F. and Edmée M. Langley, Sand, Sweat and Camels, pp. xv, 144.
25 Gullett to Latham, 16 Aug. 1923, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/1112.
26 Gullett to Latham, 11 Aug. 1924, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/1270.
27 C. J. Lloyd, ‘The Formation and Development of the United Australia Party’, Ph.D. thesis, Australian 
National University, 1984, p.24, courtesy of the late Professor Clem Lloyd.
28 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, 22 Feb. 1928, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/5/595–7.
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of consequences’, in the next House. But it was not long before Bruce took him 
aside for the kind of heart to heart conversation that party leaders bestow on 
promising but recalcitrant backbenchers:
He had me marked for early inclusion in Ministry. He dwelt on my many 
qualities; pressed the point that outside the Ministry I could do nothing 
along the lines I believed in, while inside I could use my influence. He 
was a reasonable man, always prepared to listen &c &c.
He said nothing as to future & I can only guess at what he was driving 
at…I gave no assurances, but admitted frankly that our repeated 
disagreements were a keen disappointment to me & that I regarded the 
future without much personal satisfaction.29
Gullett would not have to wait for Bruce’s misfortune before making the longed-
for advance. In November 1928 he was appointed Minister for Trade and 
Customs. Among his first social engagements as a member of the Cabinet was 
a dinner he gave for Sir Hugo Hirst, chairman and managing director of the 
General Electric Company, who was visiting Australia with three other British 
industrialists and their wives. The delegation had come at the invitation of the 
Prime Minister to give advice on economic development. Hirst recorded his 
impressions of the new minister as ‘a most cultured man’ who ‘seems to have 
been a journalist at one time’. Hirst was struck by the decorations in the Gullett 
house that ‘show in good taste’ records of his travels in Japan and the East, 
Canada, and Europe. Like almost everyone, he found Penny Gullett charming.30
There was real work to do as a minister; but less than a year later Gullett was 
out of office when the Bruce–Page government was defeated at the polls. With a 
Labor government in power, and his former leader Bruce departed, Gullett felt 
‘without much direction politically’. Yet his career advanced. As Deputy Leader 
of the Opposition under Latham there was some relief to be felt that it was 
James Scullin and his Labor colleagues who were at the helm at a time of world 
economic crisis. It was Labor that would have to bear the opprobrium for some 
years of ‘increasing expenditure & falling revenues ― and more direct taxes’.31 
As Jack Lang remembered, Gullett was ‘the gad-fly who harassed the Scullin 
Government incessantly’.32 Gradually, from a vantage point in the inner circle, 
he was becoming more comfortable with the moneyed interests he had once 
disdained. The lack of direction was perhaps further mitigated by the news 
that the National Union, the Collins Street powerbrokers, had granted him up 
29 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, [n.d. 1928], Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/5/600.
30 Sir Hugo Hirst’s diary, 25 Nov. 1928, 6 Jan. 1929, MS Marconi 3174, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
31 Gullett to Latham, 3 Feb. 1930, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/1956.
32 J. T. Lang, The Great Bust: The Depression of the Thirties, McNamara’s Books, Katoomba, 1980 (1st ed. 
Angus & Robertson 1962), p.311.
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to ₤400 a year to pay for a secretary.33 Direction was certainly found when the 
departure of Joe Lyons from the Labor ranks and the formation of the United 
Australia Party soon brought an end to Labor rule. Gullett, working closely with 
Menzies, had been privy to the manoeuvrings with Lyons, his friend and fellow 
Athenaeum Club man Keith Murdoch, and others that led to the new party. He 
was present when Menzies vetoed Earle Page as ‘No. 2’, thereby determining 
that the conservative forces were to go ahead without the Country Party.34 In 
the new configuration Latham, having deferred to Lyons as leader, assumed 
Gullett’s role of Deputy Leader of the Opposition. After the UAP’s landslide 
victory in the general election of December 1931, Gullett entered the Lyons 
Cabinet, once again as Minister for Trade and Customs.35
The political ferment of the next few months, with ‘secret’ and not so secret 
armies competing in alarms and excursions, left few political leaders completely 
untouched. Unfounded fears of communist revolution and well-founded 
concern about the intentions of the New South Wales government under Jack 
Lang, brought many prominent businessmen, pastoralists, and retired military 
officers into anxious conclave. Among the first to congratulate Gullett on his new 
appointment was Captain L. W. Sutherland, secretary of the militant and highly 
visible anti-communist group, the New Guard. Leslie ‘Woodie’ Sutherland 
was a former Australian Flying Corps observer whose service in Palestine had 
brought him a DCM and an MC as well as several mentions in Fred Cutlack’s 
official history of the AFC at war.36 Cutlack, now a leader writer for the Sydney 
Morning Herald, remained an ally in advancing patriotic causes.37 In the late 
1920s, having been invalided out of the RAAF after an accident, Sutherland 
was aviation representative for the Vacuum Oil Company; in that capacity he 
was closely involved with Charles Kingsford-Smith, Charles Ulm, and Keith 
Anderson. He had testified to the ‘Coffee Royal’ Inquiry that Anderson had 
not followed regulation procedure in ‘swinging’ of the Kookaburra’s compass 
at Richmond before the fatal flight with Bobby Hitchcock. ‘Highly intelligent 
and of adventurous disposition’, as a secret naval intelligence division report 
described him, Sutherland now wrote to ‘Harry’ Gullett introducing ‘a close 
personal friend of mine Capt De Groot’.
33 E. H. Willis to Latham, 25 Feb. 1930, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/1961.
34 Anne Henderson, Enid Lyons: Leading Lady to a Nation, Pluto Press Australia, North Melbourne, 2008, 
p.161; Anne Henderson, Joseph Lyons: The People’s Prime Minister, Newsouth, Sydney, 2011, p.290.
35 ‘The Rise and Fall of the United Australia Party’, is authoritatively distilled by Clem Lloyd in J. R. 
Nethercote (ed.), Liberalism and the Australian Federation, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2001, pp.134–62; for 
‘The Politics of the Depression’ Allan W. Martin’s essay in Robert Manne (ed.), The Australian Century, Text 
Publishing Melbourne, 1999, pp.80-118, remains unsurpassed.
36 Sutherland to Gullett, 28 Jan. 1932, NAA A367/1, C94121; F. M. Cutlack, The Australian Flying Corps 
in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War 1914–1918, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1935 (1st ed. 1923). 
Sutherland’s own war stories, written in collaboration with Norman Ellison, are in Aces and Kings, published 
in 1935.
37 Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, pp.123, 131.
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According to Sutherland, Attorney-General Jack Latham had been anxious to 
contact Eric Campbell, the New Guard leader, ‘re some departmental matter’. 
Campbell was a decorated artillery officer, and now a well-connected solicitor 
with command experience in the Militia. He had been retained for some time 
by Vacuum Oil where he came into close contact with the former post-war 
Director of Artillery, Brigadier-General Herbert Lloyd, who punctuated his 
military and business career with spells as a Nationalist, and later UAP MP in 
the NSW Parliament. Campbell had achieved considerable publicity in 1929 
representing Kingsford-Smith and Ulm as they defended themselves against 
allegations that their disappearance in the Kimberley was a stunt arranged with 
Keith Anderson. He had been intimately connected with the shadowy groups 
of businessmen, graziers, and ex-officers gathered together in 1930 amid fears 
of revolutionary anarchy. By 1932, having broken away in February 1931 from 
what came to be known as the Old Guard, he had recruited his own New Guard 
with as many as 36 000 adherents. Herbert Lloyd initially occupied the deputy 
leadership role. Kingsford-Smith was, it seems, designated by Campbell as the 
head of an air wing if the New Guard were ever to be mobilised to keep order. 
Both Campbell and Gullett’s parliamentary colleague Frederick Stewart were 
directors of Kingsford-Smith’s company, Australian National Airways.
Meanwhile, Captain Frank De Groot had been detailed to see the Attorney-
General. It was 28 January 1932 and the NSW Premier J. T. Lang’s populist 
economic policies were causing increasing alarm in conservative financial and 
political circles. Evidently Gullett acted promptly on the request that he assist 
De Groot to contact Latham. If Gullett did not know Campbell, he certainly 
would have known of him. Campbell had been associated in a para-military 
venture with Major Jack Scott, at the instigation of former Prime Minister 
Stanley Bruce in 1925. Scott was now chief of staff of the Old Guard, with 
whom the New South Wales police had a quiet understanding. Sutherland’s 
letter bears a handwritten note from Latham to the Director of the Intelligence 
Bureau: ‘Brought to me by Capt de Groot to whom I explained that I had not 
sought contact with Col. Campbell but that, as A. G., I wd be glad to receive any 
authentic information which might prove of value.’38
Latham, long enmeshed with the intelligence community and forces arrayed 
against communism, appears to have been economical with the truth about his 
contact with Campbell.39 On the same day, from his office in the Sydney Morning 
38 NAA: A367/1, C94121. The connection between De Groot, Campbell, and Latham is acknowledged in 
Andrew Moore, ‘De Groot, Francis Edward (Frank) (1888–1969)’, Christopher Cunneen et al (eds), Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, Supplementary Volume, MUP, 2005, pp.97–9, and explored more fully in Moore’s 
Francis De Groot: Irish Fascist Australian Legend, Federation Press, Sydney, 2005, and ‘Loyal lieutenant or 
spy? Frank De Groot and the intelligence services’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. 96, 
Pt 2, Dec. 2010, pp.201–20, the latter of which came to hand after these paragraphs were written.
39 For Latham as legal officer for Monash’s special constables during the 1923 Victorian police strike, and 
the support of the anti-Bolshevik Australian Legion for his early parliamentary candidacies, see Andrew 
Moore, The Right Road: A History of Right-wing Politics in Australia, OUP, Melbourne, 1995, p.28.
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Herald building, Campbell wrote direct to Latham introducing De Groot who 
was, he said, ‘known to Mr Gullett’. It appears that Gullett’s old colleague and 
‘very close friend’ Fred Cutlack had acted as an intermediary, and Campbell 
acknowledged that it might be embarrassing for Latham to see him personally.40 
Campbell did not need to add that De Groot was well-known as a former 
reproduction furniture manufacturer, shop-fitter, and antique dealer, as well as 
a prominent supporter of the Red Cross Limbless Soldiers’ Association. Latham 
met De Groot but was careful to put on record for the director of the Investigation 
Bureau that he had given no undertaking, agreement, or understanding about 
future government action. He would, however, ‘be glad to receive at any time 
useful information — rather than hearsay accounts — from any source’.
Whatever authentic information Latham received directly from Campbell’s 
camp, the government was well-informed about the New Guard, especially its 
wilder elements, and soon recognised, along with the New South Wales police, 
that it was better treated with caution, as more a threat to ‘constituted authority’ 
than an ally in the cause of social harmony. De Groot’s spectacular intervention 
at the opening of the Sydney Harbour Bridge caught the public imagination. 
But more-sinister plans were germinating. When Campbell cabled the Prime 
Minister in April 1932 offering to place the New Guard at the government’s 
disposal in the event of an emergency, he was politely rebuffed. ‘We deprecate 
the suggestion that an emergency is likely to arise that will require intervention 
by the Commonwealth and the use of organised force,’ Lyons wrote.41
Gullett, as Minister for Customs, was too cautious to have allied himself with 
Campbell’s quasi-fascist and fractious movement. He was neither attractive 
to, nor attracted by, secret armies. But some of his parliamentary colleagues 
were not bashful about their New Guard links. It was evident that there was 
considerable overlap between those in the community who looked to the 
New Guard as a guarantor of public safety and those who saw in the United 
Australia Party the answer to the nation’s political troubles. The newly-elected 
UAP MP for Parramatta, Frederick Stewart, was most conspicuous. A director 
of Associated Newspapers, as well as chairman of Kingsford-Smith and Ulm’s 
airline, ANA, Stewart openly assisted the Guard by making part of his Sydney 
bus fleet available to convey a bizarre fire-fighting expedition to Cobar.42 He was 
soon to become Minister for Commerce and to take over trade negotiations from 
an exhausted Gullett.
40 Re Cutlack as a very close friend: Gullett to A.R. Wiggins, 3 Jan. 1933, Gullett Family MSS.
41 Campbell to Attorney-General, 28 Jan. 1932; Maj. H. E. Jones to A/g Attorney-General, 1 March 1932, 
‘The New Guard and “The Association”’, NAA: A367/1, C94121; Cables Campbell to Lyons and reply 6,7 April 
1932, Lyons MSS, NLA MS 4851 Box 1, folder 4; Moore, Francis De Groot, pp.48–51,56–81; Richard Evans, 
‘“A menace to this realm” The New Guard and the New South Wales police, 1931–32’, History Australia, 5(3), 
Dec. 2008, DOI: 10.2104/ha080076.
42 Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, p.149; Mackersey, Smithy, pp.204–5, 253.
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It was only 10 months later, after playing a key role in defending Australian 
trade interests at the Ottawa imperial economic conference ― his ‘fiery temper 
was useful’ Stanley Bruce would recall ― that Gullett’s health broke down.43 
After four months of convalescence he felt compelled to resign his office. As 
Charles Bean was to summarise this phase of his life, he ‘rounded off his work 
at the Ottawa Conference with one of the greatest speeches ever delivered in 
our Parliament, and with the permanent loss of his health’.44 Consoled with 
a knighthood, ‘like all the political ones, purely an accident but…a pleasant 
souvenir of the happy, if somewhat hazardous, Ottawa enterprise’, he might 
have supposed that he would spend the rest of his political career on the UAP 
back benches.45
‘A fanatical Australian’ 
‘The main purpose of the United Australia Party’, a young Sydney scholar 
had pronounced in 1935, was to keep the ALP out of office. ‘It is not bound 
together by any principle that it can claim as peculiarly its own.’ If anything 
held together ‘the chequered and speckled complicated piece of cabinet-making 
known as the United Australia Party’, it was ‘a determination to defend the 
rights of property’.46 It was to be expected therefore that men like Geoff Street 
and Jim Fairbairn would be found among the UAP’s most active figures. Nor 
was it strange that the announced policy of what was left of the New Guard in 
August 1934 was to give whole-hearted support to the UAP at the next federal 
general election. But Harry Gullett? During a decade and a half of political 
turmoil and re-alignment he had found a home outside the Labor Party to which 
he had at first been attracted. For all his instinctual revulsion from fat capitalists, 
his vision was of development and immigration, an Australia of prosperous 
farms and pasture but also of burgeoning towns providing work for builders, 
carpenters, plumbers. He saw too a future for secondary industry. As early as 
1914 he had written: ‘For nearly a century the squatters produced the bulk of 
Australia’s wealth; but the second century is to belong not to the squatter but 
to the farmer and the industrialist.’47 ‘He was,’ remembered Sir Larry Hartnett, 
‘a fanatical Australian, absolutely crazy to get a motor car manufactured.’48
43 Cecil Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne: Man of Two Worlds, Heinemann, London, 1965, p.211.
44 Reveille, Sept. 1940, p.8. Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘Australia and the Ottawa Conference’, Working Papers in 
Economic History, No. 122, Jan. 1989, Research School of Social Sciences, ANU.
45 Gullett to Sir Hugo Hirst Bt, 11 March 1933, Gullett MSS, NLA MS ANU 3078/3/468.
46 J. A. McCallum, ‘The Economic Bases of Australian Politics’, W. G. K. Duncan (ed.), Trends in Australian 
Politics, Angus & Robertson in conjunction with the Australian Institute of Political Science, Sydney, 1935, 
pp.62–4.
47 Gullett, The Opportunity in Australia, p.114.
48 Recollections of Sir Laurence Hartnett, 16 Sept. 1977: Joe Rich, Hartnett: Portrait of a Technocratic 
Brigand, Turton & Armstrong, Sydney, 1996, pp.102–7.
12 . Patriot: Harry Gullett
257
Gullett was a man of enthusiasms, with a deep belief in the potential of government 
to make the nation a better place. For such a man, thoughts of retirement were 
premature. Lyons brought him back after the 1934 general election as Minister 
without Portfolio with responsibility for trade treaties. When he returned to 
the government he had not foreseen the difficulties ahead, not least his own 
ill-health. Jim Fairbairn would tell Charles Hawker in February 1935 that their 
friend ‘looked like death (or a candidate for the mad house)’. In London in 
October 1935, he was contemplating but rejecting the idea of resigning: ‘There 
is nobody else for the job & it must be done.’49 Reflecting on the experience 
when in due course he did resign, he told one of his old wartime heroes, the 
‘serene and unpretentious little man’ Sir Harry Chauvel, ‘I had rather an awful 
2½ years because of the fact that after my illness I joined in a junior capacity, 
and yet was called upon to handle so much important work.’50
The important work to which Gullett had to turn his hand was the government’s 
policy of ‘trade diversion’. In May 1936 he was to announce the new policy 
designed to increase export of primary produce, expand secondary industry, 
and generate rural and industrial employment. A key element of the plan 
entailed preference for ‘great customers’ like Britain and correspondingly 
higher tariffs on Japanese textiles. When the pastoral industry, particularly the 
NSW graziers, mounted a campaign against the government’s policy, Gullett was 
staunch with Lyons and the Country Party leader, Earle Page, in standing firm 
against pressure from wool growers and brokers to accede to Japanese demands. 
Restrictions on Japanese rayon and cotton exports to Australia looked to some 
like a capitulation to British cotton manufacturers. Gullett explained the policy 
privately to the Governor-General: ‘If we cannot keep within definite bounds 
the import and competition of goods produced by Eastern standards (not only 
in textiles but in all manufactures) there is no safe future for British Australia.’51
Unimpressed graziers, abetted initially by Gullett’s erstwhile Cabinet colleague 
Charles Hawker, saw the minister with responsibility for trade treaties as the 
author of their prospective misfortunes. Bob Menzies, Deputy Leader of the 
UAP, was quietly letting it be known that he had misgivings about the way 
negotiations were being conducted.52 But there was an ‘inwardness’ about the 
policy. Hawker, understanding the political danger of a stalemate and public 
conflict between pastoral interests and the UAP, eventually came round to 
support a compromise government position. Gullett and Lyons were edging 
49 Fairbairn to Hawker, 28 Feb. 1935, Hawker MSS, NLA MS 4848/1/1; Gullett to Lady Gullett, 17 Oct. 1935, 
Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/5/626.
50 Gullett to Chauvel, 22 March 1937, copy, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/3/40; Gullett, The Australian 
Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, p.698.
51 Gullett to Lord Gowrie, 10 Jan. 1937, Gowrie MSS NLA MS 2852/5/9.
52 J. P. Moffat’s diary, 11–12 Feb. 1937, microfilm copy, NLA G7251.
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their way towards a balance between the wool industry and the interests of beef 
producers, dairy men, and other primary-goods exporters who needed access to 
the British market.53
Less controversial treaties were negotiated with France, Czechoslovakia, and 
Belgium. On the North American dimension of trade diversion Australia was 
less successful. With the Americans unwilling to do anything to ease the large 
trade imbalance with Australia, it fell to Gullett to introduce measures to restrict 
imports of American goods. A licensing system and prohibitive duties were 
imposed in the hope of persuading the United States to lower barriers to Australian 
primary produce while simultaneously boosting Australian manufacturing, and 
increasing both rural and urban employment. A visionary element of the policy 
was the notion that it would smooth the way for an Australian automobile 
manufacturing industry.54 When the Americans retaliated in November 1936, 
Gullett had the task of putting the Australian position to J. P. Moffat, the U.S. 
Consul-General. Moffat’s diary records the Trade Treaties Minister’s heartfelt 
argument:
We are not out of the woods; we are fighting for national solvency. We 
have had six good moist years in a row, thank God! But Australia is a 
country of ups and downs; you have never seen it withered and parched 
and thirty or forty million sheep dying in a year. But we have. And the 
vision haunts us. We cannot rest until we have reserves enough to ride 
us over such a period. That is our first consideration. If not, we might 
have to default, and non-payment might gradually weaken the bonds of 
Empire and then God help us. No, our financial solvency is not only a 
matter of honour but of self-preservation.
And now you come along, oblivious of the fact that buying from North 
America is Australia; it is not only you but Canada. That is our next 
problem.
Five months later, the ‘next problem’ was to bring about Gullett’s downfall. As 
Moffat summarised it on 10 March 1937, Gullett had resigned after encountering 
almost total opposition when seeking Cabinet agreement to impose further limits 
on Canadian imports and encourage trade with nations outside the Empire:
53 Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘Business, Empire and the United Australia Party’, Politics, 24 (2), Nov. 1989, pp.39–52; 
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Journal of Politics and History, 27 (2), Aug. 1981, pp.143–59; D. C. S. Sissons, ‘Pitfalls on the Road to N.A.R.A. 
— Sir Henry Gullett’s Treaty Negotiations with Japan 1935–36’, paper presented at 46th ANZAAS Congress, 
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54 Ross, Armed & Ready, pp.85, 96–7.
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The rest of the Cabinet apparently pointed out that his trade diversion 
policy was getting nowhere, that this would cut across inter-Empire 
trade, etc. Finding himself virtually alone, with only the Prime Minister 
supporting him, and with his colleagues almost a unit in censuring him, 
he walked out of Cabinet meeting, resigned then and there and is leaving 
Canberra today.55
What Moffat knew, as a result of the disloyal indiscretion of J. F. Murphy, 
Secretary of the Department of Commerce, was that not even Gullett’s department 
supported the trade diversion policy. Murphy explained at a private lunch that, 
had it not been for the absence overseas of Page and Menzies when the policy 
was being formulated, the measures decided upon would not have given ‘such 
immense offence’.56 Gullett’s pointed the finger firmly at Earle Page: ‘He and 
his tribe deliberately worked behind my back in direct consultation with the 
Canadians.’57 Gullett resigned for ‘personal reasons’ but insiders knew better. 
He had made it clear that he had not left because of his health. To a journalist 
invited to his hotel on the evening of his dramatic departure he went on the 
record: ‘I have not felt so fit for many years.’
There were the usual commiserations from former colleagues. But, of all the 
valedictions, that from Attorney-General Menzies to ‘My dear Harry’ showed 
the most effort:
Although I was, unfortunately, not able to agree with you on the 
particular point we were discussing before your resignation, I feel I must 
write to tell you how distressed I feel about the whole matter. In a way, 
I have mixed feelings. On the one hand, any Cabinet must be the poorer 
when it loses a man of patriotism, ability and courage. On the other 
hand I have felt for a long time that you were over-exhausting yourself, 
both nervously and physically, and that only your indomitable spirit 
kept you to a task which most men would have long since abandoned. 
On the whole, I suspect that you will be a happier man from now on, 
and I certainly know that there will be many occasions during the next 
twelve months when I will envy you mightily.
Thank you for all your friendliness and companionship of the last few 
years…58
Menzies’ distress was no doubt tempered by the fact that he had himself been 
given responsibility for trade treaties, co-ordinating the work of the Ministers 
55 Moffat diary, 10 March 1937, Nancy Harvison Hooker (ed.), The Moffat Papers: Selections from the 
Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat 1919–1943, Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass, 1956, p.144.
56 Moffat diary, 26 Jan. 1937, microfilm copy, NLA G7251.
57 Gullett to Latham, 24 March 1937, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/5117.
58 Menzies to Gullett, 12 March 1937, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/3/37.
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for Customs and Commerce and their departments. If Gullett felt any resentment 
he did not show it. He would later confide to a former parliamentary colleague: 
‘I was rather the “pigeon” of the piece, as trade diversion really had its origin 
in the Treasury.’59 He would stay in the House of Representatives as a private 
member, he had said, a role that offered ‘a great field of usefulness’.
The Gulletts’ Orchard Cottage, photograph by Nash-Boothby Studios, 1924 
(Courtesy of Malvern Historical Society and Stonnington History Centre)
With a homestead and 2500 acres six miles from the capital, the Gulletts had 
assumed a leading role in Canberra social life. They were welcome visitors at 
Yarralumla, where the Governor-General found discussions with Harry on 
‘various subjects, local, Imperial, world wide…most helpful and instructive’.60 
Charles Hawker would spend weekends and go out riding; the Fairbairns 
and others would drive out to dine or for a picnic. But, for a backbencher 
without the obligations of the political inner circle, the Hill Station property, 
remote from the nation’s metropolises, become more a burden than an asset. 
In Melbourne, at Orchard Cottage in Moonga Road, Toorak, the Gulletts were 
closer to the heart of society. Extended as a result of a generous settlement from 
Penny Gullett’s mother, Lady Headley (an astute businesswoman, principal 
59 Gullett to Sir Donald Cameron, 11 May 1939, copy, Gullett Family MSS.
60 Lord Gowrie to Lady Gullett, 16 Aug. 1940, copy, Gowrie MSS NLA MS 2852/5/12.
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shareholder of the profitable Law Book Company, but still more widely known 
as the writer Barbara Baynton), the house and a tennis court sat on an acre and 
a half. It was big enough to accommodate a cook, a housemaid, and a parlour 
maid, with a governess for the children when they were young, and a gardener 
and part-time laundress. A chauffeur was shared with Lady Headley, who built 
and occupied a house next door until her death in 1929. There was one large 
room for entertaining.
Penny Gullett was a popular hostess, ‘devastatingly funny’ as Elisabeth 
Murdoch remembered, celebrated for amusing stories about her friends, whose 
voices she effortlessly mimicked. She had befriended Enid Lyons and cleverly 
brought together personalities from politics, the press, especially the Murdochs, 
and wider society. She had been ‘a loving friend and encourager’ of Elisabeth 
Murdoch since taking the 19-year-old under her wing when she was being 
courted by the 42-year-old bachelor editor of The Herald.61 Bob Menzies too 
had often enjoyed the Gulletts’ hospitality and befriended their son Jo. During 
his first visit to the United Kingdom in May 1935, the Attorney-General went 
up to Oxford to take Jo, Bill Baillieu, and some other young Australian friends 
to dinner at the Mitre Tavern.62 It was the kind of gesture that counted with a 
colleague who was a proud father. Gullett and Menzies were not confidantes. 
They disagreed publicly on modern art. But they had mutual respect and their 
easy communication survived breaches over policy as well as their differences 
over Matisse, Picasso, and Van Gogh.63 Whatever their quarrels, Gullett would 
tell his son, he admired Menzies as ‘the least greedy man you can imagine’ ― 
giving up a most lucrative legal practice for a life of public service with all its 
political savagery and personal slurs.64
After the election of 1937, discontent simmered in the Cabinet. For some, the 
issue was what seemed like a dilatory approach to defence preparations. Writing 
35 years later, Enid Lyons described the malcontents as men who thought her 
husband lacked vigour and drive. Gullett, she said, was one of them. ‘He resigned 
his portfolio and openly opposed Joe’s leadership.’65 In fact, the Prime Minister’s 
wife had been informed privately that Gullett was secretly contributing critical 
articles to the Murdoch press.66 Briefed by the restless retired Major General 
Sir John Gellibrand, a former parliamentary colleague, Gullett was openly 
calling for the creation of an effective infantry and infantry mobilisation plan, 
a national register of men from 18 to 50, and ‘sounder training’. By the end of 
61 Gullett, Good Company, passim; John Monks, Elisabeth Murdoch: two lives, Sun, Sydney, 1995 (1st ed. 
Pan Macmillan 1994), p.139.
62 Menzies’ draft typescript diary, 17 May 1935, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/579/7. Gullett recalled a 
breakfast with other friends in his rooms at Oriel College (Gullett, Good Company, pp.96–7).
63 June Helmer, George Bell: The Art of Influence, Greenhouse Publications,  Richmond, 1985, p.86.
64 H. B. ‘Jo’ Gullett, interview, 7 Aug 1978.
65 Lyons, Among the Carrion Crows, p.61.
66 Henderson, Enid Lyons, p.242.
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1938, as the Cabinet itself was increasingly divided on the best way to respond 
to growing international tensions, Gullett had nailed his colours to the mast of 
a stronger commitment to defence and compulsory military training. He was 
understood to be colloguing with Menzies and Sir Keith Murdoch (who had 
taken on Gullett’s son as a reporter), all of them impatient for a change at the top 
of the government. In a speech laced with inflammatory language, he spoke on 
a Labor confidence motion on 3 November 1938 of the ‘farcical training’ of the 
citizen force which, if it were to encounter any ‘real invading trouble’, would 
be ‘a mere suicide club’.
Two days later, Gullett raised concerns in the party room about leadership, 
suggesting that Lyons should make way for someone else. There was ‘a little 
wordy by-play’ between him and the Prime Minister. But he received little 
support and was openly derided by Tommy White, the Minister for Trade 
and Customs.67 Within a few months Murdoch and the money men of the UAP 
had lost their confidence in Menzies. They were convinced that he was so 
unpopular with the electorate that Lyons, although exhausted and desperate to 
retire, was essential to the survival of the government. Lyons had reshuffled the 
ministry immediately after the November party room meeting, promoting Geoff 
Street to be Minister of Defence, and creating a ‘policy committee’, in effect 
an inner Cabinet, prompting an excluded and piqued Tommy White to resign. 
Recognising that matters of substance remained unresolved, Gullett did not 
waver. In the manoeuvrings that followed Menzies’ resignation and the death 
of Lyons in April 1939, he was unequivocally in Menzies’ camp.68
Support for Menzies brought its reward. It did not hurt that he had publicly 
praised the increasingly influential Fred Shedden, Secretary of the Defence 
Department. Gullett had kept in touch with other key figures ― hosting 
a dinner for Jim Fairbairn and General Squires on March 7 after which the 
latter recorded ‘much talk…about Defence matters ― I hope not indiscreet on 
my part’.69 Squires may not have known how close Gullett was also to Sir Tom 
Blamey, appointed chairman of the Manpower Committee by a hesitant Joe 
Lyons, who had heard ‘funny things’ about the Victorian Police Commissioner.70 
Initially expressing reluctance to take up office again, Gullett had two meetings 
with the new Prime Minister. The disclosure by Menzies that he was offering the 
External Affairs portfolio brought him into the fold. Writing to Jack Latham, 
now Chief Justice of Australia, he commented on the new ministry:
A fair team. All depends on Bob. He has it in him, if it can be extracted 
& applied.
67 White diary, 5 Nov. 1938, in Hazlehurst, Menzies Observed, p.154.
68 CPD, House of Representatives, 3, 8 Nov. 1938, pp.1231, 1323–6; White, A Political Love Story, pp.201, 206–16.
69 The Herald, 24 Feb. 1939; Lt Gen. E. K. Squires diary, 7 March 1939, UNSW@ADFA Library, MS 184 folder 2.
70 Frank Legg, The Gordon Bennett Story, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1965, p.158.
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Alas I am one of the few survivors ― the only one of the old B-P team.
I was reluctant to begin again but Bob put it almost as a duty. And he 
has treated me handsomely. I think Coalition will come quickly, but only 
if Page is discarded. When it does I am out.71
A minister again, reluctant but persuaded
(Courtesy of Peter and Kate Gullett)
Writing more expansively to an Australian pastoralist living in London, Gullett 
explained a fortnight later:
The new Menzies team which is solely U. A. P. is of course at the mercy 
of the Country Party. The C. P. after Page’s loathsome attack on Menzies 
has split, and I think now that five members do not attend its meetings. 
71 Gullett to Latham, 3 May 1939, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/5312; Gullett to Sir Archdale Parkhill, 11 
May 1939, copy, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/3/519.
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So long as Page remains the C. P. leader a coalition is impossible and 
with the general unhappiness of the party I think it likely that we will 
carry on through this year and possibly up to the eve of the elections. 
However this is all surmise, and the P. M. probably has his own views 
about it.
We have a sound team and Menzies is shaping phenomenally well. 
He is striking a deeper, wider note and certainly has a grand public 
throughout Australia after only three weeks of office. Page’s attack on 
him did him the world of good and, strangely enough, particularly with 
the returned soldiers.72
As External Affairs Minister, Gullett was a member of the Council of Defence. 
He took a variety of issues to Cabinet, but it was soon obvious that both foreign 
and defence policy were firmly in the Prime Minister’s hands. Menzies left 
Gullett to handle the delicate diplomatic contacts with Japan. In dialogue with 
the Japanese Ambassador, the External Affairs Minister faithfully presented 
the Australian official position that ‘there was not the least hostility in this 
country towards Japan, apart from some feeling over the Sino-Japanese war’. 
He oversaw negotiation of oil concessions in Timor, and endeavours to thwart 
Dutch ambitions to secure the commercial air route from Dilli [sic] to Darwin ― 
both in pursuance of establishing Australian interests in Portuguese Timor and 
‘to forestall Japanese activities as part of their southward advance policy’. The 
Australian government had proposed to the Portuguese government a weekly 
air service as long ago as April 1939. The effort gained impetus following a 
survey visit to the colony in July 1939 by Jim Fairbairn, the Minister for Civil 
Aviation, in company with his principal public service advisor, Edgar Johnston. 
A draft agreement had been sent to Lisbon.73
Like all of the Cabinet, by early July 1939, Gullett had to contemplate the 
imminent outbreak of war with the Axis Powers in Europe. With Menzies’ 
concurrence he had earlier danced gingerly around the contentious question 
of the extent to which Australia was free to make its own decisions. The Prime 
Minister had said in a broadcast that ‘the British countries of the world must 
stand or fall together’. But these words, Gullett said:
…were not to be interpreted to mean that in any and every set of 
circumstances the foreign policy of a United Kingdom Government, 
if it led to war, should or would, automatically, commit Australia to 
72 Gullett to D. Russell Ferguson, 18 May 1939, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/3/497.
73 Sir Henry Gullett, Minister for External Affairs, to R. G. Menzies, Prime Minister, Memorandum, 7 June 
1939, Secret, NAA: A981, Japan 101, ii; H. S. Gullett, ‘Portuguese Timor-Oil Concessions and Air Service’, 
Cabinet submission, 13 March 1940, NAA: A981, Timor (Portuguese) 22, v; Hudson Fysh, Qantas at War, 
Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1968, p.112.
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participation in that war. Nor did they mean that action taken by a 
Government of the Commonwealth in any and every set of circumstances, 
and leading to war, should or would automatically commit the United 
Kingdom to participation in that war.
It is conceivable that upon either side a policy might be adopted 
which met with strong disapproval, or condemnation, by the other 
Government…But in the circumstances in which the Governments of 
the United Kingdom and of the Commonwealth find themselves to-
day there is no sort of disagreement. On the contrary there is complete 
unanimity on the policy being followed, and on any action which may 
arise out of that policy.74
As the record of a discussion of a defence policy review by the Chiefs of Staff 
makes clear, Gullett was profoundly pessimistic about the prospects in the next 
few months:
If in that period war should come, we would be in a very unsatisfactory 
position. Singapore was devoid of assistance from an effective Navy and 
would remain so until the position was cleared up in the North Sea by 
the British and French Navies. Within that period…anything might 
happen. Japan would, in his opinion, undoubtedly come south and have 
the capacity to entirely destroy the small Australian Navy, some portion 
of which, unfortunately, at the present time, was in the unhappy position 
of undergoing modernisation. Our Air Force had not a single frontline 
aircraft in Australia, although of course, it soon would have.
He said that the outline conveyed by the Chief of the General Staff as 
to the ineffectiveness of our coastal defences was most depressing and, 
in addition, many of our 6" guns appeared to be not fully effective. He 
particularly stressed the fact that he did not wish to reflect on anyone in 
authority for he stated that, when the present position was surveyed in 
the light of the situation three or four years ago, our position now was 
undoubtedly good, but nevertheless was not good enough. To his mind 
the Army was of first importance in view of the relative ineffectiveness 
of the Navy without the support of a squadron at Singapore and the 
deficiencies in the Air Force, but when he considered the Army strength 
it appeared that we had at present no military force outside of the Fixed 
Defences.75
74 Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May 1939; Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939–1941, p.119.
75 Summary of Proceedings of Council of Defence Meeting, 5 July 1939, NAA: AA 1971/216 in Documents 
on Australian Foreign Policy, vol. 2, 1939, No. 117.
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The Chiefs of Staff might have protested that this was an unduly gloomy 
assessment. But there was too much truth in it for anyone’s comfort. After 
a Council of Defence meeting, Gullett confided to his Army friend, John 
Gellibrand, his disillusion with the makers of defence policy. General Squires 
he thought was ‘unscrupulous & a bad swine’. Generals Chauvel and Brudenell 
White, and the Defence Minister Geoff Street were ‘nincompoops & Squires’ Yes 
men’.76 Being noticeably sensitive, Gullett could be impetuous in debate.
An entertaining conversationalist, he could occasionally be a little too free with 
his opinions. Yet much was forgiven of a man of ideals and intellectual rigour, a 
fine host, and above all someone who did not spare himself in the pursuit of the 
government’s goals.77
Weary propagandist
The coming of war dissolved many old quarrels and brought new responsibilities. 
Jo Gullett, awaiting his medical examination before joining the AIF, would 
sense his father’s frustration: ‘Menzies puts a dam side [sic] too much work on 
him because the Cabinet is pretty full of dumbells [sic]. Dad is working up for a 
frightful row with Street who lacks drive but he holds back with impatience.’78
When a Department of Information was created in September 1939, the portfolio 
was assigned to Gullett.79 As Secretary of the department he brought in his old 
friend and successor at the Australian War Memorial John Treloar. A punctilious 
and disinterested classical public servant, Treloar had served as a staff sergeant 
during the war on Gallipoli, as a lieutenant in No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying 
Corps in Egypt, as confidential clerk to General Brudenell White in France, 
and finally as officer in charge of war records in London. Treloar made it clear 
to his subordinates that they were on no account to be drawn into defending 
the government or the Minister. In October, Gullett explained to the Cabinet 
the tasks of the department. First was maintenance of domestic morale and 
distribution of information. Next was overseas propaganda (a logical link with 
the External Affairs department’s role) mainly disseminated by means of a 
shortwave radio service. And third was censorship. In elaborating his mandate 
for Cabinet, he articulated a grand aspiration to ‘constantly increase and sustain 
76 Edith Gellibrand diary, 8 July 1939, in Peter S. Sadler, The Paladin: A Life of Major-General Sir John 
Gellibrand, Oxford UP, Melbourne, 2000, p.247.
77 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p.21; Irvine Douglas, ‘Australian Air Disaster: Careers of Three Ministers’, 
Sunday Times (London), 18 Aug. 1940.
78 Jo Gullett to ‘Weed’, 25 Sept. [1939], Gullett Family MSS.
79 For much of what follows on the Department of Information I have drawn on Edward Louis Vickery, 
‘Telling Australia’s story to the world: The Department of Information 1939–1950’, PhD thesis, Australian 
National University, Aug. 2003, pp.15–79 and John Hilvert, Blue Pencil Warriors: Censorship and Propaganda 
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the faith of the Australian people in the cause for which we are engaged in 
war’. Specifically, they were ‘to promote the interest and thought calculated 
to support the government in the necessary recruiting, the raising of money, 
the acceptance of the inevitable taxation and its activities generally’. Then, in 
case anything important had been omitted, they were ‘to distribute sound facts 
upon all phases of the war direct and indirect through every kind of available 
channel’.
Gullett’s mission might have been easier if there had been greater clarity about the 
‘cause’ for which Australia was fighting. But the government was notably quiet 
about its war aims. He was astute enough to realise that whatever the volume of 
‘sound facts’ despatched throughout the country, increasing and sustaining the 
‘faith’ of the people was going to be an elusive goal. At least, without any regular 
attempt to gauge public opinion, no one could say with certainty that they were 
failing. What could be said, albeit with little foundation, was that the department 
was in effect a government-financed propaganda machine for the United Australia 
Party. A Labor Party standing aloof from government could make the charge but 
could not give it substance. And of course, in its international role, dissemination 
of propaganda was precisely what Gullett’s team was meant to be doing.
If his statement to Parliament on 21 November 1939 was a reflection of his real 
feelings, Harry Gullett had little enthusiasm for the Information role. The ministry 
was not his creation, he said. ‘It was passed over to me for administration. It is 
a very heavy task.’ The weight of the task owed something to the jealousies and 
resistance of established departments. Relations with Defence and the Army 
especially had to be constantly finessed. He was happy in January 1940 to join 
the Service Chiefs in putting the representatives of the Sydney press right about 
what could and could not be said about the movements of the AIF, happily 
assisting as General Squires and Admiral Colvin ‘refuted their arguments’.80 But 
a few weeks later, after a bungle over the release of information about the landing 
of the 2nd AIF in Egypt, he had to get Cabinet backing to secure ‘paramount 
authority’ for himself and the Chief Publicity Censor. Service representatives 
were henceforth to be advisors only.81
By March 1940 Gullett was showing signs of weariness. He, along with the 
Prime Minister, had been rebuked in letters to newspaper editors for suggesting 
that Army recruiting figures showed that Australians were apathetic about the 
war. He was perhaps less in touch with popular sentiment than once he had 
been.82 He wrote to his old comrade Latham that he had ‘not been in much 
physical shape’. With relations between the UAP and the Country Party once 
again proving difficult, he reflected:
80 Squires diary, 12 Jan. 1940, UNSW@ADFA, MS 184, folder 3.
81 Submissions, Cabinet decisions and minutes, 16 Oct. 1939, Jan.–Feb. 1940, NAA: A A2676, 36.
82 The Argus, 20 Jan. 1940; Sydney Morning Herald, 27 Feb. 1940.
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A lovely political kettle of fish. A counter attack is I think overdue & 
between ourselves I am advising Bob to object to Cameron, but to offer 
to deal generously with a C. P. led by McEwen. (The going between 
Cameron & McEwen is I think about equal, if it does not actually favour 
McEwen). Whatever the government’s frailties it has had no chance 
with a press so hostile…
I find myself strangely disinterested. Perhaps I am too old to worry now. 
I do my job with what strength & brains I have — & leave the rest to 
fate. Meanwhile I dream of the day when I may be able to go for the rest 
of my days to ‘Tawstock’ — my farm.83
Gullett got part of his retirement wish when coalition came shortly afterwards. 
He was dropped from the War Cabinet, making way for McEwen at External 
Affairs, when the ministry was reconstructed in March 1940. Within External 
Affairs he had been increasingly seen by his officials as ‘a dilettante, rather 
indolent, very agreeable, very civilised, good company ― but the sort of man 
who never bestirred himself very much’. He had the reputation, one recalled, of 
being ‘an able but somewhat vain and pernickety man’.84 Whatever the truth of 
that, Menzies was at pains to keep him in the government as Vice President of 
the Executive Council, minister in charge of industrial and scientific research, 
and minister assisting the Minister for Information, the second post he had 
himself just vacated.
The appointment of Sir Keith Murdoch as Director-General of Information in May 
might have been thought by some a recipe for friction. Menzies had not hidden 
from the War Cabinet his belief that the Information Department was ‘poor’.85 
Murdoch was given unprecedented powers and reported directly to the Prime 
Minister, who had ‘nominally appointed’ himself Minister for Information. 
But Murdoch was an old friend and shooting companion, and Gullett was not 
minded to make difficulties. He turned his attention to censorship, leaving the 
rest of the domain to Murdoch. It was just as well. Menzies soon began to lose 
patience with the Director-General and the antagonism which the appointment 
of a business rival eventually provoked from the Sydney Morning Herald’s Rupert 
Henderson. Rationing of newsprint aroused the wrath of press proprietors 
convinced that Murdoch had disclosed commercially sensitive information to 
the government. In July 1940 other media interests also found themselves in 
conflict with the Director-General over proposed national security regulations 
requiring newspapers, cinemas, and broadcasters to publish statements deemed 
essential to the prosecution of the war. Forced into embarrassing amendments 
83 Gullett to Latham, [?] March 1940, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1.
84 Sir Keith Waller, interview, 21 June 1977; Watt, Australian Diplomat, p.21.
85 War Cabinet Notes, 21 May 1940, Shedden Papers, NAA: A5954, 729/1.
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by a storm of protest over the proposed ‘dictatorial’ powers and an openly 
disgruntled Postmaster-General, Vic Thorby, and other unconsulted Cabinet 
members, Menzies instructed his private secretary Peter Looker to keep 
Murdoch at arm’s length.86
As early as April 1940, with a general election looming, Gullett had admitted:
I am somewhat feeble on the physical side. My capacity for night 
engagements really is most limited. As a general rule I take to my bed 
immediately after dinner and there read papers. The social side of my 
life has been almost entirely abandoned which at my age is perhaps not 
unbecoming.87
What was unbecoming was a needless row with John Curtin over arrangements 
to distribute the Leader of the Opposition’s shortwave address to South Africa, 
which was in Gullett’s view ‘merely a rehash of a great many speeches he has 
made on Labor’s defence policy’. ‘Mr Menzies, it is believed,’ the Sun News 
Pictorial reported on April 10, ‘prevailed upon Sir Henry Gullett to modify 
his attitude.’ Recurring bouts of ill-health, silently accentuated by decades of 
tobacco smoking, had taken their toll. He was still able to make a good speech, 
as he did at the University of Melbourne on July 20 commending newspaper 
scrutiny of the ministry: ‘A government leading its people into war should have 
the worst known about it at the outset.’ Yet, unless they were intent on changing 
the leadership or removing a government, newspapers should be careful in 
the national interest not to bring a ministry into ‘disrepute with soldiers or 
citizens’.88
A plea for co-operation between journalism and government might have been 
Gullett’s political swan-song. Had his electorate seemed safe he would have 
preferred to stand down and not fight the next election. He had bought a block 
of grazing land about 50 miles north of Melbourne, fenced off five acres, and 
built a weekend cottage flanked by a stream and surrounded by ash, oak, and 
other English trees he planted himself. ‘Tawstock’, an evocation of the Somerset 
of his grandfather’s youth, was an increasingly enticing retreat. However, there 
were signs that a fresh candidate might have difficulties in the Henty electorate; 
and he was already beginning to think that he might have to saddle up again. 
Perhaps he would be relieved of ministerial responsibilities. But for now, on 
another crisp August morning, with the quick smile that flickered for Prime 
Minister and chauffeur alike, Harry Gullett embarked dutifully on the familiar 
drive from Toorak to Essendon.
86 Hilvert, Blue Pencil Warriors, pp.56–65; Sir Cecil (Peter) Looker, interview, 25 March 1976; Sydney 
Morning Herald, 18, 19, 20 July 1940.
87 Gullett to A. Bishop, 4 April 1940, Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/3/66.
88 The Argus, 30 July 1940.
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13. ‘A charming boy who would do 
big things’: Dick Elford
The youngest of the civilians walking across the tarmac on the morning of August 
13 was Dick Elford, the private secretary to the Minister for Air. Stricken with 
influenza, Elford had risen from his sickbed at 508 Punt Road, in fashionable 
South Yarra, very early that day to be driven to Essendon. Since joining Jim 
Fairbairn the previous year, Elford had become accustomed to flying with him 
and his assistant, Murray Tyrrell, in the Minister’s own sleek DH90 Dragonfly. 
But now the arrangements for travel to Canberra were different. Along with 
many other private flyers, Fairbairn had handed in his own aircraft for use as 
the government saw fit. The Dragonfly had been impressed by the Air Force, 
the Minister deciding it was politically inexpedient to insist on giving it to his 
friend Eddie Connellan.1 The machine he had used on a flight around the nation 
a few weeks earlier, a Percival Q6 Petrel, had been returned to its owners, the 
Civil Aviation Department. Like other ministers he must now rely on the newly 
allocated Lockheed Hudsons for transport to Canberra.
The 30-year-old Richard Edwin Elford was embarrassed to be in his well-cut 
three-piece lounge suit rather than in an Air Force blue tunic or battle dress 
and cloth-visored peak cap. He was eligible. He was fit. He wanted to serve in 
the armed forces. He had taken flying lessons to prepare for enlistment in the 
RAAF. But since he had joined Fairbairn at the beginning of 1939 the Minister 
had come to rely upon him.
When Fairbairn was sent overseas to negotiate the terms of the proposed 
Empire Air Training Scheme soon after the outbreak of war, Elford’s duty was 
to accompany his chief. He knew then that he could not travel as a serviceman 
as that would render him liable to internment in any neutral countries through 
which they might have to pass. On their return to Australia, the demands of 
office were unremitting. So Elford’s personal desire for service in uniform was 
on hold, indefinitely. In his pocket as he stepped across to the waiting aircraft 
was the jangling reminder of his servitude, a ring holding 10 keys including 
those that opened the ministerial safes in Melbourne and Canberra, for whose 
custody he had sole responsibility.
1 Connellan, Failure of Triumph, p.283.
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Dick Elford, who would rather have been in uniform, 1939
(Courtesy of Hugh Elford)
New lives
Dick Elford was an immigrant. Born in Chelmsford, Essex, in 1910, he arrived 
in Australia from England with his parents 10 years later. His father Archibald 
Sefton Elford, born near Exeter into a prosperous merchant family in 1878, 
was the last of a remarkable cluster of Elfords who studied chemistry at St 
John’s College in Oxford. Percy Elford, Archibald’s oldest brother, had won an 
open scholarship to Christ Church, was awarded first-class honours in Natural 
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Sciences (Chemistry) in 1889, was President of the Oxford Junior Scientific 
Club, and after a brief spell at University College, Reading, and lecturing for the 
Shropshire County Council, became a Fellow of St John’s in 1892.2 After their 
father, Edwin Elford, died in a railway accident at the age of 47, Percy assumed 
a special place in the lives of his six surviving siblings (three others had died in 
infancy). Their mother, born Ann Louisa Fell, had been bequeathed £5514 on 
Edwin’s death. With income from the Etna Fire Light Company founded by her 
husband, Ann Elford had sufficient means to move to Oxford. But there would 
no longer be a governess, cook, housemaid, and nurse to assist her.
To relieve the family’s burdens, oldest daughter Constance had become a 
governess, and Percy abandoned his chance of a rowing ‘Blue’, cutting short 
his studies in mathematics to work in the Christ Church chemistry laboratory 
as a demonstrator under the ingenious experimenter, Dr A. G. Vernon Harcourt, 
FRS.3 In an unprecedented record, Percy taught a succession of his brothers, 
Stanley, Bertram, and Archie, each of whom took additional classes at Magdalen 
College’s Daubeny Laboratory in the Oxford Botanical Gardens. Early in the 
new century, after a long association with local technical education, Percy 
was appointed Secretary to the Oxfordshire Education Committee. He was 
soon playing a part in national education policy discussions as president of 
the Association of Directors and Secretaries for Education. He would hold the 
Oxfordshire post until retiring in 1920 following a nervous breakdown, his 
condition partly attributable to an exhausting schedule of school visitations 
and compilation of a vast ‘Domesday’ card index of information about every 
elementary school in the county, with 3000 annexed photographs.
While Percy Elford was consolidating his authority over Oxford education, 
Stanley Elford had, at 31, already earned a glowing reputation as headmaster of 
Cirencester Grammar. He had then topped a field of 70 candidates to become head 
of the Coopers’ Company and Coborn School, a sixteenth-century foundation in 
London’s East End that had merged with an eighteenth-century co-educational 
school in 1891. Stanley had taken early steps in his older brother’s professional 
domain as an Oxford science master, then as Inspector of Science and Art 
Schools for Oxford County Council. The Elfords were close and not embarrassed 
to offer or to accept each other’s helping hand. Undeterred by the misgivings of 
the Cooper’s school governors, Stanley almost immediately appointed younger 
brother Bertram to the vacant science mastership at Cooper’s. Undeniable 
ability, as well as nepotism having taken them so far, the brothers contrived 
for Bertram to move to Bath School in 1906.4 Their older sister Constance, like 
2 Daily News, 14 Oct.1892.
3 Percy Elford to David and Hugh Elford, 8 Dec. 1949, (transcripts), Elford MSS, courtesy Hugh Elford.
4 John Ireland (compiled and illustrated by Edwin Cuss), The History of Cirencester Grammar School, 1993, 
pp.68–70, courtesy of Peter Rowe; Colin Churchett, Coopers’ and Coborn School Anniversary History, Coopers’ 
Company and Coborn Educational Foundation, Upminster, 1986, p.80, extract courtesy of Dorothy Gorsuch.
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Percy living with their widowed mother, was already a high school teacher in 
Oxford. Another sister, Mary, was a nurse. She also soon moved back to live 
with her mother. Although Stanley had been in business briefly before taking 
up teaching, only one of Edwin Elford’s sons, John Farley, had followed his 
father into trade, joining a wholesale velvet house in London as a clerk. By 
1914 John was managing a rubber plantation in Ceylon, where he distinguished 
himself by building over nine years a magnificent mountain-top mansion for 
his Scottish bride, only to be sacked for the ‘colossal waste of time, money and 
labor’.5
Archie Elford, chorister, 1888
(Courtesy of Hugh Elford)
5 ‘Ayr’ became a luxury hotel (http://www.estatebungalows.com/ayr.htm).
13 . ‘A charming boy who would do big things’: Dick Elford
275
Archie and his six siblings
(Courtesy of Hugh Elford)
Archie Elford, the youngest of the children, had been educated as a chorister 
at Christ Church school in Oxford until his voice broke at 15, then at Magdalen 
College Grammar School. Moving to London, he lived with an uncle and 
worked for five years as a messenger at the Stock Exchange. Then, with Percy’s 
encouragement, he successfully sat the entrance exam at St John’s and graduated 
in 1902 with a third-class degree. With the example and assistance of his three 
brothers putting wind in his sails, he also embarked on a career in education. 
While still an undergraduate he had been assistant organising secretary to the 
Oxfordshire Technical Instruction Committee. Posts with the Surrey and Essex 
education committees led late in 1914 to a divisional school inspectorship with 
the London County Council. It was not a job for the faint-hearted. In the slums 
of London, he was told to wear the oldest clothes he possessed, not to take a 
watch, and only carry enough money for his travelling expenses.
When war came, Archie Elford was rejected four times for active service; poor 
eyesight and a hernia could not be disguised. Eventually, in March 1916, he 
was ‘borrowed’ by the Admiralty, finding a niche in the Military Sea Transport 
Branch and then in the new Ministry of Shipping which took over his 
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department. There he worked on the senior staff of the Director of Transports 
and Shipping, Graeme Thomson, a precociously gifted civilian administrator 
promoted by Winston Churchill over the opposition of the Sea Lords, and dubbed 
‘the greatest transport officer since Noah’.6 Graeme Thomson was an inspiring 
leader and valuable patron. In April 1918, Archie accompanied Thomson to the 
USA to assist in organising the embarkation and transport of American troops 
across the Atlantic to Europe. In his first four months, over half a million men 
were embarked on British vessels.7 As the war drew to an end he was entrusted 
with the task of determining the compensation that should be paid to American 
and Canadian shipowners whose vessels had been lost or damaged after being 
requisitioned for war service. A colleague on the North American mission was a 
young maritime communications expert and managing director of Amalgamated 
Wireless (Australasia), Ernest Fisk. Elford’s final task, in consultation with the 
War Office, was drawing up a complete shipping scheme for the repatriation of 
demobilised British and Dominion troops from the various theatres of war.8 His 
work was recognised with an OBE at the end of hostilities.
With temporary staff being shed in Whitehall, it was time for Elford to return to 
his former career path. He found an unexpected opening in the midlands. After 
a financial scandal and a purge of incompetent council authorities who had not 
noticed the disappearance of £84 000 over 12 years, he was appointed Director 
of Education for the County Borough of Wolverhampton in February 1919. 
This was a challenging appointment for a man of integrity with a reputation 
for administrative acumen. Graeme Thomson’s reference attested that he had 
‘shown very great ability and energy together with organising capacity of a 
very high order…great tact and adaptability’.9 He won the post against 110 
applicants, five of whom were interviewed. It had taken the casting vote of the 
chairman to break a tied committee. After passing a medical examination Elford 
quickly set about re-organising schools, developing curricula, and determining 
salaries and conditions of service for teachers. But within five months, to the 
regret of the council, he had tendered his resignation. He left the £800-a-year 
job ‘for family reasons’ at the end of October. The Wolverhampton education 
committee wished him ‘happiness and success in the new work he is called 
upon to undertake’.10 But family tradition suggests that no ‘new work’ was in 
prospect. He was leaving for his health. On medical advice, the smoke and grime 
6 Time, 9 Oct. 1933.
7 J. A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1921, p.193. I am grateful to Dr Nick Lambert for assistance in tracing details of Elford’s wartime 
work.
8 ‘Memorandum on General Proposals for Shipping Programme for Repatriation of Troops, Labour, and 
Prisoners of War’, 15 Sept. 1918, Elford MSS.
9 Thomson undated reference, ts copy, Elford MSS.
10 Wolverhampton Education Committee Minutes 1918–19, Wolverhampton Archives & Local Studies, 
CMB-WOL-C-EDU-16; G. W. Jones, Borough Politics: A Study of the Wolverhampton Town Council 1888–
1964, Macmillan, 1969, pp.234–6, 272.
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of the industrial heartland of England could not be endured. He was worn out 
from the pressures of war work. Perhaps too he was vulnerable to the influenza 
pandemic that had taken thousands of lives on Atlantic transport ships as well 
as millions on land. Whatever the cause, Archie Elford had to seek a change of 
climate.
While assistant secretary of the Surrey education committee Archie had met 
and successfully courted Sybil Audrey West, daughter of a hop merchant and 
champion rose-grower. The couple married in Reigate in 1907. A daughter, 
Barbara, was born the next year. Richard Edwin (named for the paternal 
grandfather he had never known) followed in 1910 when his father was working 
for the Essex County Council. Barbara and Dick, as he was soon known, would 
surmount several disruptions in their childhood, making and losing friends 
as their father’s successive appointments took them to new homes. After a 
bomb crashed through the roof of grandmother Ann Elford’s nearby house in 
Sydenham, bouncing down the stairs but failing to explode, their own house 
was packed up, and they were sent to live with their mother’s parents in Reigate. 
Dick would lose his playmate, Peter Scott, the son of the Antarctic hero whose 
widow, the sculptress Kathleen Scott, lived a few houses away. Dick’s sister 
would never forget the excitement before their move:
One day the air raid warning sounded but Mother said we should go 
upstairs so that if there was a hit we wouldn’t be buried under tons of 
rubble! We watched the raid over London…We should have felt much 
worse if we’d realised they were bombing the Admiralty. Father and all 
the other staff had grabbed the most secret documents and fled to the 
basement. After it was over it was discovered a bomb had gone right 
through my father’s office and the one below, exploding on the next 
floor down.
Both Barbara and her brother went to boarding schools on Reigate Hill. Seven-
year-old Dick and his prep school classmates ― dressed up in long pin-striped 
trousers and short Eton jackets, wide Eton collars, and top hats ― would join 
the girls at church on Sunday. His family transplanted to Wolverhampton at 
war’s end, Dick continued at the prep school. Inured as he had become to new 
homes and new friends, nothing had prepared him for the adventure that would 
now take him away not only from friends but from the extended networks 
of indulgent relatives who could be relied upon at least to make holidays a 
treat. His parents were drawn to a new life in Australia. ‘Mother had a brother 
orcharding in Tasmania,’ Barbara recalled, ‘so they decided to try that and 
through agents in London bought what was described as a 54 acre apple orchard 
in full production.’ Thus Archibald and Sybil Elford set sail for Melbourne on 
the Orient liner Osterley, with ‘Master Richard’ and ‘Miss Barbara’ in tow, on 
23 January 1920.
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S. S. Osterley took Harry Gullett to England in 1916 and brought the 
Elfords to Australia
(Courtesy of Bernard Malloy)
Archie knew all about the Osterley, which had been requisitioned as a troop 
hospital ship during the last 18 months of the war. To the ANZAC soldiers it 
was known familiarly as ‘The Osteralia’. Returned to service as a migrant ship, 
she was now refitted with accommodation for up to 1000 passengers, 200 in 
first class. With Archie’s maritime connections they could expect more comfort 
and consideration on the 45-day journey than most of those on board. Barbara 
Elford described the departure and the trip:
Only a very small amount of cargo space was allotted to each passenger 
so most of the furniture had to be sold. This was done in a large hall 
in Reigate only a week before we sailed. There were a ring of dealers 
who wouldn’t bid against each other, but one would buy and then they 
bid among themselves afterwards. It was heartbreaking, the furniture 
went for almost nothing but had to be sold before we left England.  
We left two days after my 12th birthday for Australia. In the Indian 
Ocean near the Cocos Is we struck a cyclone and counted seven water 
spouts dangerously close. The Captain ordered the hatches closed and 
all passengers below. Even in 1st class the crowd and heat was bad…We 
were carrying a cargo of chemicals whose smell began to permeate the 
ship…just like rotten fruit. How thankful we were when the ship was 
opened up again...We arrived in Melbourne just before the Autumn race 
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meeting and all good accommodation was booked out…Father finally 
found rooms at the old Federal Hotel at the Spencer St end of Collins St. 
In those days it was described as a family hotel and was a temperance 
one. A huge building and good sized rooms but we discovered there 
were bed bugs and had to sit up all night. Next morning Father managed 
to get accommodation at what is now the Windsor Hotel, a booking had 
been cancelled. Thankfully we moved and spent a comfortable week 
there.11
There had been a long shipping strike which ended at the end of our 
week in Melbourne. They didn’t want to load cargo but filled the boat 
with impatient passengers. We had the worst crossing of Bass Strait there 
had been for years, luckily we still had our sea legs but the luggage shifted 
from one side of the cabin to the other all night and we had to cling to our 
bunks for dear life otherwise we should have rolled on the floor with the 
luggage. All our boots and shoes were in a kit bag which a wharfie miss-
threw on to the deck and it landed in the water never to be seen again. 
Father was so furious he tongue lashed the careless man. Wharfies weren’t 
used to being talked to like that but he was so stunned he gave Father a 
murderous look and backed away. A man in the crowd just near said ‘Well 
done Mister but you’re lucky you aren’t in the water too.’
Worse was soon to come. Archie Elford, with visions of being a gentleman farmer, 
had described himself as a property owner on the emigrant ship’s passenger 
list. For advice on his rural venture, his oldest brother was the person to turn 
to. Unfortunately, although Percy Elford had published reassuring handbooks 
on ‘practical school gardening’ and a best-selling guide to the cultivation of 
allotments, what Percy could not do was guarantee what awaited Archie and his 
family 12 000 miles from home.
Arriving in Launceston we drove the 16 miles to Exeter in a horse-
drawn cab and next day Father went with his brother-in-law to see 
his new orchard. He had never had any farming experience and was 
unfitted for physical labour by his bad hernia, so imagine his horror and 
despair when he found only five acres of the land planted with apple 
trees which looked in bad shape as the drainage system was blocked, 
the rest of the property was bush. He realised he would have to sell 
as quickly as possible and find some office job, cutting his losses. He 
took his family to Hobart where they rented what had once been a golf 
club house.  The golf club had given up. This was at Sandy Bay which 
was then a very sparsely settled bit of bush…The children were sent to 
schools in Hobart and my father looked for work…
11 The Grand Hotel, remodelled, refurnished, and extended, became the Windsor late in 1923 (Chrystopher 
J. Spicer, Duchess: The Story of the Windsor Hotel, Loch Haven Books, Main Ridge [Vic.],1993, pp.38–43).
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
280
The Elfords were not the first hopeful emigrants who bought land in the Tamar 
Valley unseen, only to be deceived about what awaited them. With a wife and 
two young children to support, the 42-year-old head of the family had to seek 
employment urgently. He was offered the headmastership of the recently re-
established junior school at The Hutchins School, Hobart’s leading Anglican 
boys’ school; but, as his daughter remembered, ‘turned it down as the pay was 
so bad he said he couldn’t bring up a family on it’.12 Within three months he 
found a better paid position in Adelaide as manager and secretary of Standard 
Salt & Alkali Ltd, overseeing the amalgamation and public share offering of 
two salt mines.13 But the saga of misfortune had not yet ended. After renting a 
house at Walkerville and placing the children once again in new schools, Archie 
realised, in the words of his daughter, that the salt company was ‘run by crooks’.
Elford had the background for better things. A return to public service or 
education was possible. However, his experience in shipping and transport 
opened up more remunerative prospects. At the Admiralty and Ministry of 
Shipping, Archie had come under the notice not only of Cabinet ministers 
and top civil servants but of prominent shipowners and executives serving on 
advisory bodies and negotiating contracts with the government. He could count 
on the good offices of the former Shipping Controller, Lord Maclay, as well as Sir 
Thomas Royden, the chairman of Cunard, Sir Kenneth Anderson of the Orient 
Line, and Sir Graeme Thomson. By fateful coincidence, in late March 1920 the 
directors of the Australasian Steamship Owners’ Federation had begun to discuss 
the need for a salaried chairman. Since the federation was launched in 1899 its 
chairman, who served on an honorary basis, had been elected annually from 
among its leading figures. The federation founder, W. T. Appleton, chairman 
and managing director of the dominant coastal steamship company Huddart 
Parker, had been chairman or president for 11 of the organisation’s first 21 years. 
During the war, Appleton had been president of the Melbourne Chamber of 
Commerce and the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Australia. His company 
had extensive coal interests. Fortuitously for Elford, Appleton was also on 
the board of Amalgamated Wireless Australasia Ltd (AWA) whose managing 
director, Ernest Fisk, had haunted the corridors of Whitehall in the recent past 
pursuing the merged interests of AWA and Marconi.14 Fisk’s principal wartime 
and post-war role had been in maritime communications, crucial for the troop 
convoys from the United States evading submarine attacks. But he had spent 
time with Elford in North America dealing with claims for payment for loss or 
damage to ships that had been requisitioned. They had come to know each other 
12 The Hutchins School has no record of the offer, which came exactly a year after an assistant master was 
promoted into the position on £200 p.a. plus a house, then given a Christmas bonus of £20 (Margaret Mason-
Cox to CH, 13 Jan. 2011, email).
13 The Advertiser, 1 June 1920 (prospectus).
14 G. R. Henning, ‘Appleton, William Thomas (1859–1930)’, Bede Nairn and Geoffrey Serle (eds), Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, vol. 7, MUP, 1979, pp.84–5.
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well. It did Archie’s career no harm either that he had been acquainted with 
the Nobel Prize-winning Guglielmo Marconi since living in Chelmsford within 
sight of the first wireless station.
There is no evidence that the idea of a salaried position to relieve the Steamship 
Owners’ Federation chairman was a response to Fisk’s advice about Archie 
Elford’s availability. If family tradition is to be believed, their luck changed 
when Archie saw a newspaper advertisement for a job that seemed to have 
his name on it. His then 12-year-old daughter remembered: ‘The applications 
were due to close the following day. He rang them explaining his difficulty 
and sat up all night writing out his qualifications and posting them.’ The real 
impulse for the appointment of a full-time chief executive was the urgent need 
to organise a scheme that would meet the Commonwealth government’s desire 
to rationalise coastal shipping arrangements without transgressing the anti-
monopoly provisions of the Industries Preservation Act.
Having rejected the idea of a new amalgamated company, the immediate task for 
the steamship owners was therefore to devise and manage a workable interstate 
shipping pool. This was a job for which Elford was uniquely qualified. He was 
in Australia. He was available. And there were men locally as well as overseas 
who could vouch for him. In Adelaide he had assisted Thomas McGlew, a ship 
broker and coal merchant, in a company reconstruction. At least one other 
prominent shipping executive, John Langley Webb of Huddart Parker, had an 
interest in AWA’s affairs.15 Langley Webb was a close associate of Fisk, having 
taken a large shareholding and joined the AWA board at Fisk’s invitation in 1917. 
Other Australian shipping interests, including Burns Philp, and the Adelaide, 
Melbourne, and Union Steamship companies had shares in AWA.16 Fisk’s 
endorsement therefore, together with compelling references from Britain, could 
well explain the exceptionally short time between the decision to advertise the 
post of ‘Vice-President’ of the federation in June 1920 and Elford’s appointment 
as ‘Deputy Chairman’ of the interstate shipping combine at £1000 a year five 
weeks later.17 At last, in what Sir Kenneth Anderson called a ‘distinguished 
billet’ at the head of a major industry group, with a handsome salary, and 
growing links with some of the nation’s most influential businessmen, Elford 
could look to the future with confidence.18
15 H. J. Gibbney and Anne G. Smith (eds), A Biographical Register 1788–1939; Notes from the name index 
of the Australian Dictionary of Biography, 2 vols, ADB, Canberra, 1987, vol. 2, p.334.
16 Jock Given, ‘Transit of Empires: Ernest Fisk and the World Wide Wireless’, PhD thesis, University of 
Melbourne, 1997, pp.99–100, 119.
17 Decisions leading to the appointment of Elford as the Steamship Owners’ Federation Deputy Chairman 
can be traced in the Minutes of the Federation board, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, ANU, NBAC E217. On 
Australian interstate shipping interests, see John Bach, A Maritime History of Australia, Nelson, West 
Melbourne, 1976, pp.308–26.
18 Sir Kenneth Anderson to A. E. Elford, 20 Sept. 1920, Elford MSS.
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The new boy with mother and sister
(Courtesy of Hugh Elford)
Class rooms
For the Elfords’ children, a decision about their schooling was critical. The 
family had rented a small house in Middle Brighton, and Barbara was enrolled 
as a day girl at nearby Firbank. While they were in Adelaide, Dick had attended 
St Peter’s preparatory school. As a former educational administrator, Archie 
was well qualified to compare the merits of local Australian public schools like 
Melbourne Grammar, Wesley College, and Scotch College. Nevertheless, there 
was a serious false start. Dick was sent, once again as a boarder, to Melbourne 
Grammar’s Grimwade House (the junior school). Discovering that the Matron was 
incompetent, neither making the small boys wash properly nor administering 
their prescribed medication, the Elfords complained and withdrew their son. 
Urgently seeking an alternative, they lit upon a resurgent boarding institution 
southwest of Melbourne.
Geelong Grammar School had long been the school of choice for the graziers of 
Victoria’s Western District, like the Fairbairn dynasty. Since 1914, when it had 
opened a splendid building at Corio on a new 262-acre site with its own railway 
station, Geelong Grammar had become a fashionable boarding option for the 
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sons of Melbourne’s business and professional elite.19 Thus in 1921, at the age of 
11, Dick Elford was despatched to Geelong. There, initially in Junior House and 
then in Perry House, he was seen at first as ‘a rather timid or hesitant boy’. This 
was perhaps unsurprising for an English child, a ‘pom’ detached from all his 
friends, and now embedded with a company of robust colonial youth, including 
two Mackinnons and John Grey Gorton.
The Corio atmosphere was ‘philistine and hearty’, a junior contemporary found 
in 1926. ‘Scorching heat beat down in spring and summer; piercing winds swept 
across in winter when the place was not petrified in frost.’ Naked dashes to cold 
showers after a bugle call awakening, unheated dormitories, scorn for dressing 
gowns, uncompromising emphasis on games, weekly military instruction, would 
toughen or crush the nervous boy. No wonder, as Balcombe Griffiths, a couple 
of years Elford’s senior, remembered, the English lad had largely overcome his 
shyness by the time he left school.20
Though undistinguished academically or on the sporting field, Dick was a 
notable performer in school drama, appearing in a fund-raising production of 
Frank Anstey’s fantasy farce Vice Versa following a devastating fire in 1925. 
Dick seems to have contracted the acting bug at the same time as his sister. 
Barbara would progress from understudying in amateur productions to walk-on 
and bit parts with the Sybil Thorndike and Lewis Casson touring company. In 
Brisbane, with cast member and private pilot Norman Shelley at the controls of 
a rented Moth, Barbara would become the first member of her family to loop 
the loop.21 Dick’s interest in theatricals led to an unusual friendship with Tom 
Judd, the school porter. The stage-struck Judd, whose Cockney father was the 
school laundryman, had been allowed to sit in on play rehearsals, and even to 
assist with make-up. The first play he ever saw was Beauty and the Beast with 
Elford and Noel Newman, a prefect three years older than his co-lead and better 
known as an athlete and superb Australian Rules footballer, playing the young 
lovers. Judd was to write many years later:
Dick and I were nearly the same age. I was a little older in years but 
not in any other way. He had been in Perry House and because of my 
help with the Pastime Club we discovered, that although poles apart as 
regards class and upbringing, we had something in common: our love 
19 Peter Gronn, ‘Schooling for Ruling: The Social Composition of Admissions to Geelong Grammar School, 
1930–1939’, Australian Historical Studies, vol.25, no.98, April 1992, pp.72–89.
20 Francis Stuart, Towards coming of age: a foreign service odyssey, Griffith University, Division of Asian 
and International Studies, Centre for the Study of Australian–Asian Relations, Nathan, 1989, p.14; Balcombe 
Griffiths to CH, 10 Nov. 1981, 8 May 1982.
21 Norman Shelley, falsely rumoured to have voiced some of Winston Churchill’s wartime broadcasts, flew as 
a ferry pilot in the Air Transport Auxiliary and became a much-loved radio actor. (For an authoritative review 
of the impersonation myth, see www.winstonchurchill.org.)
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
284
of the theatre, drawing and art and we had read the same books, in fact 
there are a number of books I would never have read if Dick had not lent 
them to me and insist that we discuss them later.22
Dick had also made a lasting impression on his first house master R. G. Jennings. 
‘Jenno’, housemaster of Junior House, was ‘a middle aged bachelor with a mission 
in life’, recalled Jo Gullett, Harry Gullett’s son, who entered the school in the 
year Elford left. ‘The mission was to turn the schoolboys under his authority 
into Christian gentlemen, perhaps rather self-conscious Christian gentlemen, 
as he was himself.’ For Reginald Jennings it mattered less that one might be an 
outstanding scholar or sportsman. What was important was the moulding of 
character.23 If Tom Judd’s testimony is to be believed, Dick Elford was a natural 
gentleman. Judd’s friend had ‘a good sense of what was right and wrong. He 
also had an earnestness of purpose and when combined with a very pleasant 
personality it made him a boy to remember.’ As for Jennings, author of stories 
of school life, who had also published a three act play, Snappy, in 1919, he was 
to remember Elford as ‘a boy of whom I held a very high opinion’, especially 
‘preparing him for the leading part in a play at school and how really well he 
did it...I learned to regard him as a charming boy who would do big things.’24 
This was perhaps a conventional posthumous tribute, though ‘charming’ has a 
ring of authenticity.
What we know for certain is that Dick’s time at Geelong meant that his life 
touched that of many boys and their families whose path he was likely to cross 
again: Pat, younger brother of Jim Fairbairn; Jim and Pat White, sons of General 
Sir Brudenell White; as well as Balcombe Griffiths, whose mother had been a 
bridesmaid at the Whites’ wedding.25 In class, dormitory, and sports field close 
friendships were forged. Hampers were shared: Heinze [sic] Baked Beans ‘done 
up in tomato sauce gravy (not too strong)’ might have only ‘one bit of bacon 
(not pork) just big enough to cover a florin, but the beans were glorious. They 
make one big meal for two people or a fairly large one for three, you try them’, 
he urged his mother.
22 Tom Judd, Fifty Years Will Be Long Enough! a school porter’s story, National Press, Melbourne, 1971, 
pp.39–40. Newman, later a long-serving master at the school, was the father of the AFL footballer and 
television personality Sam Newman.
23 Gullett, Good Company, p.30. For other views of Jennings: Geoffrey Dutton, Out in the Open An 
Autobiography, UQP, St Lucia, 1994, pp.37–55; David Osborne Hay, From Collendina to Boomanoomana: An 
Unfinished Autobiography, Hyland House Publishing, Melbourne, 2009, pp.28–32.
24 Judd, Fifty Years, p.112; R. G. Jennings to Audrey Elford, 2 Sept. 1940, Elford MSS. For Jennings’ 
influence, see Weston Bate, Light Blue Down Under: The History of Geelong Grammar School, Oxford UP, 
Melbourne, 1990, pp.147–50.
25 W. B. Griffiths to CH, 10 Nov. 1981.
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Archie and Sybil Elford, and children home from school
(Courtesy Hugh Elford)
Dick matriculated in 1927, with first-class honours in drawing in the School 
Leaving Examination, and entered Melbourne University in 1928. Enrolled 
in architecture, he managed to pass only two subjects, graphics and drawing, 
in his first year. Pure mathematics, natural philosophy, and chemistry proved 
beyond him. He tried them all again without success in March and December 
1929, and finally in March 1930. The triple failure in chemistry must have been 
a barely fathomable disappointment to his father and uncles, in particular Percy 
Elford, who claimed that he had been a month away from discovering Argon in 
1890 when he was forced to end his research to take up a teaching appointment 
in Shropshire.26 Dick’s lecturers had lost patience. In the terse language of the 
university’s student record, he was ‘reported for repeated failure’. He told the 
authorities that he did not desire to proceed with the architecture course. But 
this evidently was not enough. Presumably to guarantee that he could not 
change his mind and come back, he was formally excluded from the course in 
May 1930.27
What had happened? Lack of application rather more than lack of ability seems 
the likeliest explanation. There had been distractions. In September 1929 he was 
26 Percy Elford’s research is summarised in a letter to David Elford, 8 Dec. 1949, Elford MSS.
27 I am indebted to Michael Collins Persse for information about Elford’s schooling and to the Melbourne 
University Archives for his later academic record.
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elected the architecture faculty representative on the Students’ Representative 
Council, and became honorary treasurer. Richard Latham, the federal Attorney-
General’s son, was SRC president. The brilliant Latham, a dedicated practical 
joker, was soon on his way to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. Others prominent on 
the council were the Test cricketer Ted A’Beckett, succeeding Harry Winneke as 
representative of the law faculty; the medical student, William Fenton-Bowen, 
who was to become notorious as an abortionist; and the engineer C. N. Edgerton, 
who made his name on campus as a boxer. Engaging as student politics and 
innocent undergraduate romps were, the most significant diversion for Elford 
was the vivacious girl he met at the architects’ ball in his first year. Audrey 
Edith Basham had just arrived in Melbourne on a holiday trip from Perth. A 
friend persuaded her to go to the ball. Before the night was out she and Dick 
were unofficially engaged.
Apart from the understandable hesitations of their parents about such a meteoric 
courtship, there was another consideration: Audrey was three years older than 
the 18-year-old university student she had just met. In deference to parental 
counsel, the couple were to wait until Dick was 21 before they were to marry. 
Audrey’s father George Basham, a retired bank manager, was ill and would 
die aged 64 in February 1930. By then it was obvious that Dick had to find 
employment. In a depressed economy, with construction and house building 
languishing, prospects for advancement in the architectural profession, even 
for a graduate, were few. His slightly older school chum and fellow architecture 
student Balcombe Griffiths was secure for the moment in the fashionable firm of 
A. and K. Henderson, biding his time before quitting with his friends John and 
Tom Freeman and Rob Yuncken to start their own practice.28
For Dick a junior drafting position, at the going pittance of five shillings a week, 
was out of the question. An opening for a cadet reporter on The Argus, Melbourne’s 
conservative morning newspaper, was more promising. As if to demonstrate the 
intimate interlocking of the Melbourne elites, Balcombe Griffiths’ boss Kingsley 
Henderson, along with W. T. Appleton and Sir George Fairbairn, had been 
among the principal money-men supporting Stanley Bruce before his electoral 
defeat in 1929.29 Henderson was one of the small group behind the transition of 
Joe Lyons from the ALP to lead the United Australia Party in 1931, and in a few 
years was to become one of the financial angels of The Argus.30 The Argus was 
28 ‘William Balcombe Griffiths, O.B.E., M.C., E.D.’, The Corian, July 1991, pp.197–8; Roy Simpson, ‘W. 
Balcombe Griffiths’, Architect, July 1991, pp.4–5. For Latham, see ‘Geoffrey Hutton’, in Hume Dow (ed.), 
More Memories of Melbourne University: Undergraduate Life in the Years Since 1919, Hutchinson of Australia, 
Melbourne, 1985, pp.24–5. For Elford’s reflections on ‘The Training of an Architect’, The Argus, 19 Aug. 1937.
29 The Argus, 2 Nov. 1929, p.18.
30 According to Dame Enid Lyons, Henderson was one of her husband’s two closest friends from 1931 
onwards (Dame Enid Lyons, So We Take Comfort, Heinemann, London, 1965, p.275). The other members of 
the group that persuaded Lyons to join the new political grouping were the stockbroker Staniforth Ricketson 
(head of J. B. Were), C. A. Norris (secretary of the National Mutual Life Association), Ambrose Pratt (former 
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unashamedly the paper of the right in politics: ‘Conservative, free trade; very 
dignified, stands for everything constitutional, strongly Imperial; circulates 
amongst society people, commercial leaders, pastoralists, bankers, etc.’, was 
how a brief for the new Victorian governor characterised it in January 1934.31 
George Johnston, who also started as a cadet in the 1930s, thinly disguised it as 
the Morning Post in his novel My Brother Jack: ‘Everything…was deliberately 
and publicly arranged to suggest dignity, grandeur, omniscience, infallibility 
and a privileged standing in the community.’32 A staid broadsheet appealing to 
the status-conscious, it sold less than its morning rival, The Age. Between them, 
the two rather self-satisfied morning papers barely exceeded the circulation 
of Keith Murdoch’s brash tabloid the Sun News-Pictorial. But The Argus had 
strong connections with the federal government, and was the favoured recipient 
of information from Melbourne financial circles.
So Dick Elford began there at the bottom of the journalists’ ladder, the most 
junior member of the ‘literary staff’, assigned to the motoring section, on the 
lowest circulation daily paper in the city. Advancement within the business 
had to be the first objective. His cadetship was a four-year apprenticeship. The 
Argus cadets were subjected to a rigorous regime of training that enriched their 
general knowledge while it polished their grammar and syntax. Another way 
forward was a recently launched Diploma of Journalism course at Melbourne 
University. The diploma could lead eventually to a Bachelor of Arts degree. 
Still maybe hoping to satisfy waning family aspirations that he would obtain 
university qualifications, he enrolled in the course. It proved a struggle. He 
scraped through Economics I and Law affecting Journalism at the end of 1932. 
But that was to be the end of his studies. Clearly Dick had no appetite for the 
higher education that his father, uncles, and aunts had enjoyed. Nor, if truth 
were acknowledged, was he dedicated to journalism. He had talent as a reporter 
and feature writer; but the newspaper was a means to an end not a vocation.
Ambition
Dick Elford’s real ambition was a life in politics. What led him in this direction 
is unknown. An eighteenth-century ancestor, Sir William Elford, first and 
last Baronet, was a friend of William Pitt the Younger and had been an ally of 
William Wilberforce in the anti-slavery movement in the House of Commons. 
journalist, novelist, and tariff reform advocate, with mining interests in Malaya and Siam), Sir John Higgins 
(head of the British Australian Wool Realisation Association Pty Ltd, the largest public company in Australia), 
and Robert Menzies, a leading Opposition figure in the Victorian Parliament (Philip Hart, ‘The Piper and the 
Tune’, in Cameron Hazlehurst (ed.), Australian Conservatism, p.115).
31 P. M. G. Bayley (London News Editor, Australian Press Association), ‘The Australian Press’, Huntingfield 
MSS, NLA AJCP M2821.
32 George Johnston, My Brother Jack, Collins, Melbourne, 1964, p.206.
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And Dick’s grandfather, Edwin, was related by marriage to the famous Welsh 
reforming MP, Henry Richard. But all that was in the distant past, and the Elford 
name ― in spite of a lineage traceable back to the thirteenth century ― meant 
nothing in the Australia of the 1930s. If a political career were to be undertaken, 
some strategic planning was needed. So too was maturity. Dick was no longer 
a ‘rather timid or hesitant boy’. A prolonged engagement and some career 
success had changed him. Balcombe Griffiths remembered a transformation into 
‘an active and positive personality’. Exposure as a young adult to the banter 
of the newsroom and the raffish after-hours haunts of Melbourne’s literary 
luminaries, as well as his father’s more decorous social world, had melted his 
residual shyness. On his wedding day in November 1931, followed by Griffiths 
as his groomsman, and best man Dick Latreille of the pastoral company Dennys 
Lascelles, all in white tie and tails, Dick Elford looked as though he belonged 
on the steps of the Reverend Dr Archibald Law’s fashionable St John’s Church, 
Toorak.
Dick’s bride, Audrey Basham, and her two younger brothers Geoffrey and 
Maxwell had a colourful heritage. Their father had moved from the family’s 
mixed farming property at Port Elliot in South Australia for a career as an 
accountant with the Western Australia Bank, first in the goldfields boom town 
of Menzies, then as manager in the burgeoning Laverton, 150 miles to the 
northeast. At Laverton he met Alice Byfield, formerly of Hobart, a nurse at the 
local hospital. Married in 1905 in St George’s Cathedral by the Bishop of Perth, 
the couple moved to the more established port town of Geraldton, and then in 
1920 to Katanning, in the farm belt southwest of Perth.
George Basham traced his ancestry from Xenophon Basham, a Hammersmith 
butcher transported to Tasmania in 1814 after being found with a forged £5 
note in his possession, serving time in the hulks, escaping, and having a death 
sentence commuted. Xenophon was clearly a man of some resource, as he 
was followed to Hobart shortly afterwards by his wife and four children. By 
the 1840s there were Basham children and grandchildren in South Australia. 
Audrey’s grandfather, Charles Abraham Basham, purchased the broad acres of 
Pleasant Banks stretching from Port Elliot to Middleton in 1856 on his return 
from the Bendigo goldfields, where he and his brother had made money crafting 
cedar gold boxes. George, the second son and sixth of Charles’ eight children, 
had cash if not gold dust running in his veins. He had bought an interest in the 
Hotel Australia in Laverton as well as making his own way as a successful and 
well-connected bank manager. With his uncle and cousins running a Guernsey 
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stud, his father the creator of the ‘Basham Black Mammoth’ grape, and a Basham 
history of dairy production, flour milling, and farming around Port Elliot, the 
convict stain had been well and truly erased.33
Audrey and Dick, wed at last
(Courtesy of Hugh Elford)
33 Annie Basham and Melody Cartwright have generously instructed me on Audrey Basham’s ancestry. ‘A 
family history of Xenophon Basham and descendants’, an essay by Judy Johnson, is held in the library of the 
Society of Australian Genealogists, Sydney.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
290
If the Bashams had risen from convict forger to bank manager (sleeping with a 
revolver under his pillow) in three generations, the Elfords, twentieth-century 
immigrants, had long-established claims to gentility. Descended from the Elfords 
of the hamlet of Sheepstor on Dartmoor, the family traced their ancestors back 
to the late thirteenth century and beyond.34 They had the right to bear arms. 
Sir William Elford Bt, MP for Plymouth, a banker, was a Fellow of the Royal 
Society and a talented amateur artist, one of whose paintings graced the royal 
apartments at Windsor. Although his company crashed spectacularly in the 
1820s his descendants were proud of their name. Dick Elford wore a signet ring 
bearing the crest with a demi lion rampant over the family motto adopted by 
Sir William: Difficilia quæ pulchra, variously translated as ‘To be honourable is 
difficult’ and ‘Things that are honourable [or beautiful or excellent] are difficult 
to attain.’35 Now established in a smart South Yarra apartment, a member of the 
Australian Club and the exclusive residential Peninsula Country Golf Club in 
Frankston, Archie Elford moved in the same circles as the Grimwades, Harold 
Clapp, G. J. Coles, Herbert Brookes, and the conservative party leaders Stanley 
Bruce, John Latham, and the coming man, R. G. Menzies, and their financial 
backers. As chief executive of a shipping cartel that operated with official 
blessing, A. S. Elford was frequently in the news for his negotiations with the 
Waterside Workers and the government. But it was evidence of his family’s 
aspiration if not their arrival in Melbourne society when The Argus social notes 
on 6 January 1930 recorded the return of the Elfords to their Toorak Road home 
after spending a few days at the ‘millionaires’ golf course’ in Frankston.36
Archie Elford had briefed the young barrister Robert Menzies, and first 
appeared with him in the Commonwealth Arbitration Court in 1925 when they 
attempted to get the unruly Seamen’s Union deregistered.37 Menzies, though 
possibly blackballed in previous years because of his lack of a war record, had 
been elected to the Australian Club in 1931.38 This was a connection that could 
in time be useful for the Elfords. But Dick’s more immediate need was financial 
independence. Through the City directors who sat on the Steamship Owners’ 
board ― men like James Kelso of McIlwraith, McEacharn; David York Syme of 
the Melbourne Steamship Co., a director of the National Bank of Australasia, and 
a fellow member of the Australian Club; and J. Langley Webb of Huddart Parker 
and chairman of the Commercial Bank of Australia ― Archie could help his son 
34 ‘A Brief History of the Elford Family of Sheepstor’, St Leonard’s Church, Sheepstor, n.d., Elford MSS.
35 A. E. Elford to Col. H. E. Jones, 23 Oct. 1940, NAA: A1378, P8903 refers to a ‘golf ring’. For the Elford 
family background, see www.one-name.org/profiles/elford.html; and a family tree and other records in the 
Elford MSS; Felicity Owen, ‘Elford, Sir William, baronet (1749–1837)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8624, accessed 3 April 2010].
36 John Pacini, It’s Your Honour: An Account of the First Fifty Years of the Peninsula Golf Club, [1975], p.17; 
for the ‘so-called millionaires golf course’, Lord Wakehurst’s diary, 31 Oct. 1937, Wakehurst Papers, NSW 
State Library ML MSS 6347 1 (5).
37 The Argus, 20 Jan. 1925.
38 Paul de Serville, The Australian Club Melbourne 1878–1998, Australian Club, Melbourne, 1998, p.87.
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to embark on a lucrative course in commerce or finance. With his friends on the 
Court of Directors of the Royal Humane Society, and associates in the 1928–29 
Industrial Peace Conference, friends of the Prime Minister like the flour miller 
W. C. F. Thomas and the Collins House powerbroker R. W. Knox, he could open 
many other doors. Archie Elford made no secret of his political views, notably 
his hope in mid-1932 that the New South Wales governor would intervene and 
end the premiership of Jack Lang.39
The path for Dick might not be rapid but it would be steady. He and his adoring 
wife Audrey would be a team, sharing the burdens and rewards of a modestly 
prosperous middle-class family life. In due course, with a secure home base, a 
sound business reputation, and carefully cultivated connections, they would 
be ready to move forward if and when a political opening presented itself. A 
cautious approach had much to recommend it, especially as The Argus, respectable 
newspaper though it was, was going through troubled times. The company lost 
money in 1932 and, with classified advertising shrinking, there was no revival in 
sight. With this in mind it seems that an attempt was made to mobilise friendly 
forces on Dick’s behalf. Foremost among them, and as respected as a referee 
could possibly be, was the Commonwealth Deputy Prime Minister, Attorney-
General, Minister for External Affairs, and Minister for Industry, John Latham. 
Latham had come into the orbit of Dick’s father as retained legal counsel to 
several shipping companies, and then as the Bruce–Page government’s moving 
spirit in industrial relations disputes and legislation affecting the maritime 
industries. A courteous formal relationship with the minister was deepened by 
the furnishing of private information on waterfront conditions, and warmed by 
assurances that the shipowners had no wish to embarrass the government, even 
when they were alarmed about the impending Maritime Industries Bill in 1929. 
After the formation of the Lyons government, Elford sought Latham’s private 
guidance on contentious issues such as the Queensland government’s move late 
in 1932 to force volunteers off the waterfront, an action that Elford hoped was 
‘ultra vires the Constitution’.40
As a young barrister, John Latham had contributed articles to The Argus at a 
penny a line, and had been a correspondent for the London Standard. He knew 
newspapers, and had almost certainly authorised the provision of intelligence 
information that underpinned a series of Argus articles on communism in May 
1933.41 Now, in March 1934, he recorded that he had known ‘Mr R. E. Elford’ 
39 Sir Kenneth S. Anderson to A. S. Elford, 1 May 1932, Elford MSS.
40 Elford to Latham, 3 Jan. 1933, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/2958. Elford’s correspondence with Latham 
in 1929, including ‘personal and confidential’ exchanges about the ‘“red” and highly undesirable element’, is 
in Latham MSS NLA 1009/36 and 39.
41 Sybil Nolan, ‘Manifest editorial differences: The Age and The Argus in the 1920’s and 30’s’ and David 
Dunstan, ‘The Argus: The Life, Death and Remembering of a Great Australian Newspaper’, in Muriel Porter 
(ed.), The Argus: The life and death of a great Melbourne newspaper 1846–1957, RMIT UP, Melbourne, 2003, 
pp.9–41, 79–113.
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for seven years, since Elford’s university days in fact, when his own son had 
been President of the Students’ Representative Council. Elford was a man ‘of 
attractive personality and he has displayed great energy and ability in his work 
as a journalist’. Moreover, Latham attested:
I know he is entrusted by his newspaper with assignments usually 
reserved for men of much longer experience, and I am assured from a well 
informed and independent source that his progress in the journalistic 
profession has been unusually rapid, whether judged from a standpoint 
of the work with which he has been entrusted or of the salary which he 
is now paid.
Latham had ‘no hesitation in recommending Mr Elford as an intelligent, well 
informed and energetic young man’.42 With this sort of support, a new arena 
was probably only a few interviews away. But an unexpected turn of events a 
few months later brought another option.
In December 1934, following the sudden death of Lauchlan Mackinnon, principal 
proprietor and general manager of The Argus, Archie Elford was entrusted with 
responsibility for managing the newspaper interests of the Mackinnon estate. 
As a member of the council of management he became, in effect, a director of The 
Argus and Australasian company. The unforeseen assignment lasted for the next 
three years until new owners led by Robert Menzies’ business partner, Staniforth 
Ricketson of the stockbrokers J. B. Were, took over what was a commercially 
ailing property.43 His father’s position affording him some protection, if not 
patronage, Dick could adopt a more audacious strategy. He presented Audrey 
with a choice. If they were to put all their resources into developing his career, 
staying with The Argus and riding out its financial uncertainties would give 
him flexible hours to widen his circle of useful acquaintances, and pursue 
other interests and opportunities. The polo, racing, and riding to hounds of the 
Mackinnons, the Fairbairns, and their Western District pastoralist neighbours 
might be beyond his reach. But he would have enough money for smart clothes, 
entertainment, perhaps tennis and squash, and even occasional hospitality. 
Meanwhile Audrey would stay in the background, thrifty and frugal, taking 
care of the children ― twins Hugh and David born in February 1933 ― until 
her husband ‘came good’.
42 Latham testimonial, 6 March 1934, Elford MSS (copy, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/1/3561). Seven months 
later Archie Elford was a member of the organising committee led by Prime Minister Lyons for a dinner 
honouring Latham on his retirement from politics — ‘one of the greatest tributes ever paid to a public man in 
Australia’ (The Argus, 11 Oct. 1934).
43 For Lauchlan Mackinnon and The Argus, see Geoffrey Serle, ‘Mackinnon, Lauchlan Kenneth Scobie 
(1861–1935)’, Bede Nairn and Geoffrey Serle (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 10, MUP, 1986, 
p.316. For the business links between Ricketson, Henderson, and Menzies, see ‘The House of Were’ 1839–
1954, privately printed, Melbourne, 1954, pp.300–1, 326, 329–31.
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The Elfords at Roy Pearce and Barbara’s wedding 1937; left to right: 
Audrey, Archie, Sybil, Dick, Roy, Barbara, the best man, groom’s father, 
with twins David and Hugh
(Courtesy of Hugh Elford)
Dick’s preference was obvious; and Audrey acquiesced. So this was the plan, 
‘an arrangement’, as Audrey described it with a tinge of embarrassment 40 
years later. To the extent that their carefully rationed means would allow, Dick 
would live something akin to a playboy life. His social circle would embrace old 
school chums, the junior members of the Mackinnon clan, his architect friends 
like Balcombe Griffiths and their wealthy clients, Dick Latreille of Dennys 
Lascelles, journalists like Archer Thomas of The Herald and the flamboyant left-
winger Rupert Lockwood, the rising society solicitor Max Ham, the ex-Geelong 
Grammarian and aspiring artist Russell Drysdale, and the dashing bachelor MP 
for Fawkner, Harold Holt.44 On rare occasions, noticed in The Argus ‘Life in 
Melbourne’ columns, Audrey would also come into her own ― acting as a ticket 
secretary and then committee president, for example, when Dick and a group 
44 Harold Holt to John Buchan, 16 June 1961, Holt MSS, NAA: M2606/1/23 recalls Holt’s friendship with 
Elford.
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of old boys from public and grammar schools’ associations organised an ‘Alma 
Mater’ ball and other functions to raise funds for a boys’ ward at Prince Henry’s 
Hospital.45
The Elford plan also included taking work seriously. At The Argus Dick was 
at first taken under the wing of Edgar Holt, one of the younger men already 
making their mark on the paper, along with the Deputy Chief of Staff W. Shelton 
Smith, and Clive Turnbull. A poet, and a major presence in the literary pages, 
Holt was assigned to ‘keep an amiable eye on him’ by the editor, Roy Curthoys.46 
Within a short time of joining the paper, ‘Richard Elford’ had stories appearing 
over his own by-line. Initiation pranks for college freshmen, the prospect for 
the Victorian ski-ing season ― he could turn his hand with a light touch to 
whatever was required.47 By the time Curthoys, opinionated and volatile, fell 
out with the owners and left in 1935, Dick was securely established.
From late 1937, Argus staff came under the supervision of the dynamic Sydney 
journalist Errol Knox, who had enlisted as a private in the AIF, was commissioned 
and served with No. 3 Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, and ended the war 
as a temporary major attached to the Royal Flying Corps staff. Appointed as 
managing editor to turn around the paper’s faltering fortunes, ‘Knocker’ Knox 
had edited Who’s Who in Australia 1933–34 and another edition in 1935 in 
which Archibald Elford now appeared among his more famous friends. Other 
contemporaries of Dick at The Argus included Bob Menzies’ sister, Belle Green, 
working for the board of directors in ‘a public relations capacity’; and in the 
newsroom the senior feature writer, film reviewer, and novelist Erle Cox; Bill 
Brennan the veteran chief leader writer (whose brother Tom was a junior United 
Australia Party minister); and Erle Cox’s son Harry, deputy chief of staff, who 
went on to assist in the paper’s Canberra parliamentary gallery from 1933, 
and would share tales of the turmoil and conflict in the national capital before 
moving on to be news editor at the Sydney Daily Telegraph. Elford himself 
brought along the talented Melbourne University student journalist Geoffrey 
Hutton to work for £2 a week under the stern tutelage of Roy Curthoys.48 It was 
a good school. And, as the paper was revamped in the late 1930s, with news on 
the front page, rising circulation and advertising revenue, Dick Elford settled 
into a comfortable routine.49
45 The Argus, 6 Nov., 16 Dec. 1935.
46 Edgar Holt to CH, [May 1983]; Bridget Griffen-Foley, ‘A “Civilised Amateur”: Edgar Holt and His Life in 
Letters and Politics’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 49 (1), 2003, pp.33–6.
47 The Argus, 14 March 1931, 4 June 1932.
48 ‘Isabel Alice Green née Menzies’, Latrobe Library MS 10741 Box 957/4; Dow (ed.), More Memories of 
Melbourne University, p.36.
49 For The Argus’s revival, see Bob Murray, ‘All a matter of finance’, in Jim Usher (ed.), The Argus: Life 
and Death of a Newspaper, Melbourne, 1999, p.15 and Matthew Ricketson, ‘Staniforth Ricketson and the 
Rejuvenation of The Argus’, in Muriel Porter (ed.), The Argus…, pp.159–73. Also Sally O’Neill, ‘Knox, Sir 
Errol Galbraith (1889–1949)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 9, MUP, 1983, pp.628–9.
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An auspicious embrace
At last, his spurs earned, Dick was beckoned towards one of the political doors 
he was hoping would open. One of the people into whose orbit he had inserted 
himself was James Fairbairn, the flying MP for Flinders. He had perhaps first met 
Fairbairn through Fairbairn’s younger brother Pat, one of his contemporaries at 
Geelong Grammar. Allan ‘Jiggie’ Spowers, an Argus director, was a prefect and 
captain of boats at Geelong when Fairbairn was there. Spowers and Fairbairn 
and their wives moved in the same social circles: polo tea parties, vice-regal 
balls, racing carnivals. Spowers, Osborne Fairbairn, and Jim Fairbairn himself 
had seen something of the young journalist on the committee of the Old 
Geelong Grammarians’ Association which Elford had joined two years after 
leaving school and remained on ever since. He was, it was said, a keen and 
useful committee man. In mid-1938, Fairbairn invited him on an adventure. 
They were to fly to New Guinea together in August, ostensibly to undertake an 
aerial survey of the Salamua-Wau road but with another agenda that emerged 
on return: to challenge the choice of Salamua over Lae as the capital of the 
mandated territory.50
The Argus gave Elford leave of absence. It was to be a determining event in 
the young journalist’s life. A more intimate environment than the cockpit of a 
small plane is hard to imagine. Sharing the dangers of the air through rough sea 
crossings and blinding storms, navigating with official maps that did not show 
many ranges and peaks of over 1000 feet, the two men learned that they really 
liked each other.51 Great excitement followed when Fairbairn’s arguments against 
Salamua led to Cabinet repudiating the decision of the Minister for Territories, 
Billy Hughes, and considering Fairbairn’s proposal that the administration of 
Papua be merged with New Guinea. So it was not a great surprise when early 
in 1939 Fairbairn, raised to the Cabinet in the Menzies ministry as Minister for 
Civil Aviation and Minister assisting the Minister for Defence, asked Elford to 
become his private secretary. Dick did not hesitate.
The appointment as private secretary to the new minister reflected both 
professional and social acceptance. The Fairbairns, Victorian Western District 
aristocracy, were socially exclusive. Mere public servants and business 
acquaintances did not readily get past the ex-RAN petty officer manning the 
lobby of Alcaston House at the top of Collins Street, the seven-storey apartment 
building designed by A. and K. Henderson, where the Caseys and the Streets 
also had flats. Still less were invitations proffered to the Fairbairn estate at Mount 
Elephant. The gregarious Fred Scherger, for example, then a 35-year-old Wing 
50 Sydney Morning Herald, 8, 23 Aug. 1938.
51 The Mercury, 13 Aug. 1938.
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Commander and RAAF Director of Training, whose ability their father greatly 
admired, was never seen at home by the Fairbairn children.52 A career officer, 
graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, too young to have flown in 
the Great War, the diminutive Scherger was ambitious and well-connected. One 
of the RAAF’s most respected pilots, he was Chief Flying Instructor at No 1 
Flying Training School, Point Cook, when the Minister for Defence Vic Thorby 
(prompted by the Prime Minister Joe Lyons) authorised the school being placed 
at Dick Casey’s disposal to enable him to qualify for his pilot’s licence.
Fairbairn and Elford take flight together, August 1938
(Courtesy of Audrey Elford)
The Chief of the Air Staff gave Scherger the task of instructing the Treasurer. 
In the 1937–38 Christmas holidays the instruction that had begun at Laverton 
was continued at the Caseys’ Berwick property in southeast Victoria; there 
Maie Casey, now an enthusiast after early misgivings, joined the class. Scherger 
remained friendly with the appreciative Caseys.53 He played golf with Fairbairn 
whenever they met at the Barwon Heads Golf Club. The minister later confided 
to his teenage son Geoffrey that he would have promoted Scherger to the top of 
52 Geoffrey Fairbairn, interview, 10 Oct. 1978.
53 Williams, These are Facts, p.229; Harry Rayner, Scherger: A biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick 
Scherger KBE CB DSO AFC, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1984, pp.24–5; Maie Casey, Tides and Eddies, 
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969 (1st ed. Michael Joseph, 1966), pp.65–6.
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the RAAF if he could. But he had to tell a crestfallen Scherger in 1940 that he 
must yield his position to a more senior man, one of the Great War generation, 
because he lacked ‘weight in the top councils of the service’.54
Relative youth was not a handicap for a ministerial private secretary. The right 
old-school tie and social graces in any case compensated for much that might 
otherwise be deficient. Dick Elford’s journalistic colleagues had appreciated his 
‘quiet courtesy and unfailing bonhomie’. As the Geelong Grammar magazine, 
The Corian, was to put it 16 months later, Elford had qualities to impress an 
older man: ‘a keen sense and acute mind, good judgment, and a strong sense 
of right and wrong, together with a real though not oppressive earnestness of 
purpose…a natural pleasantness of manner’.55 Perhaps, too, Jim Fairbairn was 
able to confirm his assessment of Elford’s character and ability from his uncle 
Sir George, a former Senator and Victorian Agent General in London, who was 
a director of The Argus and Australasian Ltd. George Fairbairn, as trustee for 
the Wilson family, The Argus’s original owners, of course knew Dick’s father 
from his days as the Mackinnons’ trustee. As President of the Victorian National 
Union in the early 1930s, the main financial backer of the United Australia 
Organisation, George Fairbairn’s influence reached into the deepest recesses of 
the conservative political heartland.56 Scattered through the network of relatives 
and business associates, the Melbourne and Australian Club establishment, the 
Collins Street mining and financial magnates, there would be many people who 
could vouch for the sociable Dick Elford.
Dick was in fact in demand. Sir Keith Murdoch was contemplating offering 
him a post on the Melbourne Herald. And just two days after he had accepted 
Fairbairn’s offer, Dick Casey, appointed as Minister for Supply and Development, 
made a similar proposal. Casey had just relinquished the Treasury portfolio and, 
by mutual agreement, his private secretary, Colin Moodie, a graduate clerk from 
External Affairs, had returned to a better-paid departmental post. Moodie had 
not enjoyed the demands of the private secretary’s post: hours lingering around 
Parliament House, Sunday summonses to the minister’s home, an ambience of 
political intrigue from which as a career public servant he felt he should be 
detached. Elford’s pedigree and commitment were different. He had known 
Casey’s wife, Maie, for several years. She, and their mutual friend Russell Drysdale 
were fellow students at George Bell’s Melbourne art school. Ethel Spowers, 
sister of The Argus director, Allan Spowers, was another of Bell’s Contemporary 
Group circle. Maie, as well as her husband, and her brother Rupert were avid 
flyers, with a newly built airstrip on their ‘Edrington’ property near Berwick. 
Much as he welcomed the chance to work with Fairbairn, Elford regretted the 
54 ACM Sir Frederick Scherger, interview, 2 Sept. 1978.
55 The Argus, 14 Aug. 1940, editorial; ‘Richard Edwin Elford’, The Corian, Aug. 1940, p.122.
56 Lex Watson, ‘The United Australia Party and its Sponsors’, in Hazlehurst (ed.), Australian Conservatism, pp.73–4.
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missed opportunity to join the entourage of the more senior party figure. It 
was more than a co-incidence that Elford’s bosses at The Argus had backed the 
campaign for Stanley Bruce to succeed Joe Lyons, a bid led by Casey, whose 
ill-judged support for Bruce and subsequent lame candidature of his own, cost 
him whatever confidence the successful Bob Menzies might have retained for a 
declared leadership rival.
Irrespective of the immediate political consequences, there was a lesson to be 
learned from a particular enthusiasm Fairbairn and Casey shared. The two 
ministers had a unique bond. Elford could not fail to be impressed by the passion 
for the air displayed by both his new chief and the ‘figure of glamour’, the 
immaculate ‘Ronald Colmanesque’ Casey. As Casey was to write some 18 months 
later: ‘Australia is one of nature’s flying countries.’57 If Fairbairn was the better-
known aviator, Casey had his own early flying stories. His first was paying £5 to 
spend 10 minutes aloft near Paris in 1911. In 1917 he was attached as an observer 
to an Australian squadron in France and went up in several military machines.58 
He had started flying lessons in England as long ago as 1929. But, after a few 
months, his instructor ‘killed himself by running into another machine in the 
air, so that I am at present subject to certain domestic pressure to give it up’.59 
The domestic pressure had abated by January 1938 when Casey bought Simple 
Flying for Simple People: notes for the use of A-licence pilots by one of them, Nancy 
Lyle, who happened to be the first woman to fly across Bass Strait.60 Although 
Audrey Elford did not know it, Dick himself was soon to begin flying lessons. 
But first, traditionally farewelled by his Argus colleagues with a wrist watch 
suitably engraved in recognition of nearly a decade of service, he had fresh 
realms on land to make his own.
The political world
People in political and public service circles quickly warmed to Dick Elford. On 
the new stage, with her boys at school, and an additional allowance supplementing 
her husband’s salary, Audrey could begin to entertain more expansively in their 
Punt Road home. Cocktail parties for visiting friends on successive evenings 
in late August 1939 found their way into The Argus social page. ‘The rooms 
57 ‘Notes to assist in the preparation of scenario for “March of Time” of Australia’, attachment to Casey to 
Sir Keith Murdoch, 5 Sept. 1940, Casey MSS, NLA MS 6150/2.
58 Lord Casey, ‘Foreword’, Sir Norman Brearley (with Ted Mayman), Australian Aviator, Seal Books, 1974 
(1st ed. Rigby 1971).
59 R. G. Casey to S. M. Bruce, 23 May, 18 July, 1 Aug. 1929, W. J. Hudson and Jane North, My Dear P. M.: 
R. G. Casey’s Letters to S. M. Bruce 1924–1929, AGPS, Canberra, 1980, pp.515, 542, 553.
60 Casey bought the book, published by Angus & Robertson in 1937, in Sydney on 24 Jan. 1938; it now 
forms part of the Casey Collection in the Berwick Mechanics’ Institute & Free Library (Judith Dwyer to CH, 
email, 31 Aug. 2009).
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were decked with hyacinths, violets, daffodils, and blossom. The hostess wore 
a frock of misty blue woollen striped with red and white, with a wide belt 
and buttons of white patent leather.’61 Many in Melbourne and Canberra of 
course knew Dick’s father as the principal representative of the employers in the 
shipping and waterfront conflicts of the last decade and recently as a member of 
a Commonwealth government defence co-ordination committee advising on the 
requisitioning of mercantile vessels in time of war. Dick soon became a popular 
member of the coterie of younger ministerial private secretaries. Cecil (‘Peter’) 
Looker was friendly. Looker had come from the Prime Minister’s department as 
Casey’s third choice when Moodie departed and Corby Tritton declined.62 Keith 
Waller, a Melbourne University history graduate and career External Affairs 
officer seconded to Billy Hughes’ staff, was among those who introduced him 
into the close world of Canberra society. Dick made friends wherever he went, 
Waller said, ‘one couldn’t help liking him’. Though his university career had 
been brief and unremarkable, Elford was embraced by the clique of graduates 
recently recruited to the Department of External Affairs. The group included 
Waller’s Scotch College contemporary Pat Shaw, Colin Moodie, Tom Eckersley, 
and Peter Heydon who had been at Fort Street High School in Sydney with 
Looker. Heydon’s Sydney law background, joviality, and quick intelligence 
had impressed Bob and Pattie Menzies on a five-and-a-half-month overseas 
trip in 1938. As External Affairs liaison officer with the Defence Department in 
Melbourne in the first few months of war, he was to see much of Elford, along 
with Geoff Street’s Toorakite assistant, CMF Captain Garry Armstrong, in the 
ante-rooms of the War Cabinet.63
‘He was a most attractive fellow’, Keith Waller recalled of Fairbairn’s private 
secretary. ‘I don’t think there was any great profundity but he was tremendous 
fun and a splendid person to spend an evening with ― bit of a womaniser 
but that’s forgivable in youth I suppose.’64 Waller’s verdict was echoed by 
the distinguished RAAF officer Air Marshal Sir George Jones, then a Wing 
Commander and Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. Jones saw Elford at close quarters 
for many weeks crossing the Pacific aboard the Matson liner Monterey, then 
travelling across the United States, and in Ottawa for a month from mid-October 
1939. Temporarily gazetted out of the RAAF and travelling in mufti so that the 
neutral Americans would not be obliged to intern him, Jones accompanied the 
61 The Argus, 21 Aug. 1939; 1 Nov. 1938.
62 N.C. Tritton, interview, 7 June 1977.
63 Keith Waller to Audrey Elford, 13 Aug. 1940, Elford MSS; David Lee, ‘Shaw, Sir Patrick (1913–1975)’, 
Ritchie and Langmore (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 16, pp.220–1; J. R. Nethercote, Heydon, 
Sir Peter Richard (1913–1971)’, Ritchie and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 14, 
pp.445–6; Hazlehurst, Menzies Observed, pp.135–7.
64 Sir Keith Waller, interview, 21 June 1977.
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Minister to assist in negotiating the Empire Air Training Scheme. Fairbairn’s 
private secretary, he remembered with a twinkle, ‘was a nice sort of a fellow. He 
got on well with people, particularly with the girls.’65
Elford was indeed attractive to women. Nor was he afraid to pitch his cap 
in dangerous territory. The Minister’s wife, Peggy Fairbairn, encouraged his 
attention, pursued him, according to Audrey Elford. What especially irked 
Audrey was the way in which Peggy’s 15-year-old son Geoffrey, home from 
school, was charged with delivering messages from his mother. For his part, 
Geoffrey was at pains 39 years later to affirm that the initiative came from the 
other direction. Elford wrote poems and sent them to his mother. She was 
‘charmed’ by Elford’s attentions. His father, he said, was not worried about the 
relationship. In answer to a question that had not been asked, he volunteered 
that there had been no affair.66
Whatever the truth about the young Dick Elford and Peggy Fairbairn, known in 
her family for sensitivity about her age, it clearly did not bother her husband. 
Scarcely a day passed when Fairbairn and Elford were not in each other’s 
company. The friendship that had been forged in the air over New Guinea and 
strengthened as the uneasy months of peace in 1939 turned to ‘phony’ war, 
was to be tested by another extended period of travelling intimacy. When the 
Menzies government decided to join with the United Kingdom and the other 
Dominions in launching an Empire Air Training Scheme it was natural that the 
Civil Aviation Minister and Minister assisting the Minister for Defence, Fairbairn, 
should be sent overseas to negotiate the terms. The small team accompanying 
the Minister was just his private secretary, Wing Commander George Jones 
(Assistant Chief of the Air Staff), and C. V. Kellway, Finance Member of the 
Air Board, who joined the mission in New York where he was Acting Assistant 
Trade Commissioner. For Elford it was an eye-opening trip, ‘one to remember 
for the rest of my life’, as he told his mother on his return.67
On the long sea voyage across the Pacific, the Minister and his private secretary 
had weeks to relax and restore their bodies and spirits. There was good company, 
and they enjoyed it. The journey was broken to collect the New Zealand 
delegates. Then in Fiji, on October 19, the Monterey paused long enough for a 
party of 28 to be entertained by the Governor, Sir Harry Luke, at lunch followed 
by a vocal concert in aid of Red Cross. The highlight, according to the host, was 
the ‘admirable rendering’ of the ‘Song of the Flea’ by the Australian baritone 
Alfredo Luizzi, the 1938 Sun Aria winner and a protégé of Marjorie Lawrence, 
en route to the USA to further his studies.68 ‘There were also a lot of parties in 
65 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
66 Geoffrey Fairbairn, interview, 10 Oct. 1978; telephone conversation, 8 March 1979.
67 R. E. Elford to Sybil Elford, 31 Jan. 1940, Elford MSS.
68 Sir Harry Luke, From a South Seas Diary 1938–1942, Nicholson & Watson, London, 1945, p.130.
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various cabins’, Elford and Fairbairn’s travelling companion Jones remembered. 
The Prime Minister’s friend F. B. ‘Tim’ Clapp and his wife, Jane, were also on 
board. Clapp, who headed General Electric in Australia, was going to New York 
to supervise the ‘expediting of orders for defence requirements’ in association 
with a proposed British Purchasing Mission. Although his appointment had 
been kept confidential ― he was travelling incognito as were the Air Minister’s 
party ― Clapp’s identity was no secret. And it soon became apparent to Fairbairn 
and his group that there would be much to be gained if Clapp could join them 
in Ottawa to meet the various British, French, and Canadian representatives at 
the air conference.69
For Elford, more than his well-travelled companions, landfall brought both 
delights and disagreeable surprises. ‘After the luxuriant growth and colour 
of the tropics,’ he reported to his mother, ‘Los Angeles with its timber frame 
houses and apparent lack of civic pride which allowed much dirt and many 
eyesores to disfigure the landscape rather appalled me.’ Even Hollywood was a 
disappointment. But the trip was, after all, official business. As Australia had 
placed an order for 100 of the Lockheed Corporation’s latest Hudson bombers, 
the Lockheed factory at Burbank and several other big manufacturing plants on 
the west coast were on the official itinerary. Francis Clapp, as ‘Special Business 
Consultant, Commonwealth Government’, reported to Menzies that he had 
accompanied Fairbairn’s party to the Lockheed works where the president of 
the company had shown them all that was to be seen. They found that the last 
machines for the initial British order of Hudsons were being cleaned up and that 
production of the Australian order was about to begin at the rate of two a day.
As Fairbairn and his team were aware, final negotiations were in train for 
Australia’s payment to Lockheed. Under America’s recent neutrality legislation, 
title to the aircraft had to pass to the buyers on American soil. This entailed that 
final transfer of funds must occur on delivery at the factory or warehouse not on 
the ship, a technicality that occasioned considerable teleprinter traffic between 
Defence and Treasury officials, the Air Board, the Commonwealth Bank, and 
the Prime Minister’s department.70 Clapp had told his brother Harold, general 
manager of the Aircraft Construction Branch of the Commonwealth Department 
of Supply and Development, that Lockheed had 6800 employees, of whom 600 
were draughtsmen; ‘he can figure out for himself what he is up against’. Harold 
had been given the task of supervising the assembly of the Bristol Beaufort 
69 F. Clapp to Menzies, 16 Oct. 1940, NAA: A5954, 713/1. Neither the Clapps nor the Fairbairn party appear 
on the ship’s passenger list.
70 ‘Purchase of Lockheed Aircraft in U.S.A.’, NAA: A705, 9/19/95. Hudsons purchased for delivery in 
Canada were flown to a specially purchased airstrip in North Dakota and dragged over the border by mule 
teams (Wayne Biddle, Barons of the Sky: From Early Flight to Strategic Warfare: The Story of the American 
Aerospace Industry, Henry Holt, New York, 1991, p.263).
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bombers the government had agreed to build. When the delivery of Beauforts 
was delayed because of British needs, he was soon to be a key player in the 
Hudson program.71
From the west coast there followed an overnight trans-continental flight to 
New York, a train journey to Ottawa, and a month ensconced in the turreted 
magnificence of the Château Laurier hotel with offices next door in the Canadian 
House of Commons. Elford and his colleagues worked hard but managed 
some recreational escapades as well, including trips across the river to Hull, 
the French quarter. In spare moments, at the suggestion of Harry Gullett, 
Dick despatched a series of 12 cables and collected photographs for use in 
Department of Information publicity. Out of pocket ― ‘the Lockheed pictures 
alone cost him two very expensive lunches’ ― he had to wait until June before 
receiving what a departmental official described as a ‘meagre and long overdue’ 
10 guineas honorarium. An ever-miserly Commonwealth Public Service Board 
had sought ‘further particulars’ of the material supplied. Dilatory (nine weeks 
from provision of the information requested) and circumlocutory (the Victorian 
Public Service Inspector referred the matter to Canberra for decision), the Board 
finally had ‘no objection’ to the proposed special payment.72
When an agreement on imperial air training collaboration was finally sealed, 
there was time for the Minister and his private secretary to explore New York. 
Then an island-hopping flight to Lisbon by Pan American Airways trans-
Atlantic clipper with an initial unplanned five days in Bermuda, ‘where there 
are no motor-cars and people take life very calmly’. The delay was supposedly 
caused by inclement weather at Horta in the Azores. When they finally arrived 
at Horta after flying all night, they picked up 18 Germans. Refuelled, they flew 
on towards Lisbon only to encounter a severe electrical storm. By what Elford 
admiringly described as ‘a fine piece of navigation’ they managed to find the 
Azores again before retracing their path to Lisbon the following day.
Four days in Lisbon were enjoyable but for the ubiquitous ‘German intrigue’, 
a reminder of why Elford ― like George Jones, who had temporarily gazetted 
himself out of the Air Force ― was not allowed to be in uniform. There had 
been earlier evidence of German intrigue. While in New York, Fairbairn was 
informed that a Nazi agent under surveillance had received a clumsily coded 
cable from London advising him of the date of the Air Minister’s departure. The 
cable was traced to a waiter in a London restaurant who had overheard a British 
minister talking indiscreetly.73 The original ‘inclement weather’ it seems may 
have been the excuse for a cautious change of flight plan. From Lisbon there 
71 F. Clapp to Menzies, 5 Nov. 1939, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/579/4.
72 ‘Missions from Australia — Mr Fairbairn to (Canadian) [sic]’, NAA: SP112/1, 353/3/1.
73 Irvine Douglas, ‘Australia Air Disaster: Careers of Three Ministers’, Sunday Times (London), [18] Aug. 1940.
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was one more stop, at Biscarosse in France, before arrival at last in England 
at Southampton. The contrast between perpetually damp, wintry London and 
the springtime Melbourne Elford had left could hardly have been greater. At 
the heart of the Empire he found a city of sandbags, blackouts, rationing, gas 
masks, and a pervasive sense that there was to be a very long war. There was 
much to see in a short time ― the War Office, the headquarters of Fighter, 
Bomber, and Coastal commands. Crossing the Channel through pelting rain in a 
fast French steamer with a destroyer escort, there was a visit to advanced units, 
conversations with Australian pilots, and a day in ‘the biggest fort in the Maginot 
line’. Back to Paris, thence to Marseilles to join an Imperial Airways flying boat 
for the journey home. To complete the tour, there were brief inspections of war 
preparations in Egypt, Palestine, Iran, and Iraq. Siam and the Dutch East Indies 
were the last ports of call before Australian landfall.
Back in Canberra and Melbourne early in the New Year, Dick Elford was now a 
connected and effective insider. He was well liked by Air Board and departmental 
chiefs, Fred Mulrooney and Mel Langslow. He would liaise and gossip with 
friends in uniform at RAAF HQ, such as the lawyer, Jack Graham. After a long day 
in Parliament, he would carouse in the company of Artie Fadden, who had led a 
group of Country Party dissidents appalled at Sir Earle Page’s attack on Menzies’ 
war record and was to become Minister without Portfolio in March 1940. Among 
the ministerial staff, Dick had become especially friendly with ‘Peter’ Looker 
who, since the departure of Casey to Washington, had been assistant private 
secretary to the Prime Minister. ‘We were all bearing the heat and burden of the 
day’, Looker reflected 36 years later. He himself was enjoying the company of a 
stenographer in Fairbairn’s office, Jean Withington, whom he was later to marry. 
Another sharing the heat and burden, and Elford’s companionship, was J. R. 
(Bob) Willoughby, a political organiser who had come from Adelaide as private 
secretary to one of the Prime Minister’s key political associates, George McLeay, 
leader of the government in the Senate and successively Minister for Commerce 
and Minister for Trade and Customs.
Like Elford, many of the younger men in the Cabinet entourage chafed at being 
prevented from joining the armed services. Fred Shedden vetoed his assistant 
Sam Landau’s attempt to get into uniform. Dick Randall, a Treasury research 
officer attached to Percy Spender, had undertaken flight training but a defect 
in his left eye was keeping him out of the RAAF.74 Also determined to get away 
was W. S. Bengtsson, secretary to the Minister for the Interior. Dick’s friend 
Bill Bengtsson, formerly a Victorian public servant and draughtsman with 
militia experience, presented himself to the RAAF’s No. 1 Recruiting Centre in 
Melbourne in June 1940.75 He was soon on his way. Garry Armstrong, briefly a 
74 Sir Richard Randall, interview, 20 June 1977.
75 W. S. Bengtsson, Attestation Form, Personal File, NAA: A9300.
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colleague at The Argus, who had been assigned to Geoff Street’s staff from the 
Department of Defence, was gone in July. Armstrong, a law graduate and CMF 
captain, had been despatched to the minister’s office on the day he was about to 
be interviewed for a short service staff course at Duntroon. Street, who knew of 
him socially, wanted the bright young officer to take on the tasks for which the 
‘precise and accurate writer of minor letters’, his private secretary Percy Hayter, 
had little aptitude. When war came Armstrong was told he could join the AIF 
if he produced a suitable replacement as assistant private secretary. It took nine 
months but he finally found Hugh Bathurst whose ability, and status as an AIF 
volunteer who had been medically discharged, made him acceptable to Street.76
Charming, but still hoping for a uniform rather than tweeds
(Courtesy of Hugh Elford)
For Dick Elford there was no release from the Minister’s staff. Where Fairbairn 
went, so must he. With the House of Representatives sitting in August 1940, 
it was once again a schedule of shuttling between Melbourne and Canberra. 
There were shoals of constituency correspondence to attend to, requests for 
autographs and souvenirs, appointments to arrange, untimely callers to meet, 
76 Garry Armstrong, taped reminiscences, 30 Jan. 1983.
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unwanted callers to deflect, research for speeches to be gathered, official files 
to be digested, catnaps for the Minister to be organised during late night 
parliamentary sittings, instructions to be transmitted to the Chief of the Air 
Staff and the Secretary of the Department of Air. And on Monday evening, 
August 12, at 8.25 p.m., just before he left Century House after a ‘friendly pee’ 
in the men’s room with John Harrison of the public relations staff, a telephone 
call conveying another disturbing accident report to be followed up. This time 
it was about the disappearance of one of the new Hudson bombers, apparently 
crashed into the sea off the Queensland coast.77
It was less than a fortnight since news of the death of two young pilots in a 
training accident in the Blue Mountains had greeted the Air Minister on his 
arrival in Melbourne at the end of his trip around Australia. Two more airmen 
had been killed, one of them an instructor, when their machine crashed near 
the Narromine flying training school on August 8.78 Tragic as they were, such 
deaths had become almost routine as the RAAF strained to produce the new 
generation of flyers the war demanded. However, a Hudson vanishing without 
trace was something Dick’s chief would want to know about as soon as possible 
the next day. ‘John,’ he told Harrison, ‘I'm sorry, I’ve done you out of a trip. I’m 
going with the boss tomorrow.’79
On a bleak morning, when he would rather have been in a warm bed nursing 
his influenza-racked body, it was therefore an early call for Dick Elford, a drive 
out to Essendon, and the prospect of an hour and a half in the air to be endured 
before work would begin again in earnest at Parliament House.
77 NAA: A705, 32/10/2759.
78 The Argus, 2, 9 Aug. 1940.
79 John Harrison, interview with Daniel Connell, 21 July 1991, AWM: S01054.
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14. A passion for the air: James 
Fairbairn (I)
James Valentine Fairbairn, grazier, politician, flyer, was a man whose adult life 
had been shaped by war, the Great War. Fairbairn, born in Wadhurst, England, 
in 1897, grew up in Victoria’s Western District. His grandfather George Fairbairn, 
who died before he was born, was a pioneer pastoralist whose holdings in 
Victoria and Queensland totalled millions of acres. His father, Charles, the third 
of six brothers, had been joint general manager with his brother, George, of 
the Fairbairns’ Queensland properties. At one time, as another brother, the 
legendary Cambridge rowing coach Steve Fairbairn, recalled, they were running 
300 000 sheep ‘the finest big flock…in the world, but they were travelling all 
over Australia for food’.1 Charles Fairbairn married Elizabeth, daughter of Sir 
James Osborne of Yackendandah. He acquired Banongill near Skipton and 
moved there with his family in the year of his second son James’s birth.
On his eleventh birthday Jim, or Jimmy as some of his friends called him, was 
despatched with 11 cakes to be a boarder at Geelong Church of England Grammar 
Preparatory School. In 1909 he moved to the Geelong Grammar senior school, 
where he had been preceded by his father, five uncles, and his older brother, 
Charles Osborne, known as Osborne.2 The Fairbairns were a Grammar dynasty, 
captains of the cricket team, senior prefects and then, spurning the fledgling 
Melbourne University, undergraduates at Jesus College, Cambridge. Like most 
of his forebears, Jim’s six years at Geelong were remembered principally for his 
sporting achievements. He was a member of the running team, played in the 
tennis four, and rowed in the first eight. Scholastically, he distinguished himself 
in Classics, winning the prize for Greek in his final year.3
For many of Jim Fairbairn’s generation, their final years of schooling were an 
unwelcome impediment to joining their older brothers, cousins, and uncles in the 
great conflict that had engulfed Europe since August 1914. Compulsory military 
training only added tedium to frustration. ‘I looked forward with hatred to eight 
years without free Saturday afternoons,’ the mature Fairbairn would testify.4 When 
he was at last free to pledge his service, the 18-year-old James V. Fairbairn sailed 
to England, his mind set on entering the Royal Flying Corps. Ten of his Geelong 
Grammar contemporaries had made the decision to enlist at Christmas 1915.
1 Steve Fairbairn, Fairbairn of Jesus, John Lane The Bodley Head, London, 1931, p.208.
2 In later life he was ‘popularly known’ as John (Australian Women’s Weekly, 17 Aug. 1940).
3 I thank Michael D. de B. Collins Persse for material from the Geelong Grammar School archives and for 
a draft of his contribution, ‘Fairbairn, James Valentine (1897–1940)’, Bede Nairn and Geoffrey Serle (eds), 
Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 8, MUP, 1981, pp.458–9.
4 The Argus, 18 Nov. 1938.
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The new boarder
(Courtesy of Geelong Grammar School)
Accompanying Jim on the journey on the P & O liner RMS Medina were his older 
sister Esther and her friend Inez ‘Gyp’ Currie from the neighbouring ‘Larra’ 
station at Derrinallum.5 The young women, too, with no professional training, 
were intent on finding opportunities to serve. Jim’s older brother Osborne had 
been at Jesus College, Cambridge, when the war broke out. After a short spell 
in the 3rd Battalion, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, Osborne had transferred 
to the RFC. Shot down and wounded in December 1915, he was undergoing a 
series of operations on what was to remain a disabled left arm.6
5 The Argus, 23 Feb. 1916.
6 I. Alethea Russell, ‘Fairbairn, Charles Osborne, O.B.E., A.F.C., (1893–1959)’, Gordon Forth, with Jan 
Critchett and Peter Yule (eds), The Biographical Dictionary of the Western District of Victoria, Hyland House, 
South Melbourne, 1998, p.42. Charles Osborne Fairbairn was promoted to flight commander (captain) in 1916, 
and appointed an instructor at No. 5 School in August 1917. Acting as a major in the RAF by October 1918, 
he returned to Australia as a squadron leader.
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Eleven Geelong Grammar boys about to enlist
(Courtesy of Geelong Grammar School)
Admitted to officer training, Jim was sent to Scotland for flying instruction in 
June 1916. In letters home he told of flights from Turnhouse over the Forth, 
where he could soar over the navy’s battle cruiser squadron, but he missed 
Admiral Beatty’s return from the battle of Jutland because of bad weather. 
Moved to Stirling, he made ‘nerve-racking’ take-offs and landings from an 
aerodrome ‘bounded at one end by Stirling castle on a cliff 400 feet high, at the 
other end by a hangar on one side of the cliff and on the other a thickly wooded 
hill’. The hills deflected the wind upwards, making violent air bumps that gave 
the trainees a ‘terrible shock’ at first but ‘soon you hardly take any notice of 
them’. Hoping no doubt to reassure anxious parents, Jim reported that one 
of the ‘most extraordinary things about flying is the way people have terrific 
smashes and don’t get hurt’:
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At Stirling I saw a man, who was up by himself for the first time, gliding 
down into the aerodrome at about 75 miles an hour. He was doing turns 
just [sic] one way then another in order to judge his distance and when 
he went to make his final turn into the aerodrome by some temporary 
lapse he banked his machine the wrong way, and still travelling at 75 
and side slipping violently he crashed into the ground on one wing. 
The machine was entirely destroyed and when the ambulance dashed up 
they found him strolling around the machine, quite unhurt except for a 
scratch on the ear. And the first day I was here a man stalled his machine 
three hundred feet from the ground and dived vertically nose first. He 
would also have come off unhurt only he got his chin over the glass 
wind screen and had his throat nearly cut, but was otherwise unhurt.
A portrait before leaving Melbourne 
(Courtesy of Geelong Grammar School)
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The truth was often harsher. The word ‘crash’, applied to aviation accidents, had 
been coined in England in 1914. When Paymaster Lieutenant Lidderdale first 
used it to describe an accident on landing it was thought amusing.7 The humour 
was short-lived. As Jim Fairbairn and his wartime colleagues were to learn, 
heavier-than-air machines were unforgiving vehicles. While the youngsters 
were learning the perils of flight they were also learning the attitudes and 
habits of the flying elite. ‘Discipline was casual,’ W. E. ‘Bill’ Johns recalled, 
‘for the senior officers of the R.F.C. had not had time to grow old.’8 ‘Flying and 
everything to do with it is an extravagant matter,’ admitted Maurice Baring who 
served at RFC headquarters throughout the war. As Baring elaborated: ‘The 
pilot is extravagant, the squadron is extravagant, even the Equipment Officer, 
even the Technical Sergeant-Major was sometimes found to be extravagant.’ But 
extraordinary efforts were made to curb ‘useless’ extravagance: ‘even superfluous 
magneto boxes and an unnecessary indent for lorry cushions were noted’.9 To 
the extravagance few denied, Baring might have added exhibitionism, more 
sympathetically described perhaps as an understandable youthful propensity 
for high jinks. Fairbairn was quick to report his impressions of the revelry that 
was to become more frenetic in the evening intervals between rehearsals for 
confrontation with the enemy:
The Flying Corps is very unpopular in a great number of Scotch [sic] 
towns, because they always try to wake up the inhabitants a bit. At 
Montrose the Mayor was continually complaining about the way the 
R.F.C. officers drove their cars and motor bikes about the town. The 
O.C. was so annoyed that he threatened to fly an aeroplane through the 
town, and when there was another complaint he went up in a small 
Bristol Scout and flew it right down the main street below the level of 
the house tops. After that they decided that it was preferable to have 
cars scorching through the town than an aeroplane.
After only a week in Stirling, Fairbairn was moved again, this time further 
south to Croydon. Taking advantage of the long summer evening twilight, 
flying practice continued until 9.30 p.m. when weather permitted. Happily the 
base was close enough to London for occasional late-night or Sunday afternoon 
recreational sorties. Expecting to get his wings in about three weeks or a month, 
Fairbairn wrote on 29 June 1916 of his latest exploits. ‘A few days ago I was 
taken up by my flight commander to do “stunts.” It…showed me that you can do 
whatever you like provided you are high enough and the machine will recover 
itself.’ For the benefit of earthbound Geelong Grammar boys he explained:
7 Hector Bolitho, War in the Strand: A Notebook of the First Two and a Half Years in London, Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1942, p.3.
8 Capt. W. E. Johns, Biggles of the Camel Squadron, Dean & Son, [1961, 1st ed. 1934], p.7. Johns actually left 
the post-war RAF as a flying officer.
9 Maurice Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters 1914–1918, William Heinemann, 1920, p.192.
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First he climbed up to 400 feet and then stalled the machine a few times. 
To stall a machine is to lose flying speed so that the machine is no longer 
under control and dives at the ground for a few hundred feet till flying 
speed is regained and then it flattens out. When intentionally stalling…
you pull the control back till the nose is pointing straight up in the air, 
then it slowly stops and falls backwards and suddenly nose dives. We 
did this several times and then tried to loop the loop, but he did not get 
up sufficient speed and when we got upside down there was not enough 
pace to take us right over, and we began to fall upside down for nearly a 
thousand feet, till the machine slowly turned over sideways and righted 
itself.
Wasn’t this dangerous? Should friends and family be worried? ‘It was a rather 
horrible sensation while it lasted,’ he admitted, ‘especially as I had no safety 
belt and had to hold on for all I was worth. Of course,’ he hastened to add, ‘if 
you loop properly you could not fall out if you tried with all your strength, as 
the centrifugal force is very great and forces you down into your seat.’ He was 
perhaps unaware of the fate of several pilots whose seat belts had failed to take 
the strain. He would certainly have known that parachutes were only issued to 
the crews of airships and balloons.
Loops, stalls, landings, and take-offs mastered; instruction received in 
photography, gunnery, aerial observation, and bomb dropping; Jim Fairbairn 
emerged with his commission as a flying officer in the 17th Reserve Squadron 
in July 1916. At various flying schools around the country, there had been 178 
officers and 15 men in training at the beginning of June. Three months later 
there were 909 officers and 54 men needing instruction.10 This vast and rapid 
expansion meant that many just-qualified pilots almost immediately became 
instructors. So, for two weeks after he graduated, Jim stayed at Croydon as 
an instructor with No. 43 Squadron, one of ‘a bunch of raw pilots’ as their 
CO, Major Sholto Douglas, described them, who would endeavour to escape to 
London each night at 19.00 and return for duty at 09.00 the next morning.11 
Then it was to Netheravon in Wiltshire to practise on Bristol Scouts while 54 
Squadron waited to take out ‘Sopwith fighting machines’ to France.
10 Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914–20, The War Office, 1922, p.497.
11 Sholto Douglas, Years of Combat, Quality Book Club, London, 1963, p.134.
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Flying Officer Fairbairn RFC
(Courtesy of Angela Mercer)
Netheravon, as another young Australian trainee flyer reported six months 
later, ‘is situated in a most drearisome place on Salisbury Plain, miles from 
any town…However it is an ideal place for an aerodrome with plenty of good 
fields for landing.’12 Jim proudly explained that the new Sopwiths, highly 
manoeuvrable at great heights, were ‘about the best machines that we have, 
only one squadron of them has gone out before, and they did marvels, and 
strafed every Hun machine that they met’. Arthur Gould Lee, who had to wait 
three months after getting his wings before being allowed into the cockpit of a 
Pup in April 1917, was to describe it as ‘a dream to fly, so light on the control, 
12 R. W. Howard to ‘Father’, 20 Feb. 1917, ‘The Personal Letters of Captain R. W. Howard. MC, Australian 
Flying Corps, Part One’, The ‘14–’18 Journal, 1997, Australian Society of World War 1 Aero Historians, p.69.
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so effortless to handle, so sweet and amenable, and so eagerly manoeuvrable 
that you found yourself doing every kind of stunt without a thought ― loops, 
sideslip landings, tail slides, rolls, spins’.13
In London, Fairbairn had seen old boys from Geelong Grammar, some of them 
resting or recuperating from wounds. A star among them, Alex Russell — 
Osborne Fairbairn’s friend, and four years Jim’s senior, a prefect, captain of 
the 1st XI, member of the 1st XVIII football team and the shooting team — his 
Cambridge engineering studies abandoned, was now an artillery lieutenant. He 
was recovering after being buried by a shell burst. Russell, soon to be engaged 
and married to Fairbairn’s cousin Jess, elder daughter of Frederick W. Fairbairn, 
had been 14 months at the front. By the end of the war he would be Major Russell 
MC. John Webster, a younger and close companion from schooldays, recently 
awarded the Military Cross, ‘was very badly knocked about and has nearly 70 
scars on his body’. On Salisbury Plain, Australians were everywhere, including 
‘Chettie’ Manifold (a lieutenant in the Royal Field Artillery), Les Chomley on 
the staff of ‘General’ (temporary Brigadier-General commanding the 3rd Division 
Artillery) Harold Grimwade, and others from Geelong. The lucky ones were 
taken up for a short flight; all were treated to an exhibition of loops each day 
over the Larkhill camp.
Fairbairn’s squadron had been told they were to be ‘used exclusively for fighting 
and long reconnaissances’. Writing on 26 September 1916 he could scarcely 
contain his joy that they were not to be required for bombing or artillery 
spotting: ‘Fighting is much the best fun in France especially on a really good 
machine.’ Such was the ‘fun’ that in the previous week 20 RFC aircraft had been 
lost. The German ace Oswald Boelcke had been responsible for one of them; and 
a new pilot, Lieutenant Manfred Freiherr von Richthofen, for a second. The 
British press was more interested in the latest four combat victories of Captain 
Albert Ball DSO MC. But those who understood the growing German dominance 
of the air were increasingly alarmed. On September 30, Major General Hugh 
Trenchard, GOC of the Flying Corps, wrote to the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Sir William Robertson, at the War Office urging the accelerated supply of 
fighters capable of competing with the best German machines. British losses in 
the air were unsustainable. At the beginning of July 1916 there had been 426 
pilots available for duty. By November 17 there were 585 with their squadrons. 
In the meantime, 308 had been killed, wounded or were missing, and another 
268 had been removed from active duty from other causes. In the same period, 
191 observers had been lost.14 These were not statistics to be shared with the 
young men on their way to the front.
13 Arthur Gould Lee, Open Cockpit: A Pilot of the Royal Flying Corps, Jarrolds, 1969, p.24.
14 Hilary St, George Saunders, Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power 1911–1939, Oxford UP, 1944, pp.212–13.
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Real stunts
It was not until Christmas Day 1916 that Fairbairn’s No. 54 Squadron, with their 
18 Sopwith Scouts, arrived in France. Until then the only squadron equipped 
with the Pups, as they were called unofficially, was No. 8 Royal Naval Air Service, 
whose B Flight was commanded by the Australian ace, Flight Lieutenant S. J. 
Goble. Naval Eight, as it was known, had become operational on November 
3. The RFC had one squadron of Nieuport 17s for its fighter pilots, French-
designed, proven, and popular. ‘A little daisy of a machine,’ the Canadian 
Billy Bishop called it, ‘with all the daintiness of a Parisienne.’15 The rest were 
condemned to go up day after day in obsolescent two-seater pusher DH 2s and 
FE 8s. Fairbairn was lucky. He had filled in the last two months assisting in the 
air defence of London. Scores of other freshly qualified pilots had been sent to 
France with an average of about 17 hours of solo flight. He had more time to 
gain knowledge and confidence in a safe environment, to learn a little about 
formation flying, so crucial for survival against superior German forces.
Flying a Pup, ‘smooth and stable, mellow like old wine’, as a contemporary 
fighter pilot described them, Fairbairn imbibed the new trade of aerial 
reconnaissance and combat over the next six weeks. Under Major K. K. Horn 
MC, No. 54 Squadron began operations on January 11. Before coming out to 
France Fairbairn had learned of how a novice pilot had shot down the German 
ace, Immelman. ‘It shows that there is a considerable element of luck in air 
fighting.’16 And, as his squadron motto said, ‘Audax omnia perpeti’ (Boldness 
to endure anything). If luck was with him at first, on 14 February 1917 his 
fortune changed. Perhaps by now he realised as Alec Little, another Australian 
with Naval 8, reported on December 30, the deficiencies of the outclassed Pup 
on escort duty: relatively poor manoeuvring powers and a slow-firing gun, in 
particular.17
Ten scouts of No. 54 Squadron were assigned to escort 10 planes of the 
reconnaissance squadron that shared their aerodrome. They were charged with 
taking photographs of the sector between Cambrai and St. Quentin, some 20 
miles across the lines. With his 80hp Rhone engine failing as they reached the 
target, Fairbairn was forced to break off from the formation and head back to 
the lines. Swarmed over by a superior force of ‘Hun scouts’, he and several of his 
friends did not make it back. His own machine shredded by the German guns 
and barely controllable, and with one arm shattered, Fairbairn was eventually 
brought down. After some months of suspense following reports that he was 
15 William A. ‘Billy’ Bishop V. C., Winged Peace: The Story of the Air Age, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Montreal, 
1990 (1st ed. Macmillan 1944), p.37.
16 ‘J. V. F.’ , 20 June 1916, The Corian, Aug. 1916, pp.55–6.
17 Mike Rosel, Unknown Warrior: The search for Australia’s greatest Ace, Arcadia, North Melbourne, 2012, pp.50–5.
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missing in action, relieved family and friends heard that he was a prisoner of 
war. Informed only that he had a broken leg, they were unaware of the extent 
of his injuries.18
The downed pilot’s dramatic narrative account of his experience, written 
from internment in June, revealed how lucky he was to survive. Noticing that 
his engine was spluttering and dropping revs, he had signalled to his flight 
commander that he could not continue and must turn for home:
Then the fun began. Immediately the Huns started to dive on my tail 
and flanks from all directions. I held straight on till they got to close 
range and opened fire; at once I turned and attacked the nearest machine 
which dived vertically, then began to spin and was still spinning when 
I lost sight of it.
Fairbairn turned and fought five or six times and then, a mile from home, at 2000 
feet, he tried to turn and fire at the last four of his pursuers but the machine did 
not respond:
I looked to see what had happened, and noticed that my hand had fallen 
off the control stick whereupon I concluded that I was wounded, so 
took the stick in my left hand. Then I did an Immelmann turn, but when 
I tried to get my machine off the bank I found that my lateral control was 
broken and there was no means of getting the bus level again.
Forced to descend in a vertical spiral, he crashed as gently as he could, turned 
a catherine wheel on the ground, and came to rest, ‘my nose sticking into the 
ground and my tail in the air’.
Some Huns came running up from every direction, swords drawn and 
bayonets fixed as though they had half the British Army to deal with. I 
tried to get my revolver out but found I could not reach it with my left 
hand, so I decided there was nothing to be done but burn my machine 
and ‘wait and see’, so I threw a match into a pool of petrol that was 
dripping from my engine and tried to clamber out, but found to my 
consternation that I could not get my belt undone, as it was clasped 
under my left armpit and could only be got at with the right hand, 
which was not taking much interest in life at the moment. However a 
18 J. V. Fairbairn, Royal Air Force Casualty Cards, RAF Museum, courtesy Peter Elliott; International 
Committee of the Red Cross Archives record: James V. Fairbairn, 2nd Lt, Royal Flying Corps, captured in 
Péronne 14 Feb. 1917; wounded. Present in Reslz. [Reserve Lazarett] Hann[oversch] Münden, coming from 
Krgslz [Kriegslazarett = War Dept Hospital] I Western (list dated 9 May 1917). Interned military (no place 
indicated). Arrived on 14 April 1918, coming from Hanover (list dated 7 May 1918); Trevor Henshaw, The Sky 
Their Battlefield: Air Fighting and the Complete List of Allied Air Casualties from Enemy Action in the First War, 
Grub Street, 1995, p.137 describes Fairbairn as the first Sopwith Pup pilot lost in action by the RFC and notes 
the claim of Lt George Schlenker of Jasta 3 to this, the second of his 14 victories.
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Hun cut my belt with his clasp knife, and hauled me out of the fire, but 
not until I had given a very life-like imitation of Guy Fawkes for the 
space of about a minute.
Press reports in later years echoed the Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook 
in saying that Jim Fairbairn had been ‘Credited in official communiques with 
destroying two hostile aircraft.’19 He said that he had seen one enemy plane 
go down; and a German flieger officer, congratulating him on the fight he had 
put up, told him that two of the 10 pilots who attacked him had been killed. 
These stories were not denied but there was no confirmation in official records.20 
What was undoubtedly true was that badly wounded, scorched, but alive, Jim 
Fairbairn had beaten the odds. If a new pilot in France had survived incompetent 
teaching, poorly constructed training aircraft, and foolhardy stunting over his 
base, he had an 80 per cent chance of becoming a casualty before he flew 20 
missions. Rationalising the loss of lives in ‘stunting’ during training earlier 
in the war, the commander of the British Air Mission in Washington told an 
Academy of Sciences audience a year after Fairbairn was shot down that the 
danger was not in stunting but in not being able to stunt: ‘The man who is going 
to come out alive is the one who can outdo his opponent in flying…unless you 
are trained to do real stunts (which are really not at all dangerous), you are not 
going to be able to down him.’21
In fact, though it was not known precisely at the time, about seven in 10 of 
the casualties among first-year pilots were victims of their own errors rather 
than the combat skill of the enemy.22 As P. G. Taylor recalled: ‘It was said…
that any pilot who destroyed more German aircraft than British had justified his 
existence. This did not always happen. A friend of mine in the RFC crashed five 
British aircraft, and was therefore said to be a German ace!’23 Of the youthful 
survivors, the Australian war records historian Harry Gullett was to write to his 
wife a few months later: ‘it is hard to believe such schoolboys can be captains 
19 Parliamentary Handbook and Record of Elections for the Commonwealth of Australia, Ninth Issue, 1931 to 
1938, Canberra 1938, p.74.
20 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April 1939, The Argus, 13 Oct. 1939, 19 Feb. 1941; John D. R. Rawlings, 
Fighter Squadrons of the R.A.F. and their aircraft, Macdonald and Janes, revised ed., 1976, p.132 says 54 
Squadron’s ‘first victory’ went to Captain W. V. Strugnell in April 1917. According to Norman Franks (Sopwith 
Pup Aces of World War 1, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2005, pp.15–6), the Squadron claimed at least three 
victories by the end of January.
21 C. F. Lee, ‘Aviation and the War’, Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, vol. VIII, no. 8, 19 April 
1918, pp.225–6.
22 For the RFC I have drawn principally on Christopher Cole (ed.), Royal Flying Corps 1915–1916, William 
Kimber, 1969; Denis Winter, The First of the Few: Fighter Pilots of the First World War, Allen Lane, 1982; Peter 
H. Liddle, The Airman’s War 1914–18, Blandford Press, Poole, 1987; John H. Morrow, The Great War in the Air: 
Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, 1993; S. F. Wise, Canadian 
Airmen and the First World War: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, vol. I, University of 
Toronto Press, 1981; and Richard Townshend Bickers, The First Great Air War, Hodder & Stoughton, 1988.
23 John Hetherington, Uncommon Men, F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965, p.180.
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with wonderful records’.24 It was true that, before appalling attrition rates led 
to selection of many from the ‘lower middle classes and some from the artisan 
class’, most pilots were likely to have been previously ‘the public schoolboy, 
the cavalry officer, or the athlete’. Whatever their background, by their own 
testimony ‘it appears necessary for the well-being of the average pilot that he 
should indulge in a really riotous evening at least once or twice a month’.25
For Jim Fairbairn, public schoolboy, horseman, and athlete, fortnightly 
indulgences came to an abrupt halt. His fate is best told in his own words, 
writing from an officers’ prison in Germany on 3 March 1917:
When I was at the French town where I was kept for three days after 
coming down, I met some of the officers who had claimed to have 
brought me down. They were very nice, and obviously gentlemen and 
sportsmen, and laughed heartily when I told them that it was my engine 
that brought me down really though I could have glided home if I had 
not had to turn and drive them away every few yards…
Some German stretcher-bearers took me to a neighbouring dressing 
station. The worst part of the whole show was being shelled by our own 
guns; one of the bearers was hit but they behaved splendidly.
Taken to Germany in an evil-smelling ‘hospital train’, accompanied by Russian 
prisoners wounded by British shelling while digging trenches for the Germans, 
the young flyer got his ‘first glimpse of the true German spirit’:
Whenever I wanted anything the Huns simply tumbled over themselves 
to do it; when the Russians asked anything they were answered as 
though they were dogs, German dogs, of course, as no civilised person 
could ever speak or act to a dog as the Huns did to these poor helpless 
prisoners.
The journey took two days and nights:
If it had lasted much longer I believe I would have gone quite mad. The 
Russians, on the other hand, although very badly wounded, considered 
themselves in clover, being able to lie and rest for once, the first real rest 
for three years, even if it was in a bumpy goods van.26
A prisoner of war in Holland and then a convalescent in neutral Switzerland 
for a total of 14 months, Fairbairn carried with him thereafter a permanent 
24 Gullett to Penelope Gullett, [n.d. ? Aug. 1917], Gullett MSS, NLA MS 3078/5/319.
25 ‘The Temperament of Aviators’, Flight, vol. 10, 3 Oct. 1918, pp.1117–8 being extracts from Capt. T. S. 
Rippon and Lieut. E. G. Manuel, ‘The Essential Characteristics of Successful and Unsuccessful Aviators, with 
Special Reference to Temperament’, The Lancet, 28 Sept. 1918.
26 ‘J. V. F.’, 28 June 1918, Letters from the War’, The Corian, Dec. 1918, pp.86–92.
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reminder of his war service in a burnt face and a crippled right arm, shattered 
at the elbow by a bullet from a German Spandau. Doctors in the prison hospital 
had been reluctant to operate as the broken bones set slowly and grew together, 
and fragments of bone were expelled from the dressed wounds. Captivity was a 
time of boredom punctuated by pain. There was some relief in the company of 
a French priest, the only other prisoner who could walk. ‘In apologising to the 
Frenchman for not understanding his language better I said “At school I spent so 
much time learning Latin and Greek languages that I rather neglected French.”’ 
The priest promptly offered to speak Latin instead but the embarrassed young 
flyer had the presence of mind to say that he would prefer to practise his 
French.27 Fairbairn was eventually exchanged for a wounded German airman, 
and entered the Prince of Wales Hospital in Marylebone in April 1918.
By war’s end, 417 Geelong Grammarians had enlisted; 87 did not return.28 
For many of the survivors like Jim Fairbairn, in London after the Armistice 
and back home in Australia, there was to be recurring medical treatment. Jim 
Fairbairn would submit in all to 20 operations. Now the recipient of a small RAF 
war pension, he sailed home on the P & O’s Orvieto, converted from its wartime 
mine-laying and armed merchant-cruiser roles. He arrived in Melbourne in 
December 1919. Though he may not have been aware of it, Fairbairn’s return 
to Australia was in the same vessel on which the AIF’s first 91 officers and 1347 
men had left Sydney in 1914, including the chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel 
C. B. B. White, Major J. Gellibrand, Lieutenant R. G. Casey, and the official 
correspondent, C. E. W. Bean.29
Chettie Manifold, a lifelong friend and neighbour, recalled:
After the War he spent several years in the hands of doctors in an 
endeavour to regain the use of his right arm without success. This 
wound greatly restricted his activities in after life. He was a keen tennis 
& squash player & learnt to play left handed. As a result of a circular 
saw accident he lost two fingers on his left hand. He then through sheer 
determination learnt to play right handed with considerable success.
In fact, as Fairbairn’s niece Alethea Russell remembered, after losing one finger 
in the circular saw incident, her uncle accidentally discharged a gun while he 
had a finger in the barrel. Thus, having taught himself to play tennis left-handed 
after the war, he had to learn to throw up the ball with his right hand and revert 
to playing right-handed.30
27 ‘J. V. F.’, 29 July 1917, ‘Letters from the War’, The Corian, Dec. 1917, pp.82–3.
28 I. V. Hansen, Nor Secular Nor Free: Six independent schools in Victoria: a first sample, Oxford UP, 
Melbourne, 1971, p.49.
29 For details of the wartime service of the P & O ship Orvieto, see http://petermanchester.me.uk/index.
php?page=rmsorvieto1 and post-war history in http://flotilla-australia.com/hmat.htm (accessed 1 Oct. 2011).
30 Sir Chester Manifold to CH, [1976]; Alethea Russell to CH, (email), 20 Jan. 2009.
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Keen-eyed readers of The Herald on 15 February 1940 would have noticed in 
a photograph that the third finger of the Air Minister’s left hand was severed 
at the knuckle, and the ring finger was completely absent. In spite of these 
afflictions ‘you would have to watch him pretty carefully to realise that he had 
quite a disability in one of his arms’, George Jones remembered as a senior 
RAAF advisor to the minister. ‘It wasn’t very conspicuous.’31 As John Manifold, 
Fairbairn’s colleague on the Geelong Grammar School Council, testified: 
‘Disability that would have handicapped most men, he simply disregarded.’32
What was conspicuous if you visited Fairbairn at Mount Elephant, the one-
time Chirnside and Currie property near Derrinallum he acquired in 1924, were 
the pictorial reminders of aerial warfare and post-war aviation development 
― cartoons on the wall, and magazines in the billiard room. Jim Fairbairn’s 
own airstrip and private plane, 176 kilometres west of Melbourne, completed 
the picture of a dedicated aviator. On his desk, a decade after the war ended, 
there were photographs of two men. John Webster, his school friend, killed in 
Palestine, had run out of money while on leave in 1918, and returned to active 
service when multiple wounds should have kept him at home. Close by was 
Charles Hawker, another Geelong Old Grammarian, the great friend of his later 
years in Parliament, grievously wounded, crippled, disfigured, and enduring 
never-ending pain. Hawker’s death in an aircraft accident in 1938 would stun 
Jim Fairbairn and the many colleagues who had looked to him as the man who 
should lead the United Australia Party when the Prime Minister, Joe Lyons, 
eventually retired.33
Fairbairn, flanked by Chettie Manifold, had married Daisy Olive ‘Peggy’ 
Forrester, daughter of Charles and Alice Forrester of Toorak, in March 1923. It 
was, said The Argus, ‘a wedding that attracted wide interest’. The bride’s father 
was an estate and commission agent, and a stalwart of the Australian Club; she 
had two surviving brothers, one of whom, Charles Lamont Forrester, was to set 
up in the city as an auctioneer a few years later.34 Among Peggy’s bridesmaids 
was Jim’s younger sister, Betty Fairbairn. During the previous Easter, Jim 
and Betty had reached the semi-finals of the mixed doubles at the Geelong 
Lawn Tennis Club’s Annual Tournament. Had they won they would have met 
Miss Forrester and her partner in the final. By November, Jim Fairbairn and 
Peggy Forrester were paired in the mixed doubles handicap at the Victorian 
championship. With the new partnership confirmed for life at St John’s Church, 
Toorak, two children, Geoffrey and Angela, quickly followed.
31 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
32 ‘The Acting Chairman’s (Mr. John Manifold) Address, Speech Day 1940’, The Corian, Dec. 1940, p.214.
33 Geoffrey Fairbairn, interview, 10 Oct. 1978; Fairbairn, ‘Personal History’, p.10.
34 The Argus, 28 June 1935 (Charles Forrester obituary).
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Jim Fairbairn and Peg (as her husband and close friends called her) embraced 
the opportunities their privileged life offered. They thrived in the company of 
the younger generation. Jim enjoyed taking Peter and John Mercer, sons of a 
neighbour, on flights to Melbourne, returning with a copy of The Herald 4.00 
p.m. edition for the boys’ father. When there were no youngsters to disembark, 
he would drop the folded paper from the air, usually managing to avoid the big 
dam just outside the garden fence.35 On weekends and school holidays there was 
a parade of family visitors at Mount Elephant.
Mount Elephant estate homestead
(Courtesy of Fay Stokie-Ryan and Virginia ‘Bardie’ Mercer)
It was a fine homestead on the banks of Lake Logan, known throughout the 
Western District as the ‘swagman’s lighthouse’.36 To Gillian Gubbins, Peggy 
Fairbairn’s niece, there was an unforgettable aura about that ‘elegant, spacious 
home…Geoffrey and Angela having their own quarters, surrounded by a 
magnificent well-manicured garden, two tennis courts (one grass, one hard 
court), a squash court (quite rare in the 1930s), a lake complete with boat and 
fishing gear’. For Geoffrey there were memorable older visitors:
…a hairy and beloved uncle who had landed at Gallipoli; another, 
equally loved, who had been decorated for rescuing a man who fell 
35 Virginia ‘Bardie’ Mercer, ‘Memories of J. V. Fairbairn’ [Dec. 2009].
36 John Sorell, ‘The Fabulous Fairbairns’, The Herald, 30 June 1966, p.25.
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overboard from a Dover-Calais troop transport; yet another who had 
won the A.F.C. for restoring the depleted morale of his air squadron by 
stunting in the face of the enemy…37
Successful on the land, Jim had run the family’s Peak Downs station in central 
Queensland for five years before buying Mount Elephant for himself. He was 
a progressive farmer, one of the first, his daughter said, to have Southdown 
rams cover Corriedales. He represented his district in the Graziers’ Association 
of Victoria.38 Raised as a Presbyterian, he became active in Anglican diocesan 
affairs, and in the Old Geelong Grammarians Association and School Council. 
He had dipped his toe in local politics late in 1924, losing by 288 votes to 171 to 
his friend and neighbour Geoff Street in an extraordinary election for a vacancy 
in the North Riding of the Shire of Hampden. But it was an invitation to attend 
a private meeting at the recently launched Constitutional Club in Melbourne 
on 29 April 1926 that was to transform his life. It was a remarkable gathering. 
His friend Alex Russell was there, now both a national golf champion and 
budding course designer, and lately companion and private secretary to the 
Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce.39 So also were two of the Manifolds (a third sent 
apologies); Fairbairn’s cousin George; the young city commercial lawyer Trevor 
Oldham; Lionel Grimwade of the Melbourne pharmaceutical and chemicals 
family, a former Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy officer and now a 
stockbroker with William Noall & Sons; Harold Oscar Nevett, a Camperdown 
solicitor and friend of the Manifolds and Geoff Street; Billy Kent Hughes, 
gallant Light Horseman and Olympic athlete; and the man who organised the 
meeting, Keith Officer. Among those who sent apologies were Geoff Street and 
Alex Russell’s cousin Max Bell, of Golf Hill, chairman of the pastoral company 
Dennys Lascelles and a council member and benefactor of Geelong Grammar.40
What had brought these young men together? Keith Officer, from the Western 
District and Melbourne Grammar, trained as a lawyer, a decorated AIF staff 
officer, had returned to Australia in 1924 after three years in Nigeria with the 
British Colonial Service and an interval in London. He was ostensibly working 
in his father’s accountancy firm but had begun the clandestine development 
of an integrated conservative organisation to compete more effectively against 
37 Gillian Gubbins to CH, 8 Feb. 2009; Geoffrey Fairbairn, ‘Personal History’, Nation, No. 150, 8 Aug. 1964, 
p.10.
38 Angela Mercer, interview, 8 Nov. 1978; J. O Randell, Teamwork: A History of the Graziers’ Associations 
of Victoria and Riverina, (1983?), p.63.
39 William I. Whitton, ‘Russell, Alex (1892–1961)’, Ritchie and Langmore (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 16, pp.151–2; Tony Hirst and Neil Crafter, ‘Great Australian Golf Course Architects: Alex 
Russell (1892–1961)’, Golf Architecture: The Journal of the Society of Australian Golf Course Architects, Issue 
6, 2003, pp.20–8.
40 I am grateful to Veronica Filmer, Registrar, Geelong Gallery, for information about Max Bell. Diane 
Langmore, ‘Biddlecombe, Janet (1866–1954)’, Ritchie and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
vol. 13, p.179, records the Bell family’s financing of a music school at Geelong Grammar in association with 
Janet Biddlecombe (née Russell).
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the Australian Labor Party. Officer and his associates, including the ambitious 
young barrister Robert Gordon Menzies, were creating a political action 
movement. Nationalist fortunes in Victoria were at a low ebb with a Country 
Party government in power. Officer saw the need both to revive the Nationalists’ 
urban appeal and to reconnect the party to rural voters.41 Their evolving plan 
was to diminish control of party finances by the recently unmasked National 
Union powerbrokers, infiltrate party branches, nominate candidates, and 
eventually install a new party leader. Fairbairn, present at the creation, was 
to be an active participant in the unfolding of the strategy that led to the 
creation of the Young Nationalist Movement three years later with Menzies 
soon at its head. Fairbairn’s own Hampden district was the first with its own 
finance committee.42 He himself with Chester Manifold (now married to Gwenda 
Grimwade, his old CO’s daughter), assisted by H. O. Nevett, was soon drawn 
into local government as a member of Hampden Shire Council along with Geoff 
Street.43 With Trevor Oldham, Manifold, and Bob Menzies, Jim was elected 
to the executive of the Young Nationalists, Menzies becoming president in 
February 1931. The ‘fighting platform’ of the organisation declared that the 
‘restoration’ of government finance through balanced budgets was the key to a 
return to national prosperity.
In May 1932 Jim Fairbairn became Member of the Legislative Assembly for 
Warrnambool. For some two years as an endorsed Nationalist he had cultivated 
the former Country Party seat now held by Henry Bailey, Minister for Lands 
in the Hogan Labor government, but standing as a Premier’s Plan candidate. 
Proclaiming his faith in free enterprise, and supported by the Australian 
Women’s National League as well as the National Federation, Fairbairn said his 
principal aim in standing was to defend the interests of primary producers. 
Harry Gullett’s friend Colonel George Langley, headmaster of the local high 
school, acted as his campaign manager. Fairbairn would lend Langley his Buick 
from time to time to assist the campaign as well as making it possible for Langley 
to enjoy occasional family outings. Robert Menzies came down to speak for 
the candidate at a well-attended Town Hall meeting in the week before the 
election. The friendly Camperdown Chronicle and Terang Express had previously 
lauded ‘Three Virile Politicians’ ― Menzies, Manifold, and Fairbairn ― but 
the blatant bias of the Warrnambool Standard probably did more to contribute 
41 Leslie Gordon Lomax, ‘The Western District Farmer, 1914–1927’, PhD thesis, Monash University, 1979, 
vol. 2, provides valuable background on post-war Western District politics.
42 Keith Officer’s hitherto unnoticed role in organising a Nationalist revival in Victoria in the 1920s 
is described in Alan Fewster, Trusty and Well Beloved: A Life of Keith Officer Australia’s First Diplomat, 
Miegunyah Press, Melbourne, 2009, pp.90–102, 107–8. For details of H. O. Nevett’s professional and political 
interests I am grateful to his son, Guy Nevett (telephone interview, 2 Aug. 2007). Phylia Keble-Johnston 
kindly provided information about her father, Lionel Grimwade (telephone interview, 4 Dec. 2007).
43 Manifold, Street, and Fairbairn look thoughtfully into the camera in a 1930 council photograph (R. A. 
McAlpine, The Shire of Hampden 1863–1963, Terang Express, 1963, p.20). The photograph has now been lost.
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to a resounding victory over the ‘effete generation’.44 The next year Fairbairn 
retired from the Hampden council on the expiration of his term. His sights were 
set higher.
After only 17 months in the Victorian Parliament with Chettie Manifold, Billy 
Kent Hughes, and Bob Menzies, Fairbairn resigned to contest a by-election in 
the federal seat of Flinders, vacated by Stanley Bruce. It was a path from state 
to national politics that had been trodden by his uncle Sir George Fairbairn. 
Flinders, running around the southeast edge of Port Phillip Bay, included the 
southern Mornington Peninsula, and reached the shores of Western Port Bay, 
embracing Phillip and French Islands as well as the holiday resorts of Portsea, 
Sorrento, and Rosebud. Normally it was a safe conservative seat for a favoured 
candidate whose presence in Canberra was desired by party chieftains. Bruce, 
who had a 16-room mansion in Frankston, had regained the seat in 1931 after 
being ejected in 1929 because of what his Labor opponent E. J. Holloway called 
‘the wilfulness and overbearing class bias of his policies’.45 Fairbairn, who 
would never live in the electorate, had all the class but none of the overbearing 
bias of the former Prime Minister. The ‘flying MP’, as he was soon dubbed, 
caught the eye of the press at once by piloting his own plane to Canberra for his 
parliamentary debut. The train would have taken him 16 to 19 hours, he said. 
Even the five-hour flight itself was too long, so he was contemplating buying a 
faster machine.46
The flying MP
Tanned, fit, firm-jawed, blue-eyed, his fair reddish hair and moustache neatly 
clipped, the young backbencher was soon noticed on the national stage. 
Everyone knew his flying credentials. Personally disappointed by being 
rejected as medically unfit for the Citizen Air Force, he was on record as a critic 
of government aviation policy. He served on the executive of an evanescent 
lobby group of ex-wartime flyers calling itself the Air Convention. Eric Roberts 
(who was simultaneously embroiled in the shadowy League of National 
Security), the aero club pioneer Major Harry Turner Shaw, and the struggling 
airline operator Jimmy Larkin had been alleging malpractice in the subsidised 
monopoly airlines and favouritism in the administration of civil aviation. Larkin 
44 Camperdown Chronicle, 28 Aug. 1930. I am indebted here to Ian Hancock for exploring the Warrnambool 
Standard and to Alan Gregory for information not included in his The sentimental soldier: A life of George 
Furner Langley, Langley, Courtis, Thompson Library Trust, South Yarra, 2008, pp.96–7.
45 E. J. Holloway, ‘From Labour Council to Privy Council’, unpublished autobiography, Holloway Papers, 
NLA MS 2098.
46 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 Nov. 1933.
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and Shaw were the spokesmen.47 Fairbairn, ‘slightly out of place with legalities 
and formalities’, as a young public servant was to observe, was never a fluent 
speaker.48 Reserved, some people thought, with a quiet, deliberate manner of 
speaking. But he was at home with graziers and club men as well as those with 
experience of war and ‘wind in the wires’; and his pastoral background allowed 
him to speak with authority on rural production and marketing. In 1932 he had 
made a hurried trip to England to study the quality and marketing of Australian 
butter. Irregular supplies and competition from higher-grade Danish butter 
were handicapping Australian exports. Flying to Denmark in the company of 
a Warrnambool dairyman, he spent two days investigating Danish farming 
practices, concluding that their pasturing and dairying methods are ‘far from 
ultra modern’. Where the Danes excelled was in the high average standard of 
their herds and their marketing. With immediate prospects for the Australian 
dairy industry gloomy, he advocated methodical herd testing, culling of all but 
the truly profitable cows and, where feasible, converting to mixed farming.49 In 
London, in May 1933, he spoke to the committee of the Empire Parliamentary 
Association on the practical working and future possibilities of closer settlement 
in Victoria.
Fairbairn had ideas about world affairs. He had enjoyed a private audience with 
Benito Mussolini in April 1933. ‘In the Duce’, he enthused, ‘the Italian people 
have an asset worth more than all the golden hoards of America.’ Agreeing with 
Il Duce that there was little prospect that any international monetary or credit 
scheme would raise wholesale price levels and stimulate world trade, he pointed 
out the great difficulties attending tariff reduction.50 Understandably, the new 
member’s principal focus in the House of Representatives was rural. He spoke 
in defence of dairy producers, the preservation of large-scale sheep studs, the 
adjustment of farmers’ debt and, drawing on personal knowledge, he forecast 
the future value of Corriedales, and the present benefits of the restored fertiliser 
bounty:
…nine years ago a property of 4,000 acres of which I have the direction, 
in Victoria, carried 3,000 sheep indifferently, although the season was 
good. This year the same property will shear over 10,000 sheep, almost 
entirely owing to the use of superphosphate on its pastures…The 
production of wool…has increased from 54 bales to over 220 bales…
When those 3,000 sheep were carried…it was not possible to carry any 
47 Leigh Edmonds, ‘Jealousy and Death, War and Politics: Reasons for Creating the Department of Civil 
Aviation in November 1938’, History ’86, Papers Presented to Civil Aviation Sessions, Adelaide, 25/26 Aug. 
1986, pp.5, 6, 17.
48 Garry Armstrong, taped reminiscenses, 30 Jan. 1983.
49 J. V. Fairbairn, ‘The Position of Australian Dairying: The Present Situation’, The Australian Quarterly, No. 
21, 14 March 1934, pp.41–8.
50 J. V. Fairbairn, ‘Impressions of a Short Visit to Rome’, reproduced from The Standard (Warrnambool), 19 
April 1933, copy courtesy of Mary Browne.
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cattle, except a few milkers, yet it is now carrying 350 head of cattle. The 
3,000 sheep were looked after by one station hand with very occasional 
assistance in the way of casual labour, whereas at present five men are 
permanently employed.51
For all that he was recognised as someone who spoke authoritatively on behalf 
of graziers, Fairbairn was also welcomed into the city corporate world with 
invitations to sit on the board of the Union Trustee Company of Australia 
(replacing Sir George Fairbairn who had served for 40 years) and the Victorian 
board of the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney, the domain of Sir Robert 
Knox, the leading conservative powerbroker.
No one who knew ‘JV’ doubted that his flying was much more than a hobby. 
His deep belief in the future of aviation was exemplified annually through the 
early 1930s to generations of teenage boys who were brought together in Lord 
Somers’ camps.
Yellow Group and its leader, Lord Somers’ Camp, January 1932
(Courtesy of Pat Lesslie and Alan Gregory)
51 CPD, House of Representatives, 26 July 1934, p.794.
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As a camp group leader, Fairbairn would fly in every January and land in a 
nearby playing field to take his place with Wilfrid ‘Billy’ Kent Hughes, Squadron 
Leader Ray Brownell, Gilbert Castieau (Assistant Solicitor-General), and other 
civic leaders.52 He would take the Somers boys up in the air, imagining for them 
a future in which as men they would commute 150 miles to work, meet their 
wives after they had a day’s shopping in the city, and fly them home to the 
country ‘in time to cook dinner’. It was a vision that his own wife did not share 
with him. ‘Peg you will be pleased to hear is getting air minded at last’, he told 
Charles Hawker in February 1935. But it was a false dawn. Although ‘she thinks 
nothing of flying to Melbourne & back for a day’s shopping’, Peggy Fairbairn 
was not a light plane enthusiast.53 Fast cars ― even for a journey from Sydney 
to Melbourne ― were always more to her taste.
In Parliament, Fairbairn was cautious about predictions and silent on spousal 
preferences. But he raised questions about subsidies to aero clubs, the desirability 
of creating a new airport at Fishermen’s Bend to replace Essendon, the poor 
condition of Canberra aerodrome, the improbability of any increase in efficiency 
resulting from the establishment of a Civil Aviation Board, and the resentment of 
the airline industry at the practice of holding secret inquiries into aircraft accidents. 
After the loss of a DH86 in Bass Strait in October 1935, the third DH86 to crash, 
he rose to the defence of the British aircraft before a court of inquiry had reported:
A little while ago I had an opportunity to hold a lengthy conversation 
with one of the chief pilots of Qantas, during which we discussed frankly 
the eccentricities of various aeroplanes, and I asked him whether he had 
any misgivings at all about the DH86 machines. The pilot assured me 
they were the finest machines he had ever flown…
…I consider that as much publicity as possible should be given to the 
findings of the court…the publication of the causes or possible causes of 
these accidents will have the effect of restoring confidence, rather than 
of causing uneasiness.
On one point he was emphatic. There was, he said, a certain reluctance by many 
people to testify at an inquiry ‘because they feel that they may seem to be 
maligning the dead pilot of the ill-fated aeroplane’. But it was the duty of those 
with relevant knowledge to appear as witnesses and tell of what they knew.54
52 Alan Gregory, It’s only the Game that counts: A History of Lord Somers’ Camp and Power House 1929–
1989, [1994], pp.48, 56, 61.
53 Fairbairn to Hawker, 28 Feb. 1935, Hawker MSS, NLA MS 4848/1/1.
54 Sydney Morning Herald, 4 July 1935, 1 Dec. 1939; CPD, House of Representatives, 17 Oct. 1935, p.835. 
For anxieties, investigations, and confidential consultations on the safety of the DH86, see NAA: MP187, 3, 
and T. W. White to Vera White 15 Mar. 1936, T. W. White MSS, NAA MS9148, 2/2: ‘The machines have a bad 
reputation and I have been warned not to travel in them.’ A pilot recalled that quite a few words would be 
said ‘if an air hostess walked too quickly fore or aft…because down would go the nose’. (Willis Reeve, ‘A talk 
to the AHSA meeting 24 May 1978’, Aviation Heritage, vol. 43, no.1, March 2012, p.41).
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When he began to travel regularly between Canberra and Melbourne, Fairbairn 
soon attracted attention by flying himself in the second-hand Metal Moth he 
had bought in April 1931. Sometimes it was unwanted attention. The ‘grazier 
pilot’ had already made headlines in March 1932 when he smashed up the nose 
of his Moth, crash-landing in a field half a mile from Camperdown on the way 
home from a Hampden Shire Council meeting. Belatedly adjusting his goggles, 
he inadvertently touched the controls and flew into the only tree in the paddock. 
Apart from a scratch over his right eye, only his pride was injured. But it was a 
sharp reminder of the need to be careful in the cockpit. In July 1934, at Duntroon 
aerodrome, there was trouble of a different kind. Someone took a knife to the 
fabric of his recently acquired DH85 Leopard Moth’s wings, slashing them 
so severely that it was too dangerous to fly. Even without malicious damage, 
Fairbairn family flying could have tragic consequences. As Betty Fairbairn told 
the press, when asked if she intended to try to lower Amy Johnson’s time for a 
flight from England to Darwin, ‘It’s then that people crash.’55
Without chasing records, Jim’s youngest brother, George Patrick ‘Pat’, was to die 
with his wife Mary at the controls when their Spartan Arrow ran out of fuel and 
crashed soon after take-off from Essendon in May 1935. Pat had made headlines 
in 1931 while still a 22-year-old undergraduate at Jesus College, Cambridge, 
when he flew in a deliberately leisurely fashion from England to Australia in an 
overloaded Gipsy I Moth.56 The risk of the flight was reduced by the presence 
of a passenger, a fellow undergraduate and previous flight companion, Kenneth 
Shenstone, soon to become managing director of a family firm supplying leading 
aircraft companies with machine tools. It was sobering for Jim Fairbairn to learn 
from a private briefing how his 26-year-old brother and sister-in-law may have 
died, leaving a 14-month old orphan daughter, Frances Mary. They had simply 
failed to fill their petrol tank before leaving Wooloomanata, their home at Lara. 
The deficiency might have been remedied had Pat not declined, as he usually 
did, to refuel at Essendon the next day. Although the Air Accidents Investigation 
Committee had no choice but to disclose that Mrs Fairbairn was not authorised to 
carry a passenger in Spartan aircraft, they softened their finding by concluding 
that there was no reason to doubt her competency to fly the aircraft. Evidence from 
the proprietor of the Hart Aircraft Company that Pat Fairbairn was very casual 
about the maintenance of his aircraft ― ‘the way he used to keep the machine was 
a disgrace’ ― was not mentioned in the Investigation Committee’s report.57
55 The Argus, 5 March, 17 April 1932.
56 Edward P. Wixted, The North-West Aerial Frontier 1919–1934, Boolarong Publications, 1985, p.94 has 
Fairbairn and Shenstone flying the Spartan Arrow to Australia. Contemporary Northern Territory newspapers 
do not identify the aircraft type.
57 NAA: MP187, 4/144. Much of the archival material on which this paragraph was based was subsequently 
published in Neil Follett, ‘An Accident Investigation: George Patrick Fairbairn’, Aviation Heritage, vol. 42, 
no. 4, Dec. 2011, pp.174–9. A coronial inquest had concluded that it was impossible to determine the ‘actual 
cause’ of the crash (Camperdown Chronicle, 29 June 1935). There is no substance to the theory that ‘the 
plane’s controls had been jammed by a large suitcase’ (Tink, Air Disaster, p.108). Frances Mary’s maternal 
grandparents became her guardians. With the concurrence of her trustee, Osborne Fairbairn, she was given 
the adopted name of Murray-Fairbairn (The Argus, 22 June 1939).
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Moth (left) and Dragonfly (right): the progress of a private flyer 
(Courtesy of the Civil Aviation Historical Society, Phil Vabre, and Geoff Goodall)
Amid his other responsibilities, Jim had found time to fly his Leopard Moth 
cabin tourer (VH-UUL) 7075 miles around northern Australia in 1935 with his 
other brother, Osborne, to whom he had sold his Gipsy Moth the previous 
year. The ‘Flying Fairbairns’ the press called them. Reflecting on the trip, he 
suggested that it would be helpful to aviators if every post office and railway 
station in the country should have the name of the town painted on its roof 
in as big letters as possible. He then left on a Qantas mail plane to England, 
where Peggy had taken a flat for six months, returning the following year in 
his own brand-new de Havilland Dragonfly. Osborne Fairbairn, unfazed by the 
deaths of his other brother and sister-in-law whose estate he was now managing, 
was again the buyer of Jim’s redundant aircraft, this time (September 1936) the 
Leopard Moth, VH-URK.58 The dual-control DH90, a streamlined twin-engine 
biplane, had a plywood fuselage skin and high aspect ratio wings. Its list price 
was £2650 sterling. Normally accommodating up to five passengers and crew, 
Jim Fairbairn’s craft had one passenger seat removed and an extra fuel tank 
installed. It had a cruising speed of 127 mph though he usually kept to around 
115 mph on the long trip home.
With a young Sydney pilot, Frank Thomas, navigating and sharing the flying, 
Fairbairn had set off from Lympne on 14 September 1936 intending to reach 
Vienna in one hop. Fog made them set down in Brussels before flying along the 
Rhine through bad weather to Budapest. He attended a parliamentary congress 
in Bucharest, flew across Turkey and thence via Basra and Karachi to Delhi, 
Calcutta, Rangoon, Bangkok, Penang, Singapore, Surabaya, and Koepang. They 
reached Darwin, clad in khaki shorts, coats and topees, on October 3. At about 
the same time, Peggy Fairbairn was about to board ship for an unhurried voyage 
58 For a history and photographs of VH-URK: http://www.goodall.com.au/australian-aviation/dh85/
dh85leopardmoth.htm.
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home from Naples. When the Orontes docked in Adelaide, Jim was there to meet 
her and fly her to Mount Elephant in the new Dragonfly which, he proudly said, 
was the first of its type seen east of Karachi.
Having registered the ‘baby airliner’ in Australia in September 1937, Fairbairn 
made it known that he intended to use it to fly between Melbourne and Canberra. 
Like his brother Osborne, Jim was one of the ‘old men’ of aviation, the flyers of 
the Great War, the pioneers and record breakers, the founders of airlines. Men 
who could scarcely imagine life without flying. Of his generation of RFC flyers, 
a British official had written in July 1916 that ‘the Australian temperament is 
specially suited to the flying service’.59 For them, accidents were vivid threads 
in the tapestry of flying life. And, of course, the veterans of the 1930s were not 
old men. Most ― like Norman Brearley in Western Australia, Horrie Miller in 
Victoria, Hudson Fysh of Qantas, Murray Jones of de Havilland Australia, and 
Jim Fairbairn himself ― were in their 40s. They had accepted, some might say 
embraced or even sought, the danger of the air all their adult lives. As Horrie 
Miller put it of the time he and a band of ex-AFC men launched a barnstorming 
business in Glenelg in 1919: ‘The general public still associated aircraft with 
death and disaster.’60 The general public were not wrong. But the flyers were 
undaunted. Oliver La Farge, a wartime staff officer in the U.S. Air Transport 
Command was to write of their American contemporaries: ‘The progress of their 
craft had been such that they had never lost the habit of doing things which 
until recently had been known to be impossible…They were ready for new 
conquests and strange developments, not in the far future, but tomorrow.’61
Jim Fairbairn never forgot the good fortune of his survival in 1917. His feelings 
were revealed in a brief intervention on the Repatriation Bill in 1934:
Those of us who, after a month or two at the front, and a comparatively 
brief share of the strain imposed on the fighting forces, found our 
services terminated by injury, did not suffer the same nervous strain 
as those who, month after month, and year after year, escaped injury...
the unfortunate individual who, though apparently bodily sound, has 
frayed nerves, and perhaps finds it necessary to take stimulants to steady 
them, experiences great difficulty in getting work, and is not regarded 
with understanding or sympathy.62
The speech might have referred to many of his flying contemporaries, not least 
to those with unrecognised afflictions, like that hero of the hour, Sir Charles 
Kingsford-Smith.
59 Firkins, The Golden Eagles, p.14.
60 H. C. Miller, Early Birds, Rigby, 1968, p.71.
61 Oliver La Farge, The Eagle in the Egg, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1949, pp.7–8.
62 CPD, House of Representatives, 1 Aug. 1934, p.1047.
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Fairbairn was not obsessed by the air. Nor did he depend on aviation for a living. 
Yet if flying was not his vocation it was certainly the passion of a man whose 
wealth, pastoral interests, business connections, and family traditions directed 
him to a career of public service. It was a passion he shared not only with his 
brothers but with his sister Betty and brother-in-law and horse racing partner 
Ross Grey-Smith. The one person close to Fairbairn who was nervous about 
flying was his wife. As her niece Gillian Gubbins remembered, Peggy declined 
to accompany Jim on his regular trips from Mount Elephant to Essendon, 
preferring to be driven.63 But his interest was not merely that of an avid private 
flyer. ‘Jimmy’ Fairbairn, as Qantas’s Hudson Fysh ― a slightly older Geelong 
Grammar contemporary ― called him in correspondence with Imperial Airways 
associates, was acknowledged as an authority on aviation policy, both domestic 
and international. On his return from England in 1936, The Age had reported 
that he had seen the new flying boats to be used on the proposed imperial air 
mail service. Seizing the opportunity to offer his thoughts on policy, he had told 
the journalist that he favoured a five-year agreement, renewable for five years, 
rather than the 10-year agreement being mooted.64
In a letter to his old school magazine, written while he was away, the young 
MP professed to have been shocked at the state of the meteorological station 
in Darwin ― safety was being compromised by the government’s cheese-
paring economies.65 In his public utterances it was rare for Fairbairn to venture 
beyond rural and aviation matters, where his expertise gave him some latitude 
to probe weaknesses and gaps in government policy. A notable exception was 
his adjournment motion in April 1936 on ‘the alarming growth of imports’ 
from the USA and the consequent ‘growing menace’ to trade with the United 
Kingdom and other ‘good customer nations’. The speech earned him the 
plaudits of Charles Hawker, who mocked the ministerial responses of Harry 
Gullett (Trade Negotiations) and Tommy White (Trade and Customs) who gave 
Fairbairn’s critique their blessing ‘with a sickly kind of sentiment designed to 
rob it of its vitality’. The exercise was a revelation that parliamentary badinage 
and byplay were not Fairbairn’s strong suit. This would not have surprised his 
former Hampden Council colleagues who had observed that he was capable and 
courteous but never had much to say. It was eight months before he returned to 
the fray. In a mild remonstrance at the trade diversion policy, he criticised the 
‘unnecessary curtailment’ of trade with Japan compared with the far gentler 
treatment of the USA, ‘our most unsatisfactory customer’. This time, however, 
his touch was lighter. He had not noticed until May 22, he admitted, that he had 
63 Gillian Gubbins to CH, 8 Feb. 2009.
64 The Age, 5 Oct. 1936.
65 The Corian, Aug. 1936, p.175.
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moved his motion on April 1. And, following a slashing attack on Harry Gullett 
by the Country Party’s Archie Cameron, he confessed his disinclination to put 
pinches of salt in the minister’s claymore wounds.66
Gathering confidence session by session, year by year, Fairbairn was sufficiently 
satisfied with his performances in the House of Representatives to arrange for 
a friend, Eddie Connellan, to sit behind him any time when Parliament was in 
session.67 Never a polished speaker, and noted for a degree of personal reserve, 
the member for Flinders commanded respect as someone who seldom got to 
his feet unless he had something worthwhile to say. Such an occasion was his 
attempt to head off an Opposition attack on the government in December 1937 
for its handling of a series of ‘Air Force Disasters’. In view of the damage being 
done to Australian aviation by the ‘extravagant publicity given in the press 
and in this House to aviation accidents and minor mishaps’, Fairbairn asked the 
Minister for Defence to make an appeal to ‘keep such publicity to something 
approaching proportion to that given to accidents associated with other forms 
of transport’. And, because of Labor attacks on the government’s Air Accidents 
Investigation Committee, would the Minister make a statement ‘explaining the 
very great difficulties that confront any committee that inquires into major air 
accidents’.
Unhappily the Minister’s statement provoked an adjournment motion in 
which the ‘black record’ of the RAAF ― eight accidents in nine days ― was 
contrasted unfavourably with civil aviation and motor accident rates. After 
listening to an hour of unrestrained criticism, Fairbairn rose to defend the 
government. It was ‘fantastic’ to call several of the accidents ‘serious’. Secret 
inquiries, to which Labor speakers objected, were more likely to yield candid 
answers. The latest modifications or servicing changes resulting from advice 
given in secret inquiries were promulgated in air regulations. Admitting that 
there was considerable controversy in air circles about whether inquiries should 
be open to the public, he was emphatic that ‘aviation would benefit to the 
greatest extent if the evidence were given in camera’. To the complaint that 
the interests of the public were not represented, he asserted that the rights of 
the public were protected by coronial investigations: ‘a coroner is as capable 
of carrying out an inquiry into an aircraft accident as any other’. A statement 
issued by Defence Minister H. C. Thorby two days later regarding ‘serious Air 
Force flying mishaps’ quoted ‘Mr. Fairbairn, M.P. (himself an airman)’ on ‘A 
Question of Proportion’.68 Proportionality was to be encouraged by officially 
characterising even fatal crashes as ‘mishaps’.
66 Camperdown Chronicle, 15 Aug. 1933; CPD, House of Representatives, 1 April, 25 Nov. 1936, pp.741–53, 
1322–5.
67 Connellan, Failure of Triumph, p.84.
68 CPD, House of Representatives, 8 Dec. 1937, proof copy, NAA: A461, V314/1/1.
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Useful as he had been to Thorby, unbeknown to many Fairbairn’s influence in 
aviation had been increased by the appointment of Geoff Street as Assistant 
Minister of Defence. The role he could play was evidenced late in October 1938 
after the appalling crash into Mount Dandenong of the ANA DC-2 Kyeema in which 
his dear friend Charles Hawker perished with four crew and 13 other passengers, 
including the winemakers Tom Hardy, Hugo Gramp, and Sidney Hill Smith of 
Yalumba.69 Writing to Hudson Fysh, Hawker’s friend since their schooldays at 
Geelong Grammar, he sweetened an earlier feeler on behalf of the government:
This tragedy has certainly put the press and the public into a frame of 
mind to demand a clean-up of Civil Aviation which has been due for 
a long time. Things may happen, I think quickly. You will, of course, 
have realised when we were discussing the post of chairman of the 
Civil Aviation Board the other evening that I was pumping you to see 
whether there was any possibility of your being persuaded to take this 
job should a change be made.
I feel that I would like to know whether you would consider accepting 
the position if it should become vacant and be offered to you, and what 
conditions you would consider adequate. I think many senior members of 
Cabinet feel that this position should be very greatly increased in status.
Fysh was happy where he was. To the managing director of Qantas’s annoyance, 
the government then secretly sounded out his lieutenant, the Qantas flying 
operations manager, Lester Brain, who indicated without reference to his boss 
that he would accept the position should it be offered. It wasn’t.70 In due course 
the senior post in the reformed civil aviation regime went to Arthur B. Corbett, 
an engineer who was close to retirement as Deputy Director-General of Posts 
and Telegraphs in Queensland. Unencumbered by knowledge of aviation, ABC 
or ‘the Alphabetical Old Bastard’ as Corbett was known by staff, was to stay 
at the helm under successive ministers long enough to accumulate a litany of 
offences in the eyes of frustrated subordinates. Released in 1944 from the public 
service obligation to mute his political opinions, he became chairman of the 
provisional executive that formed the Liberal Party in Queensland.71
69 The Canberra Times reported on 14 Aug. 1940 that Fairbairn escaped death on this occasion because the 
Kyeema was delayed by fog and he therefore flew himself to Canberra. The story was repeated elsewhere (e.g. 
Lismore Advertiser, 21 Aug. 1940). But, as the crash occurred before the plane reached Melbourne, Fairbairn 
could not have been on board.
70 Hudson Fysh, Qantas at War, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1968, pp.75–6; John Gunn, The Defeat 
of Distance: Qantas 1919–1939, UQP, St Lucia, 1985, pp.280–1, 334, 338, 343. Brain, perennially irritated at 
being under-appreciated by Fysh, had made clear his willingness to join Edgar Johnston, Controller-General 
of Civil Aviation, as his deputy as early as 1935. (Cameron Hazlehurst, ‘Brain, Lester Joseph [1903–1980]’, 
Ritchie and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 13, pp.247–8).
71 S. A. Prentice, ‘Corbett, Arthur Brownlow (1877–1970)’, Ritchie and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, vol. 13, pp.500–1; Arthur H. Affleck, The Wandering Years, Longmans, Croydon, Victoria, 1964, 
pp.157–60, 165; C. Arthur Butler, Flying Start: The history of the first five decades of Civil Aviation in Australia, 
Edwards & Shaw, Sydney, 1971, p.46.
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When the Ministry of Civil Aviation was created late in November 1938 the 
Country Party’s H. C. Thorby, demoted from Defence where he was replaced by 
Geoff Street, was appointed as the first Minister. Fairbairn was not completely 
at one with his old friend on defence matters, believing that the government 
had over-emphasised home defence over Imperial needs.72 But he was at pains 
to publicly congratulate Street on his appointment, ‘something for which I have 
hoped for many years’. Nor was he uncritical of British influence on Australian 
affairs. He lambasted the government for its ‘monstrously unfair’ public gloss 
on a report by Marshal of the RAF Sir Edward Ellington that purported to 
demonstrate poor training and discipline in the RAAF.
Ansons and Demons on parade for Sir Edward Ellington: A4-11, at the 
head of the line, would crash in controversial circumstances in 1939
(The Jack McNally Collection courtesy of Wendy Coultas and Peter Dunn)
Although he was speaking at 3.30 a.m. to a sparse and somnolent House, his 
defence of the RAAF made headlines. Were it not for his reputation as an aviator, 
his customary loyalty to the government, and the presence of friends in high 
places, such an attack might have seriously damaged his political prospects. He 
was an advocate of national service ― that was an issue still to be resolved ― 
72 David S. Bird, J. A. Lyons — the ‘Tame Tasmanian’: Appeasement and Rearmament in Australia, 1932–39, 
Australian Scholarly Publishing, North Melbourne, 2008, p.294.
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and of a commitment to reinforce Singapore in an emergency. He warned how 
easy it would be for an enemy to invade Western Australia or land a powerful 
force in Newcastle. And he was fertile with ideas about the training of Air Force 
pilots: if the RAAF could not manage enough cross-country flights then their 
pilots should be allowed to fly as assistant pilots on commercial airliners.
As it was, within months, following the death of Joe Lyons and the refusal of 
the Country Party to serve with the new Prime Minister, Bob Menzies, Jim 
Fairbairn’s moment came. The position of Civil Aviation Minister was vacant. No 
one in the UAP was better fitted to occupy the post. Harry Gullett had proposed 
him as ‘obviously the man for the job’ back in October 1938.73 Fairbairn did not 
have to ask.
73 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 April, 28 Oct., 8 Nov 1938; The Argus, 8, 14 Dec. 1938; 25 Nov., 8 Dec. 1938.
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At last Jim Fairbairn was in a position to apply all he knew and believed about 
aviation. There was wide appreciation of the Minister’s appointment, not least 
at Geelong Grammar where the boys were awarded a celebratory half-holiday 
on 6 May 1939 in honour of the chairman of the school council’s attainment 
of Cabinet rank.1 A proud Geoffrey Fairbairn enjoyed universal gratitude at 
Corio, but his mother was not at home to share her husband’s delight. In mid-
March she had left for six months abroad, farewelled at a party for 400 guests. 
Peggy Fairbairn was now in England and, as one of Bob Menzies’ British friends 
reported, she was ‘in the seventh heaven’ about Jim’s elevation.2
Peggy Fairbairn in pastel and gouche by Loudon Sainthill, 1939
(Courtesy of the Bridget McDonnell Gallery)
1 G. A. Cameron (A/g Headmaster) to J. V. Fairbairn, 26 April 1939, copy, Geelong Grammar School Archives.
2 The Argus, 14 March 1939; J. P. L. Thomas to Menzies, 16 May 1940, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/539/5.
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Fairbairn’s new Air Ministry would soon move into offices in the recently 
constructed Century Building at the corner of Swanston Street and Little Collins 
Street, opposite the Melbourne Town Hall. Blonde plywood panelling, flush 
jointed, with matching joinery, cushioned rubber-sheet flooring, terrazzo, and 
stainless steel were more suggestive of a passenger liner than flying machines. 
But it was a sparkling Art Deco structure reaching 14 vertically ribbed storeys 
to the sky. Melbourne’s first fully air-conditioned building, it was a symbolic 
contrast to the grim earth-clasping nineteenth-century bluestone of the Army’s 
Victoria Barracks, a brief tram ride away in St Kilda Road, where Geoff Street 
presided over the Defence ministry. The 100 or so officers of the Department of 
Civil Aviation central administration were also re-located from Victoria Barracks 
to two floors of Almora House, at the other end of Little Collins Street.3 Plans 
made by the former Defence minister, Vic Thorby, to shift Civil Aviation to a 
new building in Canberra had been shelved by Menzies amid Country Party 
remonstrances at the dominance of Victorian ministers in the Cabinet, and 
the alleged ‘evacuation’ of public servants from the capital to Melbourne. Air 
Vice Marshal Williams, by contrast, could hardly conceal his joy at the arrival 
of an informed and enthusiastic aviation minister and the departure of the 
uncommunicative Thorby, a builder who ‘paid particular attention to building 
plans to ensure that plumbing costs were kept to a minimum by having kitchens, 
bathrooms and toilets close to one another’.4
The new minister was soon in the news. He was, it was reported, going to meet 
weekly with his senior staff. There was going to be ‘frank talk’. A cascade of 
policy announcements followed. He signalled his support for the introduction 
of night-flying services by Australian airlines. He recommended stop-gap 
measures to ensure stability of domestic airmail and passenger services pending 
new agreements and rationalisation. He announced that all aircraft operating 
on routes supplied with beam radio beacons would be equipped with receiving 
apparatus by the end of May. He pronounced that there was no limit to the 
amount of money that could be spent on aviation in Australia, without one 
penny being wasted. Rising temperatures at the Treasury were mildly subdued 
when he said that the three aerodromes needed in every capital city would 
not all have to be paid for by the government. He was also quickly on record 
attesting his pleasure at finding that:
the old idea that a pilot should be a reckless devil-may-care individual 
has passed — at any rate as far as the professional pilot is concerned 
— and that displays of fool-hardiness by the inexperienced are greeted 
with all the emphasis on the ‘fool’ and none on the ‘hardiness’…
3 Butler, Flying Start, pp.45–7.
4 Williams, These are Facts, p.229.
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Not only must air transport be safe, but it must convince the public of 
its safety…[and] the subsidy requirements of existing lines are reduced 
by greater public patronage.
Belatedly displaying sensitivity to the cost of aviation to the public purse, 
Fairbairn took opportunities to underline the contribution made by the civil 
aviation industry to the nation’s defence preparedness.
Although he was only assisting the Defence Minister in relation to military 
aviation, Fairbairn’s knowledge and popular acceptance as an authority on 
all aviation matters were a political advantage to Geoff Street and the Prime 
Minister. As war came closer, it was he who issued a reassuring statement about 
the organisation of Australia’s reserve flying forces. In an emergency, he said, 
Australia could provide 373 highly trained pilots and 121 transport machines 
capable of carrying a force of 1000 men. Commercial pilots provided a reserve 
of skilled men for the RAAF, capable of making long-distance flights under any 
weather conditions. In what some might have thought an implicit admission of 
inadequate and vulnerable air capability, he described the reserve forces as a 
second line of defence in the air. In addition to these pilots, he said, aero clubs 
and other organisations had trained 2500 pilots, giving Australia an additional 
reserve of about 1500. With little expansion of present civil training facilities, 
he suggested, 1000 pilots a year could be trained ‘at a moderate expense to 
taxpayers’. Fortunately for the government these rather fanciful figures escaped 
serious criticism.5
Among the earliest tasks for the new Minister for Civil Aviation had been some 
delicate matters of personnel. None was of more concern to Fairbairn than the 
fate of Wing Commander A. H. Cobby. Writing about him to the Prime Minister, 
Fairbairn noted that ‘Cobby was the greatest single seater fighter pilot in the 
Australian Flying Corps during the War’ (No. 4 Squadron’s ‘most successful 
Hun-getter’ as the squadron history had put it in 1919).6 Unfortunately, in the 
reorganisation of the Civil Aviation Department, Harry Cobby’s position of 
Controller of Operations had become redundant. Cobby had retired from the 
RAAF to become a member of the Civil Aviation Board in the Department of 
Defence. The Board having been abolished with the creation of the department, 
he was neither a public servant nor an Air Force officer. ‘It is unthinkable that 
Wing Commander Cobby’s appointment should be terminated without some 
other position being found for him.’ Thus matters stood at the beginning of 
August 1939. Menzies referred the problem to the Defence Minister. A month 
5 Sydney Morning Herald, 2, 11, 13, 19 May 1939; The Argus, 13, 16 May 1939; Flight, 3 Aug. 1939, p.113.
6 E. J. Richards, Australian Airmen: History of the 4th Squadron Australian Flying Corps, Melbourne, 1919, 
p.17. For a modern account of Cobby’s exploits, see Michael Molkentin, Fire in the Sky: The Australian Flying 
Corps in the First World War, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2010, passim.
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later, with war declared, an obvious solution presented itself. The famous Harry 
Cobby DSO DFC and two bars would be welcomed back into the RAAF. As it 
turned out this was not one of Geoff Street’s best decisions.7
The Dili Mission: ‘Fraternisation 22/7/39 J. V. Fairbairn’
(Courtesy of Audrey Elford)
Shortly before he had taken up Cobby’s case, on 22 July 1939, Fairbairn had 
flown to Dili with his private secretary, Dick Elford, to explore the possibility 
of an air service between Portuguese Timor and Australia. The mission itself 
was productive in spite of Fairbairn having no facility in Portuguese and being 
unable to understand the Acting Governor’s French. Fairbairn’s English was 
equally unintelligible to his host. Negotiations were therefore carried out in 
both English (the Governor) and French, in which the Australian minister, 
like his friend Geoff Street, was proficient. Proceedings were accompanied by 
numerous ‘rounds of port wine on an empty stomach’ followed by a breakfast of 
more port, fried eggs, roast mutton, boiled pork, sweet cakes, preserved fruits, 
and cocoa. Earlier, a full dress parade of 100 barefooted native troops had turned 
into farce when they approached the saluting stand only to find the Governor’s 
car stalled in their path. Urgently hand-cranked into life, the vehicle showered 
7 Fairbairn to Menzies, 28 July 1939, and N. C. Tritton to P. Hayter, 7 Aug. 1939, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 
4936/2/3; NAA: MP288, 2/22.
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the front rank with gravel as it pulled away just in time to reveal a gaping hole 
in the ground, dug to accommodate a new flagpole. Bravely the troops marched 
into the chasm, three feet deep and six feet wide, emerging, according to Dick 
Elford’s account, undismayed ‘with scarcely a kink in the ranks’.8
Diverting as the ceremonial formalities were, the mission was most notable for 
being the first time anyone had left the country, landed on foreign soil, and 
returned to Australia in a single day. The original itinerary had the Minister 
making the trip in a Qantas flying boat; but urgent repairs to the landing 
strip made it possible to use a Guinea Airways Lockheed 10A Electra airliner 
chartered by the Commonwealth government in the previous year.9 Although it 
was now available to carry ministers, the primary role of the plane was to assist 
in calibrating the radio navigation aids that were being brought into service 
to avoid the kind of accident in bad weather that befell the Kyeema. It was not 
Fairbairn’s first time in the aircraft. He had taken the controls ‘nearly all the 
way’ in a flight from Canberra to Sydney two months earlier. This, as the Sydney 
Morning Herald reported, was ‘the first time he had flown such a large plane’.10 
The Dili trip also had a special personal significance for the Air Minister. His 
was only the third machine to land in Portuguese Timor. Dave Ross, who 
accompanied him, had flown the second. His late brother Pat had been the first.
On the evening of his return from Dili to Darwin, the Minister for Civil Aviation 
gleaned a shaft of spotlight at a ‘smoke social’ gathering of the Returned Soldiers’ 
and Sailors’ League at which the Minister for Supply and Development, Dick 
Casey, was the principal speaker. ‘Darwin,’ Casey had declared, ‘is the front door 
of Australia…the front line of Australia’s defence.’ Yes, Jim Fairbairn concurred, 
and it was his department that had made it so.11 It was not long before Fairbairn’s 
status was further enhanced. When war brought an imperative to build up the 
RAAF into a genuine fighting force, he was the obvious man to lead the new 
Air Ministry. Nor was there any doubting that he would retain the dual civil 
and military aviation responsibilities when some of his UAP colleagues had 
to make way for Country Party representatives in the reconstructed coalition 
government of March 1940. No-one was going to displace Jim Fairbairn.
8 ‘Visit to a little known land’, The Corian, Aug. 1939, pp.168–70.
9 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 July 1939; NAA: A461, 748/1/539.
10 Sydney Morning Herald, 19 May 1939. The Lockheed Electra (Model 10A), with a crew of two, carried 10 
passengers, had two Pratt & Whitney R-985-13 engines, 450 hp (340 kW); span 55’, length 38’ 7”, height 10’ 
1”; maximum speed 202 mph; range 713 miles.
11 Northern Standard, 25 July 1939. For the development of Darwin’s defences, Alan Powell, The Shadow’s 
Edge: Australia’s Northern War, Charles Darwin University Press, Darwin, 2007, pp.1–33.
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A minister in full flight
‘Victory in this war will depend upon mastery in the air,’ the Minister for Civil 
Aviation told radio listeners at the beginning of October 1939. Two weeks 
earlier he had transferred his office to Victoria Barracks where he could be closer 
to the nation’s principal defence officials. He was vocal in informing the nation 
of plans to manufacture aircraft, recruit civil pilots as instructors, and train 
pilots and aircrew.12 The government had underestimated the desire of qualified 
private and commercial pilots to be posted to operational squadrons rather than 
be sidelined in training establishments. But the faltering expansion plans were 
about to be overtaken by the ambitious Empire Air Training Scheme. Naturally 
it fell to Fairbairn to travel to Ottawa to negotiate the details of the plan. As 
George Jones, who accompanied him, recalled:
There were some very interesting people on the ship, including a little 
movie actress. She played the poker machines in the cocktail bar two-
thirds of the way across and then went to bed until the last day. And 
somebody came to her aid. I’m not going to say who, and she came up as 
large as life again, for more fun.13
There were in fact several companies of actors and show people returning to 
North America from Australian tours. Fairbairn, long since cured of the shyness 
that school contemporaries had remarked on, was always ready for fun.
The conferences and private parleys to settle the Empire Air Training Scheme 
in a form acceptable to Menzies and the Cabinet were to test Fairbairn’s political 
mettle.14 While he was away, his authority grew with the announcement that 
he was to be Minister for Air ― all of the air not just civil aviation. Conscious 
of the growing burden on Street as Minister for Defence, on 13 November 1939 
the Prime Minister had split the portfolio into four elements. He created for 
himself the overarching role of Minister for Defence Co-ordination.15 Street 
was Minister for the Army, and Sir Frederick Stewart was Navy Minister. 
Fairbairn’s appointment was unique in Australian constitutional history. He was 
the first minister to be sworn in outside the country, the Canadian Governor 
General, Lord Tweedsmuir (better known as the popular novelist John Buchan), 
performing the task in Ottawa, to the delighted curiosity of the press.
After finalising the terms of the Empire Air Training Scheme in London and 
making a quick trip to France late in 1939, Fairbairn flew back to Australia to take 
12 Sydney Morning Herald, 9, 13 Sept., 2 Oct., 29 Nov. 1939; Canberra Times, 19 Sept. 1939.
13 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
14 Empire Air Training Scheme, War Cabinet paper, [ca. 30 Nov. 1939], NAA: A2671 43/1939.
15 Robert G. Menzies, ‘Department of Defence Co-ordination Functions, Machinery and Procedure’, 23 Dec. 
1939, AWM: 54 243/6/157.
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up the challenge of overseeing the development of recruiting depots, training 
schools, and new establishments to receive the thousands of men who were 
responding to the nation’s call to arms. He had hoped to return in the company 
of Air Vice Marshal Richard Williams, expecting that Dicky Williams, currently 
exiled on secondment to RAF Coastal Command, would be re-appointed as Chief 
of the Air Staff. Williams and Fairbairn were old confidants. The then CAS had 
secretly briefed the backbencher Fairbairn to take up the Air Board’s case against 
the Ellington Report during the 1938–39 Budget debates. Brought from Britain 
by the government in response to community consternation over a series of fatal 
accidents, Sir Edward Ellington had concluded that the training of RAAF flying 
instructors was ‘not altogether satisfactory’, and ‘a high proportion’ of accidents 
(the rate of which was allegedly worse than the RAF) were due to ‘disobedience 
of orders or bad flying discipline’.16 The Air Board had been outraged by what 
they saw as a superficial and inaccurate assessment of their performance by a 
‘very shy and reserved’ man who had not faced them personally.17
Fairbairn, necessarily attacking his friend, Defence Minister Geoff Street, 
had carelessly used information in Parliament that could only have come from 
Williams. By so doing he seems, unwittingly, to have firmed the government’s 
resolve to replace the CAS. Behind the scenes, Williams was informed, there were 
at least three ministers (one of them almost certainly Dick Casey) keen to exchange 
him with an RAF man. Two senior Army figures, Sir Harry Chauvel and Sir 
Brudenell White, also had ‘a finger in the pie’. Whatever the origins of the advice, 
the government was determined to insist on accountability. As an embarrassed 
Geoff Street was to admit: ‘It is politically expedient for the Government to send 
you to England at the present time.’ Williams, celebrated in print as a man with 
no ‘pals or chums’ and with no known vices, had been made a scapegoat. With 
no satisfactory British officer available, he was replaced as CAS by his rival, Air 
Commodore S. J. ‘Jimmy’ Goble.18 Dissension and conflict in the senior ranks did 
not end there. Goble in turn was undermined, and lost the confidence of Fairbairn 
and, more importantly, the Prime Minister. He resigned amidst controversy within 
10 months, misguidedly expecting that the government would accept his demand 
that a disloyal RAF officer on the Air Board would be removed.
Now, as Minister, Fairbairn wanted a man he knew and could trust by his side. 
By bringing Williams back as CAS he would be putting right the damage he had 
carelessly done to the RAAF leader’s career the previous year. But Menzies had 
16 ‘Report by Marshall [sic] of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward L. Ellington…’, 16 July 1938, courtesy of Parliamentary 
Library, Canberra. The situation in the U.K. was, if anything, worse than in Australia (Wg Cdr Jeff Jefford, ‘Accidents — 
Investigation, Institutions and Attitudes 1919–1945’, Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, 37, 2006, pp.35–55). Lord 
Gowrie to Capt. L. S. Bracegirdle, 25 May 1938, Gowrie MSS NLA MS2852/5/10.
17 Lord Gowrie to Capt. L. S. Bracegirdle, 25 May 1938, Gowrie MSS NLA MS2852/5/10.
18 Williams, These Are Facts, p.244; ‘Dicky was completely and absolutely “pure”’ (Sutherland with Ellison, 
Aces and Kings, pp.56–7).
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other ideas. He was aware that Williams had divulged confidential information 
to Fairbairn to be used against the government, and that he had also stirred up 
agitation in the flying community. Menzies, believing with justification that 
there was no obvious Australian candidate apart from the unacceptable Williams, 
wanted an RAF officer to head the RAAF. He had briefed Stanley Bruce and Dick 
Casey, who was in London before Fairbairn, to begin the search for a suitable 
senior man. To Fairbairn’s chagrin, Menzies proved determined. Williams would 
not get the job. The British officer on offer, 62-year-old Air Chief Marshal Sir John 
Steel, had been recalled from retirement to become AOC Reserve Command just 
before war broke out. There was one other possibility, Air Marshal Sir Charles 
Burnett, an Inspector General of the RAF. Burnett was 57, had served in France 
and Palestine during the 1914–18 war, held senior Air Ministry appointments, 
commanded the RAF in Iraq, led the Training Command from 1936 to 1939, 
and was a member of the British Mission to Moscow in August 1939. He was a 
plausible appointee.
When he got back to Australia, Fairbairn allegedly told his old friend Group Captain 
Adrian ‘King’ Cole ― Bob Hitchcock’s nemesis ― a somewhat whimsical story:
After negotiating with the Air Ministry he was sent to Portsmouth to 
interview the officer they had selected, and Sir Charles was sent with 
him to act as guide and make the necessary introduction. On the way 
down by car they got on so well together that Jimmy decided to have 
Burnett and not go with the ministry’s selection.19
If it was not true, it should have been. Fairbairn had not wanted a British officer at 
all. He was prepared to consider Australian-born Air Chief Marshals Sir William 
Mitchell and Sir Arthur Longmore. Unless someone of their ‘standing, tact and 
energy’ was found, he told Menzies, he was convinced it was more advisable to 
recall Williams. As he told Harry Wrigley, rather less whimsically, he had quickly 
concluded that if Steel were appointed ‘he’d have been telling Cabinet what to 
do instead of Cabinet telling him’.20 He might have been influenced against Steel 
by the RAF representatives he had spoken to in Canada (ACM Brooke-Popham 
and AM Courtney). Something about Burnett, his forthrightness and sense of 
humour perhaps, an aura of authority and willingness to use it, made him the 
least worst option. Whatever the attraction, not only did Fairbairn reject the RAF 
nominee endorsed by Casey and approved by Menzies, he made sure that the 
British government and the chosen man understood that he saw the appointment 
as being for a term of just one year. Then, in a conscious act of defiance of the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, he told Williams, whom he intended to promote 
to Air Marshal, that he would be recalled to Australia as second member of the Air 
Board, with the implied succession to Burnett.
19 A. T. Cole, Merry Old Souls, draft memoirs, p.157, Cole MSS, AWM: PR88/154.
20 AVM H. N. Wrigley, interview [1977].
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Sir Charles Burnett: an outstanding personality at home, soon to be abroad 
(Illustrated London News, 13 January 1940, Issue 5256, p. 55, courtesy of the National Library of Australia)
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It was impossible for Menzies to deny Williams the higher rank, but the War 
Cabinet gave a clear signal to Fairbairn that he had overstepped the mark: they 
made the promotion temporary with no increase in pay, and decided explicitly 
that whatever post Acting Air Marshal Williams did take up would ‘not imply 
any right of reversion to the post of Chief of the Air Staff’.21 A baffled and 
annoyed Fairbairn had told Williams: ‘While I am to be politically responsible 
for the Air Force others are making arrangements which tie my hands so far as 
control of the efficiency of the Service is concerned.’ As Williams would put it 
in his memoirs: ‘By now Fairbairn was wondering whether he was a Minister 
or a clerk.’22
On Fairbairn’s return to Australia, he explained to the War Cabinet that he 
was ‘under the erroneous impression that he had full authority to make an 
appointment to the post of Chief of the Air Staff’.23 Stanley Bruce had warned 
Menzies that ‘Fairbairn might feel impelled to resign if the commitment he 
entered into believing he was authorised to do so, was repudiated’. Disingenuous 
as Fairbairn’s apology was, it sufficed. When the new appointments were 
announced, the Prime Minister let it be known that henceforth there was to 
be closer ministerial direction of the Air Force, to which end the Minister for 
Air would preside at all important meetings of the Air Board.24 The government 
was saved the embarrassment of having to explain the supersession of Goble 
while letting it be seen that when Service chiefs disagreed with them, as Goble 
was understood to have done, the Cabinet would prevail. The message of firm 
ministerial control was reinforced by allowing photographers into Sir Charles 
Burnett’s first meeting of the Air Board on 20 February 1940. At the head of 
the table sat the Minister for Air, flanked on his left by Burnett but on his right 
by the civilian Secretary of the Board, F. J. Mulrooney. The Secretary of the 
Department of Air, Melville C. Langslow, who had been commissioned in the 
AIF Pay Corps and liked to be addressed as ‘Major’, was the only other member 
not in uniform.25
The advent of a new regime was signalled that day by Fairbairn’s approval of 
a request to modify his own pre-war decision that no hardwood floors should 
be covered with linoleum. Henceforth RAAF Sick Quarters, Link Trainer 
rooms, bedrooms and passages for officers, cadets and NCOs, and passages in 
airmen’s quarters would all be quieter, cleaner, safer. Mel Langslow, installed as 
21 The story of Fairbairn’s resistance to the pressure to appoint a British Chief of the Air Staff was well told 
in Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939–1942, pp.74–8. See also Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, p.163 
and the same author’s valuable article, ‘“A Damnable Thing”: The 1938 Ellington Report and the Sacking of 
Australia’s Chief of the Air Staff’, Journal of Military History, 54 (3), July 1990, pp.307–23.
22 Williams, These Are Facts, pp.252–6.
23 War Cabinet Agendum and Minutes, 4 Jan. 1940, NAA: A2673 80, A2670, 8/1940.
24 The Age, 5 Jan. 1940.
25 Richard Kingsland, ‘Langslow, Melville Cecil (1889–1972)’, John Ritchie (ed.), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 15, MUP, 2000, pp.58–9.
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Secretary of the Air Department in the hope that his uncompromising frugality 
would contain any ministerial or CAS extravagance, might well have choked. 
The Air Minister himself had played no part in the selection of his departmental 
head. Like the heads of all the Service departments, each of them previously 
the Finance Members of their respective Boards, Langslow was the choice of 
the Prime Minister, guided by his close advisor Fred Shedden. Exhausted by 
the travel and travail of the last two months, Fairbairn was rushed to hospital, 
ordered to rest for several days. It was the second time in a month. To the 
irritation of his doctors he had risen from his bed to attend the War Cabinet on 
January 25. In conformity with the Prime Minister’s directive that he should 
chair significant Air Board meetings, he had previously summoned the Board 
to his hospital bedside to discuss the criteria for aircrew to be sought in a 
forthcoming recruitment drive.26
The press needed little prompting to sense the discontent within the upper ranks 
of the RAAF at the appointment as their Chief of a modestly regarded British 
officer nearing retirement, a man who had never been in Australia. Sir Earle Page, 
suffering the back-bench irrelevance of a discarded Country Party leader, had 
called the decision to appoint a non-Australian ‘staggering’ ― a comment that 
might have been taken more seriously had he not been Deputy Prime Minister 
when Sir Ragnar Colvin and Ernest Squires were appointed from Britain to lead 
the Navy and Army. The government responded with selective briefing of its 
own, and crisp statements through gritted teeth by Fairbairn about Burnett’s 
‘exceptional ability with the whole problem of training at his finger tips’. The 
Prime Minister won no friends in the RAAF by the tactless and contestable 
statement that ‘Air Chief Marshal Burnett is being brought to Australia so that 
we will not have to ask our very limited number of relatively senior officers to 
undertake a task far beyond their experience.’ The demonstrated dispensability 
of Goble and Williams, and the evident determination of Menzies, were 
chastening. Within days the Sydney Morning Herald’s aviation correspondent 
retracted, saying that a ‘careful check of opinion’ showed that a majority of 
RAAF officers supported the appointment. Not knowing whether they would 
be winners or losers under the new regime, those in the upper echelons were 
naturally divided. But the initial wounded pride of some top commanders was 
as nothing to their dismaying realisation that Burnett had little knowledge of 
the RAAF, little concern for the home defence of Australia, little regard for the 
men who were to sit around the Air Board table with him, and no intention of 
being in thrall to inherited arrangements and expectations. Like him or not, he 
26 Air Board Agenda 2651, approved by Minister for Air, 20 Jan. 1940, NAA: A4181, 17; Sydney Morning 
Herald, 22–26 Jan. 1940. For the irascible Burnett’s general attitude to wartime expenditure, see John McEwen: 
His Story, n.d. p.40.
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was their leader. Autocratic and abrupt as some senior colleagues would find 
him, he was to exhibit a ‘tremendous initiative and mental energy’ they had 
never previously encountered.27
The Air Board: happy at their work, July 1940
(Courtesy of the RAAF Museum)
A minister and his friends
At the outbreak of war there were 310 officers and 3179 airmen in the RAAF; 
there were an additional 194 Citizen Force and Reserve officers.28 Harry Cobby, 
rescued by Fairbairn, was an eminent representative of the oldest of several 
27 Daily Telegraph, 9 Jan. 1940; undated note on Burnett, RAAF Historical Branch, in John Robertson 
and John McCarthy (eds), Australian War Strategy 1939–1945: A Documentary History, UQP St Lucia, 1985, 
pp.55–7; Canberra Times, 8, 9 Jan. 1940; F. M. Bladin, typescript memoir, 1953, AWM: MSS 886. See NAA: 
A705, 163/1/296, A2908, A28, and M2740/ 65 for Burnett’s appointment on a salary of £3000 sterling, partially 
paid in the UK, and other benefits. Jim Fairbairn vetoed his request to bring his personal servant who, in any 
case as  Fairbairn pointed out, could not have stayed at the Melbourne Club where the CAS proposed to reside. 
Press reports on the reception of Burnett are usefully distilled in Neil Kendall Quarmby, ‘Regrettable at Best? 
A Reappraisal of Sir Charles Burnett’s Effect on the Royal Australian Air Force 1939–1942’, BA Hons thesis, 
Department of History, Faculty of Military Studies, Royal Military College of Australia, University of New 
South Wales, 1985, p.13. For a senior colleague’s testimony that Burnett ‘could not tolerate opposition of any 
kind’, see ‘Wrigley, Henry Neilson CBE DFC AFC (Air Vice Marshal)’, Interviewer/Recordist Frank Marshall, 
ACCNUM S00416, 3 Squadron AWM Collection.
28 Alan Stephens, ‘An Analysis of the Development of Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921–
1991’, PhD thesis, University College, University of New South Wales, 1992, p.188.
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identifiable cadres of RAAF officers.29 Most recently there had been an influx 
of commercial pilots and aero club members. The latter in particular were a 
concern for George Jones and others at HQ who thought that the aero clubs had 
been inclined to cut corners to get their paying customers through.30 The alleged 
failure of the government to use the schools to full capacity in the early months 
of the war would be the leading charge in a litany of criticisms published by the 
Sydney Morning Herald in May 1940. The resumption of Citizen Air Force flying 
training in 1932 had opened a door for young men of means who liked to fly 
while pursuing a civilian career. Wilfred Brookes, for example, then a trainee 
with the family firm of Australasian Paper and Pulp Co. Ltd, had come through 
this door in a group of 30 in 1926. Before them in the 1920s and through the 
middle 1930s there had been a steady trickle of men who enlisted as cadets, 
some of them like Alan Charlesworth, Val Hancock, and Fred Scherger with 
previous Army experience, perhaps even Duntroon graduates. A small number 
of them had also enjoyed four-year commissions in the RAF. The Duntrooners, 
embraced by Dicky Williams for their supposed administrative competence, 
were regarded as a select race, resented by both younger and older men for 
‘getting all the good posts’.31 The originals, survivors of the Great War in Europe 
and the Middle East, and of another two decades of flying in Australia and 
around the globe, had special bonds and memories. Cobby could recall with 
wonder and gratitude the training he received from Major Norman Brearley in 
the Gosport Instructors’ course. What Brearley did with an Avro ‘seemed to be, 
to me, impossible, and I thought I could fly’.32
Cobby, Dicky Williams, George Jones, Arthur ‘Spud’ Murphy, ‘King’ Cole, 
‘Mucker’ Anderson, Lawrence Wackett, Frank Lukis, and others were uniquely 
connected. And Jim Fairbairn was one of them. Made a Wing Commander, and 
shortly afterwards promoted Group Captain, Cobby was appointed on 25 July 
1940 as Director of Air Force Recruiting. On the same day Wing Commander 
Carn ‘Stiffy’ Wiggins arrived from the Department of Civil Aviation, where 
he had been Chief Electrical Engineer, to resume his old role as Director of 
Signals. Wiggins was the only member of the civil aviation administration who 
had emerged with his reputation intact if not enhanced by his appearances 
in the inquiries into the Kyeema disaster.33 Cobby soon found ex-colleagues 
everywhere: ‘the old team is back in harness…for the duration and whatever 
29 GpCpt D. J. Lancaster, ‘The Social Dimension 1921–1939’, in Barry Sutherland (ed.), Command and Leadership 
in War and Peace 1914–1975, Proceedings of the 1999 RAAF History Conference, Canberra 29 Oct. 1999, Air Power 
Studies Centre, Canberra, 2000, pp.71–82. The data underlying this analysis can no longer be found.
30 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept. 1977; AVM G. C. Hartnell, interview, 11 April 1978.
31 ACM Sir Frederick Scherger, interview, 2 Sept. 1978.
32 A. H. Cobby, High Adventure, Robertson & Mullens, Melbourne, 1942, p.181.
33 Department of Defence Air Accidents Investigation Committee, ‘Report…on Kyeema…’, 5 Dec. 1938, 
p.20, NAA: MP 1353/3; Affleck, The Wandering Years, pp.156–7.
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period we are wanted for afterwards’.34 But not everyone was happy about the 
recall of the old team. Among the many unimpressed officers, Squadron Leader 
Stuart Campbell, himself summoned to service after 10 years in business and 
Antarctic exploration, would tell the war correspondent Gavin Long’s wife tales 
of appalling ineptitude and disorganisation. Four decades later Sir Frederick 
Scherger was still scornful of the appointment of Cobby and other ‘World War 
I chaps that persisted in spite of the certain knowledge that they lacked the 
necessary attributes to do the jobs they were posted to’.35
Getting the administration of the burgeoning RAAF to settle down into efficient 
routine was a taxing assignment for Jim Fairbairn. Constrained initially as he 
had been by a seniority system in which at the outbreak of war 16 of the top 56 
officers were World War I veterans, he was gradually able to take advantage of 
the demands of an expanding organisation to bring in able men of business.36 
For all his knowledge of the aviation world, finding the right men for new jobs 
was not easy. For the key role of Director-General of Supply and Production, 
devised by Burnett to replace the old Air Member for Supply, he was guided to 
one of A. B. Corbett’s former colleagues in the Postmaster General’s Department, 
the Chief Engineer Robert Lawson. As chairman of an interdepartmental 
committee investigating the administration of the Civil Aviation Board late in 
1938, Lawson had quietly shifted to the Director-General and the Secretary of 
the Board as a whole much of the blame for the Kyeema disaster initially laid 
personally on the Finance Member Mel Langslow for his ‘insistence on the 
limitation of expenditure’. Langslow had found a sympathetic ally and Fairbairn 
recognised the value of an effective and fearless administrator. It turned out to 
be an outstandingly successful appointment; and Lawson stayed at the centre of 
RAAF business and technical affairs for the rest of the war.
Sometimes well-meant choices proved mistaken. For all his years in the civil 
aviation administration, for example, Harry Cobby was not cut out to direct 
a critical element of a complex, restructured, and rapidly growing wartime 
Service. He was popular with subordinates who were given latitude. Val Hancock 
thought him a ‘lazy bloke’ but a good leader with a gift for talking people into 
doing things for him.37 But he was uncomfortable in dealing with colleagues and 
superiors, some of whom were unimpressed by his cheery detachment. He was 
later to do good work in the field, perform heroically when a Catalina in which 
34 Cobby, High Adventure, p.196.
35 Mary Jocelyn Long MSS, NSW State Library, ML MSS 7191; Scherger, interview, 2 Sept. 1978. Scherger 
did not mention, but doubtless had in mind, the debacle in 1945 when Cobby was found to have failed to 
maintain ‘a proper control over his command’ when eight of his officers submitted identical letters resigning 
their commissions in protest against the alleged futility of the operations in which they were engaged. Wiggins, a 
Duntroon graduate who transferred to the RAAF in 1925, was probably exempted from Scherger’s condemnation.
36 Norman Ashworth, How Not to Run an Air Force! The Higher Command of the Royal Australian Air Force 
During the Second World War, vol. One ― Narrative, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 2000, pp.3–32.
37 AM Sir Valston Hancock, interview with Ken Llewellyn, 30 June 1993, AWM: S01657.
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he was travelling crashed at Townsville, but was to come to grief towards the 
end of the war when unwisely posted to a senior appointment at Morotai by 
George Jones, then the CAS. Like Lord Kitchener in 1914, however, if not a great 
man he was certainly a great poster.38
It was not all Cobby’s fault of course. But, with recruitment in an embarrassing 
state, Fairbairn had to confront his critics. The Sydney Morning Herald and Daily 
Telegraph had launched a scathing attack on the ‘scandal of air bungling’ late 
in May 1940 alleging, in addition to recruiting chaos, training delays and a 
shortage of machines for the EATS scheme. An incensed Minister responded 
unwisely: ‘One or two aviation correspondents in Sydney are doing the work 
of the fifth column…The articles could only have been written in three ways, 
because of stupidity, because of bitterness against myself, and officers of the Air 
Force generally, or subversively in the interest of the enemy.’39
Predictably, the editor of the Sydney Morning Herald rejected the charges ‘as so 
patently absurd and unworthy of any responsible Minister that it is charitable 
to dismiss them as the product of temporarily uncontrolled emotions’. Unsubtle 
he may have been, but Fairbairn did not lack political courage. In the House 
of Representatives he hit back. The progress of the air training scheme was, he 
pointed out, dependent on the provision of aircraft. That, he said, was partly 
out of the government’s control. But, he admitted:
Certain mistakes are bound to be made in an undertaking of this size…I 
would like to remind the House and outside critics that the R.A.A.F. is 
endeavouring to set up a bigger organisation than the Broken Hill Pty 
Ltd in less than 18 months.
Our recruiting staff, which now numbers 397, is comprised almost 
entirely of men who have offered their services from civilian life.
It would be ridiculous to expect that an organisation of this size, staffed 
by men with great enthusiasm but little experience would make no 
mistakes in the big and intricate job of dealing with more than 80,000 
applications from young men wishing to be pilots, observers, air 
gunners, educationists, electricians, fitters, air riggers, flight mechanics, 
cooks and a dozen other occupations.40
Fortunately for Fairbairn his friend Sir Harold Luxton, ex-RFC, shot down 
in August 1917, ex Lord Mayor of Melbourne, ex-UAP MLA, and racehorse 
breeder, had already provided the answer. Luxton was chairman of directors 
38 J. D. Walker, ‘Red Tape or Red Blood: Civil Aviation Administration in 1938’, Tempus Aerianus: Australian 
Civil Aviation in 1938, Department of Aviation Historical Society, 1988, p.8; Hayes, Angry Skies, p.108.
39 Aircraft, 18 (9), 1 June 1940.
40 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 May 1940; The Herald, 29 May 1940.
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of the National Mutual Life Association where his vice-chairman, Sir Brudenell 
White, had just been recalled to service as Chief of the General Staff. Very early 
in the war Luxton, who also chaired the board of the Metropolitan Gas Company, 
had released his assistant manager at the gas company, Albert Chadwick, to help 
with equipping the proposed six-squadron air expeditionary force. Now Luxton 
himself would take a lead as Victorian director of the Empire Air Recruiting 
Committee. More important, when listening to Fairbairn’s woes over a drink at 
the Melbourne Club in April 1940, he had suggested that Chadwick, his key 
executive and sales controller, a wartime air mechanic with Dicky Williams’s 
No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps and now a pilot officer in the Reserve, 
was the man to sort out the paralysing organisational muddle and inundation 
of letters from potential recruits. As Recruiting Liaison Officer, appointed ‘by 
special arrangement’ and rapidly advanced in rank to squadron leader, Bert 
Chadwick had set about reorganising the recruiting program. Initially confronted 
with 12 wheat sacks of mail ― there had been 68 000 applications by March 
1940 ― he brought in other men he could trust, and conquered the chaos.41
As long as his position was not slighted Cobby was content to be an affable 
figurehead. With direct access to the Minister, Chadwick, effectively supported 
by Dick Elford in turning oral briefings into appropriate documentation, created 
a network of over 500 local committees, each headed by the town or shire clerk 
or some other ‘worthy’, and including people like headmasters and RSL sub-
branch presidents. When regular public servants resisted allocating funds to 
recruiting committees flushed with devolved authority to spend, Fairbairn 
successfully took the issue to Cabinet. It was not long before Chadwick also 
ended the cosy, inefficient, and inequitable practice by which RAAF officers 
and airmen were directing friends seeking to enlist to amenable staff officers in 
the Directorate of Recruiting. Henceforth all enquiries were to be passed to the 
recruiting centre in Queen Street.42
As for the Air Minister himself, not only friends, and friends of friends, but 
relatives as well, all of them able and eminently qualified, were being drawn 
into positions where they could be useful. There was no disguising the influence 
that had brought Osborne Fairbairn into the RAAF in April 1940, ‘persuaded’ 
by his brother, as his daughter ruefully recalled, to lead No. 1 Wireless and Air 
Gunnery School (EATS 1 WAGS) at the Ballarat Showgrounds.43 The Minister 
41 Gavin Long, The Six Years War: A Concise History of Australia in the 1939–45 War, Australian War 
Memorial and AGPS, Canberra, 1973, p.27. RAAF aspirants outnumbered AIF and RAN applicants three to 
one and nearly 10 to one respectively. So congested was the RAAF recruiting organisation that 25 per cent of 
those who signed applications did not respond when eventually called up.
42 GpCpt. A. E. Chadwick (Director of Manning) to Air Member for Personnel, May 1945, copy, Chadwick 
MSS, courtesy of Sir Albert Chadwick; Chadwick, interview, 14 June 1978; Charles Fahey, ‘Chadwick, Sir Albert 
Edward (Bert) (1897–1983)’, Di Langmore (ed.), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 17, MUP, 2009, pp.198–9.
43 Alethea Russell to CH, (email), 20 Jan. 2009. At the time, in addition to his property responsibilities, 
Osborne Fairbairn had in his charge four children of his own, his orphan niece, and two British evacuees.
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may not have played a direct part in bringing his brother-in-law Ross Grey-
Smith into the RAAF’s Administrative and Special Services Branch, but the well-
known connection could not have been a hindrance. Grey-Smith, a solicitor, was 
a former committee member of the Royal Victorian Aero Club. Commissioned on 
2 July 1940, he became chief instructor at the School of Administration, which 
opened at Laverton on August 6.
Three weeks later, Fairbairn was confronted with a dilemma which could not be 
resolved by anyone else, friend or relative, and for which none of his previous 
experience had prepared him. To make an intrinsically sensitive problem worse 
he was required to reject the wishes of the Chief of the Air Staff. It was the delicate 
matter of precedence among the RAAF chaplaincy. Burnett, briefed by Williams, 
had thought it sensible to follow the British practice of giving chaplains rank 
and designating a Chaplain-in-Chief. Given that 45 per cent of RAAF personnel 
were Anglican it seemed to them natural that a chaplains’ branch should be 
headed by an Anglican. But they had not counted on the combined resistance of 
Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, and Methodist representatives who gathered at 
a conference with Burnett and the Director of Personal Services, Group Captain 
Joe Hewitt, on 19 July 1940. In unison the churchmen pointed out that there 
was no Established Church in Australia and the idea of Anglican primacy was 
unacceptable. To consolidate their position, Monsignor P. F. Lyons, instructed 
by Archbishop Daniel Mannix, called on Fairbairn the next day, a Saturday, and 
elicited from him a signed confirmation that Burnett had been right to accept 
their argument: the Australian Constitution knew nothing of an Established 
Church; therefore the four most senior Staff Chaplains would have authority 
only within their own denominations.44
Whatever the tribulations behind the scenes, in public as well as private, the 
Minister for Air did not disguise his pride in the potential achievement of the 
Empire Air Training Scheme. For the first time in Australian history, he had 
told a meeting at Wesley Church in Sydney on 4 February 1940, the nation had 
embarked on an enterprise ‘in which failure could mean complete disaster for 
the British peoples throughout the world and in which success can make victory 
and security against aggression certain’. He had already told the Prime Minister 
much the same thing: ‘The only activity that we have undertaken which could 
lead to the winning or losing of the war by our failure or success in carrying out 
our undertaking is the Empire Air Training Scheme.’45 It was a large claim that 
carried with it a huge burden of responsibility.
44 Davidson, Sky Pilot: a History of chaplaincy in the RAAF 1926–1990, pp.2/2, 3; Hewitt, Adversity in 
Success, p.4; NAA: A705, 36/1/99 (‘Chaplains — policy file’).
45 John Malcolm McCarthy, ‘The “surrender” of aircrew to Britain 1939–45’, Journal of the Australian War 
Memorial, vol. 5, Oct. 1984, p.4; McCarthy, A last call of empire, p.16; J. V. Fairbairn to Prime Minister, 16 
Jan. 1940, NAA: A5954, 235/7.
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When Menzies had outlined the scheme in Sydney on 15 December 1939 he had 
foreshadowed that a total of 26 000 men would be trained, of whom 10 400 were 
to be pilots and 15 600 observers, radio operators and air gunners. Most were to 
be trained in Australia, except for a few thousand in Canada. Australia, Menzies 
said, would establish and pay for 34 new training schools, supply all aircraft 
for elementary training, and bear the estimated cost over three years of A£50 
000 000. In return, Great Britain was to supply or pay for all engines required 
for elementary trainers, a proportion of the cost of the intermediate trainers 
(Wirraways), and all the aircraft for advanced training (Fairey Battles and Avro 
Ansons). Great Britain would also supply wastage replacements and spare parts 
for maintenance. Australian instructors were to be supplemented by instructors 
lent by the Royal Air Force.46 It was early February 1940 before the report of the 
Australian Air Mission at the Empire Air Conference in Ottawa was ‘noted by the 
War Cabinet’.47 By March, the scheme had expanded way beyond the original 
forecasts. The RAAF had enrolled 68 000 volunteers, 11 500 as aircrew. The first 
EATS course was inducted on April 29 at Somers in Victoria where the former 
Cabinet minister and heroic AFC escapee from Turkish captivity Tommy White, 
one of the first four graduates from Point Cook in 1914 and now back in uniform 
as a flight lieutenant (temporary squadron leader), was the commanding officer. 
But by July, in spite of stringent educational standards being applied, the flood 
of recruits for the RAAF itself was overwhelming the Air Force’s capacity to 
absorb them. Fairbairn had to tell the War Cabinet that training units could not 
be organised because of the difficulty in devising a syllabus and providing the 
necessary instructors.48
Command and control
To cope with the massive growth of the Air Force at home, as well as the huge 
demands of the EATS, a new command system was announced in March 1940. 
It was designed, according to minutes for ministers as well as in the formal 
statement published on Anzac Day, to decentralise administration and allow 
headquarters staff to concentrate on major policy. In fact the new structure 
was not greatly different from what had preceded it. A great deal of authority 
remained at the centre, reflecting Burnett’s advice on how functions should 
be allocated. Fairbairn appears to have been content to let the irascible and 
46 Flight, 31 Dec. 1939, p.516.
47 War Cabinet Minute, 6 Feb. 1940, NAA: A5954, 803/1, cited in Helson, The Private Air Marshal, p.134.
48 War Cabinet Minutes, 2, 9 July 1940, NAA: A2673, 283, 286. One reason why instructors were in short 
supply was the determination of qualified pilots to gain operational postings. Fairbairn himself tipped off 
Clive Caldwell during a chance meeting at the Australian Club that his course graduates were to become EATS 
instructors. Caldwell contrived to resign from the RAAF and re-apply for a later course (Kristen Alexander, 
Clive Caldwell, Air Ace, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2006, pp.9–10).
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indefatigable Burnett have his way on most professional matters. If the Minister 
did not put his own stamp on the structure of the Air Force nor did he make 
radical changes to the personnel who were to deliver on the ambitious program 
for which he was responsible. With both Williams and Goble sidelined, their 
pre-war rivalry no longer a source of tension for their subordinates, he could 
hope for a more harmonious higher command group. But the men on whom he 
was to rely were confirmed or assigned on the customary seniority principle 
that had prevailed since the RAAF was created.
The Cabinet had endorsed a regionalised operational structure and a reorganised 
Air Board.49 Though press releases and public relations briefings made it look 
like a whole new regime, the truth was that the new regional commands were 
in effect the same as the previous No. 1 (Melbourne) and No. 2 (Sydney) Groups 
that had been created at the beginning of the war. The same men led them. 
Thus a Southern Area command based in Melbourne was announced under 
No. 1 Group’s Group Captain Harry Wrigley, with Senior Air Staff Officer Wing 
Commander Leon V. Lachal and Senior Administrative Staff Officer Group Captain 
Joe Hewitt, who would shortly become Director of Personal Services. A Central 
Area command with headquarters in Sydney was still to have Air Commodore 
A. T. ‘King’ Cole as Air Officer Commanding. Cole’s Senior Air Staff Officer was to 
be Wing Commander Alan Charlesworth; the Senior Administrative Staff Officer 
was Wing Commander D. E. L. Wilson. The man on whom Sir Charles Burnett 
had come to rely more than anyone else, Group Captain W. D. ‘Bill’ Bostock, 
remained Deputy Chief of Air Staff with Wing Commander (promoted to Group 
Captain in June) F. M. ‘Dad’ Bladin as Director of Operations and Intelligence.
At least one of the appointments Fairbairn initiated personally was that of 
his EATS travelling companion and advisor, temporary Group Captain George 
Jones, formerly Assistant Chief of Air Staff, to become Director of Training in 
the branch of the Air Member for Personnel, Air Commodore W. H. Anderson. 
Fred Scherger, who then held the post was in effect demoted to Assistant 
Director. ‘I think it is better that we have a World War I man there’, Fairbairn 
told Scherger after the younger officer returned from Perth to find Jones sitting 
in his office. ‘Oh boy, you swallow hard when that happens.’ Scherger bore no 
grudge. Fairbairn, he said, was ‘a remarkable man, a ton of guts, by jove he was 
a courageous bloke and a damn good pilot’.50 Although he did not know all of 
these senior men well, Fairbairn knew most by reputation. Some were indeed 
very old friends. Adrian ‘King’ Cole, like George Jones a wartime AFC ace, had 
been in the same house at Geelong Grammar School. Cole, two years older than 
‘Jimmy’, had taught the youngster to ride his bicycle in 1908 ‘in order to gain 
49 ‘Expansion of R.A.A.F. Organisation and Administration Part I, Higher Organisation and Command’, 
Narrator F/O G. E. Mayman, AWM: 54 81/4/143; The Herald, 4 March 1940.
50 ACM Sir Frederick Scherger, interview, 2 Sept. 1978.
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permission to ride it myself’. Meeting up again after the war, Cole recalled, ‘At 
a Picnic Racecourse in Queensland, where I had landed in the course of an air 
survey in 1919 in exchange for a spectacular “Joy Ride”, he had helped me to 
“pick the card” for the only time in my life.’51
Men at the top whom the Minister could trust were a start. But critical also to 
the rapid expansion of the Air Force was securing candidates for flying training 
who conformed to the RAAF’s desiderata.  By March 1940, Fairbairn had been 
briefed on the difficulty in recruiting young men with sufficient knowledge of 
mathematics and physics. To his dismay he learned from the officer in charge 
of the recruiting depot in Melbourne that the six associated public schools 
together were sending fewer applicants for training as air crew than the 
Melbourne Technical School. His blood, he said, ran cold at the news. But there 
was some comfort from his own school. He was delighted to learn that James 
Darling, the headmaster of Geelong Grammar, was signing an average of two 
applications for the Air Force every day. Darling admitted he was uneasy about 
signing testimonials for boys who did not have intermediate maths and physics: 
‘I am afraid I have been rather reckless about their educational qualifications 
and hope that this will not be a trouble for somebody else.’ Fairbairn hastened 
to re-assure him:
Not only is the Air Training Scheme the most important part of the 
Commonwealth’s war effort, but air crew trainees will have much greater 
opportunities of having their capacity utilised to the full than those who 
join the A.I.F. in view of the fact that 50 per cent of pilots and observers 
will receive commissions upon the completion of their training. As a 
great number of the trainees will be young men who have had barely the 
required education, any boy with reasonable personality and initiative 
who has had a public school education should be almost certain to 
receive a commission.52
In April 1940, having seen the senior postings in the RAAF settled, Fairbairn 
was at last completing the reorganisation of the Civil Aviation Department. 
But there was a stumbling block. The Director-General wanted as his Assistant 
Director-General, Captain E. C. Johnston DFC, the former Controller-General of 
Civil Aviation. The Public Service Commissioner, Frank Thorpe, queried the 
appointment, noting the adverse findings of the Kyeema inquiry which reflected 
badly on Edgar Johnston. Fairbairn had no reason to favour an official whose 
department had been denounced for the shortcomings that he held responsible 
for the death of his friend Charles Hawker. Johnston had been passed over when 
51 A. T. Cole, Merry Old Souls, pp.125–6, Cole MSS, AWM: PR88/154.
52 Fairbairn to Darling, 20 Feb and 19 March 1940, Darling to Fairbairn, 14 March 1940, Geelong Grammar 
School archives, Headmaster’s correspondence 1940, A–F, partly quoted in Janet McCalman, Journeyings: The 
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Corbett was brought in. But the Minister had come to appreciate his formidable 
knowledge of Australian aviation. Perhaps too he had a lingering regard for 
Johnston’s outstanding war record as an RFC ace with 20 victories. Seeking 
to break the deadlock, Fairbairn wrote to Menzies asking him to intervene on 
Johnston’s behalf. Menzies’ private secretary Corby Tritton, assuming that the 
Prime Minister would comply with the request, drafted a personal letter to the 
Public Service Commissioner for his chief to sign. But Menzies baulked. Tritton 
was instructed to advise Fairbairn’s private secretary, Elford: ‘In the light of the 
evidence of the Kyeema report the Prime Minister feels it would be improper for 
him to take action as Mr. Fairbairn suggests.’
Undeterred, Fairbairn wrote again to Menzies. Ignoring the undisguised 
rebuke, he began by saying that he understood from Tritton that the Prime 
Minister wanted ‘further advice’. He admitted that he had at first himself been 
‘somewhat prejudiced against Johnston’. But he had found him ‘most efficient’ 
and he had done excellent work in negotiations with airline companies and in 
connection with the soon to be inaugurated trans-Tasman service. The failure 
to confirm Johnston and other senior officers of the department was creating a 
state of uncertainty that was not only unfair but impairing efficiency. Menzies 
was unmoved. While he was not going to comment on the merits of individual 
officers, he would not seek to influence the decision of the Public Service 
Commissioner.53 Fairbairn might well have suspected that Menzies’ lack of 
enthusiasm for Edgar Johnston stemmed from his opposition to ceding control 
of the Empire Air Mail Scheme route from Singapore to the British. Johnston’s 
preference for all-metal American aircraft over the British flying boats favoured 
by Menzies compounded his offence.54 Had Fairbairn been privy to Menzies’ 
diary of his trip to Britain in 1935 he would have realised that the Prime Minister 
thought Johnston ‘dull’ and a ‘man of limited vision’.55
In the end Fairbairn prevailed. But the Johnston appointment, like the 
appointment of Sir Charles Burnett at the beginning of the year, was evidence 
of a certain uneasiness in his relations with the Prime Minister. There had been 
early signs just before the war. A rambling submission by the Civil Aviation 
Minister on prospective British trans-Pacific air services and their possible 
impact on relations with the United States had left the Cabinet floundering. 
Menzies assumed principal responsibility with Gullett for preparing replies on 
the subject to the British and New Zealand governments, Fairbairn himself being 
effectively superseded.56 All of this was of course concealed from public view.
53 Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/581/22.
54 Leigh Edmonds, ‘The Ultimate Imperial Air Service: The Empire Air Mail Scheme’, Tempus Aerianus: 
Australian Civil Aviation in 1938, Department of Aviation Historical Society, Sydney, 1988, pp.22–4.
55 Ewer, Wounded Eagle, pp.58–68.
56 Agenda 121, 3 August 1939, NAA: A2697, vol. 2.
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Mount Elephant homestead and its châtelaine
(The Australian Women’s Weekly, 6 January 1940, p.42, courtesy of the National Library of Australia). 
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Nor did the public get wind of the conflict underlying Fairbairn’s announcement 
on 18 April 1940 of the War Cabinet’s decision to place an order for 49 additional 
Hudson ‘reconnaissance bombers’ with spare engines and parts. The truth was 
that a significant doctrinal shift had occurred in Australian defence thinking. 
Relying on Burnett’s advice of ‘a continuous lessening of the probability’ of 
a Japanese attack on Australia, Fairbairn had advised his colleagues to cancel 
an order for Beaufighters for a proposed fighter squadron. The Defence 
Committee had come round to the RAAF’s view that it was essential to have a 
sea reconnaissance and bomber capability with which to find and destroy the 
enemy rather than rely upon intercepting hostile aircraft in the air.57 Fairbairn 
had announced the arrival of the first batch of Hudsons in Sydney on January 
26. The new machines were to replace the Avro Ansons that were being phased 
out of service for home defence, with 18 set aside to equip a new squadron. 
The Hudsons, 86 of which were already in the country though many were still 
in crates awaiting construction, were, the Minister said, a great acquisition 
because of their reliability, power, and endurance. What he naturally did not 
disclose was that the recommendations of the Air Board which he had taken 
to the War Cabinet had been questioned by the Treasury Finance Committee, 
undermined by the Secretary of the Department of Defence Co-ordination, and 
barely secured the acquiescence of the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Chief 
of the General Staff. In the end, a reluctant Menzies had tipped the balance 
in favour of the Defence Committee’s advice. Menzies had been cautioned by 
an unenthusiastic Shedden that it would be risky, as public opinion began to 
focus more on local than Imperial defence measures, to take the responsibility of 
not adopting the decision of the defence chiefs ‘unless financial considerations 
absolutely preclude such a course’.58
Finally, with the Prime Minister’s concurrence, Fairbairn was to all intents and 
purposes admonished in a War Cabinet decision in which ‘grave disapproval’ was 
expressed of negotiations that had begun in Australia with Brown and Dureau, 
local agents of the Lockheed Corporation, instead of with the Commonwealth 
representative in the United States who was charged with making all purchases. 
The point was driven home by the ‘instruction’ that all future aircraft purchases 
should be made through the recently created Aircraft Production Commission 
57 Stephens, ‘An Analysis of the Development of Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force’, p.189. Ewer 
(Wounded Eagle, pp.163–4), overlooking the reservations of the other defence chiefs, characterises this 
decision as based on ‘a strategic appreciation of striking ineptitude’. For earlier RAAF thinking on the need 
for flexible deployment of resources, see David M. Stevens, ‘The Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia’s 
Maritime Defence 1915–1954’, PhD thesis, School of History, University College, University of New South 
Wales Australian Defence Force Academy, Nov. 2000, pp.109–10; and on the equipment implications of 
strategic thinking in the 1930s David Joseph Wilson, ‘The eagle and the albatross: Australian aerial maritime 
operations 1921–1971’, PhD thesis, Humanities & Social Sciences, Australian Defence Force Academy, UNSW, 
2003, Chs 2 and 3.
58 David Day, The Politics of War, Harper Collins, Sydney, 2003, pp.50–1.
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run by Menzies’ appointee Harold Clapp.59 After so much tension it was 
something of an anti-climax when a month later Winston Churchill’s Minister 
of Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbrook, let it be known that the embattled 
British wanted the next batch of Hudsons, and Menzies agreed to their diversion 
to England.60 By late June, however, the War Cabinet was ready to accept the 
RAAF’s expansion plan entailing an increase in the Home Defence Force from 19 
(nominal) to 32 squadrons: seven would be reconnaissance bomber squadrons, 
another three would be ‘general purpose’, one was to be flying boats, with two 
fighter squadrons to be acquired later.61
There were legitimate differences of view between the Service chiefs about the 
priority to be given to the acquisition of extra Hudsons. Yet more than once on 
matters in which a minister might well feel that his judgment and preference 
should be accepted, Fairbairn had to fight hard to carry the day. With the Air 
Minister bearing the liability for decisions on the Empire Air Training Scheme 
that sometimes were forced upon him, the Prime Minister could allude jocularly 
to seeing placards insisting ‘Fairbairn must go’. It was small comfort to read that 
Menzies had reminded the public that:
At the moment the question of whether or not Mr Fairbairn gets the 
sack is for me and he is not getting the sack because I happen to think 
that he is a pretty good minister and I know that no-one in Australia 
could have worked harder to make the scheme a success.62
If, as a result of some of this faint praise and of other dissonances, there was 
a slight coolness between the Air Minister and the Prime Minister it was 
barely perceptible to outsiders. But Fairbairn had reason to feel that Menzies 
did not accord him the respect appropriate to his role. Menzies was clever but 
not clever enough to hide his lack of appreciation for minds less agile than 
his own. Fairbairn was no intellectual. Audrey Elford, his private secretary’s 
widow, remembered that he seemed to rely very heavily on her husband and 
departmental officials.63 Lady White, daughter of Alfred Deakin and wife of Sir 
59 War Cabinet Minutes, 17 April 1940, NAA: A2673, 165. The background to the decision to order 31 
Hudsons and 16 spare engines (not the 49 announced the next day) is in NAA: A5954, 232/10 and A705, 
9/19/177. Brown & Dureau, who advised Lockheed about long-term prospects for US aircraft sales in Australia, 
were receiving a commission of $2000 per plane on the first 100 Hudsons (Lockheed Archives: Brown & 
Dureau, file 092-0-5, Box 77761; Box A5189).
60 ‘Transfer of Lockheed Hudsons to Britain (together with Twin Row Wasp Engines for Hudsons)’, NAA: 
A1608, G17/1/2; War Cabinet Minutes, 28 May 1940, NAA: A2673, Agendum 114/1940. ‘Before an intended 
programme can be proceeded with, changes in the International situation throw it in the melting pot, and 
discussions from a new beginning are necessary’ (D. H. Dureau to S. W. Voorhes, 11 June 1940, Lockheed 
Archives: Box A5189).
61 NAA: War Cabinet Agendum No. 151/40, 28 June 1940, cited in Stephens, ‘An Analysis of the Development 
of Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force’, p.191.
62 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 1940.
63 Audrey Elford, interview, 27 July 1977.
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Thomas White, a minister in the Lyons Cabinet, recalled her husband’s friend 
as a pleasant man, but ‘not brainy’.64 On the other hand, Percy Spender, who 
sat with him in Cabinet, rated him a ‘most competent man undaunted dedicated 
to the performance of any task allotted to him’. As a minister, Spender placed 
him with ‘Doc’ Page and John McEwen, and above the efficient but obtrusively 
dignified Dick Casey.65
What Jim Fairbairn had was an understanding of character gained under fire 
and in perilous flight. It was something that Menzies’ cerebral superiority 
would never match. Fairbairn had experienced the drudgery of backbench life. 
He had an acute awareness of the impact on the reputation of a minister and 
his department of failures to respond promptly and courteously to inquiries 
and requests from fellow MPs. In April and again in June 1940, he signed 
remonstrances prepared by Dick Elford at the ‘lack of proper organisation 
and supervision’ that was causing him embarrassment with his parliamentary 
colleagues.66 What he understood about men was politically important. What he 
knew about aircraft and aviation made him a uniquely informed minister. As a 
discomfited RAAF senior hierarchy learned, he took seriously the criticisms that 
reached him from units about administration and equipment. An approachable 
minister, trusted and detached from the chain of command, could be better 
informed about the state of morale than headquarters staff.67
George Jones, who had risen from the ranks and was not given to indiscriminate 
praise, worked closely with his Minister on their trip to Canada in 1939: ‘I 
thought he was pretty bright’, was Jones’s later judgement.68 Bright or not, the 
vastly experienced flyer Scotty Allan testified, Fairbairn had:
a lively interest in all factors connected with aviation. We therefore 
talked about those affairs — general training of pilots which was rather 
sketchy at that time, civil aviation regulations, air navigation — even 
meteorology as applied to aircraft movements and how much pilots 
ought to know or be taught.69
Fairbairn’s was no academic interest. When the opportunity presented, he 
would find out for himself what his RAAF flyers were encountering. Thus, on 6 
July 1940, the Argus reported that the previous day he had ‘thoroughly tested’ 
one of the RAAF’s new Fairey Battles, Britain’s fastest bomber. Strapping on 
a parachute, he had taken to the air at Laverton with the station commander, 
Group Captain Frank Lukis. Five days later he was to fly without a parachute in 
64 Lady White, interview, 3 June 1977.
65 Percy Spender, Politics and a Man, Collins, Sydney, 1972, pp.29, 33.
66 NAA: A1196, 36/501/92.
67 Report of Staff Conference No. 35…, 25 May 1940, NAA: AA1977/635.
68 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
69 G. U. Allan to CH, 16 Aug. 1982.
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a War Cabinet meeting. As an unusually detailed minute recorded, the Minister 
for Air ‘raised without Agendum’ his alarm about the possibility of Pan 
American Airways being given landing rights in Australia. To do so would be to 
give away an important ‘bargaining counter’ for landings in Hawaii by a British 
trans-Pacific service. The American company’s ‘methods of achieving their 
ends’ were, according to Australia’s ambassador in Washington, ‘circuitous and 
notably lacking in frankness and honesty’. And, after having been sidelined 
when he had raised the issue a year earlier, Fairbairn was gratified by the War 
Cabinet’s decision to insist on government-to-government negotiations on the 
question of reciprocal rights.70
As the massive effort of recruiting, training, testing of new equipment and 
machines, and deployment of squadrons gathered speed, Fairbairn decided to 
fly on a morale-building tour of inspection around the nation. War Cabinet had 
contemplated that the Director-General of Information might use his regulatory 
powers to counter a barrage of press criticism, from the Daily Telegraph in 
particular.71 Fairbairn affected disdain: ‘Splenetic outbursts against me are of 
no consequence.’72 The Air Minister would admit publicly on July 23 that the 
response to the recruiting drive had exceeded all expectations. There were 2000 
RAAF recruits waiting to be called up. Many prospective pilots would have to 
wait until the resources were available for intermediate training. Arriving at 
Darwin after a 1200-mile flight from Brisbane via Rockhampton, Cloncurry, and 
Daly Waters, he was met by an escort of four Wirraways from No. 12 Squadron. 
‘I would not like to fly over this country all day long like those fellows with 
single engine machines,’ he told reporters. ‘It is tough enough with a twin-
engined machine.’ On the ground there was a frank discussion with the Station 
Commander, Group Captain Charles Eaton, whose 14-point agenda included 
delays in construction of the base, inadequate defences, a shortage of spares 
and equipment, and promotions. Fairbairn was impressed with what he saw. On 
his return he sent a message to Eaton that he ‘was particularly pleased with the 
keen-ness and efficiency of all ranks of the station’. The very high morale was, 
the Minister added, ‘particularly praiseworthy in view of the definitely difficult 
conditions under which all have been living and working since the establishment 
of the station’. For their part Eaton and his team found ‘his cheerful presence 
and vigorous optimism were an encouragement and inspiration to all’.73
70 ‘Air Service in the Pacific — Pan American Airways’, War Cabinet Decision, 11 July 1940, NAA: A5954, 
344/15; John Gunn, Challenging Horizons: Qantas 1939–1954, UQP, St Lucia, 1987, pp.18–22.
71 War Cabinet Notes, vol. 2, 16 July 1940, NAA: A5954, 729/2.
72 ‘Air Training Scheme: Irresponsible Criticism Deprecated’. Press release, 19 July 1940, NAA: A5954, 235/1.
73 Charles Eaton, The Cross in the Sky, ‘Episode XIV’.
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Three Hudsons on display for the Minister, Darwin July 1940
(Courtesy of John Harrison) 
The flying Minister for Air arrived back in Melbourne in record time after long 
hops from Perth and Adelaide. In Perth he had paused long enough to assure a 
‘national party luncheon’ audience that there was method in the government’s 
‘dalliance’ over airframe production (engine production was lagging and 
recruitment had already overtaken the ‘ambitious’ Ottawa program). And, if 
they were worried about enemy raids, they should know that bombers could be 
assembled anywhere between Perth and Cape York within five hours.74 When 
Fairbairn reached Melbourne, he had been away 12 days and covered 6700 miles 
in 46 hours and 47 minutes’ flying time.75 In his absence he had missed a two-
day War Cabinet meeting in Melbourne during which the Chief of the Air Staff 
was grilled by the Prime Minister. What was the schedule for aircraft deliveries 
from Britain? Why were so many recruits being rejected in Victoria (a question 
that Fairbairn had dodged a fortnight earlier by reference to Air Force insistence 
on high educational standards)? What was the situation with Hudson aircraft 
which were rumoured to be crashing? What was the status of the proposal to 
increase the size of the RAAF to 32 squadrons? What prospect was there of 
obtaining aircraft from the United States if previously expected British Ansons 
and Battles did not arrive? For Burnett to be subjected to such an inquisition 
when his Minister was not there might have been justified if the matters raised 
were urgent. They were not. It could be seen as another example of Menzies’ 
disrespect for a senior ministerial colleague.76
74 The Argus, 30 July 1940.
75 The Argus, 2 Aug. 1940.
76 War Cabinet Minutes, Agenda Nos 163, 169, 23 July 1940, NAA: A2673, 308; Extract from War Cabinet 
Minutes, 9 July 1940, ‘RAAF Development and Empire Air Training: Recruiting Organisation’, NAA: A5954, 236/3.
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In May, the Minister for Air had made known a Cabinet decision that much of 
the repair and overhaul work on the 1700 aircraft required for the Empire Air 
Training Scheme would be carried out by civilian contractors.77 On Sunday, 
August 4, Fairbairn announced a new plan to use every suitable aeroplane, 
private or commercial, from September onwards to maintain the momentum 
of training under the Empire Scheme. At the same time, he rejected an offer 
of a civilian committee to train a home defence force of 1000 airmen. In the 
unadorned speech for which he was known, he pointed out that there was no 
shortage of elementary training. It was advanced training that was the problem. 
It would be ‘a waste of time for instructors, men and petrol to give elementary 
training to hundreds of more men than we could train further’.78 He said nothing 
of the vexing issue of how best to deploy the existing pool of experienced 
senior captains. If he knew the extent to which this very real dilemma had been 
rippling through RAAF headquarters he gave no hint of it. Nor was there any 
mention of the decision of the Chief of the Air Staff four days earlier to begin 
planning for a large number of training aircraft to be ‘operationally equipped 
and manned to form a potential second line reserve home defence force’.79
Determined to put his stewardship in a better light, the following weekend 
Fairbairn had his department release comprehensive statistics on recruitment. 
The RAAF had accepted 22 000 ground personnel in addition to 7894 air crew 
personnel accepted under the Empire Air Training Scheme. These figures did 
not include cadets in training, calling up of reservists on mobilisation, selection 
of civil pilots as instructors, and administrative, medical, and equipment 
officers. Of the ground personnel, 15 631 were already serving and 6969 were 
on the waiting list. Air crew personnel under training totalled 1416 and 6278 
were waiting to be called up.80 It was a good story.
When Parliament had resumed on August 6, Fairbairn flew up from Melbourne 
the day before in the new Hudson A16-97, fitted out at his request for important 
passengers. Flying Officer Bill Heath of No. 2 Squadron was at the controls. It 
was the Minister’s second recorded flight in one of the RAAF’s latest machines. 
A week later, on August 13, he was to fly up to Canberra in the air-conditioned 
and sound-proofed special aircraft for the second time. As well as War Cabinet 
business he would be meeting with aviation pioneer, P. G. ‘Bill’ Taylor, to discuss 
a proposal of Taylor’s ― previously rejected by the Chiefs of the Naval and Air 
Staffs ― to roam around the Pacific in a P.B.Y. (Catalina) flying boat surveying 
for future air bases and watching for German raiders.81 Take-off on August 13 
77 The Advertiser, 16 May 1940.
78 Canberra Times, 5 Aug. 1940. p.3.
79 A1196, 1/501/355 Pt 1; Wilson, ‘The eagle and the albatross’, pp.71–2.
80 More detailed figures were released over the next two weeks (The Argus, 12, 24, 26 Aug. 1940).
81 War Cabinet Minutes, 29 April 1940, NAA: A2673, 169; Stuart Swinton, P. G. Taylor, The Last of the Great 
Air Pioneers, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus 2006, p.67.
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was to be at a gentlemanly hour. An RAAF sergeant driver would collect the 
Minister in good time. So there was no reason why he could not do his regular 
exercises. Since he had hung in his dressing room a vibrant study of the touring 
dancers Baranova and Petroff in full flight in Swan Lake, he said, ‘a grace which 
wasn’t apparent before has made itself apparent in my early morning exercises’. 
‘There is grace and vigour in every line of the picture’, he had confided to The 
Argus at a showing by the 21-year-old artist Loudon Sainthill in April 1939. 
What he thought of the portrait of Peggy done by Sainthill in her Berkeley 
Square apartment a year or so later is not recorded. Sainthill’s work seems to 
have been a rare enthusiasm the Air Minister shared with Bob Menzies, who 
had opened the artist’s exhibition at the Hotel Australia.82 There would be no 
opportunity to talk to the Prime Minister on this trip. But Fairbairn could look 
forward on the flight to another instructive conversation with an experienced 
Hudson pilot. There was a lot to learn about the new aircraft.
82 The Argus, 4 April 1939.
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16. ‘Not a machine for the careless 
or the ham fisted’
Settling into the cockpit of Hudson A16-97, Bob Hitchcock, his small suitcase 
stowed, was secure in a dual-purpose harness. His ‘QC (quick connection) 
seat type’ parachute allowed for interchangeability with the second pilot or 
navigator. The Irving parachute pack attached to his harness served as a cushion. 
Hitchcock faced an array of controls that were now familiar. He could see around 
him the dials and instruments he had learned to read ― the levers, buttons, and 
switches he knew would respond to his touch, the engine control pedestal with 
its three cranks for ailerons, rudder and, closest to him, the elevator. In his mind 
and muscle memory there was recently acquired experience. He had come to 
know the subtleties of the brakes, operated by pulling a car-type ratchet lever 
set in the central pedestal to his right. He had been instructed on the Hudson’s 
tendency to swing during the landing run and the consequent importance of 
a three-point landing, touching down with the main and tail wheels at the 
same time. He had been warned of the danger if braking became necessary 
during a landing run and he was forced to lean to one side and pull ― the 
rudder bar’s effectiveness could be compromised, the differential brake could be 
applied unwittingly, resulting in a ground loop. If that were to happen he had 
the further concern that the fuel tanks, directly above the undercarriage struts, 
might rupture and be set ablaze.1 He had probably heard as well of the story 
told by Pat Hall to pilots undergoing conversion courses with him at Richmond. 
An unexplained Hudson crash in England, Hall had said, was attributed to the 
accidental shifting of the flap lever downwards when the aircraft was flying at 
high speed. Something to be particularly careful about.2
Yet, for all the rumination about Hudson peculiarities and potential dangers, 
with assiduously acquired knowledge and over 100 hours practice to subdue 
any lurking apprehension, Bob Hitchcock was in command. To Dick Wiesener, 
in the right-hand seat, every inch of the machine’s 44' 3⅞" (13.51m) fuselage 
and 65' 6" (19.96m) wing span was new.3 The previous day’s brief observation 
1 NAA: A705, 919/50 on parachutes; Lettice Curtis, The Forgotten Pilots: A Story of the Air Transport 
Auxiliary 1939–45, G T Foulis & Co., Henley-on-Thames, 1971, pp.126–7. An instructor and RAF Hudson 
squadron commander Geoffrey Bartlett’s recollections of the Hudson Mark I:  Andrew Hendrie, Lockheed 
Hudson in World War II, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1999, pp.17–9. Crashes and ‘formidable’ blazes were soon 
experienced by the RAF Hudson conversion training flight at Leuchars in Scotland under an Australian, S/
Ldr Rankin (Gron Edwards, Norwegian Patrol, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1985, pp.5, 9–10).
2 The Court of Inquiry into the crash of A16-27 on 12 Aug. 1940 would conclude that there was no evidence 
of what the effect of lowering the flaps at high speed would be; but it was possible, and pilots and crew should 
be warned that it might cause an accident (NAA: A705, 32/10/2830).
3 There are slight discrepancies in the quoted measurements in different sources. Measurements here are 
manufacturer’s specifications. See also http://airforce.gov.au/raafmuseum/research/aircraft/series2/A16.htm.
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from behind the pilot had made a deep impression. In his mind, too, as in the 
captain’s, was knowledge of what they had read and been told by others about 
this powerful new aircraft. He could not fail to notice the distinctive smell, 
unlike anything he would previously have encountered: ‘something to do with 
fresh cellulose, upholstery fabrics, floor coverings, and a beautifully clean Elsan’, 
a British Hudson pilot and student of the aircraft would say, ‘mingling with the 
faint whiffs of hydraulic and de-icer fluids, aviation fuel, several different kinds 
of oil, synthetic rubbers and who-knows-what’.4
Wiesener knew that the Hudson’s Pratt & Whitney G-3-5 twin-row engines gave 
it superior performance to the Hudsons delivered to the RAF. He understood 
that it was faster than the Dutch Lockheed 14s because of less radial resistance 
and extra horsepower. He knew that its payload would be less than the British 
machines. There was assurance though in knowing that the Hydromatic (full 
feathering) propellers fitted to Hudsons 51 to 100 could be stopped from 
revolving in a few seconds if an engine failed, reducing vibration and making it 
easier to fly on one engine. Now, in one of the first 17 Hudsons delivered to the 
RAAF with dual controls, Wiesener could begin his formal conversion.5 First he 
would see, as the British Hudson instructor Geoffrey Bartlett recalled, the help 
that was necessary in starting the engines from the cockpit:
…it required dexterity single-handed. What with working the hand-
pump (the ‘wobble’ pump), priming via an electric push-button, 
pushing the separate starter and booster buttons simultaneously, and 
turning on the ignition switch after one full revolution of the propeller.6
For the men who would fly them, there was much to admire as well as to learn 
about the Hudson. They would be quick to notice its comfort and sound-proofing. 
Those who were on the alert to the rapid and remarkable developments in 
aircraft technology from the mid-1930s onwards would know that the Lockheed 
company was in the forefront. The first fully pressurised plane, Lockheed’s XC-
35, had taken to the air in May 1937. Feathering airscrews ― which cut the 
drag of a failed engine on multi-engined aircraft ― had been introduced for 
the first time on Lockheed 14 transports.7 A brilliant young Lockheed engineer, 
Clarence ‘Kelly’ Johnson, had also developed the Fowler wing flap for the model 
4 Andrew Hendrie, Seek and Strike: The Lockheed Hudson in World War II, William Kimber, London, 1983, p.33.
5 ‘Supply of Lockheed Hudson aircraft’, NAA: A705, 2 9/1/350. On the delivery of Lockheed Hudsons, see 
‘Aviation-Purchase of Lockheed Bombers’, Prime Minister’s Dept Correspondence, NAA: A1608, F17/1/12; War 
Cabinet Agendum No 28/1939 ‘Delivery of Lockheed “Hudson” aircraft from USA’, NAA: A2671, 28/1939; War 
Cabinet Agendum No 84/1940 ‘Supply of 31 Lockheed Hudson aircraft and 16 spare engines’, NAA: A2671, 
84/1940. For training of maintenance crews and ferrying of Hudsons to squadrons: NAA: A1196, 1/501/317.
6 Hendrie, Lockheed Hudson in World War II, p.17.
7 Peter W. Brooks in C. H. Gibbs-Smith, Flight Through the Ages: A Complete Illustrated Chronology from the 
dreams of early history to the age of space exploration, Hart-Davis McGibbon, London, 1974, p.156.
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14, designed to improve braking safety and enhance speed when retracted in 
flight. As the manual for the Model 14 medium-range bomber supplied to the 
Australian authorities explained:
Trailing edge Fowler type wing flaps on the under surface of the 
Lockheed Model 14 wing are operated hydraulically and controlled 
by the pilot…The principal effect of these flaps is to increase the 
maximum lift coefficient without increasing the vertical sinking speed. 
The flaps also permit shorter take-offs with steeper climb after take-
off for clearance of obstacles. This increase in lift is not accompanied, 
as in the case of the split flap, with so large an increase in drag. This 
further facilitates their use for take-offs…it is possible to carry a much 
larger load for a given wing area than with the split type of flap. With 
present day low power loadings, take-off distance, not flight, becomes 
the critical factor governing wing loading.
Lockheed’s assurance: ‘the absence of any undesirable stalling 
characteristics’
(Flight, 15 June 1939) 
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The Lockheed engineers, Hall Hibbard and Kelly Johnson, had settled on a 
highly loaded wing of relatively small span and area to enable a faster cruising 
speed. The Fowler flaps were necessary to reduce the otherwise excessive 
approach and take-off speeds. Drag was increased to lower approach speed, and 
the wing area was augmented to assist take-off. 
The Hudson, with its fuselage constructed of 24ST Alclad aluminum alloy sheet, 
was still in some ways an unproven aeroplane. This could have been expected 
for a civil airliner that had been mocked up as a coastal reconnaissance bomber 
in five days in April 1938 to capture the imagination of a British Purchasing 
Mission. By the time Lockheed had completed the 250th Hudson in November 
1939 the company had more than doubled its staff, pioneered mass-production 
methods, and started apprenticeship and retraining programs for desperately 
needed aircraft engineers.8
As the aircraft was tested and brought into service, there had been accidents in 
America and in Britain whose causes were still being studied. The Lockheed 14 
was in service with several Norwegian, Dutch, Polish, and Swiss airlines. Japan’s 
GJAL owned some, as did Trans Canada Airlines. The company representative 
in Europe had given a ‘frank exposition’ to the leading aeronautical magazine 
of what was known about the early failures of the Lockheed 14. But doubts 
persisted about an aircraft that was ‘delicate to handle…stalls suddenly, at a 
rather high speed, and so ought only to be committed to the care of thoroughly 
competent pilots. It is not a machine for the careless or the ham fisted.’ There was 
talk of the RAF following the lead of British Airways and cutting slit-slots into 
the wing-tips in front of the ailerons to further improve control of the aircraft 
at below normal stalling speeds.9 It was not only Service pilots unfamiliar with 
its peculiarities who lost control. In a crash on a test flight near Birkenhead, 
Cheshire, late in July 1939, a Lockheed pilot, factory inspector, and mechanic 
who were employed at the assembly plant at Speke Airport, were killed.10
Lockheed’s own development work was ongoing. In due course Australian pilots 
like ‘Spud’ Spurgeon, flying in Singapore with No. 8 Squadron, were to discover 
that the aircraft ‘had about four-and-a-half hours’ range in it, I suppose, five if 
you squeezed it. The books used to say it had seven hours, but I think that must 
have been in the minds of the advertiser.’11 This was the performance with the 
Mark I aircraft with Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp engines. The first Mark III 
Hudsons with Wright Cyclone engines were no better. When Donald Bennett 
8 Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Horizons: The Lockheed Story, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1998, pp.88–105.
9 The Aeroplane, 4 Jan. 1939, pp.9–10; 12, 19 Oct. 1939; 11 Jan. 1940, p.32; 5 April 1940, p.418.
10 R. E. G Davies, A History of the World’s Airlines, Oxford UP, London, 1964, pp.120–1, 192, 212, 231; 
Flight, 3 Aug. 1939, p.112.
11 ACdre C. H. Spurgeon, interview, The Australians at War Film Archive, Dept of Veterans Affairs, Archive 
No. 0937. Strictly, Spurgeon was speaking of endurance (a measure of time) not range (a measure of distance).
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inaugurated the trans-Atlantic ferry service for the RAF, he was charged with 
testing the aircraft as well as selecting and preparing crews for long-range 
delivery flights. Bennett’s first trial flight, over five hours at the Lockheed plant 
in Burbank in mid-September 1940, indicated that the performance figures 
supplied by Lockheed were inaccurate. He was right.12
In May 1940 it had been acknowledged that in certain Hudsons the pilot’s 
compass was subject to ‘variable magnetic disturbance due to (a) control column 
(b) undercarriage’. Flight Lieutenant Geoff Hartnell, the navigation officer 
attached to the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, had reported on the 
problem. No-one was sure how many aircraft were affected. Pending further 
investigation, a confidential order was promulgated that the pilot’s compass was 
not to be relied on for navigation unless it had definitely been established that 
it was not adversely affected by either cause. By early July the undercarriage 
had been identified as the culprit, the major cause of the difference between the 
compass deviation on the ground and in the air. A new order on July 5 pointed 
out the obvious, that it was impracticable to swing the compass on the ground 
with the undercarriage retracted. Therefore, until further notice, all pilots’ 
compasses were to be swung in the air by bearings taken on the sun. The entry 
in both the airframe and compass logbooks had to be endorsed to that effect. 
Commanding officers were to make arrangements for instructional lectures on 
the required compass-swinging method.13 Bob Hitchcock’s logbook for July and 
August shows that this quickly became a priority. For someone whose father’s 
death was officially attributed to a faulty compass, this was hardly surprising.14
In the first few months of Hudson operational flying in Australia there had been 
a number of accidents. Mishandling of controls and a poor standard of night 
flying and instrument flying were diagnosed when Pilot Officer Val Morehouse of 
No. 1 Squadron lost height on take-off and struck a tree with A16-1’s port wing 
tip on May 13. Morehouse would have another mishap on July 17, overshooting 
on landing and damaging the undercarriage and bomb chamber of A16-1.15 
Two days later, A16-31 in No. 14 Squadron at Pearce was damaged in a landing 
accident and sent for conversion to components. According to the Directorate of 
12 Major R. H. Mayo, ‘Report on Technical Aspects of Scheme for Delivery of Aircraft by Air to Great 
Britain’, 8 Oct. 1940, PRO (now National Archives) AIR 38/1 XCB55K1; Alan Bramson, Master Airman: A 
Biography of Air Vice-Marshal Donald Bennett…’, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1985, p.40; Firkins, The Golden Eagles, 
pp.201–2. Seven hours maximum endurance was quoted when A16-32 failed to return from an exercise to 
seaward from East Sale in July 1943 (NAA: A9845, 134).
13 ‘CAS [Chief of Air Staff] — Navigation facilities Hudson Aircraft’, NAA: A705 9/19/144; ‘Compasses, 
Hudson Aircraft’, A.F.C.O. 54,67, and 72; instructions on compass swinging were issued on 29 Aug. 1940 
(NAA: A7674, 1/89,112,140–3). 
14 ‘The Committee consider that the primary cause of the tragedy was the inaccuracy of the compass 
through which Lieutenant Anderson lost his direction and bore to the north of his intended course.’ Report 
of Air Inquiry Committee in Connexion with the Flights of Aeroplanes “Southern Cross” and “Kookaburra”, 
March–April 1929, Victorian Govt Printer for Commonwealth Govt, p.12.
15 NAA: A9845, 134 Lockheed Hudson A16 [Accidents Part 1].
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Training the accident was caused by ‘inexperience on the type of aircraft’. On 
May 23, Flying Officer J. F. Murphy of No. 6 Squadron had crashed on take-off 
in Canberra and was disciplined for negligence in not removing early-morning 
hoar frost.16 A week later both engines failed in a Hudson from No. 2 Aircraft 
Depot and Flying Officer Lloyd Douglas landed the aircraft 15 miles north of 
Junee with its wheels up. Another Hudson, A16-58 of No. 6 Squadron, had 
stalled at 300 feet, crashed, and burned five miles north of Windsor on July 17, 
killing the pilot, Flight Lieutenant Jim Hamilton, and Cadet Wallace Stewart 
who was with him. Hamilton had 15 hours of dual instruction and eight hours 
solo. Squadron Leader Bertie Simms would tell a Coroner’s court two months 
later that the pilot would have needed another nine or 10 hours before being 
allowed to take a full crew into the air.17
Commenting on the unexplained accident in which Jim Hamilton was gaining 
solo practice, the Training Directorate urged: ‘Whenever possible, whilst a 
pilot is gaining experience as 1st pilot in Hudson aircraft during the early stages 
after a conversion course, an experienced Hudson pilot should be carried in the 
aircraft.’ As ‘Dad’ Bladin had minuted in a handwritten note to Jones: ‘There 
may be arguments against this but Hudsons are too valuable to take any chances 
with them these days.’18 Bladin may not have heard that Lockheed’s ‘Swede’ 
Parker had been showing his own prowess and the aircraft’s unadvertised 
aerobatic capability by doing rolls when no official eyes were on him. Or that 
the irrepressible Flight Lieutenant Brian ‘Black Jack’ Walker, who had survived 
critical injuries as a cadet when his Wapiti was totally wrecked in a 1935 crash 
at Echuca, was ignoring Parker’s warning that ‘this Hudson is strictly not 
aerobatic’.19
16 RNZAF tradesmen sent to Laverton to learn about the Hudson evidently were not told of the need 
to remove hoar frost; they worked it out for themselves after a failed take-off at Whenuapai in mid-1941 
(Geoffrey Ellis, Tool Box on the Wing: My Life in the Air Force, Mallinson Rendel, Wellington, 1983, pp.181–2).
17 Canberra Times, 3 Sept. 1940.
18 ‘Lockheed Hudson A16 [Accidents Part 1]’, NAA: A9845 134; ‘Flying Accidents Analysis of 1940’, NAA: 
A705, 32/10/2478; ‘Fatal Accident to A16-58…’, NAA: A705, 32/10/2602. For the fate of A16-31, see Vincent, 
The RAAF Hudson Story, Book One, p.297.
19 A. B. McFarlane, interview, 18 April 1978. Adelaide-born Brian Walker, aged 27 in 1940, ended the war 
as a Group Captain and became De Havilland’s chief test pilot in Australia. The American demonstration pilot 
had told him: ‘I’ve heard about you and your flying attitudes…’ (Canberra Times, 31 Oct. 1935; Brian Walker, 
Black Jack, Banner Books, Belconnen, 1994, pp.34–5).
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Inside the Hudson cockpit at Laverton 
(Photo by Frank Jefferies, courtesy of Paul and Helen Struc) 
The word was out that the Hudson was not without its perversities. Paddy 
Heffernan had been given a sobering surprise while under instruction from Alec 
Barlow in Canberra. Preparing to ‘land’ in cloud at 6000 feet, he was told at the 
last moment to go round. When power was applied the aircraft snap-rolled into 
an inverted dive.20 Val Hancock, then CO No. 1 Bombing and Gunnery School, 
also knew ‘that the Hudson had some unpredictable tendencies when the flaps 
were set for various configurations as I got this information in conversation 
with Flt./Lt. Simms who did the first conversion on the aircraft’. Bertie Simms, 
one of the RAAF hierarchy’s favourite pilots, had been sent to Burbank in April 
1939 for instruction. He had seen the efforts Lockheed were making to overcome 
the dangerous stalling proclivities of the first generation of Hudsons. If Simms, 
knowing of the modifications that had been made to the original model, 
commented on it, there was a reason to be cautious. At least one of those under 
his command in August 1940 would later testify that Simms was not a very 
good pilot, and those who were proficient Hudson pilots were not popular with 
20 ACdre P. G. Heffernan to CH, 7 April 1978; Heffernan, interview, 16 May 1993, quoted in ‘Douglas DC-3’s 
and No. 8 Squadron R.A.A.F.’, Man and Aerial Machines, no. 39. Nov–Dec 1993, p.90; Heffernan, ‘Singapore 
1940’, Stand-To, Jan–Feb. 1964, p.13. There are slight variations in the story as told at different times.
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him. Still, as a Squadron Leader in February and March 1940, with the ‘control 
and direction’ of the six teams at Richmond responsible for the first Hudson 
conversion courses, no one spoke with more authority.21
A16-97
Much of this Bob Hitchcock could not fail to know. He knew too that, with the 
exception of his second pilot, he had a seasoned crew. Notwithstanding the 
Hudson’s temperament there was no reason to suppose that the journey would 
be anything but uneventful. As he prepared to leave, Hitchcock discussed 
the weather with his CO: ‘he informed me that weather conditions were clear 
sky all the way’, Freddie Thomas remembered.22 The six additional parachutes 
taken aboard at Laverton were hardly likely to see service, even if any of the 
passengers knew how to use them.23 Before being handed over for operational 
duty, A16-97 had been flown without mishap for two hours and 35 minutes 
by the Lockheed test pilot. Whatever the aircraft’s challenges in the air, on the 
ground it had been thoroughly prepared for the flight. Received at 1 Aircraft 
Depot on 20 June 1940 along with eight others, A16-97 was allotted to No. 2 
Squadron on 2 August 1940.24 By then the squadron had 11 Hudsons, seven of 
them delivered within the last month.25
On the morning of August 13, a four-man team at Laverton had serviced A16-
97, carrying out what was officially known as a ‘tradesmen’s daily inspection’. 
The machine, which had been assigned to A Flight for the first time, had been 
given a major check the previous afternoon when it was known that it was to 
be used to carry the Air Minister and his companions. The work on Tuesday 
morning was done according to the Aircraft Maintenance Schedule for the 
Hudson-Wasp, S.C.3G. The schedule, issued on August 1, was meant to be 
used ‘in connection with unit maintenance orders, part II, in accordance with 
21 Air Marshal Sir Valston Hancock to CH, 7 April 1978; Deputy Director, Training (WCdr F. Scherger) 
to D[irector] O[rganisation] (through D[irector], T[raining]), 18 March 1940, NAA: A1196, 1/501/317; A. B. 
McFarlane, interview, 18 April 1978.
22 Service Court of Inquiry, 13 Aug. 1940, p.14, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729.
23 RAAF aircrew had been required to wear parachutes since 1927, happily for Sam Balmer who fell out of 
the Wapiti in which he was instructing a trainee in Aug. 1937 (Chris Clark, 90 Years of the RAAF: A Snapshot 
History, Airpower Development Centre, Canberra, 2011, p.50); and for F/Lt Sturt de Burgh Griffith and two 
companions, lost in cloud and out of fuel en route to Canberra from the coast, who had to bail out of their 
Anson just before midnight on 10 Jan. 1940 (No. 1 Squadron Operations Record Book, NAA: A9186 1; The 
Argus, 12 Jan. 1940).
24 Ron Cuskelly to CH, 15 July 1978; Air Force Court of Inquiry, report of His Honour Mr Justice Lowe, 
NAA: A705, 32/10/2729/19; Aircraft status card: Lockheed Hudson A16-97, NAA:  A10297, BLOCK 84/180.
25 No. 2 Squadron Operations Record Book, 1 Aug. 1940, NAA: A1980 599. The normal establishment 
would have been 18, with six in reserve. But because of ‘commitments entered into with the United Kingdom 
government’ squadrons were operating on reduced numbers. (‘Service Squadron Establishments’, A.F.C.O. 71, 
1 July 1940, NAA: A7674, 1/116).
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aeroplane maintenance instructions, RAAF publication No. 42’. Fitter Corporal 
James W. Davey assisted by two mechanics, Rigger AC1 Les Roffey (Corporal J. 
Morrow had been detailed the previous day), the electrician, W.O. Mechanic 
AC1 Graham Bardwell, and Instrument Maker Corporal Paul Dines all carried 
out their designated checks. Instruments, engines, propellers, flap mechanism 
and the flap indicator, petrol and oil, pressure gauges, hydraulics, gyro pilot ― 
all were in good order. The altimeter and rate-of-climb indicator were corrected. 
Wireless operator Corporal Jack Palmer looked over his own equipment, the 
AT5/AR8 radio installation. In flight, Palmer would be responsible for the 
electrical systems as well as the radio. In recent months he had spent a lot of 
time in the air and was at ease with the routine. As the aircraft was unarmed 
there was nothing for the Armourer AC1 Moore to do. The NCO in charge of A 
Flight, Flight Sergeant Fitter William S. McGowan (one of the first of the ground 
staff to be instructed by the Lockheed team at Richmond), signed off the work 
before Hitchcock did so at about 8.35 a.m. Like all pilots Bob Hitchcock had 
seen the homily from the Chief of the Air Staff promulgated two months earlier:
Aircraft maintenance, although primarily the duty of the fitters, riggers 
and technical non-commissioned officers, must also be a matter of 
deep concern to all pilots no matter whether they are serving as flying 
instructors or in operational units. The service now contains large 
numbers of new airmen whose experience is very limited, and these men 
must be assisted and encouraged to progress rapidly in their training. 
Routine inspections must be adhered to strictly, and it is to be the duty 
of all pilots to exercise general supervision over this work on the aircraft 
for which they are responsible. They must be required to spend as much 
time as possible with their aircraft so that they may be acquainted with 
the maintenance staff and with all work performed, do cockpit drill, 
study the petrol system, and generally take a keen interest in all matters 
relating to their safe and efficient performance.26
As Hitchcock’s logbook shows, he had been working closely with the team of 
Roffey, Davey, Morrow, Dines, Crosdale, and McGowan in the previous month. 
They had all been in the air with him on several occasions. Before the flight, 
Hitchcock had discussed with another pilot who had flown A16-97 (probably 
his No. 2 Squadron colleague Bill Heath) the trim of the aircraft in relation 
to the stowing of a load. He knew it was necessary to distribute the luggage 
carefully around the cabin. So far as fuel was concerned the ‘Daily Inspection 
Certificate’ showed that there was a full load of 536 gallons and 24 gallons of 
oil; the ‘responsible airman’ (JW) had confirmed this. At 2000 r.p.m., fuel usage 
was estimated at 73 gallons an hour. In its seven hours and 10 minutes’ flying 
26 I confess to having lost this reference, which was transcribed directly from a document in the National 
Archives.
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time A16-97 had been run at 1500 r.p.m.27 Hitchcock had also discussed with 
Jack Ryland which petrol tanks it was advisable to empty first, and the two rear 
tanks were suggested. With the load stowed correctly and the two rear petrol 
tanks emptied, he would be sure that the aircraft would be within its centre of 
gravity limits when it arrived for landing in Canberra.28
Coughing tentatively, as the starter prompted them, the Pratt & Whitney 
engines would soon settle to a steady rhythm, flaring to a deep roar as they were 
put through their full throttle tests. Hitchcock could expect 1050 hp on take-off 
and 900 hp in level flight at 12 000 feet/3660 metres. The Hudson would need 
some 650 yards for its take-off run. As late as 1938 a runway of 600 yards was 
the standard for civil aerodromes but by 1940 the standard for multi-engined 
aircraft had been extended to 1500 yards.29 ‘Until its wheels are up,’ David 
Campbell reminisced, a Hudson ‘seems to be pulled off the ground by sheer 
brute force. You can hear the horses straining. Then the wheels tuck themselves 
up in three slow jerks and the aircraft begins to fly.’30
Uplift at Essendon
It was a short hop from Laverton to Essendon where the passengers were to 
be collected. Hitchcock had been instructed to leave Laverton in time to 
depart with his passengers at 9.15 a.m. He took off at 8.47 a.m. As he came 
into Essendon aerodrome from the west around 13 minutes later, the air was 
filled with training aircraft of No. 3 Elementary Flying Training School. In the 
control tower, the CO of 3 EFTS, Squadron Leader Roy ‘Beau’ King DSO DFC, 
was watching the circuits and landings. King, a Great War ace was credited, 
somewhat generously, with 26 victories.31 An AFC 4th Squadron colleague of 
Harry Cobby and George Jones, he had seen everything in subsequent years as 
27 Aeroplane maintenance form, ‘Lockheed Hudson A16 Accidents Part 8 [Air Force Court of Inquiry ― 
Lockheed Hudson A16-97 crash on 13th August 1940] ― Master Copy [Volume 3]’, NAA: A9845, 320/48–9; 
‘Court of Inquiry…Exhibits’, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729 Attachment 1.
28 ‘Confidential: Informative Circular Relative to the Accident to Hudson A. 16-97 at Canberra on 13th 
August, 1940’, NAA: A705, 32/10/2733.
29 After five Hudson engine failures due to piston trouble in No. 3 Squadron in Nov. 1940, Pratt & Whitney’s 
expert adviser suggested that RAAF pilots were over boosting engines for take-off. Engines were averaging 
only 300 hours. It was not until December 1940 that the Director of Technical Services, noting that the makers’ 
advice had been followed, told his colleagues that Hudson engines had been running at wrong ratings — 
comparatively low revs and high boost — giving a weak mixture (Report of Staff Conference Nos 61, 62, 63, 
28 Nov., 3, 10 Dec. 1940, NAA: AA1977/635). For the novelty of the Hudson carburettors and superchargers, 
see Ellis, Tool Box on the Wing, p.179. For airport runway standards: Civil Aviation Department Annual Report 
1939–40 in Sydney Morning Herald, 27 Dec. 1940.
30 David Campbell, Flame and Shadow, UQP, St Lucia, 1976, p.165; for the recollections of Geoffrey Bartlett, 
one of the first RAF Hudson pilots: Hendrie, Seek and Strike, pp.27–33.
31 King’s record was four balloons, 13 aircraft destroyed and three shared, and six out of control (Christopher 
Shores, Norman Franks, and Russell Guest, Above the Trenches: A Complete Record of the Fighter Aces and 
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a pioneer flyer in the Northern Territory. Now he was doing his bit to be useful 
in preparing a new generation to fight. He asked the civil operator to put the red 
light on several of the training aircraft, indicating that they were to take another 
circuit to make way for the Hudson to land. One pupil did not see the signal 
and completed his landing. The Hudson, already turned into the wind with 
its undercarriage and flaps down, was at about 100 feet when it pulled up to 
make a second circuit. Hitchcock may have seen the obstruction on the ground. 
Or possibly received a ‘do not land’ light intended for another aircraft. King 
observed that the undercarriage was retracted and the flaps were pulled up as 
the motors were put on. To clear the way for the Hudson, two more elementary 
aircraft were given red lights by the Assistant Control Officer, J. J. Williams. The 
signals from the control tower reflected the delicate demarcation of authority 
between the civilian controller of a civil aerodrome and the RAAF users who 
shared it. Although the RAAF aircraft were not under civil control they would 
normally obey signals from the control tower and use the civil aeradio service.
‘Beau’ King had heard the Hudson’s engines as it came in a mile or so away at 
about 1000 feet. Evidently he was not expecting it. After making his second 
circuit, Hitchcock landed and taxied up to within 25 yards of the control tower, 
turned into the wind, and shut off the engines. It was 9.05 a.m. King thought 
the landing ‘a particularly good one’ and remarked on it to the control tower 
officer. Hitchcock went over to the tower and reported to King who, no doubt 
conscious of his own nine-inch height advantage, had come down the steps to 
meet him. Hitchcock began to apologise for interrupting the flying training, 
but King told him it was unnecessary to do so. What King wanted to know was 
what Hitchcock’s duty was. Hitchcock explained that he was to pick up ‘Federal 
Ministers and others’ to convey them to Canberra. King asked him if he knew 
who his passengers were. He did not but was ‘under the impression there were 
to be six’. King asked Hitchcock for the names of his crew.
Before Hitchcock could complete writing a list, his first passenger arrived. 
Sir Harry Gullett emerged from his chauffeur-driven car and joined the two 
officers. After a few minutes conversation, Hitchcock excused himself to report 
to the meteorologist’s office. Before he left Laverton he had received a summary 
weather report with a ‘route forecast’ from the duty pilot. But he was to collect 
at Essendon the more detailed ‘Aviation Meteorological Report’ that would 
give him the latest wind and cloud observations, visibility, and any necessary 
warnings. The forecast, based on a chart drawn up at 6.00 a.m., was:
Units of the British Empire Air Forces 1915–1920, Grub Street, London, 1990, pp.224–5); Christopher Shores 
and Mark Rolfe, British and Empire Aces of World War 1, Osprey Publishing, 2001, p.90, say 20 (three shared) 
for claims of aircraft and balloons ‘destroyed or captured’.
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Scattered to broken cloud — base 2000/3000 feet south of ranges. Broken 
to overcast on the ranges with snow. Icing risk in cloud above 3000 feet. 
Cloudless or scattered cloud north of ranges, with morning fog or low 
stratus in valleys.
They would fly via Benalla, Hotham (where dense fog was likely), Albury, 
Wagga, and Cootamundra. At Canberra as they came in to land they could 
expect a northwest wind at 20 miles an hour. Nothing to be concerned about, as 
the aerodrome Weather Officer, John Nance, told him.
Meanwhile, as Harry Gullett and his bag-carrying chauffeur headed for the 
aircraft, Squadron Leader King decided to assert himself. A little irritated 
perhaps by the lack of warning about the interruption to his morning routine 
and the vagueness about the Hudson’s passengers, King immediately instructed 
the duty pilot of the EFTS to get the names of the crew, ‘the passengers who 
actually got into the aircraft, its time of arrival, departure and destination’. Pilot 
Officer J. B. Wilson walked over to the aircraft and took details of the crew 
mingling with the Air Minister’s RAAF sergeant chauffeur and Gullett’s civilian 
chauffeur before asking Hitchcock for the names of the passengers and the flight 
plan. As A16-97 began manoeuvring for take-off, Wilson followed King back 
to the control tower. At 9.40 a.m., some 10 minutes after the aircraft left the 
ground, Wilson delivered the information his chief required. King thereupon 
telephoned Southern Area HQ to advise Wing Commander Lachal.32 Being 
the authority for the flight as SASO Southern Area HQ, Lachal was due for a 
polite remonstrance. Of the nine copies of the flying operation instruction form 
distributed from Laverton, none had been sent to Essendon.
When it left Laverton, the aircraft had four 50lb sandbags loaded as ballast. The 
sand was to compensate for the dorsal gun turret that had not yet been fitted 
to the Hudsons, and for the gunner and ammunition that the plane was also 
designed to carry. (It was illegal for the neutral United States to supply armed 
aircraft.)33 With six passengers joining at Essendon, the four sandbags were 
removed to ensure the correct centre of gravity was maintained.34 Although 
it was not his responsibility to identify the passengers, the tarmac officer I. 
Smith recognised four men among the crew and drivers: Sir Harry Gullett, Jim 
Fairbairn, Dick Elford, and Geoff Street. He noticed two others near the plane 
32 The sequence of events at Laverton and Essendon and in the air thereafter is reconstructed from 
documents and oral evidence tendered to the Air Court of Inquiry, NAA: A705 32/10/2729 and the Service 
Court.
33 For Menzies’ perturbation at the American Neutrality Proclamation cutting off Australian access to 
military aircraft and ‘civil aircraft for civil training’, see Menzies, Personal Cablegram to President Roosevelt, 
7 Sept. 1939, NAA: A1608, F 17/1/2.
34 Inspector of Aircraft Accidents, ‘Report on Accident to Lockheed Hudson Aircraft A16-97’, 16 Aug. 
1940, (Most Secret), para. 5, NAA: A705 32/10/2733.
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but did not see them get aboard. One, he thought, was a colonel in uniform.35 
Having got all of the passengers seated, Hitchcock started the engines. The last 
man into the aircraft was Fairbairn, who had been in conversation with King 
about the Empire Air Training Scheme before excusing himself as he was in a 
hurry.36 Assistant Control Officer Williams noticed that it took two minutes for 
the starboard engine to start. Then the aircraft taxied to the east boundary of 
the aerodrome where it remained out of wind for about 10 minutes. Turning into 
wind, the aircraft paused, Williams thought, for about four minutes.
Taking seriously his obligation to instruct his neophyte second pilot, now 
would have been a sensible time for Hitchcock to give Wiesener another run-
down on the instruments, draw his attention to the need to ensure that weight 
was properly distributed when there was a full load of passengers, and remind 
him of the effect of the flaps. Perhaps too the Minister for Air might ease himself 
forward to get a good look at the cockpit and listen to the briefing. From the 
control tower, A16-97 was seen to take off perfectly at around 9.30 a.m., make 
a left-hand circuit, and head for Canberra. Thirteen minutes later, Jack Palmer 
signalled Essendon confirming that VMZAY ― to give it the civil call sign it had 
been allotted ― had ‘left Essendon at 0930’.37 Palmer knew from the ‘Flying 
Operation Instruction’ issued on August 9 that he was to make scheduled calls 
at 10 and 40 minutes past the hour. The Essendon aeradio station confirmed 
‘OK schedules 10 and 40’. At 10.12 a.m. Essendon was told that VMZAY was 
communicating with Canberra. The secondary aeradio station at Holbrook 
noted that Canberra was the next ‘schedule’. Palmer signalled Holbrook ‘QTR’, 
meaning ‘What is the time?’ and was told it was ‘1014½’.38 At 10.41 a.m. he 
sent ‘QRK? QRU’ (‘How are you receiving? I have nothing for you.’). Three 
minutes later he repeated ‘QRU’ and received ‘QRU’ in return. The aircraft and 
the Canberra station had nothing to tell each other. It was an uneventful flight.
‘The modern technique’
Having spent much of the last few months teaching others to fly Hudsons, Bob 
Hitchcock was well equipped to guide his second pilot through a safe approach 
and landing. Dick Wiesener would have been familiar with the RAAF’s latest 
35 Director General of Civil Aviation to Secretary, Attorney General’s Dept, teleprinter message, 23 Aug. 
1940, NAA: MO625 CP169/4 (Crown Solicitor’s Office Inquest file which appears to be NAA: A6079 MO625).
36 Tink, Air Disaster, p.213, asks: ‘Why was the air minister in a hurry? Was it to get a pre-flight briefing from 
Hitchcock?’ That was likely, although the most obvious reason was that everyone else was on board, waiting to go.
37 The DG Civil Aviation advised Sec. AG’s Dept that A16-97 took off at ‘0923’ (ibid.).
38 Palmer’s querying of the time has led to unfounded speculation that some sort of record attempt was being 
made (R. A. Fisher [Air Force Office, Dept of Defence] minute, 20 July 1990, courtesy Bronwyn and John Myrtle).
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thinking promulgated in an Air Board Order just as he was completing his initial 
training. In a preamble, the Board explained why it was essential to issue fresh 
guidance on flying instruction:
The introduction of modern high wing-loaded, flapped monoplanes has 
rendered the old accepted methods of approaching and landing both 
difficult and unnecessary. Steep gliding turns with engine throttled 
back at low altitudes in the modern high wing-loaded monoplanes are 
necessarily difficult with more than a little danger involved in their 
performance, due to the rapid increase of the wing-loading to danger 
point resulting from a change of direction of the aircraft at comparatively 
low speeds.
For flyers of Jim Fairbairn’s vintage, this amounted to a warning that they would 
have to discard the habits of a lifetime if they were to fly the RAAF’s modern 
aircraft. The Air Board Order had set out the requirements for instructing pupils 
in ‘the modern technique’ at all stages of training. A normal powered approach 
or engine-assisted approach entailed a descent across wind from approximately 
1000 feet to about 500 feet at a moderate angle, followed by a turn into wind 
and a straight descent at the same ‘moderate’ angle. In the vicinity of the 
aerodrome, air speed should not exceed 120 m.p.h. (the precise speed to depend 
on the actual aircraft type being flown). Noting the direction of the circuit and 
the wind, the pilot should then fly around the aerodrome in a wide circuit at 
approximately 1000 feet, keeping ‘a sharp look-out for other aircraft’. Turning 
across wind when to leeward, the best landing path could be chosen.
All this was second nature to Hitchcock. He could probably recite how to start 
a normal approach:
Throttle back, lower the flaps, and assume the correct approach speed. 
Trim the aeroplane for landing. Keep the throttle open sufficiently to 
achieve a moderate angle approach. When almost opposite the selected 
landing path, turn gently into wind and continue the approach at the 
same moderate angle. The approach should be arranged so that this turn 
is made at approximately 500 feet.
Hitchcock could talk those he was converting to the Hudson through the next 
stage. Much of it would sound simple and familiar to any pilot:
Maintaining the correct air speed with the elevators, regulate the angle 
of approach and the rate of descent with the throttle. If overshooting, 
throttle back. If under-shooting, open the throttle. During the approach 
towards the aerodrome, correct any drift and look well ahead and to 
each side.
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Having reached about 20 feet, the control column would be moved back until the 
aircraft was flying just above the ground. As the throttle was gradually closed, 
the control column would be moved further back to prevent the aeroplane 
sinking until it was in the landing attitude when, all being well, ‘it will sink 
gently to the ground’.
This was fairly conventional advice. It was the effect of the flaps that needed 
special attention. When they were lowered, there ‘may be’ a large change of 
attitude. A steep nose-down attitude might be necessary to maintain an adequate 
approach speed to overcome the additional drag of the flaps. ‘Fortunately,’ the 
novice was assured, ‘the aeroplane tends to assume a nose-down attitude of its 
own accord immediately the flaps are lowered and no attempt must be made to 
hold the nose up.’
What then was the likely trouble? A steep attitude would result in a greater 
angle through which the aeroplane must be moved before the landing. The angle 
could, ‘if practicable’, be lessened by increased use of the engine. But owing to 
the drag of the flaps, a decrease in the steepness of the attitude would result in a 
loss of flying speed. ‘Since the lowering of the flaps increases the lift co-efficient 
of a wing, any reduction of the flap angle during an approach may result in the 
stalling speed being increased above the approach speed, and therefore the flaps 
must not be raised during the descent.’39
As Canberra came into sight it was time to keep these cautions in mind. Below, 
east of the airport, were low, sparsely timbered hills, strewn with rocks and 
dotted with dead trees, stumps, and decaying logs where the ground had been 
cleared. As observant journalists described it, the hills ― all of them a little 
over 2100 feet high ― were scarred by deep gutters etched by cascading rain. 
That same rain, if it were heavy or persistent, could render the clay surface of 
the Canberra airfield hazardous for heavy aircraft. This morning the sky was 
clear, and a medium westerly wind caressed a spur of the range bordering the 
aerodrome. ‘Watchers on the aerodrome saw the plane approach shortly before 
11 a.m.,’ the Sydney Morning Herald reported, ‘make the usual circuit and come 
in to land’:
It appeared as though the pilot had misjudged his height and decided 
not to land. The machine was trimmed for landing with the wheels 
lowered in position and the flaps down. The machine gained height and 
commenced a second circuit.
The hills on the western side of the aerodrome were known to possibly give a 
false horizon on the instrument panel. Hitchcock might have felt it necessary 
39 Air Board Order N.196, ‘Flying Instruction — Approaching and Landing’, 26 April 1940, NAA: AA 
1977/635. I have followed the wording of the order closely in this summary.
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to go round again. Or perhaps he was just taking the opportunity to show his 
second pilot or the Air Minister some of the aircraft’s characteristics. From the 
ground near Queanbeyan, Hudson A16-97 was seen to begin another circuit, 
lower and slower, it seemed, than was customary. What at first looked merely 
unusual was about to be catastrophic.
385
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Camouflaged though it was with aluminium-doped under-surfaces and regulation 
RAF dark earth-and-foliage green on the upper surfaces, the Hudson was easily 
seen by scores of people going about their business in Canberra, Queanbeyan, 
and the surrounding countryside.1 One of the first to catch sight of it was 
Corporal Mortimer G. Ewing, an RAAF fitter with 2A Survey Flight, who heard 
the motors at about 10.40, he said, and went outside the Officer Commanding’s 
former office at the aerodrome to see where it was coming from. He could see 
the aircraft arriving from the southeast at about 6000 feet. Moments later, Pilot 
Officer Raymond Winter, duty officer of the Survey Flight, saw the aircraft turn 
left — through approximately 110 degrees to port, he would tell a Service Court 
of Inquiry two days later — and complete a full circuit of the aerodrome, losing 
height gradually before continuing in another circuit.
Winter was an experienced civil pilot who had completed an RAAF flying 
course in May. Two weeks earlier he had successfully landed a twin-engined 
Wackett Gannet (A14-6), steering by motors after losing rudder control at 9000 
feet and ordering his accompanying photographer to bail out.2 When asked by 
RAAF investigators about his observation of A16-97, Winter said he thought 
the pilot of the Hudson displayed above-average airmanship as he executed the 
circuits. Standing on the control tower veranda, Winter could see the machine 
turn into the wind about 500 feet above the hills and continue in ‘an apparently 
normal approach’ with undercarriage down. Having gathered his message pad 
to write out the message that the Hudson had arrived, he watched as the aircraft 
approached from the east then turned about 100 degrees to the left, losing 
height rapidly before disappearing behind the hills. The left wing appeared to 
be dropping: ‘the aircraft flicked down and the port wing continued to drop 
at an angle of 45 degrees’. The nose, he was sure, when asked later, had not 
dropped; nor had it gone up.3
A less authoritative observer, Flight Sergeant Clifford Linton Smith, a 
storekeeper, had been standing at the permanent site of the ‘new’ aerodrome 
where hangars being erected for the RAAF were almost complete. Smith saw 
the aircraft approaching from the south, but took no more notice as it did a 
left-hand circuit until it was flying in an easterly direction ‘from where I was 
standing’. He had noticed that the landing gear was down but it did not seem as 
though the plane was likely to land. AC1 Henry House, a mess steward at No. 2 
1 Geoffrey Pentland, Aircraft and Markings of the R.A.A.F. 1939–1945, Lansdown Press, Melbourne, 1970, 
pp.44–5; Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story Book One, p.388.
2 NAA: A705, 32/10/2696.
3 NAA: A705, 32/10/2729.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
386
School of Technical Training, near the Kingston railway station some three miles 
southwest of the aerodrome, was sitting on the doorstep of the officers’ quarters 
at the school when he heard the aeroplane. He saw it, ‘very high’, heading in a 
northerly direction: ‘The engines were throttled back over the ’drome. It made a 
complete circuit of the ’drome and came back heading south. I did not see much 
because I was cleaning my shoes.’
Flying Officer Ronald Campbell Wilson, the 31-year-old station equipment 
officer, was walking towards his tent from the ante-room of the Officers’ Mess 
when he heard the noise of aircraft engines. Looking up, he too saw a Hudson 
about a mile south of the aerodrome going down wind in an easterly direction at 
the ‘usual height he had seen Lockheeds preparatory to landing’. He watched it 
for a moment or so, he told the Service Court of Inquiry on August 15. He was 
certain at the time that he noticed that ‘the machine wobbled but immediately 
became, what appeared to me, normal again’. A fortnight later, having looked 
at other Hudsons approaching in an almost identical fashion, he thought that 
‘it might have been a trick of the sun’. Wilson was called, and the call took his 
attention away from the aircraft.
‘Is he doing aerobatics?’
At Parliament House, watching from a window in the office of the Minister for 
the Army, the minister’s staff also saw the aircraft in the eastern sky. Later that 
day someone remembered Geoff Street’s private secretary, Percy ‘Pip’ Hayter, 
saying ‘The Brigadier will soon be here.’ The plane circled and disappeared from 
sight.4 At 10.49, wireless operator Jack Palmer sent the signal ‘QAL’ — ‘I am 
landing.’ ‘Ground wind west 10 to 15’, was the response from Leonard de Leuil, 
the wireless operator at Canberra aerodrome. The message was repeated. Then, 
with a hint of concern that there was no acknowledgement, de Leuil asked: ‘Did 
you want wind?’ Half a minute later VMZAY responded but the signal was in 
de Leuil’s words, ‘jammed out’. De Leuil tried again at 10.50: ‘Did you get the 
wind OK?’5
Elsewhere, at Canberra aerodrome most civilian workers, and airmen like Flight 
Sergeant Smith, were paying little heed to the sound of another incoming 
aircraft. The RAAF’s No. 8 Squadron had been established at Canberra in 
August 1939. A year later, plans to transfer the aerodrome from civil to military 
4 The Herald, 13 Aug. 1940.
5 Feature articles by ill-informed writers 30 or 40 years later sometimes assumed that radio contact was 
actually by voice. ‘The pilot’s voice was almost blasé as he reported “I am landing,”’ (The Observer [Gladstone], 
21 Dec. 1972).
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control had yet to come into force.6 An RAAF station had been opened formally 
at the beginning of April 1940 under the temporary command of Squadron 
Leader Paddy Heffernan. But for the first few months the Air Force had to make 
do with an orderly room in the civil aerodrome administrative building. The 
protracted coal strike and consequent shortage of steel meant that buildings and 
hangars took longer to finish. Airmen and junior officers required to sleep on 
the base were accommodated in tents. The Chief of the Air Staff had personally 
intervened to order the provision of five blankets per man, covering the issue 
with a medical certificate to the effect that it was essential.
A civilian, Sydney Rhodes, was the senior attendant in charge of the aerodrome. 
It was customary for him to watch approaching aircraft and to have the only 
‘crash equipment truck ready for any emergency’. Rhodes was standing 
outside the original hangar — a large structure, diagonally opposite the RAAF 
hangars, completed in 1936 — and watching the Hudson approach now from 
the northwest; it was about 10 miles away, he thought, at 3000 feet or 4800 
feet above sea level. Asked 13 days later by counsel assisting the Coroner if 
he was competent to judge the height of the aircraft, Rhodes said he had been 
connected with flying for some time. ‘We sometimes have competitions at the 
aerodrome to gauge the height of planes.’7 To lend further authority to his 
testimony, he prefaced his evidence by stating that his employer was ‘Mr C. 
S. Daley’, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Interior, the most senior 
Canberra administrator and colleague of the Coroner on the Federal Capital 
Territory Advisory Council. Fortunately, he had nothing to lose; he may have 
been unaware that the Coroner blamed Charles Daley for a severe professional 
humiliation earlier in their careers.8
On August 14 Rhodes described what he had seen to Commonwealth Police 
Sergeant Ivan Perriman of the Acton Police Station:
The plane made one complete circle of the aerodrome, and the half-circle 
which brought the plane from a south-easterly direction preparatory to 
landing into a north-westerly breeze. I saw the plane approaching the 
hill closest to the drome, and it appeared to me to have then lost unusual 
height for landing, but I thought it would clear the hill. The next thing 
I saw was the plane appearing to make what I thought was a right hand 
turn. It then disappeared from my view behind the hill.
6 T. H. Cooke, ‘Aviation’, Canberra’s Engineering Heritage, Canberra Division. The Institution of Engineers, 
(2nd ed.), 1990, Ch. 11; Ginette Snow, Canberra Airport:A Pictorial History, Capital Airport Group, 2009, 
pp.7–12; ‘Report of [CAS] Staff Conference No. 32…30th April, 1940’, NAA: AA1977 635.
7 Sydney Morning Herald, 27 Aug. 1940.
8 Charles Daley (ed. Shirley Purchase), As I Recall: Reminiscences of Early Canberra, Mulini Press in 
assoc. with Canberra & District Historical Society, Cook ACT, 1994, pp.124–5. Rhodes became a stipendiary 
magistrate, president of the Trades & Labour Council, and Labor candidate for the ACT in 1949.
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Pilot Officer Winter, seeing the Hudson again, had noticed its left wing down for 
a second or two. The aircraft appeared to be straightening for approach when the 
left wing dropped, rapidly at first and then more slowly until it reached an angle 
of 45 degrees before he lost sight of it. Winter observed that the undercarriage 
was down but could not say if the flaps were down — he would say later that 
from that distance it would be hard to judge if the flaps were down. Sydney 
Rhodes was sure they were not. But Corporal Ewing, recalling the aircraft as 
he saw it about two-thirds of the way around its second circuit with its engines 
running normally and wheels coming down, thought he remembered seeing the 
flaps down. At that time the Hudson was about 500 feet above ground, by his 
estimate, 200 feet above the hill. Winter had by then gone inside to get a pad to 
write out the routine arrival message.
About a mile and a half from Queanbeyan on a high point of the road some 
300 yards east of the railway station, with a clear view of the Sutton Valley and 
surrounding hills, F. A. Tetley, a garage proprietor, and his assistant, Lawrence 
O’Brien, were pushing a truck into the garage when they heard aircraft engines.9 
A few hours later, they told journalists that they looked up and were struck 
with how low the aircraft appeared to be. ‘Ah boss,’ Fred Tetley’s assistant said, 
‘look at this fellow — he’s stunting low.’ They watched as it flew on north of 
them towards the hills across the Sutton Valley about two miles away. O’Brien 
estimated that it turned about 200 degrees before it ‘slipped sideways to the 
right’ while at the same time the left wing went down. ‘Young’ O’Brien, as The 
Examiner called him on August 14, was under the impression that the aircraft 
had just taken off and was circling to gain height. It appeared to be making a 
circuit to the left when ‘the left wing dipped suddenly and the machine dropped 
height rapidly’. It dropped nose first into a stall, making two ‘corkscrew-like 
spirals’. The two men gazed in horror as the machine went into the ground 
among trees. They heard no noise but saw it at once burst into flame. As a 
column of black smoke then began to rise — it went to 100 feet, they thought — 
Tetley telephoned the Queanbeyan police and gave them directions to the site.
Meanwhile, mess steward Henry House, his shoe cleaning completed, had 
looked up again and saw the plane heading north, ‘just a little over the height 
of the hills from where I was, almost directly in front of me’. House would say 
later that he thought ‘it was too low if it were going to land’. He noticed the 
aircraft nose dip ‘and it gave a couple of spins’ before passing from his view. 
James Mathews, leading cook at the Royal Australian Navy’s Harman Naval 
Wireless Station, was looking out of his window to the east when he saw ‘a 
large aeroplane falling straight to the ground’.10 Speaking to Senior Constable R. 
9 In at least one account they were pushing a car out of the garage.
10 Unless otherwise indicated the eye-witness accounts are derived from statements to the Commonwealth 
Police (NAA: A1378, P8903) and subsequent testimony to the Coronial Inquest, the Service Court of Inquiry, 
or the Air Court of Inquiry.
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S. Brodribb the next day, he estimated that he was some three or four miles from 
the crash site. He had not seen the aircraft before he noticed it falling. He could 
not hear its engines; but he saw it burst into flames. There had been no smoke or 
flames visible before the impact. Closer to the scene than Mathews were Dudley 
Lalor, a carpenter by trade and Canberra manager of Victorian construction 
contractors, J. L. Simmie & Co., and his foreman plasterer, Jack Tilyard. The 
Simmie company was working on erecting the hangars at the aerodrome as 
well as on the construction of the Australian War Memorial, having completed 
several important Canberra projects including the Albert Hall and Manuka’s 
Capitol Theatre.11 Lalor and Tilyard were driving to the aerodrome from a job 
in Queanbeyan. As they came down the hill approaching the bridge crossing 
the Molonglo River on the Sutton Road — not the main Canberra–Queanbeyan 
road — they noticed the aircraft about three-quarters of a mile ahead. It flew 
easterly across the Canberra–Queanbeyan road about a mile and a quarter from 
the aerodrome. They could see that the wheels were down but could not hear 
the engines. They said the aircraft turned to the left ‘at a steep angle and went 
into a spiral dive’. The Age ‘special representative’ reported next day that ‘Mr 
Lalor involuntarily shouted a warning’. ‘I pulled up the car with a jerk,’ he 
told other journalists, ‘and yelled, “Look Tilyard! He’ll never make it.” Tilyard 
replied, “My God, no. He’s got no chance.”’12
Speaking to Sergeant Perriman on August 14 Lalor described the plane hitting 
the ground ‘as though it were landing’. Thinking about it a day later, Lalor 
reiterated that he saw the machine turning left in a northerly direction and 
the left wing dropping. The aircraft then turned completely over, he said, in a 
rolling movement with the nose down. The aircraft was at an angle of about 45 
degrees when it hit the ground. That was how he remembered it 13 days later 
for the Coroner. Launceston and Perth readers had seen a more graphic account 
in The Examiner and the Western Mail on August 14:
The whole ghastly business happened right before my eyes. A few feet 
from the ground the plane appeared to pull slightly out of the stall and, 
instead of nosing into the ground, it struck at a shallow angle. The 
machine caught fire immediately, but Mr Lalor was emphatic that there 
was no explosion.
As Lalor and Tilyard ran up the hill across the paddock to see if they could help 
‘there was a sudden burst of intense flame, and a dull explosion was apparent 
from one of the petrol tanks’. By then, RAAF men who had passed them in a 
‘lorry’ were at the scene. Lalor got as close as he could to the plane but the 
11 Simmie & Co. were about to discover that they had been operating in Canberra without fulfilling the 
registration requirements as a ‘foreign company’ and were liable to a fine of £5 a day since October 1935. After 
apologies, no fine was imposed (NAA: A432, 1940/651).
12 The Examiner, The Western Mail, The Age, 14 Aug. 1940.
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servicemen declined his offer of assistance; and he and Tilyard were soon 
ushered behind a cordon of NCOs and lower ranks that Corporal Ewing and 
Flight Sergeant Smith, under Flying Officer Wilson’s orders, had established 150 
yards away from the burning wreckage.
Unbeknown to the Simmie managers, one of their employees had a different 
vantage point. A young bricklayer, Bob McJannett, working on the hangar roof 
at the aerodrome, would recall 67 years later:
I always liken it to a leaf falling off a tree…
I think there was a wee bit of pilot error inasmuch as he possibly 
misjudged the speed of the wind for a start and then he banked too 
sharply which meant that he had more wind force up against him when 
he put the nose [down]…He actually didn’t get right around. He got 
about halfway round you see, that’s when the wind hit him…it just sort 
of spiralled down.
McJannett had the same reaction as Lawrence O’Brien: ‘I said to myself what a 
stupid height to be stunting. And it was only when he disappeared I thought 
God, he’s crashing and next thing this huge big cloud of black smoke came up.’13
John Power, a railway goods clerk, was standing at the door of the office at 
Queanbeyan railway station when he saw the Hudson flying from Canberra 
‘fairly low in a normal fashion’. There was nothing about it to hold his attention, 
he told the Service Court on August 15. The engines sounded normal. It turned 
west towards the aerodrome just as he moved inside to answer the telephone. D. 
R. Vest, 42-year-old managing agent of the Texas Oil Company, was at the goods 
shed at the station. He told the Coroner that he saw the plane heading towards 
‘heavily timbered country’ on course for the aerodrome. Then, he thought, it 
made two turns to the left, apparently getting into trouble on the second turn. 
Earlier he had told newspaper reporters and the Service Court that there was 
a large piece of cleared ground between the plane and Queanbeyan; and he 
thought the pilot was making for this ground for a forced landing. But before 
getting there the pilot suddenly took a turn to the left. He seemed to lose control. 
‘The wing dipped first to the right and then to the left and the whole plane zig-
zagged until it hit the ground in a pancake landing. It struck the ground heavily 
and immediately afterwards burst into flames.’14 In a signed statement for the 
Coroner Vest said: ‘I did see it hit the ground.’
Darcy Vest, like several of the eye-witnesses, would have to tell his story at 
least three times over the next two weeks as the Coroner, the RAAF, and the 
13 McJannett interview with Philip Williams, Stateline Canberra, ABC Canberra, 29 June 2007, http://www.
abc.net.au/stateline/act/content/2006/s1967294.htm, transcript accessed 20 Nov. 2010.
14 Canberra Times, 27 Aug. 1940; Vest statement 26 Aug.1940, Coronial Inquiry, NAA: A432, 1940/764.
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government all urgently mounted inquiries. Speaking to the Service Court of 
Inquiry, he said that when he saw the aircraft it was about a mile and a half from 
the aerodrome and 400 to 500 feet up. He visualised that if it continued it would 
crash into the thickly timbered hill between it and the aerodrome. Interviewed 
by reporters only hours after the crash, Vest had given a more detailed narrative 
of what he saw and heard:
I heard the motors running perfectly, and watched the machine for about 
a mile as it glided over the hills 400 or 500 feet up and heading for the 
aerodrome…when I first saw the machine it was under perfect control, 
and the motors were running. The pilot throttled them back, and just 
after he did I noticed that although still gliding stably the aeroplane was 
losing height much more rapidly than is usual when machines approach 
the landing ground from that quarter. As I watched, I realised that 
although still headed for the aerodrome the machine would not clear 
the last of the hills in its path if it continued its quick descent. The 
pilot must have realised this simultaneously. To his left, on the timbered 
hillside, there was a big bare patch of ground.
Suddenly, as the machine continued to sink rapidly, it made a quarter-
turn to the left, flying towards me and still dropping steadily. It made 
another quarter-turn to the left, and seemed to head for the bare patch.
Vest kept the aircraft in view and, as the turn was completed, ‘it seemed to 
waver and wobble, when the nose fell and the machine drove in a corkscrew 
spiral into the ground, striking it’, one journalist quoted him as saying, ‘almost 
vertically’. That was one version.15 To RAAF officers convened on August 15, 
Vest was recorded as testifying: ‘The plane did not then dive spirally into the 
ground but went in on a more or less flat turn. The plane hit the ground at 
an angle of 30 to 40 degrees.’ A few minutes later he spoke of a ‘spiral dive to 
the ground’. In fact, Vest had lost sight of the aircraft before it hit the ground 
though he saw immediately afterwards ‘a bright flame flash above the hilltops 
and then dense clouds of smoke billowed up from the wreck’.16 Vest had seen 
enough to know that urgent action was necessary if there was to be any hope 
for whoever was in the aircraft. John Power ‘heard Mr Vest call out something 
about the plane’. Vest went inside the goods shed office and asked the clerk to 
ring the aerodrome, ambulance, and fire brigade. Some seconds later, with a 
small group congregated on the railway platform staring at the dense column 
of black smoke, Vest heard ‘a loud report’. The same ‘explosion…much fiercer’ 
than the first noise he noted, was heard as far away as Harman naval base by 
15 The Daily Telegraph report (14 Aug. 1940), in nearly identical words, does not include the phrase ‘almost 
vertically’.
16 The Mercury, 14 Aug. 1940.
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James Mathews. Vest did not immediately go out to the site although he would 
tell Queanbeyan Police Constable Harold Sheldrick later in the day that when 
the plane hit the ground it stopped where it crashed.17
Much closer to the aircraft, as it did a left turn northwards towards the 
aerodrome, was 55-year-old Harry Southwell. Working in his pioneer family’s 
Queanbeyan market garden within view of the aerodrome, Southwell saw the 
left wing drop ‘and the aircraft appeared to roll over on to its back and the 
nose went down’. He lost sight of it as it dived towards the ground about three-
quarters of a mile away. ‘Instantaneously there was a loud explosion and a sheet 
of flame went up.’ ‘Did the engines of the aircraft appear to you to be functioning 
normally?’ he was asked soon afterwards at the Service Court. ‘Yes up to the 
time the aircraft rolled over, then as the nose went down the engines appeared 
to roar.’ Dairy farmer Hilton Clothier, out in a paddock fencing with his 16-year-
old son Geoffrey, looked up to see an aircraft coming from the west. Clothier’s 
observation from his Queanbeyan River property ‘Hazelbrook’ on the Oaks 
estate was similar to Southwell’s. He watched the plane flying east about two 
miles away until it came at about 800 feet to within 800 yards of where he was. 
As it reached ‘the junction of the Queanbeyan, Yass, and Queanbeyan Sutton 
road’ it turned to the north covering a radius of about a mile. Clothier noted that 
as the plane lost height, the left wing dipped to an angle of 45 degrees. Then, he 
thought, it seemed to right itself and go about 30 degrees the other way. There 
was a fairly stiff westerly breeze blowing, he told the Service Court, and ‘just at 
that point I heard the noise of an engine crackle as though it was trying to pick 
up. Simultaneously the nose went down and then I saw the plane dive towards 
the ground.’ Correcting himself Clothier went on:
It was not really a dive but it was a sort of skid with the nose down and 
half slipping around to the left at the same time…
It went from my view behind a clump of trees. When the crackle started 
as those engines were trying to pick up I saw flames coming from the 
right wing.18
Clothier alone reported seeing flames while the plane was in the air. Two other 
witnesses, John Castle and his 10-year-old son, saw the final seconds. Castle, a 
Sydney real estate agent and auctioneer, had been driving close to Queanbeyan 
and was about to return to Sydney. In the next day’s Daily Telegraph, alongside 
photographs of ‘Mr John Castle’ and ‘John Castle Jr’, their story was prominent:
17 NAA: A1378, P8903.
18 Hilton Clothier had been a wool classer with New Zealand Loan and Mercantile, then a wool and skin 
buyer, before starting a five-pen dairy after bankruptcy in 1937 (Karen Williams, Oaks Estate: No Man’s Land, 
1997, p.151). I am grateful to Raphael Clothier, Hilton Clothier’s eldest son, and Max Hill, who as a youth on 
his father’s commercial vegetable garden saw A16-97 making a circuit over the aerodrome, for information 
about the Clothier family and Harry Southwell (telephone interviews, 5 Feb., 21 Jan. 2011).
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The plane was pulled out of three slips before it made a final half-roll 
and crashed.
John asked, ‘Is he doing aerobatics?’ and I replied, ‘No, he’s too low; 
he’s in trouble.’
The big plane slipped to one side, and the pilot pulled it out — only to 
slip to the other.
That happened three times, and it then did a half-roll.
John called out, ‘Look you can see the cabin windows,’ as it did.
It slid from sight just behind the low hills in front of us, and there was 
an immediate sheet of flame.
It must have been an inferno. Black smoke followed when the flames got 
to the oil tanks.
It was no use my rushing to it. Nobody could have lived in that flame.
What impressed me were the desperate attempts the pilot made to get 
out of trouble.
He was like a car driver trying to pull a car out of a bad skid.
The race to the site
When the aircraft disappeared from the sight of those at the aerodrome and 
billowing dark smoke appeared, Flying Officer Winter asked Flying Officer 
Stanley Willmott, a special-duties officer, to get in touch with the Air Board. 
Winter ordered the despatch of the fire tender and ambulance and two crash 
parties before following in an official car. Flight Sergeant Smith went out to 
the ‘main Air Force road and procured a tender’, the station’s crash-emergency 
vehicle that was passing, and set off for the site. He would reach the burning 
wreckage — about one and three-quarter miles southeast from the landing 
ground — in about five or six minutes, a few seconds after the RAAF ambulance.
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The crash location marked for the Coroner on a ‘Federal Territory feature 
map’ published by the Department of Home Affairs
(Courtesy of the ACT Coroner’s Office)
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Flying Officer Ronald Wilson heard somebody cry ‘Ambulance, fire tender, the 
Lockheed has nosed in.’ Wilson rushed over and jumped into the ambulance 
with Sergeant W. H. Galvin, the medical orderly sergeant, who had gathered his 
first-aid kit and already started the engine. Galvin drove along the Queanbeyan 
road and turned into a paddock to get closer to the aircraft which had come 
down in Duncan Cameron’s ‘Dundee’, an 888-acre hilly grazing property about 
two miles north of Queanbeyan on the ACT border.19
The RAAF rescuers had to proceed on foot, running through the scrubbed 
hillside paddocks, dotted with stumps, to reach the smoking wreckage. Winter 
got there ‘immediately after the fire ambulance and ahead of the crash party’ he 
had despatched. Just ahead of him, Wilson claimed to be the first man on the 
scene, noting that his time of arrival was three minutes past eleven (he checked 
his watch with ‘wireless time’ at 1.00 p.m.). Wilson would tell the ACT Coroner 
13 days later:
When I arrived the machine was on fire. One part far more than the 
other. The fuselage had practically finished burning. The starboard 
wing was only just burning. It was burning very quietly. It wasn’t a big 
blaze at all. The tail fin and rudder were not burning. The port wing and 
the nose were burning very fiercely.
The aircraft, evidently coaxed into a trajectory of 40 to 45 degrees for a crash 
landing, had come to a sudden halt on impact with a log — described in some 
reports as a stunted tree — some two and a half feet in diameter and 15 feet 
long. Rather than travelling forward, the plane had bounced back about two or 
three feet, and the engines were embedded in the ground. Sparks had ignited 
vapour and fuel from a ruptured tank. The wind blowing from the west was 
pushing the flames toward the nose of the plane, which was oriented north of 
east. So fierce was the blaze that the young Daily Telegraph journalist, Alan 
Reid, who went out to the scene, saw that grass was burned and the earth 
scorched for a radius of 50 feet around the wreckage. A tree 100 feet ahead of 
the nose was also scorched. Flight Sergeant Smith realised that there was little 
he could do with the extinguisher he had taken from the ambulance. He told the 
Coroner the next day that he had ‘played it on the bodies mostly. It was not very 
successful.’ Another day later, talking in camera to the Service Court, both he 
and his superior, Ronald Wilson, were more emphatic: the RAAF extinguishers 
were ‘hopeless’. There was no alternative but to wait for the fire brigade.
19 Block 60 Gungahlin District, Crown lease granted to D. A. Cameron in 1936, was subsequently disposed 
of to W. A. Taylor (Sharon Priestly, ACT Place Names Officer, to CH, 8 Sept. 2011).
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‘Old’ Jack Butt, perpetually haunted by the lives he could not save
(Courtesy of Edna Byrne)
Neither Smith nor Wilson made mention of arriving to see a white-haired local 
farmer, Jack Butt, and his 15-year-old son Bill, ‘attacking the aircraft with axes’, 
and ordering them away. Butt, who lived in Queanbeyan, had leased a 298-
acre soldier settlement block (102C), much of which had been reclaimed by the 
Department of the Interior in 1936 to expand Canberra’s landing ground; he 
had been given in exchange a site on the edge of the nearby hills on which he 
ran sheep.20 He also share-farmed with Duncan Cameron, about a mile closer 
to Queanbeyan. He was ploughing in Cameron’s paddock when he heard an 
aircraft in trouble. As he would tell his family, when he saw the flames and 
smoke he rushed to the scene in his truck. He would later tell Jo Gullett of his 
distress at being prevented from trying to save several men whom he believed 
were still alive. He had pleaded with an RAAF officer to try to pull away the 
lightly burning starboard wing, but was told nothing could be done. As his 
20 Agistment of sheep on the aerodrome was permitted, a drover being required when mail planes were due, 
as late as 1938 when the Canberra Aero Club plane struck a stray on landing (Canberra Times, 1 Aug. 1938).
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youngest daughter, Edna Byrne, would recall 73 years later, the sight of men 
‘panicking at the windows’ as they were engulfed by flames would haunt her 
father for life.21
Butt’s name appears nowhere in contemporary press accounts or official records 
of the crash investigations. The story remembered by his family and by Jo 
Gullett, who wrote of it privately in 1972, is dramatically at odds with the 
sworn testimony of the RAAF officers and men at the scene. Jo Gullett told 
the story to Lord Casey in 1972 and apparently to no-one else.22 Did Butt or 
his son tell anyone other than Jo Gullett that they had seen men alive in the 
crashed aircraft? Were they disbelieved, purposely ignored by the authorities, 
encouraged to keep silent? Or had they just convinced themselves that no 
good would come of talking about it? There are no answers to these puzzling 
questions. Jack Butt, an AIF returned serviceman, a stalwart of the pastoral and 
agricultural association, was a respected figure in the local community. Perhaps, 
when it was obvious there was nothing they could do, he and his son simply 
went back down the hill and returned to their ploughing, somehow escaping 
the notice of the police.
Jack Butt and his son were not the only men to reach the scene moments after 
the crash. A young truck driver and well-known local rugby league player, Les 
McIntyre, on his way from collecting brickies sand, had also been close by. He 
had run to the aircraft, too late to do anything other than gaze at the burning 
wreckage. It was a sight that haunted Les McIntyre. His son, John McIntyre, 
would recall his father’s memories of helplessness, often waking in the night 
long afterwards.23
It was no puzzle that the plane had burned so quickly. There were two fuel 
tanks in each wing centre section of the Hudson. They were directly above the 
undercarriage struts, rendering them liable to rupture with a heavy landing or 
broken undercarriage. The tanks were integral tanks — the actual wing structure 
was sealed to contain the fuel. The capacity of the front tanks was 125 imperial 
gallons; those in the rear each held 143 gallons. CO² extinguishers were fitted on 
the firewall behind the engine accessory section (between the engine and the fuel 
tank).24 With a full fuel load of 536 gallons on take-off from Laverton it is likely 
that there would have been well over 400 gallons remaining when the plane hit 
the ground. It was bad enough that the tanks had been only minimally depleted 
by the trip. Worse was that the Hudson, like all Australian military aircraft, did 
21 Edna Byrne, telephone interview, 26 March 2013; interview with Alex Sloan, 666 ABC Canberra, 25 
March 2013. Mrs Byrne recalled being taken to the crash site a day or two later, walking though white ash, 
and discovering a clump of coins melted together.
22 Jo Gullett to Lord Casey, 7 Oct. 1972, NAA: M1129, WHITE/C B.
23 Megan Doherty, ‘McIntyre recalls crash’, Canberra Times, 18 May 2013.
24 Ron Cuskelly to CH, 14 Nov. 1978.
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not have self-sealing tanks. Both the British Air Ministry and the RAAF had 
been unhappy to learn in January 1940 that no satisfactory way had been found 
to modify the Lockheed aircraft’s integral tanks. Jim Fairbairn, who had been 
intrigued by the self-sealing tanks of a downed German Dornier bomber on an 
RAF station in France, had called for a report on them just two months earlier. 
What further accentuated the conflagration was the high magnesium content in 
the metal skin of the plane.25
As the senior Air Force officer present at the wreckage, Flying Officer Wilson 
took charge and told men to search in front of the plane in case anyone had 
been thrown clear. One unnamed ‘rescuer’ was quoted the next day in the Daily 
Telegraph as saying: ‘From the position of the bodies it appeared that they knew 
the crash was inevitable. They were grouped together, as though the victims 
had risen from their seats and made for the door of the plane.’ This was not the 
testimony of any of the witnesses who went on the record that day and later. 
Wilson said he had seen four bodies in the wreckage ‘already not recognisable’ 
but knew there must be more. None had been found at the front. Smith had 
seen three bodies at first. One was at the rear on the ground near a gap where 
the exit door should have been; the door itself, detached and lying 10 to 15 
yards behind the tail, was severely dented. Smith thought that the door might 
have been released from the inside. Two bodies were on the port side, two 
yards closer to the nose. The fuselage had been consumed by the fire and the 
bodies had just fallen through. Following a mild explosion, another body fell 
out near the port engine. As Wilson, Smith, and the others took in the horror of 
the scene, the RAAF tender and ambulance were rapidly joined by the airport 
crash-emergency vehicle. Flight Lieutenant Lloyd Law of the Survey Flight at 
the aerodrome reached them at 11.10 a.m. and departed almost immediately, 
leaving Wilson in charge.
Arriving in his own car shortly after the fire tender, ambulance, and two tenders 
which he had despatched, Pilot Officer Richard Winter, the duty pilot of the 
Survey Flight, ordered the airmen to empty their extinguishers on the bodies. 
Winter put on an asbestos helmet and gloves — there were no asbestos suits 
available — and moved the port wheel and undercarriage leg away from the 
bodies. There was nothing more they could do, he would tell the Service Court 
of Inquiry, until the Canberra Fire Brigade arrived. The Queanbeyan police were 
even less able to help. Alerted by the garage proprietor Fred Tetley, Sergeant 
25 Lettice Curtis, The Forgotten Pilots: A Story of The Air Transport Auxiliary 1939–45, G. T. Foulis, Henley-
on-Thames, 1971, pp.126–7; ‘Lockheed Hudson (B14) — Policy Equipment’, NAA: A705, 9/19/50; ‘Aircraft 
Fuel and Oil Tanks — Fire and Bullet Proofing — Processes’, NAA: A705, 9/1/598 Pt 1. Mark III and IV 
Hudsons had self-sealing petrol and oil tanks (‘New Features noted on Hudson Aircraft during Erection 1942’, 
NAA: A705, 9/19/69). ‘The Hudsons were unpopular in some quarters because of their tendency to burn after 
a crash landing…it was a standing joke after a heavy landing to shout “Out quick they burn.”’ (C. L. Hawkes 
to CH, 27 April 1977).
17 . ‘A leaf falling off a tree'
399
L. J. Warburton drove a motor truck with Constable Harold Sheldrick to the 
crash site, finding the aircraft enveloped in flames. The two policemen said they 
could see men hunched forward in their seats but could not reach them because 
of the heat. Outside the machine, scorched but neatly folded parachutes lay 
among ‘charred and smouldering clothing…mixed up with tools, the remains of 
seats and fixtures, twisted pieces of metal’, burnt cameras, suitcases, and other 
personal belongings.26
 Although smoke was visible almost immediately after the aircraft itself vanished 
from view, there was no way of knowing from the airport control tower whether 
there were survivors. While Sydney Rhodes was racing from the civil aviation 
hangar in the aerodrome’s ‘crash equipment car’ in the direction of the burning 
aircraft a call was made to the Canberra Community Hospital for medical staff to 
be alerted. Nurses were told to prepare 10 beds, only to learn soon afterwards 
that they would not be needed. Dr Lew Nott had been collected by police from 
his nearby property but quickly realised that there was nothing he could do 
for the victims.27 Others whose duty called them were converging on ‘Dundee’, 
Duncan Cameron’s Majura farm. Monsignor Patrick Haydon, Canberra’s first 
parish priest and confidant of ministers and officials, was hurrying to offer or 
administer the last rites. Police too were on the way. Senior Sergeant Bailey of 
the Commonwealth Police was despatched to the scene, followed an hour or so 
afterwards by his chief, Colonel H. E. Jones. Bailey arranged to return with the 
‘Deputy Coroner’ to view the crash site and inspect the bodies.28
Whatever the fate of the men on the aircraft, ambulances and fire-fighting 
equipment would still be required. Since 1935 the Canberra ambulance 
service had been co-located with the fire brigade though it was soon under 
the administrative control of the newly formed hospital board. There had 
never been an exercise to test systems for co-ordinating RAAF and civilian 
emergency responses. There was no direct telephone line from the sprinkler 
installations at the aerodrome to the fire brigade headquarters. But the delay 
this day was minimal. The hospital telephoned the fire brigade. As the brigade 
‘daily occurrence register’ records, the phone message at 10.58 on the morning 
of August 13 advised of an aeroplane crash on Queanbeyan Rd near Harman 
wireless station. A fire appliance and an ambulance were requested.
The Canberra Fire and Ambulance Service had one fire appliance and six officers 
who were on a 24-hour, seven-days-a-week roster. Fire officers with first-aid 
certificates could be rostered alternately for ambulance duties. For this they 
would wear white dust-coats and special caps and would earn an extra allowance 
26 Daily Telegraph, The Examiner, 14 Aug. 1940.
27 Tink, Air Disaster, p.178; Canberra Times, 6 May 2013.
28 Commonwealth Police File, NAA: A1378, 4 P8903. The ‘deputy coroner’ is not identified but presumably 
this was a reference to ‘Colonel’ John Goodwin described elsewhere as Acting Coroner.
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of five shillings. Station Officer Bill Maloney was in charge at the new Forrest fire 
station in Empire Circuit when the telephone call came from Canberra Hospital. 
As it happened, the No. 1 ambulance, a Buick bought 16 months previously, 
with officers Harold Stephenson and Tom Hynes on board, was already on its 
way to the hospital after a call received about 20 minutes earlier. So a message 
was left for them to drive to the aeroplane accident at ‘Pialligo aerodrome’ as 
soon as they could. The station fire-alarm bell was sounded by watch officer C. 
Lomax. Billy Stewart, the rostered driver, and Lomax’s son-in-law Jim Kearney, 
a professional rugby league player recently added to the crew, jumped on 
board the Dennis fire engine with Maloney. Extra chemical extinguishers were 
stowed; and the fire crew headed off through the Royal Military College to the 
Queanbeyan–Yass road, then turned up the Sutton road.
Almost as soon as they left the station the firemen saw smoke and realised 
that they had been given the wrong directions. Knowing the area well, they 
lost no time, and about a mile and a half along a gravel section of the Sutton 
road — deemed by the Department of the Interior to be in ‘trafficable order’ 
— they decided to divert through the bush. Using wire cutters they forced 
their way through a fence. ‘We just followed the smoke’, Maloney remembered. 
Meanwhile, Officer M. O’Brien was called in from leave and told to take the 
station’s reserve ambulance, its superseded ‘Austin appliance’, to the scene of the 
accident. He did not make it, returning after 40 minutes with gearbox trouble. 
The Austin had been prone to breakdown for years, and could manage only 15 
miles an hour when climbing Canberra’s ‘mild slopes’ in third gear.29
When they arrived at what Maloney described in a police statement next day as 
‘Cameron’s paddock’, the fire crew found the nose of the aircraft in the ground, 
the left wing completely burnt, the right wing and tail in the air, the small 
wheel on the ground partly burnt. They approached the plane at once with 
five soda/acid and two pyrofoam extinguishers as well as water. Watching as 
the firemen moved forward, Flying Officer Wilson made a note of the time they 
arrived, and instructed Sergeant Charles Oscar Bueno, a storekeeper at No. 2 
School of Technical Training, who was with him, to do the same. Police Sergeant 
Ivan Perriman took Bueno’s statement the next day, when he said it was 11.24 
a.m. The Queanbeyan brigade reached them at 11.33, three minutes after the 
first four bodies had been placed in the RAAF ambulance. It was another half-
hour before the remaining bodies were taken from the wreckage.
29 Interviews W. Maloney, 15 July 1977; J. Kearney, 23 July 1977; Canberra Fire Station, Canberra Fire Brigade 
Daily Occurrence Register, Canberra Fire and Emergency Services Museum, formerly held in Australian Archives 
at CRS A3328; ‘Inquisition before a Coroner Sitting Alone’, 26 Aug. 1940, Canberra Coroners’ Court Papers; Sec. 
& Exec. Officer, Bd of Fire Commissioners of NSW to Sec., Dept of Interior, 16 April 1941, NAA: A659, 41/1/151; 
‘Queanbeyan-Sutton Road…’, NAA: A292, C8738; Arthur Ide, Royal Canberra Hospital: An account of its origins and 
development; The first forty years, 1914 to 1954, Arthur Ide, Canberra, 1994, pp.209–10.
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Fire Brigade Station Officer Maloney reports to his chief, 14 August 1940
(ACT Fire Brigade archives, courtesy of Drew McLean)
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Wilson observed that the firemen applied extinguishers where bodies could be 
seen between the nose and the port engine. Maloney’s testimony to the Coroner 
13 days later summarised the desperate but unavailing efforts that followed:
The bodies were lying in the debris with the debris of the fuselage on 
the ground. I took one body out from the tail of the plane. We worked 
along the tail and removed the bodies as we worked along towards 
the nose of the plane. The first body was removed a minute or so after 
commencing operations. We continued to work extinguishing the fire. 
There were two bodies lying side by side held in by the framework of 
the seats. We pulled the wire work off the cushions and removed two 
bodies from there. We worked further forward extinguishing the fire 
and more bodies were removed. In the nose of the plane there were three 
bodies. They were removed last.30
Bill Maloney had reported on August 14 to the Chief Officer Percy Douglas:
When seven extinguishers had been used, six bodies had been 
recovered. The Queanbeyan Fire Brigade then arrived with two chemical 
extinguishers and with these we were enabled to recover one more body. 
All available extinguishers were then used up and the empty cylinders 
were taken by R.A.A.F. tender to [a nearby] creek for refilling with 
water to enable them to be recharged.
Before these returned, however, the three remaining bodies, in the nose 
of the plane, had been recovered.
Maloney’s reiterated reference to three bodies in the nose of the plane appears to 
be inconsistent with the second of two drawings made the same day by Flying 
Officer Wilson for Police Sergeant Perriman. The Wilson drawing has marks 
representing two bodies in the nose and a third on the ground between the 
nose and the port engine. It also shows three more marks on the port wing. 
Curiously, in none of Wilson’s statements — to the Coroner, to two policemen, 
to the Service Court or the Air Court — did he say explicitly that he saw two 
bodies in the nose. To the Service Court, for example, he said: ‘When the blaze 
in the nose and along the port wing had subsided somewhat I saw more bodies, 
and as soon as it was possible these were taken from the crash. They totalled 
six…The six mentioned were all taken from the position between the nose and 
the port engine.’
30 Tink (Air Disaster, p.10), quoting from the Canberra Times report, 27 Aug. 1940, has Maloney accounting 
for one body in the tail, three in the nose, ‘with the remaining six “in pairs on the coiled springs of the burnt 
seats”’. The newspaper paraphrase of Maloney’s testimony said ‘the others’, not ‘six’. The Inquest verbatim 
transcript, however, refers only to two bodies being removed from the framework of the seats.
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Flying Officer Wilson sketches where he thought bodies were
(Commonwealth Police file P8903, NAA: A1378)
Station Officer Maloney’s typed report is explicit that he had personally taken 
charge of the situation at the site and ‘directed all operations which included the 
fire, recovery of bodies, covering of same and their subsequent removal to the 
mortuary’. When his work was completed he advised the RAAF officers present 
that he and his men would return to the station. Flight Lieutenant Law had 
come back at 12.07 p.m. and taken charge. A military guard was then posted 
over the crash. By the time the fire crew reached their base at 12.37 p.m., one 
hour and 39 minutes had elapsed since they received the call out.
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The next day, as he reflected on the horrific events that were to haunt him 
for a long time to come, Maloney made a point of drawing attention to the 
fact that until his team arrived on the scene ‘no attempt was made to either 
fight the fire or remove the occupants of the plane’. This was almost true. 
Flight Sergeant Smith had deposed to the Coroner that he had ‘attempted to 
extinguish the flames with the extinguisher in the ambulance’, playing it on 
the bodies mostly. ‘It wasn’t very successful.’31 Maloney, as his young colleague 
Kearney remembered, was ‘a real old bushman, putting it gently…practical man 
down to the ground. Hops in and gets things done.’32 It appeared to him that 
‘adequate equipment for dealing with such a situation was not available to the 
R.A.A.F. or, if it was available, no attempt was made to use it either before or 
after the arrival of the Brigade’. This was not an innocent observation. When 
Maloney’s superior, Percy Douglas, prepared a memorandum to accompany the 
typed report being forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of the Department of 
the Interior’s Canberra Services Branch he too remarked that it ‘would appear 
that prior to the arrival of the fire engine, under the command of Station Officer 
Maloney, no fire extinguishing agent was available’.
Douglas added that ‘Contrary to press reports all bodies were removed from 
the burning plane by the Canberra Fire Brigade and without the assistance of 
anyone.’ Douglas could not have known that Flight Sergeant Smith would tell the 
Service Court the next day, and the Coroner 11 days later, that he had assisted 
in the removal of the bodies. Sydney Rhodes would also speak to the Coroner’s 
Court on August 26 of helping the RAAF men ‘in removing the bodies’. The 
language was ambiguous. In fact, as Maloney himself said in a statement to 
Police Constable Leslie Ivey, ambulance officers and RAAF personnel worked 
with firemen ‘in placing the ten bodies in the Ambulance and RAAF Ambulance’ 
— Rhodes presumably gave support in transferring the bodies into the waiting 
vehicles. The Chief Officer did not comment on an accurate press report that his 
firemen had to borrow asbestos gloves from the Air Force crash tender before 
they could lift out the bodies.33
The Fire Brigade was not overtly critical of the performance of the RAAF. 
Maloney had mentioned that the call to the brigade was not a direct one. It 
had come via the hospital. Perhaps mindful of doubts in some minds that lives 
might have been saved if rescuers had arrived more promptly, Douglas noted for 
the record that his men got the call eight minutes after the RAAF said the crash 
occurred. ‘Canberra’ was, he said, six miles further from the site of the crash 
than the aerodrome. The RAAF ‘therefore, had 8 minutes and six miles start on a 
31 Coroner’s Court Inquest Papers, now at NAA: A6079, MO 625.
32 Kearney, interview, 23 July 1977.
33 The Argus, 14 Aug. 1940.
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total run, from Canberra, of 16 miles’. Oddly, the Fire Brigade daily register and 
occurrence book contained no entry for the time of arrival at the scene; nor did 
the statements of Maloney and Kearney.34
At 55, an AIF Heavy Artilleryman, early president of the Canberra RSL Club, 
and married to a member of the pioneer Southwell family, Perce Douglas was 
influential in Territory social and sporting circles.35 He was not looking for 
credit for his men. Rather he was reminding the public service authorities of 
complaints and warnings that had been made repeatedly over the previous seven 
years. In August 1937, he had made recommendations about fire precautions at 
the aerodrome, explaining:
such crash precautions are provided, not with the idea of using them 
frequently, but with the knowledge that should a crash occur the 
Department has at hand up to date equipment which will afford a 
reasonable measure of success in the attempt to rescue passengers and 
pilots from which, in an aeroplane crash, is unfortunately but usually, 
accompanied by dreaded and shocking circumstances [sic].
Subsequent complaints resulted in a flurry of blame-shifting as ‘carelessness’ 
was attributed by the aerodrome owners to the occupying RAAF units. As 
recently as January 1940 Douglas had reiterated his concern that fire-fighting 
equipment including a 30-gallon chemical engine, a hose reel, and 600 feet of 
‘best quality hose’ were being left out in the open. ‘While the…apparatus is left 
out in the rain and the hot sun, deterioration, far greater than need be, must 
take place and the gear, small enough as it is to protect such valuable property, 
will shortly become useless.’ Driving the point home, Douglas concluded that it 
was at the time impossible to purchase new fire hose in Australia.36 There is no 
evidence that these disturbing matters had been rectified eight months later. On 
13 July 1940 James Fairbairn had approved provision of £5200 for 39 000 feet 
of canvas fire hose to be ordered from New York. His successor as Air Minister, 
Arthur Fadden, authorised a further 32 000 feet on September 2.37
In his signed witness statement for the Coroner, Maloney said that he assisted 
in placing four bodies in the ambulance, believing that the other six bodies 
34 If the firemen had arrived earlier, Jim Kearney might have seen Les McIntyre, a former Queanbeyan 
rugby league player who had played with a combined Southern Monaro team against Kearney’s Canberra two 
weekends previously (Canberra Times, 27 July 1940).
35 Southwell Family History Society Australia Inc, The Southwell Family in Australia: Pioneers of the 
Canberra District 1838–2007, 2008, p.X; Lyall L. Gillespie, The Southwell Family: Pioneers of the Canberra 
District 1838–1988, Southwell Reunion Committee, Canberra, 1988, pp.62–3.
36 Report of Station Officer W. Maloney to Chief Officer, Canberra Fire Brigade, 14 Aug. 1940; Chief Officer 
to Assistant Secretary, Civil Administration, 9 Aug. 1937, 12 Oct. 1939, to Canberra Services Branch 11 Jan. 
1940 and 14 Aug. 1940, copies and transcripts courtesy of Drew McLean, Canberra Fire and Emergency 
Services Museum.
37 Air Board Agenda 2917, 2985, NAA: A4181, 18.
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went in the ‘RAAF tenders and ambulances’. When Stephenson and Hynes 
arrived at the scene, they said, they placed two bodies in their vehicle and 
drove directly to the morgue. The fire brigade daily-occurrence register had an 
entry for 1.10 p.m. on August 13 noting the return of the ambulance officers in 
the No 1 vehicle and their report that they had taken two bodies to the morgue. 
But Tommy Hynes had corrected this, deleting ‘two’ and substituting ‘three’, 
and adding his initials. The discrepancy does not seem to have been noticed 
subsequently. Stephenson, an ex-Grenadier Guardsman, had seen and gathered 
up fragmented bodies on the battlefield; he was perhaps more phlegmatic than 
his younger partner that day.38 Hynes had stumbled over a still-smouldering 
body at the crash site and he may well still have been in shock. If three had been 
correct, the total would have been 11, one too many. Sergeant W. H. Galvin, 
driving the RAAF ambulance, also took four bodies to the morgue. In language 
providing assurance that nothing untoward had happened on their journeys, 
both Stephenson and Galvin stated that they did not stop en route and had no 
accidents. The same assurance was offered by LAC Campbell Sheahan, who had 
driven a RAAF tender to the crash site and assisted in placing four bodies on the 
tender and taking them to the morgue.
When word came from the aerodrome that the Air Minister’s plane had crashed, 
Street’s secretary (Percy Hayter), Murray Tyrrell (Fairbairn’s assistant private 
secretary), and the Prime Minister’s secretary, Corby Tritton, were reported to 
have driven to Cameron’s farm to identify the victims. The speed with which 
the charred bodies were retrieved and transported to the hospital suggests that 
only the most cursory examination could have occurred at the scene, if indeed 
the three ministerial staff arrived there in time. On the morning of August 14, as 
Bill Maloney was writing his statement for the Coroner, the Canberra Times and 
other newspapers reported that three ministers (the Treasurer, Percy Spender, 
the Postmaster-General, Vic Thorby, and the Minister for Supply, Sir Frederick 
Stewart) had gone to the scene of the crash. According to The Mercury they 
‘inspected the wreckage’. When they arrived, the Canberra Times said, they 
saw doctors and Air Force men removing the ‘remains’ of the victims from 
‘the head of the burnt wreckage’. ‘The remains of some of the victims were 
unidentifiable’, the Times concluded.
Stewart and Thorby had in fact arrived on a commercial flight from Sydney 
late in the morning, and were joined by Spender who had left the meeting of 
the Loan Council at which he was presiding. Thorby, as a former Civil Aviation 
minister, could have had a particular interest in a catastrophe so close to the 
38 Yorkshire-born, Stephenson grew up in Cairo where his father was a pharmacist. He returned to England 
to study medicine but war intervened. Post-war he tried pineapple farming in Queensland before settling in 
Canberra in 1926 and becoming one of the town’s first firemen and ambulancemen (Obituary, Canberra Times, 
24 June 1981).
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airport for which he had recently shared ministerial responsibility. He had 
himself been the survivor of a crash landing. Stewart had been involved in 
some of Kingsford-Smith’s aerial business ventures. It is possible that the three 
ministers were driven to the scene in time to see Flight Sergeant Smith, fire 
chief Bill Maloney, and others standing among the wreckage at the front of the 
aircraft. They might have seen the well-known Canberra doctor Lew Nott, who 
was briefly at the scene, as well as white-coated ambulance men.39
Smith later testified, contrary to Perce Douglas’s report, that he had ‘helped to 
remove the bodies’. Senior Constable Brodribb of the Commonwealth Police had 
written on August 20 that Flying Officer Wilson had ‘assisted in the removal of 
the bodies from the wreckage’.40 The precise nature of the ‘assistance’ or ‘help’ 
may not be as significant as the fact, if it were a fact, that ministers might have 
arrived soon enough to talk to some of those who had been earliest and closest 
to the crash scene.41
Identities
At the small room that served as the morgue it fell to Dr Duncan Mackellar, 
medical superintendent of the Canberra hospital, to examine the bodies and 
determine the cause of death in each case. Mackellar, a Sydney University 
graduate, was a general practitioner with interests in surgery, radiology, and 
obstetrics. He had some pathology training but had no claim to expertise in 
forensic medicine. The Depression had cut short his surgical studies in Edinburgh 
and he had practised in Wollongong and Portland before being recruited to 
Canberra at the beginning of 1938. In 1940 he was a captain in the Australian 
Army Medical Corps Reserve, having been commissioned as an undergraduate 
into the Sydney University Regiment then known as the Sydney University 
Scouts. To his intense disappointment he had been rejected for service in the 
RAAF, perhaps damned by an adverse security report of his youthful flirtation 
with the ultra-loyalist New Guard, but more likely debarred because, at 34 in 
1939, he was six years older than the age limit.42
39 Tink (Air Disaster, p.180) has the three ministers ‘talking to various RAAF types’ and being informed 
that until the plane had struck a log the ‘pilot had a good chance of making a crash landing in which all the 
occupants…might have survived’. The Aug. 14 Canberra Times report quoted has ‘flying men’ expressing this 
view but does not say they were speaking to, or within  earshot of, ministers.
40 NAA: A1378, P8903.
41 The Herald, 13 Aug. 1940; Canberra Times, 14 Aug, 1940.
42 Dr John Mackellar to CH, (email),10, 18 Feb. 2009. I am grateful to Dr Mackellar who advises that the 
family name gained its first ‘a’ and lower case ‘k’ as a result of his emigrant grandfather’s admiration for the 
eminent Australian doctor and politician, Sir Charles Mackellar. For Mackellar’s later career in Mooroopna 
and his pathbreaking work on direct blood transfusion, see Geoffrey Nice, Not Bricks and Mortar and Paint 
— but People, [?1986], and files with the Historical Society of Mooroopna.
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Confronted by the most distressing scene he had ever encountered, Mackellar’s 
first thought was that the bodies, some still emitting vapour, could not be 
identified. There was even some initial doubt about how many bodies there 
were. Back at Laverton, Fr Ken Morrison was instructed to prepare to take 
part in a ceremony at a mass grave. There were doubts about the ‘possibility of 
identification’. Morrison recalled working for some time on the assumption that 
there would be a combined graveside service until he was told there would be 
individual burials.43 As Jim Kearney later commented: ‘How the hell they ever 
identified anybody I wouldn’t know really.’44 Murray Tyrrell, who remembered 
having travelled to the hospital, informed Corby Tritton in the Prime Minister’s 
office of the uncertainty. Menzies, said Tritton, had issued an edict: the bodies 
must be identified.45
To assist in the grim task, the Army Minister’s private secretary, ‘Pip’ Hayter, 
joined Dr Mackellar. Hayter, a Great War survivor, wounded and gassed, was 
almost a Canberra institution. Unusually among Canberra ministerial staff, 
he had a working wife. The Hayters had no children and, as Pip’s assistant 
Garry Armstrong remembered, ‘they had a few bob more than some of their 
contemporaries’. After a preliminary visit around noon, Hayter returned to the 
morgue in the evening. His attention was directed to six of the bodies. The first 
was Frank Thornthwaite, for whom he had given up his place on the flight. 
Identifiable by military uniform on ‘a portion of the body’ and a key chain and 
keys in a pocket of the uniform, Thornthwaite was said to have carried a pipe, 
tobacco pouch, and matchbox, together with a pocket knife. Later a cigarette 
case with the initials ‘F. T.’ and the date ‘3/2/20’ was found.46
Hayter knew both Thornthwaite and Brudenell White well. The CGS’s ‘general 
appearance and features’ helped to identify White; but he was definitely 
recognisable by the cross-sword-and-baton badge found embedded in a chest 
that before that morning would have had visible scars. The insignia was worn 
only by general officers on the shoulder strap of their coat and jacket. White’s 
pipe and the silver ring that he always wore on the little finger of his left hand 
— a gift from his beloved youngest brother Eustace, who had died after falling 
from a horse 42 years earlier — were not found.47 The gold signet ring that Street 
wore, well known to Hayter, allowed Mackellar to identify the Army Minister. 
An upper denture plate was also unique to Street. Gullett was the only member 
of the party known to have sets of both upper and lower dentures. Fairbairn 
43 Msgnr K. R. Morrison to CH, 6 June 1983.
44 Kearney, interview, 23 July 1977.
45 In another version of these events Tyrrell recalled for Lord Casey going with Tritton to the morgue to try 
to identify the bodies: ‘a fairly hopeless task. There was little left to argue about’ (NAA: M1129 WHITE/C B).
46 NAA: A1378,  P8903; MO 625 A6079 44 (Inquest). In an amplified statement sworn for the Coroner, 
Hayter substituted the less graphically confronting ‘portion of uniform’ for ‘portion of the body’.
47 Bean, Two Men I Knew, p.81.
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had distinctive wartime injuries. With these identifications already made, 
Elford’s ‘general appearance and build’ — he was, Mackellar said, about the 
same stature as Fairbairn — were enough to confirm that his was the remaining 
body not in uniform.
Hayter could aver that he had been in daily contact with Brudenell White and 
Thornthwaite for the last five months, and with Street over nearly two years. 
There could be confidence in his identifications. He also knew Elford and Gullett 
well. He would tell the Coroner that he had identified the bodies ‘in company 
with Dr Mackellar’. He had, he said, ‘looked over the bodies’ in the morning 
and returned in the evening when he ‘identified’ them. In a statement to the 
Coroner, Hayter was explicit about seeing the dental plate being removed from 
Street’s mouth by Mackellar. He also said he ‘recognised’ Elford by his general 
appearance and build. But on all of the others the wording of Hayter’s statement 
indicates how he ‘identified’ them by certain physical features or personal items 
which were shown to him or whose presence was confirmed by the doctor. He 
would tell the Coroner that a part of a khaki uniform and keys in the pocket 
served to distinguish Thornthwaite.48 Mackellar himself testified that ‘Mr. 
Hayter came to the morgue and told me certain things about the deceased and 
together we identified the bodies.’
Mackellar’s testimony to the Coroner also left some doubt as to what Hayter 
actually saw. ‘Mr Hayter told me a ring would be found on Mr Street’s finger. 
A ring was found on Mr Street’s finger. I recognise the ring produced.’ From 
a statement he prepared for the Commonwealth Police it seems doubtful that 
Hayter looked closely at the bodies:
I identified the body of Sir Henry Gullett because of the general 
appearance and build of Sir Henry Gullett and I was informed by the 
Medical Officer that his body had a double set of dentures.
I identified the body of the Honourable J. V. Fairbairn because I was 
informed by the Medical Officer that this particular body showed injuries 
of long standing to each arm and, in particular, to the right arm.
I identified the body of Mr. R. E. Elford because I was informed by the 
Medical Officer that this body had only one testicle and because of his 
general build.49
Mackellar, probably unaware of Hayter’s war record with the 23rd Infantry 
Battalion, had perhaps tried to spare the former regimental quartermaster sergeant 
sights that would distress even battle-hardened servicemen and pathologists. 
48 Courier-Mail, 27 Aug. 1940.
49 Inquest testimony: NAA: A6079, MO 625; unsigned statement by P. Hayter, Commonwealth Police file 
P8903, NAA: A1378, 4/95. Italics added.
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When Mackellar himself, still nauseous and understandably shaken by the 
appalling nature of what he had seen, came to write up a summary report for 
the Police a week after the accident he seems to have forgotten some of what he 
had been told. ‘A larger body [than the one he had determined was Street’s] with 
evidence of a war wound in the left shoulder’, he said, distinguished Fairbairn 
from the others. More strangely, he referred to the ministerial private secretary 
who had assisted him in the morgue as ‘Mr Tritton’. Someone quietly amended 
the Commonwealth Police file copies: Fairbairn’s right shoulder (it should have 
been elbow) not the left; ‘Mr Hayter’ not ‘Mr Tritton’, the Prime Minister’s 
private secretary.50 The possibility that Corby Tritton was in fact present may 
account for Mackellar’s confusion. Certainly Tritton was well informed, recalling 
years later the injury, the result of a motor bike accident, that uniquely marked 
his friend Elford.51
When it came to determining the identities of the RAAF officers and men, 
Group Captain D. E. L. Wilson, who had been flown from Sydney by A. B. 
‘Tich’ McFarlane, took responsibility. Flying Officer McFarlane and his crew in 
Hudson A16-57 had scrambled at Richmond at 1.00 p.m., picked up Wilson at 
Mascot, and taken off for the capital 20 minutes later, arriving at 2.30 p.m. As 
the senior commander nearest to Canberra, Douglas ‘Del’ Wilson, accompanied 
by Squadron Leader Sturt de Burgh Griffith, was assigned to liaise between 
government departments and the Air Board.52 Pilot, crew, and passengers had 
little time to think about the circumstances that brought them urgently together 
in an aircraft similar to the one that had just inexplicably crashed. McFarlane 
recorded in his log book: ‘Bob Hitchcock spun in in A16/97 with a stack of 
politicians on board.’ In retrospect, McFarlane felt that, with about 100 hours 
in Hudsons, he would not have considered himself suitable for the flight that 
Hitchcock had captained. He recalled learning that his own approach to land in 
Canberra, after a low circuit to get a better look at the nearby accident site, was 
‘watched in fear by the locals’.53 McFarlane took practically the same course as 
A16-97 had in the morning; but, as J. V. Power told the Service Court, ‘the one 
in the afternoon was flying higher this was a remark made by spectators at my 
office’.
At the morgue, Group Captain Wilson proceeded by elimination. He was to 
admit to the Coroner that he knew none of the men personally. Identity discs 
were found but not with the bodies. However, Crosdale and Palmer’s dress 
50 D. G. Mackellar, ‘Identification of Bodies recovered from Aeroplane Crash Near Duntroon 13/8/40’, 
Commonwealth Police file P8903,  NAA: A1378, 4/97; cf his inquest testimony NAA: A6079, MO 625.
51 N. C. Tritton, interview, 7 June 1977. According to Sir Edwin Hicks (interview, 18 Sept 1980), then a 
Department of Air officer, it was Fairbairn who was identified by the fact that he was known to have only 
one testicle.
52 EFTS Mascot to Sec. Prime Minister’s Dept, telegram, 13 Aug. 1940, NAA: A461, 700/1/392.
53 McFarlane, interview, 19 April 1978; logbook 13 Aug. 1940.
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indicated that they were not officers. Crosdale would have been at the rear of 
the aircraft in a seat by the door; he was the least burnt and mutilated. Of the 
two pilots, Wilson attested that he identified Wiesener as ‘the younger of the 
two bodies’. ‘Hitchcock was identified by reason of the fact that it was the only 
further body awaiting identification.’ The men at the front of the plane had 
borne the full impact of the crash and the flames.
Wilson’s claim to be able to distinguish between Hitchcock and Wiesener 
because Wiesener was younger strains credibility. ‘Wiesener is 28 and Hitchcock 
38’, Wilson said. Wiesener was in fact 18 months older than Hitchcock. Maybe 
Wilson took height as a proxy for age. If he did, then his identifications would 
certainly have been wrong. At 6'½", Wiesener was 6¾ inches taller than the 
senior man. The one surviving photograph of a somewhat cherubic Wiesener 
in 1940 suggests that in life he looked significantly younger than the more 
careworn and balding Hitchcock. In any case, as fireman Jim Kearney recalled 
the horrific scene, ‘there wouldn’t have been any wrinkles on those bodies, 
that’s for sure’. But Wilson was clearly there to make positive identifications 
without delay. Accuracy was a secondary consideration. When he presented his 
evidence to the inquest, the Coroner asked him no questions.54
Cause of death
After examining each of the bodies Dr Mackellar pronounced that it would ‘be 
fairly safe to assume that all ten men were killed when the plane hit the ground’. 
All the men, he said, had fractured skulls as ‘the immediate cause of death.’ ‘I 
am of the opinion that the men were killed before the plane was burnt.’ On the 
day of the crash, ‘Tich’ McFarlane had met the local Air Force doctor at the 
scene ‘wandering around with a jam tin and a fork. When I asked him what he 
was doing…he looked at me as if to say “You bloody fool what do you think I 
am doing?” He was picking up fingers, toes, and bits and pieces…a gruesome 
sight.’ Standing back to look at the still-smoking wreckage McFarlane remarked 
on how terrible it would have been to be burnt to death. The doctor corrected 
him: ‘These people weren’t burnt to death. They were all dead when they hit 
the ground — hit the ground with a great thump. They would have had broken 
backs, broken necks, thump like that, look at the chairs, broken, sagging. 
None of them would have burned to death.’ This, of course, was a conclusion 
at variance with Jack Butt’s belief that he had seen struggling survivors a few 
hours earlier, and with several newspaper reports the next day. Whatever the 
54 NAA: A6079, MO 625. Tink (Air Disaster, p.11) quotes Wilson’s plainly erroneous identification of the 
two pilots without comment. He says that Gullett’s identity was confirmed by his gold cigarette case, actually 
found later, whereas his double set of dentures was conclusive.
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truth about the deaths, modern forensic pathology suggests that it was more 
likely the subsequent inferno than the impact that caused all of the skulls to be 
fractured.55
Acting Coroner ‘Colonel’ John Goodwin (he had been made an honorary 
Lieutenant Colonel on his retirement from the militia in 1920) accepted the post-
mortem findings. In the state of medical knowledge at the time, it was unlikely 
that any further examination could have conclusively determined whether the 
men had died on impact. This was, in any case, the kindest conclusion that 
could be reached. Moreover, it was consistent with the fact that almost as soon 
as it hit the ground, as the first RAAF investigators on the scene noticed, the 
aeroplane had come to a sudden stop against a large box log. As ‘Tich’ McFarlane 
had deduced, the plane had fallen into the ground in an almost flat horizontal 
attitude and slid forward no more than 30 yards.
Sadly for the families of the victims, some newspapers had already headlined, 
as did the Canberra Times on August 14, ‘Ten Persons Burnt to Death.’ The 
Launceston Examiner the same day had referred to ‘officials who examined the 
wreckage after the flames died down’ saying that it was ‘the explosion’ after the 
crash that killed the occupants. The Argus even said that officials who examined 
the wreckage were certain that the aircraft ‘was very little damaged in landing, 
and that had the fire not occurred the occupants would have escaped’. These 
reports lend credence to the story of ex-AIF Lance Corporal Jack Butt and his 
son, axes in hand, being ordered away from the burning aircraft. It is possible 
that an anguished Butt himself could have spoken to journalists at the scene. 
Duncan Cameron’s friend might have been mistaken about what he saw. Men 
still alive for moments after the crash might have sustained fatal injuries. But, 
whatever the now unknowable truth, an official consensus soon emerged about 
the deaths. Making belated amends for its insensitivity two weeks earlier, the 
Canberra daily led its story on the Coroner’s findings on August 27 with a 
triple-decker headline: ‘AIR VICTIMS KILLED BY FATAL CRASH DIED BEFORE 
MACHINE CAUGHT FIRE CORONIAL INQUIRY INTO CANBERRA DISASTER.’56
Colonel Goodwin, 74-year-old retired Commonwealth Surveyor-General and 
Director of Lands, and now chairman of the Federal Capital Territory Advisory 
Council, had begun the inquest in the tiny Canberra court ‘house’ in one of 
the dining rooms of the old Acton Hotel on the morning of August 14. On the 
previous evening he had been out to inspect the wrecked aircraft. Goodwin had 
55 I am grateful to Professor Jo Duflou (email 28 March 2012), Chief Forensic Pathologist, Clinical Professor, 
University of Sydney, for advice on the effect of extreme heat on human bodies. Tink (Air Disaster, p.178) 
follows the Coroner, concluding that all 10 men ‘died instantly’; but at pp.191–2 he points out that a fractured 
skull ‘is not necessarily fatal’.
56 Canberra Times, The Examiner, The Argus, 14 Aug. 1940; Chronicle (Adelaide), 29 Aug. 1940: ‘Victims 
Were Not Burnt Alive: WERE DEAD WHEN FIRE STARTED’.
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been a special magistrate in the Court of Petty Sessions in Canberra since 1930 
and was experienced in coronial duties. As Charles Daley recalled, Goodwin 
was ‘less experienced and alert’ than his Advisory Council colleagues; but 
‘he had nevertheless a tenacious side to his personality’.57 As a member of the 
Canberra Community Hospital Board he was also one of the men to whom Dr 
Mackellar — who ‘seemed to be afraid of the Board’ — reported.58 There were 
three RAAF officers, the chief of police (Colonel Jones), two reporters, and 
court attendants present in the court. Harry Jones, being there in his capacity 
as the Capital Territory’s police chief, could keep his other roles as director 
of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch and the Secret Defence Security 
Intelligence Bureau unadvertised. But if issues affecting security were to arise 
he would want to be the first to know. His meticulously presented claim for 
reimbursement of private car expenses records that he had been out to the scene 
of the crash and later to the aerodrome the previous afternoon and returned to 
the aerodrome the following day.59 Goodwin was to be assisted by J. M. Mills of 
the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor’s Office. As the officials who had identified 
the civilian bodies were said to have already departed to Melbourne and Sydney 
on government business, evidence was taken only about the identification of the 
Service personnel. In the afternoon, Group Captain Wilson was reported to have 
gone out to the crash site to examine the wreckage. According to the Herald 
he was securing evidence for an inquiry by the Air Accidents Investigation 
Committee ‘which may be held in Melbourne’.   
When the inquest resumed on August 26, Mills questioned people who saw A16-
97’s last moments in the air, presented evidence connecting specific exhibits 
with individuals who had perished, and led the evidence of identification for 
the three ministers and Dick Elford. The proceedings, carried out in accordance 
with the Capital Territory Coroners Ordinance 1932 and the New South Wales 
Coroners Act 1912, were expeditious. As the bodies had already been released 
for burial, and no evidence was taken as to the pilot’s health immediately before 
the crash, Goodwin clearly had ruled out the possibility of a medical condition 
contributing to the pilot’s loss of control of the aircraft. In so doing he was 
ignoring the working principle of the doyen of Australian coroners, Dr A. 
A. Palmer of Sydney, who counselled never to infer from the circumstances 
57 Charles Daley, As I Recall, p.49. Canberra had no magistrates until 1949. Special magistrates like 
Goodwin dealt with undefended cases; defended cases were heard by visiting magistrates from Queanbeyan 
and Goulburn (Susan Mary Woolcock Withycombe, Ethos and Ethics: A History of the Law Society of the 
Australian Capital Territory 1933–1993, Canberra, 1993, p.13). For Goodwin as ‘a sort of father-figure to the 
city’, Jim Gibbney, Canberra 1913–1953, AGPS, Canberra, 1988. p.80.
58 A. J. Proust (ed.), History of Medicine in Canberra and Queanbeyanand their hospitals, Brolga Press, 
Gundaroo, 1994, p.53 (observation of Dr Lew Nott, medical supt 1929–34, 1940–49); Jack Taylor, ‘Goodwin, 
John Thomas Hill (1865–1950)’, Ritchie and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 14, 
pp.293–4.
59 ‘Use of Private Car on Official Business’, Aug. 1940, Lieutenant Colonel H. E. Jones (Personal file), NAA: 
A367, C17200.
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in which a body was found that death was due to those circumstances.60 The 
idea of the pilot ‘collapsing’ was, as Hitchcock’s fellow flight commander, Jack 
Ryland, would later say, ‘very improbable’ but not impossible.61
All 13 eye-witnesses were examined between 10.55 a.m. and 2.40 p.m. with 
a break of an hour and 25 minutes for lunch. Flight Sergeant Smith was on 
the stand for 23 minutes; Dudley Lalor for 15 minutes; Sydney Rhodes for 13. 
Since the viewings in the morgue, additional items had been found, mostly 
by an administrative and special-duties officer at Canberra Station HQ, Flying 
Officer Stanley Willmott, a 1914–18 artillery, RFC, and RAF veteran, who had 
seen more carnage than most men at Canberra aerodrome. ‘Pathetic personal 
belongings of the victims’, blackened, charred, half-melted, ‘littered’ a table 
in the court house.62 They confirmed the presence in the plane of White (his 
nine-year-old monogrammed hair brushes), Fairbairn (his engraved gold pocket 
watch and gold rail pass on a gold chain), Thornthwaite (a cigarette case marked 
‘F. T. 3/2/20’). Another gold cigarette case was recognisably one presented to 
Gullett by staff of the Ministry of Information exactly two months earlier on 
June 14. The engraved back of Elford’s watch was enough to satisfy the Coroner 
that he too had died in the aircraft. Dr Mackellar was shown and verified the 
items that he had seen in the morgue.
Had Mackellar or Colonel Goodwin paused to reflect on the assembled 47 
exhibits they might have been struck by the poignant assembly of five pocket 
timepieces and four wrist watches — silenced reminders of the social gulf that 
separated in life the 10 men united in death. Percy Hayter restated how he 
was able to identify the six civilian victims. Having determined the identity of 
the men and the cause of their deaths, the Coroner’s task was complete. Mills 
had advised Goodwin that coronial jurisdiction started at the time of death. 
What caused the plane to fall was a matter for another tribunal. These were 
dubious contentions. However, Mills evidently felt free to say that ‘there were 
no suspicious circumstances’. The Coroner was more cautious. ‘There is no 
evidence’, he concluded, ‘to determine the cause of the accident.’63
60 J. B. Cleland, ‘Inquests and Experiences in the Coroner’s Court’, Medical Journal of Australia, vol. 
II No. 18, 9 Nov. 1940, p.435. In the UK and US, post-mortem examinations or autopsies after transport 
accidents were not routine until the late 1950s (Peter J. Stevens, Fatal Civil Aircraft Accidents: Their Medical 
and Pathological Investigation, John Wright & Sons, Bristol, 1970, pp.2–3; Col. Claude K. Leeper, ‘The 
Development of Aviation Pathology and the Joint Committee on Aviation Pathology’, in William J. Reals et.
al., eds, Medical Investigation of Aviation Accidents, College of American Pathologists, Chicago, 1968, p.72).
61 Air Force Court of Inquiry, transcript of evidence, 27 Aug. 1940, p.24 (NAA: A705, 32/10/2729).
62 Northern Standard (Darwin), 27 Aug. 1940.
63 ‘Inquisition before a Coroner Sitting Alone’, 26 Aug. 1940, Canberra Coroner’s Court Papers, and in NAA: 
A6079, MO 625; Canberra Times, 27 Aug. 1940. Tink (Air Disaster, p.191) says: ‘It appears that in accepting 
Mills’ argument about the commencement of his jurisdiction…Goodwin ignored all the evidence he had heard 
which suggested that some of the victims might have survived the initial impact.’ In fact, whatever he might 
have read in the newspapers, no evidence of this kind was put to the Coroner.
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None of those affected by the crash were to forget where they were when they 
first heard about it. Or rather, as is the way with human memory, recollections 
evolved. Roland Wilson, then Commonwealth Statistician and Economic Adviser 
to the Treasurer, remembered 44 years later that he was at a Premiers’ Conference 
in Canberra at 11.00 a.m. when someone came in and spoke quietly to the Prime 
Minister who quickly made the news known to all of those present.64 Wilson 
was right to remember being present at a meeting with the state premiers that 
day. The Loan Council had been in session for several days. But it was not the 
Prime Minister at his side but the Treasurer, Percy Spender, who was president 
of the Council.65
Was there a fear that secret papers or security keys might have fallen into 
inappropriate hands? As late as January 1941, enquiries were being made 
about two keys issued to Jim Fairbairn facilitating after-hours access to Victoria 
Barracks. A similar set held by Street had been returned, as had the keys to his 
Melbourne and Canberra safes. Officers of the Prime Minister’s department were 
said to be searching through the wreckage for ‘valuable documents’. No one 
could say what had been taken on board. Newspapers reported that files and 
secret documents had been destroyed in the flames. Officials were quick to call 
on the widows of ministers, Thornthwaite, and Elford to retrieve papers that had 
been in their husbands’ possession. But there seems to have been no urgency 
about returning a bundle of partly burnt papers recovered from the scene. The 
Commonwealth Police passed the six typewritten sheets in an envelope to the 
Defence Secretariat in Canberra on October 10, whence they were forwarded to 
Army headquarters. Evidently the papers had remained in police safekeeping 
along with personal items like house keys, badges, cigarette cases, hair brushes, 
scissors, coins, and watches, most of which had been found at the scene by 
Flying Officer Willmott.66 All these were returned to the relevant next of kin or 
executors at the same time. It was not until November 19 that a letter from Olive 
Hitchcock to the Prime Minister drew attention to Mrs Palmer’s wish to know 
of any of her husband’s belongings, specifically the rosary beads he had been 
wearing.67 The beads and an attached St Christopher medal had indeed been 
found. MPs’ gold passes were sent back to the Department of the Interior.
While the coronial inquest was adjourned after its first sitting, official protocols 
of condolence and funeral preparation were being set in motion and messages 
about the memorial service were being despatched to the bereaved families. 
64 Sir Roland Wilson, interview, 28 March 1984. Wilson had inherited what remained of the aeroplane’s 
duraluminum propeller from his friend the Commissioner for Patents, who had retrieved it from the Deakin 
tip and had been cutting off pieces and melting them down in his workshop.
65 Canberra Times, 14 Aug. 1940, p.5.
66 NAA: A1378, 4/168,181,190,197. Other items were found by Cpl Victor Walpole, F/O Wilson, and Flt Sgt 
Smith (NAA: A6079, MO 625).
67 NAA: A461, 700/1/392.
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In Canberra and Melbourne there was urgent confabulation about what must 
happen next. For the Air Force there was some satisfaction that the Coroner 
had been plainly intent on a rapid and tidy inquest. Not for him or for them 
the embarrassment of the inquest at Windsor in January into the crash of an 
Avro Anson into the Richmond Golf Links resulting in the deaths of Flight 
Lieutenant Arthur Moorehouse Watkins, Flight Lieutenant Hugh Horner, two 
accompanying flying officers, and a leading aircraftsman. The Windsor court 
house had been the scene of an inquisition of RAAF witnesses by relatives of the 
deceased. ‘King’ Cole’s No. 2 Group HQ had been instructed by the Air Board 
that, although it was not considered necessary to have counsel to represent the 
Service, there should be a ‘responsible senior officer in touch with facts of the 
case to watch Service interests and ensure that Coroner exercises powers under 
National Security Regulations and otherwise to prevent publication in the 
Press of any matters…which are considered contrary to public policy to have 
published’. But, to the horror of Cole’s superiors, the Windsor and Richmond 
Gazette had carried a full report of the proceedings; and the national press 
seized on the story of laxity in engine checks, deficiencies in record keeping, 
alleged shortage of mechanics, and over-working of personnel.68
There was little comfort for the RAAF in being told that the legal officer sent to 
Windsor to watch the Service’s interests reported that every technical allegation 
made against the Air Force was refuted, that all the Sydney newspaper reports 
were misleading, and the Daily Telegraph ‘appeared to be deliberately so’. 
Following the inquest, a confidential investigation at No. 1 Group by Group 
Captain Henry Wrigley had substantiated that there was ‘serious laxity in the 
application of the maintenance system’, the captains of the aircraft and the 
officer in charge of the flight having neglected the supervision for which they 
were responsible. The father of the dead pilot, knowing nothing of the adverse 
findings on his son, pressed his local MP, Sir Frederick Stewart (Minister for 
Supply and Development), for answers to unanswered questions. But it was not 
until May 1940 that a bulky file containing the Court of Inquiry proceedings 
and an explanation of what looked like a dismissive draft reply to the bereaved 
father — ‘answers to several of the points reflect adversely on his late son, 
therefore the less said the better’ — had found its way to an impatient Minister 
for Air’s desk. Jim Fairbairn’s evasiveness about allegations of lax maintenance 
had meanwhile brought him a rebuke from one of the fathers. ‘Mr Fairbairn 
68 Parents had themselves testified to the Coroner to rebut allegations that their pilot sons had been 
drinking the night before the crash. Hearsay evidence was led that the captain of the aircraft had complained 
that maintenance of his machine was being compromised because the number of mechanics in the squadron 
had been reduced from 15 to six. To the relief of harried RAAF officers, after a day of angry outbursts and 
conflicting testimony the Coroner had thought better of prolonging his inquiry into what ‘does appear to be 
some laxity in the manner in which the planes were serviced before flight’ (Windsor and Richmond Gazette, 
26 Jan. 1940).
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would be doing an injustice to the cause of aviation generally and particularly 
to the interests of the hundreds of young men now training if he showed a 
reluctance to examine carefully all evidence relating to fatalities in the RAAF.’
It was symptomatic of the confusion and apprehension in Service headquarters 
over this episode that the Court of Inquiry file had been mislaid for two months, 
wrongly attached to a related file on coronial inquiries. Confusion was further 
compounded by the preparation of a letter for the Air Minister’s signature 
referring to the Service Court of Inquiry as an ‘Air Court of Inquiry’.69 These 
muddles could no doubt be eliminated. When the victims were not household 
names the press would in due course lose interest. But a judicial probe into 
the accident to A16-97 would be a major national news story no matter how 
carefully it was shaped and monitored.
69 Sydney Morning Herald, 20, 22 Jan. 1940. A Court of Inquiry held in the last two weeks of December 
had blamed this otherwise inexplicable accident during a celestial navigation exercise on the Venturi-driven 
instruments not settling down before the aircraft entered cloud, thus giving the pilot a false horizon (‘Flying 




Extinguishing the inferno of a crashed aircraft was never easy and often 
impossible. Even with enough men, equipment, water, and flame retardant 
it would be a daunting confrontation for experienced professionals. For the 
Canberra firemen and RAAF airmen attending A16-97 in Duncan Cameron’s 
paddock there was no chance that they could repel the unyielding flames. The 
horror of what assailed their senses would keep them awake that night and 
bring disturbance to their sleep long into the future. For those charged with 
guarding the site and searching among the twisted wreckage and charred grass 
for fragments of past lives there were scattered cues to reflection. Here in burnt 
cloth, shattered watches, warped cufflinks, fractured dentures, a tangled rosary, 
and yards of wind-strewn parachute silk, was evidence of God’s indifference to 
distinctions of rank and status. There was no discrimination in death between 
rich and poor, old and young, men of all faiths and of none. What did it mean? 
What in Divine Providence had decreed an end in one terrifying moment to 10 
lives, in this way, in this place, at this time?
Questions and doubts about a loving Creator would afflict bereaved families and 
friends for years to come. As Thornton Wilder had meditated in his 1927 novella 
The Bridge of San Luis Rey: why had God settled upon that person and upon that 
day for His demonstration of wisdom? The kindly Archbishop of Melbourne 
had consolation to offer, but no explanation. He wrote to Audrey Elford:
It is very difficult to give an answer to the question of why this accident 
happened. I can only pass on to you my belief that the Love of God is 
with His children whatever may happen to us. Brave men are always 
prepared to take risks in the discharge of their duty, and if they meet 
with danger or even death, God’s love for them is unchanged. That 
Divine Love meets them upon the other side of the grave, and in their 
Heavenly Father’s keeping all is well with them whether in this life or 
in the life to come.1
The clamouring mysteries of life and death on a fatal flight might in time be 
quieted by pastoral compassion and habits of worship. But preventing the molten 
metal and embers of A16-97 from igniting a flash fire of innuendo, probing, 
and devastating criticism was a challenge that brooked no delay. Frequent as 
they had been in the last decade, aviation accidents remained headline news. 
Not always on the front page as the war progressed, but often alongside the 
1 Abp F. W. Head to Mrs R. E. Elford, 19 Aug. 1940, Elford MSS.
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main political stories. They sold newspapers and drew cinema audiences.2 Press 
photographers jostled to get pictures, sometimes like a Daily Telegraph man 
in May 1939, running afoul of Air Force guards and prompting complaints of 
assault from Frank Packer and the Australian Journalists’ Association to the 
Prime Minister.3 As RAAF pilot training and operations gathered momentum 
in 1940, the increasing frequency of crashes and enquiries from the censors 
prompted a policy clarification from the Air Board to the Director of Staff Duties 
at the beginning of May: statements about accidents were not to be issued to the 
press unless the occupants were killed or seriously injured.4
In the days after the crash of A16-97 hundreds of curious local residents 
flocked to Duncan Cameron’s property. They were kept at bay by guards 
with fixed bayonets. Thousands more saw press photographs, and Cinesound 
and Movietone newsreel footage of the broken and incinerated aircraft and 
commentary on the gravity of the nation’s loss. For the RAAF, therefore, as for 
all air forces around the world, the urgent need to understand what had caused 
a calamitous accident was accompanied by acute concern about a possible loss 
in public confidence.
There was a repertoire of protocol and technique on which shocked authorities 
could draw. The Air Board had turned its mind to the procedures in place 
for investigating Air Force accidents in the week following Robert Menzies’ 
declaration in September 1939 that Australia was at war. Conscious of a recent 
history of embarrassing revelations and jurisdictional squabbles, the Board 
was determined to set a simplified course for the future. Up to four separate 
inquiries could occur in peacetime: ‘(a) Air Force Court of Inquiry (Judicial); 
(b) Inquiry by Air Accidents Investigation Committee; (c) Service (or internal) 
Court of Inquiry; (d) Coroner’s Inquiry.’ Under King’s Regulations for the Royal 
Air Force, incorporated in RAAF Orders, a Court of Inquiry was to be held into 
wartime accidents ‘in the field’ that involved ‘any injury to persons or damage 
to property (including aircraft) unless the Commanding Officer is satisfied that 
the cause of the accident is free from doubt, or that the holding of an inquiry 
would serve no useful purpose.’
2 Leigh Edmonds, ‘How Australians were made airminded’, Continuum: The Australian Journal of Media & 
Culture, vol. 7, no. 1, 1993.
3 NAA: A461, V314/1/1. The Minister for Defence (Geoff Street) detailed an agreement reached in Sydney on 
15 May 1939 with newspaper proprietors and the Australian Journalists’ Association regarding photographs 
of air crashes. In future, photographers would get in touch with the officer in charge. If photographers arrived 
before the officer, the photographs would be submitted before publication to an RAAF officer, who would be 
sent to the newspaper office (Townsville Daily Bulletin, 18 May 1939).
4 NAA: A705, 32/10/2536. Publication of crash photographs was banned in Feb. 1941 (NAA: A2676, 819).
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A16-97 awaiting removal from Cameron’s farm
(Photos by Frank Jefferies, courtesy of the RAAF Museum and Frank and Helen Struc)
The Air Board had urged that the internal Service Courts of Inquiry should 
be held in accordance with King’s Regulations and that judicial inquiries and 
Air Accident Investigation Committee Inquiries should be discontinued. This 
appears to have been the policy followed over the next 11 months. (In the case 
of the Air Accidents Investigation Committee the Secretary of the Air Board 
had already advised that, as it was now constituted under the Air Navigation 
Regulations which did not apply to the Air Force, the AAIC was ‘considered to 
lack jurisdiction in air-force accidents.’)5 There was a further recommendation. 
If coronial inquiries were still to be held, the censor should be instructed that 
no reference to them should be permitted in the press. Wiser heads prevailed. 
As ministers scarred by years of newspaper scrutiny well understood, nothing 
would foster suspicion and discontent more than blatant attempts to suppress 
information about catastrophic events.
5 RAAF 32/10/2208, NAA: A705, 108/2/189.
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Announcements
Just six weeks before the Canberra crash the RAAF had appointed its first 
Director of Public Relations. Sir Keith Murdoch, Director-General of Information 
since late in May, had recommended that each of the three fighting services 
as well as the munitions and supply departments should have public relations 
directorates. The War Cabinet had concurred. The RAAF’s public relations 
operation, approved in detail by the Minister for Air, was mandated to assist 
with recruiting as well as ‘inform and educate’ the general public, and manage 
contact with the press and radio stations. Fairbairn also sought to head off 
‘hasty criticism’ in Canberra with a weekly bulletin of ‘publishable’ RAAF 
activities for parliamentarians. Dick Elford’s friend Archer Kyffin Thomas, the 
chief of staff at the Melbourne Herald, was chosen to lead the directorate in 
Melbourne, and issued the first decisions on procedures after a meeting of the 
Air Minister, Air Board, and Directors late in June.6 But Thomas was not in good 
health and the Herald’s Reg Leonard, a UAP volunteer publicist and a protégé 
of Keith Murdoch’s, with 16 years newspaper experience though still only 33, 
had taken up the RAAF post in July. As luck would have it, Leonard was away 
in Tasmania on the day of the crash, and ‘unable to be involved in dealing 
with Press inquiries and related matters…I was stranded there for a couple of 
days and was more or less “out of the action” during the crisis.’7 Standing in at 
first for Leonard was his deputy Wilfred Bailey Tart, Sir Earle Page’s son-in-law. 
Wilf Tart, as Press Relations Officer, would have been responsible for issuing a 
statement, in accordance with recently confirmed practice, about the accident 
and the names of those who died.8 But on the day after the crash, by the time 
information about action the RAAF was taking was ready for release, Leonard 
was there to authorise it.
The Department of Air announced on Wednesday, August 14 that two inquiries 
were under way. First was an investigation by the Inspectorate of Air Accidents, 
‘an organisation set up in the Department of Air to provide a speedy means 
of investigating R.A.A.F. aircraft accidents and forced landings, in order to 
determine the cause and prevent recurrences’. The Inspector ‘and staff’ had 
left for Canberra on Tuesday. When they had finished their work a report 
would be submitted to the Chief of the Air Staff ‘outlining as far as can be 
gauged the cause of the accident and any underlying circumstances which may 
have contributed directly or indirectly to it’. The phrase about ‘underlying 
6 NAA: AA1966/5/226, A705, 168/1/166; The Advertiser, 19 June 1940.
7 R. B. Leonard to CH, 22 May 1978; Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939–1942, p.103; Lyons MSS 
NAA: M2270 24 for Leonard’s assistance in the 1937 election campaign. Leonard was on the last leg of a visit 
to state capitals to set up relations with RAAF stations and the press (NAA: A705, 168/1/168 Part 1).




circumstances’ was drawn directly from an Air Board order (N391) issued just 
33 days earlier. Without actually saying so, the press release implied that this 
investigation would be little more than a preliminary assessment. But it could 
possibly rule out some feared explanations. Newly sworn-in Minister for Air, 
Arthur Fadden, told the press that the Inspectorate would report to him as well 
as to the Chief of the Air Staff.9
The first concern of the government was to assure the public that the disaster 
was not the work of enemy saboteurs. It was barely six months previously, 
when the first Australian Hudson test flight had been held at Richmond, that 
over-zealous censors had prohibited publication of details of the aircraft’s 
performance. Precisely what secrets might have been divulged was not clear 
for, as Aircraft magazine pointed out, ‘by the expenditure of a few pence at a 
well-stocked local bookstall any school boy can work out their top speed and 
cruising range’.10 Recognising the truth of this, Jim Fairbairn tacitly approved a 
proposal in July that John Harrison, just beginning work at the Public Relations 
Directorate, should prepare an illustrated article on Hudsons for distribution to 
newspapers.11
Ineffectual as restrictions were in relation to an aircraft that was essentially 
similar to one that had been in service around the world for several years, 
there were more justified fears about loose talk. Air Force personnel could 
mostly be relied upon to respect the order issued late in June not to ‘make 
any communication, directly or indirectly’, to the press without the Minister’s 
authorisation.12 Nevertheless, it would have been no surprise to discover that the 
Hudson’s passenger list on August 13 had not been confidential. Far more secret 
information had escaped from loose lips. Squadron Leader Paddy Heffernan had 
reported just over a month earlier that news of No. 8 Squadron’s planned move to 
Singapore had leaked from Air Force Headquarters and ‘people associated with 
Government positions’ within a week of the decision being taken. An officer 
of Heffernan’s No. 8 Squadron en route to Canberra had heard of the proposed 
departure and the destination while pausing for refreshment at the ‘Niagara’ 
café in Gundagai. When the squadron arrived at Alice Springs on August 5 they 
were greeted warmly by a local population supposedly uninformed about where 
they were going.13
9 The Mercury, 15 Aug. 1940.
10 Aircraft, vol. 18 (6), 1 March 1940, p.15.
11 NAA: A705, 168/1/168 Part 1.
12 NAA: AA1966/5/226.
13 CO RAAF Station, Canberra to Secretary, Air Board, 4 July 1940, secret, A1196, 36/501/111; Vincent, The 
RAAF Hudson Story Book One, p.38. Contrast the ‘Gilbertian’ prohibition on the Canberra aerodrome ground 
attendant answering telephone enquiries, even from his departmental head, about whether the mail plane had 
arrived because the RAAF used the same landing ground (Canberra Times, 5 Feb. 1940).
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The possibility of sabotage was on many minds. In the previous week the 
Australian press had reported that the director of the United States Federal Bureau 
of Investigation had announced the discovery of acts of sabotage, including 
the placing of emery dust in aircraft engines and ‘destructive metal in naval 
motive power…Every one of these heinous things,’ J. Edgar Hoover had warned 
dramatically, ‘has been done by persons shielded by innocent but subversive 
forces.’14 It was only a couple of months since the New South Wales Deputy 
Premier, the Country Party’s Michael Bruxner, had attacked the Commonwealth 
government for being slow to recognise the dangers of subversion from both 
communist and fascist groups. The Prime Minister had been obliged to mount a 
public defence without being able to reveal all that had been done, necessarily 
without publicity.15
Military guards had been supplied to Essendon aerodrome and the associated 
aeradio station shortly after war was declared. Menzies had written to state 
premiers noting that sabotage was thought to be the cause of the destruction of a 
hangar and aircraft at Broken Hill, and requesting that they assist by providing 
protection at aeradio transmission stations and aerodromes where aircraft of 
commercial or training value were housed.16 The correspondence was secret. 
By late November RAAF guards were preventing cars from entering Canberra 
aerodrome, to the immediate discomfort of the Prime Minister himself, his wife, 
and Sir Harry Gullett who were compelled to walk several hundred yards to the 
landing ground to catch a Friday morning flight to Melbourne.17
Some newspapers, in ignorance of much that had been done to increase security 
around the country, reported fears that the ‘RAAF bomber’ with its prominent 
passengers might have been sabotaged. The better-informed Daily Telegraph 
said there was no such suspicion. They had perhaps been briefed off the record 
on the three sets of instructions RAAF stations had received within the previous 
four months on ‘the question of special security and anti-sabotage methods’. 
Sentries were doubled (20 men were on guard at Laverton during non-working 
hours). Hangars, usually containing six aircraft, were fully lit as well as locked 
at night.
If security had not been breached, could the aircraft have been carrying too 
much weight? Departmental officials were quick to deny fears that the plane 
14 Canberra Times, 7 Aug. 1940.
15 Don Aitkin, The Colonel: a Political Biography of Sir Michael Bruxner, Australian National University 
Press, Canberra, 1969, pp.239–40. Bruxner had discussed security and intelligence with Menzies and Lt Gen. 
Squires in July 1939 (Squires diary, 21 July 1939, Australian Defence Force Academy [UNSW@ADFA] Library, 
MS 184 folder 2).
16 Prime Minister to Premier of Victoria, n.d. [13 September 1939], Premier’s Office Secret Papers 1889–
1944, 1939/78, Public Record Office of Victoria, VPRS 1172.
17 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 Nov. 1939.
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was overloaded.18 The press were enjoined not to identify the type of aircraft, 
though the Canberra Times and Western Mail had already done so, and it was 
readily recognisable from photographs and newsreels of the wreckage. The 
Mercury left even less to the imagination by putting a photograph of ‘an RAAF 
bomber in flight’ across six columns of its front page on August 14.
The absurdity of the censorship was pointed out by the Cairns Post, reporting 
on August 24 that the Commonwealth Gazette had mentioned that the aircraft 
was a Hudson. The inadvertent revelation was made in a notification of the 
appointment of RAAF ‘assessors’ to assist an announced open inquiry into the 
accident. Among the thousands of people for whom this was not news, Jim 
Fairbairn’s grieving widow Peggy had wondered aloud to family and friends 
about sabotage. Of those reliant on other sources of information, at least one 
psychic was moved to write to the Prime Minister about a clairaudient revelation 
that ‘The landing controls were tampered with’, followed by a clairvoyant view 
of ‘a man in white overalls kneeling under the machine doing something with 
his right hand…I am also told for you to question the sentry or watchman on 
duty.’19
Since the signing of the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact, subversion could 
be suspected from more than one direction. The security services had long 
been watchful of communists, Nazi and fascist sympathisers, and those with 
Japanese connections. Years later some contemporaries remembered speculation 
that the pilot Bob Hitchcock might have been a fifth columnist. Members of 
the Wiesener family, whose grandfather had been naturalised in 1876, recalled 
feeling that they might be under suspicion because of their German origins. 
Unfounded though they were, these were predictable responses to a shocking 
and inexplicable event. They could not be completely ignored. But they were 
unlikely to deflect those responsible for investigating the tragedy from their 
proper focus on more likely explanations. It was not as if aircraft accidents were 
a rare phenomenon.
In addition to the rapid deployment of the Inspectorate of Air Accidents, the 
press were advised, a Service Court of Inquiry had been constituted ‘under 
Air Force regulations’. The purpose of the Service Court would be ‘to inquire 
into and to report upon the circumstances surrounding the accident’. It would 
make a ‘thorough review of all relevant factors’ and submit recommendations 
to the Air Board ‘to avoid any similar occurrence in the future’. Anticipating 
some possible puzzlement about the overlapping roles of the two processes now 
in train, the statement concluded: ‘The ultimate aim of the two investigating 
18 Air Force Court of Inquiry, evidence of S/Ldr A. D. Carey, 27 Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729; Daily 
Telegraph, 14 Aug.1940.
19 Geoffrey Fairbairn, interview, 10 Oct. 1978; I. Harry to Prime Minister, 18 Aug. 1940, NAA: A461, 
AM314/1/1.
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bodies is the same, but they work entirely independently.’20 It was presumably 
thought that confusion might be compounded if an attempt were made to 
correct reports in many newspapers linking Group Captain D. E. L. Wilson and 
two other officers examining the wreckage on the afternoon of August 13 with 
the superseded Air Accidents Investigation Committee.
‘A complicated one to operate’
While the machinery of investigation was being mobilised at Southern Area 
headquarters in 10 Irving Road Toorak, in Sydney the moment was being seized 
to advance ‘King’ Cole’s agenda for the training of Hudson pilots. Four days 
after the crash, a conference of station commanders, commanders of squadrons 
equipped with Hudsons, and other staff concerned, was convened at Central 
Area HQ in Edgecliff. Air Commodore Cole reported immediately to the Secretary 
of the Air Board that it was agreed that:
since the Lockheed type was a complicated one to operate, had a wing 
loading of ten pounds per square foot more than any other type in the 
Service, and the supply was limited, the question of their successful 
operation would require pilots with the following attributes:
a. Above average flying ability as shown by graduation course and 
subsequent experience.
b. To be of a reliable type, and
c. To have had at least 500 hours solo by day and by night.
Cole had already argued that previous postings to squadrons with Hudsons had 
included people who did not meet these standards. He reiterated that many of 
the present postings of flying ranks were ‘below average in their flying course, 
weak in instrument flying, and have as little as 45 hours solo experience’. In 
many cases, Cole said, individuals had none of the requisite attributes; ‘and 
their present demeanour would suggest that it will take a considerable period to 
achieve all — in the interim they would be dangerous first pilots on the type’. 
The remedy, rejected four weeks earlier, was immediate switching of postings 
with officers of ‘known ability’ replacing those of the ‘lower category’. Ten 
men — seven flying officers and three pilot officers — were named. And Cole 
concluded with a ‘recommended flow’ scheme by which the optimal conversion 
of first pilots could be achieved.21
20 NAA: A9845, 319/22.
21 NAA: A705, 208/1/1533.
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Cole’s persistence, opportunistic as it was, is understandable in the context of 
the RAAF’s recent history. Never noted for his tact, his personal assertiveness 
also owed something to the diminishing of his influence resulting from the 
supersession of his friend Air Commodore Williams.22 Concern about accidents 
had been a perennial preoccupation of the Air Board and Defence ministers 
through the 1920s and 1930s. After a spate of misadventures involving Hawker 
Demons, the RAF’s Inspector-General, Air Marshal Sir Edward Ellington, 
had reported to the Australian government in July 1938 that the training of 
both RAAF pilots and their instructors was deficient. Ellington’s observations 
about accidents had led ineluctably to a more wide-ranging review. His secret 
criticisms, extending to the responsibility of the Air Board, provided grounds 
and a rationale, if not an unanswerable case, for changes at the top. The 
government, seizing on the Ellington critique, was happy to look as though it 
was doing something. In vain did the Air Board ‘emphatically contest’ Ellington’s 
flawed accident analysis. Someone had to take the blame. Unmoved by Air Board 
rebuttals of Ellington’s conclusions, and stiffened in his resolve by a hostile press 
campaign casting the affair as a triumph for a pro-English school of thought, the 
Prime Minister had pronounced that ‘the main responsibility’ for shortcomings 
rested with the Chief of the Air Staff, Richard Williams. Noting that further 
accidents ‘indicated the persistence of underlying causes’, the government 
sidelined Williams, whose determined recommendation of American aircraft 
for the RAAF had cost him the support of Menzies and Casey. Williams was 
replaced with his perennial rival Jimmy Goble.23 Goble had been away with the 
RAF for two years to January 1938. He adroitly disclaimed responsibility for the 
unsatisfactory situation highlighted by Ellington. Within a year, Goble in turn 
had overplayed his hand, been moved aside, and succeeded by an RAF officer, 
Sir Charles Burnett.
As we have seen, Air Chief Marshal Burnett, not Menzies’ first choice, owed his 
appointment to an uncharacteristic episode of insubordination by Fairbairn. 
Burnett had developed a good relationship with his minister. Much as he would 
have preferred Dicky Williams in the post, Fairbairn was pragmatic. He realised 
that the Scottish Air Marshal had a grasp and vigour, despite recurring ill-health, 
that had been good for the Air Force. On 4 July 1940 Cabinet had endorsed 
Fairbairn’s recommendation that the CAS’s appointment should be extended for 
22 Chris Coulthard-Clark, McNamara VC: a hero’s dilemma, Air Power Studies Centre, Fairbairn ACT, 1997, 
p.82; Knight, These Things Happened, p.383.
23 Report of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward L. Ellington…on the Royal Australian Air Force 
together with the Comments of the Air Board and the Civil Aviation Board and the Decisions and Observations of 
the Commonwealth Government, [Jan. 1939]; ‘War Mates Rally To Aid Of Williams’, Sunday Sun and Guardian, 
16 Oct. 1938, ‘Innocent Aussie Taking Blame For Errors’, Truth, 15 Oct. 1938, cuttings in Williams MSS, RAAF 
Museum.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
428
another year.24 Burnett had been determined to prove that he was worthy of the 
Minister’s trust. Growing evidence of problems with Hudsons as they came into 
service was an embarrassment that could not be concealed from his political 
masters. On June 13, information about four accidents had been circulated to 
Area commands at his behest. Aiming to prevent similar occurrences and to 
impress on unit commanders and other officers the need for close supervision of 
training and maintenance, ‘Dad’ Bladin provided brief details of each incident. 
A pilot had landed with his tail wheel unlocked; another had attempted to climb 
at too slow a speed after take-off; a third had stalled back to the ground because 
he failed to remove hoar frost; and the fourth had lost power in both engines as 
tank drain cocks had not been opened to discharge water that condensed inside 
the tank.25
These were not trivial incidents. One of them was fatal. And too many people 
knew about them. At a meeting of the War Cabinet in Melbourne on July 23 the 
matter was raised. ‘Arising from rumours of recent crashes of Hudson aircraft, 
the Chief of the Air Staff said that he would include in his report in future 
reference to any serious losses that might occur.’26 The wording was curious. 
The crashes were not just rumoured. They had actually happened. It was 
rumours about unexplained crashes that presumably were creating anxiety. 
The next day Bladin, writing on behalf of the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, 
advised appropriate colleagues that the minister wanted the Weekly Statement 
to include the number of aircraft that had been written off.27
Aware that his predecessor but one, the luckless Williams, had been held 
accountable for unacceptable losses of pilots and aircraft, Burnett had already 
pressed George Jones for action as Director of Training. In his second month 
in the job Burnett realised that he did not know what system was being 
used to investigate and analyse accidents. ‘I wish a proper record of flying 
accidents kept and analysed so that periodic instructions can be sent out for 
the benefit of the Flying Training Schools and others.’ From a hustle of review 
and recommendations it emerged that the preliminary accident report form and 
subsequent analysis based on an American format were about to be replaced 
with a process ‘more in keeping with the R.A.F. system’. Fresh instructions 
about accident reporting were promulgated in mid-May.28 At first Jones, now 
a Group Captain, tried to develop a better appreciation of what was really 
24 ‘Extension of Appointment of Chief of the Air Staff’, War Cabinet Minute 392, 3 July 1940, NAA: A5954, 
804/1.
25 NAA: A705, 32/10/2478.
26 ‘Extract from War Cabinet Minutes, 23rd July 1940’, NAA: A5954, 331/1.
27 NAA: A1196, 37/501/14.
28 Since March 1938 considerable effort had been devoted to revising form E/E/24 for reporting technical 
and training matters arising from aircraft ‘casualties’. As late as April 1940 forms amended in Nov. 1939 
had not been distributed (NAA: A705, 32/10/1950). It had been determined in August 1937 that messages 
reporting aircraft casualties should be in plain language, not code or cypher (NAA: A705, 32/10/1764).
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happening. A statistical analysis was to be prepared each month showing the 
numbers of accidents, their causes, the penalties imposed, and the remedies 
adopted. Instructors and pupils were required to sight the reports. Burnett had 
personally corrected the text of the order and a covering letter, expunging some 
ill-considered words that were ‘most dangerous to give to Pilots. To say we 
allow aircraft to be flown that are dangerous to fly owing to age will not foster 
confidence with the Pilot or his relatives.’29
In a further endeavour to at least do something about recurring collisions, Jones 
‘cooked up a scheme’. In the absence of better suggestions, he remembered, ‘I 
originally decided to put a big red sticker on the instrument board of every 
aeroplane: Avoid collisions. Look out for other aircraft.’ When the order to print 
the notices crossed the desk of ‘Johnnie’ Coleman, the Secretary of the Air 
Board and Air Council and the first Assistant Secretary of the Department of 
Air, counselled more customary public service language: ‘Wouldn’t it be better 
to say: In accordance with regulations so and so you are required to keep a sharp 
look-out?’ Jones recalled that he prevailed, notwithstanding that Coleman’s 
‘sharp look-out’ was quoted from the Air Board Order on ‘Flying Instruction — 
Approaching and Landing’, issued at the end of April 1940.30
It was one thing to issue orders, but as the Director of Operations and 
Intelligence would comment on ‘recent accidents’ in July: ‘in the end it is the 
vigilance of the flight or squadron commander and the efficiency of the unit 
training which determine whether pilots apply the orders issued’.31 And on the 
morning of August 13, Jones’s bureaucratic victory over someone not known to 
throw his weight around shrivelled into insignificance. It was a time when the 
organisation and its senior men would be put to a test unlike anything they had 
hitherto encountered.
Accident investigation
Viewed from a distance of over 70 years, the reactions of the Air Force and 
government are remarkable for their speed and effectiveness. On the day of 
the crash, RAAF procedure entailed the prompt completion of a one-page 
‘Preliminary report (external) of flying accident or forced landing’. Procedure 
was followed, presumably on receipt of a signal from Canberra to the duty 
officer at headquarters. The form was completed and submitted as required to 
the Secretary, Department of Air. However, the next day it was replaced by a 
29 CAS [Chief of Air Staff] to AMP (DT), 28 Feb. 1940, NAA: A707, 32/10/2478.
30 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept. 1977. In From Private to Air Marshal: The Autobiography of Air 
Marshal Sir George Jones, p.67, the intervention of Coleman is omitted; NAA: AA 1997/635; A705, 32/10/2476.
31 NAA: A705, 208/1/1549.
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second version bearing the annotation ‘This cancels preliminary report 39 dated 
13/8/40.’ The second version on file is also numbered 39. The original does not 
appear to survive in the National Archives. Nor is there an explanation of why 
it was thought necessary to replace it.32
It would be fruitless to speculate on why another report would have been 
substituted for the original. But it may be doubted that it was normal practice 
to do so.33 The ‘preliminary’ report, submitted by the Director of Training (DoT) 
and bearing the signature of the DoT, George Jones, provided cryptic details. 
‘Nature of Accident: Spun into ground.’ ‘Probable cause: Obscure.’ Reflecting 
the recent concern to understand and if possible reduce accidents, the printed 
circulation list was headed by the Minister for Air, then the Chief of the Air 
Staff, the Air Member for Organisation and Equipment, the Air Member for 
Personnel, the Secretary of the Air Board, and the Director of Medical Services 
(Air). The Assistant Secretary of the Air Board added his own initials.34 A typed 
addition to the names printed on the circulation list was ‘Gp Captain Murphy’.
Arthur W. Murphy, already at 49 a veteran RAAF flyer who had begun in the 
Australian Flying Corps as a technical warrant officer, had been appointed 
Inspector of Aircraft Accidents only two months earlier. As a Wing Commander 
immediately before this, he had commanded the No. 1 Aircraft Depot at 
Laverton. After wartime service with the Royal Flying Corps and Australian 
Flying Corps which earned him a DFC, ‘Spud’ Murphy had made his mark in 
1919 as the sergeant mechanic accompanying his old Melbourne High School 
friend Captain Harry Wrigley on an epochal trans-continental survey flight 
from Point Cook to Darwin. His technical background as well as his long flying 
experience had made him a logical choice to lead accident investigations.35 In 
December 1937, when controversy erupted over a spate of what the Defence 
Department suggested should be called ‘mishaps’ — including the death of Pilot 
Officer J. F. Fallon, the son of a Labor MP — Murphy had been appointed by 
the Air Board with Group Captain W. H. Anderson and Wing Commander E. C. 
Wackett as a special committee to ‘investigate the troubles experienced recently 
with Demon aircraft fitted with Rolls Royce “Kestrel” engines’.36 Jack Graham, 
who had been called from the RAAF’s legal office into a personnel role early in 
32 There does not appear to be a revised form E/E 24 relating to A16-97.
33 I have not seen a similar note on any of hundreds of other reports in this period.
34 ‘Lockheed Hudson A16 [Accidents Part 2]’, NAA: A9845, 135/27. The form is annotated with references 
to other files on which copies were presumably placed: 32/10/2824, 32/10/2729, 32/10/2733.
35 Alan Fraser, ‘Murphy, Arthur William (1891–1963)’, Nairn and Serle (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 10, p.633 does not mention the Air Accident Inspectorate. In 1936 Murphy had been part of 
a mission overseas to advise on aircraft suitable for production in Australia, and was involved in the decision 
to produce the Beaufort and the establishment of the Commonwealth Aircraft Factory. Murphy’s wartime 
exploits in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Arabia earned him a place, ‘one of the immortals by proxy’, in the 
index of T. E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Stanley Brogden, Sky Diggers: A Tribute to the R.A.A.F., 
Whitcombe & Tombs, Melbourne, 1944, p.14).
36 ‘Accidents to Hawker Demon Aircraft 7/12/1937’, Secret Confidential, NAA: A5954, 869/10.
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1940, remembered Murphy as ‘a hard bitten character’.37 He would be expected 
to work quickly and report candidly. He had known and served with Richard 
Williams since the very earliest days of the AFC. There were few men in the 
senior ranks of the permanent Service whom Murphy did not know personally. 
Charles Burnett, like Williams before him, reposed considerable trust in him.
The Inspectorate was the creation of the Chief of the Air Staff. At a staff 
conference on 18 June 1940, Burnett had been surprised to discover that the 
Director of Training, not the Director of Operations and Intelligence, was 
responsible for Courts of Inquiry.38 Impatient at the delay in forwarding findings 
about a Hudson that had force-landed after both engines cut out, he directed 
that proceedings of Courts should reach headquarters more quickly. His temper 
was not improved when the Director of Technical Services revealed that the 
Hudson had been imperilled because the daily inspection had not been properly 
carried out and water had not been drained from the petrol tanks.39 Plainly 
mistrustful of the adequacy of existing arrangements, Burnett had set his own 
machinery in motion. The Service was notified of the existence of Murphy’s 
unit and its functions in a temporary order issued on July 11. The unit had 
no statutory basis but action was in train to establish it formally and confer its 
functions and powers by regulation under the National Security Act.
Burnett’s initiative paralleled a change to the more formal practice. The Air 
Accidents Investigation Committee, whose jurisdiction over RAAF accidents 
had been queried a year earlier, was abolished as from 7 August 1940. It had 
taken some nine months to draw up the Air Navigation regulations necessary 
to put into effect the Cabinet decision to abolish the Air Accidents Committee 
— thereby saving £600 a year as well as the time of senior officers who were 
members — and to establish Air Courts of Inquiry.40 Under statutory rule 
No. 155 of 1940 the new Courts of Inquiry would ensure due process and the 
representation of RAAF interests. But Burnett wanted advice without delay, 
irrespective of process. In fact, the dual system of investigation was the outcome 
of a struggle for control that had erupted 18 months earlier.
Early in 1939 the Acting Director-General of Civil Aviation, Maurice Mehaffey, 
in collaboration with the Crown Solicitor, Harry Whitlam, had begun to prepare 
a bill for the creation of Air Courts of Inquiry constituted on similar lines to 
the traditional Marine Courts of Inquiry. Civil Aviation Minister Vic Thorby 
37 GpCpt. J. E. Graham, interview, 11 May 1978.
38 Although lines were sometimes crossed, responsibility for investigating accidents lay with the Director 
of Training ‘because the majority of accidents are due to the pilot’s error and the D.T. being responsible for 
flying training is in the best position to prevent their recurrence’ (S/Ldr J. M. McCauley D.T. to AVM H. R. 
Nicholl A.M.P., 19 March 1937, NAA: A705, 32/10/1704).
39 Report of Staff Conferences Nos 39, 40, 18 and 25 June 1940, NAA: AA1977/635.
40 H. E. Holt (A/g Minister for Civil Aviation), ‘Air Courts of Inquiry’, Cabinet Agenda 244, approved 30 
Nov. 1939, NAA: A461, V314/1/1.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
432
had referred the proposal to the Defence Minister, Geoff Street, for advice on 
20 February 1939. Street passed it to the Air Board. Alarmed by the prospect of 
intrusion into Service affairs, the Board scurried to defend its autonomy. Within 
four days Air Commodore Williams had made it clear that he agreed with his 
subordinates that ‘in the first instance they should try to remain outside the 
jurisdiction of the proposed Air Court of Inquiry’. ‘If unsuccessful,’ the fall-
back position was that ‘they should limit it to fatal accidents only and that the 
assessors be Air Force officers.’ Meanwhile Air Commodore Goble, four days 
from formally taking over from Williams as Chief of the Air Staff, ‘directed that 
no reference be made to the Air Accidents Investigation Committee at present’.
The Air Board’s case was developed in a minute to the Secretary of the 
Department of Civil Aviation on February 24. With the provocative caveat, ‘on 
the assumption that the Government has already decided to establish an Air 
Court of Inquiry’, they accepted that the proposals of the Director-General of 
Civil Aviation were ‘satisfactory so far as civil aviation is concerned’. But there 
the agreement ended:
As for Air Force accidents, these are now investigated by a Service 
Court of Inquiry, as it is in the vital interest of the Board, and the Royal 
Australian Air Force as a whole, to discover causes. Irrespective of what 
other Courts or Committees may be charged to investigate Air Force 
accidents, this internal Court of Inquiry must still be held, and the Board 
feels that such a Court, conducted by qualified officers of experience, is 
the most satisfactory means of investigating Air Force accidents.
The argument then shifted to another level.
The Government, on the advice of the Air Board, has consistently 
refused to agree to allow Air Force accidents to be investigated at ‘open’ 
enquiries, and it is considered that this policy should continue. The 
Air Force is a fighting Service dependent mainly on the morale of its 
pilots for its efficiency in flying, and it is considered that the publicity 
connected with open investigations would have a most harmful effect on 
the morale of the young pilot or cadet pupil.
The conclusion embodied the outgoing Chief of the Air Staff’s position: Air 
Force accidents should not come under the jurisdiction of the proposed new Air 
Courts of Inquiry. Just as accidents involving naval vessels were excluded from 
Marine Courts of Inquiry so should RAAF accidents be subject only to Service 
inquiries.
If the Air Board thought that was the end of the matter they were in for a 
shock. When the Defence Minister saw their advice he recognised the political 
danger at once: ‘I cannot agree that public opinion would be satisfied with the 
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investigation of Air Force accidents by R.A.A.F. Courts of Inquiry only.’ Street 
had been unimpressed by the RAAF response to a forced landing on King Island 
on 11 September 1938. The Court of Inquiry was belated and ‘the facts were 
only elucidated promptly by reference to the Air Accidents Committee’. Geoff 
Street laid down the policy that was to be followed:
R.A.A.F. Courts of Inquiry can still operate for Service purposes, but Air 
Force accidents should be dealt with by the Air Court of Inquiry, and 
an Air Force officer added as an additional assessor in these cases. Rules 
can be laid down for dealing with accidents in camera where important 
Service considerations are involved, or the Court can use its discretion.
Lest it be thought that he was surrendering any Defence prerogatives, Street 
added an oral assurance, noted on the file the same day: as far as Air Force 
accidents were concerned any powers to be exercised by ‘the Minister’ under 
the new Act or regulations should be vested in the Minister for Defence, not the 
Minister for Civil Aviation.41
Burnett’s inspectorate
With the appointment of a Minister for Air late in 1939, Geoff Street’s role in 
relation to Air Force aircraft accidents had passed to his friend Jim Fairbairn. 
The new minister brought another dose of common sense to the developing 
regulatory regime. He successfully urged the deletion of a draft clause 
mandating a Court of Inquiry whenever there was loss of life or serious injury. 
There would, he said, be cases where there was some obvious cause that would 
not warrant bringing in a judge and assessors. It would be far better that the 
minister should have discretion to decide if an investigation was in the public 
interest, or if it was desirable because the department was unable to certify the 
cause of an accident or had not ‘correctly explained’ it. More worrying for civil 
aviation officials was an entirely new recommendation, accepted by Cabinet on 
29 May 1940, that would enable any officer authorised by the Director-General 
to investigate any accident or forced landing that had not previously been 
referred to an Air Court of Inquiry, and to summon witnesses to give evidence 
on oath or affirmation.42
Although not directly affected by these changes, Sir Charles Burnett was alert to 
the fact that his minister not only knew a lot about flying but had strong views 
about the government’s accountability to a potentially fractious electorate. 
41 NAA: A705 108/2/189; A432, 39/442.
42 NAA: A461, F114/1/1. Fairbairn’s submission, 8 May 1940, took further proposals brought to Cabinet in 
his absence by Holt, Cabinet Agenda 244, ‘Air Courts of Inquiry’, NAA: A2697, roll 2.
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Burnett had realised that if he was to keep ahead of political curiosity and 
concern, and of inquiries he could not control, it was essential to have his own 
‘quick and expert’ source of information. His first thought had been to bring in 
an outsider, independent of the RAAF hierarchy, as ‘Inspector of Air Accidents’. 
Advice on suitable men from A. B. Corbett, Director-General of the Department 
of Civil Aviation and his deputy E. C. Johnston, led to an overture to Qantas 
for the services of their chief engineer, Arthur Baird. Qantas managing director 
Hudson Fysh, communicating directly with his old friend Jim Fairbairn, made 
it clear that Baird could not be spared.43 No other available ‘outside’ man met 
Burnett’s requirements. He therefore settled on Wing Commander Murphy, 
who was recommended by Air Commodore Anderson over the objection of Air 
Marshal Williams who thought Murphy would be ‘pulling a far greater weight’ 
in command of the Aircraft Depot. Murphy was instructed that he would 
operate directly under the CAS’s orders ‘or those of the Deputy Chief of the Air 
Staff, and you will be responsible solely to me, through the Deputy Chief of the 
Air Staff’ — the arrangement demonstrating the unique position of trust and 
authority now enjoyed by Bill Bostock. The Inspectorate’s remit covered all Air 
Force aircraft accidents and forced landings. Its brief was to ascertain the cause 
of an accident and recommend suitable preventative action for the future. An 
unadvertised occasional extra dimension of their mission was to take a good look 
at station administration, aircraft maintenance, and flying orders, especially 
in new Elementary and Service Flying Schools manned by comparatively 
inexperienced COs, chief flying instructors, instructors, and ground personnel. 
Murphy thus ran a de facto unofficial organisational investigation team for the 
Chief of the Air Staff.44
Burnett’s Inspectorate, a rather grand name for what at the time was a four-man 
operation — the ‘staff’ mentioned by the departmental press release was one 
legal officer, a clerk, and a pilot — was despatched to Canberra in the afternoon 
of August 13.45 Murphy’s initials on the ‘preliminary’ form are undated but he 
would certainly have known of its unenlightening contents before he left. He 
had already that morning heard of another accident that might ordinarily have 
demanded his attention. A Hudson of No. 23 Squadron based at Archerfield had 
disappeared the day before on a navigation exercise out to sea. Three pilots and 
43 ‘Air Accidents — Investigation of’, NAA: A705, 32/1/45 Part 1. In March 1943, the DCAS was advised 
that ‘the file covering the formation and policy of the Inspectorate…was lost towards the end of 1941’ and the 
Inspectorate had been operating for 18 months without terms of reference. The file was identified and released 
for the first time on 17 May 2013.
44 Sir Harry Winneke, interview, 18 Jan. 1979; ‘CAS — Inspectorate of Aircraft Accidents — Policy’, NAA: 
A705, 32/1/45 PART 2. The establishment of the Inspectorate was belatedly announced in a press release in 
Fairbairn’s name on 8 Aug. 1940 but Gillison (Royal Australian Air Force 1939–1942, p.96) was mistaken in 
saying that it was ‘set up to make confidential reports to the Minister’.
45 Two fitters on the establishment of No. 1 Aircraft Depot were to be placed at the disposal of the 
Inspectorate ‘as and when required’ (NAA: A705, 231/9/462).
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three other men were missing.46 In the absence of physical evidence there was 
no immediate call for the Inspectorate’s presence in Queensland. So Murphy 
and his associate, Squadron Leader Harry Winneke, the able young Melbourne 
barrister originally attached to the RAAF legal section, scrambled for Canberra. 
Harry Winneke’s flying experience was limited. He was not a pilot. He was not 
there to be an aviation expert but to use his forensic skills to elicit information 
from witnesses. He had enjoyed the benefit of kindly instruction from ‘Air Force 
fellows…they’d take me down to Point Cook and those places and explain the 
theory of flight to me, take me up in the air and put me through the controls and 
show me how the aircraft worked’.47
Winneke was no stranger to aircraft accidents. In November and December 
1938 he had represented Associated Airlines Pty Ltd during the Air Accidents 
Investigation Committee’s inquiry into the Kyeema crash. That had been a 
significant learning experience. As the inquiry report noted: ‘The accident in 
question involved a greater loss of life than any other aircraft accident which has 
ever occurred in Australia and one of the most serious in the history of regular air 
transport throughout the world.’48 It was not just the 15 men and three women who 
perished, but the enormous publicity surrounding the most prominent of them, 
the greatly respected federal MP Charles Hawker, that made the Kyeema accident 
so notable. A separate inquiry headed by Robert Lawson, the Chief Engineer of 
the Postmaster General’s Department, had revealed the administration of civil 
aviation to be dysfunctional. Sweeping organisational reforms were recommended 
and implemented: too late to save the lives of the Kyeema’s passengers and crew. 
Too late, also, for the peace of mind of Jim Fairbairn and Geoff Street, the distressed 
political colleagues and friends of Charles Hawker, who blamed the bungling and 
procrastination of the Civil Aviation Board for the failure to install and test radio 
beacons that might have prevented the crash.49
In mid-1939 Winneke had been counsel assisting with RAAF accident inquiries 
run by Justice H. B. Piper.50 He was thus familiar with the new Air Court of 
Inquiry process. With Piper he had been taken on familiarisation flights 
in Ansons, given basic instruction in the theory of flight, and even flown 
alongside the pilot in a dual-control aircraft. His forceful leading of evidence 
on the Riverstone crash of A4-32 and the Port Philip Bay crash of A4-11 
suggested that the pilots, not the machines, were at fault. He had struck a chord 
at RAAF headquarters. Very early in the war he was asked by Group Captain 
46 ‘Lockheed Hudson A16 [Accidents Part 1]’, NAA: A9845, 134.
47 Sir Harry Winneke, interview, 18 Jan. 1979.
48 ‘Department of Defence Air Accidents Investigation Committee, Report on…Fatal Accident to the 
Douglas D. C. 2 Aircraft VH-UYC “Kyeema”…’, Melbourne, 5 Dec. 1938, p.1, enclosed in Australian Archives 
Accession MP 1353/3, ‘Civil Aviation confidential report on Kyeema crash, 1938’.
49 For the ‘minefield of bureaucratic delays’, see Macarthur Job, Disaster in the Dandenongs: the Kyeema 
airliner tragedy, Sierra Publishing & Mount Dandenong Historical Society, 2008, pp.48–55.
50 NAA: A705, 32/10/2387.
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Bill Bostock, then Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, to join up to handle courts 
of inquiry, courts martial, and various other personnel matters that were the 
anticipated consequence of a rapidly expanding Service. He had been posted to 
the Inspectorate of Air Accidents in mid-June 1940.51
Harry Winneke, advocate and accident investigator
(Sketch attributed to Roy Hodgkinson, courtesy of Heather Winneke)52
The Air Member for Personnel had pleaded in vain that Winneke be retained in 
his legal role but Burnett’s incontrovertible argument was that he would work 
smoothly with Murphy ‘who, I fancy, is sometimes a little difficult in producing 
his meaning on paper’.53 In August, the Accident Inspectorate was on 24-hour 
standby, with their own aircraft, Dick Casey’s four-seater Percival P10 Vega 
51 Robert Coleman, Above Renown: The Biography of Sir Henry Winneke, Macmillan & Herald & Weekly 
Times, Melbourne, 1988, pp.93, 98–9, for a different version of Bostock’s approach to Winneke.
52 The image is attributed to Roy Hodgkinson in Robert Coleman’s biography of Winneke but on close 
inspection the signature is indistinct.  
53 NAA: A705, 32/1/45 Part 1.
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Gull Six, now impressed and repaired for Service use. Complete with Casey’s 
customised soft-leather upholstery, it was a luxury ride ‘more like flying in a 
saloon car than in an aeroplane. One can even carry on a reasonable conversation 
while in flight.’ They had their own pilot, an RFC and commercial flyer, Frank 
Neale. Neale had been recalled to duty at Laverton as a flying officer, later 
promoted squadron leader in charge of the Communication Flight, a small fleet 
of light aircraft formed at Laverton in November 1939 and available to move Air 
Officers Commanding Groups or Areas and their staffs.54 It was into this unit 
that the private planes of both Casey and Fairbairn had been collected.55 The 
crash in Canberra was to be the Inspectorate’s most sensitive assignment; and 
the CAS needed answers rapidly.
The Service looks after its own
Murphy and Winneke were not to have the field to themselves. Independently 
of the Air Force, Commonwealth Police detectives and uniformed officers were 
already interviewing witnesses and preparing statements for the Coroner. The 
Inspectorate was also raced to the scene and to the witnesses by the members 
of a specially constituted Service Court of Inquiry. Under Air Force Regulations 
such a Service Court could be assembled by the Air Board or, in the carefully 
chosen words of the Secretary of the Board, Mel Langslow, ‘other appropriate 
air-force authority’. As Langslow advised the new Minister for Air, the Country 
Party’s Arthur Fadden, two days after the crash, it was not superseded by 
the new Inspectorate; and when assembled ‘may still function in the normal 
way and even investigate the same accident’. What Langslow did not say was 
that Burnett’s Inspectorate took precedence in access to the wreckage. As the 
Air Board Order had put it on July 11: ‘A court of inquiry shall not…without 
the permission of the Inspectorate, interfere with, for purposes of inspection 
or examination, any aircraft involved in an accident concerning which the 
Inspectorate has been directed to report.’ If there were to be a Service Court of 
Inquiry inspection or examination, it would ‘normally take place concurrently 
with that conducted by the Inspectorate, but the Inspectorate may grant such 
permission subject to such conditions as it thinks fit’.56
54 Edward P. Wixted, The North-West Aerial Frontier 1919–1934, Boolarong Publications, Brisbane, 1985, 
pp.196–7 for Neale, ‘one of the great aerial achievers of Australian history’. Neale had ferried Fairbairn from 
Mt Elephant to Laverton in Vega Gull A32-1 on 3 June 1940 (NAA: A11094, 5/6/Air Part B.).
55 Sandy Johnstone diary, 20 March 1940, Air Vice-Marshal Sandy Johnstone, Enemy in the Sky: My 1940 
Diary, William Kimber, London, 1976, p.36; AFCO 15–16/1939, NAA: A7674, 1/30; Sir Harry Winneke, 
interview, 18 Jan. 1979. Maie Casey recorded ‘Gull goes’, diary, 15 Jan. 1940, Lady Casey MSS, NLA MS 
1840/13. A second Vega Gull had been impressed from the Queensland pastoralist and aviation enthusiast J. 
W. F. Collins shortly before he was commissioned into the RAAF in March 1940 (NAA: A705, 9/23/163/10).
56 ABO N391/1940, 11 July 1940, NAA: AA1977 635.
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The Air Board did not need ministerial approval to set up a Service Court. 
Unlike the less formal procedure of Murphy and Winneke, a Service Court 
had unfettered authority to call and examine Air Force personnel. It could also 
invite, though not compel, civil witnesses.57 Within hours of news of the crash 
reaching Melbourne, Group Captain U. E. Ewart, Senior Administrative Staff 
Officer, Southern Area, had signed off on the appointment of a three-person 
Court of Inquiry. The president was to be Wing Commander L. V. Lachal, a 
36-year-old career officer lately returned from the United Kingdom where 
he had been CO of No. 10 Squadron, and currently working alongside Ulex 
Ewart at Headquarters Southern Area in  Toorak.58 The other members were 
Squadron Leader Frederick Ivor Stevens on engineer duties at No. 1 Service 
Flying Training School, and Pilot Officer George A. Pape, who was ‘marched in’ 
to join the law staff attached to Southern Area HQ on August 5 after completing 
a month’s course for administrative and special-duties officers. Thirty-seven 
years old, unmarried, and living at home with his father, in applying for a 
commission Pape had modestly noted ‘13 years as a barrister with a reasonably 
good practice’.59 His presence was, as Lachal would recall, a ‘very happy co-
incidence’. The team was to submit ‘proceedings in triplicate…not later than 
MONDAY, 19th August, 1940’.60
Leon Lachal, a Xavier College boy, had risen in 14 years from cadet to squadron 
commander and senior headquarters staff appointments. He had experience of 
courts of inquiry. He was trusted and understood the urgency. Honest, pleasant, 
and well-liked, ‘Old Stump’ (he was about 6ft 3in, the RAAF photographer, John 
Harrison, remembered) was not a man to make waves. ‘He was a sound fellow,’ 
his chief, Harry Wrigley, recalled, ‘he had a pretty wide flying experience, 
and he had a fund of common sense.’61 But he had not flown Hudsons. Fred 
Stevens, a CAF officer aged 37 called to serve at HQ in 1939, was fully alert to 
the implications of the crash for the flying training task to which he had been 
posted at Point Cook. He had been a sergeant pilot and had been Lachal’s flying 
instructor.62 Pape, whose service in the Melbourne University Regiment had 
57 Minute, Secretary, Air Board to Minister, ‘Investigation of Accidents Affecting Air-Force Aircraft’, 15 
Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2733. A concerned Mel Langslow had written to the Secretary of the Attorney-
General’s Department on Aug. 21 suggesting that the draft Inspectorate of Air Accidents Regulations would 
need amendment as they would have prohibited the Air Court of Inquiry approved by the government. A-G’s 
had been sent the draft on July 10; on Nov. 4 the Air Department was advised that their enactment was in 
hand as ‘an urgent matter’. The Statutory Rules were finally agreed in May 1941 (NAA: A705, 32/1/45 Part 1).
58 HQ Southern Area had been No. 1 Group HQ until renamed in March 1940 and transferred from 425 St 
Kilda Road to the old Creswick family mansion ‘Yarrien’ which was scheduled for demolition, its five acres to 
be sub-divided into 19 home sites (NAA: A11334, 2/1/1/Air; The Argus, 26 Aug. 1939). The RAAF was not 
permitted to use the name ‘Yarrien’ during its tenancy (NAA: A705, 4/4/164).
59 NAA: A9300, PAPE GA.
60 Sir George Pape and ACdre L. V. Lachal, interview, 14 Sept. 1977; Convening Order, GpCpt U. E. Ewart to 
WCdr L. V. Lachal, 13 Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2733.
61 John Harrison to CH, 25 July 1978; AVM H. N. Wrigley, interview, [1977].
62 NAA: A9300, STEVENS FI.
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overlapped that of Lieutenant Robert Menzies, had been one of Menzies’ last 
pupils at the bar. Like Menzies, he practised from Selborne Chambers; he needed 
no advice about the Prime Minister’s temperament and impatience with brains 
that moved more slowly than his own. By the end of the day, five interviews had 
been taken at Essendon, and another four at Laverton. Two days later, flown in a 
Hudson piloted by Bob Hitchcock’s fellow flight commander Jack Ryland with 
Wilbur Wackett as 2nd pilot, the team was in a chilly Canberra and Queanbeyan 
where they took sworn statements from 13 witnesses. With language tightened 
up — and no hint, for example, that one interview had taken place out in a 
paddock among the farmer’s cows — Pape could bring coherence to what might 
otherwise have been stumbling narratives. Flight Lieutenant Ryland, who was 
formally ‘in attendance’ throughout the interviews, was the twenty-fourth and 
last witness. By Saturday August 17 the four men were back in Melbourne. 
Pape, who had to collect the final signatures on the witness statements, had 
been the last to get aboard the aircraft in Canberra as its engines were warming 
up. The Service Court report, drafted by Pape, was completed on Sunday.
The Accident Inspectorate: Murphy and Winneke about to swoop
(Courtesy of Sir Harry Winneke)
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Murphy and Winneke had already finished their own work. Watching them at 
dusk on August 13 examining the wreckage, a reporter saw that ‘the dead tree 
upon which the plane was virtually impaled, burned fiercely, throwing a red 
glow over the scarred hillside’.63 The inspectors had spoken to 15 witnesses in 
Canberra and Queanbeyan by the time they submitted their report on August 
16. Although the report of the Inspector of Air Accidents went formally to the 
Chief of the Air Staff, within hours a copy was despatched by Winneke to the 
Secretary of the Air Department for the information of the new minister.
Four days before the accident, the day after the Inspectorate’s existence was 
publicly announced, Fairbairn had sent a minute to the CAS, routed via the 
Secretary of the Air Department, saying that he wanted to be sent copies of 
all reports from Murphy. Softening any implication of mistrust, Fairbairn 
pointed out that the Air Accidents Investigation Committee had reported on 
RAAF accidents to the Defence Minister and latterly to the Minister for Air.64 
Burnett may well have had preliminary advice as early as the afternoon or 
evening of the crash, having arrived in Canberra that day to stay at Government 
House accompanied by his personal assistant, Flying Officer N. B. Palmer. In a 
‘Most Secret’ minute, Mel Langslow advised Arthur Fadden that what he had 
submitted was ‘for your personal information’. With characteristic caution 
Langslow wrote:
This report is submitted in accordance with the approved procedure but, 
in view of the fact that the Government has decided to constitute the Air 
Force Court of Inquiry to investigate this accident, it is considered that 
the contents of this report should not be disclosed at this stage.
The last three words were added by hand. Earlier in the day, with no formal 
advice of what the two concurrent Service investigations would report, Cabinet 
had agreed to set up an Air Force Court of Inquiry. It was to be an open judicial 
inquiry of the kind the Air Board had unsuccessfully argued against the 
previous year. What Artie Fadden now learned was to set the tone for all that 
followed. Murphy concluded that the ‘immediate cause’ of the crash was a stall. 
He thought that the height of Canberra aerodrome, some 2000 feet above sea 
level, and a heavier load than the pilot was accustomed to, ‘may have been 
factors contributing to cause the stall’. But ‘the first pilot’s attention’ had been 
drawn to these matters on the afternoon before the crash. The aircraft itself was 
‘completely serviceable’. He had made a ‘close inspection’ of what was left at the 
site. The remains of the starboard wing showed the flaps to be down to within 
nine inches of the total travel of the ramp. The throttles appeared to be to the 
63 Sun News-Pictorial, 14 Aug.1940.
64 Three months later Langslow was tersely reminding the CAS that ‘the directions of a previous Minister 
that a copy of all reports…was to be forwarded to the Minister as issued, are not being complied with’ (NAA: 
A705, 32/1/45 Part 1).
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rear. The throttle of the port carburettor was partly open. The elevator tabs 
were ‘slightly up’, three-eighths of an inch above the elevator’s trailing edge. 
The starboard aileron tab was in the neutral position. The surviving elevator 
and rudder ‘worked quite freely’.
Nothing that Murphy noticed in the wreckage indicated a failure of the aircraft. 
He did not repeat in his report what he seems to have incautiously conveyed to 
reporters near the wreckage on August 13: that the collision of the aircraft with 
a fallen log and the subsequent conflagration had caused most if not all of the 
deaths. As the Launceston Examiner story put it the next day: ‘if it had not been 
for the fire most of them could have been extricated from the ’plane without 
serious injury’. What credence could be given to Murphy’s conclusions? 
In the opinion of L. P. Coombes, who had arrived in January 1939 from the 
British aircraft establishment at Farnborough to create the CSIR Aeronautical 
Research Laboratories (ARL), Murphy was ‘a sound practical engineer with 
long workshop and maintenance experience’.65 He was certainly no mechanical 
forensic pathologist. ‘Tich’ McFarlane was less kind: ‘Nice enough bloke — he 
wouldn’t know which was the flying end of a Hudson.’66 But, in the absence 
of a more thorough investigation, his advice on the causes of the crash was as 
good as the Chief of the Air Staff could hope to get. The ARL itself was not yet 
sufficiently established and equipped to have undertaken any engineering tests.
In the circumstances, Murphy had ‘no option but to attribute the stall to an 
error of judgment on the part of the pilot’. Whether the baldly listed technical 
detail in the Inspectorate report would have been comprehensible to Fadden or 
any other non-flying minister must be doubted. Burnett, who was in Canberra 
for the August 13 Cabinet meeting and did not return to Melbourne until the 
next day, would have been relieved.67 What they would all have assimilated was 
the unequivocal conclusion that the responsibility lay with the pilot. The last 
thing that Murphy would have wanted to present to the Chief of the Air Staff, 
still less to the Air Minister or Prime Minister, was a suggestion of mechanical 
fault symptomatic of careless maintenance, poor construction, or design flaw.
While it might be thought that there was an unseemly haste about Murphy’s 
activities and those of Lachal’s Court, the rapid interviewing of those who had 
first-hand testimony to offer ensured that there was little time for details to be 
forgotten or memories to be conflated or corrupted. Among the Service witnesses 
from RAAF Station Canberra to whom Murphy and Winneke had spoken were 
Pilot Officer R. R. H. Winter (duty officer, Survey Flight), Flying Officer Ronald 
C. Wilson (Station Equipment Officer), Flight Sergeant Clifford Linton Smith 
65 L. P. Coombes to CH, 3 April 1982.
66 A. B. McFarlane, interview, 18 April 1978.
67 AM Sir C. Burnett to Mrs R. E. Elford, 14 Aug. 1940, Elford MSS.
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(storekeeper), and Corporal Mortimer G. Ewing (fitter IIa).68 All four had also 
been interviewed by the Lachal group. So too was AC1 Henry F. House, the 
mess steward at No. 2 School of Technical Training, who had told them he saw 
the aircraft’s nose dip and the machine commence to turn in a spinning position 
above the height of the hills on the eastern side of the aerodrome. House had not 
seen the plane hit the ground but when he saw an eruption of flames he hastened 
to tell the mess chief, Warrant Officer Jordan. Corporal Harold Unitt, also of No. 
2 S.T.T., did not give evidence to Lachal’s team. Murphy did not mention that 
he had never flown a Hudson. His knowledge of its construction, functioning, 
and performance was limited. Nor did he take evidence from anyone who was 
familiar with the aircraft.
The Ryland factor
Lachal and his associates might have had informal conversations with Murphy. 
Pape and Winneke were friends and regular golfing companions. However, 
there is no evidence of any co-operation between the two investigating teams. 
Certainly the Service Court did not take evidence on the record about what could 
be inferred from the wreckage. They did have the time to talk to ground crew at 
Laverton to establish that required maintenance and checking had been done. 
But they sought no independent professional advice. If the range of expertise 
enlisted by the Service Court was limited there was perhaps an even more 
serious concern about its procedure. To understand the flying characteristics of 
the Hudson better, they had contemplated calling 34-year-old Squadron Leader 
Dallas Scott who had been given command of No. 7 Squadron late in June 1940. 
Scott, a Melbourne Grammar boy and Public Schools boxing champion, had 
briefly been Bob Hitchcock’s flight commander in No. 21 Squadron in 1937. 
While awaiting the arrival of his own squadron’s Hudsons, he had been assisting 
No. 2 Squadron with their conversions. One of the Air Force’s most experienced 
Hudson pilots, Scott had flown Sir Charles Burnett in May in a week-long tour 
of inspection of Darwin, Townsville, Archerfield, Richmond, Cootamundra, and 
Wagga. He had subsequently been attached to No. 1 Squadron at Sembawang to 
help with their Hudson conversions.69 Lachal was evidently unaware that Scott 
68 The haste with which the report was compiled is reflected in a number of minor errors such as the listing 
of P/O R. H.[sic] H. Winter. Winter’s three forenames, Richard Raymond Henry, also defeated Lachal’s team 
who listed him as R. M. H. Winter.
69 No. 1 Squadron Operations Record Book, NAA: A9186, 1/178. For the confused decision-making around 
the formation of No. 7 Squadron, and the arrival of its first two Hudsons on Aug. 12: Kevin Gogler, We Never 
Disappoint: A History of 7 Squadron RAAF 1940-1945, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2012, pp.1-6.
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was out of the country and would not return to Australia until August 18. With 
Scott absent, the Service Court was to rely for technical advice on the behaviour 
of the aircraft on Jack Ryland, with whom they had travelled to Canberra.70
Ryland was without doubt exceptionally able. David Campbell, converted by him 
to the Hudson in the weeks after the crash, thought he was an ‘extraordinarily 
good officer and pilot…there was no better instructor than him’.71 However, in 
the rush to get things done, no one seems to have been troubled by the conflict 
of interest Ryland faced. He would unavoidably be giving advice relevant to the 
adequacy of his own training and evaluation of Bob Hitchcock. Murphy and 
Winneke had seen a copy of Hitchcock’s conversion course certificate, signed by 
Ryland and Squadron Leader Freddie Thomas. But they did not report having 
spoken to either man. Nevertheless, Murphy and Winneke wrote that Hitchcock’s 
Squadron Commander assessed him as ‘above average as a pilot and a sound 
experienced pilot’. His instructor on the conversion course (Ryland was not 
named) assessed him as ‘a very sound pilot, slightly above average on HUDSONS’.
Jack Ryland records a week of Hudson conversion courses at No. 2 Squadron
(F/Lt Ryland’s flying log book, Ryland MSS NLA MS 5020)
70 Service Court of Inquiry, Notes on suggested witnesses to be called, undated [13 Aug. 1940?], NAA: 
A9845, 318/48; E. R. (Bon) Hall, Glory in Chaos: The RAAF in the Far East in 1940–42, Sembawang Association, 
West Coburg, 1989, pp.4, 11.
71 Campbell, telephone interview, 24 May 1978.
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Jack Ryland recounted for the Service Court the details of the conversion course 
for his pupil Hitchcock between June 26 and July 21: 19 hours 15 minutes dual 
and check dual, 49 hours 10 minutes solo practice. Had Hitchcock been given 
instruction in full-load flying? Yes. He had taken off at full permissible take-
off load of 18 500 lbs, flown until sufficient fuel had been burned to reduce 
the load to 17 500 lbs (maximum permissible landing weight), and carried out 
‘three or four landings’. Was Flight Lieutenant Hitchcock instructed in the 
stalling characteristics of ‘Hudson type’ aircraft? Yes, and both before and after 
solo he was made to demonstrate these characteristics ‘to ensure that he fully 
understood them’. Was he instructed in the stalling characteristics with full 
load? No, Ryland did not consider that the stalling characteristics would be 
‘vastly different’ with full load to what they were when he instructed in them 
and demonstrated them.
The Court then turned to the possible need to alter the disposition of the 
load during flight as petrol was consumed. Ryland here was careful to give a 
conditional ‘No’ — if the aircraft was loaded correctly in the first place and 
if the tanks were operated in the correct sequence ‘which I taught to Flight 
Lieutenant Hitchcock and which is shown on a label in front of the fuel cock’. 
What then, Lachal and Stevens asked, do we know about the characteristics of 
the aircraft with the load disposed in different manners? Had any tests been 
done? Yes, Ryland in company with Dallas Scott, had tried two unusual loads: 
the first had the pilot in the correct position, four people in the navigator’s 
compartment, and nobody in the cabin; the second had four people and ballast 
in the ballast compartment and only the pilot in the cockpit with no people 
forward of the pilot. ‘As far as I can remember,’ Ryland went on:
in the first case, one complete turn of the trimming tab maintained the 
aircraft in normal flight and in the second case one complete turn of the 
trimming tab similarly trimmed off tail heaviness. Otherwise the aircraft 
was quite normal except for a slight vertical hunting in the second 
instance. This vertical hunting was in no way dangerous and could be 
easily controlled by the pilot. I do not think that the Hudson reacted 
in a manner different to any other type of aircraft which I have flown 
under similar conditions.
Satisfied with this explanation, the Court then asked which of the four main 
types of stall with Hudsons was the most sudden: (1) gear up, power on (2) gear 
up, power off (3) gear down, power on (4) gear down, power off? It was (3): gear 
down, power on.
There remained the question of whether Hitchcock had landed on Canberra 
aerodrome before the fatal crash (and implicitly whether local conditions might 
have contributed to the accident). In fact both Ryland and Hitchcock had flown 
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in on the same day on an earlier occasion. The wind had been blowing from 
the same direction as on August 13; so the approach was similar, and Ryland 
‘experienced no difficulty’. He would later tell the Air Court of Inquiry that 
he had watched Hitchcock execute a perfect landing.72 But had Hitchcock 
practised landings with various flap settings? The Court was assured that he 
had done so on many occasions and that it was normal practice to vary flap 
settings according to the wind.
In their report, completed the day after the final testimony had been taken, 
Pape, Lachal and Stevens noted that they had ‘co-opted the services of Flight 
Lieutenant J. P. Ryland…in order to have available his knowledge when witnesses 
were being questioned’.73 There is no direct reference in the transcripts to any 
intervention he might have made. But it is difficult to believe that Ryland’s 
contribution was limited to the recorded testimony. Having sat through the 
proceedings, there was only one piece of evidence which he openly and strongly 
rejected. In an obviously pre-arranged final question, it was put to him that he 
had heard it said that the aircraft did a complete roll and a change of direction 
as it was coming in to land at a height of about 500 feet above the ground. ‘Do 
you consider this possible? Definitely no.’74
Ryland was brought in as a witness to attest to Hitchcock’s competence as a pilot. 
It might reasonably have been supposed that his own judgment as an instructor 
could have been put in question if there were doubts about Hitchcock’s ability 
to handle the Hudson. Yet not only did Ryland testify, the last person to do so, 
he was co-opted as ‘an experienced “Hudson” “Captain” and Instructor’, in 
effect an expert assessor. There is no reason to suppose that Ryland’s testimony 
was anything other than candid. But, in relying on his professional advice — 
some of it, one might suppose, given off the record — the Court was rendered 
vulnerable to the possibility that Service witnesses might be shielded or 
deflected rather than stringently examined.
If Ryland were to find reason to attribute blame to the aircraft itself, its 
construction, maintenance, or performance, he would by implication be leading 
Lachal’s inquiry to a finding that would at least in part exonerate the pilot. He 
took pains to say that the aircraft presented no problems to a competent pilot. In 
conveying to Lachal, Pape, and Stevens his assessment of Hitchcock as a ‘slightly 
better than average’ Hudson pilot, Ryland was setting up a question to which 
there was no easy answer. How could a very sound, better-than-average pilot, 
in a machine with no discernible mechanical faults or severe flying peculiarities, 
in good weather, be responsible for this shocking accident? The evidence of 
72 Testimony of S/Ldr J. P. Ryland, Service Court of Inquiry, 17 Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729; 
32/10/2733.
73 ‘Statement by the Court’, Service Court of Inquiry, 18 Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729; 32/10/2733.
74 Ryland testimony, Service Court of Inquiry, 17 Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729; 32/10/2733.
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Squadron Leader Thomas implicitly posed the same question: ‘What was your 
personal assessment of Flight Lieutenant Hitchcock as a pilot? I consider Flight 
Lieutenant Hitchcock was slightly above average as a pilot, his instrument flying 
was good and he was a steady and thorough type.’
Here was a puzzle that Lachal was ill-equipped to solve. Geoff Hartnell, then 
the navigation officer in Group Captain Bladin’s Directorate of Operations 
and Intelligence, recalled Lachal at headquarters as ‘professionally absolutely 
unimpressive’, a judgment confirmed when he served under him later in the 
war. It did not help Lachal that he had no direct knowledge of Hudsons.75 But 
George Pape, no pilot but a smart lawyer, was shrewd enough to realise the 
value to the Service and the government of a finding that even a well-trained 
and competent pilot might make an unforeseeable error of judgement. The 
contemporary record bears the stamp of Pape’s command of language and logic. 
And as Lachal ruefully remembered, ‘George, from the legal aspect, gave me a 
kick in the pants a few times…and said “He didn’t say that, he didn’t say that” 
and so on.’76
The members of the Service Court were troubled that they had not been able 
to ascertain the all-up weight of Hudson A16-97 when it left Essendon. Taking 
their cue from Ryland, they did not think the distribution of the load in any 
way contributed to the accident. They did, however, recommend that squadrons 
equipped with modern multi-engined aircraft be issued with a weight sheet 
summary for the type of aircraft and with Librascope ‘balance computors [sic]’ 
for calculating an aircraft’s centre of gravity and total weight and enable the 
load to be correctly disposed. And pilots of multi-engined aircraft should, they 
said, be given as much full-load practice as possible.
Led by Pape, who crafted the words, the Court was confident enough in its 
understanding to pronounce a finding that the crash was ‘due to the aircraft 
stalling when approaching the aerodrome to land’ with its landing gear and 
flaps lowered. What then was the cause of the stall? It was:
…probably due to the power approach being made at too low an altitude 
and the pilot realizing that he would not be able to clear an intervening 
hill easing the nose of the aircraft up to such a position that it stalled.
A contributing factor to this may have been the existence of high hills 
on the western side of the aerodrome. These would give a false horizon.
The accident was due to an error of judgment on the part of the pilot.
75 AVM G. C. Hartnell, interview, 11 April 1978.
76 Sir George Pape and ACdre L. V. Lachal, interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
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The evidence of civilian eye-witnesses on the last moments of A16-97’s 
flight had informed the Service Court’s analysis. But their observations were 
interpreted through the professional eyes of Ryland. Whatever those on the 
ground thought they saw, it would be understood within the framework of 
possibility and probability that Ryland elaborated for his Air Force colleagues.
The Service Court of Inquiry met its deadline. Forwarded from Southern Area 
to the Director of Training, its proceedings and report had been digested by 
George Jones and circulated to the most senior headquarters officers within five 
days. Jones was uneasy. His initial reaction on hearing of the crash had been 
to say that its cause was ‘obscure’. Presented with a formal finding that the 
accident was ‘due to an error of judgment on the part of the pilot’, he was 
disinclined to accept it. ‘I feel that this is going too far’, he told the Air Member 
for Personnel and his directorate colleagues:
There appears to me to be insufficient evidence to arrive at any 
definite finding as to the cause of the accident. I cannot believe that 
a pilot of HITCHCOCK’s experience would stall the aircraft under the 
circumstances which apparently existed. I have experimented with the 
Hudson under similar circumstances, except as regards load, and find 
that the aircraft would give ample warning of an approach of a stall.
The capitalisation of Hitchcock might have looked like a subtle hint for some 
readers. But it was common practice in RAAF documents to capitalise surnames. 
This time, however, Jones seems to have been suggesting something he could not 
put into words. ‘Dad’ Bladin, Director of Operations and Intelligence, returned 
Jones’s minute on August 27 with a courteous but emphatic declaration: 
‘The evidence points to a stall which after all is the result of a pilot’s error of 
judgment.’ Before placing the documents on file Jones added a final enigmatic 
rebuttal: ‘I agree, but I doubt whether this was a pilot’s error of judgment.’77 
And in a later accident summary under the heading ‘Criticism by Director of 
Training’ he simply referred to the Court of Inquiry’s finding that the accident 
was caused by the pilot’s error of judgment. Jones expressed no doubt and 
offered no alternative explanation. But he might have had in mind the acerbic 
observation of the long-serving editor of The Aeroplane published nearly nine 
years before this event in a three-part essay on ‘Errors of Judgment’. The phrase 
was most useful, Charles Grey wrote, because it covered everything ‘from a 
genuine error in calculation by a thoroughly competent person all the way 
down to an act which in the common tongue, would be described as just plain 
damned foolishness’.78
77 GpCpt. G. Jones, D. T., Minute, 24 Aug. 1940, note by GpCpt. F. M. Bladin, D. O. I., 27 Aug. 1940, and 
undated note by Jones, NAA: A705, 32/10/2733. The file was secret.
78 NAA: A705, 32/10/2478; C. G. G., ‘On Errors of Judgment — 1’, The Aeroplane, XLI, 11 Nov. 1931. For 
Grey’s subsequent logical dissection of ‘errors of judgment’, see Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society, 
vol. XXXVI, no. 251, Feb. 1932, p.105.
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For those outside official circles who studied aviation accidents, the concept 
of pilot error was an inexhaustible theme. The respected American expert 
Harry Armstrong, head of the Physiology Research Laboratory of the Air 
Corps, returned to it repeatedly. To him much of what was concluded by official 
inquiries was simplistic and self-serving. There were only four explanations of 
a crash that could be considered valid, he said in 1938:
If it was shown that a pilot was not mentally or physically fit, then the 
flight surgeon who is charged with his care is at fault and the accident 
should be charged to ‘doctor’s error.’ If it can be shown that the pilot 
was lacking in flying technique or experience then the accident should 
be charged to ‘employment manager’s error.’ If it can be shown that 
any of his equipment failed then the accident should be charged to 
‘material failure.’ Finally if it can be shown that the accident was due 
to a multiplicity of duties which might cause him to forget, to make 
an erroneous calculation, or to overlook a fact which would have been 
obvious under less trying conditions then the accident should be 
charged to ‘airplane designer’s error.’79
Troubled, but uninstructed in these subtleties, Jones ventured his own simple 
explanation of the crash of A16-97. It was possible, he suggested, that too low 
an approach could have been a contributory cause. All units had previously 
had their attention drawn to this error, ‘an undesirable outcome of the use of 
powered approaches’. He proposed to write a special letter to units reiterating 
this concern. But for the moment he would have to keep his ideas to himself. 
For now, although the victims of the crash were interred, and the Service 
was returning to an equilibrium that had been disturbed by a fortnight of 
introspection and stifled suspicion, there was yet another inquiry in motion.
79 Harry G. Armstrong, ‘The Influence of Aviation Medicine on Aircraft Design and Operation’, Journal of 
the Aeronautical Sciences, vol. 5, 1937–8. p.196.
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19. Obsequies
Understanding the crash was an imperative for the Air Force. The government 
also had to be seen to be committed to doing all that could be done to advance 
the quest for explanations. What had happened in Canberra was shocking 
and bewildering. The tragedy of 13 August 1940 was national. But first it was 
personal, intimate. For families and friends whose loved ones had been lost in 
horrific circumstances the grief was natural and intense. No one could predict 
exactly when and how it would find expression, how long it would last. It was 
properly private. Yet there was an indistinct boundary between what could and 
should be kept from the public gaze and the national recognition and mourning 
that enveloped the personal loss. Burial or cremation were family decisions. But 
in a disaster of this magnitude somehow they had to be harmonised with the 
ceremonial events that were prescribed by custom or created for the occasion. 
For the public, an opportunity to pay tribute, and to perform rituals of eulogy, 
thanksgiving, and memorial, required planning and organisation. It was all 
done in a day.
On the morning of August 14, The Argus leader writer, who had lost a former 
colleague in the crash, wrote of the ‘fearful swath cut by Death’:
…a reverent sense of fitness and spontaneous feeling alike demand 
that the community shall pause in its daily round to express sympathy 
with the bereaved relatives, with the Federal Ministry, with the Royal 
Australian Air Force, and with the Australian Army in the loss of their 
loved ones, their loyal colleagues, and their efficient servants.
In Service protocol, distinctions of rank, status, and religion were finely drawn, 
in death as in life. For the three Cabinet ministers, the Army and Air Force 
officers, and Dick Elford there was to be a combined memorial service in St 
Paul’s Cathedral, Melbourne at 11.45 a.m. on August 15. Services would be 
held simultaneously at St Andrew’s Cathedral in Sydney and St John’s Church 
in Canberra. The Anglican Archbishop of Melbourne would give the address at 
St Paul’s. Dick Wiesener, a member of the Homebush-Strathfield Congregational 
Church, was to be embraced among the Church of England group. So too were 
Dick Elford whose parents were Christian Scientists and Bob Hitchcock, a 
member of the Church of Christ.1 All of the bodies were to be brought overnight 
by special train, leaving from Canberra at 7.30 p.m., to Princes Bridge station 
opposite the cathedral.2 Passing through Seymour, the train would slow down 
1 ‘Feeling references were made to the death of Bro. R. Hitchcock’ at the following Sunday service at the 
Hampton church where he had once worshipped (Australian Christian, 21 Aug. 1940).
2 The Age wrongly reported on Aug. 15 that the bodies had been flown to Melbourne. Other papers thought 
that only nine bodies were going to Melbourne.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
450
for a guard of honour from Puckapunyal to pay tribute. Troops along the length 
of the Princes Bridge platform would present arms, with officers coming to the 
salute. Eight of the caskets were then to be carried across Flinders Street by 
bearer parties flanked by a guard of honour. Three officers and 50 other ranks 
of 12 Garrison Battalion and five RAAF officers and 100 other ranks would make 
up the guard. A full muffled peal of bells, a tribute reserved for the nation’s 
greatest citizens, would be rung at 11.00 a.m.
For the Roman Catholic airmen, Jack Palmer and Charlie Crosdale, there were 
other arrangements to be made. There had been some anxieties, especially among 
Sheila Palmer’s brothers and the rest of the Curtain clan, that their Catholic faith 
would not be acknowledged in a memorial service in an Anglican cathedral. 
They would not have forgotten the controversy that had continued since 
1938 when the Victorian branch of the Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial 
League of Australia (RSSILA), in a gesture of inclusiveness to Catholics and 
Jews in particular, had introduced a non-denominational ANZAC Day service 
of songs and silent prayer at the Shrine of Remembrance. Archbishop Head 
as well as the senior Presbyterian and Methodist chaplains had protested and 
declined to attend the ‘civic’ ceremony. Generals Brudenell White and Smyth, 
following the lead of the most senior Australian General, Chauvel, unhappy at 
the abandonment of the traditional Anglican service, had refused to lead the 
march to the Shrine in 1938; and, like the church leaders, they were again absent 
in April 1939 and 1940. Congregational and Baptist spokesmen regretted the 
RSSILA’s decision but left attendance to the conscience of individual ministers.3
Catholic fears were allayed when it was announced that a special requiem mass 
had been arranged by Archbishop Mannix at St Patrick’s Cathedral for the day 
after the state funeral, ‘as an expression of the general sympathy of the Catholic 
community’. It was agreed that the caskets of Corporal Palmer and Aircraftman 
Crosdale would be taken directly from the train by an Air Force party to St 
Patrick’s, thence to Sleight’s Funeral Parlors in St Kilda Road. An Air Force tender 
would take Palmer’s casket to St Patrick’s where it was placed on a catafalque 
in front of the high altar. There, in the presence of Sheila Palmer, her parents-
in-law, siblings and other relatives, prayers were read by Father Ken Morrison, 
3 With Catholic students expected to listen to the broadcast service, the state Education Department had 
suggested the replacement of the ‘Protestant’ hymns ‘O God Our Help’ and ‘Abide With Me’ with ‘Australia, 
Land of Ours’ and ‘Land of Hope and Glory’ (Mark Lyons, Legacy: The first fifty years, Legacy Co-ordinating 
Council & Lothian Publishing, Melbourne, 1978, p.68). Peter S. Sadler, The Paladin: A Life of Major-General 
Sir John Gellibrand, Oxford UP, Melbourne, 2000, pp.241–2; The Argus, 24 Feb., 23, 25 April 1940. Smyth’s 
absence in 1938 was attributed to ill-health. The 1937 march had been marred by a wrangle over the selection 
of Major-General Senator Brand over the heads of three more senior generals after White, Smyth, and 
Gellibrand had all declined (Cairns Post, 19 April 1937). Chauvel said that ‘the Jews wanted to cut everything 
Christian out of the service’ (Lord Wakehurst diary, 24 April 1938, Wakehurst Papers, ML MSS 6347 1 5). ‘The 
service as drawn up meets with the unqualified approval of Rabbi Danglow only!’ (F. E. Dixon to the editor, 
The Herald, 12 April 1938, copy, Menzies MSS, NLA 4936, 579/2).
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the padre at Laverton. The funeral mass, deferred to the next day because of the 
Feast of the Assumption, was celebrated by Father Morrison, and attended by 
Palmer’s parents, sister, and brothers Max and Laurie, as well as five brothers-
in-law, the Tasmanian Deputy Premier, the influential Victorian ALP executive 
member and Curtain family friend, Councillor Arthur Calwell, and unnamed 
RAAF officers and airmen. An RAAF guard of honour, 20 NCOs and men and 
five officers, lined the path from the gateway to the cathedral entrance. Father 
Morrison also conducted the funeral service at the old Melbourne General 
Cemetery.
Following telephone consultation with Rita Crosdale and her husband’s parents, 
it was decided that Charlie Crosdale’s remains would be returned directly to the 
Hunter Valley. The news that Crosdale’s body would be taken home via Newcastle 
was conveyed to his widow’s parents by railway officers who intercepted them 
en route to Melbourne to be with their daughter and new grandchild. Ben and 
Mary Ling had responded to an eight-word telegram from their daughter the 
day before: ‘Charles killed. Baby son born. Come at once.’ Keith Murdoch’s 
Melbourne Sun News Pictorial had published the message. Even the details of 
the changed travel arrangements were reported in the press — no aircraftman 
had ever been paid such attention in death or in life. Crosdale’s casket was taken 
by car from West Maitland railway station to his parents’ home in Paxton, 27 
miles further; after a requiem mass at St Joseph’s Catholic Hall in Cessnock, 
he was buried in Ellalong cemetery. Contingents from the RAAF seaplane base 
at Rathmines and the AIF at Gretna were present along with the RAAF band. 
Rowley James MHR and the NSW Premier’s private secretary had accompanied 
the casket most of the way, James detouring nine miles to his own home town, 
Kurri Kurri. Federal ministers, who had hurried to Melbourne the day before, 
were represented by the Cessnock Postmaster. Business houses in Cessnock 
closed for five minutes at four o’clock on August 16 to coincide with the funeral 
ceremony. The rest of the community showed their respects at a Sunday night 
memorial service at St John’s Church of England. The next morning the Prime 
Minister gave instructions that the Commonwealth was to meet the costs of 
travel from Melbourne to Cessnock of Crosdale’s widow, her parents, and her 
infant son.
The Adjutant-General, Major General Victor Stantke, appointed only two weeks 
earlier, was responsible for arranging the state funeral. He had previously 
managed the funeral procession for Joe Lyons in Sydney and the transfer of 
the late Prime Minister’s coffin to a naval destroyer for return to Tasmania. 
Stantke had received preliminary advice by telegram from Duntroon just after 
4.30 p.m. on the day of the crash from the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s 
Department that there might be a service in King’s Hall at Parliament House 
on Wednesday and at St Paul’s Cathedral in Melbourne the next day. Colonel 
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R. C. Prisk, Director of Personal Services, was sent immediately to Canberra to 
liaise with officials there. Stantke and his staff were bombarded with queries, 
requests, and suggestions, not least from RAAF headquarters. Duties were to be 
shared and co-ordinated. The military worked with E. C. Rigby, the lay canon of 
St Paul’s, on requirements at the cathedral. By the next day Lieutenant Colonel 
R. E. Pascoe, Assistant Chief Marshal, signed and distributed 180 copies of a 
five-page summary of the arrangements for special trains, guards of honour, 
bearer parties, troops to line the streets, vehicles for the conveyance of caskets, 
formation of the corteges, floral cars, mourners’ cars, routes to be taken, an 
artillery salute, and a motor ambulance to be held on call at Victoria Barracks. 
Dress was prescribed: ‘All ranks — No. 4 Service Dress Drill Order.’ Officers 
would wear Service Dress (cloth), cap, jacket, breeches, field boots or leggings, 
Sam Browne belts without shoulder strap, mourning band, gloves, ribands but 
not medals. ‘Armlets and spurs will not be worn. Swords and canes will not be 
carried.’4
Geoff Street and Frank Thornthwaite, intimate friends for 25 years, neighbours 
at Derrinallum, were to make their last journey together. After the half-hour 
service was over they were to be brought out first and carried back across 
Flinders Street to Princes Bridge station then placed on a train for Lismore, 106 
miles to the west. A large official party, led by the Prime Minister and including 
Cabinet colleagues, senior public servants, and Army officers, would accompany 
the coffins on the special train. After a procession to the Presbyterian church 
a mile from the Lismore railway station, a funeral service would be led by the 
Rev. E. A. Forbes. Hundreds of returned servicemen formed a guard of honour 
at the cemetery. Former comrades filed past the graves casting poppies over the 
coffins.5
Normally, The Argus had reported, a general’s coffin would be carried on a gun 
carriage with a cortege of four battalions of infantry, and a cavalry escort led 
by the general’s charger. On this occasion the arrangements were to be much 
simpler. Brudenell White would, in due course, follow Street and Thornthwaite 
in the leading motor hearse en route to Buangor accompanied by a police escort. 
As White’s casket was placed on its conveyance outside the cathedral, a flag 
signal from high on a parapet would be given to begin an artillery salute, 17 
minute guns fired by a saluting battery in the nearby Domain.6 Then would 
come Gullett, Fairbairn, Hitchcock, Wiesener, and Elford, each in turn, followed 
4 ‘Funeral Arrangements — Air Accident Canberra, involving Ministers, Military Officers and others on 13 
Aug 1940’, NAA: MP508/1, 76/701/78.
5 Camperdown Chronicle, 17 Aug. 1940.
6 For the scene viewed from a bedroom window at Young and Jackson’s Hotel by one of Brudenell White’s 
family friends: Bethia Foott Ogden, Ethel and the Governors’ General: A biography of Ethel Anderson (1883–




by a floral coach and chief mourners’ car. The whole procession would turn 
south along St Kilda Road, travelling between some 1800 men from Navy, Army, 
and Air Force units standing in single rank on both sides from Batman Avenue.
As each cortege reached a designated turn-off point it would form up with its 
own funeral party. Wiesener’s casket, which would be returning to Sydney by 
train, would be taken in the interim to Sleight’s Funeral Parlors. The others 
would pause at Victoria Barracks; and then would be driven under RAAF 
direction to Springvale Cemetery — Elford, Gullett, and Fairbairn for cremation 
(a costly option as fuel prices had risen), Hitchcock for burial.7 At the Spring Vale 
Necropolis, a Masonic service was conducted for Hitchcock by the secretary of 
the Verdon Lodge. Among the pall bearers were two young Flying Officers, B. 
M. Palmer and Stanley Prowd, who had been under Hitchcock’s tutelage, Bob 
Dalkin, and their squadron commander Fred Thomas.8
The Prime Minister, better acquainted with Presbyterian than Anglican forms, 
had asked Archbishop Head to ‘personally’ conduct the service. In the event, 
the Precentor, the Rev. H. O. Hole, read the burial service; Bishop Charles Riley 
from Bendigo, chaplain of the 10th Light Horse 1918–19, read the lesson; and 
the Archbishop gave the address. The anthem was the consoling chorus ‘How 
Lovely is Thy Dwelling Place’ from Brahms’ German Requiem. (The order of 
service acknowledged the composer but omitted the title with its reminder 
of the enemy nation.) The ‘Dead March’ from Handel’s Saul provided the 
traditional ending. National radio stations broadcast the service and reported 
on the processions to and from the cathedral. There were few serious hitches. 
Invitational telegrams from the Prime Minister went out on the afternoon of 
August 14 noting that the service would be at 11.45 a.m. the next day, not 
2.00 p.m. as had been announced in the press. Sir George Fairbairn missed the 
service for his nephew because the telegram arrived after he had already left 
to visit his property. The Wiesener family name was misspelled in the order of 
service. Lieutenant General Miles of Eastern Command, Major General Sturdee 
of the 8th Division, and Major General Richardson of the 1st Cavalry Division 
(Brudenell White’s associate in the secretive patriotic defence of the realm a 
decade before), all of whom had travelled from Sydney, were left off the Army 
list of attendees provided to the press. The next day, the Deputy Adjutant-
General wrote to newspaper chiefs of staff asking that the generals’ travel from 
Sydney to attend be mentioned.
Meanwhile, a panicky morning telegram from Frank Strahan, Secretary of the 
Prime Minister’s Department, exposed fears that important personages arriving 
7 Cremation cost approximately £7.7.0, double the cost of burial. RSSAILA diaries advised that members 
were eligible for a reduction to £4.4.0 (Sir Thomas White, diary 1940, T. W. White MSS, NLA MS9148, Box 1; 
Jessie Hennessy, Springvale Botanical Cemetery to CH, [email], 19 Jan. 2010).
8 F/O Stanley Prowd was killed in a test flight accident in August 1941.
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by plane at Essendon might not get tickets assuring their passage through the 
barriers around the cathedral. ‘Not received until too late’, noted Stantke, a man 
of few words, most of them blunt and direct. He did not have to deal with the 
complaint to the Prime Minister from the Netherlands Consul-General that, after 
negotiating their way through barricades and chain fences, he and his Chinese 
colleague were forced to sit in one of the last rows of chairs rather than on the 
consular bench. After the cathedral service and processions were over, Stantke 
joined the party that accompanied White to Buangor for what was meant to be a 
very private burial. ‘Presumed a great deal’, General Lavarack’s ADC recorded. 
Lavarack, never inhibited in expressing his opinions, had a simple explanation 
for Stantke’s presumption: ‘He’s a Bosch.’9
Unaware of this annoyance to a former Chief of the General Staff, the Prime 
Minister had written before the day was out to the new Minister for the Army 
commending Stantke’s customary ‘great courtesy and efficiency’. Menzies went 
on to add that the ‘parades of Troops at the various places between Canberra 
and Melbourne, and in Melbourne, and the military bearing of those taking 
part therein, were the subject of gratifying comment’. Members of units of the 
Citizen Military Forces who were detailed for duty had cost the Army £145.1.3 
in pay and fares.10 As far as the Chief Finance Officer (Military) was concerned, 
the expenditure was incurred in connection with the funerals of Lieutenant 
General Sir Brudenell White and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Thornthwaite. The 
others, it seems, were incidental beneficiaries. When the other costs of the 
funerals and memorial services, including a service in St Paul’s Cathedral in 
London attended by 22 relatives as well as dignitaries, were calculated, the 
Treasury’s final tally was £1434.17.2.
As invoices were collated and bills paid, missing flags tracked down, and thank-
you letters despatched, there were a few remaining glitches and aggravations to 
be dealt with. The Department of Supply and Development fielded complaints 
from the Queanbeyan undertaker, M. H. O’Rourke, and Melbourne’s B. 
Matthews Pty Ltd that their contracts to arrange funerals for Defence personnel 
had not been honoured. The Prime Minister’s Department, acting in ignorance 
of these arrangements, had authorised the Department of the Army to engage 
A. A. Sleight in Melbourne and Masons of Queanbeyan. The quick-thinking 
head of the Prime Minister’s Department maintained that, as the Commonwealth 
had decided on a state funeral for all of the men, the contracts did not apply. 
Unappeased, the contractors niggled for months over whether the inclusion of 
9 Curtis Wilson’s diary, 15 Aug. 1940, A. B. Lodge Papers, UNSW@ADFA, MS 164, Box 4 folder 10; Warren 
Perry, ‘Lieutenant General Henry Douglas Wynter: An Officer of the Australian Staff Corps’, The Victorian 
Historical Magazine, vol. 43, no. 2, May 1972, p.852.
10 NAA: MP508/1, 76/701/80.
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RAAF personnel in the state funeral was a breach of the exhaustively detailed 
contract which in Matthews’ case had been signed to run for four years from 1 
July 1940.11
‘The ceremonies were carried out satisfactorily despite much tension in the 
upper echelons’, recalled the then Group Captain Joe Hewitt who, as RAAF 
Director of Personal Services, was closely involved. Hewitt, possibly the ablest 
of his generation in the Air Force,12 had himself presided late in 1938 over a 
politically sensitive Committee of Inquiry after the crash of an Anson and 
the loss of five lives. Tasked now by the Chief of the Air Staff to keep him 
informed on how the funeral arrangements were progressing, he was careful not 
to mention anything that would reflect badly on his colleagues. With attention 
focused on the procession of vehicles leaving the cathedral, no-one had noticed 
that 22 of the 30 cars that had conveyed passengers from Spencer Street were 
retained for hours after they were needed. Sir Charles Burnett was not told of 
the disarray at Laverton when it was realised that many of the airmen directed 
to attend the funerals were still awaiting the issue of complete uniforms.13 Dick 
Elford’s friend from Geelong Grammar, the porter Tom Judd, was among those 
rushed through the store to make up the deficiencies but he still had to borrow 
someone else’s trousers. The men from Laverton had been divided into Catholic 
and Protestant groups, but the Catholic contingent was so small it had to be 
reinforced with unsuspecting Protestants.14 The Anglican Judd found himself 
attending mass at St Patrick’s rather than paying his respects to the Geelong 
Grammarians, Elford and Fairbairn.15
Air Vice-Marshal Hewitt was to write years later:
The disaster seemed to make each and every one of us experience a 
sense of blame. Just why should such a thing happen!
Burnett obviously felt the loss of Fairbairn and perhaps, too, a sense 
of failure since a major reason for his being CAS was to cut down the 
aircraft accident rate in the RAAF. He was really hot on this problem 
11 Army papers relating to funeral arrangements and condolence messages from service units were gathered 
in NAA: MP 508, 76/701/78. The Prime Minister’s Department file including the Service funeral contract 
conditions for Tasmania, South Australia, and Victoria is at NAA: A461, 700/1/392.
12 He was so regarded by ACM Sir Frederick Scherger (interview, 2 Sept. 1978).
13 Before the war, uniforms had been manufactured by the Commonwealth Government Clothing Factory; 
but it had been unable to keep up with demand and civilian contractors had not yet made up the shortage 
(NAA: A705, 39/8/188).
14 ‘I had 230 Catholics between Laverton & Point Cook in 1939 out of a total of 1300…We were very heavily 
represented in clerical & medical musterings etc. but lacking in trade musterings’ (Msgnr K. Morrison to CH, 
6 June 1983).
15 Judd, Fifty Years, pp.112–3.
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and despite the growth rate of the RAAF under war conditions he had 
certainly been successful in the circumstances — never failing to see 
that appropriate disciplinary action was taken.
Burnett, as we have seen, owed his appointment in Australia to an almost 
accidental meeting with Fairbairn when it seemed that his career was almost 
over. He had enjoyed notably amicable relations with his minister. Whatever 
hint may have reached Burnett that Fairbairn might have been in part at least the 
author of his own fatal misfortune, Joe Hewitt ‘sensed in him after this terrible 
accident an irritability on his part for Australians and things Australian’. The 
senior commanders on whom Burnett relied had let him down.16
WCdr Joe Hewitt, S/Ldr Fred Thomas, GpCpt Ray Brownell, and 
unidentified S/Ldr at Laverton, October 1940
(Courtesy of Rob Thomas)
Their lives having been celebrated, their bodies at rest, private mourning for 
the victims would continue long after the short season of public homage ended. 
Three days after the state funeral, The Argus and the Canberra Times reported, 
many people were visiting the crematorium in the hope of seeing the urns of 
Gullett, Fairbairn, and Elford. As the ashes were kept in steel containers in a 
room to which only family members were permitted access, the pilgrimages were 
16 AVM J. E. Hewitt, ‘Diary for my daughter Pt II’, Sept. 1939–Dec. 1948, p.6, Hewitt MSS, Australian War 
Memorial. The published version of this document omits some passages and reduces Burnett’s ‘sense of failure’ 
to ‘disappointment’ (Hewitt, Adversity in Success, pp.4–5, 161–2).
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in vain. As the tide of grief receded, the routines of government and Service 
life resumed. The Prime Minister would replace his lost Cabinet colleagues and 
install a new Army chief under the formal authority of the Governor-General.
For the RAAF personnel, being ‘struck off the strength’ required a series of 17 
signatures. Designated authorities had to certify the absence of liabilities to the 
barracks, mess, canteen, recreation club, technical library, medical and dental, 
base library, tool store, pay clerk, benevolent fund, stores officer, O.C Flight, 
Squadron Commander, and education officer. The accounting officer and the 
adjutant signed off ‘final clearing action’, completing the ‘clearance certificate’, 
form E/A. 32. Then, just in case any of the officers or men from No. 2 Squadron 
had died owing money to their fellows, station ‘routine orders’ on the day of 
the funeral invited anyone with a claim to submit it in writing to the president 
of the Committee of Adjustment by noon on August 18. The Committee of 
Adjustment was also responsible for making inventories of each man’s ‘personal 
and private’ effects and Service clothing, assembling death certificates and 
information about the beneficiaries of any wills, and gathering statutory 
declarations to authenticate the validity of spouse claims. For men who had 
been issued with equipment, ‘deficiencies’ in toolkits had to be listed. However 
defective its flying training or pilot selection might be, the Service’s adherence 
to its administrative procedures and paperwork was unimpeachable. A cohort 
of ex-RFC, RAF, and RAAF officers had been recruited and given a course of 
training to relieve officers in full flying practice from such administrative chores 
and other ground duties; and a whole new ‘Administrative and Special Duties 
Branch’ had been created in the CAF to embrace essential non-flying tasks.17
In the face of tragedy there was something about the assignments and 
responsibilities laid down in Service manuals and routine orders that assuaged 
the pain. Fatalities were always and inevitably distressing. Yet they had become 
commonplace enough in the RAAF for there to be protocols in place to cover the 
contingent consequences. Wrecked machines would be written off and replaced. 
Within a few days, new pilots would arrive to take the place of those who 
were lost. Personal effects would be dispersed to next-of-kin. Shared memories 
would begin to fade as fresh challenges and adventures obtruded. Pilot Officer 
Keith Eddison, who ‘used to have a good bit of fun’ with Hitchcock, probably 
reflected the sentiments of many young men in No. 2 Squadron, when he wrote 
to his mother:
I managed to escape the funeral even though I was tempted with seat 
tickets at St Paul’s. I’ve been O.C. wreaths & general chucker out about 
17 NAA: A9301, 2130/9,11,15; Air Board Agenda 2631 [Nov. 1939], 2658 [Jan. 1940] NAA: A4181, 17.
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the place. You’ve absolutely no idea the upheaval it caused here for a day 
or two but thank heaven it’s all over now & forgotten. By the way I lent 
my cap to put on the bod [sic] so you may see it in the pictures.18
Insouciant as some might affect to be, puzzles about a crash that had killed 
friends and work mates would linger, debated inconclusively. But in this 
unique case the ill-informed and desultory speculation of the officers’ mess 
would soon be overshadowed by intimations that in the upper echelons of the 
Service and the government there were deep concerns. There was surely more to 
be said about the causes of a most calamitous event. ‘A pretty poor show that,’ as 
Eddison wrote on August 16, ‘& nobody knows just what happened yet.’ When 
comrades in uniform died in company with some of the nation’s most famous 
men, serious questions had to be asked and answered by those in authority.




20. Inquiry and investigation
Whatever might be learned from the inquiries set in train by the Air Force, 
the Prime Minister and the members of his Cabinet knew that a nation 
prompted by an inquisitive press would want answers that internal and secret 
investigations could not give. Hugh Dash, reporting from the crash scene for the 
Daily Telegraph, had learned that a coronial inquest would be the ‘only public 
inquiry’. ‘Only an open inquiry will satisfy the public’, the Telegraph said on 
August 14, ‘because of the number of accidents to the type of machine in which 
the Ministers flew from Melbourne.’ Here was a signal that the Telegraph knew 
more than it was saying about the RAAF’s new Hudsons and the difficulties 
their pilots had experienced with them. A day into his new ministerial role, 
Arthur Fadden had enough sense of self-preservation to let it be known to the 
press that he would be seeking Cabinet approval of the action to be taken.1
What could the government do to give reassurance to an anxious and disturbed 
public? The Secretary of the Department of Air hurriedly prepared a briefing 
paper to explain the options. When there was a fatal accident involving an RAAF 
aircraft, a Service Court of Inquiry was ‘invariably convened’, Mel Langslow 
pointed out on August 15. Since the Inspectorate of Air Accidents had been 
established in June 1940 its two-man team also had a duty ‘to make a first-hand 
investigation of any accident or forced landing when directed by the Chief of the 
Air Staff and to make a personal report to him’. As ministers well understood, 
these inquiries were established and conducted within the RAAF. They were 
already in motion before the Cabinet had considered what should be done.
A moment’s reflection would have brought the realisation that those who 
undertook the RAAF inquiries, competent as it may be supposed they would 
be, might have been personally acquainted with the officers and airmen 
whose deaths they were examining. The Air Force investigators could bring 
to their inquiries knowledge acquired from their own observations, as well as 
impressions conveyed by fellow officers. They might be willing and capable of 
keeping open minds. But there was a further possible concern. Officers selected 
by their superiors, subject to Service discipline and rules, naturally having 
regard for their own careers, could be portrayed by sceptical reporters and 
informed aviation commentators as lacking independence. The point had been 
made in Parliament nearly four years earlier by a school contemporary of Jim 
Fairbairn, the United Country Party leader in the Senate, Charles Hardy. The 
charismatic Hardy, former leader of the secessionist Riverina Movement, had 
deemed it ‘anomalous’ and ‘inadvisable’ that Defence Department officers who 
1 The Argus, 15 Aug. 1940.
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were members of the Air Accidents Investigation Committee (AAIC) should be 
allowed to ‘determine the cause’ of accidents for which Defence Department 
officers might have been responsible.2 Had he been conscious of the extent to 
which the AAIC relied on work done by departmental officials other than those 
on the Committee, Hardy might well have been even more perturbed.
What else could be done? It had been the very concern about perceptions that 
had prompted the proposal to Prime Minister Stanley Bruce 13 years previously 
to create the Air Accidents Investigation Committee: the tendency for press and 
public to suspect that an Inquiry by the Service interested ‘is not as full, far-
reaching and searching as is necessary in such cases’.3 Until less than a week 
before A16-97 crashed, the AAIC, established by powers conferred by the Air 
Navigation Act No. 50 of 1920, might have been mandated to investigate the 
Hudson accident. At least so it was thought by those who had not followed 
the intricacies by which the Committee’s civil and military aviation roles had 
recently been separated. The Committee consisted of an independent chairman 
with engineering qualifications and two (originally four) aircraft and flying 
experts appointed by the Minister of Defence. It was required to furnish 
reports on all accidents involving injury to personnel or damage to aircraft, 
and all forced landings. The Committee would seek to determine the cause of an 
accident, and recommend action to prevent a recurrence. It had rights of access 
to any aircraft establishment and could examine any aircraft, equipment, or 
process in that establishment. Evidence presented was to be kept confidential. 
Reports of all Air Force accidents were made to the Air Board. Other reports 
were made to the Controller of Civil Aviation.
Perennial criticism from aero clubs and aviation companies about the secrecy 
and alleged unfairness of AAIC proceedings had been brushed aside by 
successive Defence Ministers. The Committee even resolved in 1934 that ‘in 
the interests of both aviation and the public, no reports on accidents would 
be submitted for insertion in the press’. But more widespread public disquiet 
about aviation safety in the late 1930s produced a shift in policy. The creation 
of a Department of Civil Aviation had led to the separation of responsibilities 
for investigating RAAF and civil accidents. The Committee was replaced by 
Air Courts of Inquiry.4 Such Courts were to be established under the authority 
of the Governor-General, with jurisdiction to make inquiry into air accidents 
referred by the Minister. Jim Fairbairn had been keen to retain ministerial 
control but was in Canada at the end of November 1939 when Cabinet decided 
in relation to civil aviation that causes of accidents or forced landings were to be 
2 CPD, Senate, 26 Nov. 1936, p.2378; Hardy died in an aircraft accident in August 1941.
3 Minister of Defence (Sir T. W. Glasgow) to Prime Minister, 12 May 1927, NAA: A461, F314/1/1; Dept 
of Defence, Air Board, Air Accidents Investigation Committee, NAA: A664/1 415/402/120. For continuing 
doubts about the expertise and independence of the committee, see NAA: MP187/1.
4 The Courts of Inquiry were established under Statutory Rule No. 40 of May 1939 amended as No. 155 of 1940.
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referred to the Court of Inquiry, ‘unless the Minister certifies that the matter is 
too trivial so to do; provided, however, that the Minister should not be entitled 
so to certify in the event of death or serious injury without a direction from the 
Governor-General’.5
The new Courts had characteristics in common with the Air Navigation (Enquiry 
Committee) Regulations drafted in 1929 by Attorney-General Latham. When a 
baffled and angry public made it imperative to investigate the forced landing 
of Kingsford-Smith’s Southern Cross and the tragic fate of Bob Hitchcock and 
Keith Anderson, the government had decided that a smaller inquiry body with 
greater powers than the AAIC was needed.6 But to create the appearance of 
independence, the new regime established late in 1939 went too far in yielding 
political control. Jim Fairbairn applied his mind to the matter and came back to 
Cabinet in May 1940. Cabinet agreed with him that the Court of Inquiry should 
have jurisdiction only when the minister referred an accident to it. Similarly, 
under the revised Air Force Courts of Inquiry regulations, the Minister for Air 
could refer a Service accident to a Court constituted by a Justice or Judge of 
any federal or state court or court of a territory appointed by the Governor-
General. As with civil accidents there was no obligation to set up such a Court 
of Inquiry. It was a matter for ministerial decision. Once appointed, however, 
the presumption of judicial independence provided the assurance that neither 
the government nor the Air Force could determine the result.
With this background fresh in his mind, Mel Langslow reminded ministers 
that the new inquiries were ‘to be held in open court’. The Court itself would 
have the discretion to hold the hearing ‘or any part of the hearing…in camera’. 
Langslow proffered no advice. However, the government could not ignore the 
newly established process for independent inquiry. As The Mercury reported 
on August 15, ‘a section of the Federal Cabinet and probably an overwhelming 
majority of the members of the Federal Parliament believe that the inquiry 
should be public’. The government’s decision was noted by the Prime Minister 
at the foot of the submission: ‘Cabinet approves of open enquiry by Air Force 
Court of Inquiry.’ Murray Tyrrell, now assistant private secretary to Arthur 
Fadden, conveyed these precise words to the Secretary of the Air Department 
on August 16.7
5 ‘Air Courts of Inquiry’, Cabinet Agenda 244, NAA: A461, V314/1/1.
6 ‘Summary of Events in Connection with Flights of “Southern Cross” and “Kookaburra”’, NAA: MP274, 
4 21/1/846 Pt 5.
7 NAA: A461, F314/1/1; A705, 32/10/2729.
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Justice Piper’s tune
Legislation to establish the Air Courts of Inquiry was being drafted early in 
1939. But when an Avro Anson crashed at Riverstone in New South Wales, and 
another went down into Port Phillip Bay, a fresh eruption of public consternation 
about the safety of RAAF operations prompted an urgent political response. The 
first parliamentary questions addressed to Robert Menzies as Prime Minister in 
April 1939, and to his new Minister for Defence, Geoff Street, were about these 
accidents. John Curtin asked if the Prime Minister would direct the Minister 
to ensure that an open inquiry would be held by a High Court Justice. The 
Prime Minister announced on 5 May 1939 that legislation to create a ‘Federal 
Air Court’ would be presented to Parliament ‘in a week or two’. Menzies did not 
know that the current draft bill was replete with anomalies and ambiguities. Not 
the least of these — resulting from the failure of the Civil Aviation Department 
to pass on to the Attorney-General’s Department the views of the Minister for 
Defence — was that it actually made no specific provision for the investigation 
of accidents to Air Force aircraft. Realising that a new Act could not be ready 
within Menzies’ time frame, Geoff Street immediately instructed the Defence 
Department to prepare ‘Special Draft Regulations’ under the Defence Act to 
‘constitute a Committee of Enquiry’. Street’s idea was that the ‘Court of Enquiry’ 
— the language and the spelling were not yet settled — would not be restricted 
to the recent Avro Anson crashes but would have ‘general application’.
In anticipation of a new regime coming into effect, Judge Harold Bayard Piper, 
an Adelaide barrister and vice-president of the Liberal and Country League 
who had joined the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in early 1938, was 
appointed to undertake investigation of air accidents as a temporary justice of 
the Supreme Court of the ACT until the end of November 1939.8 It had at first 
been thought, too optimistically as it turned out, that a High Court judge might 
be available. But by mid-May, Menzies had to admit that after discussion with 
the Minister for Defence he was ‘agreeable to the inquiry being conducted by 
a judge, if one can be obtained for the purpose, or, failing that, a magistrate’. 
Temporary appointment to the ACT Supreme Court was necessary for Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration judges because theirs was not regarded as a proper 
court.9 Ex-AIF Gunner Piper, the default selection, held the first Air Force 
Courts of Inquiry under hastily devised procedures later that month.10
8 P. A. Selth, ‘Piper, Harold Bayard (1894–1953), Ritchie and Langmore (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 16, p.6.
9 NAA: A432, 39/486; Sec., Air Board to AMP, 5 May and 10 May 1939; Sec. Dept of Air to Sec., Air Board, 
5 May 1939, copies, NAA: A705, 108/2/189; ‘Appointment of Acting Supreme Court Judges ACT’, NAA: A432, 
1942/733.
10 The (Adelaide) Mail, 8 Jan. 1938, had wrongly said that Piper on the Arbitration Court bench would 
have the status of a High Court Judge. When it seemed that Piper might not be free, it was reported that his 
Arbitration Court colleague Edmund Drake-Brockman would be appointed. An Executive Council minute 
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Three days after the funeral services, Artie Fadden told reporters that ‘Bay’ 
Piper would probably preside over the open inquiry announced by the Prime 
Minister.11 A draft Executive Council minute paper on August 20 requested 
the Governor-General to establish a Court of Inquiry and appoint ‘His Honour 
Harold Bayard Piper’ to constitute the Court. But Piper’s name is struck out 
and ‘The Hon. Charles John Lowe’ is inserted by hand. What might have been 
overlooked was that both Piper, and his Conciliation and Arbitration Court 
colleague the Deputy President, former Senator, Major General E. A. Drake-
Brockman, whose family connection and acquaintance with senior RAAF officers 
made him the first choice in 1939, could only sit on the Supreme Court bench 
if another of the judges was on leave. The Governor-General had to certify that 
for the period of the appointment he was satisfied that the judge was ‘unable to 
act’.12 That had been possible when the ailing 71-year-old Judge Lionel Lukin, 
a ‘crusted Conservative’ in Jack Lang’s words, was absent on sick leave the 
previous year; but at two days’ notice it would have been difficult to contrive 
to create a vacancy. The fact was, however, that Piper was unavailable, being 
already engaged in the Full Court hearing of the 1940 Basic Wage Inquiry.13
The substitution of Justice Charles Lowe of the Victorian Supreme Court for 
Judge Piper might in any case not have been a belated change of mind, at least 
not by the departmental and Service chiefs. Piper’s previous work had been 
thorough and meticulous. Perhaps too meticulous — ‘a painstaking chap’, Harry 
Wrigley recalled.14 Sitting with Piper as an assessor with Squadron Leader 
Allan Walters, Wrigley had seen the examination of witnesses in relation to 
the crash in fog of Anson A4-11. The thoughtful Wrigley and the ‘fiery’ Wally 
Walters, a brilliant flying instructor whose recent RAF Staff College evaluation 
noted that he reasoned by instinct rather than logic and was an ‘indifferent and 
naming him was prepared and hastily amended. The disarray of the government was reflected in the press 
with stories that Drake-Brockman was to be added to the Air Accidents Investigation Committee (NAA: A432, 
1939/19; The West Australian, 10 May 1939). The Advertiser, 17, 18 May 1939, for clarification of government 
intentions and Piper’s appointment to the two Anson inquiries.
11 Sydney Morning Herald, 19 Aug. 1940. It is possible as Tink says (Air Disaster, p.205) that Cabinet 
resolved that Piper should conduct the Inquiry, though more likely that they just assumed he would.
12 A similar stipulation was suggested when Piper took leave of absence as Chief Justice of the Arbitration 
Court in 1946 (NAA: A2153, PIPER H B).
13 At the time of Piper’s appointment Lukin had not sat in the Arbitration Court jurisdiction for several 
years, being preoccupied with bankruptcy cases and Supreme Court work in the Federal Capital Terrritory 
(The Mercury, 8 Jan. 1938). The Basic Wage Inquiry sat on Aug. 5–8, 12–15, 20–22, 1940 and was then 
interrupted by the illness of Beeby CJ (Sheehan’s Bulletin of Proceedings in the Commonwealth Arbitration 
Court, vol. 14, 1940, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, ANU, NBAC E217).
14 AVM H. N. Wrigley, interview [1978]. To my chagrin I cannot recall, and can find no note of, what 
Wrigley told me about Piper off the record, with the tape recorder switched off. Piper’s penchant for off-the-
cuff remarks from the bench could also have been a worry e.g. The Advertiser, 17 May 1939. In welcoming 
him to the Bench, Attorney-General Menzies had spoken of his ‘integrity, ability and reputation for strong 
commonsense and strong vigilant judgment’ (Piper MSS, NLA MSAcc06/057 Box 1).
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somewhat incoherent speaker’, made an odd combination.15 Neither could have 
been comforted by Piper’s rigorous questioning of Service witnesses and his 
observation that ‘there appears to be a difference of opinion amongst superior 
officers as to whether during the period of instruction at Laverton it is necessary 
for pilots to fly in actual cloud’.
Piper’s Court
(Border Watch [Mount Gambier], 3 June 1939)
In his inquiry into the fatal crash of another Anson, A4-32, on 28 April 1939, 
Piper had drawn attention to training matters which he had not had time to 
investigate. The question he had been asked to consider was whether trainees 
were ‘reasonably capable of carrying out the duties and responsibilities which 
they are required to perform’. After reviewing the training of the pilot of A4-
32, he added pointedly: ‘It is not within my province to express an opinion 
15 NAA: A12372, O312. AVM Walters’ personality appraisal in 1937 does not appear to have impeded his 
career progression. Clive Caldwell, who served under him in No. 1 Fighter Wing, thought him ‘a first class 
officer and an excellent chap’. The US Air Force Gen. George C. Kenney remembered a ‘big, red-faced, and 
jolly’ Walters; promotion to ACdre followed Walters’ unwise disclosure that as a GpCpt. he had been combat 
flying and shot down a Zero (Hayes, Angry Skies, p.100; Watson, Killer Caldwell, pp.147–8; George C. Kenney, 
General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1949, p.33). 
For Walters’ landing mishap in a Gypsy Moth in 1932, see NAA: A9845, 73/10.
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as to whether, under this practice, the pilot, on this amount of training and 
experience should be entrusted with a valuable machine carrying a crew of 
three besides himself.’ He went on to qualify this judgement: ‘mishaps and 
accidents are rare’. And if it was good enough for the RAF, which it was, ‘it must 
be considered…that the pilots are reasonably capable of carrying out ordinary 
peace-time operations under normal flying conditions’. But what about abnormal 
situations?: ‘…under the present system the pilots get the knowledge but it is 
doubtful whether they get sufficient practical experience to ensure speedy and 
instinctive action in some cases of emergency’.16
A finding of this kind, unwelcome as it was to the RAAF, would be potentially 
much more damaging in a public report on the most shocking air disaster in 
Australian history. In a summary prepared for the Prime Minister’s information, 
Piper’s most troubling ruminations had not been mentioned.17 He had confined 
his report to the relationship between training and the specific accident he was 
charged with investigating. He and the assessors would, he said, ‘willingly make 
further inquiry’ and submit a further report if asked. They were not.
Piper had himself brought the government’s attention to the drawbacks and 
pitfalls of the kind of inquiry with which he had been entrusted. In a letter to 
Sir George Knowles, the Commonwealth Solicitor-General, on the day he sent 
his reports to the Governor-General, he explained:
In the report re the Port Phillip accident I have referred to the difficulties 
I experienced in obtaining complete evidence from Laverton. This was 
to some extent [italicised words were added by hand to replace the typed 
‘largely’] due to the fact that the evidence was not privileged and could 
therefore be used in any other place or proceedings. Some officers were 
therefore on the defensive and not being represented by Counsel were 
obviously not sure of their position. I could of course have taken their 
evidence in camera but this would have been very undesirable.
I would suggest that consideration be given, if the Court should have 
to sit again in the future, to the possibility and desirability of making 
some provision for prohibiting the evidence being used in any other 
sphere. Apart from the position of officers concerned, it may be a matter 
of some importance to the Government if civil claims were to be made 
for damage done to private property by a crash.
16 ‘Air Force Court of Inquiry — Avro Anson A4-32 crash on 28th April 1939’, NAA: A9845 317/15–16, 19.
17 NAA: A461, V314/1/1.
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In my covering letter to His Excellency I have referred to the fact that my 
comments on the syllabus and training are based on normal conditions 
of training and not the exigencies of war.18
On the most significant training matters raised by Piper the files reveal a 
sequence of evasion and buck-passing that plainly did not impress the principal 
officers of the Department of Air. Geoff Street as Minister for Defence had asked 
for the comments of the Air Board. But as late as March 1940 nothing more 
than what ‘Johnnie’ Coleman minuted as ‘a most sketchy reply to the Minister’s 
request’ had been received. By then Piper’s report had passed through the 
hands of the Prime Minister (who, as Attorney-General, had appointed him to 
the Arbitration Court), and Harold Holt, as Acting Minister for Air. It had been 
‘noted’ by Jim Fairbairn almost as soon as he arrived at his desk on returning 
from England. Fairbairn had himself expressed a desire for Air Board comments 
on ‘the questions of a training, technical, etc. character, specifically raised’ in 
Piper’s two reports. It had already been decided that air cadets would receive 
some training before they left Point Cook in Ansons or ‘some similar type of 
machine’.19 Flight Lieutenant Dixie Chapman, Deputy Director of Training, 
was quick to inform his superiors that instrument flying was to be included 
in the conversion course syllabus and ‘a far more extensive & comprehensive 
syllabus has been prepared for conversion of pilots to Hudson aircraft’. But the 
Director of Training, George Jones, referring to the use of the Link Trainer as 
well as ‘a certain amount of the experience in actual cloud flying’, cautiously 
drew the Secretary of the Air Board’s attention to the short duration of the 
course in wartime. Although files do not always tell the whole story it is notable 
that, having decided that there was no need to report to the Prime Minister’s 
Department of Defence Co-ordination, the Air Board does not appear even to 
have reported to its own minister. The file was quietly ‘put away’ on 16 July 
1940.20
If inconvenient facts could be pigeon-holed, inhibitions caused by fear of self-
incrimination could be removed by amending the regulations. The necessary 
change was drafted in October 1939 but stalled while the Attorney-General’s 
and Defence Departments punctiliously consulted each other over wording. It 
was finally made in a statutory rule (No. 165) signed by UAP Senator Herbert 
Collett, Vice President of the Executive Council, a week after the Canberra crash. 
The new Minister for Air had been briefed urgently the day before. In language 
that had sat on a file for 12 months, Arthur Fadden was advised that witnesses 
18 H. B. Piper to Sir George Knowles, 2 Oct. 1939, NAA: A432, 39/486. Piper had commented in his report 
that ‘certain officers were obviously not sure of their position when giving evidence and this led at times 
to some confusion in their answers and to their adopting a somewhat defensive attitude which was entirely 
unnecessary but understandable’ (NAA: A705, 32/10/2387).
19 Courier-Mail, 8 June 1939.
20 NAA: A705, 32/10/2387; A461, V314/1/1.
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might not be ‘altogether ingenuous, especially if they feel that the Inquiry is 
being used as a “fishing expedition” as a prelude to civil or criminal (including 
court-martial) proceedings’.21 It does not seem to have been noticed that, if 
the Governor-General were to issue a commission by Letters Patent, witnesses 
would have been protected under Section 6DD of the Royal Commissions Act 
1902–1933.
Other dangers to the Air Force could be minimised by writing the terms of 
reference far more tightly than the ones that Geoff Street as Defence Minister 
had endorsed in great haste for Piper. But, for a beleaguered government with a 
general election due in not more than two months, a senior judicial figure was 
needed to deflect potential harm. This was not the time for the kind of specious 
objection raised on an earlier occasion by ‘Johnnie’ Coleman, then Secretary of 
the Air Board, that ‘it is difficult to see how a judge of the High Court or any 
other court could be more qualified to judge the cause of an aircraft accident 
than the Coroner’.22
Arthur Fadden, as the rapidly installed Minister of State for Air, made the 
press statement accompanying the proclamation of the inquiry on 20 August 
1940. The Governor-General had that same day received the Prime Minister’s 
recommendation that the House of Representatives be dissolved and a general 
election held on September 21. It was the day after Wing Commander Leon 
Lachal’s Service Court of Inquiry had reported. The Coroner’s inquest had 
not yet been completed. Technically, setting up the Air Court of Inquiry was 
separate from referring a particular accident to it. The reference from Fadden 
requested that the Court ‘with all possible expedition, inquire into, and report 
to His Excellency the Governor-General concerning the accident and the 
cause or causes thereof’.23 Fadden was unavoidably the formal authority but 
the file on the constitution and terms of reference of the new inquiry bore the 
unmistakeable fingerprints of the Service hierarchy.
There was a salient contested element in the task remitted to the Inquiry. It was to 
look for the ‘cause or causes’ — it was not assumed that there was a single cause. 
But even more important was a word that did not appear in the Commonwealth 
of Australia Gazette on August 21. ‘It will be noted,’ the Secretary of the Air 
Board had advised the Minister on the nineteenth, ‘that in the Reference the 
Court is asked to inquire into the immediate cause or causes of the accident.’ 
The Chief of the Air Staff had sensed the danger inherent in a draft prepared by 
21 ‘Air Force Courts of Inquiry — Regulations’, NAA: A705, 108/2/189; A432, 39/442.
22 ‘Accidents Involving Hawker Demon Aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force’, Notes for the Minister, 
10 Feb. 1938, NAA: A5954, 869/10. Much of this memo, including this sentence, was copied from a minute by 
the Chief of the Air Staff, 7 Jan. 1938, NAA: A5954, 869/8.
23 NAA: A9845, 319/37.
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the Attorney-General’s Department after a telephone conversation between Mel 
Langslow and Jim Fairbairn’s friend Gilbert Castieau, Assistant Secretary of the 
Attorney-General’s Department.
The draft proclamation from Castieau invited a report ‘concerning the 
circumstances connected with, and the probable cause or causes of that accident’. 
Burnett corrected the phrasing in his own hand, deleting the ‘circumstances 
connected’ and inserting the qualifying word ‘immediate’.24 The proposed 
restriction of the Inquiry’s scope to ‘immediate cause or causes’ was clearly 
designed to minimise the potential for embarrassing discoveries and revelations. 
For the Chief of the Air Staff there was to be no trawling back through previous 
months and years of policy and performance, omissions and mistakes that might 
prove to be relevant to an understanding of the fate of A16-97, its crew and 
passengers.
By directing attention to the word ‘immediate’ had Mel Langslow intended 
to offer reassurance to the Minister or to undo the Air Force’s self-serving 
restriction on an Inquiry they could not control? Arthur Fadden, with an 
instinct for due process and conflict of interest, asked the Attorney-General’s 
Department to re-draft the terms of reference. Fadden’s signed copy was returned 
to the department by his acting private secretary, Murray Tyrrell. Faint pencil 
underlining of the changed wording — ‘immediate’ had gone — showed that 
its import was understood. Whatever Langslow’s motive had been, the outcome 
was alarming for anyone in the RAAF who understood the ways of inquisitive 
judges and zealous counsel.
Assembling the court
The reasons for the choice of Charles Lowe to lead the Inquiry can only be 
surmised. Even if a judicial berth could be found for him, Edmund Drake-
Brockman was unavailable, having stepped down from the Arbitration Court 
in November 1939 to become an active Major General. The policy file created 
to deal with Lowe’s appointment, which passed between the Secretary of the 
Air Board and the Attorney-General’s Department between 17 and 23 August 
1940, was destroyed some time after 1960.25 The Victorian judiciary was known 
in later years to be averse to undertaking royal commissions and inquiries. But, 
doubtless realising that this was no ordinary matter, the Chief Justice of the 
24 NAA: A705, 32/10/2729 for Burnett’s pencilled amendments, the advice to Fadden, and Gazette reference; 
A9845, 319/37; A705, 32/10/2387. Lowe’s surviving papers in the Victorian Supreme Court Library contain 
no relevant material.
25 NAA: A2408, 108/2. The subject registration booklet for Air Department correspondence records the 
creation on 17 Aug. 1940 of the file ‘Establishment of the Court and appointment of Judge to constitute’, and 
the file’s movement and destruction.
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Victorian Supreme Court and the Premier, Albert Dunstan, consented to make 
Lowe available.26 Before his elevation to the bench in 1927 Lowe had enjoyed a 
strong practice in common and criminal law. He had never taken silk but was 
the recognised leader of the County Court Bar. Concealed beneath ‘a grave and 
courtly demeanour’, Lowe was known for a sense of humour, ‘at times impish 
in its unexpectedness’. He had crossed swords and laughed uproariously with 
the young junior, Robert Menzies, a fellow tenant of Selborne Chambers.27 A 
member of the Melbourne and Australian Clubs, and the Royal Melbourne Golf 
Club, he had long moved in the same professional and social circles as the Prime 
Minister. They sat together on the council of Melbourne University. He had 
served on the council of Trinity College. They were both likely to be found 
taking summer holidays in picturesque Macedon, where the Menzies family had 
their own retreat and the Lowes would stay at the exclusive Golf House.
Menzies knew that Lowe would bring detachment and a keen mind to the task. 
He would also have a broader appreciation of the government’s sensitivities. 
There might be scepticism in aviation circles generally and the RAAF in particular 
about the ability of a 59-year-old judge who had never been in an aeroplane 
to add anything of value to their understanding of the crash. However, Lowe 
could be relied upon to listen carefully to the evidence of those who supposedly 
knew what they were talking about. And he was quick to win over some of 
the doubters by taking to the air himself with the court registrar and the two 
RAAF assessors appointed to assist him; he would see, hear, and feel a Hudson 
and its crew at work. On the morning of August 27, with Squadron Leader 
Freddie Thomas at the controls of Hudson A16-78, he was treated to a 30-minute 
demonstration flight in sight of the granite peaks of the You Yangs near Lara, 
north of Geelong, the world so familiar to Jim Fairbairn, Geoff Street, and Frank 
Thornthwaite.28
For the vital role of counsel assisting the Inquiry the logical man on grounds 
of experience would have been Harry Winneke, incidentally a friend both of 
the Lowe family and the Prime Minister. It was ‘understood’, according to 
press reports, that Winneke would be appointed.29 But he was now in uniform, 
and his involvement in the Inspectorate of Air Accidents would in any case 
26 ‘Air Force Court of Inquiry to Investigate the Aircraft Accident Near Canberra on 13/8/40’, Attorney-
General’s Department File, NAA: A432, 1940/729.
27 ‘John Minogue’, in Dow (ed.), More Memories of Melbourne University, p.47; F Maxwell Bradshaw, 
Selborne Chambers Memories, Butterworths, Sydney, 1962, pp.54–8; Sir Robert Gordon Menzies, The Measure 
of the Years, Cassell, London, 1970, pp.255–6.
28 F. W. Thomas, flying log book, 27 Aug. 1940, Thomas MSS, courtesy of Rob Thomas; Sydney Morning 
Herald, 28 Aug. 1940. Tink, Air Disaster, (p.209), following the paraphrase in Newman Rosenthal, Sir Charles 
Lowe, A Biographical Memoir, Robertson & Mullens, Melbourne, 1968, p.99, makes the flight 30 minutes. 
Thomas would recall that he demonstrated a stall to Lowe (Frank Cranston, ‘Note of Telephone Conversation 
with Group Captain Sir Frederick Thomas Sunday November 11, 1990 4.55pm to 5.20pm’, courtesy of Rob 
Thomas).
29 The West Australian, 17 Aug. 1940.
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disqualify him. Having already participated in one inquiry into the accident, 
Squadron Leader Winneke could not be seen as independent. Nor could he 
easily be spared from his other duties. Someone from outside the Air Force had 
to be found: someone who would have the confidence of both Justice Lowe and 
the government. Fred Gamble, a friend and former pupil of the Prime Minister 
at the Bar, and counsel assisting the Air Accidents Investigation Committee 
inquiry into the Kyeema accident, would have been an obvious choice. But he 
was now on the verge of embarking for overseas service as a major in the 2nd 
AIF. The answer was a slightly older Law School contemporary of the Prime 
Minister’s from Melbourne University, a fellow Presbyterian and Freemason, 
Arthur Dean.
Unlike Menzies, a conspicuous figure on the wartime Parkville university 
campus, Dean had postponed his entry into the legal profession to enlist in 
the Army in 1915. He had served in the ranks on the Western Front, earned a 
commission, was wounded and gassed. In 1933 he had co-authored a history of 
the AIF 7th Battalion.30 He was now a leading junior at the Victorian Bar with 
a practice in equity and industrial property, and the acknowledged authority 
on the law relating to estate agents, auctioneers, and hire purchase. He had 
continued through the 1930s in the Reserve of Officers, rising to the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel. In 1940 he was the 3rd Division’s legal officer. Arthur Dean 
and Menzies had seen each other at close quarters over 20 years. Dean had the 
highest admiration for Menzies’ forensic skills and advocacy. He had fought with 
him and against him.31 He was also well acquainted with Charles Lowe, whose 
learning, extraordinary memory, courtesy, judicial temperament, and home 
tennis court he knew at first hand. He was to describe Lowe 28 years later as ‘a 
simple and straightforward character with no complications...a practical minded 
lawyer’.32 In later years, Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams, who professed never 
to understand why judges were appointed to inquire into aircraft accidents, 
was to say that counsel assisting ‘without any real knowledge’ made their own 
decision about who was to blame and then set out to prove it.33 But, whatever 
premature conclusion Dean might have been tempted to formulate, he would 
not be left uninstructed for long.
30 Arthur Dean & Eric W. Gutteridge, The Seventh Battalion AIF: resume of activities of the Seventh Battalion 
in the Great War — 1914–1918, Melbourne, 1933, reprint with amendments 1986. The authors had paid 
tribute to their CO, Pompey Elliott: ‘Outspoken, impulsive, straight as a ruled line, intensely headstrong…a 
dour fighter, brave to a fault…’ (p.7).
31 Dean was a signatory of a testimonial to Menzies by scores of eminent civic leaders, businessmen, and 
barristers re-affirming on 7 Aug. 1941 their ‘complete confidence’ in his leadership (Menzies MSS NLA MS 
4936/40/23). He had not signed a similar circular in June 1940 (Wright MSS, NLA MS 8119, Series 6/1).
32 R. L. Sharwood, ‘Dean, Sir Arthur (1893–1970)’, Ritchie and Cunneen (eds), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 13, pp.599–600; Sir Arthur Dean, A Multitude of Counsellors, F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, 
pp.220–4; Sir Arthur Dean, ‘Pillar of Justice’, The Age, 1 June 1968; Ursula Whiteside to CH, 14 March 2010.
33 Williams, These Are Facts, p.350.
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Arthur Dean at home
(Courtesy of Ursula Whiteside)
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Even before Dean was briefed by the Crown Solicitor, Harry Whitlam, two 
assessors to ‘assist and advise’ the Court had been chosen and announced. 
Wing Commander (temporary Group Captain) D. E. L. Wilson had been, like 
his contemporaries Ulex Ewart and ‘Dad’ Bladin, an Army lieutenant when he 
joined Lester Brain, Joe Hewitt, and others in the first group of a dozen men to 
go through the RAAF’s new flying course in 1923. Douglas ‘Del’ Wilson, Service 
number 16, had later graduated from the RAF Staff College, and commanded 
the RAAF station at Richmond 1939–40 before becoming Senior Administrative 
Staff officer at RAAF Central Area Headquarters in Sydney.34 ‘He has had long 
experience in Service squadrons’, the press release noted. His experience as 
a vigorous court-martial prosecutor in 1936, reassuring as it perhaps was to 
his superiors, was not mentioned. Nor his confident exposition of theories to 
explain the crash of the Anson A4-32 to Judge Piper in June 1939.35 Wilson 
had been seen making a ‘minute examination of the wreckage’ the day after 
the crash in Canberra. Attention would not be drawn to this. Or to his role in 
identifying bodies at the Canberra morgue on August 13, or his testimony to 
the Coroner the next day. The Victoria Barracks and Toorak hierarchy, especially 
his close friend the Director of Operations and Intelligence, ‘Dad’ Bladin, (the 
oldest of his group at Duntroon), needed no briefing on his record.36
Wilson’s companion was to be 33-year-old Squadron Leader (temporary Wing 
Commander) A. G. Carr AFC. Tony Carr was Director of Staff Duties at Air 
Force Headquarters, Melbourne. He was a rising star, like Paddy Heffernan and 
Val Hancock a Duntrooner taught to fly by Ray Garrett, and as experienced a 
Hudson pilot as could be found. He had only recently relinquished command 
of No. 1 Squadron, equipped with Hudsons since April. The appointment of 
Wilson and Carr on the recommendation of the Air Board gave reassurance that 
the legal minds would have reliable professional guidance. But in case it might 
be thought that they could unduly influence the outcome of the Inquiry their 
role was explained for the press: ‘The duties of assessors in the Court will be 
similar to those performed by assessors in the long established Marine Courts 
of Inquiry, and like the latter, these officers have no power of adjudication.’ As 
Air Marshal Williams was to lament, assessors ‘could not submit a minority 
report even if they considered the finding of the Court was wrong’.37 What no-
one appears to have remembered was the advice about the selection of assessors 
given by the Secretary of the Air Board to the Air Member for Personnel the 
previous year: ‘…consideration should be given to whether they have been 
34 NAA: A9300, WILSON DEL.
35 The West Australian, 23 June 1939.
36 F. M. Bladin, Typescript Memoir, 1953, AWM: MSS 886. For Bladin’s sobriquet ‘Dad’, see J. E. Hewitt, 
The Black One, Langate Publishing, South Yarra, 1984, p.101.
37 ‘Draft Press Statement’, ‘telephoned to Pte Sec to Min at Canberra 1715 hrs 20/8/40’, NAA: A705, 
32/10/2729/72.; Williams, These Are Facts, p.350.
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connected directly with the particular inquiry, e.g. if they have been witnesses 
at the air-force court of inquiry or members of such court or otherwise directly 
interested in the accident’.38
These implicit criteria should have given pause to anyone who knew of Wilson’s 
roles in Canberra immediately after the accident.
With Lowe, Dean, Wilson, and Carr appointed, on August 20 the Deputy Chief of 
the Air Staff, Air Commodore Bill Bostock, who was orchestrating proceedings, 
passed the accident inquiry file to the RAAF’s principal legal officer, Wing 
Commander F. F. Knight. Fred Knight, another Victorian barrister, veteran of 
Gallipoli and the Western Front, was asked for his ‘comments and any necessary 
advice’. Knight at once recognised the danger inherent on the reference the Court 
had been given. There were crucial procedural elements that Anderson, Bostock, 
Burnett, and others had missed. Another job needed to be done, one that the RAAF 
high command should be anxious to ensure would be done by someone they could 
trust. If there was going to be an independent judge and an independent counsel 
and assessors assisting him, it was essential that the Air Board had someone in 
the room to represent their interests. Knight had learned this lesson when Justice 
Piper had roamed freely and mused over embarrassing issues the previous year. 
‘It is considered advisable’, Knight warned, ‘to take action to avoid the recurrence 
of certain unfortunate incidents which took place during the hearing before the 
previous court in 1939.’ In that case the Service was not represented by counsel:
Neither the assessors, nor any technical representative of the Service 
saw counsel assisting court before the hearing. The result was that at the 
outset and whilst evidence of a somewhat damaging nature was given, 
counsel was left without the technical assistance essential to enable him 
effectively to cross-examine the witnesses.
Knight’s version of events in 1939 was tendentious. The truth was not that there 
had been no meeting between the assessors and counsel before proceedings 
began. Rather, that meeting had not afforded an opportunity to talk privately 
to counsel assisting; it had occurred in the presence of the judge, and officers 
of the Deputy Crown Solicitor’s office and the Air Board.39 The situation was, 
Knight noted, retrieved before the Court convened for a second time to inquire 
into the accident to Anson A4-11 but not before ‘considerable damage had been 
done to the Service in the eyes of the public’. Determined that this should not 
happen again, Knight laid out the course that needed to be taken. In a minute 
to the Air Member for Personnel on August 20, seen first by the Director of 
Personal Services, Joe Hewitt, he recommended:
38 ‘Assessors for Special Courts of Inquiry into Aircraft Accidents’, 10 May 1939, NAA: A705, 108/2/189.
39 Sec., Air Board to Sec., Dept of Defence, ‘Air Force Court of Inquiry — Accident to Anson A4-11 on 
2.3.39’, NAA: A705, 108/2/189.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
476
(a) that counsel be briefed to represent the Air Board, or, if this is not 
agreed to, that a legal officer be detailed to do so. It is recognised that 
Squadron Leader WINNEKE may not be available, and if that be so 
Pilot Officer PAPE is suggested. He is a member of the Service Court of 
Inquiry on this accident;
(b) that a General Duties Branch officer, preferably with experience of 
Hudsons, be detailed to assist counsel assisting the court, if counsel so 
desires;
(c) that all assistance be offered to counsel assisting the court by this 
Department, and that the services of Squadron Leader WINNEKE be 
made available to him, if he so desires. This suggestion is made because 
in this way counsel could be advised of the witnesses who might be 
called, and the order in which it is advisable to call them;
(d) that, where possible, all service witnesses, be instructed to confer 
with a service legal officer before giving evidence, if the service is not 
represented before the court;
(e) that the assessors confer with Section L.1 with respect to the exclusion 
from the press, etc. of secret and confidential matter arising before the 
court.40
Knight’s message was not lost on his superiors. Known as the ‘Legal Eagle’, for 
over a decade he had lectured and examined cadets as well as officers seeking 
promotion to squadron leader. He had served frequently as Judge Advocate in 
courts-martial. Called up in December 1939, he had helped steer the Air Force 
Act through Parliament.41 He was a respected and trusted advisor. Educated at 
Melbourne Grammar and Trinity College at Melbourne University, Knight had 
been in the Service part-time since 1926 and was promoted Wing Commander 
in 1934. The son of a prominent pastoralist, stockbroker, and philanthropist, 
and cousin of Otway Falkiner of the famous Boonoke merino stud, he moved 
familiarly in Melbourne club land and was a valuable link between the Bar 
and the Air Force. His closest Service friends were ‘King’ Cole, Harry Cobby, 
Allan Walters, Doug Candy, and Jack Graham, who was his legal assistant before 
being called up in 1939.
40 Sec., Air Board to Sec. Dept of Defence, 30 May 1939, NAA: A705, 108/2/189; WCdr F. F. Knight to Air 
Member for Personnel (through Director of Personnel [sic] Services), minute, 20 Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 
32/10/2729/85.
41 The provision of the legislation purporting to apply British rules and regulations via a general regulation-
making power was ‘probably invalid’ (Neil Preston, ‘The Development of Defence Force Disciplinary Law 
1901–1985: An Outline’, Work-in-Progress Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences, ANU, 29 Nov. 1988).
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Knight openly displayed his political sympathies, scrutineering at elections for 
the UAP deputy leader, Jack Latham.42 With his barrister friend Ned Herring, 
he had played his part in the Victorian secret army organisation of the previous 
decade, and was a close friend of Geoff Street’s cousin, Jack Scott, now in 
counter-intelligence.43 His recommendation of counsel to represent the Air 
Force went up to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. Bostock was careful not 
to reveal too much of his own hand. He was adept at pleasing his chief, as his 
promotion to Air Commodore, vaulting over the heads of seven more senior 
officers (Anderson, Harrison, Cole, De La Rue, Wrigley, McNamara, and Lukis), 
had marked two months earlier.44 He endorsed Knight’s advice and passed the 
file to the CAS. Sir Charles Burnett agreed and sent the papers back to the Air 
Member for Personnel (AMP) and the Secretary of the Department.
‘A. M. P. will I presume take necessary action’, Burnett wrote. ‘Mucker’ Anderson 
knew better than the British CAS about the relevant lines of authority. He took 
the opportunity to nominate someone for the task in a minute to the Secretary 
on August 23:
Action to request that counsel be briefed to represent the Air Board must 
be taken by the Secretary. I recommend Mr J. B. Tait, of the Victorian 
Bar, who is a man of high standing in his profession and was a pilot 
in the last war. If the request for counsel to represent the Air Board is 
refused, Section L.1 will supply a legal officer.
Why there might be a refusal, and who might refuse, was not clear. The 
nomination of Jim Tait was shrewd. As an Australian Flying Corps Lieutenant 
in No. 3 Squadron he was an old comrade both of Anderson and Harry Wrigley. 
He was one of only three men ever to read with the formidable High Court judge, 
Owen Dixon, Menzies being another. Would there be political resistance to the 
appointment of outside counsel? Would the engagement of so well-regarded a 
barrister suggest that the RAAF felt it needed exceptionally able protection? 
That had not been the thought 31 months earlier when both the then Minister 
for Defence and the Attorney-General had approved of the department being 
represented in the politically sensitive inquest into the death of Flying Officer 
Jack Fallon, a Labor MP’s son. Attorney-General Menzies had then ‘directed 
that the best available counsel should be secured’.45 This time, as Anderson 
42 Knight, These Things Happened, pp.285–327; F. F. Knight, History of the Australian Club, Melbourne, vol. 
II 1932–1965, [1971]. Knight does not mention that he was a contemporary of R. G. Menzies in the Melbourne 
University Law School and Melbourne University Rifles.
43 Robert Darroch’s diary, 12 March 1985, reporting conversation with Ernest Whiting. For Darroch’s quest 
to identify Scott with D. H. Lawrence’s Jack Callcott in Kangaroo, see D. H. Lawrence in Australia, Macmillan, 
Sth Melbourne, 1981, and www.cybersydney.com.au/dhl/thesis1b.htm.
44 In his own words, Bostock had ‘made his mark very quickly’ with Burnett. (‘Why Bostock?’, ts draft 
article, Heritage Collections, Queensland State Library, Acc. 4349).
45 ‘Accidents involving Hawker Demon Aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force’, NAA: A5954, 869/8.
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noted the next day, there was ‘further discussion’, after which ‘it was agreed to 
provide one of our own legal officers rather than brief outside counsel, & this 
is being arranged. CAS concurred.’ Given that George Pape had already assisted 
Lachal, it might have been predicted that he would be assigned. There was in 
any case no-one else.46
‘Mucker’ Anderson: ‘immersed in the minutiae of administration’
(Courtesy of the RAAF Museum)
46 NAA: A705, 32/10/2729/1–3.
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Bostock’s precautions
The Air Force hierarchy had mobilised for damage control. A week later, on 
the day the Inquiry was due to start, Pape received his riding instructions. 
The directive came down from the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff to the Air 
Member for Personnel with a copy to Fred Knight. Whereas Knight had urged 
that the RAAF not be left without protection before the court, Bostock now set 
out a comprehensive strategy to ensure that anything that might conceivably 
be embarrassing was shielded from view. Bostock had for some time been alert 
to criticism, including letters reaching the Air Minister, of ‘the administration 
of senior officers and of equipment by personnel in units’. The Air Member 
for Personnel had taken the matter up with Area commands ‘in an endeavour 
to improve morale generally’. There had been concern, too, about a ‘large 
percentage increase in forced landings’. In secret conclave it was admitted that 
the cause was ‘principally the lack of close supervision by Flight and Squadron 
Commanders’. Poorly executed aerobatics and incomplete knowledge of the 
characteristics of particular engines were blamed. Now Bostock might have 
taken as his text the advice of the Secretary of the Air Board to the Minister of 
Defence on an earlier politically fraught occasion: ‘it has not been the practice 
in the past to enter into any discussion with the press or public on the technical 
causes of air accidents, otherwise ill-informed criticism and comments cannot 
be avoided’.47
In 1937 Jim Fairbairn had been a strong defender of secret inquiries: ‘I 
believe that aviation would benefit to the greatest extent if the evidence were 
given in camera…the rights of the public are protected by means of coronial 
investigations.’48 Those senior officials familiar with the Piper inquiries that 
followed would have known that, on the advice of the assessor, Group Captain 
Harry Wrigley, the proceedings in camera in Melbourne were closely held. 
Only three transcripts were made. Defence Minister Geoff Street, distinctly 
peeved, noted that ‘advice should have been given to the Judge for a copy of 
such evidence to be made available to the Minister’. Street directed that in 
future he was to be sent any evidence taken in camera.49 What Street could not 
have known was that the Solicitor-General, the recently knighted Sir George 
Knowles, had privately recommended that Piper keep his inquiry papers in the 
47 ‘Report of Staff Conference No. 35…’, 21 May 1940, NAA: AA1977/635; ‘Accidents to Bomber Squadron 
on Training Flight’, minute, 6 Dec. 1937, NAA: A5954, 869/10.
48 Uncorrected proof of Debate in House of Representatives, 8 Dec. 1937, NAA: A5954, 869/8.
49 Minute by Street, 8 Sept. 1939, on Sec., Air Board to Sec. Dept of Defence, 14 Aug. 1939, NAA: A705, 
108/2/189.
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offices of the Arbitration Court in Sydney and Melbourne. If he had to rely on 
support staff from the Air Department he could at least keep the files secure 
under his own control.50
Air Commodore Bostock knew what he was doing. As station commander at 
Richmond in the mid-1930s he had used his press contacts to avert ‘unjustified 
but nevertheless distasteful publicity when individual members of the Service, 
suffering under the emergency “cuts”, were anxious to rush into print with all 
sorts of  grievances’.51 In June 1939, as Director of Operations and Intelligence he 
had belatedly been assigned to assist counsel to Piper’s Air Court of Inquiry in 
Melbourne. It was his activity at that time — providing the Court with a secret 
document explaining why all Ansons not fitted with Sperry instruments had 
been grounded after a crash into Port Phillip Bay — that Fred Knight had hinted 
at when he spoke of the situation being retrieved. Bostock’s ostensible brief 
then was to assist in gathering ‘requisite information’ relating to the ‘adequacy 
of training of air-force personnel’. Alert to the potential for the independence of 
the proceedings to be undermined, Geoff Street had approved the arrangement 
but insisted that ‘the officer should not “sit in” as a member of the Court but 
be available to give advice when required’.52 Such a passive role minimised the 
influence that could be brought to bear on the scrupulous Harry Winneke. 
And, when Piper’s two assessors found him unbiddable, the judge’s subsequent 
damning queries and faint praise brought no joy to the RAAF’s upper echelon.
Bostock was determined that nothing like this would happen again. Arthur 
Fadden had let it be known that before Cabinet met to decide on the form of a 
possible public inquiry he would seek the views of the Air Board on technical 
evidence that might prove useful to the enemy.53 On such matters a new and 
inexpert minister would be foolhardy not to follow the advice he received. 
Taken at its face, Bostock’s minute on August 27 amounted to a brazen order to 
subvert the ‘open inquiry’ authorised by the Cabinet. ‘As the terms of reference 
are wide in their scope,’ he pointed out, ‘it is inevitable that evidence may be 
required which must not be made available to the Press or Public.’
It is therefore considered necessary that the officer appearing for the Air 
Board should request that evidence on the following matters should be 
taken in camera:
Maintenance of Aircraft:
50 Knowles to Piper, 22 June 1939, NAA: A432, 486 of 1939. Knowles had a personal source on RAAF flying 
safety, his son, Air Cadet Lindsay Knowles (later F/Lt, killed in action Nov. 1941).
51 Bostock to Norman Ellison, 16 Aug. 1940, Ellison MSS NLA MS 1882 2/22.
52 The Mercury, 10 June 1939; Sec., Air Board to Sec., Dept of Defence, 31 May 1939, annotated by Street, 
1 June 1939, NAA: A705, 108/2/189.
53 Townsville Daily Bulletin, 15 Aug. 1940.
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Standards reached by maintenance personnel.
Maintenance equipment available.
Security of aircraft storage:
Whether aircraft are housed in hangars or in the open.
Disposition of aircraft on the aerodrome.
System and numbers of guards available.
Training of Pilots:
Methods and time spent.
Adverse comment on general standard.
Adverse comment on standard of pilots of the particular aircraft.
Armament and Wireless Equipment:
No indication of armament or details of wireless equipment should be 
given.
Adverse comment on crew members.
General Equipment:
No indication should be given as to lack of equipment.54
Taking care not to divulge matters that would jeopardise security was of course 
entirely proper. When opening his inquiry in Melbourne in May 1939 Judge 
Piper had said ‘It was the wish of the Court to preserve any state secrets. He 
would ask witnesses not to divulge openly details of defence importance.’ If 
necessary the Court would sit in camera (as it did for a period at Winneke’s 
request) or confidential matter would not be taken in evidence. There were 
already stipulations in place that prohibited disclosure of the mark of the engine; 
all internal construction, armament, and equipment of the aircraft; as well as 
performance, range, or estimated speeds.55 However, all this was not enough 
for Bostock. Adverse comment on crew members unable to defend themselves 
might justifiably be kept confidential. But to endeavour to hide criticisms of 
54 DCAS (ACdre W. D. Bostock) to AMP (ACdre W. H. Anderson), 27 Aug. 1940, copy, to L.1. (WCdr F. 
F. Knight) passed to P/O G. Pape, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729/38. Anderson prefixed ‘any’ to each ‘Adverse 
comment’.
55 The Argus, Courier-Mail, 26 May 1939; ‘Disclosure of Information Regarding Aircraft and Engines’, 
AFCO 3/1939, NAA: A7674, 1/5.
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pilot training, shortages of equipment, or maintenance standards could be seen 
as self-serving — or would have been if the contents of the document had been 
made public.
Bostock’s list of areas for in camera evidence was as good a guide as could be 
assembled to the RAAF’s fears about the flaws and weaknesses that might be 
exposed. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff could scarcely have forgotten, for 
example, that it was less than four months since the Air Board issued orders 
promulgating a new policy on ‘approaching and landing’. The introduction of 
‘modern high wing-loaded, flapped monoplanes’ had made ‘the old accepted 
methods of approaching and landing both difficult and unnecessary’. Four pages 
of detailed advice followed on the ‘modern technique’ that was henceforth to be 
imparted.56 Bostock knew only too well how hard it was proving to replace ‘old 
accepted methods’ with ‘modern technique’. Well aware of how narrowly he 
had himself escaped a share of the blame for the spate of accidents a few years 
earlier, he now took a perilous step across the line of propriety.
The Secretary of the Department of Air was not sent a copy of Bostock’s advice 
to the court until August 28. Extraordinary as it may seem, the Service members 
of the Air Board had gone behind the back of the Department and the Minister. 
Alerted by the transcript of evidence typed and delivered to his office each 
day, the departmental Secretary, Mel Langslow, sent a brusque request late on 
August 27 to the Chief of the Air Staff, invoking the Minister’s name:
C. A. S.
It is understood that at the opening of the sittings of the Air Force Court 
of Inquiry, which is investigating the aircraft accident at Canberra on 
13th August, 1940, a document was handed to the judge ‘by order of 
the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff’ relating to the evidence which should 
be heard in camera.
Would you please forward for the information of the Minister a copy of 
the document which was handed to the judge.
Ml
Secretary
A typed message, conveying a request that could very easily have been made 
personally or by telephone, signalled displeasure and an implicit rebuke, on the 
record.57
56 ‘Flying Instruction — Approaching and Landing’, 26 April 1940, ABO N196/40, NAA: AA 1977/635.
57 ‘Proceedings of Court of Inquiry — Flying Accidents, Master Copy, Vol. 1’, NAA: A98451, 318/39.
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Precise as always for the file, when the document arrived Langslow noted: ‘Copy 
of statement handed to Court by Deputy Chief of Air Staff.’ But, as Langslow 
already knew, the statement by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff had not been 
handed to the court by Bostock himself. The distinction is important, and 
was not a syntactical error. When George Pape had received his copy of the 
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff’s minute he knew what was meant by ‘For your 
information & attention.’58 He could rely on Lowe to seek guidance from counsel 
assisting about when to exercise the power to direct that evidence should be 
given in camera. A word to Arthur Dean would ensure that he would have the 
opportunity to advise what should be kept from the public. And so it proved. 
Bill Bostock, orchestrator of proceedings
(Courtesy of Geoff Bostock) 
Dean in his opening remarks referred to evidence from Service personnel ‘of a 
character that should not be published’. Lowe asked him to indicate when such 
evidence was about to be led. Dean then opened the door for Pape:
58 NAA: A705, 32/10/2729/38.
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MR. DEAN: I will do that to the Court and, if there is any evidence 
that my friend Mr. Pape thinks should not be made public, and which I 
should not so describe, I feel sure that he will no doubt give Your Honor 
[sic] a similar indication. It is not necessary to indicate the reasons that 
exist for this course to be followed.
THE COURT: No, they are obvious. In a time like this, evidence of this 
nature, which is of a technical character, should be made subject to that 
protection.
MR. DEAN: Exactly.
Whether or not Justice Lowe realised it, he had walked into a trap. He had 
assumed that the evidence that needed to be protected was ‘of a technical 
character’. This was of course true in part. But, as Dean and Pape led him 
forward, the net tightened. Dean explained that he was first going to call Air 
Force personnel from Laverton whose evidence should be taken in camera. 
There was, however, no reason he believed, as ‘at present advised’, why persons 
from Essendon or observers from Canberra need be heard in camera. As the first 
witness was about to be sworn, Lowe sought confirmation from Pape that the 
evidence from Laverton personnel was of a nature that ought not be disclosed 
in public. Yes it was, Pape responded, seizing his chance:
…furthermore, it may perhaps assist Your Honor in dealing with this 
matter if I hand you [a] copy of an instruction from the Deputy-Chief 
of the Air Staff which has been supplied to me. Your Honor will see the 
particular type of matter which it is felt should not be elicited in public.
With Bostock’s ‘instruction’ in his hands, Lowe heard Pape continue for about 
20 seconds, repeating his agreement about the way to deal with the witnesses 
from Laverton, Essendon, and Canberra. Having had barely enough time to scan 
the ‘instruction’, the judge made the commitment that guaranteed the secrecy 
Bostock wanted: ‘I propose to follow, at any rate at the outset, the suggestion 
that has been made, and to direct that evidence which involves matters under 
the headings handed to me by Mr. Pape shall be taken in camera.’
Lowe clearly had insufficient time to assimilate the document Pape put in his 
hands. He had already agreed in principle to the exclusion of what he thought 
would be matters of a ‘technical character’. Now he acquiesced in the placing 
of a cloak over everything that had not been observed on August 13 by civilian 
witnesses. Such was to be the ‘open inquiry’ that the Cabinet had approved. 
Pape, entitled to an extra blue cotton band on his sleeves denoting his promotion 
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to acting flight lieutenant with effect from August 26, had done his work well.59 
Unintentionally perhaps, the 37-year-old barrister had also provided plausible 
deniability to the government.
Just in time for the next morning’s newspapers, Arthur Fadden issued a 
statement. ‘Commenting on the fact that the Court had met in camera for the 
greater part of yesterday’s hearing,’ The Argus reported on August 28, the Air 
Minister said, ‘the interpretation of the terms of reference was a matter for the 
judge. The aim of the Ministry was a comprehensive inquiry into the cause or 
causes of the accident consistent with protection of the war effort.’ What Fadden 
never knew was the Air Force’s fall-back position if the judge declined to close 
the Court when ‘matters of a secret nature’ were about to be raised: ‘Failing the 
agreement of the judge it is suggested that the assessor seek the adjournment of 
the court to enable the Minister to decide whether the proceedings should be 
held in camera.’60
The government had insulated itself from Lowe’s inquiry. There was no need 
for anyone to articulate the obvious truth that the Air Force interest in limiting 
unhelpful revelations was itself a bulwark against political embarrassment for 
an embattled Prime Minister.
59 All quotations from the Inquiry transcript copy in NAA: A705, 32/10/2729 where Pape is addressed as 
‘Mr’ throughout, and sometimes described as Pilot Officer. Pape’s promotion: HQ Southern Area Personal 
Occurrence Reports, 2/1940, NAA: A10605, 48/2; NAA: A9300, PAPE GA shows P/O 1 July 1940, F/O 1 Jan. 
1941, F/Lt 20 July 1941.
60 ‘Assessors for Special Courts of Inquiry into Aircraft Accidents’, 10 May 1939, NAA: A705, 108/2/189. 
The Secretary of the Air Board, following the Defence Minister’s lead, had argued: ‘It is essential that there 
should be a provision empowering the Minister to certify that in the public interest it is desirable that any 




Charles Lowe had been preoccupied. He had dispensed justice to a procession 
of innocent men and minor miscreants over the weeks following the Canberra 
disaster. Judgement on a civil suit involving Sir Brudenell White’s Trustees, 
Executors, and Agency Co. had been followed by cases of false pretences and 
alleged larceny of a bicycle. On Monday, August 26, Justice Lowe had sat in the 
Criminal Court while a Grand Jury — Victoria’s first in 15 years and one of only 
half a dozen called in the state’s history — was sworn to deliberate on the case 
of three police constables charged with perjury. Fourteen prosecution witnesses 
were also sworn. The 23 jurors were instructed by the judge on the role of 
a Grand Jury and the law of perjury. After five hours of deliberation behind 
locked and guarded doors, a ‘True Bill’ was returned against the constables.1 
Thus, with just an evening to prepare, Lowe could turn his mind to a very 
different task. Here, knowledge of statute, case law, and sentencing precedent 
would be of no service. He had neither theory nor practical experience to guide 
him. With no technical background, he must rely on the RAAF assessors to alert 
him to issues, clarify and reconcile conflicting testimony. He had no tentative 
answers, and would struggle even to formulate meaningful questions to the 
parade of witnesses who had been summoned.
Lowe had the assistance of Arthur Dean of counsel (‘30 guineas on Brief, 5 
guineas Conference, with refreshers of 20 guineas for Melbourne and 27 guineas 
for attendance at Canberra’); James Aloysius Davoren of the Air Department, 
appointed by the Attorney-General as registrar; and a team of four shorthand 
writers from the parliamentary reporting staff. Two aircraft models, a large 
panoramic photographic mosaic, and a map of the area around the crash scene 
and Canberra aerodrome — ‘the Australian Capital Territory Landing Ground’, 
as the Coroner had described it — had been assembled.2 On accepting the 
appointment, Lowe had indicated to the Crown Solicitor that he would open 
the Inquiry on Tuesday, August 27 ‘and proceed without interruption until 
the completion of the Melbourne evidence’. He aimed to travel to Canberra 
on Wednesday night (vouchers for train travel for himself and his associate 
had been supplied), begin sittings on Thursday, and again proceed without 
interruption until all the evidence had been taken. Canberra and Queanbeyan 
witnesses were served summonses on August 26 to appear at the Supreme Court 
1 The Argus, 27 Aug. 1940.
2 The mosaic appears to be one compiled in May 1940 and now to be found in the NLA aerial photography 
collection. The map (Air Court of Inquiry Exhibit No. 9) is the ‘Federal Territory feature map’ published by 
the Dept of Home Affairs now catalogued in NLA: MAP G8981.P6 and viewable online. The Coroner’s Inquest 
had another copy of the map, similarly marked; this map, of which I obtained a photograph 35 years ago, now 
seems to have disappeared.
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at 10.30 a.m. on Thursday, August 29. Lowe hoped to complete the Inquiry by 
the end of the week and ‘immediately set about the preparation of my report’. 
It was a brisk timetable.3
It had been envisaged by the drafters of the Air Court regime that the evidence 
collected and the findings of a Service Court of Inquiry would be available to 
counsel assisting the Air Court. Counsel could then determine whether the 
evidence on all relevant points was complete or whether the Service Court needed 
to be re-opened to clear up any remaining questions. The intended procedure 
was that the Service Court (referred to as the ‘ordinary court of inquiry’ by 
the officials) ‘will be used solely for the purpose of enabling the Minister to 
determine whether or not the Court should be held’. The expectation was that 
the ‘ordinary’ Court’s proceedings would be used to prepare ‘the statement of 
the case and notes to enable the Court to obtain a complete outline of the subject 
matter of the inquiry’. Apart from this limited purpose, the proceedings of a 
Service Court ‘should not be available to the Court, witnesses, etc., during the 
inquiry’.4
No-one had contemplated a situation in which the government would decide 
to hold an Air Court of Inquiry before a Service Court had completed its work. 
But, as it turned out, the members of the Service Court had signed their report 
on August 18. The Coroner had also issued his findings on August 26, a day 
before the Air Court opened in No. 2 High Court. A copy of the record of the 
Coroner’s Court was despatched immediately from Canberra to the Deputy 
Crown Solicitor’s office in Melbourne; it could have reached the registrar of 
the Air Court in time to be read before the Court re-convened in Canberra on 
August 29. It appears that Arthur Dean quickly assimilated the Service Court 
documents. He submitted a list of topics on which he would require additional 
evidence: the aircraft’s design, construction, assembly, maintenance, and flying 
record; arrangements for guarding the aircraft; load calculation; and crucially:
Some expert opinion by the most qualified person available as to
(i) deductions as to cause of crash, to be deduced from accounts of eye-
witnesses;
(ii) what are most likely reasons for crash, and why?
Dean had been told that Flight Lieutenant Ryland and Squadron Leader Dallas 
Scott were the suggested experts. But there was doubt about Scott’s availability, 
and the possibility was raised that Squadron Leader Freddie Thomas and Pilot 
3 Deputy Crown Solicitor (F. F. Clausen) to Crown Solicitor (Sir George Knowles), 28 Aug. 1940; Charles Lowe 
to Knowles [23 Aug. 1940], NAA: A432, 85 1940/729/25–6.
4 ‘Special Court of Inquiry (Investigation of Aircraft Accidents) Air Force Regulations, Part XVI, Notes on 
Procedure of the Court’, 19 May 1939, NAA: A705, 108/2/189.
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Officer Raymond Winter might be called in his stead.5 Dean asked that Ryland, 
Scott (if available), Thomas, and ‘any other witnesses’ who might be able to give 
evidence on the cause of the crash would see him on Monday afternoon, the day 
before the Court convened.6 Wing Commander Fred Knight co-ordinated the 
Air Board response. Scott and Ryland, he said, were on ‘an extremely important 
operational flight’ and it was impossible to say when they would return, ‘if at all’. 
Scott was about to fly the Chief of the Air Staff and was not expected to return 
before Thursday or Friday the following week. But the advice about Ryland was 
misleading. He was engaged on August 26 and 27 on taking Flight Lieutenant F. 
B. Chapman of the RAAF Reserve through a Hudson conversion course.7 It was 
obvious from Knight’s letter to Dean that great reliance was going to be placed 
on Freddie Thomas’s performance in the Court. Pilot Officer Ray Winter was not 
considered a satisfactory expert witness because of his ‘limited experience’. But 
Wing Commander Colin MacKenzie Henry, Director of Technical Services, was 
suggested as an alternative.
Lowe and Dean had planned to finish hearing the Melbourne witnesses by 
lunchtime on Wednesday, August 28. They did not expect any dramatic 
revelations. In his ‘opening of the facts’ in the case on August 27, Dean 
summarised what had been observed and determined about A16-97’s last flight 
and the crash.8 As a result of the destruction of the greater part of the aircraft, he 
said, ‘it is impossible to reconstruct any definite cause of the accident’. The pilot, 
Dean said, was ‘trained, competent and experienced’, familiar with the aircraft 
type and with Canberra aerodrome. ‘In all the circumstances, it is impossible to 
state accurately what led to the trouble.’ With the slenderest of hints about a 
matter that could possibly prove embarrassing, Dean concluded that the aircraft 
took off from Essendon with its full load ‘with the crew properly on it, without 
any difficulty whatever’.
Commenting on the appearance of the crashed plane itself, Dean noted, as the 
Inspector of Aircraft Accidents, Wing Commander Murphy, had reported, that 
the wing flaps remained more or less intact; they were extended almost to the full 
extent, and appeared to have operated together. Informed by this observation 
from the official accident investigator, Lowe could reasonably expect that what 
would be elicited from the Laverton ground crew would be straightforward 
if unilluminating. But he had not counted on the effect of the evidence to be 
presented in camera by AC1 Les Roffey, the 22-year-old flight rigger of No. 2 
Squadron’s A Flight, who had inspected A16-97 at Laverton on the morning 
5 There was no mention of the other most experienced Hudson pilot, F/Lt Alec Barlow, who had been 
attached to No. 7 Squadron at Laverton since Aug. 5.
6 NAA: MP401/1, CL12774; A432, 1940/729.
7 F/Lt J. P. Ryland, Flying Log Book, 26–7 Aug. 1940, Ryland MSS, NLA MS5020 Box 1.
8 Unless otherwise indicated, information and quotations from proceedings of the Air Court of Inquiry are 
from the transcript found at NAA: A705, 32/10/2729.
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of the fatal flight. Group Captain Wilson, who seemed to have a theory, had 
asked the fitter, Corporal Jim Davey, at the end of his testimony on August 27: 
‘Could you give us any indication of under what circumstances one flap would 
be caused to come down while the other flap remained in position?’ Davey, more 
expert on the airframe than the hydraulics, had ventured that a wire would have 
to break or a pin shear, ‘which is very unlikely’. He added that a rigger would 
be more qualified to speak. Flight Lieutenant Ryland, who had been listening to 
proceedings, was asked the same question. He said it would be impossible in a 
Hudson deliberately to lower one flap without the other being lowered as well. 
To the related question, if one flap were down and one up would that put the 
aircraft on its back, Ryland had no answer. But he was in no doubt that ‘nothing 
I can think of’ would cause a Hudson to go on its back. Pressed by Acting Flight 
Lieutenant George Pape, Ryland said he was not qualified to say under what 
circumstances one flap might be lowered while the other did not move. Echoing 
Corporal Davey, he advised that a rigger would be more qualified to answer. It 
would, he agreed with Pape, have to be a ‘defect in the system of working the 
controls’.
Thus attention turned to Les Roffey. Roffey, too ill in hospital with influenza to 
appear on Tuesday, was thought to be the man best able to explain the working 
of the flaps. He had testified briefly to the Service Court on August 13 that he 
checked the pilot’s controls that morning and found them ‘serviceable’. That 
had been the first time he had ever touched A16-97. Brought in from his sick 
bed, Roffey elaborated for the benefit of civilian counsel and the judge, that 
he had ‘pumped down’ the flaps — lowered them by hand pump. He had gone 
under the bomb doors and satisfied himself that the flaps were all right, then 
back into the cockpit to close the bomb doors and raise the flaps. He had found 
‘no defect of any kind’ in any of the controls: ailerons, elevators, and rudders 
as well as flaps. He had stayed by the aircraft while the fitters warmed up the 
motors and lowered the bomb doors and flaps with the power pump.
Initially questioned by Arthur Dean, Roffey was then cross-examined by George 
Pape on behalf of the Air Force. Possibly primed by the assessors, Pape asked 
the question that no-one else had been able to answer: under which conditions 
might one flap be lowered while the other remained in position? ‘More than 
likely,’ Roffey said, ‘it would mean a broken wire.’ He had of course checked the 
wires and found no indication of weakness in the wires controlling the flaps. He 
conceded that it was possible that there might be a weakness in part of the wire 
that was concealed in a sleeve; but, even if he could not see it, he said, he would 
feel it, knowing that the tension was not right. At this moment ‘Del’ Wilson 
intervened with a series of increasingly technical questions about the linkages 
between the flaps and the pilot’s control in the cabin — the hydraulic jack, the 
sleeve and swage joints by which cables were attached to each other. Had Roffey 
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ever known of a case where a wire had pulled out slightly from the sleeve joint? 
‘I have never actually seen it, but I believe there was one such incident in the 
squadron…and the whole squadron had to dissemble [sic] those sleeves and 
inspect those joints.’
Having heard of an occasion in which all the Hudson aircraft of No. 2 Squadron 
needed to be inspected, Wilson seemed convinced that he was on to something 
significant:
If both flaps were down, as we will assume from the evidence which 
will probably be obtained from Canberra, and the pilot had reason to 
take his flaps up again; in other words, if he were going round to make 
another approach, and one of those cables was loose and had pulled out, 
would I be right in saying that one flap would be down and the other 
flap up and the flap indicator in the pilot’s cabin indicating that the flaps 
had both come up? 
— I am afraid I do not know exactly where the indicator reading comes 
from.
There was nothing more Roffey could offer the Court other than an opinion:
Would you say it is possible — I think you have said it is possible — 
that if both flaps were down and the pilot endeavoured to bring them 
up, and this cable were broken, it is possible for one flap to come up and 
other flap to remain down?
— Yes.
Wilson did not mention that he had personally examined the wreckage on the 
day of the crash and had seen for himself what there was left to see of the flaps. 
He asked no questions of the next two airman witnesses — Corporal Dines, the 
instrument maker, and AC1 Bardwell, the electrician — who described their 
inspections and conclusions that they found nothing amiss. But he returned to 
flaps when Corporal Mortimer Ewing, trained as a rigger and now a fitter with 
2A Survey Flight, took the stand. All of the Service witnesses from Laverton 
had been examined in camera to this point. But at 11.05 a.m. the proceedings 
were resumed in public to hear evidence about events at Essendon. When the 
last of the Essendon witnesses had been heard, Corporal Ewing was called. He 
had asked to give his testimony in Melbourne although he was stationed at 
Canberra. Whether by accident or design the Court remained open to the public 
and the press.
Ewing was questioned in detail about his observation of the aircraft as it flew 
over Canberra aerodrome and then descended. However, Wilson’s interest was 
elsewhere. He wanted Ewing to explain to ‘His Honor’ what a swage joint was, 
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and then say whether it would be regarded as a serious defect if the wire started 
pulling away from the cylinder which surrounded it. ‘It could be.’ What if it 
pulled away one-quarter of an inch, would it be likely to pull away the whole 
distance? ‘Once it broke the joint it would be absolutely useless.’ There was to 
be nothing more from Ewing on this subject. And Dean had no more evidence 
to offer in Melbourne. But Wilson now had the ear of Lowe, who invited him to 
indicate ‘a class of evidence which he thinks may be useful, and which it may 
be possible to obtain here’. What we want, Wilson said, is ‘technical evidence 
which will show the effect on a Lockheed aircraft when the cable connecting 
the flap hydraulic gear comes apart’. Lowe put the request to Dean in his own 
words:
…the point involved is whether where such an event as that happens 
you may have one flap which will operate and the other will not. I desire 
to have the information, so far as it can be got, as to what would be the 
effect on the behaviour of the plane in such an event.
Flap puzzles
Lowe wanted answers before he left for Canberra. He had heard Ryland talk at 
length in the morning about tests he had carried out with Freddie Thomas on 
the aircraft’s stalling proclivities.9 But Ryland could not help with the ‘remote 
contingency’, as Wilson had put it, of one flap up and the other down. Flight 
Sergeant McGowan, the A Flight senior NCO, was in court. He was a rigger 
— one of the first to spend time at Richmond with Ryland and the Lockheed 
team — but could not be expected to answer complicated questions about what 
the plane might do in flight. At 12.20 p.m. therefore Dean was on notice to 
produce an expert witness when the Court was due to resume in just under two 
hours. Wilson suggested that Air Force Headquarters might be able to supply 
the evidence required. Headquarters, in the person of 27-year-old Squadron 
Leader Ernie Hey, could help. Hey, who had completed a two-year ‘long 
engineering’ course with the RAF, was the staff officer in charge of airframes 
in the Directorate of Technical Services. His superior, Wing Commander 
Colin Henry, who had preceded him on the RAF course, had no hesitation in 
nominating him. Summoned to explain how the flaps worked, Hey gathered 
a manual and drawings, and was driven at speed to face the waiting Court. 
Arriving breathless, and admonished for being late, he was sworn in, and a 
40-minute grilling began. The Court was closed to the public.
9 Ryland with Thomas alongside in A16-34 spent 55 minutes on stall tests on August 20 (Ryland, Flying Log 
Book, 20 Aug.1940, Ryland MSS, NLA MS5020 Box 1).
21 . Expert witnesses?
493
Asked at the outset whether he had any knowledge of the design and 
construction of Lockheed Hudson bombers, Hey answered cautiously, ‘Some 
— very little as yet.’ Undeterred by Hey’s next qualified response — he could 
speak only ‘generally’ as to the means by which flaps on the wings of Hudsons 
were raised and lowered —  Dean and then Lowe pushed on. To each query 
the young engineering officer gave careful answers, providing a little more 
detail but consistent with Corporal Roffey, until he too came to the limit of his 
knowledge. He did not know if there was an indicator for each of the flaps. But, 
as Wilson immediately pointed out, it was immaterial because:
one flap being down and the other flap up would cause such a movement 
of the aircraft that it would dive down very very suddenly, and the pilot 
would only have, perhaps, two or three seconds to make any correction 
that was necessary. He would be still thinking of what was wrong rather 
than looking at his flap indicator to see whether that was the cause of 
the aircraft behaving abnormally.
Hey agreed. Then, to Hey’s surprise, Wilson opened up another line of enquiry. 
Wilson had heard Corporal Ewing say that he had seen the aircraft at one point 
on its back. Ewing had shown with the aid of models what he thought he saw. 
Wilson now tried to connect this observation to the position of the flaps. If one 
flap was fully down and the other fully up, would that cause the aircraft to turn 
on its back? Not necessarily. Would it be liable to do that? It would depend 
on the difference in stalling speeds with flaps up or down. Hey explained how 
it would be possible for one mainplane (wing) to be near stalling speed while 
the other was not. But Wilson evinced little interest in the question of stalling. 
What he wanted to know was whether the aircraft would have turned on its 
back. Again Hey disappointed him: ‘I cannot say.’ Eventually Hey would agree 
that with one flap up and the other down it would be possible for the aircraft to 
partially roll while continuing in the same direction.
In what felt more and more like an interrogation, Hey remained cool. He would 
not be rushed. The Court transcript omits a frosty exchange that occurred when 
he took a little time to respond to what he characterised many years later as 
‘badgering’. ‘Answer my question! …. I’m thinking. When I’ve finished I’ll 
answer you.’10 When Wilson switched to questions about swaging he was again 
frustrated. Asked to describe how swaging was done, Hey told him he ‘could not 
answer that accurately’. Determined, Wilson demanded first that the process be 
described ‘generally’. There followed a dialogue about swaging, clamping, and 
sweating (using solder), leading to the conclusion Wilson seemed to be seeking:
10 AVM E. Hey, interview, [20] Aug. 1977.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
494
Would you say when the wire has been disturbed in its position, pulled 
out even slightly, that that is a dangerous fitting from the point of view 
of aircraft; that it is liable, in other words, to pull out?
— On Air Force standards, yes; but it might still be strong enough.
Has it come to your notice at any time that that has happened?
— Not officially.
Lowe’s interest was aroused by the revelation that something that an RAAF 
Group Captain was indicating might be ‘dangerous’ had not been the subject 
of an official report. Wilson then asked specifically if any wire had been pulled 
out of a swaged joint ‘to a certain extent’. Yes, Hey said, but he could not say 
which wire. ‘Would you consider that good engineering practice — that type of 
joint?’ Hey was reluctant, even in camera, to be drawn into an implicit criticism 
of RAAF practice. ‘I do not think it is for me to say.’
As the afternoon wore on, the exchanges between Wilson and Hey, who had 
missed his lunch, became increasingly testy. Providing his opinion about the 
merits of swaging to an insistent interlocutor, Hey said that it was not as good 
as splicing ‘used in the R.A.F., and normally used under British specifications’. 
Then, given an opportunity by both Lowe and Dean to add to what he had said 
about flaps, he was resolute: ‘only if there is anything else you want me to say’. 
Well then, Dean asked: did he know if there was anyone in the Service who had 
a more precise knowledge of the operation of the flaps in the Hudson bombers? 
An exasperated Hey responded: ‘To get precise knowledge you would require 
blue prints and technical books on the subject. I could do that myself. I have a 
blue print here at the moment, but I doubt whether anyone would understand 
it.’ Hey began to unfold the drawings he had brought, at which Lowe, sensing 
that Hey was right about the Court’s capacity to grasp the technicalities, held 
up his hands in submission. Dean then took a different tack. Did Hey know of 
anyone who had ‘practical working knowledge…from a constructional point 
of view’ who could give evidence on the working of the flaps?’ ‘If you ask me 
questions I will give the evidence,’ Hey retorted.
Lowe was intent on doing his best to make sense of what he had been hearing. If 
the stalling speed would differ depending on whether the flaps were up or down, 
how, he asked, would one ascertain the stalling speed? Answer: by practical 
flying experience. Could Hey estimate stalling speeds? The actual stalling speed 
— which would differ from the theoretical — could best be given by pilots. 
Wilson came back to the puzzle over what he now called a ‘half turnover’ of 
the aircraft. At full power you could turn the machine in a roll without losing 
height, he opined. But how much height might be lost when coming in to land 
with a small amount of power, and the wing coming down and the aircraft 
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then turning entirely on its back? Hey could not say: ‘there would be too many 
factors involved’. Appreciating the unwillingness of Wilson, the senior RAAF 
officer present, to accept how little was known, and realising that he was the 
best informed person in the room, Hey chanced his arm:
I feel it would be rather difficult to find anybody to give that information, 
because that is a manoeuvre which is an extraordinary one so far as this 
aircraft is concerned. In no circumstances would it be put on its back; 
it is not the type of aircraft for that…In my opinion this machine would 
not have turned on its back at that height.
Asked by Lowe if he could give reasons for this opinion, Hey explained that, 
assuming the flaps were up and the mainplane stalled, the machine would 
have a tendency to roll in the direction of the stalled wing. But, in rolling, the 
aircraft would also sideslip, and the air pressure on the keel surface would cause 
the machine to turn in the direction of the stalled wing: the machine would 
probably go into a spiral glide. Again Wilson pushed the scenario of one flap up 
and one down, and neither wing in a stalled position. In that position would 
the machine turn on its back? ‘No, Sir.’ The extra lift given by the wing with 
the flap down could be partially corrected by the aileron on the un-stalled wing. 
Hey reiterated that in his opinion the circumstances outlined by Wilson would 
not cause the machine to roll on to its back.
A bewildered Lowe sought clarification: ‘Do I take it from you, Squadron 
Leader, that before any roll of the machine on to its back could take place there 
must have been a stalling of the machine?’ ‘No, Sir. There must have been force 
to cause it to roll, which may be other than the forces produced by stalling.’ 
Could Hey suggest any other possible cause which would cause it to roll? By 
this time Hey was almost at the end of his tether: ‘No, Sir, because I am not 
suggesting that it did roll.’ Troubled by the conflict of Hey’s advice with the 
eye-witness testimony of Corporal Ewing, Lowe asked if Hey had read or heard 
Ewing’s evidence. ‘Not fully.’ At which Lowe then read out what Ewing had 
said and asked if it conveyed anything to the expert witness about the cause of 
the crash. The question was broad. The answer was unequivocal: ‘It does not 
suggest any cause that I can put forward.’ To the narrower question of whether 
he thought at some stage one flap was up and the other down, the answer was 
an emphatic ‘No. Sir.’
Lowe pressed on. Could Hey think of any cause for the port mainplane slowly 
to dip, without losing height, and then after four or five seconds slowly turn 
completely over on its back? Not at the height the witness had indicated — 500 
feet off the ground. Ryland had said as much the previous day. At a loss about 
how to gain further elucidation, Lowe tried one last open question. Did Ewing’s 
description ‘induce you to make any comment at all?’ Hey was not to be drawn. 
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But he offered a glimmer of hope: a pilot could comment on the possibility of 
these evolutions occurring at that height. Wilson knew that no RAAF pilot had 
ever done it. He made one last plea to the engineering officer who had given him 
no comfort: ‘You have no theory to advance as to why that machine went on to 
its back? ‘No.’ ‘Would you say it is improbable that such a thing did happen?’ 
‘I have already stated that in my opinion I did not consider it could have rolled 
on its back.’ That being the case, Lowe concluded and Hey concurred, Ewing’s 
account must have been ‘inaccurate observation’. The Court having ‘exhausted 
its questions on this subject’, the judge looked hopefully to counsel representing 
the RAAF. George Pape could not assist. Lowe turned one more time to Hey to 
ask if there was any officer who could express an opinion on whether Ewing 
had given ‘possibly an accurate account or certainly an inaccurate account’. 
Even now he was to be disappointed. No, Hey told him, opinions vary, and his 
own was ‘just a theoretical opinion which I have formed’. It was, he concluded, 
a matter of a theoretical opinion against the statement of an eye-witness who 
probably, ‘in all truth, considers that is what he saw’.
Hey did not volunteer the information that, just over four years earlier, he 
had been one of Hitchcock’s advanced-flying instructors. Nor did he offer his 
opinion that the Point Cook training was so strict that it was implausible that 
Hitchcock would have stalled the Hudson.
‘Obscure reasons’
The Court adjourned at 2.55 p.m. and Lowe’s entourage set off at 6.30 p.m. on 
the Sydney train from Spencer Street Station. They would complete the journey 
to Canberra at 8.00 a.m., travelling by car from Goulburn. Before the Court 
opened at the Patent Office Building at 10.55 a.m. the judge, the two assessors, 
and counsel drove out to inspect the crash scene. Less than 20 hours after they 
had finished their proceedings in Melbourne ‘Del’ Wilson, now armed with a 
length of cable, would resume his quest to verify Corporal Ewing’s description 
of the aircraft on its back. In questioning Ryland the day before, he had 
reflected that until then there had been ‘no evidence at all as to how this thing 
might have happened’. That being so, it was necessary to look for ‘obscure 
reasons’. To the first witness, Pilot Officer Winter, who had described his view 
of the aircraft 500 feet from the ground, he asked: ‘You saw no suggestion of it 
turning on its back?’ ‘No.’ Not satisfied with Winter’s answer, Wilson asked if it 
could have happened without Winter seeing it. ‘Not from the position I was in, 
unless it happened later.’ ‘After it passed from your view?’ The most that Winter 
would concede was ‘Possibly, I could not say.’ Nor could he say definitely where 
Corporal Ewing was standing. However, when told that Ewing was near the 
OC’s former office, he said that would not be far from where he was. Asked to 
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indicate their relative positions on Exhibit 9, the map of the district, Winter 
helpfully pointed out that, given the scale of the drawing (20 chains to an inch), 
the same position would do for both. A chain was 66 feet. The two men were 
about 20 to 30 feet apart. The map being therefore of no help, Lowe stipulated 
that their angle of vision would be the same.11
Flying Officer Ronald Wilson could add nothing; he had watched the aircraft for 
only a few seconds and noticed nothing unusual apart from a slight wobble that 
he later concluded might have been a trick of the sun. The fact that Wilson had 
been in the Service for only eight months, and was an accountant not a pilot, 
was not mentioned.12
F/O Ronald Wilson: 31 years old, new to the Air Force, claimed to be the 
first man at the crash scene 
(National Archives of Australia: NAA A9300 WILSON RC)
11 The map was 75 x 105 cm. Scale 1:15,840.
12 NAA: A9300, WILSON RC.
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Standing at the end of the aerodrome, Flight Sergeant Smith saw more. He had 
seen the aircraft make a ‘complete roll’ after which the port wing dropped. With 
a model in hand, Smith showed how he was facing east, the machine came across 
his line of vision travelling north, and he could see the flap down on the port 
wing. One after another Dean, Lowe, and Wilson, dissected Smith’s memory. Had 
he discussed his observations with Ewing? No, he had not even met Ewing until 
after he had been interviewed by Murphy. It was his independent recollection, 
and he was not mistaken. It was not, as some ‘flying men’ had suggested to him, 
that the aircraft had tilted slightly as it came in. It definitely made ‘a complete 
roll’. He was satisfied that ‘momentarily’ the machine was on its back with 
its wheels up. Although others thought they saw the aircraft coming towards 
them, he was sure that it was practically at right angles to him. From where he 
was standing it would, he conceded, be difficult to say whether the machine 
was slightly on the turn or was flying straight and level to the north. He had 
watched other aircraft coming in since the accident, and now thought it was 
possible that it could have been ‘slightly on the turn in preparation for landing’. 
He had never seen a similar machine do a similar manoeuvre, or seen another 
aircraft on its back.
Having finished with Smith, the Court swore in Sydney Rhodes, the senior 
aerodrome attendant. Rhodes, now repeating his story officially for the fifth 
time, had lost sight of the aircraft briefly when the hangar came between them. 
But he was sure he had seen it gradually descending, with under-carriage down, 
in a normal gliding motion as it came towards the last hill. Then, he remembered, 
he had exclaimed to someone standing nearby: ‘Good Lord! This ’plane has lost 
considerable height.’ In answer to Wing Commander Carr’s leading question, he 
was explicit that he had not noticed a sudden drop of the aircraft’s nose. Losing 
sight of the Hudson as it was coming across the nearest hill, he was uncertain 
initially if it had cleared the hill. ‘Sometimes a camouflaged ’plane will come 
over the crest of that hill and be obscured for a few moments in the shadows of 
the trees, especially if there are any clouds.’ Asked what interval there had been 
between losing sight of the aircraft and hearing the crash, Rhodes said he could 
not have taken more than three or four steps. He had not realised where Arthur 
Dean was heading.
Would it not have been ten or fifteen seconds?
— Oh no.
But you did say that at the Service inquiry — that it took ten or fifteen 
seconds between the time it disappeared and the time when you heard 
it crash?
— That would not be so.
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Why did you say that?
— I have thought it all over since, and ten or fifteen seconds is a long 
time for that sort of thing to happen.
In revising your evidence, or in thinking it over since, have you had to 
reconsider any other parts of it?
— No.
But in that part of it you do think that you were wrong?
— I must have been wrong. I feel now that it could not have been that 
long.
Dean had followed the lead of Lowe in subtly undermining Rhodes’s credibility. 
Lowe had earlier sought reassurance that the aerodrome attendant’s recollections 
had not been influenced as a result of subsequent conversations with others 
who had been alongside him. Rhodes admitted he had talked to others — ‘it 
would naturally be discussed by those who saw it’ — but denied that they had 
caused him to change his mind. Henry House, who was next to be questioned, 
had also spoken to others before he made a statement on August 14. He was not 
sure who they were other than that they were ‘flying officials from Melbourne’. 
Having established that House had only been in the Service six weeks, had 
not seen a wing dip nor seen the plane turn or roll with the nose up, the Court 
excused him.
The memory of Dudley Lalor, whose graphic accounts had been published in the 
immediate aftermath of the crash, was next subjected to fine-grained scrutiny. 
A sceptical ‘Del’ Wilson elicited the admission that, from the moment he saw 
the Hudson through his windscreen, Lalor continued to drive for a quarter 
of a mile down a slope without taking his eyes off the aircraft. Dean helpfully 
drew out the fact that Lalor was driving on ‘a good wide open road’ with no 
other traffic. There was no special reason to be watching the plane, Lalor said, 
until he observed that it was ‘so low that it might strike the hill in front’. When 
he saw the wing dip he drew his friend’s attention to it. ‘What did you say 
to your friend? — I could not say…’ Grasping for a version more suitable for 
the courtroom than those he had given to the press, he added: ‘I may have 
said, “Goodness Jack, look at this ’plane” or something similar.’ Tilyard, who 
followed Lalor, confirming that his boss told him to ‘Notice that ’plane, how it is 
carrying on’, said he saw the aircraft about 200 feet above coming down towards 
the ground ‘spiral like’.
What more could be said about the flaps? At the crash site, Winter had seen on 
the starboard wing that they were ‘flapped about 80 per cent’ — the rollers had 
travelled about 1½ or 2 inches. It was not possible to say anything with certainty 
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about the flaps on the destroyed port wing. And he could not say whether the 
flaps had been down when he was looking at the aircraft on approach. Nor 
could the civilian aerodrome manager Rhodes, who thought he would have seen 
them if they had been lowered when the aircraft flew around the aerodrome. 
The oil company manager Vest, the garage mechanic O’Brien, the railways clerk 
Power, and the market gardener Southwell, did not know if the flap extensions 
were down. And there the puzzles about flaps, and the aircraft possibly rolling 
over on to its back, were abandoned. Dean had no more evidence to offer. Pape 
had no evidence to advance on behalf of the Air Force.
Wilson’s widely reported cable queries had shown only how little was known 
about the design and construction of the Hudson. His tenacious pursuit of a 
theory that could not be proved appears consistent with Jack Graham’s memory 
of him as ‘a most peculiar bloke, most erratic fellow...he was quite unpredictable’. 
Joe Hewitt, who knew Wilson well, described him as an introvert. ‘He was,’ 
Hewitt remembered, ‘a violinist of some ability, and would often lose himself in 
playing a wealth of classical music.’ But, as the Air Court demonstrated, he would 
not remain in his shell when circumstances permitted his forceful presence. As 
John Harrison remembered, when Wilson became a POW and senior British 
officer in Stalag Luft III, someone who had either ‘served or suffered’ under him 
remarked: ‘God help the Germans.’13
With Wilson’s inquisition at an end and the last of the witnesses examined, 
Lowe’s main task was about to begin: how to reconcile the conflicts of eye-
witness testimony and expert advice, and construct a credible explanation of the 
tragedy. Without pausing for a moment, he enquired whether counsel assisting 
proposed to address him ‘at this stage’. Dean, exhibiting little enthusiasm, 
indicated that he was prepared to do so ‘if the Court desires’. ‘I shall,’ Lowe 
responded, ‘require all the assistance I can obtain.’ With newspaper reporters 
poised to take down his words, Dean looked to notes he had evidently prepared 
overnight, and began a compact summation of the evidence heard in Melbourne.
‘An absence of the knowledge of the 
behaviour of planes’
Prudently, Dean prefaced his remarks by the admission that ‘many aspects of 
this accident have not been sufficiently established’. Affirming that ‘the pilot 
was a competent and experienced officer and one who has specialised in this 
13 GpCpt J. E. Graham, interview, 11 May 1978; John Harrison to CH, 25 July 1978; Hewitt, Adversity in 
Success, pp.297–8. Wilson was awarded a Czech MC for risking his life in ‘fearless and extremely courageous 
protests to the German officials’, saving many Czech POW’s lives in Sagan (NAA: A9300, WILSON DEL).
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type of plane’, Dean noted that Hitchcock had visited the Canberra aerodrome 
previously. Lowe interrupted, saying that his recollection (probably from 
reading Hitchcock’s flying log book) was that the pilot had been to the Canberra 
aerodrome only once before. Dean agreed with Lowe, slightly confusing the 
issue by saying that Ryland had landed his own plane on that occasion, ‘quite 
successfully’. Then, in an apparent contradiction that suggests that the Court 
stenographer misheard, he added that ‘the pilot’, meaning Hitchcock, had 
been to Canberra the previous week with a load ‘similar to that which he had 
when he took off at Essendon’. This of course was the flight that Bill Heath, 
not Hitchcock, had captained. Hitchcock and Ryland had both flown from 
Richmond to Canberra on July 24. It was Hitchcock’s only recorded landing 
there. (The errors were not repeated when Lowe presented his findings.)
Extemporising from then on, and possibly having benefited from some private 
coaching from Ryland, Dean dealt with ‘the manoeuvre described as a flat roll…
extremely improbable and difficult to execute’. In determining which accounts 
were to be accepted, he said, the Court will ‘have in mind the evidence given 
by experienced pilots’. ‘What probably happened,’ he went on, ‘was that those 
observers who said that they saw the plane on its back saw it with its nose 
down and turning which would give it the appearance of being on its back.’ 
Lowe agreed that the opinions of ‘experienced men’ should be a good guide. 
But he was not ready yet for a conclusion. Would it be convenient to discuss 
the alternatives — one assuming that the plane did roll and the other that it did 
not? ‘It would be, except’, Dean confessed, ‘that I find some difficulty owing to 
an absence of the knowledge of the behaviour of planes.’ He reminded the Court 
that several witnesses had excluded the possibility of a roll but had advanced 
theories of what might have happened if the aircraft had ‘gone to the earth 
turning as it went’. Thus the way was opened for the RAAF assessors, Wilson 
and Carr, to furnish the judge with unchallenged advice when he retired to 
consider his findings.
Lowe had been told, although he acknowledged it was not in evidence, that 
‘misfortune has overtaken two other aircraft of the same type’. Would it 
not be possible, he asked, to get the findings of the Service Courts on these 
two ‘incidents’? In one of his rare interventions on behalf of the Air Force, 
Pape volunteered that the report on the loss of a plane of which no trace was 
found could not get the Court much further. Stating the obvious about the 
disappearance over the sea of A16-27, Pape only intensified rather than diverted 
Lowe’s interest. There might, the judge thought, be something in the reports 
which would have a bearing on some of the ‘features disclosed in this case’. 
If that were so, further investigation would be necessary. Lowe’s instinct was 
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right. The findings of the A16-27 Service Court would have led him to ask 
further awkward questions; but the report would not be available in time for 
him to see it.14
The immediate issue was what should be done about the evidence relating to 
the machine rolling on to its back. Dean was unable to assist further. Asked by 
Lowe if counsel would like him to reject the evidence, Dean responded that 
inviting the Court to do so might be presumptuous on his part. Conscious no 
doubt of the presence of reporters, Lowe said he saw no reason to challenge 
the honesty of the witnesses, but asked if Dean would like him to reject their 
evidence as ‘inaccurate observation’. That afforded a way out; this was Dean’s 
view of the matter ‘for what it is worth’. Pilot Officer Winter’s evidence was 
to be preferred to that of other witnesses, he added. As for Hilton Clothier’s 
story of flames coming over the starboard wing, it was uncorroborated: the fire 
Clothier saw was ‘nothing more than flame coming from the exhaust in a more or 
less normal manner’. At this point Dean advised the Court that he felt he could 
not usefully discuss the other witnesses’ accounts without having the complete 
transcript of their evidence. But, with the press as well as Lowe anxious for 
guidance, he ventured:
Generally speaking the conclusion to be deduced from the evidence is 
that the ’plane, as it turned from the east towards the Aerodrome, either 
while it was turning or just afterwards, was, up to that stage, prepared to 
make a normal landing. Then, for some reason, its left wing descended 
and kept on descending. The nose eventually started to go down and the 
’plane turning over two or three times went to earth nose first.
Before anyone could query Dean’s description of the aircraft turning over two 
or three times, Lowe attempted his own summing up of ‘three views’ that had 
been put to him. Flight Lieutenant Ryland, he said, had suggested two: an error 
of judgment by the pilot and the failure of the engine. In fact, Ryland had never 
spoken in so many words of an error of judgment by the pilot. The first of the 
two suggestions he had countenanced was a stall. In Lowe’s mind therefore, in 
the absence of any other acceptable explanation, a stall had become synonymous 
with an error by the pilot.
The third view, first offered by Group Captain Wilson, was that one of 
the ‘landing flaps’ might have been up and the other down, bringing about 
abnormal pressure creating a ‘position of emergency which ultimately resulted 
in the crash’. Lowe asked if Dean wished to address him in regard to any of these 
‘alternative theories’. The statement that followed was an extraordinary and 
revealing departure from what had gone before:
14 NAA: A705, 32/10/2830, and see Chapter 25.
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The Court has committed to it the duty, if it can, of finding the cause of 
the accident. As I understand the evidence there is nothing to justify 
the Court in holding that any suggested cause was the actual cause. 
One might approach the matter by a process of elimination. I suggest 
that one might very easily omit such a consideration as sabotage or any 
suggestions that the plane was not airworthy or was overloaded, or the 
view that some other person than the pilot was piloting the aeroplane.
Dean’s last point had never been raised directly in the course of the witness 
examination. None of the RAAF experts had even hinted that they thought 
it was possible. However, both Dean and Lowe now took pains to repudiate 
summarily what Lowe hastened to describe as ‘pure speculation’. Hurrying on, 
Dean gathered his thoughts:
The ’plane itself being airworthy, the pilot being competent, and the 
day being fine, and no other reason being advanced, the pilot experts 
say it still might have been due to any one of a number of causes. One 
witness said a thousand causes.
Counsel was beginning to flounder. Lowe reminded him that the witness 
(Ryland) had finally selected two causes that were the ‘least improbable’. ‘On 
the other hand’, Dean rejoined, the possibility of a control wire breaking could 
not be discounted even though there was nothing to indicate that the wires 
were not strong and in good order. ‘The question is whether we can get out of 
the realm of speculation and enter certain ground on which the Court can say 
“This is probably what caused the disaster.”’
Dean was emphatic that there was no evidence to be obtained from the wreckage. 
His next two sentences were crucial:
As to the three causes advanced, the first was that it was a stall, that the 
pilot miscalculated his speed and that it fell below his proper air speed. 
That would appear to the layman to be the most feasible explanation.
Squadron Leader Thomas had said that the manner of the descent was consistent 
with a stall. Both Thomas and Ryland had testified that an engine failure might 
have caused the ‘mishap’ but that they thought it unlikely. ‘The pilots are 
obviously most hesitant to suggest that the accident was due to a stall or to 
loss of air speed.’ Ryland in particular had expressed doubts, some of them 
perhaps off the record. Thomas gave the impression of a man keen to appear 
more knowledgeable than he was, but unwilling to pin blame directly on one of 
his own pilots.
Lowe seemed happy to embrace the conclusion that the evidence was, as he 
interjected himself, ‘overwhelmingly against’ the failure of an engine. The only 
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remaining suggestion, Dean said, was the failure of the flaps in one of the wings. 
This was a possible theory but there was no evidence of ‘any defect or that any 
of the wires were pulled away’. By process of elimination, Dean was groping for 
a conclusion:
There being no other theory, the Court is in the position of having to say 
that it adopts as the most probable cause of the accident, the stalling of 
the engine, or that it is unable to say what caused the accident…
Here, Dean himself stalled. In his book Air Disaster Canberra, Andrew Tink 
rightly observes that Dean appeared at this point to be under the ‘fundamental 
misapprehension’ that the stall of a plane was like the stall of a motor vehicle.15 
Only moments earlier Dean had correctly referred to a miscalculation of air 
speed; and Lowe himself had then rejected the idea of engine failure. But Dean’s 
previous glimpses of understanding now seemed to desert him. Evidently he 
was troubled that he was not competent to make a judgment that rested on 
an understanding of technical matters of which until 48 hours earlier he had 
been entirely ignorant. Lowe, equally ill-equipped, knew that lack of expertise 
was not going to relieve him of the task he had undertaken. ‘The Court which 
has to determine this matter’, he reminded counsel, ‘is no more expert than 
yourself.’ Although he had highly expert advice at hand, the value of which he 
greatly appreciated, ‘I have ultimately to accept the responsibility of arriving 
at a decision.’ Still, however, Dean was reluctant to go further. Having regard to 
the ‘assessors of experience’ available to the judge it would be ‘a waste of time’, 
he said, for counsel to discuss the possibilities surrounding the stalling of the 
engines. The choice was clear. If Lowe could not say that stalling of the engines 
caused the accident he would ‘probably be forced to the conclusion that it is 
not possible to say what caused the crash’. There was, however, something to 
be welcomed about the point they had reached. ‘All other possibilities have been 
excluded, and, from the point of the view of the public, that gives some ground 
for satisfaction.’
So much of the Inquiry had been held beyond the gaze of the public that Dean’s 
final remarks were sure to be seized upon by the reporters present:
Suggestions of sabotage, improper maintenance or inspection, which 
may have found some foothold in the public mind, have been displaced 
by the evidence given in this case. I think that the Court can confidently 
say that there is no reason to suppose that the aeroplane was in any way 
other than airworthy, or that the pilot was not completely competent 
to handle the machine. In the final analysis, that means that the Court 
must determine for itself whether it can say that the accident was due 
15 Tink, Air Disaster, p.218.
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to the stalling of the engine, or that it is not able to say what caused the 
accident, but that various suggested causes can be eliminated, and that 
while it is impossible to say what was the real cause, the most probable 
reason was a stalling of the engine.
There, having inadvertently erected an obfuscatory signpost for the judge, Dean 
rested. ‘I am unable to add any further observation which may be of assistance to 
the court at this stage.’ Then, remembering a point he should have made earlier, 
he directed the Court’s attention to Flight Sergeant Smith’s testimony that he 
had seen the port flap down. The evidence showed that it was the starboard flap 
that was down.
Apart from the lapse into the language of engine stalling, what was most 
striking about Dean’s final summation was the absence of any explicit discussion 
of pilot error. The Court was directed to the probability of the engines stalling. 
But both engine and hydraulic failure were ruled out; and there was no other 
consideration of what might have caused the engines to stall. Dean’s confusion 
could not be disguised. His words a few minutes earlier were crucial. He had in 
effect provided a gloss on the meaning of a stall — it was the pilot miscalculating 
his speed. For Charles Lowe there remained the task of reporting what could be 
‘found’ from what he had heard. The Court’s findings must be consistent with 
the balance of the evidence, coherent, logical, and technically credible.
Instruction from Dallas Scott
Arthur Dean’s work was meant to be finished when the Court adjourned. But he 
was not idle over the next weekend. Some copies of the English magazine The 
Aeroplane had come to Lowe’s attention. They contained details of the crash of 
a Lockheed 14 in Britain which he felt could not be ignored. Lowe, struggling 
with the expert testimony he had heard, was perhaps befuddled by Dean’s 
conclusions about engines stalling. He realised that he ought to take advantage 
of the belated availability of the highly respected Squadron Leader Dallas Scott. 
Freddie Thomas had been of limited assistance. Ryland had been reluctant to 
speculate. Of the two assessors, Tony Carr knew the inside of a Hudson but had 
asked almost no questions. ‘Del’ Wilson had a lot of questions to which there 
were few certain answers. Both Ryland and Thomas were now to be brought 
back for another session during which they would hear Scott put through the 
same range of questions they had faced the previous week.
The court re-convened at 2.15 p.m. on Tuesday, September 3. Once again, 
appearing for the RAAF, George Pape had instructions to advise the judge that 
the safest course would be hear all the evidence in camera. The questions likely 
to be raised ‘cannot properly be answered by pilots without discussing the 
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performance of the particular type of aircraft, and the view of the department 
is that any discussion of the performance of the aircraft is to be deprecated’. 
Lowe was ‘very ready to lend an ear to any suggestion that evidence that may 
possibly affect the safety of the country should be taken in camera’. Pape assured 
him that this was the nature of his instructions; accordingly the public were 
excluded. Once again the judge had been subtly misled. It was the Air Force, not 
the public servants in the Department of Air, that had given instructions about 
what should be kept from the public.
Lowe began with some basics. What was the relationship of the Lockheed 
14 which had crashed in England to the Lockheed Hudson bomber that had 
crashed at Canberra? Scott knew from The Aeroplane, which he had read the day 
before, that the crashed Lockheed 14 was an older type without slotted wings. 
The circumstances of its accident were different, and he could not see that it 
would throw any light on the fate of A16-97. Wilson then initiated a discussion 
of stalling speeds, which led Scott to explain that stalling would depend on the 
degree of bank and the rate of turn. At 20 to 30 degrees of bank the stipulated 
speed was 113 knots; this would give a considerable safety margin. Wilson’s 
next question was embarrassing. With flaps down, say 70 per cent flat and 30 
degree bank, what would be the stalling speed? Somewhat incredulously, Scott 
asked: ‘During the turn?’ The tone of Wilson’s subsequent ‘Yes?’ was captured 
by the stenographer’s question mark. ‘It is not our custom to turn the aircraft at 
all with flaps down’, Scott said.
But they do turn aircraft with flaps down. They do turn Lockheeds with 
the flaps down. It is not your practice here in Victoria?’
— No.
Do you know if it is the practice in N.S.W.?
— Not to my knowledge.
Flummoxed by his own ignorance, Wilson was silent for some time. Lowe and 
Dean continued with questions about the stalling proclivities of the Hudson, 
drawing from Scott the unequivocal statement that ‘in the ordinary way of 
handling it’ the aircraft was not liable to stall without warning. The only stalls 
he had experienced had been deliberate. There was nothing to be learned from 
the very different circumstances of the Richmond accident. But Lowe and Dean 
were eager to get Scott’s opinion of the cause of A16-97’s crash on the basis of 
the Canberra eye-witness evidence. Unfortunately he had not read the complete 
transcripts. Dean attempted a quick summary:
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Assuming that the machine tilts on its left wing…and quite suddenly it 
goes into a dive, turning once or twice, to the ground from a height of 
400 or 500 feet, can you advance any theories as to why an event of that 
kind would occur…?
Scott was slow to offer an opinion. Lowe then had the evidence of Pilot Officer 
Winter read to the witness and invited Scott to suggest ‘any cause of what 
happened…the most probable cause’. If he had hoped for a straightforward 
answer Dean would be disappointed. 
The actual description could cover several contingencies, I would say.
All equally probable, would you think?
— Yes I would say it would be very hard to discriminate between any 
of them.
What contingency do you suggest? — even such an event as the pilot 
losing consciousness, the pilot falling forward gently on to the control 
column and at the same time possibly depressing the left rudder.
You mean as the result of loss of consciousness?
 — exactly…
What other contingencies could Scott think of? The possibility that the rudder 
was in some way applied to the left and the pilot being unable to release it would 
give a ‘banking and turning tendency’ coinciding with Winter’s description. So 
too would a jamming of the aileron — ‘the lateral control’, Scott explained, 
‘jamming one wing down. If the wing were not able to be brought up there would 
be a tendency for the aircraft to sideslip to the ground and turn simultaneously.’ 
There was another answer the Court wanted to hear. ‘Any others?’ Dean asked. 
‘The possibility of a stall is present.’ Seizing on this, Lowe asked whether this 
meant that the machine was being ‘flown with an insufficient safety margin 
of speed’. It would, if a stall occurred, Scott parried. Lowe pressed: ‘it is on 
that contingency I am putting it to you’. Then, yes, it would ‘indicate that the 
aircraft had become slow’.
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Dallas Scott: no-one in the RAAF knew the Hudson better
(Courtesy of the Office of Air Force History)
Scott could not deny the logic linking the speed of the aircraft to a stall. But 
he seemed chary about saying directly that the pilot of A16-97 had erred. In 
referring to a possible loss of consciousness he was echoing what Ryland had 
said. At this point Dean stumbled. If the pilot had lost consciousness and was 
otherwise ‘unable to control the machine…I do not think that this has been 
dealt with yet: is this machine dual controlled?’ Some are and some are not, was 
the best Scott could say. He was unaware if A16-97 had dual controls. Neither 
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Dean nor Lowe remembered that it was already in evidence that the crashed 
aircraft had dual controls. What they did know was that the only person on the 
Hudson qualified to fly it was Bob Hitchcock. The matter was dropped and the 
questioning turned to the issue of flames being seen as the aircraft descended. 
Here Scott seemed sure that whatever might have been seen or heard it was 
most likely to have been caused by a sudden opening of the throttle causing 
a backfire through the carburettor intake. There would be a momentary flash 
of whitish orange flame accompanied by a loud sharp report like a motor car 
backfire.
From this point the Court could neatly segue to a discussion of stalling. If the 
motor had suddenly ‘opened’ resulting in momentarily insufficient fuel supply, 
a lean mixture, and a resultant backfire, it suggested that the pilot was conscious 
and trying to get his machine out of trouble. If he found his machine falling 
to earth it would, Scott said, be a ‘natural reaction’ to open up his throttle 
quickly. There followed what amounted to a tutorial on the stalling experiments 
that Scott had conducted. Much of it reprised what Ryland had already spoken 
about. Scott described what he had practised at a height of 6000 feet or more. 
First a gentle stall with the engines fully throttled back and the wheel and flaps 
fully retracted; it took 400 to 500 feet before the pilot could regain control. 
Then with flaps and undercarriage retracted and a ‘certain amount of engine 
power applied’; with 300 hp the result was ‘rather unpredictable… occasionally 
it will drop a wing and develop flick characteristics’ and lose about 800 to 1000 
feet before control was regained. Another possibility was a stall with flaps and 
wheels extended and engines fully throttled back; the nose would fall straight 
ahead and there was ‘absolutely no tendency to drop a wing’, and aileron control 
was maintained until after the aircraft stalled.
‘Del’ Wilson now re-joined the conversation. ‘Have you never tried to stall 
the aircraft when the machine is banked?’ If the Court did not appreciate the 
implication of the question, Scott’s answer would have alerted the non-flyers: 
‘I have not stalled through misuse of the controls at all.’ Unabashed, Wilson 
ventured his own answer. In such a case would not the tendency be for the 
left wing to go down further and the stalling become pronounced? With the 
caveat that he had not experienced it, Scott agreed that it would. Wilson tried 
another scenario: what if an aircraft coming in at just above ordinary stalling 
speed had one wing bumped by an air current that pushed one wing up? In 
that case, Scott explained, the tendency towards a complete stall would only be 
‘noticeable’ if the aircraft was already almost completely stalled.
Lowe had his own questions. Supposing that the machine was on a straight 
glide towards the landing ground at 400 or 500 feet, with undercarriage and 
flaps down, and the machine stalled: ‘would there be any possibility whatever 
of the pilot recovering control?’ Again Scott chose his words carefully: ‘…if the 
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stall had been complete, recovery would be extremely difficult’. Satisfied that 
it was the lack of height that was the critical factor, Lowe turned to ‘flaps and 
slots’. His next question betrayed how little he had understood of the plethora 
of technical information elicited over the past week. He had read the articles in 
The Aeroplane and gathered that the editor thought that there should be ‘certain 
safety devices, in the nature of slots and flaps, fitted to the Lockheed 14’. 
Patiently Scott explained that flaps had always been fitted; it was the absence 
of slots that was criticised. Wilson then intervened, revealing an astonishing 
ignorance of the distinguishing characteristics of the RAAF’s principal frontline 
aircraft: ‘Has the Lockheed Hudson slotted flaps?’ Scott, who was arguably the 
Service’s most knowledgeable Hudson pilot, was careful in the presence of an 
opinionated superior officer not to sound like a know-it-all. ‘The Fowler flap, as 
I understand it, is a modified form of the slotted flap, inasmuch as there is a gap 
between the actual flap, which is an aerofoil surface in itself, and the trailing 
edge of the aircraft.’
With Scott’s expertise increasingly evident, Pape now took the opportunity to 
put to him the troubling observations of Corporal Ewing and Flight Sergeant 
Smith about the aircraft turning completely on its back at a height of about 500 
feet over the place where it ultimately crashed. Was this possible? Not from that 
height, Scott said: ‘A large aircraft travelling at an initially slow speed cannot 
possibly, in my opinion, be rolled without a very considerable loss of height, 
running into possibly thousands of feet.’ Pape, who had the advantage of 
participating in the Service Court immediately after the accident, now realised 
that Scott could provide authoritative advice about flaps as well. Since The 
Aeroplane articles had been written, Scott said, the Hudson had been fitted 
with built-in slots, sometimes called the ‘letter-box’ slot. At Pape’s request he 
gave a short exposition of the difference between Handley Page ‘slats’ fitted 
on the leading edge of the main plane at the outboard end, and the Lockheed 
approach of cutting behind the leading edge slots in the main plane itself. He 
did not say that one of the reasons why Lockheed, then financially struggling, 
had developed its own solution was to avoid paying royalties to Handley Page 
for using their patented technology.
Lowe’s understanding was rapidly advancing. Could Scott express an opinion 
on the respective stalling characteristics of the Lockheed 14 and the Hudson? 
The Lockheed 14 without slots, which Scott had flown, had different stalling 
characteristics. So the Hudson could be regarded as a completely airworthy 
type of aircraft in the hands of a capable pilot? Completely. But what, Tony Carr 
asked, would happen when you stall the aircraft with the flaps and undercarriage 
down and some power? Did Carr, who was a Hudson pilot, know the answer? 
Scott could only tell the Court from hearsay. He had never done it himself. But 
he thought a stall would be severe. At 300 hp? He could not be certain. What 
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he could be certain of was that all pilots who flew Hudsons had been through 
a special instructional course lasting a month or so. What kind of experience 
was desirable for a Hudson pilot? The man with a background on various types, 
especially twin-engined machines, would be preferable. Was it desirable, before 
putting a man on a Hudson, that he should necessarily have had any length of 
experience in other types? Here Scott knew he was on delicate ground:
I think it is desirable. Might I qualify my statement by saying that hours, 
in themselves, do not form a background of experience, but people who 
have flown various types under all conditions are the people who can be 
most relied on to fly a modern aircraft competently.
Knowing how the demand for Hudson pilots was leading to the conversion of 
relatively inexperienced men, Scott was uncomfortable with a final question 
from Dean:
Is it possible to indicate whether the man who had about 100 hours 
flying in general types would be likely to be a competent pilot in all 
conditions on one of these Hudsons?
— On general types?
I mean your general training types. If he had perhaps 100 hours in the 
air altogether?
— I would repeat that he could be taught to fly the aircraft perfectly 
well under favourable conditions.
Scott’s qualification — favourable conditions — was a crucial implicit comment 
on current policy. Although he may not have known of it, what he was saying 
was an endorsement of the query Justice ‘Bay’ Piper had raised about training 
the previous year. Conditions were not always favourable. And there Scott’s 
contribution concluded.
Freddie Thomas was now brought back. He concurred with Scott that there was 
nothing useful to be learned from the crash reported in The Aeroplane, nor from 
the Richmond accident. He could say nothing about the comparative safety 
in the air of the Lockheed 14 and the Hudson. Lowe reminded Thomas that 
when he was last in the box he had been unwilling to express a definite opinion 
about the cause of the crash. ‘Do you still feel that unwillingness?’ ‘It is not 
unwillingness,’ Thomas responded, ‘I am afraid I just cannot express an opinion 
at all on the matter.’ Scott and Ryland had covered possible causes; ‘but definitely 
to specify one, or even two, is something I would not be prepared to do’. He 
could add nothing to Scott’s explanation of the flame seen over one of the wings. 
The following exchange teetered on the brink of exploring another possible 
reason for the crash. ‘I suppose you would agree,’ Lowe began, that, if Scott was 
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right about the sudden opening of the throttle, ‘that would rather definitely 
negative [sic] any idea that the pilot had collapsed though unconsciousness? It 
would show that he was in control.’ ‘Yes,’ Thomas agreed, with a proviso that 
went some way to illuminating his unwillingness to reach a conclusion about 
what had caused the crash, ‘he or someone else would have opened the throttle 
to cause that condition.’ Lowe, alert to the mention of ‘someone else’, once again 
asked if the machine had dual controls. Yes, Thomas said, ‘I was in the aircraft 
shortly before it took off, and the dual control was fitted.’
Now Dean, seemingly oblivious to the possible implications of this line of 
questioning, asked: ‘If the pilot for some reason became incapable of managing 
the machine, what time would elapse before anybody else could take over the 
control of the machine?’ Thomas realised that he had gone too far in postulating 
that ‘someone else’ could have opened the throttle. ‘There was nobody else in the 
aircraft, in my opinion, who was capable of taking over the duties of the pilot. 
Wiesener was there only for instructional purposes.’ ‘He would take no part in 
the actual piloting of the machine? — None whatever.’ There is no evidence that 
Thomas knew how severely Wiesener’s flying performance had been criticised 
just seven months earlier. But, knowledgeably or not, the commander of No. 2 
Squadron spoke no truer word that day.
So, Lowe asked, if a stall occurred at 500 feet, was there any manoeuvre on the 
pilot’s part that could have prevented a crash? No, there was no such action 
the pilot could have taken. Here Wilson entered once more with his theory of 
a ‘bump’ pushing one wing down. If the pilot had attempted to counter this 
would it cause a spin? If the bump was severe enough, Thomas agreed, you 
would stall with the wing down. The aircraft would turn. But it would not be a 
spin; it would be a ‘slew’.
Knowing that Thomas led the Hudson squadron in which Hitchcock had been a 
flight commander, Dean and Lowe sought his views on the preliminary training 
and conversion of pilots. He was less hesitant than Scott. It was very desirable, 
he thought, that a pilot about to fly a Hudson should have had experience in 
twin-engined aircraft, and between 300 and 300 hours flying time. Thomas 
could not have been surprised that Dean next asked him if his opinion was ‘in 
accordance with the present practice, as you know it’. It had been in some cases 
but not in others, he acknowledged. Lowe understood the message: ‘It is not the 
universal practice, at any rate?---No. We are having people without any twin-
engined experience converted.’ Wilson, cognisant of the views of ‘King’ Cole, 
his chief in Sydney, sensed the danger. Tempted as he might have been to push 
Cole’s agenda of redeploying inexperienced Hudson pilots he gave no hint of 
the policy argument within the Service. The Court had to understand, he said, 
that it was necessary ‘in expansion’ to employ people who had no twin-engined 
experience.
21 . Expert witnesses?
513
I would like to clear your mind on one matter Your Honor. There is no 
question of all pilots going from the light types directly on to Lockheed 
Hudsons. There are intermediate and service training types.
(To witness): That is so, is it not?
Thomas was not going to yield: ‘Single-engined types.’ But Wilson wanted the 
last word. ‘They may be single-engined or double-engined types? — Yes.’ Lowe 
was not taken in. He wanted Thomas’s view on the record: ‘Do I gather that you 
think that where it is practicable the advisable course is to bring a man from 
some other twin-engined plane to the Hudson? —Yes.’ ‘And that his experience 
should include something other than fair weather flying?’, Dean added. With 
both Dallas Scott and one of his own flight commanders, Ryland, in the room, 
men who knew the realities they were facing in converting inadequately 
prepared pilot officers, Thomas found a compromise formula. ‘As Squadron 
Leader Scott said, there is nothing difficult in teaching men to fly this aircraft, 
but it is the experience possibly that is the thing that should count in the end.’ 
It was just like swimming, Dean suggested, lifting the tension. Yes, Thomas 
agreed, the more you swam the better you were, and the more you have flown 
the better you are.
Finally, the Court re-called Ryland. Lowe reminded him that when he was last 
in the box, ‘I think under some pressure from me’, Ryland had offered what 
he called the two ‘least improbable theories’ of the crash — engine failure or 
a stall. Now, given the opportunity to modify or add to what he had said, he 
added ‘structural failure’. Scott had said a jamming of control, either aileron or 
rudder control. It was possible Ryland, said, that the control of the ‘Flattner 
[sic] tab’ may have fractured.16 But he was not limiting the possibilities. ‘When 
I say “structural failure” it covers a fairly wide field.’ Lowe was hoping for 
more guidance but Ryland could not help. ‘In my own mind I cannot arrive at 
any conclusion at all for the crash. I just cannot think what may have caused 
it.’ With what was known of A16-97, structural failure was hard to conceive. 
With what was known of the pilot who was flying the aircraft, he would find 
it, as Lowe put it, ‘very difficult to suppose that he would be flying his craft at 
such a speed that he did not have sufficient security margin and would have the 
machine in a condition in which it would be liable to stall.’
There were no more questions. Lowe closed the inquiry at 3.45 p.m. He had 124 
pages of testimony to consider.
16 Flettner tab (named after German inventor Anton Flettner): a small hinged device installed on an aircraft 




22. Lowe’s last word
To a modern eye one of the most notable aspects of the Air Force Court of 
Inquiry was the freedom that the RAAF had to guide the proceedings. It did 
not go unnoticed at the time that the Service had the field to itself. The Court 
was secretly constrained by the instructions of the Deputy Chief of the Air 
Staff about what could and could not be asked in public. Counsel assisting had 
very little time to review the findings of the Service Court and the Inspector 
of Air Accidents. Just time enough to assimilate the conclusions to which both 
had come. In the words of Squadron Leader Winneke and Wing Commander 
Murphy, they had ‘no option but to attribute the stall to an error of judgment 
on the part of the pilot’. It was one of the extraordinary elements of the Air 
Force Court’s proceedings that the notion of ‘an error of judgment’ by the pilot 
was never specifically explored. What would have been the nature of such an 
error of judgment? Arthur Dean had ventured to explain a stall as a consequence 
of the pilot miscalculating his speed. It seemed that speaking of a stall was 
in some cases coded language for pilot error. None of the officers who knew 
Bob Hitchcock gave any credence to such a possibility in their evidence to the 
Inquiry.
Under the regulations governing Air Force Courts of Inquiry promulgated in May 
1939: ‘Any person…the Court considers is or may be aggrieved by the accident, 
forced landing or inquiry may appear before the Court or be represented before 
the Court by any barrister or solicitor.’ When Justice Piper had investigated 
the A4-11 Anson crash, a solicitor had been present to represent the relatives 
of the deceased pilot. For Justice Lowe’s Air Court of Inquiry, the 10 widows 
were given three days’ notice by telegram that proceedings would open in 
Number Two High Court, 450 Law Courts Place, Melbourne, at 2.15 p.m. on 
August 27. Advice appeared in the Melbourne press that anyone wishing to 
give evidence should communicate with the registrar at 129 Swanston Street or 
the Attorney-General’s Department in Canberra. However, as F. F. Clausen, the 
Deputy Crown Solicitor, reported to his chief, Harry Whitlam, at the conclusion 
of the first two days in Melbourne: ‘There was no appearance on behalf of any 
of the passengers or crew of the aircraft.’1 Nor is there evidence that any of the 
families had been advised of their right to be represented. The regulations had 
envisaged that, if an allegation were to be made against any person affecting his 
character or reputation, that person should have full opportunity to make his 
defence. Nothing was said about what opportunity should be given to defend a 
dead pilot against imputations that his error of judgement caused a fatal crash. 
1 Statutory Rules 1939 No. 40, NAA: A432/85 1940/729/43; Sec., Air Board to Mrs R. E. Elford, (telegram), 
24 Aug. 1940, Elford MSS; Deputy Crown Solicitor to Crown Solicitor, 28 Aug. 1940, NAA: A432/85, 
1940/729//21.
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It was perhaps with the realisation that there was no-one present to represent 
Bob Hitchcock’s interests that neither Lowe nor Dean directly addressed the 
possibility of pilot error.
In notes on procedure originally prepared for Judge Piper’s Court it was laid 
down that a counsel appointed to assist the Court ‘should maintain an entirely 
neutral attitude and not set himself up as a prosecutor’. He was to see that no-
one suffered disadvantage by reason of ignorance or incapacity to examine or 
cross-examine witnesses. With the Court’s permission he could call witnesses 
and put any questions to them ‘which appear to him desirable for the purpose 
of eliciting the truth’.2 Arthur Dean appears to have been content to call only on 
the RAAF officers proposed by the RAAF and the civilian witnesses previously 
heard by the ACT Coroner and the Service Court. Thus subpoenas were served 
on nine men, all but one from Queanbeyan, who had already told their stories 
to the Air Force investigators: Rhodes from Canberra Aerodrome; Vest (manager 
of the Texas Oil Co.); the farmers Clothier and Southwell; O’Brien, Power, and 
Tetley from Queanbeyan; and Tilyard and Lalor from the building firm of 
Simmie and Co. Leading Cook James Mathews of the RAN who was thought 
by the police to have seen the plane hit the ground was not called. Once again 
‘one John Cassell’, who gave his address as ‘Clontarf’, Manly, was not asked to 
testify. John Castle, the Clontarf Beach real estate agent who had been driving 
with his son in the vicinity when he saw the crash, had driven back to Sydney 
the same day after speaking to Queanbeyan police.3
Reviewing the procession of expert witnesses called to the Inquiry, it is striking 
that opinion was sought only from within the RAAF. Arthur Dean would have 
been entitled to call for other witnesses. But it might have been put to him that 
there was no relevant knowledge or experience outside the Service that could 
be brought to bear. That had certainly been close to the view of the then Air 
Commodore Williams when the matter of outside advice was raised in relation 
to the Demon incidents of late 1937. Apart from the Civil Aviation Branch, as 
it then was, and the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation, Williams affirmed 
‘there are no persons in Australia who can claim to be authorities in aeronautical 
engineering nor in the operation of service aircraft and the training of service 
pilots’.4
If this had been true a few years earlier, it was questionable whether the 
same argument could be sustained in 1940. The Vice Chancellor of Sydney 
University wrote on August 22 to tell the Prime Minister that a new Professor of 
2 NAA: A705, 108/2/189.
3 ‘Crash of Ministerial Plane, Majura’, Unsigned Note [by Col. H. E. Jones], 13 Aug. 1940, Commonwealth 
Police file, NAA: A1378, 4/197. No Cassell appears in the 1930 Sands Directory or the 1943 electoral roll in 
which John and Georgina Castle are listed at Monash Crescent, Clontarf.
4 Chief of the Air Staff to Sec., Air Board, 7 Jan. 1938, NAA: A5954, 869/8.
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Aeronautical Engineering, A. V. Stephens, a scientist and a pilot, had arrived in 
the country two weeks earlier. Somehow it took six days for a copy of the letter 
to reach the Department of Air. The services of Professor Stephens, later to be 
used extensively by the RAAF, were not enlisted.5 More difficult to defend was 
the failure to call on the Lockheed personnel still in Australia. It does not seem 
to have occurred to Dean or Lowe that many of the questions they were asking 
of RAAF officers and ground crew might usefully have been addressed to the 
aircraft manufacturer’s representatives. Equally, some of the questions that were 
asked of RAAF pilots, who could not answer them, could more productively have 
been put to men in the commercial aviation industry who had some knowledge 
of Lockheed 14s.
There were other areas of expertise that might have been enlisted. If icing was 
suspected, for example, the Bureau of Meteorology could have advised that cases 
of ice accretion were common in the winter months over the higher country 
between Mansfield and Canberra. Hudsons had pitot head heating and a hot-air 
carburettor system which required timely application.6 Even so, Group Captain 
Claude Browne said when reflecting many years later on the crash, given certain 
air temperatures and precipitation, Hudsons could ice up very quickly. In this 
case, though it had been a crisp winter morning, the fair weather conditions 
allowed icing to be discounted. The conflagration at the crash site would 
presumably have made it impossible to determine whether there had in fact 
been significant icing.7
In his opening presentation to the Air Court of Inquiry, Arthur Dean had said 
that the plane was completely destroyed except for ‘some very unimportant 
parts’: ‘The result of this destruction is that it is impossible to reconstruct any 
definite cause of the accident.’8 It had evidently not been thought useful to carry 
out more than rudimentary structural and mechanical investigations. Nor was 
there the capacity to do them. The CSIR Aeronautical Research Laboratories, 
first occupied in April 1940, were not yet sufficiently established and equipped 
to have undertaken any engineering tests. However, their chief, L. P. Coombes, 
thought in retrospect that his colleague Henry Wills, head of the ARL structures 
department, might have contributed usefully to the investigating panels had he 
been asked.9 What is plain was that the Air Force had no desire to prolong and 
extend the ambit of an inquiry that might well be discomfiting.
5 NAA: A461, AN314/1/1.
6 A pitot tube is a pressure measurement instrument, with heating elements to prevent ice accretion, that 
acts as an airspeed indicator.
7 ‘Ice Accretion on Aircraft in Australia’, Bureau of Meteorology Bulletin No. 26, 1940, pp.23–6; GpCpt C. D. 
Browne to CH, 15 May 1978. For RAAF concern in 1939 about wing de-icing and rubber over-shoes for wings: 
NAA: A705, 9/19/50.
8 ‘Air Court of Inquiry into loss of Aeroplane at Canberra 13/8/40’, Deputy Commonwealth Crown Solicitor’s 
file, NAA: MP401/1  CL12774.
9 L. P. Coombes to CH, 3 April 1982. In 1940 an Australian engineer, Keith Swainger, was the only full-time 
accident investigator at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough (Fred Jones, Air Crash: The Clues in the 
Wreckage, Robert Hale, London, 1985, p.29).
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Charles Lowe, ‘a grave and courtly demeanour’ and judicial detachment
(Newman Rosenthal, Sir Charles Lowe: a biographical memoir, Robertson and Mullins, Melbourne, 1968)
Dean’s brief was tight. As counsel assisting, his role was confined to the courtroom 
and to some preliminary consultation with expert witnesses. If he assisted in any 
way in the interval between the first adjournment and the additional sitting on 
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September 3 it was not reflected in the fee claim he submitted. Nor was he paid 
for any contribution after Justice Lowe adjourned to write his report.10 Dean’s 
work was already done. He received £99.17.0 for his services. From then on the 
judge would, if he wished, have the benefit of advice from the RAAF assessors. 
As he was receiving his judicial salary, Lowe himself would be paid no fee no 
matter how many hours it took him to write the report. As he was resident in 
Melbourne, there would be no addition to the 12 guineas he was granted at the 
£4.4.0 daily travelling expense rate of a High Court Judge.
‘May it please your Excellency’
It took Lowe barely two days to complete his findings for submission to the 
Governor-General. In a preamble he pointed out that the deaths of the men on 
board meant that there was no direct evidence about the conditions that caused 
the aircraft to behave as observed. He was therefore prevented from arriving 
at his conclusions with ‘the certainty I should desire’. Before summarising 
the uncontroversial evidence about the departure of A16-97 from Laverton, 
its maintenance inspections, and the arrival at Essendon aerodrome, Lowe 
indicated uncertainty about the way the passengers and crew died. They were, 
he said, ‘killed outright in the crash or the explosion and fire which immediately 
succeeded it’. The Court had taken no post-mortem evidence. No reference had 
been made to press reports that suggested the possibility that there might have 
been survivors of the crash. There was therefore no foundation for the implicit 
rejection of the Coroner’s finding, based on the testimony of Dr Mackellar, of 
death on impact. But Lowe was right to treat the question as open.
It was four and a half pages into his statement before Lowe began to touch on 
sensitive matters. Noting that the only evidence of the position taken in the 
aircraft by any of the passengers related to Dick Elford, the judge then turned 
to the delay of some 15 minutes before the take-off from Essendon. There were 
suggestions that the mixture in the port engine might have been too rich or that 
the pilot was ‘not quite ready to go’ and signalled some Moth aircraft to take 
off. No-one, Lowe added, was seen to get out or to enter the aircraft during this 
delay. The narrative continued with the ‘perfect take-off’, the record of radio-
communications, the aircraft and its load, and the safeguarding measures which 
provided assurance that nothing untoward could have happened to it on the 
ground. The flying experience of Bob Hitchcock was set out.11 The ‘observations 
10 NAA: MP401/1 CL12774.
11 Lowe said Hitchcock’s ‘total flying time was 1,211 hours, 25 minutes, of which 107 hours were in 
Lockheed types of aircraft’. Tink (Air Disaster, p.150), has the 107 hours ‘in Hudsons’. David Vincent’s review 
of Hitchcock’s flying log book concludes that Hitchcock’s Hudson experience was: ‘112 hrs 40 mins (2 hrs 55 
mins second pilot day, 17 hrs 55 mins dual day, 89 hrs 50 mins 1st pilot day and 2 hrs 1st pilot night) plus there 
was another 5 hrs 35 mins on Lockheed 14 VH-ABH’. (Vincent to CH, email, 30 Aug. 2013.) 
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at Canberra’ were synthesised, with conflicts of evidence acknowledged. The 
lengthy explanations of stalling, and the experiments conducted by Scott and 
Ryland, were distilled into two sentences.
Examination of the witnesses, Lowe concluded, had produced four main theories 
of the cause of the crash: (1) Failure of an engine. (2) Some structural defect such 
as the fracture of the controlling wire of a wing flap. (3) Collapse of the pilot. (4) 
Stalling of the aircraft. The first three of these were ‘quite unlikely’. Lowe was 
able to say with confidence that the aircraft was completely airworthy in the 
hands of a competent pilot; it was adequately maintained and inspected; and no 
unauthorised person interfered with it. Flight Lieutenant Hitchcock had been 
‘adequately trained and was a competent pilot and all the evidence before me 
points to the conclusion that he alone piloted the aircraft on its journey from 
Essendon to Canberra’.
Had the aircraft rolled on to its back? It was much more probable that ‘it went 
into a dive or a spin’. Was the aircraft on fire before it crashed? If there was flame 
coming from the starboard engine it was ‘probably to be explained by a sudden 
opening of the throttle by the pilot causing backfiring through the carburettor 
intake’. So to the conclusion:
I think the most probable cause was the stalling of the aircraft and 
consequent loss of control of it by the pilot at a height at which it was 
beyond his power to recover control. The evidence does not enable me 
to say whether any special conditions, e.g. disturbance of wind due to 
the configuration of the hills, was the cause of the stalling.
What Lowe could not say, what Dean had not asked, what none of the 
professional witnesses had explained, was why A16-97 stalled in the first place. 
Experts had described the ‘how’ — the speeds, under-carriage and flap settings. 
Yet Hitchcock’s Service colleagues seemed baffled. They had ruled out various 
possibilities. They could not understand why the pilot they knew to be well-
versed in the Hudson’s unique behaviour could have so badly judged his flying 
speed at so low a height as to go into an irreversible dive or spin. ‘Disturbance 
of wind’ might have explained it. But the logic of Lowe’s finding was that loss of 
control was ‘consequent’ on the stall, not the cause of it. Innate judicial caution 
would not allow Lowe to go further. He did not echo the conclusion of the 
Accident Inspectorate investigation and the Service Court. He did not place 
blame on the pilot for an ‘error of judgment’.
‘Strictly construed’, Lowe continued, his functions ended with the findings 
he had offered. But he had some observations to add. Not only the accident 
to A16-97, but the accidents at Richmond and in Britain as well, pointed to 
the necessity of impressing on Hudson pilots the stalling characteristics of the 
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aircraft. Landing grounds should be approached with ‘an ample safety factor of 
speed’ to avoid the danger of stalling at an altitude giving only ‘the remotest 
chance of regaining control of the machine’. And especially was this true when 
an aerodrome was surrounded by hills that might set up air currents affecting a 
machine’s equilibrium and raising the stalling speed. The idea that an upward 
bump might have caught Bob Hitchcock off guard could not be substantiated. 
However, Lowe was influenced by the theoretical possibility. He had also 
taken seriously the concern expressed most forcefully by Squadron Leader 
Dallas Scott and No. 2 Squadron commander, Freddie Thomas, about relatively 
inexperienced pilots being converted to Hudsons. ‘Where the exigencies of the 
Service permit’, the widest background of experience, including with twin-
engined types, was advisable. Finally, having heeded Squadron Leader Ernie 
Hey’s reservations about swaged joints on cables, he suggested the advisability 
of reconsidering the method of attachment. The evidence suggested that the 
RAF’s method was more efficient.12
The Judge’s findings were signed off on September 5 and delivered with a 
transcript of proceedings to the Governor-General at Admiralty House in 
Sydney the next day. On the previous day, the Secretary of the Attorney-
General’s Department, Sir George Knowles, had passed on the coronial papers 
— a finding on one page about each of the deceased — to the ‘Chief Officer 
of Police’ in the A.C.T., inviting his advice on ‘whether in your opinion any 
further police action in the matter was necessary’. No, Colonel Jones assured 
him five days later, it was not.13 Leaving very few footprints, Jones had satisfied 
himself that A16-97 had suffered no untoward interference — at least nothing 
for which he might bear any responsibility.
Justice Lowe had, as requested, reported ‘with all possible expedition’. Lord 
Gowrie promptly forwarded the documents to the Prime Minister. Then, as 
ministers dispersed to fight an election, the papers were closely held. Frederick 
Shedden provided a covering note for Menzies on September 7: ‘You will 
probably wish to pass it on to the Minister for Air.’ Two days later, two copies 
of Lowe’s findings were sent to Artie Fadden. Intercepted in Melbourne by the 
Secretary of the Department of Air, it was another two weeks before the bundle 
was forwarded to the Minister. Mel Langslow advised Fadden on September 16 
that the original report sent to the Governor–General had not yet been received. 
Now no-one seemed in a hurry. With the election only five days away, Langslow 
assured the Minister that the details had not been made public. ‘It is presumed,’ 
he added, ‘that Cabinet will decide the extent to which the findings should 
be promulgated in the press.’ Action would be taken immediately if Cabinet 
12 Lowe’s conclusions are quoted or paraphrased from the ‘Findings’ of the Air Court of Inquiry’ in NAA: 
A705, 32/10/2729.
13 NAA: A1378, 148–9.
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required the department to prepare the statement and indicated the ‘specific 
aspects’ to be covered. ‘Special attention’ might be drawn to the findings, 
Langslow suggested, four sentences which he had marked on one copy together 
with the riders that Lowe had added. ‘These virtually epitomise the findings of 
the Court.’
Fadden knew that it was not for him or his Department to be ‘promulgating’ 
to newspapers on this subject. ‘P/Minister will make a Press Statement.’ It was 
not until October 9 that the findings of Lowe’s report were presented to the 
Cabinet and released to newspapers. There was no accompanying statement by 
the Prime Minister. Knowing that Lowe had reported to the Governor-General, 
the press generally wrote as though he had presided over a Royal Commission. 
In fact he was appointed under the authority of Regulation 6 of Air Force Court 
of Inquiry Regulations rather than the Royal Commissions Act (1902–1933). No-
one seems to have thought it necessary to issue a clarification.14 The Canberra 
Times carried the story in 248 words on page two. A month earlier there had 
been speculation that the most probable reason for the crash was ‘a structural 
defect beyond human control which made the plane unmanageable when 
the landing gear was brought into operation’. This, the Canberra Times had 
confidently said, was the theory supported by most experts at the Inquiry.15 
As they had previously reported the judge’s tentative conclusion that there had 
been no evidence of engine failure or a broken cable, and they were not privy 
to the RAAF expert testimony taken in camera, the Canberra Times sources had 
obviously let them down.
For The Argus, it was 878 words on page four. The finding that Bob Hitchcock 
alone had piloted the aircraft was mentioned but given no prominence; so too 
was the observation that no-one was seen to enter or leave the aircraft while it sat 
for an ‘unusual’ length of time before take-off at Essendon. The Canberra Times 
report was silent on both points. The Sydney Morning Herald covered the same 
ground as The Argus in around 650 words, noting in a sub-heading: ‘Pilot above 
average’.16 After the urgency of the sequence of investigations, culminating in 
a judicial inquiry intended to allay community concern, the national tragedy 
of August 13 now commanded fewer column inches than new regulations on 
investment control and the re-opening of the Burma Road.
14 Rosenthal’s biography of Lowe, and other works, convey the same misapprehension. The Inquiry had 
been ‘referred’ to Lowe by the Minister of State for Air. He was not appointed by Letters Patent issued by the 
Governor-General although he could have been by virtue of the Royal Commissions Act clause 1B definition 
of ‘Commission’ or ‘Royal Commission’ which included inquiries set up ‘in pursuance of this Act or of any 
other power’. The inquiry is not listed in D. H. Borchardt, Checklist of Royal Commissions, Select Committees 
of Parliament and Boards of Inquiry, Part 1 Commonwealth of Australia 1900–1950, n.d.
15 Canberra Times, 12 Sept. 1940.
16 Canberra Times, The Argus, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 Oct. 1940. The Examiner, The Mercury, The 
Advertiser, and the Courier-Mail carried similar reports.
22 . Lowe’s last word
523
The upper echelons of the RAAF could rest easy. The government had other 
preoccupations. Having lost his majority, Menzies was attempting first to form a 
national government and, if that failed, to reconstruct the non-Labor coalition. 
Reconciliation with Sir Earle Page was the imperative political objective. 
There was no incentive for anyone in Canberra to draw fresh attention to a 
catastrophe that had caused so much distress or to publicise deficiencies 
in Service organisation or performance. The families of the victims might 
have hoped for more illumination. Charles Lowe had done his best and was 
understandably dismayed by the resounding silence that greeted his efforts. 
As Lowe’s biographer wrote, he ‘never learned of any steps taken by the Royal 
Australian Air Force following the report…The public could have been informed 
of possible steps that had not hitherto been taken, and of measures which the 
department contemplated taking for the future…’
Lowe had a reasonable expectation that some regard might be paid to a 
Commissioner’s findings. His disappointment was as much philosophical 
as personal. In a democracy, he believed, if a public inquiry was held, ‘the 
enquiring public should be encouraged, and should be provided with 
satisfactory answers’.17 On many key technical questions certainty had eluded 
him. Referring Lowe’s findings and riders to the Secretary of the Department 
of Air for the attention of the Chief of the Air Staff, Artie Fadden asked for 
comments on the observations made. He would be glad to learn ‘what action 
is proposed should be taken regarding them’. The press was informed that the 
minister had called for a report. ‘Appropriate Air Force officers have been asked 
to supply information on these points.’18 The quest for satisfactory answers had 
begun independently of the Air Force Court and would now continue, along 
carefully circumscribed lines. The Air Force could get on with its business.
17 Rosenthal, Sir Charles Lowe, pp.101–2.
18 Fadden to Secretary (for C.A.S.), minute, 11 Oct. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729; The Herald, 12 Oct. 1940.
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23. Mr Storey’s story
Much about the crash of A16-97 remained inexplicable. As far as the public 
was concerned, privy only to Justice Lowe’s findings, the story was that the 
‘machine stalled’. Whatever might be suspected, nothing had been said directly 
to suggest that the pilot had erred. Pilot error could be inferred. It could not be 
proved. No-one was required to believe that Flight Lieutenant Bob Hitchcock 
had been inadequately instructed in the dangerous characteristics of the new 
aircraft he was flying. It would not do for there to be a loss of confidence in the 
RAAF’s selection of prospective Hudson pilots or of its training regime. A more 
satisfactory deduction for the authorities — a deduction left for the public to 
make — was that an adequately trained and competent pilot had just made a 
fatal mistake. There might have been other contributory factors but none could 
be conclusively confirmed. Thus, how or why such a ‘miscalculation’ could have 
been made was left to the imagination.
A delicate path had been constructed for the Air Court of Inquiry. Those whose 
responsibility it was to advise the Court about Bob Hitchcock’s competence had 
directed attention only to his most recent record. There was no hint of anything 
other than ‘average’ or ‘above average’ performance in the evaluations disclosed. 
But there was an economy of truth in providing only these assessments. There is no 
indication that Justice Lowe was made aware of Hitchcock’s misadventures as a young 
pilot officer, or of any later concerns about his flying. It may reasonably be supposed 
that his superiors judged that Hitchcock’s subsequent operational performance 
demonstrated that he had overcome the crisis of confidence in 1936. Four years on 
he was a different man. The exacting John Ryland had deemed him ‘thoroughly 
competent…slightly above average’ when he converted to Hudsons. ‘Not brilliant, 
but normal’ in absorbing instructions.1 What none of those who knew Hitchcock’s 
history would want was anything that could have led, as Sir George Jones was to 
put it years afterwards, to the realisation that there were those who thought ‘the man 
would never have been in the Service but for political influence’.2
In the absence of other evidence it was legitimate for Lowe to conclude that 
Hitchcock alone had been in control of A16-97 from the time it left Essendon 
to the moment it plunged into the ground in Duncan Cameron’s farm. But what 
if there were other testimony? One man who thought he could throw light on 
the accident was Herbert J. Storey, Headmaster of the Grenfell Street Trades 
School in Adelaide. In response to the war’s demand for skilled men, the trades 
school had been designated a Commonwealth Defence Training Centre. It 
offered Army technical training, RAAF basic training, and training in aircraft 
1 Ryland’s testimony, 27 Aug. 1940, Air Court of Inquiry, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729.
2 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
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and munitions production. In co-operation with the Adelaide School of Mines, 
the Trades School had undertaken to train 500 fitters at £15 per head for a four-
month course.3 Storey’s responsibilities took him around the state to Port Pirie, 
Whyalla, and other country towns. On these trips he would often be flown 




I forward for your information, a record of a conversation which took 
place in my office during a visit to this school by the late Minister for 
Air, Mr Fairbairn.
I realise of course, that it is not evidence but it may throw some light on 
the Canberra air crash, perhaps by lending support to evidence at the 
Court of Enquiry or be of value in some other direction.
Owing to some misunderstanding, Mr Fairbairn arrived at this school 
some 15 minutes ahead of Air-force officers who were to accompany him 
on an inspection of the R.A.A.F. activities. The interval was bridged by 
a quiet chat in my office.
Mr Fairbairn told me something of his trip round Australia. (He was 
then on the final stage) and we discussed modern service aircraft. 
I asked him about the Hudson bombers of which I had been reading 
with interest. Mr Fairbairn stated ‘These machines have rather a nasty 
stalling characteristic. The combined effect of throttling back and 
dropping the flaps, preparatory to landing, can land you in a whole heap 
of bother. They are very sensitive, at this stage, to varying air pressures 
and, from what I have been told, a pilot coming in to land can find 
himself, suddenly and without warning, in a machine that is no longer 
air-borne, heading straight for the ground. I don’t know much about 
them yet but, as I will be handing my own machine in when I arrive 
in Melbourne; you know, we are commandeering all private machines 
and mine can not be excepted, I will soon know all about them. I will 
be using a Hudson for my departmental travelling and on every possible 
occasion I’ll practise landings and find out more about this stalling trick. 
Personally, I think it is only a matter of handling your throttle wisely.’
The conversation closed on the arrival of several R.A.A.F. staff officers 
and an inspection was then made of this school.
3 Air Board Agenda 2677, [Jan. 1940], NAA: A4181, 17; The Advertiser, 9 July 1940.






As if to emphasise his sense that he thought he was conveying something 
important, Storey added at the foot of the letter he had typed with his own 
hands ‘/HJS (not dictated)’.
This letter, filed in a bundle of mostly routine departmental correspondence, 
adjacent to copies of papers relating to the Lowe inquiry, was extraordinary in its 
implications. There was no trace of Herbert Storey’s reported conversation with the 
late Minister for Air in any of the evidence or conclusions of the Air Force Court of 
Inquiry. No-one, it seems, contacted him to test his credibility or to see if there was 
anything further he could contribute. The only discernible response in the files was 
sent on 9 September 1940:
Dear Sir,
I desire to thank you for your letter of 31st August, 1940, forwarding a 
record of a conversation which took place in your office during a visit to 
your school by the late Minister for Air, the Hon. J. V. Fairbairn.
I would inform you that the stalling characteristics of Lockheed Hudson 
aircraft are well known and pilots are fully instructed in regard thereto, 
when undergoing conversion courses for this type of aircraft.
A special Air Force Court of Inquiry, presided over by his Honour, Judge 
Lowe, was constituted to inquire into the accident at Canberra, and the 
cause or causes thereof. You may be assured that the points brought to 





4 ‘Air Force Court of Inquiry under Air Force Courts of Inquiry Regulations into accident to Air Force Hudson 
Aircraft at Canberra on 13/8/1940 (A16-97)’, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729/28–9. Tink, Air Disaster, pp.213, 220, has 
Fairbairn speak of ‘handling your throttles wisely’ which would have been true but was not what Storey wrote.
5 The file copy in the Department of Defence Air Services Branch General Correspondence in Melbourne 
(NAA: A705, 32/10/2729/27) bears the initials of the Assistant Secretary of the Department, (Major) Patrick 
(‘Johnnie’) Eugene Coleman. Some years after I discovered Storey’s letter and the reply, I told the aviation 
journalist Frank Cranston about it. In 1990 the Defence Department Air Force Office, under the impression 
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Both the wording and the timing of the official reply were notable. Storey’s 
letter had been written on a Sunday, four days after Mr Justice Lowe convened 
his first hearing in Melbourne. The last day of hearings, also in Melbourne, 
was three days later. The Court had re-convened in the afternoon of Tuesday, 
September 3, to hear additional evidence ‘with regard to the management of 
the aeroplane’. The departmental response to Storey was dated September 9, 
four days after Lowe completed his report, with the assistance of the Inquiry 
registrar, James Davoren. The report was signed and sent to the Governor-
General on September 5. If Storey had paid the threepenny surcharge for airmail 
delivery from Adelaide there would have been time for his letter to be brought 
to the notice of Arthur Dean, counsel assisting the Inquiry. Time as well for its 
contents to be intimated to senior officers and ministers before Lowe concluded 
his work. Even had the letter been carried from Adelaide on The Overland 
overnight train service it might still have arrived in time to be assimilated by 
the Inquiry.6 In fact the letter was processed by the Defence (RAAF) Central 
Registry on Monday, September 2. The file on which the letter was eventually 
placed appears to have been forwarded to the head of the legal branch, Wing 
Commander Fred Knight, on August 30. From Knight it was sent to ‘S A B’ 
(Secretary Air Board) the next day.
It may be surmised that, in the normal course, a clerk from the central registry 
would have carried the letter to the Air Board Secretary’s office and attached it 
to the file. What might have happened next is a matter of conjecture. The letter 
bears the pencilled annotation ‘S/AB 2/9/40’ in the hand of the registrar of the 
Inquiry, J. A. Davoren. The file itself was formally in the care of the Secretary 
of the Air Board from August 31 to October 10. But there is a unique annotation 
on the file cover. Whereas all other dates of the file’s movement are the dates on 
which it was forwarded, there is an interpolation ‘Rec’d 3/9/40’ with the initials 
of the Inquiry registrar.7 At that time Davoren was still working with Lowe on 
drafting the Judge’s report.
that nobody knew of the correspondence, informed Cranston about it to assist him with an article he was 
to write on the 50th anniversary of the crash. Cranston’s article, ‘Spiral dive into Canberra hilltop rocked 
Australia’ (Canberra Times, 12 Aug. 1990), was subsequently referred to in several books including Bennett, 
Highest Traditions, p.113; Wilson, Anson, Hudson and Sunderland in Australian Service, p.107.
6 Letters for the eastern states could be left at the Adelaide GPO as late as 3.15 p.m. on Saturday or 5.15 p.m. 
on Sunday (The Advertiser, 31 Aug. 1940, p.14).
7 Secret file covers (e.g. NAA: A705, 231/9/462) contained the instruction: ‘Files must not be passed between 
Branches by hand without transit slips.’
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Air Force Court of Inquiry file created by J. A. Davoren, 20 August 1940
(National Archives of Australia: A705, 32/10/2729)
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It may be noted here that in designating the requirements for a ‘specially 
qualified officer to handle all administrative procedures’ for Air Force Courts 
of Inquiry, ‘Johnnie’ Coleman had stressed that, as the occupant of the position 
would be representing the department in open court, he should be an officer ‘of 
good personality and bearing’. He would be required to be conversant with ‘all 
Acts, Regulations, Orders, Publications &c…as one of his functions is to advise 
the judge regarding these matters’.8
James Davoren had an intimate knowledge of the relevant legalities. He also 
faced a stark conflict of duties. When not acting as a registrar, he was a normal 
member of the Air Board secretariat, understudying the head of the Regulations 
and Orders sub-section. When Air Force Headquarters had drawn up the duty 
statement for the third division clerical appointment which he came to hold, they 
had calculated that some 60 per cent of the time would be allocated to work as 
registrar. But the balance of the time, subject to the demands of Air Force Courts 
of Inquiry in all states, would be continuously free for other secretariat duties.9 
Thus Justice Lowe had a temporary claim to Davoren’s services but ultimately 
he reported to Coleman and through him to Mel Langslow.
With a letter of such extraordinary potency delivered to his desk from the 
head of his office, what was Davoren to do? What if anything was he told? 
Was he asked to draft a reply to Storey? If so, was he told what to say? Was he 
instructed not to pass the letter on to the judge? There are no answers to any 
of these tantalising questions. Most intriguing of all: why did Davoren make a 
point of initialling the file the day after he had directed it to the Secretary of the 
Air Board? It is as if he wanted it on record that the letter had been received in 
time to be referred to Lowe. It was Davoren who had created the file on August 
20. So far as that file can speak further for itself it tells us only that it was next 
passed to the Chief of the Air Staff on October 14, initialled by the Deputy 
Chief, Air Commodore Bill Bostock.10
Had Herbert Storey written in vain? We cannot know if he had accurately 
reported the words of the visiting Air Minister. If he had seen the report of the 
Air Court’s proceedings in The Advertiser on August 29 he could not fail to have 
been struck by a paragraph headed ‘Mr Fairbairn’s Place in Plane’. Group Captain 
Wilson, it said, had asked a witness about whether the Minister was sitting 
next to the pilot before the plane left Essendon. Perhaps Storey’s perception 
of his conversation with Fairbairn had also been coloured by memory of a tiny 
8 Sec., Air Board to Sec., Department of Air, 15 Aug. 1939, copy, NAA: A705, 108/2/189.
9 The percentage list of duties was ‘one of the most potent weapons available in obtaining a reclassification 
of salary or position’ as the Supervisor of Flying Operations in the Dept of Civil Aviation had learned (Affleck, 
The Wandering Years, pp.141–3).
10 NAA: A705, 32/10/2729/1. Of course, the file could have been seen by people who did not sign it. Storey’s 
letter is also annotated by Davoren ‘File L1 29/8[sic]/40.’
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news item in The Advertiser on May 2 noting that Fairbairn was to receive dual 
instruction on Wirraways in Canberra in his spare time: ‘He will not be satisfied, 
however, until he can fly solo in any Air Force machine including the latest 
Hudson bomber.’
Storey was mistaken in thinking that Fairbairn had yet to hand in his own 
machine. However, as a Broken Hill mining engineer holding a captain’s 
commission in the Royal Australian Engineers since September 1939, he would 
certainly have understood what Fairbairn was talking about. What none of those 
who saw Storey’s letter might have known is that, while waiting in Adelaide to 
join the AIF 7th Division, Storey had actually been posted to the RAAF’s No. 1 
Engineering School in Melbourne. Before he could take up the post he had been 
poached by the South Australian Superintendent of Technical Education to run 
the big new trade school.
Air Commodore Harry Wrigley, as AOC Southern Area, was one of those in 
the upper ranks of the RAAF who knew Storey, and was surprised to discover 
that he had remained in Adelaide.11 If Storey had contacted Wrigley about his 
conversation with the Minister for Air instead of going through proper channels 
might the outcome have been different? Having been an assessor for the first 
of the Air Courts in 1939, Wrigley knew the new procedures; he had taken a 
personal interest in Bob Hitchcock’s career; he had recently commanded the 
Laverton station; No. 2 Squadron was within his Area Command; the Service 
Court had been convened by his Senior Administrative Staff Officer. No one 
in the upper ranks of the RAAF was better placed to assess the credibility of 
the suspicions raised by Storey’s letter. But, if the transmission record is to be 
trusted, the file was closely held and never came into his hands.
In the event, in classically ambiguous bureaucratic language, Mel Langslow (or 
‘Johnnie’ Coleman) assured his correspondent that ‘the points brought to notice 
by you were investigated closely by the Court’. The points the officials meant 
were of course the technical questions related to what Fairbairn was said to have 
described as ‘nasty stalling characteristics’. The further point the Department 
implied was brought to notice was Fairbairn’s stated intention ‘on every possible 
occasion’ to ‘practise landings and find out more about this stalling trick’. What 
the letter failed to do was confirm that this revelation had been considered 
by Justice Lowe, or by anyone else. For good reason. The otherwise extensive 
documentary record shows no witness being called, no evidence being led, 
that even hinted that the Minister had expressed any interest in the Hudson’s 
behaviour. The transcript of the session of the Court of Inquiry held in camera 
on September 3 contains no reference to Jim Fairbairn’s conversation with the 
Adelaide trade school principal.
11 The Mail (Adelaide), 7 Dec. 1940; The Advertiser, 31 Jan. 1941, p.16.
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Perhaps the Storey letter simply did not arrive in time for Dean or Lowe to see 
it before the Inquiry was adjourned. Of course, it is possible that the letter 
had somehow lain unnoticed in an in-tray. The department might not have 
been as disingenuous as its response appears to suggest. But, in view of the 
sensitivity and potential for embarrassment of the air crash investigation, it 
strains credulity to believe that the letter’s significance would not have been 
immediately appreciated when it was read at Air Force headquarters. Sir Richard 
Kingsland, a contemporary of Hitchcock, a decorated wartime pilot, and later 
a high-ranking public servant, was to speak of being ‘very surprised that it 
had been brushed off as casually it was’ by the Secretary of the Department of 
Air.12 Even had it arrived too late to be considered by Lowe before he finished 
writing and transmitting his findings to the Governor-General, all members of 
the Cabinet as well as the Air Board had been told that the Minister for Air 
had the discretion to re-open the inquiry. James Davoren would certainly have 
been aware of this. His immediate superior, Coleman, ‘very mild, gentle…a very 
knowledgeable man’, as George Jones recalled him, did not need to be told. 
Mel Langslow knew the regulatory regime as well if not better than anyone. 
Having himself unfairly borne the initial brunt of criticism for the financial 
stringency that delayed the installation of navigational beacons that might have 
prevented the crash of the Kyeema two years earlier, he could understandably 
have hesitated to bring down another torrent of controversy on the Air Force 
and the government.
But Langslow had scrupulously informed ministers and Air Board colleagues 
from the outset that the Governor-General, ‘if requested by the Minister, may 
reopen and rehear the inquiry or any part thereof, even after the findings and 
notes of the first hearing have been forwarded to the Governor-General’.13 It is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that a decision had been taken at the highest level 
to conceal what could be construed as sensational information.
If the Storey letter was not attached to the file before it was received by the 
Inquiry registrar from Fred Knight on September 3 then Knight, acting most 
probably under instructions, was responsible for withholding it. Given what we 
know of the proceedings of the previous weeks, the most likely person to have 
directed Knight was the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Air Commodore Bostock. 
If the letter was filed, and reached the Inquiry office on September 2, it might 
12 Sir Richard Kingsland, interview, 3 April 2007, transcript courtesy Geoff Crane. Kingsland recalled 
learning of the letter while writing the entry on Mel Langslow for the Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
vol. 15. Kingsland was Julius Alan ‘Dickie’ Cohen until he changed his name in 1947, taking his remarried 
mother’s surname.
13 Secretary, Department of Air to Minister, ‘Investigation of Accidents Affecting Air-Force Aircraft’, 
minute, 15 Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729. The paper, annotated by the Prime Minister, notes that 
Cabinet had approved an open inquiry.
23 . Mr Storey’s story
533
have been overlooked when Lowe and Davoren returned from Canberra early 
the next morning. It might even have been overlooked there until after the final 
session of the Inquiry was over on the third.
Yet there must be lingering suspicion. In developing instructions for registrars 
of Air Force Courts of Inquiry the Air Board had specifically required that 
reports of proceedings be furnished daily ‘either verbally (personally or per 
phone) or in writing’.14 There must therefore have been opportunities each day 
for the transmission of confidential information. If no such communication had 
occurred, it may well have been asked thereafter: what public interest would be 
served by bringing this obscure headmaster’s disturbing story into the open? 
There was no way to determine what had actually happened inside A16-97 as it 
circled near Canberra. Surely further speculation about what might have been 
would be unproductive? It could only bring distress to the families of those who 
died. Better by far to have confined the Court of Inquiry to matters that could 
more easily be investigated and evaluated.
Is it legitimate to advance these possibilities? No documentary evidence has 
been discovered to warrant a conclusive finding of improper concealment of 
information. If Bostock, Knight, Lowe, Dean, Davoren, Langslow, or Coleman 
kept relevant private records they have not so far been found. But in the nature 
of things such evidence is unlikely ever to have existed, or to have survived if 
it had existed. As Air Commodore Bruce Courtney, a junior officer in 1940, has 
cautioned, even a Court of Inquiry ‘should be suspect in a wartime situation 
— it might well have been necessary to cover up the accident in the general 
interest’.15 The fact that Storey’s letter itself found its way on to a file at all might 
be thought remarkable. All the more so when the same file contains evidence of a 
decision to omit another embarrassing document. In a letter that itself probably 
was not intended by its author to be filed, Mel Langslow wrote to the Secretary 
of the Attorney-General’s Department about ‘the “alarmist” report said to have 
been spread by an airman mechanic’. This had been ‘referred to the Intelligence 
people to follow up….You may be assured that Mr Simpson’s letter will not be 
placed on an official file’.16
Political intervention?
Those reaching for a conspiratorial explanation of the treatment of Mr Storey’s 
information are inclined to look for political hands at work. With a little 
imagination some suggestive scenarios can be constructed. It is easy enough to 
14 ‘Air Force Courts of Inquiry — Regulations’, NAA: A705, 108/2/189.
15 ACdre E. B. Courtney to CH, 7 April 1978.
16 Langslow to Sir George Knowles, 19 Sept. 1940, copy, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729/24.
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speculate, for example, that words might have passed between the Air Member 
for Personnel, Bill ‘Mucker’ Anderson, and his old friend and Melbourne 
Grammar contemporary, Dick Casey. Anderson was closely involved in selecting 
the personnel to assist the Air Court. Casey was, of course, in Washington at 
the time of the crash. But he was only a telephone call away from old colleagues 
and friends in Canberra and Melbourne. He had learned of the crash from 
journalists who reported that he was ‘inexpressibly shocked and his emotion 
was evident in his voice’. ‘For several seconds he could not speak’, according 
to the Daily Telegraph’s’ special representative who had telephoned him. The 
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Bill Bostock, who had travelled to London with 
Casey in 1939, was another potential link at the heart of RAAF headquarters. 
So too was Alec Barlow, one of the RAAF’s most experienced Hudson pilots, 
attached successively to No. 8 Squadron (Canberra), No. 14 Squadron (Pearce), 
and No. 7 Squadron at Laverton.17 Barlow was the brother-in-law of Maie Casey’s 
secretary, former journalist Pat Jarrett. Jarrett herself had visited the Lockheed 
factory in April 1940. Whether Casey made any attempt to contact anyone in 
Australia — or if anyone from the RAAF sought to contact him — is not known. 
What is known is, as Casey wrote to his friend Jack Latham, that he ‘was — & 
am — very cast down by the air accident. All my friends.’18
Had Casey still been in Australia he would have known of Fairbairn’s interest 
in the problems being experienced with the Hudson. He was endlessly curious 
about technical matters. When minister in charge of scientific research he 
had responsibility for the development of plans for an aeronautical research 
laboratory. He had been closely involved in the discussions and decisions in 
1938 to place an order with Lockheed.19 Casey’s first flying instructor, Fred 
Scherger, now commanding No. 2 Service Flying School at Wagga, had raced 
to Canberra on August 13. There he talked first to Peter Looker, Casey’s former 
private secretary now on Menzies’ staff. It was little more than two years since 
Casey had come to Scherger asking ‘Am I too old to fly?’ He had read so much 
about flying, Scherger was to recall, that he was concerned about stalling. But 
he was ‘a very good pilot…could always talk flying, could not stop him talking 
flying’.20 Scherger’s close friend Squadron Leader Paddy Heffernan knew both 
Fairbairn and Hitchcock well.21 Heffernan was out of the country but Scherger’s 
friend from flying training days was Hitchcock’s fellow flight commander, Ray 
Garrett. If Scherger had wanted some background information he was surely 
capable of getting it.
17 NAA: A9300, Barlow AA.
18 The Argus, Daily Telegraph, 14 Aug. 1940; Audrey Tate, Fair Comment: The Life of Pat Jarrett 1911–1990, 
MUP, 1996, pp.49–50, 56; Casey to Sir John Latham, 20 Aug. 1940, Latham MSS, NLA MS1009/1/5487.
19 Prime Minister’s Department, ‘Aviation — Purchase of Lockheed Bombers’, Part 1, NAA: A1608, F17/1/2.
20 Scherger, interview, 2 Sept. 1978.
21 For Heffernan and Scherger sharing quarters and hospitality for half a century, see Harry Rayner, 
Scherger, p.42.
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In Casey’s absence there were others to whom the Prime Minister could turn. If 
he knew that Harry Winneke, a family friend, was a member of the Accident 
Inspectorate he might have thought to contact him. But more likely to be well 
informed were Winneke’s professional colleague Arthur ‘Spud’ Murphy and 
Lawrence ‘Wack’ Wackett, both of whom Menzies had come to know well on a 
long sea voyage to England in 1936.22 Tempting as it might have been to contact 
Murphy, the Chief of the Air Staff’s principal accident investigator, Menzies’ 
sense of propriety would most likely have inhibited him from intervening in a 
formal process that was already under way. Nor could he be sure that Murphy 
would be willing to compromise his own unique relationship with the Chief of 
the Air Staff. Wackett, focused on his production of Wirraways at Fisherman’s 
Bend, would know nothing first hand. But his son Wilbur was helping to train 
Hudson pilots at Laverton. There was in any case another alternative, a senior 
man whom the Prime Minister knew was both knowledgeable and indiscreet.
Menzies had long known Air Commodore ‘King’ Cole, who was based at 
Central Area Headquarters at Point Piper in Sydney. Adrian Cole, ‘Jimmy’ 
Fairbairn’s boyhood friend, was ‘very relaxed’ off duty, a dedicated club man 
with a reputation as ‘a bit of a playboy’.23 He had taken the risk two months 
earlier of sending direct to the Prime Minister, ‘against regulations and orders’, 
a brief of his own views on Australian air defence and aircraft production. 
Menzies assured Cole he would treat the communication as confidential and 
that it would ‘prove very valuable to me’. Cole had sent the memorandum to 
the Chief of the Air Staff but neither he nor Menzies sent it to the Air Minister, 
Fairbairn.24 Would Cole have volunteered information to anyone, let alone the 
Prime Minister, that would suggest that lives had been put at risk, and had 
now been lost, because his recommendation four years earlier to terminate Bob 
Hitchcock had been rejected? The thought might have crossed his mind, but 
it seems unlikely that Cole would have jeopardised his career by pointing his 
finger at Hitchcock’s protectors, the former Chief of the Air Staff and the then 
Air Member for Supply, both of them still on the Air Board.
We do not know whether Menzies sought or received information outside the 
official channels. It is hard to believe that no-one with personal knowledge 
of Fairbairn’s flying habits would have spoken to him after of the crash. But, 
if they did, no record has survived. Is it likely that he might have intimated 
that there was to be no investigation of the possibility that Fairbairn had been 
more than a passenger on A16-97? If he were minded to do so, to whom would 
he have conveyed his wish? To Sir Charles Burnett, who would be obliged to 
provide a report on the accident when the War Cabinet met? That might work 
22 Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer, p.116.
23 ACM Sir Frederick Scherger, interview with Mel Pratt, 13 Nov. 1973, transcript, NLA TRC 121/52. p.18.
24 Cole to Prime Minister, 25 June 1940; Menzies to Cole, 28 June 1940, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/581/23.
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
536
to contain inquiries by Burnett’s RAAF subordinates. But could an independent 
judicial inquiry be deflected by political influence? What of those who had 
led the Inquiry that Cabinet had decided upon? As we have seen, Justice Lowe 
himself, raised to the Supreme Court bench in 1927, moved in the same legal 
and club circles as the Prime Minister. Arthur Dean had been a contemporary 
of Menzies at the Victorian bar. Yet there is no evidence of communication with 
either man by anyone other than those properly participating in the conduct of 
the Inquiry.
Joe Hewitt, perhaps the most intelligent and reflective officer of his 
generation
(Courtesy of the RAAF Museum)
Is it likely that anyone outside the higher echelons of the RAAF would have 
sought to influence the findings or to hasten the process of a judicial inquiry? 
The possibility of exposure, if not a disciplined integrity, would weigh against 
it. Yet there had been no such inhibition a little more than a year earlier when 
Wing Commander Joe Hewitt had presided over a Service Court of Inquiry into 
a controversial Anson crash.
23 . Mr Storey’s story
537
As Hewitt wrote in his memoirs: ‘Such a Court of Inquiry requires time and 
concentration on the problem, but the urgings of Cabinet on the Air Board to 
determine the cause was passed down the line to me ultimately by telephone 
calls from the Air Member for Personnel.’25 This was precisely the kind of 
interference — admittedly in this case only a desire to get the matter settled 
quickly — that had justified the establishment of an independent inquiry 
system. Even without any inappropriate influence, the appointment of Lowe, 
and of Dean to assist him, gave the Prime Minister and Cabinet some assurance 
of sympathetic and discreet handling of what might prove to be awkward 
discoveries. They could rely as well on the Secretary of the Air Department. As 
an admittedly jaundiced Sir George Jones was to put it many years afterwards: ‘I 
don’t think Langslow would have given any advice other than what he thought 
was politically acceptable.’26
‘Contrary to all human probability’
We can trace tendrils of acquaintance, probable relationships of trust. Inferences 
are possible from what is known. But there is nothing to substantiate doubts 
about the independence of the Inquiry from direct political interference. 
We are left with a mystery. The first thing to be noticed is that one possible 
explanation of the crash that was canvassed with evident discomfort in the 
Inquiry was indeed that someone other than the trained pilot in command was 
at the controls of the aircraft. Such a possibility was perhaps so improbable that, 
without prompting, it might not have occurred to any of those charged with 
thinking about what had happened. But, as we have seen, the Lowe Inquiry 
transcript reveals that the possibility had indeed been in the minds of both 
counsel assisting and Justice Lowe himself. In the closing moments of the 
hearings on August 29 Arthur Dean had said: ‘As I understand the evidence 
there is nothing to justify the Court in holding that any suggested cause was the 
actual cause.’ By a process of elimination, he said, that:
one might very easily omit such a consideration as sabotage or any 
suggestion that the plane was not airworthy or was overloaded, or the 
view that some other person than the pilot was piloting the aeroplane. 
There is not the slightest evidence to justify the last suggestion. It is 
contrary to all human probability that a skilled pilot, responsible for 
the control of the plane, would vacate his seat for anybody else and it 
is contrary to all human probability that another person knowing the 
difficulty of piloting a plane of this kind would undertake to do so, 
25 Hewitt, The Black One, p.162. The Air Member for Personnel at the time was Air Commodore W. H. 
Anderson.
26 AM Sir George Jones interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
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particularly in view of the fact that a large number of human lives were 
involved. Not only is there no evidence to warrant suggestions of that 
kind but in fact the probabilities are all the other way.
‘Contrary to all human probability.’ The Judge concurred, somewhat awkwardly 
if the transcript is to be believed: ‘It would be pure speculation to put forward 
such a theory in the absence of the only evidence which could throw light 
on that of those who perished in the flames.’ The Canberra Times report on 
August 30 amplified Dean’s remarks: no other person ‘knowing the course of 
flying instruction necessary’ would be piloting the aircraft. Lowe was made to 
sound more coherent: ‘The theory of another pilot must be pure speculation as 
the only persons capable of giving evidence on that point were those who had 
perished.’27
In his own publicly released ‘Findings’, Lowe had explicitly stated that ‘the 
evidence before me points to the conclusion that he [Hitchcock] alone piloted 
the aircraft on its journey from Essendon to Canberra’.28 In truth, there was no 
evidence before the Court on the question of other men possibly piloting the 
aircraft during the flight. The fact that Pilot Officer Wiesener was not qualified 
to fly the aircraft was adduced in support of the conclusion that Hitchcock alone 
had the controls. It would have been a simple deduction from this information 
to the disturbing realisation that the RAAF had entrusted the safety of three 
Cabinet ministers and the Chief of the General Staff to just one man. A patriotic, 
and possibly censored, press did not comment on the hazard implicit in trusting 
a group so vital to the nation’s security to the health and judgment of a single 
pilot, however competent.
The fact that Arthur Dean had thought it necessary to submit a crushing 
repudiation of a ‘view’ and ‘suggestion’ that had not been presented is telling. 
Dean and Lowe were rejecting unexpressed ‘pure speculation’ of which they 
had obviously heard. The matter had been hinted at when Pilot Officer James 
Wilson, giving evidence in public on August 28, had been asked about what 
he had seen on the tarmac at Essendon. Dean asked whether Wilson had seen 
the passengers enter the aircraft. He had. ‘Do you know where they were seated 
respectively in the machine?’ ‘No.’ A few moments later one of the assessors, 
Group Captain Wilson (not, as far as can be determined, related to the 38-year-
old former car salesman and private flyer, Pilot Officer Wilson), intervened 
and probed further. He queried why the aircraft might have waited for about 
10 minutes after taxiing into position for take-off. This unusually long period 
27 Air Force Court of Inquiry, Transcript of Proceedings, 29 Aug. 1940, p.103 (NAA: A705, 32/10/2729). 
The Canberra Times (30 Aug. 1940) did not have the victims perishing ‘in the flames’. This was a curious 
discrepancy. If Lowe did use the words attributed to him in the transcript he was perhaps revealing that he 
was unconvinced by the conclusions of Dr Mackellar.
28 Air Force Court of Inquiry No. 1 of 1940, Findings, p.10 (NAA: A705, 32/10/2729).
23 . Mr Storey’s story
539
had not caught the attention of the Service Court but had been the subject 
of speculation at Laverton. Herb Plenty, who had undergone instruction by 
Hitchcock, recalled that when he returned from Sembawang he talked to men 
from No. 2 Squadron whom he had known before leaving: Bob Dalkin, Wilbur 
Wackett, and Phil Howson. Plenty recalled their opinions:
Seven or eight minutes at most is all that was required to check the 
engines, check ignition, set the controls, set the instruments and then 
away you go. But they were there with the engines idling for 20 to 25 
minutes…it seems to indicate, and I would almost bet on it, that Bob 
Hitchcock was explaining to Fairbairn: ‘Now you do it this way, and 
this is that, and so on, and when you line up I’ll watch you, and so on.’29
The discrepancy between Wilson’s contemporary observation of around 10 
minutes and the 20 to 25 minutes of Plenty’s story 60 years later may not be 
significant. Howson, Dalkin, and Wackett were not at Essendon when the 
passengers joined the aircraft. They were talking about what they had heard 
from others, not what they had seen. The important point about the testimony 
of Wilson and the control officer Williams was that the aircraft stood for what 
was thought to be a considerable time, more than normal; and, as they told the 
Court, the delay was not necessitated by heavy traffic. The Court did not explore 
one obvious explanation — that the second pilot, who was thought to be in a 
Hudson cockpit for the first time, was undergoing a briefing on the aircraft.
Pilot Officer Wilson was asked whether he saw any members of the Hudson’s 
crew other than the pilot. He had never actually looked into the aircraft, he said. 
‘As far as you know, did they leave the aircraft?’ Dean asked. Wilson’s response 
was succinct: ‘Not Flying-Officer [sic] Wiesener.’ By implication, he had seen 
the other two. There was no recorded reaction to his next recollection of getting 
the names of the passengers and crew from Hitchcock and then turning and 
walking away from the aircraft and into the control tower.
The examination of Pilot Officer Wilson in public concluded:
You cannot say whether the Minister for Air was sitting next to the 
pilot?
— The only person I saw actually in the plane, through the door, was 
Mr. Elford. I recognised him. He was sitting towards the rear, near the 
door.
And the pilot did not discuss with you prior to taking off anything 
about the flying of the aircraft?
29 Plenty, interview with Geoff Crane, 19 April 2007, courtesy Geoff Crane. Plenty had been flying Hudsons 
operationally for over a year (Herbert C. Plenty, Singapore Slip, Len Books, Canberra, 1990).
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— No.30
Naturally, you would understand or think that he would be the sole 
man in charge?
— Quite.
(The witness then withdrew.)
‘Del’ Wilson was obviously aware, days before Herbert Storey’s letter was 
written, of talk about Fairbairn’s disposition to sit up front with the pilot. Wilson 
asked his question in open court. He pushed for an answer that would justify 
a denial that anyone other than Hitchcock was at the controls. Whether at the 
morgue or the air base, Wilson surely had heard the rumours already loose in 
Canberra. Lowe’s conclusion, published without reference to the question and 
answer from Pilot Officer Wilson, served rather to provoke curiosity than to 
quell it. The question about the Air Minister ‘sitting next to the pilot’ had been 
asked, and reported in the press — albeit buried at the bottom of a column on 
page five of The Argus, under the sub-heading ‘Seating arrangement’ in the 
Sydney Morning Herald, or more directly on page 14 of The Advertiser on August 
29 (where Herbert Storey was likely to have seen it) as ‘Mr. Fairbairn’s Place in 
Plane’.
It was soon obvious that many people simply did not believe the official finding. 
At first within the government, the upper reaches of the public service, and the 
Air Force, and then rippling out by gossip, query, innuendo, and allegation, the 
idea that Jim Fairbairn was somehow responsible for the crash spread rapidly. In 
city clubs and what Bob Menzies had called early in 1940 ‘other congregations 
of tittle-tattlers’ — he had in mind the haunts of a loose-lipped British member 
of the Air Board — the question continued to be asked.31
Spoken in a whisper, or behind a hand, it was rarely alluded to in print, 
never developed thoroughly as a line of inquiry. Four and five decades later, 
it lingered as a rumour, occasionally finding its way into books, to be floated 
lightly into conversation by knowing insiders. For every one who quickly 
cast the notion aside as improbable, if not unbelievable, there was another 
who affirmed that it was plausible. The deceased Jack Palmer’s brothers-in-law 
turned over the idea at family gatherings, never quite sure what to believe.32 A 
handful of contemporaries are known to have been convinced that it was true. 
30 The official transcript differs from some press reports that refer to ‘piloting’ not ‘flying’ the aircraft 
(SMH, The Argus, The Mercury, The Examiner, 29 Aug. 1940). The Canberra Times and Courier-Mail, did not 
mention this part of the evidence. Some reports had the next question beginning: ‘Normally’, not ‘Naturally’.
31 Sir Geoffrey Whiskard (UK High Commissioner to Australia) to Anthony Eden (Secretary of State for the 
Dominions), 1 Jan. 1940, PRO: DO 35/100/1 quoted in Norman Ashworth, How Not To Run An Air Force, vol. 
Two — Documents, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 2000, p.14.
32 John Foley, telephone interview, 25 July 2009.
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Some, like fireman Jim Kearney, even remembered that, at the crash site in the 
days that followed, RAAF personnel on guard duty were saying that ‘Fairbairn 
was driving the plane and that it wasn’t the pilot at all.’ Ambulance officer 
Tom Hynes would tell his family similar stories.33 Most troubled of all by the 
idea was Jim Fairbairn’s own son. Geoffrey Fairbairn, on the History staff at 
The Australian National University, returned again and again to the unresolved 
question of his father’s role in the crash. As one of his students remembered:
Once Geoffrey found out I was a former RAAF pilot, he would frequently 
ask me whether I thought his father might have been flying the Hudson 
when it crashed. Geoffrey’s seminars were often enlivened by several 
glasses of wine, and the more he had the more he’d raise the subject. 
All I could say was that people I knew who’d flown the aircraft told 
me that the Hudson was unforgiving in the approach and landing 
configurations, and so it would seem unlikely that the captain would 
have allowed an uncurrent pilot such as James Fairbairn to have taken 
the controls, especially during an approach in poor weather. That would 
satisfy Geoffrey until the next seminar.34
‘On every possible occasion I’ll practise landings’
For a researcher startled in 1978 by the discovery of the file containing the Storey 
letter the first instinct was to see if Herbert Storey was still alive. After some 
hundreds of letters and telephone calls to track down other witnesses it was 
unexpectedly easy to find him. Sadly, the former headmaster and Supervisor of 
Defence Technical Training was very ill, and his memory fragmentary. But from 
Unit 8, 45 Princes Road, Kingswood, South Australia, he wrote back to me in his 
own hand on 15 May 1978:
Right from the beginning I will give you the name of the pilot associated 
with Mr James Fairbairn. He was Sq. Ldr Walker — familiarly known as 
‘Black Jack’ Walker…
Yes we discussed the Hudsons when I was flying with ‘Black Jack.’ I 
recall asking the pilot ‘What was the terminal velocity of the Hudson?’ 
The pilot said in reply ‘I don’t know. Let’s find out.’ That was enough for 
me! I never thought I would survive.
33 Kearney, interview, 23 July 1977: ‘Shadow of Calamity’, Stateline Canberra, ABC broadcast, 22 June 2007, 
transcript courtesy Geoff Crane.
34 Alan Stephens to CH, (email), 24 April 2009. Ian Hancock, a colleague of Fairbairn’s in the ANU School 
of General Studies history department, had similar memories (email to CH, 12 July 2012). The weather at the 
Canberra aerodrome on 13 August 1940 was not poor.
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I do know that Mr James Fairbairn had spent some time at Mallala with 
‘Black Jack’ Walker.
There was nothing an ailing Mr Storey could add to what he had told the 
Secretary of the Department of Air late in August 1940. What could be done 
independently was to fix the precise context and date of the meeting he had 
described. It was not difficult to establish that the Minister for Air had indeed 
visited the school of technical training in Adelaide. Fairbairn, accompanied by 
a recent addition to the RAAF public relations staff, J. T. Harrison, was on one 
of the last legs of a trip round the country. His beloved Dragonfly had been 
requisitioned by the government (and was subsequently sold on for £2300 to 
Charles Snook of Airlines [W. A.] Pty Ltd as a replacement for the Airlines 
DH84 Dragon that had been impressed by the RAAF).35 So Fairbairn was 
attempting a 7000-mile journey in seven and a half flying days in a Percival Q6 
Petrel acquired by the Civil Aviation Department in July 1939. The former Civil 
Aviation Board had belatedly ordered the British twin-engine monoplane to 
continue the urgent task of flight-testing the network of Lorenz ultra-short wave 
radio beacons after the Kyeema crash. (Dick Casey, discerning the possibility of 
a good deal, had bought a similar machine while the Percival company awaited 
news of the Australian Cabinet’s purchase approval.)36 Comfortably configurable 
for six or seven passengers, the Q6 was also to be available for carrying the 
Air Accidents Investigation Committee to accident scenes, and departmental 
officers for aerodrome inspections. Fairbairn had told Parliament on 6 June 
1939: ‘The aircraft was not purchased for the transport of Ministers.’37 Having 
left Essendon on 21 July 1940 and flown to Sydney, Brisbane, and Darwin, 
Fairbairn’s party had arrived in Adelaide from Perth on Wednesday 31 July 
1940. He inspected the Parafield flying training school before going to Storey’s 
school at East Terrace, concluding his day at the recruiting depot. The Adelaide 
Advertiser reported the Minister’s optimism that he would complete his trip 
within 46 hours, 15 hours ahead of the record set by C. J. Melrose in 1934.
Was it plausible that Fairbairn would have attempted on August 13 to do as 
Herbert Storey said he had foreshadowed he would a fortnight earlier? Had his 
interest been increased recently in Darwin by seeing three Hudsons buzzing 
the town in line abreast to celebrate his visit? Had his travelling companion 
John Harrison told him of things he had learned on July 25 from Harry Purvis, 
the doyen of Hudson instructors, while doing air-to-air photography at angles 
chosen to conceal the absence of rear gun turrets?38
35 Brian H. Hernan, Forgotten Flyer: The Story of Charles William Snook and Other Pioneer Aviators of 
Western Australia, Tangee Publishing, Perth, 2007, p.172; The Advertiser, 9 Aug.1940.
36 Ewer, Wounded Eagle, pp.88–9.
37 Details of the Percival Q6 VH-ABY are at www.airwaysmuseum.com. A similar aircraft of The King’s 
Flight was in use by the C-in-C RAF Bomber Command.
38 John Harrison, ‘The last of the “old Bus” pilots dies’, Courier-Mail, 18 Sept. 1980.
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The Minister for Air switches off the Q6’s motors at the end of his round-
Australia flight
(Courtesy of The Age)
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Perhaps the best source for determining Fairbairn’s thoughts and plans would 
have been the diary which his son affirmed he kept. To Geoffrey Fairbairn’s 
regret, the diary — which he said he had read — was supposedly lost in a fire 
that destroyed the homestead at Mount Elephant in 1956.39
I had asked several contemporaries both before and after coming into possession 
of Storey’s letter what they thought of the rumours about Fairbairn’s involvement 
in the crash. Some extrapolated from first-hand experience. None portrayed the 
man they knew as having a ‘risk-taking nature’.40 Geoffrey Fairbairn had flown 
with his father often enough to be convinced that he was a very cautious pilot. 
He had heard tales of abandoned flights, including three forced landings in bad 
weather on one trip from Mt Elephant to Canberra in 1939.41 Geoffrey himself 
recalled an occasion when, much to his irritation and embarrassment, his father 
turned back only 20 minutes or so from their destination. The 14-year-old, 
eager to get where he hoped to be, could not see why the expected bad weather 
should spoil his plans. Conceivably, he admitted, his father might have taken 
the controls of the Hudson in level flight, but it was most improbable that he 
would have undertaken a dangerous manoeuvre when an aircraft was close to 
landing.42
Murray Tyrrell’s testimony from the perspective of a personal staff member was 
unequivocal:
That Fairbairn was flying it? It’s baloney. It’s absolute baloney. Now I flew 
with Fairbairn not once but repeatedly in at least three different types 
of aircraft…I used to navigate for him in his private aircraft…Fairbairn 
was the most cautious of pilots…And if it was bad weather, and we were 
flying Fairbairn’s private aircraft out of Melbourne to Canberra, Fairbairn 
would just say ‘I’m the best turner-backer in the business.’ And we’d go 
back and come by train or by car or some other way.
Now I’ve known him to take over with the permission of the pilot of 
the other aircraft he and I had flown in but he never took off and never 
landed an aircraft.
Reinforcing these observations, Tyrrell emphasised something else he knew. 
Fairbairn recognised that his injured arm was ‘critical in handling an aircraft, 
and he would no more have attempted to land that Hudson than I would have’. 
Like Fairbairn’s son, Tyrrell was ‘not suggesting he mightn’t have been at the 
controls when it was at 9,000 feet’. 
39 Geoffrey Fairbairn quoted from his father’s diary — presumably from memory — in ‘Personal History’, 
Nation, No. 150, 8 Aug. 1964, p.10. He referred in conversation with me to another diary, purportedly written 
by his father, which he believed to have been fabricated; but he declined to elaborate.
40 Tink, Air Disaster, p.284.
41 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 June 1939.
42 Geoffrey Fairbairn, interview, 8 Nov. 1978.
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Murray Tyrrell, at left, constantly at Fairbairn’s side but never close
(Courtesy of Kirsten McCulloch)
Tyrrell’s insistence that Fairbairn was ‘too sensible, too cautious’, was not the 
evidence of an uncritical admirer. He made no secret of his personal coolness to 
his Minister in 1940.
‘Fairbairn was a very austere detached person. I never got close to him…I 
could never like Fairbairn.’ Tyrrell had been with the Minister on the flight 
to Canberra in A16-97 piloted by Bill Heath a week before the fatal flight. 
Although he didn’t ‘believe for a second’ that Fairbairn ‘was at the controls 
when the Lockheed pranged’, there is a reluctant hint here, but no more, that he 
might have seen his chief changing places with A16-97’s second pilot.43
43 Sir Murray Tyrrell, interview, 5 April 1977; Tyrrell to Lord Casey, 24 Oct. 1972, NAA:  M1129 WHITE/C B.
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Scotty Allan’s memory from his days as a senior pilot with Qantas, and as a 
converted Hudson pilot himself, was clear: ‘Jim Fairbairn was not a professional 
pilot and not up to the standard capable of flying a Lockheed Hudson…’ But 
would he want to see for himself what might happen if the aircraft was put to 
the test? Sir Edwin Hicks, who saw the Minister for Air at close quarters as a 
public servant in the new department, had no doubt. Had he been so minded, 
Fairbairn was a strong enough personality to have insisted on getting his own 
way in the cockpit.44 Scotty Allan said:
I never flew with him acting as pilot but he came into the cockpit of the 
“C” class flying boat — Sydney to Darwin on the route to Singapore, 
where he was interested in methods used for dead reckoning, use of 
varying winds at different heights.
And would he be content just to watch?
No, I don’t think that [he] could have landed a Hudson — that is 
consistently, but yes, he would try stalling a Hudson but not with me, 
possibly with some pilot not able to question the wisdom of such a 
proceeding.45
‘…some pilot not able to question the wisdom 
of such a proceeding’
What troubled many people was less the possibility that the Minister for Air 
might have taken the controls himself than that he might have persuaded 
the pilot to execute some ill-advised manoeuvres. In the circumstances, the 
minimal assessments, ‘adequate’ and ‘competent’ would be read by some as 
a patronisingly coded signal that Hitchcock was the wrong man for the job. 
There were several clues in Hitchcock’s record to what George Jones and others 
uneasily recognised as danger signs. The first might have been the evidence of 
the special consideration that had facilitated his acceptance into the service. ‘If 
enlisted by special authority’, his enlistment form required that the number 
and date of the authority be quoted. For those with permission to see the 
restricted access file the authorisation was clearly visible: ‘AS9139d, 18/6/30’. 
Much more disturbing, had the facts been brought forward, would have been 
the knowledge that less than five years before the fatal crash his flying had 
been deemed so poor, and his confidence so eroded, that his commanders at 
the Richmond station thought he should be separated from the Service. But the 
paper trail had been efficiently hidden.
44 Sir Edwin Hicks, interview, 18 Sept. 1980
45 G. U. Allan to CH, 16 Aug. 1982.
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What remained was as telling by its silences as by what it said. When the 
‘RAAF Annual Confidential Report (Officers)’ was compiled in June 1939, 
Hitchcock’s evaluation by his immediate superiors was uncritical other than 
by the resonance of its muted praise and recommendations. Personally he 
appeared beyond reproach. Was his personal conduct satisfactory? Yes. Were 
his habits temperate? Yes. Did he always set a correct example to juniors? 
Yes. Tact in handling men? Average. What then of his technical knowledge? 
Average. Administrative knowledge? Again average. Power of command, power 
to impart knowledge, general standard of professional knowledge — all average. 
But what of his competence? Here the commander of No. 1 Squadron was 
more appreciative. ‘Above average’ ability on duties now engaged, Squadron 
Leader Paddy Heffernan said. And ‘above average’ in flying duties. Heffernan’s 
‘special remarks’ were warm: ‘A sound & reliable officer, who can be trusted 
to carry out satisfactorily any duty trusted to him. He has shown himself to 
be well balanced in his judgments.’ From the former Chief Flying Instructor at 
No. 1 Flight Training School this was encouraging. Too encouraging thought 
the Group Captain in command at Laverton whose remarks were added after 
Hitchcock had initialled the report. ‘Graded a little high…I consider’, wrote 
Harry Wrigley of the ‘above average’ assessments.46 No one knew better than 
Wrigley the stress Hitchcock had endured in securing his place in the Air Force.
In hindsight, Heffernan’s emphasis was different. In 1978, he wrote of Hitchcock 
as ‘a rather stolid type’:
Although he flew satisfactorily, I never really felt happy with him…He 
certainly was not an over-confident pilot and he may not have been a 
confident pilot. We used to have five pilot gradings, Exceptional, above 
average, average, below average and poor. I would have placed him in 
the below average class.47
There were, in fact, only four gradings. There was no ‘poor’ category, except 
perhaps in the minds of those making the assessments. Heffernan could have 
forgotten his judgment in 1939, or conceivably been persuaded by Wrigley and 
by subsequent events that he had been too generous. Gossip about Hitchcock’s 
competence was certainly rife in the spring of 1940. Formal inquiries might 
distinguish between a man’s ability in general and a singular error in judgment. 
However, the rumour mill soon blurred the distinction. Maybe we were wrong 
to let an ill-qualified man into the service, one old-hand might say. But, after 
all, the Service had been trying to do the right thing by the family. And, if 
an average pilot was responsible for mishandling the aircraft, it could not be 
the fault of the machine itself, or of those who had been charged with testing 
46 NAA: A9300, Hitchcock RE.
47 ACdre P. G. Heffernan to CH, 7 April, 20 July 1978.
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and maintaining it. What was to be gained by speculating on the possibility 
that a flight lieutenant, nervous and overawed, might have tried a dangerous 
manoeuvre to please his Minister?
So much might well have been said. So much was said in messes, clubs, and 
pubs. Among those who had flown with Hitchcock it was not hard to find men 
who could relate tales that cast doubt on their contemporary’s competence. 
The Roman Catholic chaplain Father Morrison heard after the accident ‘doubts 
expressed as to Bob’s ability and the opinion expressed that he was kept on his 
flying course because of sympathy for his father’s death’.48 Forty-seven years 
later, Sir Richard Kingsland could say:
I knew Hitchcock and I was on a training course with him in 1935. 
And when I heard about Hitchcock crashing, this was when I was in 
England…I just turned around and said to my colleagues ‘Hitchcock 
was just an accident waiting to happen.’
Herb Plenty remembered that he had flown twice with Hitchcock on circuits 
around Laverton and:
almost from the minute I entered the aircraft and sat up the front, I had 
the feeling that he was very tentative…he was not fully confident that 
he knew what he was doing. We had a saying in the Air Force in those 
days, the aircraft was flying him, he wasn’t flying the aircraft.
Plenty had been taken up on June 4 and 19 June 1940 by Hitchcock. The second 
occasion was Hitchcock’s twenty-eighth birthday, a fact he might not have 
disclosed to the young pilot officer. Plenty was being instructed on the use of 
flaps in an Anson fitted with dual controls. He later testified that Hitchcock was 
‘very good as an instructor…sympathetic’. As a gifted flyer who in the 1960s 
led the Telstars aerobatic team flying dual Vampires from East Sale, Plenty’s 
assessment has to be taken seriously. But hindsight, coloured by knowledge of 
the events of 13 August 1940 and oft-rehearsed tales in the subsequent decades, 
must be treated with caution.49
So too must be the pejoratively nuanced depiction of events of which there are 
less prejudicial official accounts. Plenty was with Hitchcock, Pilot Officer James 
Sutherland, and another crewman in an Anson on 21 May 1940 when Hitchcock 
had to put the plane down in bad weather on the Melton–Gisborne road near 
Toolern Vale, northwest of Laverton. They were returning from Albury where 
48 Msgnr K. Morrison to CH, 6 June 1983.
49 The testimony of Kingsland and Plenty was broadcast in ‘Shadow of Calamity’, Stateline Canberra, ABC 
TV, 22 June 2007, and is quoted from a DVD of the program provided by the director and writer Geoff Crane. 
For Plenty’s leadership, see Alan Stephens, Going Solo: The Royal Australian Air Force 1946–1971, AGPS Press, 
Canberra, 1995, pp.169–70.
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they had been searching for an Anson missing with four crew. Landing in 
fog at 5.30 p.m. the tailplane and airscrew were damaged as the aircraft ran 
through a fence at the end of a field. Pilot and crew were unhurt.50 In Plenty’s 
colourful version 67 years later, Hitchcock ‘panicked and put the Anson down 
in a paddock, wheels down, ran through a fence, avoided some huge rocks, 
and we walked out of it…not really good judgement, not what they call good 
airmanship’.51 What Plenty did not say was that Hitchcock almost certainly had 
received no night-flying training at No. 1 FTS; he had not been given any dual 
night flying training on the twin-engine Anson; and he had been forced to fly 
too low for the trailing wireless aerial to be used and had therefore received no 
weather reports. Plenty did indeed walk out of the downed aircraft but it is 
curious that his presence is not recorded in the official record of the accident.
The Anson that Hitchcock was flying that day (A4-39) was one of the earliest 
delivered to the RAAF. It had a limited instrument panel and no flaps. With large 
hills close to the northwest blocking such of the setting sunlight as was coming 
through the fog, and with last light due at 5.42 p.m., Hitchcock’s decision to 
put the aircraft down in a paddock was prudent. The fact that he was able to 
fly it back to the base two days later indicates that the damage was minimal. As 
the late Group Captain John McKenzie concluded after a detailed study of the 
incident, including an inspection of the terrain and discussion with someone 
who had been on the scene: ‘Had I been in the situation faced by Hitchcock 
during this flight in foggy conditions at night, with basic instruments and no 
formal night-flying training, I would have done the same as he did.’52
Within the RAAF community there has long been another school of thought 
about Bob Hitchcock’s airmanship. Like McKenzie, a former Staff Officer Air 
Training, not everyone was sure that he was below scratch as a pilot. They were 
unconvinced that the fault on 13 August 1940 was his. For all his reservations 
about Hitchcock’s ability, Herb Plenty did not believe Hitchcock was in 
control of A16-97 when it crashed. The alternative view was well expressed 
by Air Commodore Bruce Courtney, who in 1940 was a flying officer with No. 
10 Squadron in England. He knew Bob Hitchcock slightly and thought there 
was no reason to believe that he was anything other than ‘a competent and 
experienced pilot who should have had no problem with the Hudson’:
50 ‘Preliminary Report (Internal) of Flying Accident or Forced Landing’, 1939/40, 184, NAA: A9845, 74/55; 
Flying Accidents Analysis May 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2478. Hitchcock is not among the aircraft crews 
listed as taking part in the search for Anson A4-4 (NAA: A11094, 241/1/8; 72/1/44).
51 GpCpt. H. C. Plenty, interview with Geoff Crane, 19 April 2007, transcript courtesy Geoff Crane.
52 GpCpt. J. J. McKenzie to Chris Coulthard-Clark, 28 Sept. 1999, made available by Dr Clark. Fifteen days 
after this incident, Judge Piper elicited the admission in open court that only 38 of the RAAF’s 82 Ansons 
were fitted with Sperry blind-flying instrument panels. WCdr Scherger, Director of Training, then revealed 
that after 2300 hours flying he had never flown in fog (Cairns Post, 6 June 1939, The Advertiser, 7 June 1939).
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…the hearsay story (which I believe) was that the aircraft was in the 
hands of Mr Fairbairn at the time of the crash…it is not difficult to 
imagine that an inexperienced pilot could get into a situation where 
recovery by the captain could not be achieved in time…it is a reasonable 
explanation and one which I believe was generally accepted by RAAF 
pilots. But don’t forget that we would want to believe it rather than 
to accept that any of us could make such an elementary mistake of 
airmanship. We were a proud lot!53
53 ACdre E. B. Courtney to CH, 7 April 1978.
551
24. Cockpit secrets
In seeking a path through the conflict of testimony and hypothesis about 
responsibility for the crash, the formal records of Bob Hitchcock’s Service progress 
are an essential resource. We have seen that he was a slow learner during his initial 
training. But what seem to be the most relevant official files do not tell the whole 
story. Whether by accident or deliberate omission, Hitchcock’s personal dossier 
does not contain the evidence that has led some scholars to conclude that a finding 
of pilot error in August 1940 was most likely to have been correct. The truth was 
that the records on Hitchcock’s personal file omitted the decisive moment when 
the Service had considered terminating his flying career. The flying log book 
made available to Justice Lowe had no entries before the beginning of 1938. His 
friend Rex Taylor was to tell others years later that Hitchcock was ‘a frightful pilot 
and he could not even pass his “ab initio” flying test’.1 This was an exaggeration. 
So too was George Jones’s explanation in hindsight:
Hitchcock was the son of Hitchcock who was lost out in the desert 
searching for Kingsford Smith. When he got old enough he applied to 
join the Air Force, but he wasn’t very bright, and he would not have been 
accepted had the selection committee not given a great deal of weight to 
political influence to get him in. But all throughout his training he was 
a doubtful case as to whether he should go on or not…he just made the 
grade and that’s all.2
Was the Hitchcock of August 1940 the same uncertain pilot of 1935 and 1936? 
That was the assumption of Dickie Cohen (later Sir Richard Kingsland), who had 
not seen his fellow cadet for four years before his death. It was the experience that 
the then tyro Herb Plenty said he remembered seven decades later. However, it 
was not what David Campbell heard when he arrived at No. 2 Squadron to take 
Dick Wiesener’s place. Hitchcock, he understood, was ‘a very respected pilot’. 
Deryck Kingwell’s testimony was similar: ‘The entire service was shocked by 
this accident because Bob was not only considered to be a very able pilot but 
one who was always expected to be “cool” under all circumstances.’ Kingwell, 
who had flown with Hitchcock in a Hudson in late July 1940, was then already 
recognised as one of the best young pilots in the Service. He was on track to 
become an outstanding operational battle commander. Thirty-eight years later, 
a distinguished retired Group Captain, he described his former Laverton mess 
mate as having ‘a very conscientious service outlook’. Hitchcock ‘could always 
be relied upon to give of his best at all times. Because of this attribute he was 
an excellent pilot and obviously especially chosen for the particular mission.’3
1 Rev. Bill Gilmour to CH, 9 May 1983, reporting a conversation with Taylor two weeks earlier.
2 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept 1977.
3 David Campbell, telephone interview, 26 May 1978; ACdre D. W. Kingwell to CH, 18 April, 31 May 1978.
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Paddy Heffernan, posted to Sembawang, 5 August 1940
(Courtesy of the RAAF Museum)
Kingwell spoke of what he remembered and what he had known. He was not on 
oath but had no obvious reason to colour the truth. He had not been a witness 
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in the 1940 inquiries. At that time he had not been converted to Hudsons. He 
was not responsible for training Hitchcock, nor did he command him. Others 
who were qualified to offer testimony to successive inquiries were not asked to 
do so. Some, like Paddy Heffernan, were too far away. Heffernan had arrived 
in Sembawang near Singapore on August 9. No. 1 Squadron was already there. 
And the ground personnel of No. 8 Squadron and No. 21 Squadron had left 
Melbourne in the liner Strathallan on the day of the crash.
Heffernan’s absence was unfortunate.4 He was one of the RAAF’s most experienced 
and versatile flyers, having undergone a test pilot’s course in England and flown 
10 different types in a month. He had converted to Hudsons under Alec Barlow, 
who had taught him that the aircraft could ‘bite’.5 His written appreciation of 
Hitchcock’s ability in 1939 had been considered generous by Harry Wrigley, 
but he was uniquely qualified to advise on the credibility of the speculations 
about Hitchcock and Fairbairn. He had been closely associated with both of 
them.
In correspondence 38 years later, Heffernan reviewed what he knew about the 
two men. Hitchcock he said was ‘a rather stolid type’. His first thought was that 
the Hudson’s ‘flicking characteristic’, which he believed to be the most likely 
cause of the accident, might have caught Hitchcock unawares. But there was 
more to it than that. His experience with Fairbairn in 1939 was directly relevant:
I knew Fairbairn well and flew with him when I was instructing him on 
the N.A.16, which was a smaller version of the Wirraway and we used 
it as a general hack machine for the purpose of keeping in practice on 
single engine planes. Fairbairn was a good average pilot, but because of 
the handicap of his useless left arm, I would not let him go solo on the 
N.A.16 for the following reason, the flaps were wound up and down 
manually and the control was on the left hand side, the same side as the 
throttle. On coming into land, the hand was removed from the throttle 
and placed on the flap control and the flaps then wound down. In the 
event of a bad landing, the engine was given full power and then the 
flaps were wound up. In Fairbairn’s case, he had to let go the control 
column with his right hand and then transfer it to the throttle and then 
to the flaps and in the meantime to hold the control column between 
his knees. In an emergency, events happened far too quickly for him to 
4 RAAF records indicate that Heffernan was in Singapore. For the departures of No. 8 and No. 21 Squadrons 
see NAA: A1196, 36/501/111 and Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939–1942, p.142. But the Canberra 
Fire Brigade daily-occurrence register for Aug. 13 notes ‘further information may be obtained from Wing 
Commander Heffernan of R.A.A.F.’
5 Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book One, p.296.
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do all this with safety, so I refused to send him solo. His private aircraft 
which he flew solo, did not have flaps, consequently there was no need 
for his right hand to be flashing round the cockpit.6
It is noticeable that Heffernan said it was the left hand, minus two fingers, that 
was useless. He might have added that it was Fairbairn’s right arm, ‘permanently 
bent by an explosive bullet’, that had limited mobility. As readers of the 
Warrnambool Standard had learned from an article their local state Legislative 
Assembly member wrote about a visit to Mussolini’s Rome in 1933, he had 
been embarrassed at being able only to ‘wave his right arm ineffectively’ when 
attempting to return Fascist salutes.7 The implication of Heffernan’s story was 
unmistakeable. Whether he might have wanted to or not, and assuming he 
understood the controls, Fairbairn would have had great difficulty in effectively 
controlling a Hudson in anything other than level flight. The later experience 
of David Campbell in the operation over Rabaul that brought him his DFC 
illustrates what could happen in a Hudson cockpit when the first pilot could 
not use his left hand. Shot through the left wrist and minus his little finger, 
Campbell brought the bullet-riddled A16-130 into land with his right hand on 
the stick and his only unwounded crew member handling the throttle and flaps.8
Would Fairbairn have wanted to try what he could do with his diminished 
personal capability? Much as he might have wished to feel for himself the 
temperament of the Hudson, a responsible Minister would be most unlikely to 
put colleagues, friends, and crew at risk.9 This is not to say that such behaviour 
is inconceivable. As the RAF Dambuster leader, Guy Gibson, testified about the 
British Air Minister Sir Archibald Sinclair, flying in 1943 as a passenger with 
some senior RAF officers when Gibson had a new flight engineer:
…the Air Minister jabbed a finger in my back and told me to feather an 
engine. This was done and he seemed very pleased. Then we feathered 
another one and he seemed even more pleased.
After we had flown along like this for a few minutes, one of the brass 
hats came forward and told me to unfeather as they were in a hurry. 
I gave the order, casually, to the Flight-Engineer. Suddenly, to the 
horror of both myself and the man with goggles on, looking over my 
6 ACdre P. G. Heffernan to CH, 7, 21 April 1978.
7 J. V. Fairbairn, ‘Impressions of a Short Visit to Rome’, reproduced from The Standard, 19 April 1933, copy 
courtesy Mary Browne.
8 Leslie Jillett, Moresby’s Few: Being an Account of the Activities of No. 32 Squadron in New Guinea, North 
Western Courier Publishers, Narrabri, 1945, p.38; David Campbell, Flame and Shadow, UQP, St Lucia, 1976, 
pp.169–77.
9 Andrew Tink’s ‘opinion’ (Air Disaster, p.175) is that ‘Fairbairn had taken control of the Hudson, as he had 
earlier told Storey he would do, intending to land the plane’; and ‘he determined to land the Hudson’ (p.284).
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shoulder, the two other engines began to feather themselves. Our new 
Flight-Engineer had pressed the wrong buttons. It was all right, though, 
because it didn’t take a second to get all four going again.10
If Fairbairn had asked to be allowed to sit in the cockpit, what would Hitchcock’s 
response have been? Heffernan’s considered conclusion was that Fairbairn 
‘could have badgered a more junior and therefore more rank conscious pilot 
into letting him have a go at the controls’. He had in fact ‘heard from other pilots 
that he often asked them to allow him to take over the controls’. What would 
Hitchcock have done? He might, Heffernan thought, have allowed Fairbairn to 
sit in the second pilot’s seat:
I cannot imagine any pilot in his right mind allowing an inexperienced 
pilot to attempt a landing on a strange aircraft, whilst flying in the second 
pilot’s seat…Hitchcock could have been placed in an awkward position 
if Fairbairn had asked him to allow him to take over the controls. He 
could have been placed in a very tough dilemma. If he said ‘No’ would 
he offend a senior Minister, or if he said ‘Yes’, what latitude would he 
have given Fairbairn, i.e. would he allow him to fly only in level flight 
or would he allow him to attempt a landing, knowing that Fairbairn was 
a reasonably experienced pilot?
Heffernan expressed no doubt about what he would have done himself. It 
would have been ‘Yes’ to level flight, ‘No’ to landing. ‘With the throttle controls 
between the two pilots, Fairbairn would have had to take his right hand off the 
control column to operate the throttles.’11 Hitchcock though ‘could have been 
somewhat over-awed by the importance of Fairbairn’s position and allowed his 
better judgment to be impaired by this thought.’ What was more likely was that 
Fairbairn’s very presence in the cockpit could have been distracting.
Heffernan was not alone in pondering the same question. Sir George Jones had 
not known Hitchcock but he too thought that Hitchcock, indeed any relatively 
junior officer, was likely to have ‘given way to the Minister’.12 Jones, who 
had himself started in the Service in the ranks, was perhaps projecting on to 
Hitchcock his own struggle for acceptance in a socially unfamiliar environment. 
Sir Richard Kingsland, an exact contemporary of Hitchcock and certainly not a 
socially inept young officer, is also on record:
Would Hitchcock have allowed Fairbairn to have a go? Oh, you do as 
you’re told! If you have the Minister for Air sitting by you, a pilot of 
10 Guy Gibson, Enemy Coast Ahead — Uncensored: The Real Guy Gibson, Crécy Publishing, Manchester, 
2003, p.172.
11 Heffernan to CH, 21 April 1978.
12 AM Sir George Jones, interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
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infinitely greater experience than Hitchcock…If he said to me when I 
was in command of the aircraft ‘look, would you let me do this approach 
and landing?’ I’d say ‘Yes sir,’ because he was a very experienced pilot. 
Been flying his own aircraft around Australia for a long time. A World 
War One Pilot…you wouldn’t dare…13
Kingsland of course had not known Fairbairn and had not seen his physical 
limitations. Nor had he observed anything of Hitchcock’s flying after their early 
training together. Sir George Pape was another who had no first-hand knowledge 
of Fairbairn and did not know Hitchcock. But reflecting 37 years after the two 
Inquiries in which he had played a leading role he concluded:
I simply cannot believe that Hitchcock would have allowed anybody to 
bring this aircraft into land, even assuming that Fairbairn pulled a bit of 
rank on him on the way up and said ‘Do you mind if I take it for a few 
minutes?’ I cannot imagine that when they got into the vicinity of Canberra 
he just didn’t say ‘Now look sir, buzz off and get back to your seat.’14
All of those who thought about responsibility for the crash were troubled by 
the uncertainty and doubts created by the various alternative conclusions. 
There was no unanimity on the vital questions. But a detached observer could 
hardly fail to notice that those who were inclined to believe that Hitchcock 
might have let the Minister take the controls were by implication saying that it 
was not their former comrade’s flying ability that led to the deaths.
In plain sight
If Herbert Storey’s letter, quickly ‘put away’, filed where it was unlikely to 
surface, was not the basis of the disturbing idea that Fairbairn might somehow 
have been responsible for the crash, there were two other possibilities. 
Fairbairn’s concern to know about the Hudson’s stalling behaviour could have 
been discussed with other pilots or political colleagues. It is known that the Air 
Minister had flown to Canberra with Flying Officer Bill Heath in A16-97 a week 
before the fatal flight. He had flown in Hudsons at least twice in June.15 But his 
flight with Heath was the first opportunity Fairbairn had after his conversation 
with Herbert Storey to find out for himself how the Hudson would behave. If 
he meant what Storey reported him as saying — and the Adelaide headmaster 
seems to have thought he was listening to more than just idle musings — he 
might well have tried something while flying with Heath. Knowing that he 
13 Kingsland, interview, 3 April 2007, courtesy Geoff Crane.
14 Sir George Pape with ACdre L. V. Lachal, interview, 14 Sept. 1977.
15 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 June 1940.
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might be making a number of flights in the coming weeks, he could have used 
this first one simply to watch and learn. As the accompanying second pilot 
under instruction was the 6'3" Pilot Officer Keith Eddison, there would have 
been little room for manoeuvre in the cockpit. If Fairbairn had asked Heath to 
do anything unusual, no record of his doing so has come to light. No evidence 
of any relevant discussions has emerged. There is not the slightest hint in any of 
the Inquiry records that anyone thought it might be worthwhile to press Heath 
for information about his flight with the Minister.
On the contrary. It seems that when Heath was called to give evidence before 
Justice Lowe his experience with Fairbairn was skated over, in spite of a prompt 
from his squadron commander moments earlier. Freddie Thomas, testifying as 
Hitchcock’s commanding officer, had been asked if he could name any officers 
who had flown A16-97. ‘Flying Officer Heath, at present in Court, had flown it 
on the previous occasion.’ When was this? What was the trip? Seemingly rattled 
by Dean’s questions, Thomas is reported as saying: ‘He carried out a trip of a 
very similar nature. On the 13th [sic] of the Eighth he had taken the Minister for 
Air and other passengers from Essendon to Canberra and returned.’ 
As soon as Thomas had finished his testimony, Heath was sworn and examined. 
Questioned for just four minutes, Heath spoke of ‘five passengers’ on his flight 
to Canberra in A16-97 but he did not say that the Air Minister had been one of 
them. Nor did he name his other passengers, including Sir Harry Gullett, Murray 
Tyrrell, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, Frank Green. Both Lowe 
and Dean seemed satisfied simply to learn that Heath had noticed nothing 
abnormal about the machine; that in Dean’s words it ‘behaved properly’. Heath 
did not mention that he had also taken A16-97 up the day before his Canberra 
trip to test its compass and radio. There had been three other junior pilots and 
two airmen with him on a flight that lasted two hours and 20 minutes. In later 
years, his sons remember, he would be troubled by the possibility that he had 
failed to notice something about the aircraft that should have been attended to, 
something that might have contributed to the fatal crash a week later.16
George Pape, understanding full well that his brief was to restrict the ambit 
of the Inquiry rather than widen it, had no questions for Heath. Perhaps Pape 
had been quietly warned that Heath’s discretion could not be relied upon.17 
Even if they had not seen Herbert Storey’s letter, in a hearing two weeks after 
the crash it is hard to believe that the rumours about Fairbairn being alongside 
16 W. P. Heath, Flying Log Book, 4, 5 Aug. 1940; Hon. Tony Street, interview, 8 Dec 2009; Daryl Heath, 
telephone interview, 15 Feb. 2010. After the war Heath would farm on a soldier-settlement block a few miles 
from the Streets’ property at Lismore where his older son Willy and Tony Street would become friends.
17 A confidential report by ‘Moth’ Eaton in 1945 graded Heath as a ‘plodder’ on mental alertness, ‘slow to 
appreciate subtle points’. The subjective and idiosyncratic nature of these reports needs to be remembered 
(NAA: A9300, HEATH WP).
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Hitchcock had not reached Lowe, Dean, or Pape. If anything was likely to deter 
them from asking about what happened on Heath’s flight it was surely the high 
degree of probability that the Air Minister’s curiosity would have led him into 
the cockpit; and, once there, to have brought him into conversation with the 
seasoned flying officer at the controls. In his report Lowe referred to Heath’s 
mention of ‘five passengers’. But there was no allusion to Squadron Leader 
Thomas’s revelation, during his testimony in camera, that Fairbairn was one of 
the five. The Minister’s presence in a Hudson a week before the fatal crash was 
to be quietly overlooked.18
Valuable as evidence of Fairbairn’s behaviour on his penultimate Hudson flight 
might have been, more telling would have been the discovery at the crash site 
of his body in a place where no passenger could be expected to be. Here we 
encounter a conspicuous lack of official interest in pursuing the inevitably 
distressing facts. ‘Del’ Wilson alone asked direct questions, almost casually, and 
only to Pilot Officer Winter:
Have you any remarks to make about the position of the bodies?…From 
the outside of the aircraft only four bodies were visible in the back of the 
machine; the others were bunched up together and covered with debris.19
I am more concerned with those close to the Pilot. You could not give any 
information about that?…No; there were a number of bodies together.
After Winter, Flying Officer Ronald Wilson was called and examined briefly. 
Wilson explained that when he arrived at the scene the fuselage had ‘practically 
finished burning’. Unsolicited, he added, ‘I saw one body quite clear where the 
door of the machine would have been.’ Arthur Dean, who had just established 
that Winter had observed nothing extraordinary when he saw the aircraft in 
the air, now seized the opportunity to ask if Wilson had seen where the bodies 
were. He had seen four immediately: in addition to the one where the door 
would have been, two were about six feet ‘in front’, and another fell out after 
a ‘mild explosion’.20 ‘You could not identify any of the bodies?’ ‘No I went to 
the body by the door but could not recognise it.’ Lowe wanted to know what 
Wilson had meant by ‘in front’; did he mean inside the fuselage? No, they were 
a foot or so outside. Wilson was not asked about the remaining bodies whose 
location he had marked in a sketch for the Coroner. Flight Sergeant Smith’s story 
differed suggestively. He spoke of seven bodies ‘in the nose of the machine’, but 
18 ‘Air Force Court of Inquiry…Findings and Transcript of Evidence’, 27 Aug. 1940, pp.9, 16, NAA: A705, 
32/10/2729.
19 Winter had told the Service Court he ‘could see about four or five bodies on the portside of the aircraft’ 
(NAA: A705, 32/10/2733).
20 Wilson had signed a statement for the Coroner on Aug. 26 which was originally typed as: ‘I didn’t see any 
people or bodies there.’ He then inserted and initialled changes so that it read: ‘I did see four people or bodies 
there.’ Coroner’s Court Inquest Papers, now at NAA: A6079, MO 625.
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quickly added that they were ‘not in a heap, but spread over the…full fuselage 
of the machine’. Again, the crucial question was asked in the negative: ‘You 
could not identify any of the bodies?’ ‘No. There were three near the tail and 
the other seven were forward.’
The RAAF assessors showed no inclination to extract more information from the 
Service witnesses or to reconcile what were obviously discrepant observations. 
Nor did they collate what the Air Force personnel recalled with the unmistakeable 
and more precise clue that had been in plain sight for two weeks. Fire station 
chief Bill Maloney, among the first at the scene, had told Senior Constable 
Brodribb the day after the crash that all 10 bodies were ‘packed forward’.21 
This was not strictly true, as Crosdale had been found in the rear. But, more 
significantly, Maloney testified for the Coroner that there were three bodies in 
the cockpit. No one questioned this very specific observation. Hitchcock and 
Wiesener should certainly have been in the cockpit. The unasked questions 
were: who was the third? And was it possible to say with any degree of certainty 
where he had been? 
That Maloney’s observations did not prompt further questions is all the more 
remarkable in view of a report that had appeared in the Daily Telegraph on 
August 14. Ten minutes after six bodies had been removed from the wreckage, 
‘the other four bodies were seen in the forward part of the machine. They were 
the bodies of the air crew.’ Only in one case were the features recognisable, the 
Telegraph reporter said. It was later established that one member of the crew, 
Charlie Crosdale, had been at the rear of the aircraft and was most likely to 
have been the person who released the door and tried to escape at the moment 
of impact. Palmer, the radio operator, would have been expected to be in his 
cubicle directly behind the two pilots. His identity disk was found among the 
ashes. But who was the fourth man in ‘the forward part of the machine’?
None of the firemen had been questioned either by Murphy and Winneke 
or by Lachal and his team. Strictly speaking, there was no reason to suppose 
that Maloney, Kearney, or their colleagues could contribute anything to an 
understanding of the causes of the crash. But even the possibility that there 
could have been a person other than the two pilots in the front of the aircraft 
ought to have sounded alarm bells. The Director-General of Civil Aviation had 
subtly signalled this in a teleprinter message to the Secretary of the Attorney-
General’s Department on August 23. Arthur Corbett had been responding to a 
telephone call to the Minister’s private secretary by Major H. E. Jones, ‘the chief 
investigation officer’ of the Commonwealth police. The information, ‘furnished 
for inquest purposes’, consisted substantially of the procedure required of 
commercial aircraft pilots when taking off and landing. Brief details of the 
21 NAA: A1378, 4/174.
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actual events at Essendon and A16-97’s flight and approach to Canberra were 
provided. For no declared reason, possibly in response to an unwritten question 
from Jones, Corbett also inserted this sentence: ‘No passenger is allowed to enter 
the cockpit of a civil aircraft in flight.’22 This was territory under-explored by 
the Coroner and the Air Force investigation and Inquiry.
For his part, Justice Lowe quickly appeared satisfied that only those who should 
have been in the cockpit were there when the aircraft left Essendon. ‘Del Wilson’ 
had put a leading question to the Laverton duty pilot: ‘You cannot say whether 
the Minister for Air was sitting next to the pilot?’ Pilot Officer J. B. Wilson 
did not reply directly. The only person he had actually seen in the plane, he 
said, was Dick Elford, seated towards the rear, near the door.23 That being the 
case there was no requirement that evidence be led to the court concerning 
relevant Air Force regulations or practice. Confining themselves to the narrowly 
defined suggestion that someone other than the pilot might have been in control 
of the aircraft, both Arthur Dean and Charles Lowe ignored what might have 
been thought of as the ‘lesser charges’. Yet, if Maloney was correct in reporting 
the finding of three bodies in the nose, there were implications that should 
have prompted questions. The incuriousness of Lowe and Dean is all the more 
difficult to excuse given that the morning newspapers on August 27 reported 
Maloney’s statement to the Coroner the previous day that ‘three were in the 
nose of the plane’.24 At least some of the readers of the Canberra Times, and 
other newspapers which reported Maloney’s testimony, must have known that 
there should only have been two men in the cockpit.
If there were three bodies in the nose of the crashed aircraft, whose were they? 
Those who went to the crash and removed the bodies were unanimous in saying 
that it was impossible to identify any of those they brought out of the wreckage. 
Flying Officer Wilson, who claimed to be the first person on the scene, told 
Police Sergeant Ivan Perriman the next day that when he arrived he saw four 
bodies ‘even then not recognisable’. He went on to say ‘Each body, as it was 
removed from the wreckage, was scrutinised by me, but not one was in any 
way recognisable.’ In his own words, rather than the police sergeant’s stilted 
paraphrase, Wilson told Justice Lowe that he had seen four bodies immediately 
he arrived but could not identify any of them. ‘I went to the body by the door 
but could not recognise it.’ Flight Sergeant Clifford Smith stated that, when he 
reached the scene at the same time as the ambulance, the fire was burning from 
near the cockpit ‘from fittings and personal effects’. It was too hot to approach. 
22 NAA: A6079, MO625. Although Commonwealth authority over civil aviation had been rejected in a 1937 
referendum, a combination of regulations resting on external affairs and trade clauses of the constitution, 
international conventions, unfettered power in the territories, and complementary legislation by the states 
had provided an effective national regime by 1938.
23 Lowe Inquiry transcript, p.43. NAA: A705, 32/10/2729.
24 Canberra Times, 27 Aug. 1940.
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He saw three bodies, one near the safety door and two towards the port wing 
where the fuselage was burnt. All were ‘burnt beyond recognition’. A fortnight 
later Smith was questioned by Arthur Dean before Justice Lowe:
In what part of the ’plane were the bodies lying? — One was lying near 
the exit door at the rear. I cannot say whether it was inside or outside. It 
could possibly have rolled out afterwards. There were two more bodies 
about a yard forward and the rest were in the nose of the machine.
Were they all mixed up with the remains of the machine? — They were 
not in a heap, but spread over the position of the full fuselage of the machine.
Smith could not identify any of the bodies — the three he said were near the tail 
or the other seven forward.25
None of those who were engaged in fighting the flames and retrieving the bodies 
either knew the occupants or suspected that it might be important to determine 
who was where at the time they perished. Their accounts of where the bodies 
were found are replete with inconsistency. Was there anyone else at the scene who 
could have recognised Jim Fairbairn? As we have seen, the Canberra Times and 
some other papers had reported that three ministers — Vic Thorby, Fred Stewart, 
and Percy Spender — had gone out to Duncan Cameron’s farm and seen bodies 
being retrieved from ‘the head’ of the plane. If any of them had seen something 
that could not prudently be revealed, there would be good reason for them all to 
say nothing that could prompt further questions. As it turned out, they were not 
called to testify by the Coroner, the RAAF inquiries, or Justice Lowe. Maybe they 
had said that the newspaper story was wrong. But, if any one of them had noticed 
that three bodies were retrieved from the front of the wreckage, or seen anything 
to suggest that one of the last bodies to emerge was their colleague Fairbairn, 
they would be in no rush to broadcast their observations. They might have had 
nothing to offer to investigators. Whatever they knew or suspected, if they said 
anything at all, it was unlikely to have remained a secret for long.
Two final clues may be considered. First, there was a barely explicable flaw in 
the reasoning behind Group Captain Wilson’s identifications of the bodies of 
the two pilots he was shown at the morgue. Theirs were the last two bodies 
to be identified. And he distinguished them on the basis that one was clearly 
older than the other, believing erroneously that Hitchcock was 10 years older 
than Wiesener rather than 18 months younger. The one feature that would have 
truly distinguished the two was the great difference in their height. Wiesener 
was nearly seven inches taller than Hitchcock. The question arises therefore: 
was Wilson actually looking at what remained of the bodies of Hitchcock and 
Wiesener? Or is it possible that there was confusion between Hitchcock and 
25 NAA: A1378, 4/170, 166; A705, 32/10/2729.
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Fairbairn? We know that one body had already been identified as Fairbairn’s by 
Dr Mackellar and Percy Hayter. However, there was a discrepancy between the 
versions provided by the two men. Hayter, who of course knew what to look 
for, said that he identified Fairbairn ‘because I was informed by the Medical 
Officer that this particular body showed injuries of long standing to each arm 
and, in particular, to the right arm’. Mackellar’s statement was different. The 
body he had determined to be Fairbairn’s was, he said, larger than Street’s and 
there was evidence of a war wound in the left shoulder. In fact, at five feet 
ten inches, Street was as tall as Fairbairn though he carried less weight. And 
Fairbairn’s war wound was not in the left shoulder.
From these various inconsistencies an alternative picture emerges. If Hayter did 
not in fact see all the bodies — and his testimony indicates that he mainly 
responded to what Mackellar was telling him — his later description was not an 
eye-witness report but, rather, a statement of what he knew would be accepted 
as unique identifying marks. In the hurry to complete a horribly confronting 
task, could Mackellar have incorrectly labelled some of the remains? Wilson 
understood that he was being asked to distinguish between two pilots, one of 
whom he would say appeared to be significantly older than the other. In the 
absence of any portions of uniform with insignia of rank it is understandable that 
he might conclude that an older one was a man he knew to be the more senior 
flight lieutenant. But it is at least possible that a plainly older body — if indeed 
there was anything to suggest the age of the bodies — was that of Fairbairn 
lying next to Wiesener. If the remains of the three bodies recovered at the same 
time from the front of the plane were brought together to the morgue and placed 
there side by side there was evidently potential for confusion. Neither Hayter 
nor Wilson knew either of the pilots. Wilson might have recognised Fairbairn but 
he thought that the ministers had been dealt with earlier. Mackellar, told to look 
for evidence of wartime injury, was vague about what he found. His reference 
to evidence of a war wound in the left shoulder could not be a description of 
Fairbairn’s shattered right elbow. Whatever he saw, his description is strikingly 
inconsistent with Hayter’s knowledgeable description of what the doctor should 
have seen.26 What is undeniable is that several of the identifications reported to 
the Coroner can only have been, at best, conjectural.27
26 Mackellar signed a statement referring to a war wound in the left shoulder; but in a typed copy in 
the Commonwealth Police files ‘left’ is struck out and replaced by ‘right’ (NAA: A1378, P8903). Tink (Air 
Disaster, pp.190, 214), notes that ‘there was no attempt to question’ Inquest witnesses who had seen bodies 
in the wreckage about whether either of the two bodies marked in the cockpit area in Flying Officer Wilson’s 
drawing had ‘an injury to its right arm’. ‘With Fairbairn’s disabled right arm an obvious identifier, it would 
have soon been obvious whether or not his body was one of those in the cockpit’ (Tink, p.195). Fireman Jim 
Kearney recalled: ‘I don’t think any of them had an arm or a leg left’ (interview, 23 July 1977).
27 Speaking to an ABC television reporter at the air disaster memorial site on 13 Aug. 2013 Andrew 
Tink said that he had not noticed Wilson’s error about the ages of the two pilots until it was brought to his 
attention after the publication of his book. He said the evidence is definitive that mistakes were made in 
the identification process and concluded that the body identified as Hitchcock’s was actually Fairbairn’s. 
He restated this view for a forum at Questacon in Canberra on 14 Aug. 2013 hosted by the ACT Australian 
Science Communicators and the Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society (http://www.abc.net.
au/news/2013-08-16/new-questions-raised-over-canberra-air-disaster/4893354?&section=news).
24 . Cockpit secrets
563
To add further doubt, there is the recollection of John Harrison, Fairbairn’s 
companion in the flight around Australia in July 1940. Interviewed by the RAAF 
historian Chris Coulthard-Clark 50 years later, Harrison is said to have recalled: 
‘hearing afterwards on 3 or 4 occasions that when police got into the Hudson’s 
wreckage…they found the skeleton of a big man in the pilot’s seat’. Harrison 
went on to say that Fairbairn was ‘a big beefy man of 15–16 stone, like the average 
police constable’. There are several troubling elements here. Police were present 
when some bodies were removed from the wreckage but they did not get ‘into’ 
it. Fairbairn in 1940 was no longer an athletic sportsman but contemporary 
photographs and film do not make him appear as heavy as Harrison suggested. 
Harrison admitted that he could not remember when he heard the stories — he 
was not protecting sources, ‘just repeating hearsay current at the time’.28 If the 
questionable elaborated detail of the hearsay is discounted, we are left with one 
challengingly improbable thought: that Fairbairn might not only have been in 
the cockpit but actually sitting in Hitchcock’s seat.
The balance of probabilities
What can properly be concluded from the surviving evidence? After weighing 
what is known with what can be inferred and deduced it is possible to reach 
a view that is at least consistent with the incontrovertible facts. When A16-97 
was on its final approach to Canberra aerodrome the captain of the aircraft, 
Bob Hitchcock, would have been in the pilot’s seat on the left of the cockpit. 
Notwithstanding Harrison’s hearsay it is scarcely conceivable that, with the lives 
of six important passengers in his hands, Hitchcock would have surrendered his 
seat to Fairbairn or that Fairbairn would have been foolhardy enough to displace 
him. In the normal course, Dick Wiesener would have been in the second-
pilot’s seat alongside Hitchcock. Wiesener was taken on the flight in order to 
familiarise himself with the Hudson; and the appropriate place from which to 
do that was next to the man in command. In the previous week Hitchcock had 
gone up in A16-9 with Ryland as first pilot to learn about right-hand-seat flying. 
The next day, August 8, he had himself instructed several junior members of the 
squadron on instrument take-offs and right-hand-seat flying. The potential use 
of the dual controls was fresh in his mind.
28 ‘Interview with Mr. J. Harrison of 12 Rapanea Street, Rivett ACT…23 Aug. 1990’, (notes by Chris 
Coulthard-Clark, copy from Defence Dept via Ms Selma McLaren and Bronwyn and John Myrtle).
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Inside a No. 2 Squadron Hudson cockpit with dual controls
(Courtesy of Murry Lawson via David Vincent)
If Fairbairn were minded to see for himself what happened under certain 
conditions he might have asked to change places with Wiesener. Or it could 
have been suggested that Wiesener move forward into the glazed nose of the 
aircraft. Designed as the navigator or bomb-aimer’s station, the glass house in 
the nose was ‘a wonderful grandstand’. It offered, as a British journalist who 
flew on an operation with Coastal Command the following year described it, a 
‘clear view in all directions except behind’.29 If Wiesener had clambered into 
the nose before the take-off from Essendon, it would have been impossible 
for him to return to the second pilot’s seat. The companion way would have 
been obstructed by the dual control; and the second seat would have had to 
be dismantled. That such a possibility was in the minds of Charles Lowe and 
Arthur Dean may be inferred from a very carefully worded sentence in the 
Inquiry Report’s narrative of events. Immediately following the point at which 
the ‘unusual’ delayed take-off from Essendon is described, it was noted that no 
explanation had been given although ‘several suggestions therefore were made’. 
Two suggestions are mentioned: that the port engine had taken some time to 
start, possibly because the mixture was ‘a little rich’; and that the pilot was ‘not 
quite ready to go’ and signalled some Moth aircraft on the ground to take off. 
29 Bernard Gray, War Reporter, Robert Hale, London, 1942, p.178.
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Then, it will be recalled, a new paragraph concludes the section: ‘No one was 
seen to get out of or enter the aircraft during this delay and eventually the plane 
made a perfect take off and headed towards Canberra.’30
‘Del’ Wilson had in fact put it to Assistant Control Officer J. J. Williams: ‘Nobody 
got out of the aircraft there?’ The response was carefully qualified: ‘No, nobody 
that I could see.’31 There is no evidence that any further effort was devoted to 
seeking testimony from the many scores of men who might have been able to 
see the aircraft while it was idling at the eastern boundary of the aerodrome.32 
But the 10 minutes spent warming the engines out of the wind, and four or 
five further minutes stationary after turning into the wind, could easily have 
been thought to be just the amount of time necessary for Wiesener to squeeze 
past the rudder pedals into the nose. Or to get out of the aircraft via the safety 
door and then, the aircraft having turned around and concealing him, climb 
up through the bomb-aimer’s window. The window could be partially opened 
and provided an emergency way out via parachute. A tiny pencilled note in the 
margin of a minute sheet in the headquarters file on the Air Court of Inquiry 
shows that the question was being asked: ‘¼ hr delay at Essnd Wiesener’.33
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the otherwise unexplained delay makes 
sense best in the context of Fairbairn’s expressed intention to Herbert Storey. 
The Minister wanted to see for himself; but he and Hitchcock did not need to 
be told that others might frown on an unauthorised presence in the cockpit. 
Hitchcock had been practising flying from the second seat. If John Harrison is 
to be believed, it would have been the right-hand seat where Fairbairn would 
have chosen to be. In his testimony in 1990 Harrison recalled the Minister’s 
insistence in their round-Australia flight on piloting from the right-hand seat 
of the Q6. ‘This was because Fairbairn liked to have the machine’s throttles on 
his left.’ The partially incapacitated flyer required Harrison to navigate from the 
pilot’s seat.
If Fairbairn was sitting in the right-hand seat next to Hitchcock as they 
approached Canberra, it is possible to construct a plausible scenario that 
explains an otherwise unlikely lapse of airmanship. It is instructive here to 
bear in mind the cockpit configuration as described by wartime Hudson pilot 
Andrew Hendrie:
30 ‘Lockheed Hudson A16 Accidents Part 6 [Air Force Court of Inquiry — Lockheed Hudson A16-97 crash 
on 13th August 1940] — Master Copy [Volume 1]’, NAA: A9845, 318 pp.5–6.
31 NAA: A705, 32/10/2729:The Advertiser, 29 Aug. 1940, reported Wilson’s words not as a statement to 
which assent was sought but as a question: ‘Did anybody get out of the plane?’ to which the answer was ‘No’.
32 P/O Wilson mentioned two possible eye-witnesses: P/O Shiel and ‘an Instructor’ (NAA: A705, 32/10/2733).
33 John White (AWM) to CH, (email), 25 Aug. 1910; NAA: A705, 32/10/2733. In ‘Overnight’ with Trevor 
Chappell, ABC Local Radio, 8 May 2013, Tink said that Hitchcock told Wiesener to go and sit in the main cabin.
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There was room below the cockpit instruments on the starboard 
side for the navigator to pass down into the nose of the aircraft. The 
location of vital controls such as those for flaps, undercarriage and fuel 
tank transfer, enabled them to be reached by the navigator or wireless 
operator if necessary.34
We have seen Heffernan’s observation about the positioning of the throttles. On 
a pedestal between the two pilot’s seats there were normally three cranks: one 
trim for the ailerons, one for the rudder, and the one nearest to the pilot for the 
elevator. With dual controls fitted, there were double sets of rudder pedals and 
two control columns. At a critical moment, if an adjustment was necessary to 
the trim of the aircraft, Fairbairn would not have had the knowledge, skill, or 
possibly even the strength, to do what was required. It was only six weeks since 
there had been a relevant discussion at Air Force HQ following the fatal crash 
of Flight Lieutenant Jim Hamilton in A16-58. The air cadet who had died with 
Hamilton had been there, not as a second pilot but as an ‘assistant…to operate 
auxiliary gear by hand should the emergency have arisen’. Wing Commander 
Simms, commanding No. 6 Squadron, had suggested that the duty of an assistant 
could be carried out by ‘an intelligent airman’. The essential point was that 
someone capable needed to be next to the pilot.35
Another theory, offered by Dick Wiesener’s friend Bob Dalkin, must also be 
considered. One of the checks for both take-off and landing the Hudson was to 
ensure that the castered tail wheel was locked to assist in directional stability. It 
was the second pilot’s job to check and advise the pilot ‘tail lock OK’. The knob 
on the lever for the tail wheel was almost identical, and of similar length, to 
the lever for activating the Sperry automatic pilot. Exactly two months before 
the crash of A16-97, the Director of Operations and Intelligence (‘Dad’ Bladin), 
writing for the CAS, had drawn attention to one of four Hudson accidents when 
the pilot ‘landed with tail wing unlocked and swung’.36
Someone unfamiliar with the Hudson’s controls could have mistaken a raised 
automatic pilot lever as indicating an unlocked tail wheel. With the throttles 
half-way back and the pitch of the aircraft well forward, Hitchcock’s view of 
the other controls might have been partly obscured. His attention would in any 
case have been directed primarily to the ground. If Fairbairn were to tell him 
that the tail wheel was not locked he might have supposed that the Air Minister 
had either failed to lock it on take-off or unlocked it when they were in the air. 
34 Hendrie, Seek and Strike, p.37.
35 NAA: A705, 32/10/2602.
36 ‘Service Training in Hudson Aircraft’, 13 June 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2478. An Anson crash with 
multiple fatalities at Richmond late in 1938 was attributed by the Court of Inquiry to a member of the crew 
roughly operating the handle that trimmed the elevators, believing it to be the handle for winding down the 
wheels (Hewitt, The Black One, p.162).
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In either case it was something that imperatively had to be fixed. Attempting 
to correct what looked like a dangerous unlocked tail wheel by depressing 
the automatic pilot lever would, in Dalkin’s opinion, ‘have been instantly 
disastrous, the aeroplane would have just fallen out of the sky’.37 Whether or 
not Dalkin was right about the proximate cause, we also have Paddy Heffernan’s 
assessment: ‘unless I can be assured that the definite cause of the accident was 
determined, I have a feeling that this “flicking” characteristic, when near the 
stall, of a Hudson, could have been the basic cause of the accident’.38
All the official Inquiries adopted the assumption that Hitchcock alone was 
at the controls as A16-97 approached Canberra. With the exception of Wing 
Commander Tony Carr, whose recorded contribution as one of Justice Lowe’s 
assessors was meagre, the Inquiry teams were limited in their familiarity with the 
layout of the Hudson cockpit. They were in ignorance of the manual that would 
have told them about the critical requirement that the tail wheel be locked, 
and the second pilot’s role in ensuring this was the case. The RAAF officers 
might perhaps have seen Bladin’s June circular referring to an accident caused 
by an unlocked tail wheel and the need for the ‘closest personal supervision’ by 
unit commanders and other officers responsible for training and maintenance 
‘to ensure thoroughness’. But, among the torrent of communications from 
headquarters, this admonition might have made little impression on officers with 
more pressing responsibilities. What is clear from the court transcripts is that 
those entrusted with inquiring into the causes of the accident were not looking 
hard for evidence that someone other than the first pilot was at fault. Knowing 
that Wiesener was new to the Hudson, there could only be embarrassment for 
the RAAF in exploring possible error by so inexperienced a second pilot with 
the lives of six important passengers in his hands.
But, as Carr certainly knew, and Murphy and Wilson would have understood, 
even if Fairbairn had been called upon to do nothing, the very presence of the 
Air Minister, ‘chatting away’ as ‘Tich’ McFarlane speculated, would have been 
a dangerous distraction for a pilot intent on showing himself to advantage.39 
Is there anything else to suggest that Hitchcock’s normal landing approach 
might have been compromised? The evidence of the very experienced pilot Ray 
Winter provides an important clue. Two days after the crash he was questioned 
closely by the Service Court of Inquiry:
Q. As Duty Pilot, did anything appear abnormal about the circuit and a 
half that the aircraft did of the aerodrome before the crash?
37 ACdre R. N. Dalkin, interview, 18 April 1978.
38 ACdre P. G. Heffernan to CH, 7 April 1978.
39 A. B. McFarlane, interview, 18 April 1978.
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A. Only the fact that the aircraft came over the aerodrome so high and 
lost height so very gradually in the circuits. Actually his airmanship 
seemed to be above average.
The Court did not pursue this point. It evinced no interest in the fact that 
Hitchcock was making a very gradual descent from a considerable height. 
Knowing that there was a second pilot under instruction in A16-97 — if not 
suspecting the presence in the cockpit of the Air Minister — might they not have 
brought to mind the policy that the height at which a first pilot was to take over 
for landing from an airman pilot in training on twin-engined aircraft was 2000 
feet?40 However, when the RAAF came to issue its ‘Informative Circular Relative 
to the Accident…’, they did emphasise that ‘numerous witnesses…practically 
everyone stated that the aircraft appeared to be flying slower than usual’. What 
credence could be given to this ‘constantly recurring impression’? The fact 
that a Hudson squadron had been stationed at Canberra for ‘some considerable 
time’, and that the two-engined Douglas airliner (similar in size to the Hudson) 
was landing there twice a day, meant that it deserved ‘serious consideration’. 
What was not divulged was the nature or extent of any serious consideration. 
Did anyone contemplate why the aircraft might have been flying more slowly 
than would have been expected? Or why it appeared to have begun its descent 
so gradually from a greater height than normal? Would it have seemed plausible 
that the pilot was showing just how close he could go to stalling the aircraft 
without actually doing so?
The Air Force Court apparently did not seriously consider the testimony of 
Harry Southwell, who was barely three-quarters of a mile from the scene, that 
‘as the nose went down the engines appeared to roar’. Southwell (and others) 
had spoken of the aircraft appearing to roll over on to its back but Jack Ryland 
and Ernie Hey, in secret evidence, had dismissed the possibility that this could 
have happened. The civilian witnesses were clearly regarded as unreliable. 
Hilton Clothier, who was even closer than Southwell, said that it ‘may have 
appeared’ that the aircraft was turning on its back. Clothier had also testified 
to hearing ‘a crackle as though it was trying to pick up just before the nose 
went down’. Questioned closely by the Air Force Court, Clothier re-phrased: it 
appeared to him as though ‘it had been throttled down and then picked up’. It 
was an acceleration, an increase of noise, rather than a spluttering — the words 
were suggested by Lowe and Dean. It was at that point that Clothier’s credibility 
crumbled when he insisted, in the face of incredulous cross-examination by 
Wilson, that he saw flame coming over the top surface of the starboard wing 
for two or three seconds before the aircraft hit the ground. It was not coming 
40 The policy prohibited airman pilots (also known as driver pilots) in training from landing a twin-engined 
aircraft unless they were thoroughly conversant with flying on one engine, including turns with and against 
the good engine, and landings with one engine (NAA: A 705, 208/1/1383).
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from the exhaust. ‘Was it a big blaze?’ Wilson asked. Yes it was. It extended six 
or seven feet, Clothier told Carr. But to Wilson’s final query, ‘Was there a streak 
of flame?’, the blaze had shrunk to ‘a wisp of reddish flame’ for ‘only a matter 
of a fraction of a second’. Other witnesses, asked if they were in a position 
to see, uniformly said they observed no flames. Yet, evidently troubled by the 
possibility that the aircraft had been alight before it hit the ground, Lowe asked 
for Pilot Officer Winter and Flight Sergeant Smith to be recalled: both were clear 
that they saw neither fire nor smoke.
Asked by Carr if he had heard any sound of an engine backfiring before he saw 
the flame, Clothier had another attempt at describing what he heard: ‘It was like 
an engine trying to pick up. It may have been a backfire.’ With two witnesses 
concurring that they had heard something like a roar or possibly a backfire, the 
Court then asked Darcy Vest whether the engines appeared to be functioning 
normally:
A. Quite normal until it took the spiral dive to the ground and I cannot 
remember any engines going.
Q. You never heard any sudden burst of engine coming on?
A. No, none whatever.
It had previously been established that Vest was a mile to a mile and a quarter 
away from the aircraft — considerably further than Southwell and twice as 
far as Clothier — and that he could not remember hearing the engines. Not all 
of the subsequent witnesses were asked about a ‘crackle’ or a surge of engine 
power. Fred Tetley seems not to have been asked any questions at all after he 
testified that he saw the aircraft diving towards the ground. ‘It appeared to 
me just before it hit the ground to straighten a little. The aircraft struck the 
ground and immediately burst into flames but I heard no noise.’ Dudley Lalor 
was next to be asked if the engines of the aeroplane appeared to be ‘functioning 
normally’. ‘I could not tell,’ he responded, ‘as I was in a closed car and could 
not hear the engines at all.’
Taken together with the relatively shallow angle at which A16-97 hit the ground 
— 40 or 45 degrees according to some, 60 to 70 degrees to others — there are 
good reasons for believing that Southwell and Clothier heard what they said 
they heard. The garage mechanic, O’Brien, also testified that ‘As it dived, the 
motors seemed to make more noise to me; they seemed to rev. faster.’ ‘They 
sounded as if they were opening up?’ ‘Del’ Wilson asked. ‘Yes.’
What therefore appears to have happened is that Hitchcock did his best to head 
for a relatively clear patch of ground. As Dudley Lalor had told reporters hours 
later: ‘As the machine neared the ground in its final plunge it seemed to me that 
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the pilot made a superhuman effort to right it.’ Hitchcock had ‘reduced the angle 
at which it was hurtling to the earth’.41 He did what ‘Tich’ McFarlane would say 
years later he himself would have done: ‘I would have poured the power on and 
shoved the stick hard forward and, if I had time, scream for somebody to rush 
up from the back to the front.’ As McFarlane would admit, there would not have 
been time for anyone to move forward. But he would have ‘whipped up those 
flaps, shoved the nose down and pulled the power on’. Would this have worked? 
‘I probably would have finished up in a molten heap…I might just have made 
it.’42 Irrespective of how Hitchcock came to lose control of the aircraft — about 
that there can be no definitive answer — his instinct was exactly what it should 
have been. If he had been another hundred feet or so higher he might have 
succeeded.
What would Fred Thomas not say?
What can we conclude? Did Fred Thomas designate Bob Hitchcock to captain 
A16-97 precisely because he was more likely than any of his peers to acquiesce 
in a request by the Air Minister to demonstrate the characteristics of the Hudson 
that were causing concern?43 If it were Fairbairn’s desire to see what the Hudson 
could do, he might have thought it proper to let the squadron commander know. 
Even to seek his concurrence. On this question we have testimony from Herb 
Plenty of a ‘little quiet chat’ he had with Thomas in the late 1950s by which 
time the former No. 2 Squadron commander was Lord Mayor of Melbourne. 
Plenty’s view, resting on what Thomas did not say, was that Fairbairn might 
have been in the captain’s seat:
He probably cleared it, with the Chief of the Air Staff maybe. He’d 
certainly cleared it with Freddie Thomas who was the commanding 
officer of the squadron. Freddie was quite happy that Fairbairn could 
have a touch of the controls…
He was a bit evasive, but he didn’t say to me that Fairbairn was NOT in 
the left hand seat. Freddie was very cagey about it, because obviously 
as commanding officer he felt a certain responsibility…he wouldn’t 
commit himself but he wouldn’t say that Fairbairn was not there.44
41 The West Australian, 14 Aug. 1940.
42 McFarlane, interview, 18 April 1978.
43 At this point, Tink (Air Disaster, pp.172, 176) refers to Hitchcock’s ‘obedient “old soldier” attitude 
identified years before by his instructors’. In a photo caption, Tink says Hitchcock was ‘described as “an old 
soldier type” who unquestionably followed orders’. But what the instructors were concerned about was that, 
after five years in the Service, Hitchcock might lead the younger cadets astray.
44 Plenty, interview with Geoff Crane, 19 April 2007, transcript courtesy Geoff Crane. Tink (Air Disaster, 
pp.154, 170) speaks of an ‘alleged’ ‘direction’ and an ‘oral instruction’ from Thomas to Hitchcock.
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If courtesy dictated that the Minister would ask for approval of his desire to try 
for himself how the Hudson handled, there remained the issue of nominating 
a pilot who would be willing to agree. Thomas would have expected some of 
his flight commanders to be unenthusiastic about obliging the Minister. Bill 
Heath had been spending almost every day since July 3 putting more than a 
dozen junior pilots through airmanship training in the newly arrived Hudsons. 
He had begun teaching them on the same day he finished his own three days 
of conversion with Jack Ryland in the dual-control A16-6. Had Heath said 
something to Garrett after the previous week’s flight about the Air Minister’s 
curiosity? Did Garrett report illness on August 12 as a convenient way of avoiding 
what he believed would have been an ill-advised and dangerous demonstration? 
His log book shows that he did not fly on August 12. But he had flown to 
Adelaide the previous week with Air Commodore Wrigley, flown patrols over 
the sea at the weekend, and may have been simply taking a break. Garrett was 
in fact on duty the next morning and, when news of the crash came, he flew to 
Adelaide with a crew of four and Frank Jefferies with a load of photographic 
equipment.45
Ryland, though still in his twenties, had been a senior captain and operations 
manager for Ansett Airways before the war. He was respectful but not overawed 
by authority. He had flown the Minister to Mascot and back to Laverton via 
Richmond on June 13 and 14 in Hudsons A16-20 and A16-21. Sir Charles Burnett 
had accompanied them on the flight up. There is no evidence of what occurred 
on those flights. However, if Fairbairn had been curious then about the flying 
characteristics of the aircraft, Ryland would have had the confidence to draw 
a line beyond which the Minister would not have been permitted to trespass.46 
Hitchcock, a little less sure of himself, deferential to the urbane flying veteran, 
would be least likely to be difficult.
What we do know is that the testimony Thomas gave to the Service Court 
of Inquiry on the day of the crash concluded with this personal assessment 
of Hitchcock as a pilot: ‘I consider Flight Lieutenant Hitchcock was slightly 
above average as a pilot, his instrument flying was good and he was a steady 
and thorough type.’ Lest there be any suspicion that his opinion was based on 
hearsay, he added: ‘I make the above assessment having flown with this officer.’47 
This was true as far as it went. Thomas made his judgment on the basis of what 
he knew first hand. Like others he found Hitchcock quiet and unassuming, a 
man who rarely took part on mess nights. Conceivably he had heard whispers 
45 Frank Jefferies, ‘The Crash of A16-97 at Canberra 13th August 1940’, June 1993, in Bennett, Highest 
Traditions, p.112.
46 John Gunn, Contested Skies: Trans-Australian Airlines, Australian Airlines 1946–1992, University of 
Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1999, pp.24, 31.
47 Service Court of Inquiry, p.15, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729. Thomas and Hitchcock had not flown together 
in Hudsons.
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of Hitchcock’s crisis of confidence in 1936; perhaps from ‘King’ Cole, a fellow 
member of the Naval and Military Club. But, if he had no knowledge of that 
episode, there was nothing subsequently left in Hitchcock’s personal file that 
would show that Thomas could have seen the documented disposition of the 
case.48
‘A steady and thorough type’, was the least a commanding officer could say 
by way of justifying his selection of a subordinate for a flight that ended so 
tragically. But the words conveyed more. They were the endorsement of a leader 
who previously had served in No. 21 Squadron with the then Flying Officer 
Hitchcock, yet barely knew the man who had been one of his flight commanders. 
Freddie Thomas, ex-Melbourne Grammar, committee member of the Naval and 
Military Club, was heir to a large family business. Like Dallas Scott, a Melbourne 
Grammar school captain, or No. 2 Squadron’s adjutant, Flying Officer Kenneth 
Ranger, and the other society flyers from Toorak and South Yarra, he inhabited 
a different world from the tiny timber cottages of Newport.49 Did Thomas know, 
for example, that Hitchcock was, as his fellow flight commander Ray Garrett 
said, ‘always subject to air sickness and never got over it (on rough days)’.50 
Did he know that the man his friend Jack Graham thought of as ‘a pretty cocky 
bloke’ had trained for years to build up his body precisely so that he would 
not be just another puny working-class lad always looking up to those, like his 
5'10½" commanding officer, sometimes glowering, born to lead?51
Naturally when I began research on this subject three decades ago, I sought to 
talk to Sir Frederick Thomas, as he had become. His response was circumspect: 
‘My evidence at the Lowe inquiry covered everything I could possibly tell 
you…You should understand that I had gone overseas before the transcripts 
were completed and it so happens that I have never seen the final publication.’
Whether or not he had ever seen the transcripts — they were not published 
and it is unlikely that he would have done so — Thomas’s recollection of the 
timing of his overseas posting was erroneous. He was assigned to ‘special duties’ 
at headquarters in April 1941, then posted as a liaison officer to the Dutch Air 
Force in the Netherlands East Indies from September to November 1941.52
48 In a telephone conversation with the journalist Frank Cranston 50 years after the event Thomas 
said he was ‘unaware of derogatory reports on Hitchcock’s personal file’ (Cranston, ‘Note of Telephone 
Conversation…1990’, Thomas MSS, courtesy of Rob Thomas).
49 Ranger, a 32-year-old WCdr in 1945, was one of seven officers whose request for permission to resign 
their commissions in protest against ‘futile’ operations late in the Pacific war led to a Royal Commission under 
J. V. Barry QC. The story is well told in Alexander, Clive Caldwell, Air Ace. For AVM J. E. Hewitt’s recollection 
of Ranger in 1943 (‘the trivialities and innuendoes of a sick man… without operational or air staff experience’) 
see Hewitt’s Adversity in Success, pp.85, 109–10.
50 Sir Raymond Garrett to CH, 26 April 1978.
51 GpCpt. J. E. Graham, interview, 11 May 1978; ACdre R. N. Dalkin, interview, 18 April 1978.
52 According to Joe Hewitt, Thomas, who finished the war as a Group Captain, was relieved of his command 
of No. 2 Squadron at the Chief of the Air Staff’s insistence after he had ‘boobed in operations over Bass Strait’. 
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What, I asked, did Thomas think of Hitchcock? He was ‘a very experienced and 
capable pilot and for that reason had charge of the special VIP Hudson aircraft’. 
Finally, he wrote ‘the cause of the crash will always remain a mystery’. Then, as if 
there was something he wanted to say but could not: ‘P.S. “Que Sera Sera.”’ It was 
much the same enigmatic response that Herb Plenty had received two decades 
or so earlier. Another decade later Thomas would tell Frank Cranston of the 
Canberra Times: ‘I think I agree with the Air Force finding that it was pilot error. 
All the evidence pointed that way.’53 Tony Street also, understandably hoping 
to learn more about the circumstances of his father’s death, was never able to 
get Thomas to talk about it. What is now remarkable is the discrepancy between 
the recollections of the weekend pilots — who were inclined to find Hitchcock 
overconfident — and those like Herb Plenty, then a junior pilot officer signed on 
for a career, who thought Hitchcock was unsure of himself. If Heffernan’s and 
Wrigley’s recollections, and those experienced men who themselves sat with 
Hitchcock, are to be believed, this was not an overconfident pilot. If he seemed 
on occasion to be taking risks, was it just as likely because of nerves, maybe 
even a bout of air sickness, than an impulse to show off? When competently and 
sympathetically instructed, as he was by Jack Ryland in his Hudson conversion 
course, he could meet every requirement. With Ryland there was a rapport. 
Ryland was not one of the society flyers. He was a professional. He had flown for a 
living, not for recreation. He had, as another junior officer put it, ‘no side to him’.54
It is reasonable to ask: was a nervy pilot, a man who appeared sometimes to take 
inappropriate risks in the air, the man a responsible squadron commander would 
assign to fly his own minister and a plane load of very important passengers? 
Was he the man you could describe a few weeks later as ‘a steady and thorough 
type’? The anonymous testimony of another No. 2 Squadron pilot, ‘also a Flight 
Lieutenant, but far more senior in years and flying experience and an airline 
pilot pre-war’, must be considered here. As paraphrased by the respected air-
crash historian Macarthur Job, this pilot had ‘accompanied’ Hitchcock on a 
coastal reconnaissance flight in a Hudson ‘only days’ before the crash. As they 
came into land at Laverton, Hitchcock’s companion was ‘appalled at the low 
airspeed at which Hitchcock was making his turns’. He had ‘firmly pointed 
out that the aircraft was getting much too slow’. Hitchcock ‘brushed the advice 
aside, telling the senior pilot: “Don’t panic — it’s all right.”’55
Memories of the appalling crash that had happened eight months earlier on Thomas’s watch would not have 
been far from the surface. Hewitt was Director of Personal Services in April 1941; I have found no official record 
to amplify or corroborate his story (Sir Frederick Thomas to CH, 5 Oct. 1979; Air Vice Marshal J. E. Hewitt, 
‘Diary for my daughter Part II Sept 1939-December 1948’, Hewitt MSS, Australian War Memorial  NAA:  A9300, 
THOMAS FW 250097). Thomas had ceased signing the squadron’s monthly operations reports in February 1940. 
They were signed by successive adjutants until Frank Headlam arrived as CO in April 1941. Several pages appear 
to have been removed from the record book in 1940; August, September, and October 1940 are compressed into 
one page. (Operations Record Book, No. 2 [General Reconnaissance] Squadron, NAA: A9186).
53 Cranston, ‘Note of Telephone Conversation…1990’, Thomas MSS.
54 David Campbell, interview, 24 May 1978.
55 Macarthur Job, Air Crash, vol. 2, Aerospace Publications, Weston Creek, 1992, pp.16,24.
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Jack Ryland presents himself in profile for the RAAF personnel file
(National Archives of Australia NAA: A9300 RYLAND JP)
The ‘well known and distinguished Australian’ who provided this information 
could not have been John Ryland, former managing director of Trans Australia 
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Airlines, who had died in 1973. Ryland had in any case been reluctant even to 
agree that the aircraft had stalled. It was one theory among many, a ‘feasible 
cause’, in the words put to him by Arthur Dean. One ‘amongst many other 
things’, no more likely than the ‘highly unlikely’ possibility of engine failure. 
When asked at the Air Court of Inquiry if he had ever had to question Hitchcock 
at all or bring to his notice that he was getting dangerously low in any of his 
flying or in his approaches to land, he was unequivocal that this was not a fault 
of Hitchcock’s.56 In saying this, he was implicitly commenting on the finding 
of the Service Court that A16-97 had stalled because the power approach was 
flown too low. There is a hint here that Ryland — like George Jones — was 
uncomfortable with the conclusion reached by Lachal, Stevens, and Pape that 
placed the blame for the crash on an error of judgment by Hitchcock.
The only person who fits Job’s description is Sir Raymond Garrett. Some 10 years 
older than Hitchcock, Garrett lived till 1994. He had become a commercial air 
pilot shortly after graduating from Point Cook in 1926, and had been a member 
of the Citizen Air Force between 1927 and 1937. Unfortunately, however, neither 
his own log book nor Hitchcock’s bears out the story in Job’s book. A week after 
he arrived at No. 2 Squadron where he had been posted as adjutant, Garrett 
went up as ‘crew’ on patrol to Zealey Point with Hitchcock in an Anson. It was 
not ‘days’ before the fatal crash but nearly 11 months earlier.57 Garrett’s name 
appears in Hitchcock’s log book on only one other day before 13 August 1940. It 
was June 30, 44 days before the crash. Garrett and Hitchcock were alone, not in 
a Hudson, but again in an Anson flying from Point Cook to Laverton. Hitchcock 
took the Anson back to Point Cook solo. Then he returned to Laverton with six 
passengers. And to end the day he took two of the men back to Point Cook in 
a different Anson. Each flight took 10 minutes. There is no occasion from the 
beginning of June onwards when Hitchcock is recorded as engaged in coastal 
reconnaissance. All this is not to deny the possibility that 40 years after the 
event Garrett genuinely recalled a disturbing incident involving Hitchcock. 
But, if it happened at all, it did not happen in a Hudson. Nor was it within three 
months of the fatal crash.58
56 Ryland’s testimony, 27 Aug. 1940, Air Court of Inquiry transcript, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729.
57 Flying Log Book of F/Lt William Raymond Garrett, 18 Sept 1939, photocopy, Garrett MSS, courtesy of 
Anne Kelly; R. E. Hitchcock’s Flying Log Book, 18 Sept. 1939, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729 attachment 1. Job has 
confirmed that Garrett was his source (telephone, 21 April 2009).
58 Clark cited the alleged episode with the unnamed ‘ex-commercial pilot’ in an interview 6 Jan. 2008 for 
the ABC (transcript via Geoff Crane). Tink (Air Disaster, pp.149–50) cites Clark.
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Comparisons
The readiness of so many of his former colleagues not simply to accept an official 
conclusion that the crash was Bob Hitchcock’s fault but to let it be known that 
they had always had doubts about his ability was deeply hurtful to his widow. 
Proud of her husband’s achievements, knowing the effort it had taken for him 
to rise through the ranks to officer status and continue to rise, Olive Hitchcock 
sensed the condescension that he had endured throughout the years since he 
was commissioned. Even Rex Taylor later expressed his ‘understanding and 
belief’ that his friend was ‘lacking in the natural aptitudes which could be 
expected to lead to a really proficient military pilot, in those days’.59 True as 
that might have been, the fact was that Taylor’s friend had until 12 August 
1940 come through flying training, five years of military flying, and conversion 
to the Anson and Hudson without grievous mishap. In a period when the Air 
Force was riven by arguments about the causes and remedies for multiple flying 
accidents Hitchcock had survived.
Any defensible assessment of Hitchcock’s Air Force career must be more than a 
compilation of anecdotes and selected incidents imperfectly if not tendentiously 
recalled. His ability and performance are best understood when set against the 
record of his contemporaries. Of the 28 cadets who began the course with him at 
Point Cook in July 1935, 27 graduated as pilot officers on 16 June 1936. One had 
been discharged for misconduct. Seven chose the option of joining the RAF. The 
remaining 20, appointed to four-year short-service commissions on probation 
from 1 July 1936, were listed in order of seniority:
D. Ashton-Shorter J. A. Cohen
D. J. Macpherson A. N. Hick
E. V. Read W. F. Allshorn
R. F. Wiley W. J. Keenan
C. T. Hannah B. G. Braithwaite
N. Ford J. P. Godsell
E. G. Fyfe G. J. Quinan
C.A. Houston J. N. Bell
R. E. Hitchcock E. J. Eagerty
G. K. Buscombe T. H. Davies
Having finished in the top half of his class and surmounted the setback at No. 
3 Squadron in his probationary year, Hitchcock had gone on to make steady 
progress. He had proved reliable in his personal life, unlike one classmate who 
59 ACdre C. R. Taylor to CH, 25 Sept. 1983.
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had been persuaded to resign in August 1938 for being ‘irresponsible in regard 
to his private affairs’ — a man who bounced cheques could not be trusted with 
the financial responsibilities that accompanied command.60 He had not been 
‘severely reprimanded’ for ‘drunkenness’ by the Richmond station commander, 
caught out joyriding, taking girlfriends on unauthorised excursions, alarming 
the inhabitants of a country town by dive-bombing and barnstorming several feet 
above the main street, or causing irreparable damage to aircraft by carelessness 
or bravado.61 And, most important, his name did not appear in the summary 
lists of fatal accidents that so troubled his superiors. He had not been one of the 
26 fatalities in 11 RAAF accidents in the five months to 12 August 1940.
Bob Hitchcock and his peers: ‘A’ Course July 1935 entry
(Courtesy of the RAAF Museum)
The contrast with some of his peers is striking. We have seen the sad fates 
of John Eagerty and Donald Ashton-Shorter. The loss of Charles Houston is 
another poignant reminder of the thin veil between the flying life of the 1930s 
and eternity. Like Bob Hitchcock, AC1 Houston had been recommended for 
a cadetship by the CO of No 1 Aircraft Depot. Before enlisting he had been 
a fitter and turner in the Newport railway workshops. Director of Training 
George Jones noted at his interview that the young airman dressed oddly, was 
rather slow and deliberate, and did not seem to have a strong personality. By 
60 Air Board Agenda 2239, NAA: A4181, 15.
61 Dickie Cohen’s strafing of Corowa made the local newspapers but brought no charge. Earlier he had been 
fined £5 for ‘disobeying in such a manner as to show wilful defiance of authority a lawful command given 
personally by his superior officer in the execution of his office’, an alleged offence of low flying of which he 
was guilty on other unobserved occasions but not this one (NAA: A10605, 521/2; Coulthard-Clark, The Third 
Brother, pp.331–2; Kingsland, Into the Midst, pp.24–6, 39–40).
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contrast, and an illustration of the subjectivity of the character assessments 
which were routinely recorded at successive stages of an officer’s career, another 
interviewer rated him a strong and pleasing personality. Houston’s outstanding 
educational record at Clifton and Haileybury Colleges, subsequent trade 
training at Swinburne Technical College, and a year as a sapper, counted in his 
favour. His enthusiasm for boxing and long-distance running might also have 
helped to earn him a place in the A course in July 1935. The sole support of his 
mother, invalid grandmother, and brother, the 23-year-old Pilot Officer Houston 
died when his D.H. Moth seaplane A7-40 disappeared in Port Phillip Bay in July 
1937.
The accident was no secret, though much of what followed was. As members 
of the armed services were excluded from the benefits of the Commonwealth 
Employees’ Compensation Act, Houston’s mother received an ex gratia payment 
of £100. The RAAF’s proceedings in Houston’s case foreshadowed a willingness 
to conceal inconvenient evidence, a characteristic that was to be exhibited again 
in August 1940. There was a good precedent for paying Houston’s mother, as 
George Jones pointed out, but the Director of Training’s recommendation of 
£150 — double the miserly amount suggested by the Finance Member of the Air 
Board — was rejected. Although other reasons were given, including that her 
untraceable husband had a legal responsibility to maintain her, it appears likely 
that the grudging ‘act of grace’ payment made to Mrs Houston was influenced 
by facts that were suppressed in the Court of Inquiry into her son’s accident. 
The Chief Commissioner of the Victorian Police had been tipped off that Houston 
and his companion, Pilot Officer Ernie Yde, had picked up two young women 
and taken them for a flight just before the crash. The Commissioner passed 
the information to the Secretary of the Defence Department. After a high-
level conclave at RAAF headquarters a ‘request’ from the Chief of the Air Staff 
was conveyed to the President of the Court of Inquiry, Fred Scherger, to make 
enquiries. Having interviewed one of the girls, Scherger was satisfied that they 
had nothing to contribute to the investigation and decided to make no reference 
in the Court to the joyride. What he could not expunge from the official record 
was the finding of the Air Accidents Investigation Committee that the crash was 
caused by ‘unnecessary low flying’.62
Inexplicable as some crashes were, even good pilots could never be absolutely 
sure of the safety of the machines they flew. It was not Joe Godsell’s fault, 
for example, that he had to make a forced landing in his Hawker Demon late 
in November 1937 — it was a defect, well known in Demons, in the water 
circulation system. Nor could he be blamed for an accident a week later caused 
62 NAA: A705, 53/1/336; MP187, 4/179. It was not long before the ‘most popular and most delightful’ 
Yde, had crashed and died in Port Phillip Bay (Gordon Olive and Dennis Newton, The Devil at 6 O’ Clock: 
An Australian Ace in the Battle of Britain, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 2001, pp.5, 36).
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by a tyre puncture.63 What all those in authority in the RAAF knew, though 
sometimes chose to ignore, was that ‘efficient’ pilots could have accidents. 
Sometimes equipment could be blamed. But there were other possibilities. The 
death of Pilot Officer L. R. Sutherland during practice for an air display in 
April 1938 was one of several examples of highly regarded young pilots — he 
had been runner-up for the Mannock Cup — making fatal errors of judgment. 
Lance Sutherland, ‘a very sound steady pilot’ according to the Air Accidents 
Investigation Committee, had attempted a slow roll in a Bulldog too close to the 
ground, realising the impossibility of the manoeuvre too late.64
In an earlier tragic incident, it was not the pilot but two spectators at a 
demonstration of Demons in Swansea, Tasmania, who lost their lives. Nineteen-
year-old Geelong Grammar old boy, Pilot Officer Eric Lansell, failed to clear the 
unmarshalled crowd as he was taking off, and his axle and wheels struck several 
spectators. Though Lansell was initially charged with manslaughter, the case 
did not proceed. His offer of resignation in June 1937 was not approved. He 
resumed his career, by May 1940 commanding the Advanced Training Squadron 
at Point Cook, and later serving as a squadron leader with No. 30 Squadron, 
flying Beaufighters in New Guinea, and ending the war as a Wing Commander.65
Overweening self-confidence could be as dangerous as timidity. Regular 
evaluations of competence were no guarantee against lapses of judgment, 
momentary inattention, surges of emotion, over-tiredness, illness, alcoholic 
excess, irrational urges to compete with others, to show off, or to prove 
something to themselves. Bill Allshorn, for example, who would go on to a 
troubled command of No. 21 and No. 4 Squadrons yet end the war as a Wing 
Commander with an Air Force Cross, was court-martialled and stripped of three 
months’ seniority in 1936 for crashing into a hill some seven miles beyond the 
limit imposed at No. 3 Squadron for an airmanship exercise.66 He was not unique.
Worrisome as Hitchcock’s early flying had been, it was no worse than that of his 
fellow West Australian Hughie Edwards. Edwards had been strongly censured 
63 NAA: A5954, 869/1; MP187, 4/184A.
64 NAA: MP187, 4/186. AVM Ernie Hey, an advanced flying instructor in the mid-1930s, reflected four 
decades later on sword-of-honour winners who killed themselves because of overconfidence (interview [20 
Aug. 1977]. Winners in the cadet courses immediately preceding Hitchcock’s — E. A Whiteley, A. D. Groom, 
E. L. Chapman — survived the war. Chapman was not selected for an RAF signals course in 1937 because of 
‘his lack of willingness to fly’, but was later recommended for an engineering course (NAA: A705, 163/1/296).
65 Air Accidents Investigation Committee Report No. 155, NAA: MP116/1; A9300 Lansell E. V.; The Argus, 
27 Mar. 1936, 2 Feb. 1943; Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, p.333; Russell, Old Geelong Grammarians at 
War, pp.263–4.
66 NAA: A471, 22488. Allshorn had been awarded four days’ C.B. for ‘wilful defiance of authority’ as a 
cadet in March 1936. In Sept. 1936 he would write off the airframe of a Moth after striking telephone wires at 
200 ft, stalling, and falling into the Hawkesbury River during approach for a forced landing (NAA: MP187/3); 
John Burton, Fortnight of Infamy: The Collapse of Allied Airpower West of Pearl Harbor, Naval Institute Press, 
Annapolis, 2006, pp.106, 113, 236; S/Ldr W. J. Harper, Report on No. 21 and No. 453 RAAF Squadrons, secret, 
14 Jan. 1946, UK National Archives AIR 20/5578.
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for his low-flying exploits during training, including ‘bouncing’ and narrowly 
avoiding a train. When he accepted a posting to the RAF, his casual airmanship 
was soon raising eyebrows. Serving in a Blenheim bomber squadron, he survived 
a serious accident in Scotland in 1938, ‘severely damaged’ and permanently 
paralysed below the right knee. The crash, caused by icing, might have 
been avoided had he observed that he was flying into cumulonimbus clouds. 
Edwards was not returned to flying duties until April 1940. He was renowned as 
a pilot whose landings were frequently hazardous. But his fearless insouciance 
won friends in high places, and a chestful of decorations, including the V.C., 
eventually attested to his valour in combat.67
To understand the significance of Hitchcock’s survival through over a thousand 
hours of flying, the records of the Air Accidents Investigation Committee (AAIC) 
are salutary. The ‘Accident or Forced Landing’ reports fill several volumes 
between 1935 and 1940. Between 1935 and 1937 alone, the RAAF recorded 219 
accidents with nine pilot fatalities.68 During the last month of Hitchcock’s cadet 
course the AAIC approved a reprinting of their standard form at £2 per 1000 
copies. An analysis by the Actuarial Society of America published at around the 
time Hitchcock began his training is instructive. In the United States the annual 
mortality rate for airline pilots was 25 per 1000; an hour in the air was estimated 
to be 80 times more dangerous than an hour on the ground. Mortality risk for 
airmail pilots was 95 times ‘normal’. For army and navy pilots it was 170 times. 
Amateur flyers faced a risk of death 255 times greater than the average man.69
For some years before the war, personal accident insurance against aviation 
accident had been available from major Australian life offices for RAAF officers 
and other personnel. But generally an extra premium was required, between 
£5 and £10 per £100 sum assured for coverage of active service overseas. When 
war came, all the big life offices imposed a restriction on their liability in respect 
of death on war service outside the country. Unless a premium of £7.10.0 per 
cent of the sum assured was paid, the liability would not exceed the premiums 
paid plus interest. A war clause was inserted in new policies that provided for 
a maximum death benefit of £1000 plus bonuses. Premiums paid in respect of 
a sum assured in excess of £1000 would be refunded plus compound interest 
calculated at 3½ per cent. Alert to a gap in the market for RAAF pilots, in April 
1940 Bennie S. Cohen & Son, Lloyd’s insurance brokers, of 341 Collins Street, 
Melbourne, were quoting a premium of 15/- per £100 for a benefit payable on 
death for ‘period of training limited to 10 weeks’. For six months it was 40/- 
67 Hoyle, Sir Hughie Edwards, pp.19–20 and passim.
68 S/Ldr J. M. McCauley (DT), ‘Analysis of RAAF Flying Accidents’, 20 Dec. [1937], NAA: A705 32/10/1915. 
The AAIC reviewed 96 accidents in 1937, finding 67 of them due to pilot error (J. L. Kepert. Aircraft Accident 
Investigation at ARL: The First 50 Years, DSTO Australia, 1993, p.10).
69 Unidentified press cutting, ca March 1935, NAA: MP187/1. Modern statisticians would doubtless show 
the flaws in these risk analyses.
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(£2) per £100. For one year, including training, the premium was ‘60s %’ or £3 
per £100.70 These were generous terms offered by the leading Australian firm of 
Lloyd’s brokers, founded by Oswald Benjamin in 1923, specialists in aviation 
insurance with an office in London’s Lombard Street. The AMP, of which Joan 
Wiesener’s uncle was a senior director, was already paying out for airmen who 
had died in flying accidents; and had recently paid on a policy for Pilot Officer 
Stanley Thornton, who had disappeared in an operation over Holland in May 
1940.71
By August 1940, not only had Bob Hitchcock avoided becoming an attrition 
statistic he had actually progressed in the Service faster than many of those who 
passed out with him from Point Cook in 1936. He had attained the rank of flight 
lieutenant in April 1939. His promotion might well have occurred as early as 
July 1938 had the recommendation of the Air Member for Personnel not been 
deferred by the Air Board. Flying Officers Read, Hannah, Ford, Fyfe, Buscombe, 
Macpherson (provisionally, he was undertaking an RAF Signals Course), 
and Cohen (now qualified as a specialist air navigator) along with Hitchcock 
eventually went up together, with the approval of the Minister for Defence, 
Geoff Street. By then another of their number, ‘mentally apathetic regarding 
flying duties’, had been terminated. Among Hitchcock’s contemporaries still 
awaiting promotion from flying officer in February 1940 were Norman Hick, Joe 
Godsell, Geoffrey Quinan, Ralph Wiley, Bill Keenan, John ‘Dinger’ Bell, Thomas 
Davies, and Bill Allshorn, the last three having slipped a month behind the rest 
in seniority, being recommended for temporary promotion from 1 October 1939 
rather than 1 September 1939.72
Whatever might have been the truth about Bob Hitchcock’s flying competence, 
the incontrovertible fact was that A16-97 was observed to plunge to the ground 
in a way that Service inquiries concluded was the result of error by the pilot. 
70 ‘Personal Accident Insurance Against Accident in Respect of Officers and Other Personnel of the R.A.A.F.’, 
12 April 1940, ABON 168/1940, NAA: AA1977/635. A Century of Life: The story of the first one hundred years of 
The National Mutual Life, 1969, pp.78–9; A. C. Gray, Life Insurance in Australia: An Historical and Descriptive 
Account, McCarron Bird, Melbourne, 1977, p.192; ‘Life Assurance Policies and War Risk’, Australasian 
Insurance and Banking Record, 21 Oct. 1939, p.851. Bennie S. Cohen & Son was later renamed Edward Lumley 
& Sons (Rodney Benjamin, Paths to Professionalism: A History of Insurance Broking in Australia, Craftsman 
Publishing, Melbourne, 1988, pp.96–9, 103, 111).
71 Geoffrey Blainey, A History of the AMP 1848–1998, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998, p.227: NAA: A705, 32/4/5.
72 Air Board Agenda 2382 NAA A4181, 15 incorrectly lists V. H. Keenan as among those promoted; AMP 
to Secretary Air Board, [Feb. 1940], NAA: A4181, 17. Bell had been awarded three days’ C.B. for disobeying 
‘a lawful command given by his superior officer’ weeks before he graduated (NAA: A10605, 521/3). Among 
those who survived the war, WCdr Ralph Wiley’s ‘high sense of duty’ and ‘good knowledge of the Service’ 
were ‘largely offset by having no tact whatever which continually causes him to be unpopular with any 
officers or airmen with whom he contacts’ (Confidential Report, 23 Jan. 1946, NAA: A9300, WILEY RF).
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Sir Peter Looker: what did he tell the Prime Minister?
(Courtesy of Swinburne University of Technology)
Nothing discovered by contemporary investigators would justify a finding 
that the aircraft itself was defective, although Jack Ryland for one would offer 
structural failure as a ‘very improbable’ alternative cause: ‘actual breakage of the 
controls themselves or the wires leading to the control surfaces’. ‘Del’ Wilson 
had pushed unsuccessfully for some confirmation that a vital cable could have 
been broken. It was permissible therefore, and logical, to infer by default that 
Hitchcock was entirely responsible for the aircraft’s stall. Explanations could 
then be sought in what was known of the pilot’s training, aptitude, experience, 
personality, and state of mind. Expert witnesses testified that the pilot was 
appropriately trained and experienced. In 1940, RAAF authorities were content 
to conclude for the record that Bob Hitchcock lost control at a crucial moment 
and was unable to retrieve the situation. This was a conventional and comfortable 
explanation. They had no desire to explore why he might have failed to bring in 
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safely an aircraft on which, by the Air Force’s standards, he was amply qualified. 
Nor were they eager to highlight the fact that the accident had occurred to what 
they knew to be a challenging aircraft.
The thought that a respected Cabinet minister might somehow have contributed 
to, if not actually caused, the crash could be relegated to the realm of 
unsubstantiated speculation. There was no evidence that anyone else was in 
control of the aircraft. Normally observed cockpit rules and etiquette would 
exclude such a possibility. Nevertheless, there were doubts. Just two weeks 
before the fatal crash, John Harrison had completed a trip around the nation 
with Jim Fairbairn during which Harrison was ‘a mixture of deputy private 
secretary, journalist, navigator, wireless operator, and general dogs-body’. 
As ‘the last person to have sat alongside Jim Fairbairn when he was pilot-in-
command’, Harrison would admit privately 38 years later ‘that dual-control 
possibility haunts me’. It haunted him all the more as he had been in the queue 
for a seat in A16-97: ‘one of the VIP’s needing a seat in that Hudson is a reason 
why I am alive today’.73
Of all the witnesses who have expressed a view about responsibility for the crash, 
none compels more attention than the man who claimed to have assisted in the 
identification of the bodies and to have reported directly to the Prime Minister. 
When I interviewed Sir Peter Looker in March 1976 he was candid about many 
things but careful about what he chose to reveal. I was talking to Looker about 
his life as assistant private secretary to Robert Menzies in 1940 and 1941 for 
the television series on Menzies’ life on which I had just embarked. We had 
been discussing the Prime Minister’s travel arrangements between Melbourne 
and Canberra. The disaster of August 1940 came up without premeditation. ‘It 
was a terrible tragedy. And I had the unenviable experience of having to go 
across and identify the bodies,’ he said. ‘It shouldn’t have happened’. Was the 
plane overloaded, I asked? At that stage I knew nothing of the allegations about 
Fairbairn. ‘No, no, somebody was flying the aircraft who shouldn’t be flying it.’ 
And then he moved the conversation firmly in another direction.74
There was only one somebody it could have been. Thirty-seven years later, I 
believe Looker was wrong. But it remains an embarrassment that I did not press 
him then or later to tell me more.
73 John Harrison to CH, 23 June, 25 July 1978.
74 Sir Cecil (Peter) Looker, interview, 25 March 1976.
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No contemporary report places the Prime Minister’s assistant private secretary 
Peter Looker either at the crash scene or the morgue on 13 August 1940. If 
he accompanied his senior colleague Corby Tritton from the Prime Minister’s 
office, or his friends Percy Hayter or Murray Tyrrell, to view the bodies, his 
presence was not recorded. Perhaps he went later and separately. In any event, 
his testimony that ‘somebody was flying the aircraft who shouldn’t be flying it’ 
is powerful evidence of what was believed at the highest levels of government. 
No-one could be sure precisely what had happened. But for those in the Air 
Force with responsibilities for the safety of pilots and their crews it had to be 
assumed, and be seen to be assumed, that it was one of their own in command 
at the time of the accident.
Whatever unexpressed doubts simmered in George Jones’s mind about who 
was responsible for a fatal error of judgment on August 13, it was incumbent 
upon him as the Director of Training to provide trustworthy guidance to other 
pilots. No matter who had been at fault, the fact was that a new aircraft, some 
hundreds of which were to be allocated to squadrons, had fallen out of the sky. 
Many of the most experienced pilots and engineers in the Service had cogitated 
and debated why this had happened. The sum of their thinking, distilled into 
systematically presented advice, might save lives in future.
Justice Lowe had reported to the Governor-General on September 5. Fifteen days 
later, Air Force Confidential Order 79 was issued to draw attention to the stalling 
characteristics of the Hudson aircraft. There was no gilding the presentation for 
the Air Court or the public. With flaps down 100 per cent, undercarriage down, 
and power off, there was, according to Confidential Order 79, nothing to worry 
about. With power on, it was a different story: ‘Very little warning is given. 
The stall is sudden and the wing drops quickly.’ The severity of the stall would 
depend on the amount of engine power used and the weight of the aircraft: the 
greater the engine power and weight, the ‘more vicious’ the stall. If flaps were 
down 40 per cent, the tail would become heavy. With 40 per cent to 100 per 
cent flaps down, the nose would become increasingly heavy. But, pilots were 
assured, this nose and tail heaviness was ‘easily controlled.’
There is no difficulty or problem in putting the engine on if undershooting, 
or if it is necessary to make another circuit. The precautions necessary 
are to avoid letting the nose rise too soon and to avoid raising the flaps 
until sufficient speed and height is obtained. There is no difficulty in 
holding the nose down, and when the flaps are operated, change of trim 
is easily controlled.
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The danger that could arise in putting the power on was when the aircraft was 
‘already stalled to a marked degree, without power on, near the ground.’ What 
would happen if the power was put on? The stall would change from a gentle stall 
without power to a sudden stall with power. It all sounded rather elementary. 
But, just in case the message was not clear, the point was reiterated: ‘The stalling 
speed with power on is less than that with power off, so that recovery from the 
stall can be effected by putting the power on provided the nose is definitely put 
down first.’1
Such was the simplified practical advice. On the same day, the Air Board issued 
generic instructions on ‘Powered Approaches in Modern Monoplanes’. A 
number of accidents had occurred ‘both by day and night’, because of powered 
approaches being carried out in ‘an incorrect manner’. Referring back to the 
detailed ‘Flying Instruction — Approaching and Landing’, distributed in late 
April, the Air Board reiterated that ‘it should be seen that the engine is used 
for the purpose of augmenting the pilot’s judgment and countering unforeseen 
difficulties, and not with the object of low flying on considerable power during 
the approach’.2
‘The moral…always have fair margin above 
stalling speed’
For those who wanted a deeper understanding of what had happened on August 
13 there was an ‘Informative Circular’ forwarded on September 28 by F. J. 
Mulrooney, Secretary of the Air Board, to Air Commodore W. H. Anderson, the 
Air Member for Personnel. The circumstances of the crash were summarised and 
10 possible causes of the stall were examined.3 The analysis, ‘for the information 
of pilots’, was to be placed in all Unit Confidential Order Books. It was set out 
in two columns. On the left were listed ‘Factors which may have contributed 
towards causing the aircraft to stall.’ In the adjacent column was ‘Comment as to 
the probability or otherwise, of these factors contributing to the stall.’
The first concern was that the aircraft was heavily loaded. The drivers who had 
brought the passengers to Essendon had estimated the weight of the luggage 
they carried, producing an average of 47 lbs per passenger. But the pilot of 
A16-97 had known this, and had previously flown other Hudsons with a full 
bomb load. In addition, as Bob Hitchcock’s log shows, on 22 July 1940 he had 
taken up Hudson A16-32 with a second pilot and nine other men for ‘full load 
1 ‘Hudson Aircraft — Stalling Characteristics’, A.F.C.O. 79, 20 Sept. 1940, NAA: A7674, 1/119.
2 ‘Powered Approaches in Modern Monoplanes’, ABO N 568/40, 20 Sept. 1940, NAA: AA1977/635.
3 ‘Informative Circular Relative to the Accident to Hudson A. 16-97 at Canberra on 13th August, 1940’, 
‘Confidential, CD58/40,’ n.d., NAA: A705, 32/10/2733.
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flying’. The all-up weight of A16-97 as it approached Canberra was assessed as 
17 500 lbs — heavy, but well below the maximum permissible all-up weight of 
18 500 lbs.
What, then, if the load was not properly distributed, tending to make the 
aircraft tail heavy? Here the answer was both factual and hypothetical. The 
pilot had discussed the trim of this aircraft with another pilot and was warned 
against placing all the luggage in the rear. ‘If the disposition of the load were 
such as to affect adversely the trim, the pilot could have easily arranged to have 
the luggage moved during the flight prior to landing.’ Could have. But as ‘Dad’ 
Bladin, Director of Operations and Intelligence, had commented a month earlier: 
‘There is little evidence that the pilot worked out his load disposition.’4 The 
Informative Circular concluded less prejudicially: ‘nothing is known of how the 
luggage was actually stowed’.
The Service Court of Inquiry had recommended that a weight sheet summary 
be issued, and this had quickly been done. As for bad dispositions of load, 
the Librascope ‘balance computor’ was the appropriate instrument. The first 
model had been designed a few years earlier in Burbank California for the 
Douglas DC-3 and the Lockheed 14, the Hudson’s civil precursor. Using it was 
easy, ‘Dad’ Bladin had said, but it was for the Director of Equipment to ensure 
that they were issued to squadrons: ‘Can the D. of E. say that a librascope is 
available in every Hudson unit?’ As Bladin would have known, the purchase 
of five librascopes, one for each station where there were to be Hudsons, had 
received ministerial approval in September 1939. But there were in fact only 
three in the country, at Richmond, Darwin, and Pearce, and two with No.1 and 
No. 8 Squadrons in Singapore.5 The instrument could not have been used by 
Hitchcock and Wiesener in A16-97. What would now become standard practice 
with a ‘centre of gravity calculator’ was described by Deryck Kingwell:
Before each flight the location and weight of all sections of the load, 
including fuel, aircrew, ammunition, guns, bombs, plus anything else 
placed into the fuselage had to be set on this calculator which gave an 
indication of the centre of gravity that resulted from that load. Unless 
the pointer pointed in the green area, the load had to be adjusted either 
fore or aft until it did so. The calculator also read off the take-off speed, 
length of take-off run, approach speed and landing speed for that 
particular load. Movement of load during these phases was very critical 
and everyone was warned of this feature.6
4 Bladin’s note, 27 Aug. 1940 on minute by GpCpt. Jones D. T, 24 Aug. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/2733.
5 NAA: A705, 32/10/2733. On the Librascope’s settings for the Lockheed 14, see The Aeroplane, 23 Feb. 
1936, p.240, quoted in Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book One, p.298; NAA: A4181, vol. 15. For the 
Librascope and its inventor, Lewis W. Imm, see, http://dcoward.best.vwh.net/analog/libra.htm, and Edward 
Churchill, ‘Automatic Brains’, Popular Aviation Magazine, Feb. 1940.
6 ACdre D. W. Kingwell to CH, 18 April 1979.
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If weight and centre of gravity were problematic the fuel tanks also had to be 
a concern. The petrol in the rear tanks had not been used first. Would it have 
made a difference if it had? Some people thought so. It was not standard practice 
to empty the rear tanks first. But in discussion about the trim of the aircraft it 
had been suggested by another unnamed pilot, probably Jack Ryland, to A16-
97’s pilot (Hitchcock was never named in the document) that to do so would 
improve the trim for landing.
Then there was the question of the flaps. The starboard flap was found pushed 
back ‘to 80% of its total travel’. The absence of the last 20 per cent of the travel 
would have had a significant effect on lift and drag. But no-one could rule out 
the possibility that the flaps had been pushed back when the aircraft hit the 
ground. Similarly, the possibility was considered that the engine cooling gills, 
which had been found open, could have increased the air flow over the flapped 
section of the wing. Again it was suggested, though some were unpersuaded, 
that the gills could have been closed until thrown open by the impact.
Experienced observers had consistently reported that the aircraft was flying 
slower than is usual for similar aircraft. Generally, estimates of the speed of 
aircraft in the air were thought to be erroneous because of the complex effect on 
perception of wind, height, and distance. In this event, however, the key RAAF 
observers were all familiar with the Hudson in flight and their impressions were 
remarkably uniform. What none of the investigators and headquarters analysts 
fully appreciated was that it was not just estimates of speed that could be 
unreliable. It was another two years before RAAF authorities were confronted 
by irrefutable evidence that the observations of even the most expert of eye-
witnesses like Jack Ryland could be seriously defective. The crash of A16-38 at 
Bairnsdale in full view of a party of senior officers, including Bob Hitchcock’s 
former CO Bob Dalton (now a Group Captain and CO of No. 3 Bombing and 
Gunnery School), journalists, and Movietone and Cinesound cameramen, was 
the turning point. As Ryland and Doug Candy, both by then Wing Commanders 
leading No. 1 Operational Training Unit, conceded, what they and others 
thought they had seen was irreconcilable. An accurate reconstruction of events 
was impossible until the Court viewed the Cinesound film of the stricken 
Hudson aircraft falling to the ground. Some evidence from ‘senior and highly 
trained personnel’ was ‘completely at variance with the facts’ established by the 
film. The Court of Inquiry therefore recommended:
In future Courts of Inquiry into flying accidents the evidence of eye 
witnesses be accepted with reservation. While their sincerity is not 
questioned, events have proved that most experienced officers have been 
unable to assimilate the true sequence of events and give an accurate 
description.7
7 ‘Hudson A16-38 — Proceedings of Court of Inquiry re accident to’, Oct/Nov. 1942, NAA: A705, 32/14/129; 
Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book One, pp.309–12.
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Whether or not human observations could be relied upon, there were ascertainable 
realities to be considered. Perhaps the fact that the Canberra aerodrome was 
approximately 2000 feet above sea level could have caused difficulty? It would 
be necessary to ensure that the angle of the approach was such as to maintain the 
required air speed: the angle or, as one reader interpolated in the margin of his 
copy, the power used. It was noted that the pilot had landed at Canberra before, 
and had specifically discussed this point with another pilot who had landed the 
same aircraft in Canberra under similar conditions (presumably Flying Officer 
Bill Heath who had flown up on August 5). By implication, ignorance of the 
locality could be ruled out. Forgetfulness would have been another matter.
A question had been raised about the possible effect of wind. After a landing 
scare at No. 14 Squadron in June it had been decided that the effects of wind 
gradient needed to be explained to all pilots. Over the Canberra hills on August 
13 a wind estimated at about 15 miles an hour was blowing. At least one senior 
officer wondered if the crash was on the lee side of the hill, which could have 
meant that the aircraft experienced a ‘down current’. The expert consensus, 
however, was that it was probable (not just possible) that the aircraft received 
an upward ‘bump under the starboard wing’. To correct the effects of a bump 
it would be necessary to use considerable aileron when flying slowly. If aileron 
were applied there would be additional drag. Eye-witnesses had reported that 
the port wing had gone down, as it would have if there had been a bump under 
the starboard wing. The natural reaction of the pilot in these circumstances 
would have been ‘to endeavour to correct this by application of ailerons’.
Finally, it was conjectured, if the port wing had been down ‘to a marked degree 
for quite a period’, the aircraft would side-slip, thereby detracting from the effect 
of the flaps on the lift of the aircraft. It was true that the wing was observed to 
be down for ‘an appreciable time (2–3 seconds)’ before dropping further, with 
the nose going down and the aircraft turning to the left. But, as those who had 
read some of the eye-witness accounts knew, side-slip had not been noticed.
What could be concluded from this discussion? No single cause could be 
determined. It was ‘possible’ that all of the factors mentioned were ‘present 
together at the critical moment, and that their combined effect was to cause the 
pilot to lose control and the aircraft to stall’. It was ‘highly probable’ that several 
of the factors were present and that the cumulative effect could have caused 
the aircraft ‘to stall under adverse conditions, viz., with flaps down and power 
on.’ ‘The moral,’ as one senior officer wrote at the bottom of the last page, ‘— 
always have fair margin above stalling speed (i.e. do not sail too close to it until 
flattened and within a few feet of ground).’
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The moral was one that would have come as no surprise to anyone who had been 
converted to the Hudson at Richmond. Wing Commander Lloyd A. ‘Smokey’ 
Douglas’s considered view was that this was a lesson already learned there. Lloyd 
Douglas, who was a 21-year-old when he knew Dick Wiesener, believed that the 
Richmond alumni who had the benefit of both KLM and Lockheed knowledge 
were the best Hudson pilots in the world. Dallas Scott, who undertook Hudson 
conversions for No. 2 Squadron while waiting for No. 7 Squadron to receive its 
own Hudsons, was ‘a tremendous bloke’ Douglas averred; but he had taught 
pilots to fly too slowly on approach and take-off. If this were so, it would have 
been odd in view of Scott’s previous experience of Lockheed 14 Super Electras 
with Guinea Airways. Was Douglas, like so many others who cast their minds 
back to their adventurous youth, echoing a friendly wartime rivalry between 
Laverton and Richmond?8 Certainly he was too modest to mention that he had 
himself managed a successful forced landing with wheels up on 30 May 1940 
when both engines of Hudson A16-54 failed 15 miles north of Junee.9
‘Curly’ Brydon, like Dallas Scott a Melbourne Grammar boy, had presented 
himself for enlistment at the age of 18 years and five months on the day after 
Britain and France declared war on Germany. By 1944, he was a squadron leader 
with a DFC and bar. Thinking back to his 550 hours as a captain of Hudsons 
in No. 6 and No. 1 Squadrons he was also inclined to see the fault less in the 
machine than in the training of the pilots. He made no exception for those who 
instructed at Richmond, where he had been posted as a pilot officer in March 
1940:
In the early days of conversion the standard instruction from such 
famous aviators as Swede Parker, Alec Barlow, Pat Hall, Dallas Scott 
and others was ‘Don’t apply flap until you are on final’. This probably 
caused more prangs than saves, specially when turning into the final 
leg when speed was necessarily low and the aircraft close to the stall. 
I can remember having a heated argument with a pilot senior to me in 
Singapore about this.10
Neither Douglas nor Brydon may have known that Hitchcock’s instructor had 
been Jack Ryland, familiar as an Ansett Airlines pilot with the Lockheed 12, 
converted to the Hudson by Swede Parker, but with hundreds of hours since 
then on the new type.
8 L. A. Douglas, telephone interview, 17 April 1978.
9 ‘Lockheed Hudson A16 [Accidents Part 1]’, NAA: A9845, 134/60.
10 A. H. Brydon to CH, 4 April 1978. Brydon was appraised by his CO WCdr Nicky Barr in 1945 as having ‘a 
tendency to be radical in his outlook, & occasionally his verbosity outweighs the amount of action required’ 
(NAA: A9300, BRYDON AH). The verbosity may have reflected his brief experience as a radio announcer 
(Herbert C. Plenty, Singapore Slip, Len Books, Canberra, 1990, p.163).
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What the ‘Informative Circular’ inadvertently proved to anyone who read it was 
that Bob Hitchcock had been cautious in preparing for the flight. He had sought 
advice from at least one of his fellow pilots on matters about which he was 
uncertain. It was possible that he had not paid sufficient attention to the load and 
its disposition. But the circular’s concluding reference to ‘adverse conditions’ 
signalled a subtle rejection of the damning and poorly justified findings of ‘pilot 
error’. Among those who bore responsibility for Hitchcock’s steady promotion 
and progress into positions that tested his ability and temperament were some 
who were now aware of the likelihood that his control of A16-97 could have 
been compromised. If there were limits to the public exploration of the truth, at 
least these senior men of repute could avoid giving professional endorsement to 
what they knew or strongly suspected to be false.
The circular was distributed across the country to Area Headquarters in Sydney 
and Melbourne; multiple copies to RAAF stations at Amberley, Archerfield, 
Richmond, Rathmines, Laverton, Pearce, Darwin, and Canberra, and No. 
1 Service Flying Training School at Point Cook; and single copies to every 
squadron overseas, elementary flying training schools, the Central Flying School, 
engineering schools, wireless air gunner and bombing and gunnery schools, 
stores depots, recruiting centres, every directorate, and even the Central War 
Room. Thereafter it was for instructors, already ‘converted’ senior pilots, and 
those just qualified, to teach and learn as best they could.
Politics and Purvis
While the Air Force was moving to advance understanding of the Hudson and 
improve flying safety, their political masters were preoccupied with a federal 
election campaign. The election, held on September 21, resulted in the UAP 
winning 23 seats and their Country Party coalition partners 13; the ALP won 
32 and Lang Labor had four. Two independents held the balance of power. 
Over the next five weeks, the Prime Minister tried in vain to persuade Labor to 
join an all-party coalition government. After further upheavals in the Country 
Party, a refreshed coalition was formed on October 28. Arthur Fadden, now 
‘Acting Leader’ of the Country Party, became Treasurer and was succeeded as 
Air Minister by John McEwen.
When the well-connected Aircraft magazine came out in November 1940, it 
commented on the report of what it pointedly called the ‘partly public’ Lowe 
inquiry. ‘The report is highly satisfactory in that it should end the silly rumors 
[sic] that followed the accident — rumors of sabotage, and of someone other 
than the pilot making the approach to land.’ Herbert Storey’s story, or stories 
like it from those who had been at the scene of the crash, were already it seems 
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common knowledge in the aviation community. Lowe’s dismissive comments 
had the desired effect. It was now legitimate to characterise as ‘silly’ the notion 
that anyone other than Bob Hitchcock was responsible for the crash. Noting 
that not all the evidence was heard in public, Aircraft found it ‘particularly 
interesting’ that the report recommended more training for pilots going on to 
the new machines. ‘This is surely an implication that evidence showed some 
pilots have not had enough experience before being passed out on the type, 
although in view of the times quoted, this could not have been the case with 
this particular pilot.’
Aircraft had been beaten to the punch by a more sensational rival, The Air-Log. 
In its September edition Air-Log had already reported the opinions of unnamed 
Dutch captains that they considered themselves ‘capable of all the answers’ on 
the Lockheed 14 only after 400 hours: ‘it amounts almost to criminal negligence 
for Authority to allow a comparative tyro in the handling of such craft to fly 
them without an expert supervisor aboard and in the second dickey[seat]’. It was 
not publicly known that the Director-General of Civil Aviation had provided 
information for the Inquest that a civil pilot of a large commercial aircraft ‘is 
required by company regulations to have 3000 hours flying experience and 200 
hours as second officer in the type of aircraft before being allowed to take charge 
as first pilot’. Air-Log took the opportunity to remind readers that, a year earlier, 
it had championed the invention of a Sydney man, Clive Murray-Waller, the C. 
M. W. Stall Indicator. ‘A stall indicator would probably have saved all’, but 
the device had been rejected by the Air Board as unnecessary. A month later, 
referring to Lowe’s report — ‘quiet judicial verbiage almost soft-pedalling in 
spots’ — handed to federal Cabinet on October 9, Air-Log returned to the C. M. 
W. Stall Indicator. The Air Minister should, they suggested, convene a meeting 
of technical experts to provide full disclosure of the Air Board’s actions.11
The Minister had some questions of his own. Artie Fadden had noticed 
in particular the three ‘riders’ to Justice Lowe’s findings. On October 11, in 
formally transmitting a copy of Lowe’s report and evidence together with the 
report of the Inspector of Air Accidents, to the Chief of the Air Staff via the 
Secretary of the Air Board, he asked for comments on Lowe’s observations. What 
action was proposed to be taken about them? Apparently no-one had thought 
to inform Fadden of the ‘Informative Circular’ or of other action in train to issue 
amplified instruction on stalling and recovery for pilots undergoing conversion 
to Hudsons. Someone did, however, think to leak the Minister’s minute to the 
Herald, where it was reproduced, to the Chief of the Air Staff’s gall, ‘practically 
verbatim’.12
11 Aircraft,19 (2), Nov. 1940, pp.26, 38; NAA: A6079, MO 625; The Air-Log, 2 (6) Sept. 1940, p.7; 2 (7) Oct. 
1940, p.5.
12 Report of Staff Conference No. 55, 15 Oct. 1940, NAA: AA1977/635.
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Advice reached the Air Member for Personnel for submission to the CAS, 
Secretary, and Minister for Air on October 25. Evidently Fadden had touched 
the nerve Lowe had exposed:
With regard to pilots having the widest possible background of 
experience before being converted to Hudsons, it is desired to point out 
that this has always been given careful attention. All pilots who were 
formerly employed in Civil Aviation on modern multi-engined types of 
aircraft have, where the exigencies of the Service permit, been employed 
on aircraft such as the Lockheed Hudson. The problem has been to 
make the best use of all the pilots available with due regard to the many 
commitments which the Service now has to face. All Service pilots are 
now gaining experience at a very rapid rate and special efforts are being 
made to shield as many operational units as possible from posting action 
consequent upon the formation of new training schools.
In what was tantamount to an admission that there had been serious shortcomings 
in the training and posting of Hudson pilots, the briefing disclosed that a ‘highly 
qualified pilot who has had a great deal of experience in modern multi-engined 
type aircraft has now been appointed to visit all Hudson Units in turn to check 
the flying of pilots engaged on this type, and to report to this Head-Quarters 
concerning each individual’. It was intended that this unnamed officer would 
continue to supervise Hudson flying ‘until the Squadron Leaders and the Flight 
Commanders and all…’ The next page of the document is missing from the file. 
But a handwritten note in the margin identifies the unnamed ‘highly qualified 
pilot’ as ‘F/Lt Purvis.’13
The advice to the Minister was more important for what it apparently did not 
say than for what it did. Flight Lieutenant Harry Purvis’s story epitomised 
much of what was wrong with the RAAF as it stutteringly came to terms with 
the massive expansion that wartime demanded. Purvis, born in 1909, was a 
ticketed mechanical engineer who had been a barnstorming pilot and mechanic 
with Kingsford-Smith in the early 1930s. He had done geophysical survey work 
in Western Australia and Queensland in the Southern Cross, operated aerial 
services in western New South Wales, flown with Cliff Carpenter’s Flying Circus, 
captained Airlines of Australia airmail flights between Sydney, Brisbane, and 
Cairns, and flown regular passenger services between Sydney and Melbourne, 
Adelaide and Darwin. Most relevantly, he had been hired by Royal Netherlands 
Indies Airways (KNILM) in 1939 and trained to their exacting standards to fly 
the airline’s Lockheed 14s. During a year’s leave from ANA, he flew the Lockheed 
14s regularly from the Dutch East Indies to Darwin and then to Sydney.
13 NAA: A705, 32/10/2729/7.
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The absence of Purvis’s name in the briefing note, or of any reference to his 
experience with the Dutch airline, might be explained as bureaucratic economy 
of words. Or perhaps it might have been thought that, as far as the Minister was 
concerned, the identity of the officer and his background were unimportant 
details. But such was the speculation and questioning of the RAAF’s training 
regime, the Air Board could well have been tempted to preserve Purvis’s 
anonymity. They would not be enthusiastic about an inquisitive minister getting 
too close to him. The man anointed as the expert best able to remedy detectable 
deficiencies in every Hudson pilot’s capability could reveal some uncomfortable 
truths. There was a chance that Artie Fadden actually knew Purvis, once an 
outsider but now inside the Service fold. His departure with Keith Virtue to 
join KNILM in 1939 had been deplored by the press as ‘a sad reflection on the 
Commonwealth’s air development’. If the Minister had occasion to talk to the 
‘crack pilot’ now charged with checking every Hudson pilot in the country, 
what would he discover?
Harry Purvis had returned to Australia immediately on hearing of the outbreak 
of war. When he reported to the RAAF Director of Recruiting, Harry Cobby, he 
learned of the order for 100 Hudsons, the military version of the Lockheed 14s 
he had been flying. Cobby told him he would be called when he was needed. 
Six months elapsed. Purvis knew that there was ‘reserve and resentment felt by 
the upper-ranking RAAF officers who had to be converted by civil airline pilots 
to modern types of aircraft, like the DC-3s (wartime Dakotas) and the Lockheed 
Hudsons that were just arriving’. But when the Hudsons started to be assembled 
the RAAF had no choice. In March 1940 Purvis was one of six former civilian 
pilots called to Richmond. No-one in the RAAF had comparable experience of 
the new generation of aircraft with variable pitch propellers, super-charged 
engines, retractable undercarriages, and flaps. With Pat Hall, Alec Barlow and 
Harold Cook from ANA, Jack Ryland, and Dallas Scott from Guinea Airways, 
he joined Squadron Leader R. H. ‘Bertie’ Simms in the team that was to lead the 
conversions. Each was posted to a different squadron. They put on a display 
over Sydney and Richmond, and four of them flew to Perth and back in 11 
hours 15 minutes, the longest one-day flight in Australia, to demonstrate the 
value of the new machines.
Purvis was then despatched to Darwin where Bob Hitchcock’s former CO, ‘Moth’ 
Eaton, had two squadrons under his command. There he trained seven enthusiastic 
young flying officers and pilot officers before moving on to Perth, where he had a 
frightening take-off with an inexperienced pilot who stalled at 800 feet:
I was appalled to find myself an unwilling passenger in a pre-dawn 
take-off…in a Lockheed not equipped with dual controls, with a young 
pilot…whom I knew could not handle the aircraft under the conditions. 
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I’d expressed doubts as to his experience to his squadron commander 
but was told I was no longer an airline captain, merely a flight lieutenant 
in the Air Force and must accept decisions.
With a ‘very high ranking naval officer’ among a full passenger load, an anxious 
Purvis positioned himself behind the pilot. It was fortunate that he did. As the 
aircraft plummeted towards the ground he stretched over the pilot’s shoulder, 
seized the control column, and pulled out of the dive just as they clipped the top 
of a gum tree. So serious a breach of regulations was Purvis’s action that he was 
close to being formally censured for presuming to wrest command from the pilot.
Purvis’s difficulties did not end there. As the ‘highly qualified’ pilot now 
designated Chief Instructor for Hudsons, he was based at the Central Flying 
School at Camden with a roving commission covering every squadron:
With memories of the Perth incident and the Canberra disaster still 
fresh, I drew up and sent to all squadron commanders a syllabus which 
included blind take-offs, asymmetric (single-engine) flying immediately 
after take-off, and a general tightening up of training methods. I finally 
managed to push it through against tremendous resistance.14
The RAAF was fortunate in Purvis — ‘a solid kind of man whose adrenalin 
flowed quietly’, as one contemporary remembered him.15 Things gradually got 
better as the men whom Purvis, and others like Ryland and Garrett, had trained 
began to pass on what they knew. Garrett himself was checked by Purvis three 
weeks after the crash.16 Among those who gracefully accepted instruction from 
Purvis on asymmetric flying was the Qantas pioneer Scotty Allan, who years 
later was to recall the Hudson’s ‘tricky qualities’. A particular concern Allan 
remembered was the general lack of confidence in flying Hudsons after dark. ‘A 
Lockheed pilot was stationed at Richmond N. S. W. and he would not fly it at 
night.’17 Nor at first would Harry Purvis or the brilliant Pat Hall, wisely in Hall’s 
case as it turned out that he was colour blind and had to be restricted to daytime 
flying. It is notable that Garrett’s certification as a first pilot for night flying of 
Hudsons took effect from the time of the check with Purvis. As the months 
passed, Purvis himself revisited pilots he had checked. ‘Tich’ McFarlane, re-
reading his log book years later, was struck by the number of times that Purvis 
took him up. McFarlane had originally done 10 hours dual on the Hudson, and 
he had the ‘genius’ Pat Hall with him at Richmond. Notwithstanding these 
14 Purvis with Priest, Outback Airman, pp.94–101.
15 Balfe, War Without Glory, p.203.
16 Garrett’s Flying Log Book, 5 Sept. 1940, Garrett MSS.
17 G. U. Allan to CH, 24 June 1982. A decade after his correspondence with me, Allan evidently told his 
autobiographical collaborator that the Hudson ‘didn’t have any tricks’ (G. U. Allan with Elizabeth Shearman, 
Scotty Allan: Australia’s Flying Scotsman, Clarion, Balmain, 1992, p.131).
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advantages, he saw Purvis at three-monthly intervals in the year or so he was 
with No. 6 Squadron. It was evidence, he thought, of the concern and care then 
being taken by the Service.18
The care and concern were warranted. It was not just the Canberra accident 
that led to it. The unexplained loss at sea of Hudson A16-27, the day before 
A16-97 went down, had prompted a search to pinpoint administrative failings 
and people to blame. George Jones had lit the fuse in qualifying the Court of 
Inquiry’s finding that the loss could not be attributed to any ‘person or persons 
now living’. The inquiry, the Director of Training said, had revealed a ‘lack 
of supervision and control’ by both the squadron and station commanders 
at Archerfield. Director of Personal Services Joe Hewitt concurred. DCAS Bill 
Bostock summarised: ‘direct disobedience of orders’ (the aircraft was sent over 
the sea without life jackets for the crew); grave negligence (the aircraft was not 
equipped with a rubber inflatable boat); unauthorised carriage of supernumerary 
crew; and lack of initiative by the squadron and base commander when the 
aircraft was overdue and known to have wireless telegraphy failure. There could 
of course be no evidence of structural defect or mechanical malfunction. Nor 
was there any evidence to support the widespread conviction that the accident 
had been caused by the flap lever being inadvertently knocked into the down 
position while the aircraft was flying at high speed. As the Service Court drily 
concluded: ‘many of the people who hold this theory do not know exactly 
where the flap lever is situated in a Hudson, and very few have ever operated it’. 
Should a guard be erected over the flap lever to prevent this kind of accident? 
No, they said: ‘since modern aircraft, being an inherently complicated and 
delicate mechanism, must be treated as such, and no amount of fool-proofing 
can counteract the effects of carelessness or lack of experience’.19
In the aftermath of A16-97’s crash, however, there were further technical 
matters to be resolved. Rider 3 of the Air Force Court of Inquiry’s findings had 
drawn attention to the method of attaching end fittings to cables. ‘Del’ Wilson 
had vigorously pursued the suspicion that the cable controlling the flaps might 
pull out of its fitting. Ernie Hey had valiantly sought to provide advice. The 
public had learned that secret evidence had been taken on this point. This was 
the Director of Technical Services’ domain. Group Captain E. C. Wackett had 
been in North America at the time of the crash on a special assignment to assess 
what possible equipment of value to the RAAF could be secured as a result of 
the collapse of France. He returned to Melbourne at the end of September:
18 A. B. McFarlane, interviews, 18, 21 April 1978; Balfe, War Without Glory, pp.207–8 for Pat Hall’s briefing 
No. 36 Squadron in Dec. 1942 to watch out for a power-on stall that ‘put Bob Hitchcock in at Canberra’.
19 ‘Proceedings Court of Inquiry Hudson A16-27 Lost at Sea August 12th 1940’ and related minutes, NAA: 
A705, 32/10/2830.
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The possibility of one flap retracting and the other remaining down, has 
been examined by the Director of Technical Services who reports that 
the method of swaging the end fitting to the cable has been carefully 
investigated by the Air Ministry and approved for the Hudson. It appears 
that after extensive tests, the method was found to be satisfactory under 
all conditions, and that in no instance could the cable be made to pull 
out of the fitting. As the only way in which the flaps could operate 
independently would be through a cable breaking, it was considered by 
the officers who investigated the accident that failure in this respect was 
most improbable.
By the time the response was prepared and approved there was a coalition 
government in prospect, and another new Minister for Air. Jack McEwen took 
up his new duties on October 28. The accident file was one of the first to reach 
his desk. His ‘Seen JMcE’ was the prudent annotation of a man too canny 
to indicate he was actually satisfied with what he had read.20 The ambitious 
McEwen was not a minister to be trifled with. Seven weeks later, infuriated 
at learning of a sequence of events from the press, he demanded from the 
Chief of the Air Staff an assurance that ‘proper provision be made, and effect 
given to it, for informing me promptly and officially of any serious incidents 
or operational activities of the R.A.A.F. of an important character’. It had not 
improved McEwen’s temper to be told by the head of the Parliament House 
switchboard, after a long delay in contacting Air Commodore Anderson, that ‘it 
was an experience stretching back to Mr Fairbairn’s day for it to take as long as 
an hour to raise Area Headquarters, Sydney’.21
Training challenges
Sturdily constructed, with reliable engines, as David Colquhoun would attest, 
the Hudson was, ‘when one became used to it, a delight to fly’. The trick was to 
stay alive long enough to become used to it. Bland reports by the Deputy Chief 
20 Minute by GpCpt. E. C. Wackett, 17 Oct 1940: WCdr L. R. S. Freestone to D.T., 24 Oct. 1940, forwarded 
by A/g DCAS Bladin to CAS Burnett, thence to Minister, 1 Nov. 1940, NAA: A705, 32/10/1729/5–7; On 30 
Nov. 1940 Wackett issued Hudson Instruction No. 10 advising that the efficiency of the swaged ends of the 
control cables had been investigated and that the blob of solder on the cables that had pre-occupied the Lowe 
inquiry was to be ignored as an indicator of movement (NAA: A705, 150/4/948); AVM E. C. Wackett to CH, 
3 Oct. 1977.
21 NAA: A1196, 60/501/38; AA1977/635. Installation of four additional automatic telephone lines in May 
had ameliorated delays in the Century Building exchange. But that did nothing to solve the problem of 
unanswered telephones or the barely credible arrangements at Air Force HQ thrown into relief by a duty staff 
officer’s plaintive comment in Feb. 1940: ‘It is pointed out that an up to date list of addresses & telephone 
numbers of officers on the staff of Air Force HQ might reasonably be supplied to Duty Staff Officers.’ Six weeks 
later, nothing had been done (NAA: A705, 87/4/813). Eric Windsor, the senior Essendon Air Radio technician, 
complained to a Court of Inquiry in June 1940 of ‘considerable difficulty’ always experienced in telephoning 
Pt Cook and Laverton because of the lines being ‘engaged’ (NAA: A11094, 72/1/44).
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of the Air Staff to the War Cabinet at the end of August 1940 conveyed truthfully 
that three Hudsons had been written off and three were under repair. But in 
what appears to have been a breathtakingly risky half-truth Bostock reportedly 
advised that ‘instruction of pilots for the flying of Lockheed Hudson aircraft 
was in the hands of civil instructors, who were fully experienced in flying this 
type of aircraft’. Hard as it might have been for Bostock to admit that the RAAF 
needed civilian help, it at least displaced some of the responsibility for any 
training shortcomings.22 The shortage of experienced Hudson pilots was not 
going to be solved in a hurry. The Court of Inquiry into the loss at sea of A16-27 
the day before A16-97 crashed would lament that the squadron commander at 
Archerfield had not undergone a Hudson conversion and was not in a position 
to exercise any technical supervision over the handling of the aircraft by his 
junior officers. Moreover, as Squadron Leader Stuart Campbell and his inquiry 
associates reminded their superiors:
The Press are continually comparing the ability of Service and Air 
Line pilots, mostly in terms unfavourable to the former. Though their 
criticisms are frequently of a somewhat hysterical nature, there is one 
factor usually overlooked, which, if realised, would lend considerable 
weight to their arguments. This factor is that there is no Commercial 
Operating Company in the world that would employ, as Captain of a 
Lockheed Hudson 14, a pilot with only 500 hours flying experience.
George Jones would respond ruefully late in January 1941: ‘It has not been 
possible to select pilots with a minimum of 500 hours’ flying before conversion 
to Hudson aircraft.’23 Hudsons continued to populate the flying accident tables.24 
On 7 September 1940, a Hudson from Darwin piloted by Bob Hitchcock’s No. 
2 Squadron contemporary Jack Sharp, now with No. 13 Squadron, crashed 
while taking off from Broome aerodrome. The aircraft caught fire and all but 
the starboard mainplane and tail unit was destroyed. The crew were uninjured. 
But Sharp was blamed for losing control and was called on to contribute £10 
towards the cost of the loss. ‘Inexperience and poor technique’ explained why 
Pilot Officer Graham Gibson of No. 21 Squadron flew heavily into the ground 
while attempting to land after his first solo on September 19.25 An error of 
judgment by Flight Lieutenant H. A. (Bob) Nicholas accounted for the damage 
done to A16-10 of No. 13 Squadron at Darwin on New Year’s Eve 1940 when it 
bounced on landing, tipped on its nose, hit the ground and turned through 180 
degrees after the starboard wing stalled when the engine power was put on.26 
22 War Cabinet Notes, vol. 2, 28 Aug 1940, NAA: A5954, 729/2; War Cabinet Minutes, 28 Aug. 1940, NAA: A2673.
23 NAA: A705, 32/10/2830.
24 NAA: A9845, 134,135.
25 ‘Flying Accidents Analysis of 1940’, NAA: A705, 12/10/2478. Gibson, employed as a second pilot until 
he had more experience, was killed in action in New Britain in Feb. 1942.
26 ‘Summary of Air Accidents Dec. 1940’, NAA: A705, 32/10/3110.
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Overseas crashes were also noticed. Six months after the Canberra disaster, an 
hour after leaving Gander in Newfoundland en route to England, a Hudson 
bearing Frederick Banting, the co-discoverer of insulin, crash-landed on an ice-
covered lake. The pilot and Banting survived the crash but Banting died shortly 
after. He had been on the way to the UK to undertake research on how airmen 
could best cope with faster and higher flight.27 As late as December 1944 there 
were echoes of the Canberra disaster when eight men died as A16-68 crashed on 
landing approach at Richmond.28
Meanwhile, the Weekly Report of the Chief of the Air Staff carried summary 
notes on ‘aircraft casualties’. As experience was gathered, additional advice 
was forthcoming. At the beginning of October 1940 the Air Board disseminated 
information on flap settings. It had been established that ‘although the Lockheed 
Hudson aircraft is controllable on sudden application of engines, after a bad 
landing with up to 90% of flap, there is a considerable nose down change of 
trim’. It was admitted that at 100 per cent flap setting the pitching moment 
‘under certain circumstances may become uncontrollable’. The best results were 
to be obtained with 70 per cent flap setting. This was to be adopted as standard 
practice. (The RAF had already introduced rubber stop blocks on the guide rail 
that limited flap travel to 70 per cent.)29 During Hudson conversion courses, 
however, pilots were to be given experience with higher flap settings up to 100 
per cent. Such settings might be applicable in an emergency.
What the Hudson required, David Colquhoun later contended, was ‘concentration 
and quick reaction, particularly on take-off when due to its short fuselage a 
swing could be induced easily’. Colquhoun had heard that the Americans in 
the Alaskan theatre had lost so many aircraft that they refused to fly them. That 
was, he believed, one of the reasons why they became available to Australia.30 
This was a rumour without foundation. But it had become apparent by October 
1940 that a ‘violent swing’ could result from the application of full rudder when 
brakes were being used during take-off. It was common practice to apply two 
or three notches of brake during the first part of take-off. The practice was 
now to be discontinued. What had been observed was that a pilot’s head would 
move when he let off the brake; his attention would be diverted from steering 
a straight course and the aircraft would be liable to swing. No such problem 
would normally be expected even in conditions of moderate cross-wind.31
27 Sholto Watt, I’ll Take the High Road: A History of the Beginning of the Atlantic Air Ferry in Wartime, 
Brunswick Press, Fredericton, 1960, p.114; University of Toronto Magazine, XXIII, 4, 1996, p.17.
28 NAA: A9845, 135. An invaluable history of all RAAF Hudsons compiled by Gordon Birkett is at www.
adf-serials.com/2a16.shtml.
29 Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book One, p.298. It was noted in early 1942 that the rubber stop 
blocks had been installed in Mk III Hudsons (Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book Two, p.250).
30 ACdre D. W. Colquhoun to CH, 7 June 1978.
31 ABO N611, 4 Oct. 1940, NAA: AA 1977/635.
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Almost all of those who flew Hudsons in 1940 were to recall its troublesome 
characteristics. Claude Browne was in one of the first groups to fly them. ‘They 
arrived,’ he remembered, ‘in crates at RAAF Richmond…when I was completing 
my intermediate course there.’ The machines were assembled, flight tested and 
put into squadron service as soon as ‘the then more senior pilots were converted 
onto them’. Posted to No. 8 Squadron in Canberra, Browne was soon at the 
controls as a second pilot. Eventually as captain, then as an instructor at No. 1 
Operational Training Unit at Bairnsdale and East Sale, he accumulated some 4000 
hours on the type. He added to his wartime experience the perspective gained 
in the mid-1950s as head of the Directorate of Flying Safety: ‘Even although 
only the more/most experienced pilots were posted to convert onto them, the 
Hudson represented a big step up from its predecessor (the Anson) which was 
under powered and viceless as regards its handling characteristics.’
The problem with the Hudson, as Browne saw it, was that it had a relatively 
high wing loading; its handling under asymmetric flight conditions (i.e. with 
one engine failed) was subject to critical limits. Also, ‘it had a rather vicious 
re-action if stalled under certain conditions of power, load and wheels/flaps up/
down configurations; it could, depending on the circumstances, flick onto its 
back, or suddenly drop a wing or assume a steep nose down attitude.’32
What Spud Spurgeon, a Laverton contemporary of Hitchcock’s, who went on 
to No. 8 Squadron in Malaya, was to call ‘unpleasant recovery characteristics 
at low speeds’ were widely experienced.33 One of those at No. 2 Squadron who 
took very seriously the injunction about having a fair margin above stalling 
speed was Neville Hemsworth, a former commercial pilot. David Campbell, 
who testified that he owed his life to Hemsworth’s example of careful flying, 
nevertheless recalled how he rued being sent into the nose at every landing 
when Hemsworth was captain. There was a second air-speed indicator in the 
navigator’s perch which could be checked against the one in the cockpit. 
Campbell was reluctant to inflict this boring and uncomfortable task on others, 
and did not do so on his own second pilots.34
While the challenges of the aeroplane itself were well established, there were 
other factors at work. Scotty Allan acknowledged a generational problem:
The suggestion that W. W. I. and pilots of the 1920’s had difficulty in 
handling aircraft of the late 1930’s is illustrated by Pan American whose 
system of promotion was based on length of service. Old pilots insisted 
32 GpCpt. C. D. Browne to CH, 15 May 1978.
33 ACdre C. H. Spurgeon, telephone interview, 16 Nov. 1982.
34 David Campbell, interview, 24 May 1978.
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on their rights to fly the new aircraft with dire results. There were of 
course exceptions, but many pilots were quite unable to apply new 
techniques or even to recognise that new techniques were necessary.35
‘By a strange turn of events,’ Harry Purvis was to write, ‘I found myself having 
to check my old instructor, Scotty Allan, on asymmetric flying. He quickly put 
me at my ease and also indicated he approved the tighter training.’ With 9591 
hours prior to enlisting on 4 September 1940, Allan had nothing to prove.36 
Whatever the understanding or potential ability of individual pilots, it would 
not necessarily compensate for insufficient and inadequate training. Flying a 
Hudson was similar in many respects to flying an Anson, except in the ‘full flap’ 
‘power on’ condition. As Air Commodore Derek Cuming, later to be the RAAF’s 
Chief Test Pilot and, in Sir Fred Scherger’s view, one of the six best pilots in the 
world, recalled: ‘In this condition of flight the aircraft could give a sharp wing 
drop at the stall and unless immediate correction was made it could roll nearly 
inverted.’ The prospect of this happening ‘did frighten some pilots’. And at less 
than 1000 feet a crash would be inevitable.
‘It must be borne in mind,’ Air Commodore Cuming cautioned in retrospect, 
‘that in 1940, with the exception of a few, most pilots were very inexperienced 
in flying by the time they were put in charge of an aircraft such as the Hudson.’ 
In his own case, his total flying experience was 182 hours as pilot in charge 
and 250 hours as second pilot or navigator in various types of aircraft. Cuming, 
who had been posted to No. 2 Squadron for three weeks in June/July 1940, 
acknowledged that he had the advantage of instruction from Sam Balmer and 
Harry Purvis while flying with No. 13 Squadron in Darwin.37 Not everyone 
had been so lucky. As ‘Spud’ Spurgeon put it, the practice of making flight 
commanders responsible for supervising the conversion of their own pilots 
was ‘hazardous’. With few exceptions in August 1940 ‘real instructors did not 
then exist’. When he was posted to Singapore the week before the Canberra 
disaster his first pilot had 20 hours in the Hudson; he, as second pilot, had nine 
and a half hours.38 The situation was not greatly improved four months later 
when the Training Directorate pronounced after another (non-fatal) Hudson 
landing accident that: ‘Conversion courses should always be given by the most 
experienced pilot available, if necessary by the Squadron Commander himself, 
particularly in the case of Hudson aircraft.’39
35 G. U. Allan to CH, 24 Nov. 1982, 
36 Allan with Shearman, Scotty Allan, pp.130–2.
37 ACdre D. R. Cuming to CH, 17 April 1978; NAA: A12372, R/33012/P; ACM Sir F. Scherger, interview, 2 
Sept. 1978; Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story, Book One, p.300; Grantham, The 13 Squadron Story, for Purvis 
and J. R. Balmer and A16-8 with dual controls.
38 Spurgeon, telephone interview, 16 Nov. 1982.
39 ‘Flying Accidents Analysis of 1940’,  NAA: A705, 12/10/2478.
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Sir Norman Brearley, for whom Hitchcock’s father had worked, made no secret 
of what he thought of RAAF pilots. In 1940 he was commanding No. 5 Flying 
Training School: ‘My main reaction to the Hudson air crash was in the report of 
the enquiry. This stated that the pilot was an average R.A.A.F. pilot. To me this 
meant that he was much below the standard that I would employ.’40
There is no doubt that the pressure to produce pilots placed unprecedented 
strain on the capacity of the RAAF. In May 1940 a large percentage increase 
in forced landings was attributed to lack of close supervision by flight and 
squadron commanders. Incomplete knowledge of the engine characteristics 
of particular types was one cause. The Director of Training was charged with 
reviewing syllabuses and recommending limits on the range of aerobatics to be 
taught and practised.41 The stretching sinews of the training establishment were 
exposed in a sequence of confidential orders in the months after the Canberra 
disaster. Less than four weeks had passed when a pilot and two pupils were 
killed in the crash of an Anson near Wagga. It was determined that the aircraft 
had become uncontrollable and broken up in a vertical dive after the instructor 
had indulged in a display of aerobatics, half-rolls, which he had promised 
to execute before going up. The pilot had ignored repeated warnings about 
overconfidence, ‘and his sense of discipline was not sufficiently developed to 
prevent a serious breach of orders’. The official reaction was a departure from 
the usual impersonal tone of the confidential orders:
The bad effect on the Service due to loss of life and loss of aircraft which 
arose directly out of these shortcomings need not be stressed. A daring 
spirit is entirely commendable provided it is used in action against the 
enemy, but it must be accompanied by sufficient commonsense, loyalty 
to the Service and discipline generally to prevent such a waste of the 
limited resources available to the Service.42
There was sensitivity about the extent to which the ‘daring spirit’ might be 
insufficiently tempered by discipline in individual squadrons. There was an echo 
here of the reaction to the Ellington report in 1938. ‘I can remember numerous 
occasions,’ the gallant AFC pilot and VC winner Frank McNamara had told 
Dicky Williams, ‘when many of us used to wonder whether we were sometimes 
not too severe in punishing some of these high-spirited lads by sending them 
up for court-martial, fining them a proportion of the cost of damage to aircraft, 
etc.’43 Others might fairly have wondered whether there was not too much 
chummy tolerance of poor technique and ill-disciplined bravado. The fact was 
40 Sir Norman Brearley to CH, 30 March 1982.
41 Chief of Air Staff Conference No. 35, 21 May 1940, NAA: AA1977/635.
42 ‘Flying Discipline’, A.F.C.O. 77/40 NAA: A7674, 1/118.
43 GpCpt. F. H McNamara to AVM R. Williams, 7 Oct. 1938, Williams to McNamara, 26 Oct. 1938, copy, 
Williams MSS, RAAF Museum.
25 . Diagnosis and remedies
603
that ‘over-keenness’ to show ‘daring and/or efficiency’ was endemic; even when 
an injunction to improve flying discipline was being circulated in May 1940 it 
was acknowledged by ‘Mucker’ Anderson that ‘this spirit has its value’.44
The necessary data
On 10 September 1940, Sir Charles Burnett told the War Cabinet that he would 
‘shortly submit statistics showing the comparison of the ratio of casualties…
since the war with the pre-war period’. This apparently spontaneous offer 
caught his principal subordinate unawares. ‘Have you the necy. data for this?’ the 
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff asked the Director of Training before remembering 
that protocol dictated the request should go via George Jones’s superior, the Air 
Member for Personnel. As it happened, at the CAS’s direct request, 25-year-old 
Squadron Leader Joshua McDonald in Jones’s directorate had prepared a day 
earlier a ‘summary of fatal accidents’ — 14 fatal accidents, with 40 people killed 
in the previous six months. There was also a table for the same period showing 
the number of fatal and non-fatal accidents per hours flown by each aircraft 
type. The numbers suggested that the Hudson was the most likely aircraft to be 
involved in fatal accidents and the least likely to be in non-fatal accidents. But 
no attempt was made to assess the meaning or significance of the data.45
The War Cabinet continued to gnaw at the accident rate. The CAS told them 
— not for the first time — about his Inspector of Air Accidents, appointed 
before the Canberra crash, and the legal officer to assist ‘in the interrogation of 
the persons concerned and witnesses’. Trainees were not being pushed on too 
quickly in their preliminary training, Burnett said. The ‘fullest possible use’ 
was being made of efficient civil pilots. The trouble was that the accidents were 
occurring at the stage in the trainees’ careers when they had ‘commenced to 
gain that degree of experience which easily led to over-confidence’. Fines were 
being imposed in cases of negligence.46
The more comprehensive information sought by Burnett was provided on 
October 10. In the 12 months before the war, there had been 39 672 hours flown 
and four ‘fatal accidents’. In ‘non-fatal’ accidents, nine aircraft had been totally 
lost, 20 needed more than a month to be repaired, and 83 more had suffered 
44 NAA: A705, 231/8/7 Pt 1. ‘Members of a club are disinclined to criticise each other professionally, and 
it seems probable that a causal relationship existed between that comfortable atmosphere and the RAAF’s 
disturbing accident record’ (Alan Stephens, The Royal Australian Air Force, [The Centenary History of 
Defence vol. II], Oxford UP, South Melbourne, 2001, p.37).
45 WCdr McDonald, newly appointed CO of No. 13 Squadron at Laha, Ambon, in Dec. 1941, stalled his 
Hudson at 400 feet, spun into water and was killed (NAA: A9300, McDONALD JR; Johnston, Whispering 
Death, pp.110–1).
46 War Cabinet Notes, vol. 2, 2 Oct. 1940, NAA: A5954, 729/2.
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minor damage. In the 12 months of war, 93 864 hours had been flown; there 
were 11 fatal accidents. Twenty aircraft were lost in non-fatal accidents, 36 were 
out of action for more than a month, and another 274 made serviceable within 
a month. The tabulated data were in due course submitted to the War Cabinet 
over the signature of R. G. Menzies in his capacity as Minister for Defence Co-
ordination.47
No doubt to the relief of RAAF headquarters the information compiled by 
Jones’s staff was simply noted by ministers. No-one seems to have noticed or 
been concerned that the figures of ‘casualties’ provided to ministers were of 
aircraft in which men were killed rather than the number of fatalities. But 
the whole subject of accidents and casualties would continue to be sensitive. 
Nerves were exposed in an extraordinary eruption of paper warfare in the 
Air Board in November 1940. It began as what purported to be a reduction of 
unnecessary reporting of minor accidents. From the beginning of November it 
was proposed that the customary signal and forwarding of form E/E 24 should 
only be continued for ‘major accidents’. The new policy defined major accidents 
as any that involved injury, breaches of flying discipline, or carelessness. It also 
included any occasion when the aircraft could not be made serviceable within 
four days. An incident that did not meet these criteria could be included in a 
monthly return to be collated for statistical analysis.
When he saw the minute accompanying the suggested order, the DCAS Bill 
Bostock immediately picked the flaw. Reports were in effect to be censored before 
they had been seen by the Inspectorate of Air Accidents. But, as Bostock well 
understood, one of the most important functions of the IAA was to inform the 
Chief of the Air Staff, by personal investigation, of the state of flying discipline 
and maintenance at units in which accidents occurred. An accident might have 
a negligible outcome but still be symptomatic of a serious problem. The existing 
system should continue, he concluded. Risking the wrath of his superiors, the 
Director of Training, George Jones, replied that commanding officers must 
be considered reliable to decide what was a minor accident. Bostock smartly 
pushed the issue up to the CAS. He could be confident of the Chief’s response. 
‘I am afraid,’ Charles Burnett noted:
that the ability of officers commanding units is in doubt in some cases, 
and we cannot afford to lessen up, in any way, the supervision.
Over the last two months the average over the months is one accident a 
day, and I do not think that will congest our lines of communication. I 
therefore wish that the old order should stand for the present.48
47 War Cabinet Minutes, 10 Sept. 1940, NAA: A2673, 359; NAA A1196, 37/501/14; Sec., Dept of Defence 
Co-ordination to Sec., Dept of Air, secret, 4 Oct. 1940, NAA: A705, 231/8/7 Pt 1.
48 ‘Reporting of Flying Accidents AFO’s 10/D/21 and 18/E/1’, NAA: A705, 32/10/2240.
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George Jones: always looking for ways of reducing the accident rate
(Courtesy of the RAAF Museum)  
Harry Wrigley: urged the ‘elimination of reckless pilots and pupils’
(Courtesy of the RAAF Museum)
Burnett was struggling to construct a coherent policy. No sooner had he 
called into question the ability of some unit commanders, he was insisting in 
December that squadron commanders were immediately to review the flying 
ability of all pilots under their command. Below-average pilots were to be given 
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
606
every opportunity to gain flying experience ‘preferably with the minimum 
crew compatible with the duty to be carried out, under the strict supervision 
of the flight commander’. For new pilots special attention was to be given 
to supervising their conversion course; they should have ‘ample solo flying 
experience before carrying a crew’.49
Trying to prevent accidents by inexperienced pilots was only a partial solution. 
Men who should have known better were also a big part of the problem. So 
worrisome were ongoing breaches of flying discipline that stringent action 
was demanded. The number of accidents attributed to ‘flying indiscipline’ had 
reached such proportions early in 1941 that the CAS conferred with Bostock, 
Murphy, Knight, Winneke, and Reg Leonard — the Air Member for Personnel 
and the Director of Training being noteworthy absentees — on means of 
preventing breaches. A confidential order followed, calling for increased 
severity of sentences in ‘flagrant cases’; ‘punishment must be deterrent, as well 
as corrective’. ‘It must be borne in mind,’ the new AMP Harry Wrigley wrote, 
‘that, although there is a shortage of pilots, the efficiency of the Service may 
be increased by the elimination of reckless pilots and pupils who endanger the 
lives of themselves and others and hazard the safety of their aircraft.’ 
Paddy Heffernan, enjoined by George Jones ‘to take any measures to keep the 
accident rate down’ at the newly opened No. 4 Service Flying Training School, 
instituted his own draconian punishment: wrongdoers in Geraldton, careless 
or disobedient, would be fined 14 days’ pay. But this was local practice not a 
Service policy. For court-martial offences, it was decided to publish the charge 
and sentence. Publicising the fate of miscreants would serve the additional 
purpose, valuable to both the higher command and the government, of deflecting 
perceptions that the fault lay in the equipment or the training regime.50
Official anxiety about public perceptions was matched by a growing realisation 
that pupil pilots themselves were arriving at Service Flying Training Schools 
‘impressed with the idea that certain types of Service aircraft are difficult and 
dangerous to fly’. The Hudson was implied but not named. What had emerged 
was that these impressions emanated from instructors at the Elementary Flying 
Schools, ‘invariably’ men who had never flown the types they were talking 
about. The ‘misleading and inaccurate statements’ were lowering morale and 
detrimentally affecting pupils’ flying. Commanding officers were enjoined to put 
a stop to dissemination of false information by personnel in their units. And, 
49 ‘Prevention of Flying Accidents by Inexperienced Pilots’, A.B.O. N.817, 6 Dec. 1940,  NAA: A705, 
32/10/2943, in A705, 231/8/7/ Pt 1.
50 P. G. Heffernan in Stand-To, Oct–Dec. 1966; A.F.C.O. 4,5,/41, NAA: A7674, 1/170–1, 209; A705, 231/8/7 Pt 1.
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doubtless in the hope that their efforts would not actually foster the fear they 
were meant to diminish, the order was to be brought to the notice of squadron 
and flight commanders ‘but not to personnel holding lesser appointments’.51
Restriction of what was to be said outside the walls of central and area 
headquarters reflected another acute outbreak of blame-shifting between the 
Directors of Training and Technical Services. On reading the report of his 
Accident Inspectorate in January 1941, the Chief of the Air Staff seized on 
Group Captain Murphy’s analysis indicating that nearly 19 per cent of accidents 
the previous month were attributable to ‘equipment’ and ‘maintenance’. The 
number of preventable accidents is still too high, Burnett minuted. Ellis Wackett 
put up a provocative defence of maintenance standards. ‘My general impression 
after going into these statistics fairly carefully,’ he wrote, ‘is that many of the 
accidents seem to be due to failure on the part of the pilot to carry out simple 
elementary acts such as turning on the petrol cock.’
Better instruction rather than disciplinary action, appears the only 
course likely to improve this position. Whilst I deprecate spreading 
rumours, yet I feel that I should state that I learned, with great surprise, 
during the last few days that certain pilots who were just about to finish 
their flying course (on Ansons) in their Advanced Training Squadron of 
a S.F.T.S. did not even know that the engine in an Anson is a Cheetah. 
If this indicates the amount of material information that these pilots are 
receiving apart from actually handling the aeroplane’s controls, then it is 
not surprising that they fail to turn on a petrol cock as they are probably 
not at all clear that the aeroplane requires petrol to remain in the air.
George Jones, as Director of Training, was quick to reply that you didn’t need to 
know the name of an engine to understand how it worked. But he acknowledged 
that the 58 per cent of accidents designated by the Accident Inspectorate as 
‘personal’ and ‘training’ occurred through disobedience of orders or poor flying 
techniques. 
Disciplinary action was invariably taken when pilots had transgressed. But 
‘poor flying technique’ was, he argued, ‘brought about mainly through the rate 
at which we are expanding’. He had been making the same point since the 
beginning of 1940. Instructors with very little experience were being used. 
Sending Central Flying School Instructors to detect weak instructors was 
helping to improve standards. But it was not enough: ‘the more we force the 
pace the greater will be our accident rate’.52
51 ‘Adverse Criticism of Service Aircraft’, A.F.C.O., 2/41, 16 Jan. 1941, NAA: A7674, 1/206–7.
52 ‘Summary of Air Accidents Dec. 1940’, NAA: A705, 32/10/3110. Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story Book 
One, Ch. 5 summarises Hudson training to 1945.
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Bob Hitchcock successfully flew these 3 Ansons and 14 others 
(Courtesy of Bob Livingstone)
Jones might have been right about the ineluctable rise in accidents. But it did 
nothing to alleviate Burnett’s ‘grave concern’. All detected offences should 
result in punishment, he insisted, ‘whether resulting in injury or damage or 
not…I should like to feel assured that offenders have acted in full knowledge 
of the serious consequences likely to ensue to them, and in wilful defiance of 
their commanding officer, officers, and instructors.’ The Chief of the Air Staff 
and his advisers realised that threats were not enough. They knew that they 
were attempting to change a culture that was deeply engrained. In addition 
to a letter addressed to commanding officers of all units, Burnett took it upon 
himself to prepare a statement for distribution throughout the Service. It was to 
be read to all trainees at the end of their courses at Initial Training Schools and 
at the beginning of their subsequent elementary and service flying courses. In 
all other units it was to be ‘brought to the notice of all flying personnel’.
Six paragraphs of persuasion distilled Burnett’s argument. First was an appeal 
to logic. Flying orders were the result of ‘the combined wisdom of persons with 
years of experience in all the varied aspects of flying and common sense alone 
dictates that they are not to be disregarded because of the inclinations, or conceit, 
of some particular individual’. Then came an ethical proposition: ‘No person 
has in time of peace, let alone in time of war, the right to kill or injure himself, 
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much less…to cause death or injury to others.’ Then shame. Other people’s lives 
and health were entrusted to pilots: ‘any pilot who betrays that trust through 
breach of orders is not fit to take his place in the pilot’s seat’. Patriotism was next. 
A member of the Service who caused ‘wanton destruction’ was hindering the 
war effort ‘just as effectively and in some cases more effectively, than the enemy 
agent or saboteur’. Service pride followed. It was up to everyone to ensure that 
the good name of the RAAF was not sullied: ‘Low flying and other breaches 
of discipline which cause loss damage and grief to civilians must eventually 
lower the prestige of the Service in the eyes of the community.’ Finally there 
was the prospect of retribution. Men had already been fined and imprisoned. 
They had been stopped from obtaining a commission. But flagrant breaches 
were still occurring. There was no alternative, Burnett concluded, but to make 
the punishments increasingly severe, including discharge from the Service, 
publicised throughout the Service and in the press.53
Evidently at their wits’ end to prevent low aerobatics and unauthorised low 
flying, RAAF headquarters came up with another idea a couple of months later. 
It was issued over the signature of George Jones as Director of Training for the 
Air Member for Personnel. The gravity of the present national emergency, Jones 
announced, demanded ‘every effort to conserve both aircraft and personnel’. 
Therefore it was proposed to introduce an honour system:
Commanding officers are to interview each of their pilots, explain the 
urgent necessity for conserving both themselves and their aircraft, 
and request each pilot individually to give his word of honour not 
intentionally to break any flying regulation, order or instruction.
If any pilot was not prepared to give his word, the matter was to be referred 
immediately to Headquarters. What Jones had not expected was that some COs 
might require signed undertakings rather than a quiet ‘verbal assurance’. Nor 
that a cantankerous officer with nothing to lose might conscientiously decline. 
At 40, Dr Clyde Cornwall Fenton OBE, with 2600 hours in light aircraft as the 
celebrated pioneer of the Northern Territory Aerial Medical Service, was now 
a general duties flying officer at No. 3 Elementary Flying Training School. 
Fenton envisaged a number of occasions when the letter if not the spirit of 
regulations might be broken so as ‘not to retard instruction unduly’. While 
expressing his dismay at an attitude ‘unexpected in an officer of Flying Officer 
Fenton’s standing’, Jones realised that a conciliatory course was called for. He 
might have known that 10 years earlier Fenton had resigned an RAF commission 
over a disagreement about regulations. In a memorandum copied to Southern 
Area headquarters, Jones stressed that the intention had always been ‘to make 
obedience to flying orders and regulations a personal matter between the pilots 
53 CAS, ‘Maintenance of Flying Discipline’, 20 Jan. 1941, NAA: A705, 231/8/7 Pt 1.
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and their commanding officers and to impress on the minds of all pilots that 
intentional disobedience of orders is a dishonourable thing’. There would 
always be borderline cases: ‘the test is the intention underlying the act…any 
reasonable variation of flying orders applied intelligently and in a co-operative 
spirit should never be regarded as evidence of the intention to break an order’. 
All ended well and Fenton finished the war as a squadron leader still recognised 
by his commanding officers as a man of fixed opinions with ‘a tendency to go 
his own way’.54
For the wartime RAAF, flying accidents would continue to be an intractable 
concern. The inquiries into the crash of A16-97 had unintentionally revealed 
how little was yet understood about why some accidents occurred. The focus 
continued on trying to determine whether a pilot was at fault. In April 1941, a 
new system was introduced in which an entry was to be made in a pilot’s log 
book in relation to any accident for which he was considered ‘blameworthy’. 
The assessment would refer to (a) inexperience (b) error of judgment (c) 
carelessness (d) gross carelessness (e) disobedience. Entries in categories (a) and 
(b) would be in black ink; the others in red. There was a further taxonomy 
of ‘accident causes’ which would be classified as ‘taxying’, taking off, over-
shooting, heavy landing, faulty cockpit drill, air collision, forced landing (lost, 
fuel exhausted, etc.), low aerobatics, and unauthorised low flying. Even if a 
breach of flying discipline did not result in an accident, the same procedure 
would be followed in the hope of reducing accidents for which pilots were to 
blame — and all ‘without loss of initiative or enterprise’. As it had occurred to 
the Air Member for Personnel that putting pilots in fear of red ink might have 
adverse consequences in some circumstances, the system was not to apply in 
cases of flights in ‘operational missions’. These were omitted ‘in order to foster 
the present high standard of self-reliance and initiative’.
Bemusing as all this might be, the AMP concluded that each pilot who had a 
‘clean’ log book would be afforded ‘a sense of pride additional to that in his 
own positive war service, that no fault of his has detracted from the war effort 
of the Nation as a whole’. Here were well-intentioned men at the pinnacle 
of a burgeoning organisation floundering for insight into the behaviour and 
motivation of thousands of new volunteer subordinates. They were overwhelmed 
by a sea of anonymity where just two years earlier they had known by name 
every pilot in their fraternity.55
54 NAA: A9300, FENTON CC; Brian Reid, ‘Fenton, Clyde Cornwall (1901–1982)’, Langmore (ed.), Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, vol.17, p.382; Neil Follett, ‘Oswald Watt Medal Dr. Clyde Cornwall Fenton 1937’, 
Aviation Heritage, vol.42, no.3 Sept. 2011, pp.107–8; N. M. Parnell, ‘Trials and Tribulations in the Top End’, 
Aviation Heritage, vol.43, no.1, March 2012, pp.30–6.
55 By 1943 a punch-card system for analysing aircraft accident data allocated percentages to fourteen 
categories of cause. Six related to personnel (error of judgement, poor technique, disobedience of orders, 
carelessness or negligence, errors of supervisory personnel, errors of other personnel); three to material 
(structural, power plant, and instrument failure); and five miscellaneous (weather, darkness, airport or terrain, 
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Better understanding
Harry Wrigley’s endorsement of eliminating ‘reckless pilots and pupils’ was one 
solution. Something could also be done about what was going into the minds of 
trainee pilots. And, as George Jones would clarify a month later, pupils ‘should 
never be punished where accidents result solely from lack of ability’.56 However, 
no-one doubted that it would be better if candidates who might prove a danger 
to others as well as themselves could be screened out before they were accepted 
into the Service. Good pilots were a scarce resource in wartime. Interviews, 
references, physical requirements, and police checks would weed out some 
obviously unsuitable applicants. Beyond that there was some primitive science. 
In 1932 an attempt had been made by the RAAF to assist aircrew selection by 
correlating reaction times to the ability to learn to fly. It would be some years 
before it was realised that rapid reactions might lead to speedy execution of bad 
decisions.
In striving to improve the selection of men for flying training, as well as to 
understand what had gone wrong when crashes did occur, attention turned 
belatedly to research on the character, temperament, and personality of pilots. 
In explaining accidents, pilot error was the residual explanatory category when 
no mechanical fault, environmental calamity, or physical infirmity could be 
found. But what if it were possible reliably to identify candidates who were less 
likely to be successful in the air and exclude them before they became a hazard 
to themselves and others?
In the United States, where aviation medicine was already an expanding 
specialty, it was recognised, in the words of the leading authorities, that ‘those 
qualities which determine the probable success or failure of a candidate for 
flying training have not as yet been accurately defined’.57 The RAAF did not 
pay close attention to American developments, depending rather on liaison 
with the RAF for exchanges of medical officers and advice on medical matters. 
In Britain as well as Australia there had been an almost exclusive reliance on 
subjective assessments of the personal characteristics of potential recruits. The 
value of professional inquiry into the psychology and physiology of pilots had 
been neglected. Giving evidence to one of the 1939 Courts of Inquiry, Wing 
Commander John McCauley, CO of the cadet wing, disclosed:
other, obscure). Lockheed Hudson A16 [Accidents Part 3], NAA: A9845, 136. For thinking six decades later, 
see A Guide for the Conduct of Investigations into ADF Aviation Safety Occurrences Classed as Incidents or 
Serious Incidents, Dec. 2003.
56 The documents quoted in the preceding seven paragraphs are all in NAA: A705, 231/8/7 Pt 1.
57 Harry G. Armstrong, Principles and Practice of Aviation Medicine, Williams & Wilkins Co., Baltimore, 
1943 (1st ed. 1939), p.147. Armstrong p.440: ‘pilot error accounts for about 50 per cent of all accidents’.
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Although trainees were selected only after personal interviews in which 
an effort was made to judge their ability to stand up to stress, an average 
of 15 to 20 trainees were found toward the end of the dual-flying stage 
not to have shown natural aptitude for flying.
It was his responsibility to determine whether they were up to the 
standard but the Air Board decided whether they were to be given 
further training or dismissed.58
A frustrated British authority, F. C. Bartlett, Professor of Experimental 
Psychology at Cambridge University, had surveyed ‘Psychology and the Royal 
Air Force’ in 1937. Speaking of the period when Bob Hitchcock was a cadet 
in training, Bartlett pointed out that 20 per cent of candidates for RAF short-
service commissions who passed the initial medical examination had to be 
rejected after a period of preliminary instruction. Steps were being taken to 
assess intelligence and motor co-ordination, but there were more profound 
problems that awaited systematic research. Having studied instructors’ reports 
Bartlett noted that in some cases ‘all the necessary capabilities are present, but 
something prevents them from coming into operation under certain conditions’:
A man has everything necessary in the way of natural fitness and 
acquired skill, but when he is confronted by unusual conditions, in a 
moment of stress, through unusual susceptibility to fatigue, when the 
tempo of his reactions must be radically changed, or for a variety of other 
reasons, his inherent ability and skill seem to desert him. Failure of this 
kind may be merely incidental to a stage of training. But it may also be 
persistent, inescapable, a part of a man’s temperament or character.
In Germany at around the same time authorities were beginning to talk about 
how medical officers could help in developing a better understanding of ‘errors 
of judgment’. The Australian CAS had brought to his desk a synopsis of an 
article urging ‘psycho-analytical treatment’ of the pilot to ‘throw light on his 
mental worries’.59 The objective would be to discriminate between cases of what 
in everyday language might be described as a nervous breakdown and others 
that were better characterised as over-compensation for an inferiority complex. 
But, as the Psychiatric Section of the Victorian Branch of the British Medical 
Association observed in mid-1940, Australian authorities were giving no lead 
58 The Argus, 8 June 1939. In a paper for the Institute of Engineers Aeronautical Branch in November 1932 
S/Ldr Bostock said that on average about 3 per cent of applicants were considered suitable for selection for 
an Air Force flying course; of those selected, approximately 20 per cent were discarded during the first three 
months as ‘unlikely to become efficient Air Force pilots’ (Ellison MSS NLA MS 1882 7/215).
59 H. V. Diringshofen, ‘The Special Duties of a Medical Officer Attached to a Squadron’, Luftwer, 5 (8), Aug. 
1938, pp.324–6, Extract from Scientific and Technical Press, Oct. 1938, Williams MSS, RAAF Museum. For 
the role of psychologists in German Army and RAF officer selection, see John James, The Paladins: A Social 
History of the RAF up to the outbreak of World War II, Macdonald, London, 1990, pp.200–2.
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to those with special knowledge of psychiatry and psychotherapy about how 
they might best serve.60 The psychiatric professionals might have guessed at the 
sceptical concern expressed by Victor Hurley, the Director-General of Medical 
Services, to the Air Force’s principal legal officer Fred Knight that psychiatrists 
‘would make life difficult for those trying to enforce discipline’.61
Old ways were ingrained. The president of the RAF’s Central Medical Board, 
Group Captain Raymond Ryan, who was appointed early in 1940 to organise 
a medical service for the Royal Canadian Air Force, encapsulated conventional 
attitudes in an address to the Canadian Medical Association in June 1940:
A hard and fast rule cannot be laid down, but those with successes in 
team games are preferable to those of the solitary type — the full back at 
rugby and hockey, or the stroke of a crew, are selected for their stability 
and reliability. It is not prejudice but experience which prompts the 
statement that the man whose only hobby is stamp-collecting or music 
more frequently breaks down than his more versatile brother…While a 
man’s hobbies alone should not militate against his acceptance, one has a 
certain suspicion about him, as his type frequently develops an anxiety 
state.62
Little wonder that sharper minds would say that authorities were generally 
agreed that ‘the pilot’s nervous and emotional stability is of prime importance, 
while…the existing tests for its estimation are inadequate and actually misleading 
in some cases’.63 Change was coming, slowly. In Britain Professor Bartlett had 
been heeded.64 From early 1940 the RAF Aviation Candidate Selection Board 
had begun to use a battery of 12 aptitude tests developed by the Cambridge 
Psychological Laboratory to assist in discriminating between potential fighter 
and bomber pilots.65 In Melbourne an RAAF Medical Training Unit had been 
60 H. Selby Link to the Editor, 12 June 1940, Medical Journal of Australia, I, 26, 29 June 1940, pp.912–3.
61 Knight, These Things Happened, p.344.
62 GpCpt. R. W. Ryan, ‘Medical Aspects of the Air Force’, Canadian Medical Association Journal, vol. 43, 
1940, p.317.
63 M. R. Harrower-Erickson, ‘Psychological Factors in Aviation’, Canadian Medical Association Journal, vol. 
44, 1941, p.350; Lt Cmdr R. Barry Bigelow, ‘The Evaluation of Aptitude for Flight Training: The Rorschach 
Method as a Possible Aid’, Journal of Aviation Medicine, vol.11, 1940, pp.202–9.
64 Bartlett argued in secret notes in late 1940 that it was time to think of flying accidents ‘less as a problem 
of training than as one of the lapses which even the most highly trained skill [sic] are likely to suffer’ (NAA: 
A705, 43/1/674).
65 The USAAF would also soon adopt an ‘adaptability rating for military aeronautics aptitude’ (Louis 
Hopewell Bauer, ed. Henry A. Christian, Aviation Medicine, Oxford University Press, New York, 1943, 
pp.568–9). For later US developments: Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel, Men Under Stress, Blakiston, 
Philadelphia, 1945. For Bartlett’s research program and conclusions on the continuing inadequacy of accident 
investigation reports: D. Russell Davis, Pilot Error: Some Laboratory Experiments, HMSO, London, 1948. On 
RAF scepticism about the pre-selection testing regime and the development of alternative approaches, see T. 
M. Gibson and M. H Harrison, Into Thin Air: A History of Aviation Medicine in the RAF, Robert Hale, London, 
1984, pp.238–54; Philip E. Vernon and John B. Parry, Personnel Selection in the British Forces, Uni. of London 
Press, 1949, pp.67–82; R. N. Ironside and I. R. C. Batchelor, Aviation Neuro-Psychiatry, E. & S. Livingstone, 
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established, and was followed near the end of 1940 by the creation of a Flying 
Personnel Research Committee personally chaired by the Director-General of 
Medical Services. However, even the limited insights into aptitude and ‘defects 
of personality’ that the committee and its network of researchers developed 
would come a decade too late to benefit Bob Hitchcock and his fellow cadets 
from the class that graduated in 1936.66
In considering the question of accidents, Frederic Bartlett had observed that it 
was usual to think in terms of ‘accident proneness’. An accident-prone person 
would have more accidents than others of similar background in comparable 
circumstances. ‘It is clear,’ he pronounced, ‘that no “accident-prone individual” 
could possibly go very far as a flying officer.’ Yet this was precisely what some 
of his contemporaries maintained was what had happened to Bob Hitchcock. 
If it were true, was it simply a triumph of hope over experience? Did the sense 
of obligation to his family outweigh what could be thought to be remediable 
lapses? Or had some fundamental problems been overlooked? Bartlett’s list 
of ‘outstanding significant temperamental qualities’ might well have been 
assembled with Hitchcock in mind:
impetuosity or caution; suggestibility or contrariness; capacity to move 
rapidly from one type of adjustment to a different one; ability to translate 
what has been learned in one medium into a different medium…power to 
remain cool-headed and steady whenever the normal tempo of reactions 
is radically altered; sociability.
On all of these criteria a shrewd assessor might have had doubts about Bob 
Hitchcock. But an undeniable truth had to be confronted. In spite of any 
shortcomings he might have had in the qualities deemed essential for a good 
pilot, Hitchcock had survived five years of regular flying and his career in 
the Service had prospered. For the four years from 1935, when he began his 
training, to 1938 there had been 18 fatal Air Force accidents with 26 deaths 
(two of them a civilian mother and daughter). Another nine men were seriously 
injured.67 If earlier fears about his flying had persisted, it would have been 
possible at any time to assign him to station or headquarters duties to which 
minimal risk attached. From the outbreak of war onwards there were many 
Edinburgh, 1945; Psychological Disorders in Flying Personnel of the Royal Air Force investigated during the 
war 1939–1945, Air Ministry Air Publication 3139, HMSO, London, 1947; Mark K. Wells, Courage and Air 
Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War, Frank Cass, London, 1995.
66 AVM E. A. Daley, ‘Aviation Medicine Progress in Australia over Twenty-Five Years’, Journal of Aviation 
Medicine, vol.25, Oct. 1954, pp.451–6; ‘Flying Personnel Research Committee — Medical aspects of aircraft 
crashes’, NAA: A705, 43/1/674; Allan S. Walker, Medical Services of the R.A.N. and R.A.A.F., Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra, 1961, pp.324–5; D. P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry, Australian War Memorial, 
1958, pp.186–7.
67 Mark Lax, ‘The Impact of Technology and Command on No 1 Squadron Operations 1915–1958’, MA 
Hons thesis, University College of University of New South Wales, 1995, pp.91–4.
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more posts in administration, recruiting, and flying instruction than men to fill 
them. Instead, Hitchcock had been one of the first to be put in charge of the Air 
Force’s newest and most demanding aircraft, and to be given the task of guiding 
less experienced men as they joined his squadron. No one who graduated with 
him in July 1936 had passed him in seniority. Somehow it was overlooked by 
many that while he ascended a dangerous competitive ladder 10 per cent of his 
contemporaries had fallen by the wayside.
There was of course an explanation for Hitchcock’s longevity in the Service. As 
the Air Board had pointed out in 1938 in its refutation of Sir Edward Ellington’s 
conclusions about RAAF accident rates, of the 12 cases he examined eight had 
involved pilots with less than two years’ experience, and two were cadets under 
instruction. The probability of fatal accidents clearly shrank with each year of 
experience.68 What no-one in the upper ranks of the RAAF wanted to say in the 
spring of 1940 was that the man they held responsible for the crash that killed 
their own Minister as well as nine other men was in fact one of their better 
pilots.
68 ‘Report of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward L. Ellington…on the Royal Australian Air Force 
together with the Comments of the Air Board and the Civil Aviation Board and the Decisions and Observations 





26. ‘That terrible hour’
Three Cabinet Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff killed. Six others 
dead, flight crew and staff. A terrible inexplicable accident. A story so shocking 
and sensational galvanised the press. There was a scramble for photographs. 
Cinesound and Movietone newsreel cameramen sped to the scene. Eye-
witnesses, people who were happy to tell of what they had seen, would be 
questioned repeatedly over the next few days by official investigators as well 
as journalists. Others in demand by the newspapers were those whose good 
fortune it had been to choose to travel to Canberra another way for the meeting 
on August 13. No major accident story was complete without expressions of 
relief and thanksgiving from those who might have been victims.
After the radio stations, the Tuesday afternoon papers had the news out first. 
They were wrong to report, as ‘The Hand of Fate’, that Sir Henry Gullett 
had planned to fly up with Jim Fairbairn in his own plane but that both men 
changed their minds at the last moment so that they could travel with Sir 
Brudenell White.1 It was closer to the mark to say that the Minister for Customs, 
Senator George McLeay, was to have travelled by the ill-fated plane, as a ‘special 
representative’ of the Melbourne Herald reported on the afternoon of the 
crash. Geoffrey Street had telephoned McLeay on Monday asking if he would 
like to join him on the flight to Canberra. McLeay declined the invitation, the 
reporter was told, because he had planned a long conference on the train with 
his departmental head, the Controller-General of Customs. Not quite true. The 
meeting, according to the Minister’s private secretary, Bob Willoughby, had 
been with some ‘motor car people’ on the way up to Albury. McLeay had kept 
his options open until the afternoon, deciding finally not to take up the offer. 
The prospect of a post-prandial brandy and cigar in the parlor car might have 
tipped the balance. Before Willoughby could call Dick Elford to tell him that 
the seats were not required, Fairbairn himself rang to ask whether McLeay still 
wanted them. Fairbairn was relieved to find that they would be free because 
‘we’re taking Brudenell White up with us’.2 McLeay was to be one of Fairbairn’s 
pallbearers on August 15.
The Assistant Treasurer, Arthur Fadden, one of the first to hear the news at 
Parliament House, had also been invited by Fairbairn to join the party, but was 
already booked on the train. By the time the Herald appeared on Melbourne’s 
streets, Fadden was acting Minister for Air. The Canberra Times explained the 
next day that it was ‘inconvenient to cancel the seat’. Fadden later recalled that 
he had been asked by Fairbairn to give up his seat for Elford so that Elford could 
1 Advocate (Burnie), 14 Aug. 1940.
2 J. R. Willoughby, interview, 18 Oct. 1977.
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stay in Melbourne on the night of August 12 to celebrate the first anniversary 
of his wedding. Like many of Fadden’s autobiographical memories it was a 
good story marred only by its comprehensive inaccuracy: the Elfords had been 
married in November 1931.3 No other high-profile escapes were reported. Some 
fateful decisions rested on personal preferences; some on unavoidable alternative 
arrangements. But for others a different element played its part.
For one very important person who most certainly could have had a seat, there 
was no hint in the press of the events that led to his absence from the flight. 
On the afternoon of Monday, 12 August 1940, Murray Tyrrell, the Minister 
for Air’s messenger, assistant to his private secretary, was in his office at 
Victoria Barracks on St Kilda Road, Melbourne. An unenthusiastic Tyrrell had 
been chosen to join Fairbairn’s official staff in July 1939. Until then Tyrrell’s 
acquaintance with federal politics had been limited. He had been ruled out of 
order at an election meeting in East Malvern for the neophyte UAP candidate 
Harold Holt when asking ‘socialistic questions he couldn’t answer’. Then, as a 
17-year-old he had been dislodged from a soapbox outside a baby health centre 
in Caulfield and frogmarched home by a police sergeant — his offence being 
to draw a bigger crowd than Harry Gullett, who was speaking at the markets 
across the road. Tyrrell was an unabashed socialist but had learned not to let his 
political convictions contaminate his public service life. He had been personally 
interviewed for the job with the Minister by A. B. Corbett, the Director-General 
of the new Department of Civil Aviation. Arthur Corbett had known of him 
previously in the central office of the Postmaster-General’s Department. His 
quixotic brief from Corbett was to ‘make sure that Fairbairn doesn’t do anything 
I wouldn’t approve’.
Among Tyrrell’s newer duties was allocating spare seats on RAAF flights 
arranged for the Air Minister.4 As the time for his chief to return to Canberra 
grew closer, he had an eventful few days. Fairbairn himself, his close friend 
Street, and Tyrrell’s immediate superior, Elford, were all issuing invitations 
to join the flight. Some ministers temporised. Others declined. Nothing was 
settled until it was known who had opted for a Monday night rail journey 
and the train had actually departed. Meanwhile, those who minded the mighty 
could exert such influence as their seniority gave them. Naturally, if the Prime 
Minister wanted a seat on a flight, he took precedence over others in the queue 
or already allotted a place. Knowing that the new Hudson offered superior 
3 Sir Arthur Fadden, They called me Artie, Jacaranda Press, Milton, Q, 1969, p.43. Fadden’s false memory of 
Elford’s supposed first wedding anniversary is quoted by Tink (Air Disaster, p.163), who omits ‘first’ but does 
not notice the wrong month as well as the nearly nine years since the Elford wedding.
4 ‘VIP’, though not yet coined in 1940, is believed to have been the creation of a British officer responsible 
for organising wartime flights for ‘very important personages’ whose safety might be preserved by anonymity. 
For R. G. Casey on a Vip [sic] flight taking the controls of an RAAF Sunderland, a type he had never flown: 
Army News (Darwin), 31 July 1944.
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speed and more comfortable seating than the planes previously used, the Prime 
Minister’s assistant private secretary Peter Looker thought it sensible to reserve 
two berths on the flight. He himself disliked nights on the train, often sleepless. 
What happened next was recalled by Looker:
Dick Elford, Jim Fairbairn’s private secretary…came along to me and 
said ‘how are you going back to Canberra? Are you going back tonight?’ 
And I said ‘Yes we are, blast it all we’re going and we’re going to sit 
up all night.’ He said ‘Well look, why don’t you come up with us in 
the morning?’ And I said ‘How are you going?’ And he said, ‘Well the 
minister is going to fly up again in a RAAF plane, a Lockheed Hudson, 
and why don’t you come with us?’ I said ‘that is an excellent idea…what 
time are you leaving?’ He said ‘Well we’re leaving I think at about eight 
o’clock or half past eight…’ So I said, ‘Well that’s fine…would you tell 
the minister…that the P.M. and I would like to come up too.’ So he said 
‘Sure I will.’
By this time the P. M. had gone home to 10 Howard St Kew. I rang him 
through, and I said ‘Look instead of going by train tonight’ — this was 
about four o’clock on Sunday [sic] afternoon — ‘the Minister for Air is 
flying up tomorrow morning in a RAAF plane. I’ve suggested that he 
reserve two seats for you and I.’ I got the full blast: ‘We will go by train!’ 
So I said ‘Alright.’ So I had to ring up Dick Elford and say: ‘Look, cancel 
it, the old man won’t agree, we’re going up by train.’5
Why did Menzies blast Looker for arranging to fly to Canberra? As a minister 
and Prime Minister he flew when he had to. Alfred Stirling, one of his last 
legal pupils and his first private secretary in Canberra, recalled that Menzies 
had done some private flying with Sir Chester Manifold when both were in 
the Victorian Parliament. On the Attorney-General’s European trip in 1938 he 
noted that Bob and Pattie Menzies flew in separate planes. When Stirling, by 
then working with Stanley Bruce in London, joined them on a visit to Holland 
and Germany, it seemed that Menzies sensed that it was the fastidious bachelor 
Stirling’s first flight. He murmured reassuring words that it would be alright.6
Sympathetic as he could be to a nervous flyer like Stirling, Menzies’ sentiment 
was not based on any particular knowledge of aircraft. The Prime Minister’s 
lack of curiosity about aviation matters was confirmed by Lawrence Coombes 
of the CSIR Aeronautical Research Laboratory at Fisherman’s Bend. On a visit 
to CSIR in 1939 Menzies called briefly at the Division of Aeronautics after a 
5 Sir Cecil (‘Peter’) Looker, interview, 25 March 1976. Looker had told the story in similar words to Alan 
Hodgart in 1975 (NLA Oral TRC 370). The incident is referred to in Michael McKernan, The Strength of a 
Nation, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2008, pp.96–7.
6 Alfred Stirling, interview, 14 May 1976.
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morning with the Division of Industrial Chemistry. He met Coombes and three 
or four of the senior staff and left showing ‘no interest in aeronautical research 
or aircraft manufacture’. If he was aware that Coombes was a decorated wartime 
RAF ace with 15 confirmed victories, and a former member of a ‘joy-ride outfit’ 
with Charles Kingsford-Smith, he did not show it.7
From the public record there was nothing to indicate that Menzies was reluctant 
to fly. In February 1939, he was booked, with Jack McEwen, George McLeay, 
Hattil Foll and their wives, Dick Casey and Vic Thorby, on an Australian National 
Airways flight from Launceston to Melbourne after a Cabinet meeting in Hobart 
and a brief tour of the Tasmanian northwest coast.8 In July 1939 he travelled by 
air from Sydney to Melbourne and then spent 10 days on a tour of South and 
Western Australia. Five months later, he flew by airliner from Melbourne to 
Sydney to attend a farewell dinner to Bertram ‘Tubby’ Stevens, the ex-Premier 
of New South Wales. In April 1940 he had even ventured to join Geoff Street 
in a flight from Canberra to Melbourne piloted by Jim Fairbairn. Fairbairn had 
landed the plane on a makeshift landing ground at Seymour to enable Street to 
visit the Puckapunyal Army camp.9 It was perhaps Fairbairn’s last flight in the 
Dragonfly before handing it in for government use. An Argus photographer was 
there to capture the moment with the Prime Minister in the cockpit with the 
pilot.
Menzies flew on other occasions. But the truth was that he never liked flying.10 
His Cabinet colleague Tom White had enjoyed a pleasant flight to Canberra with 
him one morning in September 1937 and could not resist retailing to his wife 
‘The legal gentleman informed me that his feet were very cold — apparently 
chronic since 1914!’11 Nothing illustrates Menzies’ aversion better than a 
memorable incident early in 1940 recalled by his assistant private secretary. At 
the last moment one Friday afternoon, Menzies decided that he wanted to go 
with his wife by train from Canberra to Melbourne for the weekend. Despite 
the best efforts of his staff, including a personal appeal by Peter Looker to the 
NSW Railways Commissioner T. J. Hartigan, there were no seats — all had been 
commandeered by the Services. No carriage could be added. It would have 
required a second engine and extra coal that would not be approved because of 
a fuel conservation policy caused by the miners’ strike. What happened next is 
best told in Looker’s own words:
7 L. P. Coombes  to CH, 7 May 1982; ‘Research Head Arrives’, Aircraft, vol. 18 (6), 1 March 1939, p.7; C. B. 
Schedvin, Shaping Science and Industry: A History of Australia’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 
1926–49, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987, pp.195–201.
8 ‘Cabinet Meetings in Tasmania’, NAA: A461, AC4/1/3.
9 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 Dec. 1939; The Argus, 13 April 1940.
10 Menzies’ flight to Melbourne from Canberra, The Advertiser, 11 May 1940; Looker, interview, 25 March 1976.
11 T. W. White to Vera White, 13 Sept. 1937, T. W. White MSS, NLA MS9148/2/2.
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I rang up what was then Australian National Airways — they used to 
run DC-3s from Canberra to Melbourne — and told them the problem 
and I said would you have three seats available tomorrow morning? And 
they said, yes certainly, we’ll make them available for you. So I thought 
I had shown a lot of initiative and I walked into the P.M.’s office about 
five or half past five, told him the story, that there were no seats on the 
train and we’d fly down in the morning and we’d get there just about the 
same time as if we’d sat up all night.
Well, at that he let fly. He thumped the table and he said: ‘Look, I am 
Prime Minister of this country. Do you mean to tell me that I cannot 
have a seat on that train tonight?’ And I said, ‘well that’s what I have 
been told, and there’s nothing I can do about it, and nothing that the 
Chief Commissioner of Railways in New South Wales can do about it, 
and after all we’ll get down the same time and we’ll be able to sleep 
tonight.’ Of course he loathed air flying, he loathed flying…And he — 
oh he really tore strips off me.12
Once more having lambasted his young staff member for trying to get him to fly 
when it was not essential, Menzies arrived in Canberra early on the morning of 
August 13. ‘It was a bright and sunny day, and I was at work,’ he remembered. 
‘A knock came on my door, and somebody walked in. There had been a dreadful 
air crash, almost within sight of my windows.’ Murray Tyrrell, who had also 
come up by train — having bribed a railway porter with 10 shillings for seats 
for himself and Pip Hayter — brought the news to the Prime Minister.13 Tyrrell 
had accompanied his minister with Harry Gullett and others to Canberra in 
A16-97 the previous week.14 Shaken by the realisation of how close he himself 
had come to being one of those in the fallen plane, he told Menzies: ‘I suspected 
they had [all] died in the crash. I didn’t know. I rang him immediately I knew 
there was a crash, went and saw him in his office in Parliament House and said 
I was going out to check at…Canberra airport.’
Menzies was stunned. ‘Just absolutely stunned,’ Tyrrell recalled. The young 
assistant private secretary knew nothing of the abortive attempt by Elford 
and Looker to get the Prime Minister on to the aircraft the previous afternoon. 
Menzies himself said nothing about it. Looker too kept his counsel, realising at 
once that nothing good could come of such a revelation. Fifteen hours earlier he 
12 Looker, interview, 25 March 1976. On broader questions of transport co-ordination, an official postwar 
report concluded: ‘the railway systems did not altogether willingly accept the surrender of any of their normal 
functions to the Commonwealth’ (G. J. Christopherson, A Difficult Relationship: Defence and Civilian Transport 
Industry Relations since 1945, Defence Fellowship Paper, Melbourne, 1991, p.69).
13 N. D. Tanswell, ‘Forgotten Memorial’, triad, No. 18, Winter 1980, p.19.
14 Flying Log Book, W. P. Heath, 5 Aug. 1940, Heath MSS.
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had been ‘growling like mad’ with George McLeay’s secretary Bob Willoughby 
about ‘having to travel by train while others were lucky enough to get a plane 
trip up’.15 Tyrrell was grasping at wisps of hope as he told Menzies:
‘I can’t be certain.’ What happened was that I hadn’t heard the plane go 
over, you see. By this time I was already at Parliament House. So was 
Hayter. And I rang the control tower…And the control tower said ‘No 
it hasn’t arrived yet.’ And then he added almost like an afterthought, he 
said ‘But there’s a kite just gone into the hill about two miles away and 
I’ve sent an ambulance.’ I said ‘What sort of kite?’ He said ‘Oh, I think 
it was a RAAF Hudson.’ I said ‘You bloody fool, send four ambulances. 
There are thirteen or fourteen people on board.’  He said ‘Well, it’s too 
late’ or words to that effect, ‘it’s burning.’16 And it was.
The distress of the Prime Minister was palpable to all who saw him that day. 
He had not been to the scene of the accident. ‘He immediately drove out to 
Government House to interview the Governor-General on urgent constitutional 
questions,’ the Canberra Times reported the next morning. There were three 
ministerial appointments to be made and a Chief of the General Staff to replace. 
Speaking briefly to reporters on the afternoon of the crash he ‘was deeply 
distressed at the tragedy and made no effort to conceal his emotion’. ‘Mr 
Menzies Overcome’, the Barrier Miner headlined. ‘To me,’ he said, ‘it is a most 
grievous personal loss.’ The death of his three Cabinet colleagues ‘does not bear 
thinking about’. Menzies was seen to be ‘on the point of a breakdown on several 
occasions’. After a few sentences he broke off his statement, pausing for more 
than 10 seconds, and ‘brushing his hand distractedly across his forehead: “I 
am afraid I am not able to talk about it very much. It is a cruel blow.”’17 Tyrrell 
remembered the initial reaction of a man not quite in a state of shock but ‘more 
than upset to talk rationally about anything’.18
Menzies was to describe the event in his memoirs, Afternoon Light, published 
27 years later:
Gullett was dead; Street was dead; Fairbairn was dead; the most scholarly 
and technically talented soldier in Australian history, Sir Brudenell 
White, whom I had recalled from retirement to be Chief of the General 
Staff, was dead. And dead with them were other younger men whom I 
knew, and for whom I had an affection.
15 J. R. Willoughby, interview, 18 Oct. 1977.
16 Tyrrell told the story with slight variations to Lord Casey, 24 Oct. 1972 (NAA: M1129 WHITE/C B).
17 Sydney Morning Herald, The Examiner, The West Australian, 14 Aug. 1940.
18 Sir Murray Tyrrell, interview, 5 April 1977.
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This was a dreadful calamity, for my three colleagues were my close and 
loyal friends; each of them had a place not only in my Cabinet, but in my 
heart. I shall never forget that terrible hour; I felt that for me the end of 
the world had come.19
Late that night, among the messages of condolence despatched to the bereaved 
families, two telegrams to Audrey Elford were lodged for morning delivery. 
At 11.47 p.m. officials on behalf of the Commonwealth government conveyed 
deepest sympathy over the Prime Minister’s signature for the ‘tragic loss that 
you and all of us have suffered’. Three minutes later an obviously more personal 
message followed: ‘My wife and I are deeply distressed at today’s tragic disaster. 
We share to the depth your sorrow and grief...R G Menzies.’20
The next day, when he rose in the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister’s 
emotion could not be concealed. He had woken to news that German planes had 
for the third day in succession launched wave after wave of attacks on England. 
What would soon be known as the Battle of Britain was under way.21 Whatever 
Menzies knew and feared about the war above the clouds over the southeast of 
Britain, it was the previous day’s tragedy in Canberra that gripped his mind. 
If he believed what he read in the morning papers, his friends had been burnt 
to death: ‘had the fire not occurred the occupants would have survived’, The 
Argus reported. The Canberra Times ‘had learned’ that he had not known until 
the crash was reported that the ministerial party was travelling by air. At least 
one person in the Prime Minister’s office knew this to be false. Peter Looker was 
well aware that Jim Fairbairn was going to be aboard, even if he had not been 
told the names of the others. ‘I tried to speak about them,’ Menzies wrote, ‘…
It was difficult for me, and for all of us. In the whole history of government in 
Australia, this was the most devastating tragedy.’ Menzies had not been one to 
let the world see what was in his heart. ‘It was only in my later years that the 
feelings in me would occasionally break through,’ he admitted in retirement. 
Although, he said, he had ‘always had a lot of emotion in me, I learned to 
distrust its public expression’.22
On this occasion, there was genuine grief and little artifice. This was a man deeply 
distressed. The extent of the disturbance to his equanimity is glimpsed in the 
confusion he conveyed in Parliament about the widows of Frank Thornthwaite 
and Geoff Street. They were sisters, he said. The Canberra Times had said this 
that morning. A reporter had perhaps heard someone say they were like sisters. 
But Menzies should have known that they were cousins. The next day at St 
19 Sir Robert Gordon Menzies, Afternoon Light, Some Memories of Men and Events, Cassell, London, 1967, p.18.
20 Both telegrams were lodged at 10.50 p.m. Elford MSS. Punctuation added.
21 On Aug. 13 a vigilant censorship had prohibited publication of a photograph of bombed London 
buildings (NAA: A11666, 136).
22 Menzies, Afternoon Light, p.11.
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Paul’s, reporters noticed that he was ‘weary and haggard’.23 Nearly 30 years later 
he wrote of the three Cabinet colleagues: ‘I still mourn for them and carry them 
in my memory.’ The intensity of the feelings Menzies expressed, both in 1940 
and 1967, is unique. He spoke publicly of no-one else so movingly: ‘on that 
dreadful day I was sad beyond the powers of description; some of my greatest 
friends were gone’.
When I first read the eulogies and lament in Afternoon Light the revelation 
of anguish seemed out of character for a man who habitually hid his own 
sentiments. The questions I began to ask myself were the germ of the idea that 
impelled me to write this book. Was Menzies simply exhibiting the mixture 
of relief and guilt so often felt by those who might so easily have been among 
those who perished? Or was it something more? Did he ask, like Thornton 
Wilder’s Brother Juniper who had seen the bridge of San Luis Rey snap and 
precipitate five men and women to their deaths in the valley below: ‘Why did it 
happen to these people?’ Did he know of the possibility that the pilot’s control 
of the aircraft might have been compromised by Jim Fairbairn? If others were 
canvassing that disconcerting idea, could it have been kept from him? There is 
no evidence to confirm that Menzies was by then informed of the rumours that 
would soon be reverberating in parliamentary corridors and at dinner tables 
around the nation. But it seems at least a plausible inference that the stories had 
reached him. And, if they did, the question that he could scarcely avoid asking 
himself was: would Fairbairn have restrained his curiosity if the Prime Minister 
had been among the passengers? Were all those deaths the result of his own 
insistence on travelling by train? Had his aversion to flying caused 10 other men 
to die? The questions could be asked. There could be no certain answers.
The public mask of Robert Menzies was rarely dropped. Four years before the 
crash he had mused about the ‘paradoxical fact’ that people are so ‘inaccessible 
even in the most crowded places’. ‘We guard ourselves against the prying eyes 
of others;’ he wrote, ‘we sometimes laugh when we are sad, and assume an air of 
modest gloom when we are elated, not out of perversity,’ he added, ‘but because 
we have been taught to believe that to wear our hearts on our sleeves is to 
forget the lessons of a self-controlled, not to say sophisticated civilisation.’24 The 
‘sophisticated civilisation’ that Menzies inhabited was one in which appearance 
and perception were never less important than reality. To exhibit emotion, 
except by calculation, would be to reveal vulnerability. But, if political exigency 
demanded self-control, detachment from superfluous information ensured that 
a leader could remain focused on the decisions that mattered.
23 Sun News-Pictorial, 16 Aug. 1940.
24 Robert G. Menzies, ‘Foreword’, Ambrose Pratt, Sydney Myer: a Biography, Quartet, Melbourne, 1978, 
p.vii. The foreword was written in 1936 but the book was not published for another 42 years.
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Like many successful barristers Menzies was admired for his rapid assimilation 
of the essentials of a brief. The technique that served him well at the Bar had 
become instinctual by the time he was a minister. The British businessman 
Larry Hartnett had observed Menzies closely in attempting to persuade him to 
support the development of an Australian aeroplane manufacturing capability: 
‘He wants to know all the things that seem pertinent to the case but he doesn’t 
want to dig at all deep. And Bob had no leanings towards what I call practical 
matters or the technical aspects of a subject.’25
When he came to write almost three decades later about the events of August 
1940, Menzies portrayed only the harmony and trust he had enjoyed with the 
colleagues he had lost in the crash. He had a political history to tell, with a 
message for the next generation about the comradeship and loyalty he had 
enjoyed. Neither the story nor his dignity in retirement was to be diminished 
by reviving forgotten witticisms or cruelties, extempore or premeditated. Thus 
there was no place in his memoirs for observations about Gullett’s ‘whingeing’ 
voice (which Percy Spender was sure the Prime Minister had found irritating). 
There would be no repetition of disparaging remarks about Western District 
wives. No recollection of Fairbairn’s defiant appointment of Sir Charles Burnett 
or of his occasionally wanting performance. ‘These were all men of character, 
capable of being difficult, but never capable of disloyalty.’26
In Parliament on 14 August 1940 Menzies had naturally spoken of all of those 
who died — first of Brudenell White, whose abilities were outstanding, a man 
of ‘lofty character and a gracious personality’. Then of Frank Thornthwaite, 
‘a gifted and popular officer’. He had described the 50-year-old Thornthwaite 
to reporters the previous afternoon as ‘one of the ablest of the younger army 
officers’.27 And of Dick Elford, ‘a young man greatly admired by all honorable 
members who had come into contact with him…on the threshold of what, 
no doubt, would have been a distinguished, as it was certainly an honorable, 
career’. The four RAAF personnel, ‘men of skill…on the threshold of life’, were 
acknowledged. But they were not mentioned by name. There was a collective 
tribute to the three Cabinet ministers who ‘had their greatest attributes in 
common’. In a voice ‘charged with emotion’, the Sydney Morning Herald 
recorded, the Prime Minister praised them all: ‘men of courage and untouched 
honour, fired by a burning loyalty and enlightened by ability and experience’. 
Each, Menzies said, had ‘a genius for friendship. They were rare men.’ Harry 
Gullett’s life was ‘an epic of honourable achievement’. His mind was ‘studious 
25 Sir Laurence Hartnett’s recollections, recorded 16 Sept. 1977.
26 Menzies, Afternoon Light, p.18.
27 The Examiner, 14 Aug. 1940. According to the Barrier Miner the Prime Minister had paid tribute to 
Thornthwaite as ‘one of our ageless younger officers’.
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and reflective…penetrative and inquiring’. His political work was done with 
‘the disinterested zeal of a crusader. Henry Gullett could give and take hard 
knocks.’
But when the fight was over, even his opponents saw only the grey-
haired, studious-looking man with the quick smile, the tender human 
charm, the capacity for giving a friendship so understanding and so 
moving that I can hardly bear to speak of it.
Of Jim Fairbairn there was a measured appreciation of ‘immense, though 
undemonstrative, personal courage…unmatched energy and ability’ in 
performing ‘the stupendous task of Minister for Air’:
His mind and character were strong, and he displayed an unusual 
combination of cheerful fellowship with, perhaps, a hint of Scottish 
dourness. He was slow to speech, but, once engaged, he was gifted in 
exposition and resolute in advocacy of what he believed to be true.
The deepest feelings emerged for Geoff Street whose principal pallbearer he was 
to be the next day. Street had brought to the heavy tasks of the Minister for the 
Army ‘a mind informed by study and experience and sustained by a modest but 
courageous heart’.
He had a great simplicity which made him the friend of all of us; each of 
us can say, as I now do, ‘He was my friend, faithful and just to me’.28 In a 
period of immense personal strain and trial, his steady loyalty meant more 
to me than I can hope to say. To him the business of government, and, 
in particular, the business of conducting the administration of war, was 
a grave personal responsibility. He abhorred flamboyancy and display. 
But those of us who knew him so well will for long remember those 
things about him that many may not have realised — his scholarship, his 
gentleness of spirit, his quiet gaiety and wit, his memories and his love of 
the great game of cricket, whose standards were his, his honesty of mind.29
Jim Fairbairn, though charming, hardworking, and politically reliable, had 
never really been close to Menzies. Gullett’s hospitality was a welcome escape 
from the cares of office; but he was not an intimate. Street, whose enthusiasm for 
cricket exceeded even Menzies’ own, was as Percy Spender observed, ‘keener-
minded’, and a more sought-after companion. But, whatever the loss of these 
three colleagues had meant personally, it had a vital political dimension for the 
Prime Minister in the winter of 1940. Gullett’s status in the party and links 
with the press made him a useful ally, notwithstanding his age and poor health. 
28 William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, act 3, sc. 2 (Marc Anthony on Julius Caesar).
29 CPD, House of Representatives, vol. 164, 14 Aug, 1940, pp.373–5, 378–9.
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Street, an invaluable source of guidance to Menzies about the senior ranks of the 
military, was popular and effective in Parliament and on the platform.30 Both of 
them, with Fairbairn, were key members of a Cabinet that had an unavoidable 
general election date with the nation in less than three months. Newspapers 
were already forecasting a September 21 poll.31
A heaven-sent opportunity?
No one was more conscious of the impending election than the men who 
ran and financed the UAP party machine. Within hours of the crash, Telford 
Simpson of the Consultative Council had written to Menzies with breathtaking 
indelicacy of a ‘rather heaven sent’ opportunity to launch a new party. There 
were three ministerial vacancies. If ‘men of better standing’ were willing to 
come forward to support a ‘Win the War’ party, the Prime Minister ‘could 
select a better ministry’.32 Although it was not made public until August 27, 
Sir Frederick Stewart had offered in June to step down from the Cabinet and 
vacate his seat in Parliament.33 Among the men of ‘better standing’ was the 
former NSW premier Bertram Stevens, whose Canberra ambitions were widely 
touted. News was published on August 16 that Menzies had sent an urgent 
telegram asking Stevens to come to Melbourne.34 Simpson pressed his case three 
days later, pointing out that the NSW branch of the UAP was in disarray and 
independent candidates ‘backed up by large financial resources’ threatened to 
emerge. Menzies did not rise to the bait.
Buying time, Menzies reshuffled the existing ministry, leaving the House of 
Representatives back-bench unchanged and promoting two UAP senators. His 
South Australian friend Phil McBride became Army Minister; and the respected 
72-year-old West Australian Herbert Collett, a decorated AIF infantry Colonel, 
was given Gullett’s portfolios. Artie Fadden added Air and Civil Aviation to 
his existing Ministry of Supply and Development and role as Minister without 
Portfolio assisting the Treasurer. As the three deceased colleagues all held 
Victorian seats, it was obvious that if the government were returned at the 
forthcoming election there would be Victorian additions to the ministry. On 
August 20 the Prime Minister announced the election date of September 21. The 
next day’s Sydney Morning Herald and Daily Telegraph rebuked him for missing 
the chance to form a new patriotic party and reinforce his ministry with ‘big 
30 Sir Percy Spender, interview, 16 Aug. 1977.
31 Tink contends (www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4686146.html): ‘Rather than hold three by-elections, Menzies 
decided to bring the general election forward.’ A September election date was already settled: there was never 
any prospect that three by-elections would be held.
32 Telford Simpson to Menzies, 13 Aug. 1940, Menzies MSS, NLA MS 4936/40/23.
33 Canberra Times, 28 Aug. 1940.
34 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 Aug. 1940.
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men’. The Argus joined the chorus on August 24, regretting in an editorial the 
missed opportunity of welcoming the Victorian Country Party Premier Albert 
Dunstan’s willingness to stand for the seat of Flinders.  Evidently in a fragile 
state, Menzies dictated a mournful letter to Hugh McClure Smith, the editor of 
the Herald. The letter was quoted by Menzies’ biographer Allan Martin from 
a copy in the Menzies family papers. In eight elections over 12 years ‘every 
campaign has been abhorrent to me’, the Prime Minister lamented:
I have waded through the sewer of personal abuse, but I have so far 
emerged. I have never expected that high office would be handed to me 
on a plate without pains and without trouble, and, quite frankly, I don’t 
see why anyone else should expect it…It is indeed ironical to think that 
the Government’s danger of defeat — a defeat which might have tragic 
results for Australia — does not come from its opponents but from the 
destructive activities of a relatively small group of men who have failed 
to realize that if the people are persuaded that this Government is a bad 
one they will certainly instal [sic] another government which will not be 
made up of angels of light but of Curtin, Ward, Brennan and Company. 
That result will not so much be bad for me or my party as ruinous for 
Australia. I tell you quite honestly that my own defeat would, as such, 
leave me cheerful. As Prime Minister I have sweated day and night, under 
recurrent difficulties and disappointments, and sometimes disloyalties. I 
have gone on in spite of it all, doing my indifferent best, sniped at and 
loftily admonished by every leading newspaper except the Melbourne 
‘Age’ until I sometimes curse the day I entered politics.
On reading the typed version Menzies thought better of the reference to The Age 
and deleted it.35 Revealing that he was not himself, he left in an argument that 
he must have known was not quite true: that it was constitutionally impossible 
to bring unelected men into the Cabinet — forgetting, it would seem, Section 
64 of the Constitution envisaging that ‘no Minister of State shall hold office 
for a longer period than three months unless he is or becomes a senator or a 
member of the House of Representatives’. Had he chosen to do so, the Prime 
Minister could have responded to the call to bring in new men from outside 
the Parliament in the knowledge that they could stand for election within a 
month. The point was no secret; it had been made by the press. Nevertheless, 
Menzies thought better than to throw in his hand with Telford Simpson and his 
henchman Bert Horsfield of whose joint ‘disloyalties’ earlier in the year he had 
been warned.
35 A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, vol. 1 1894–1943, MUP, 1993, pp.300–3.
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Menzies narrowly survived the ensuing election. He contemplated another 
appeal to the electorate if he could not conjure a workable majority.36 Choosing 
to rely on the support of two Independents in the House of Representatives, he 
brought back into the government Harold Holt from service as a gunner in the 
AIF, reinstated close ally Eric Harrison who had twice stood down to make way 
for Country Party members, and gave the last place to his father-in-law, Senator 
John Leckie. Though lacking the weight of Fairbairn, Street, and Gullett the three 
replacements were, it seemed safe to assume, men on whom he could rely. The 
men on whom ultimately he could not rely were rebellious UAP backbenchers. 
A year later, after his return from an extended period in Britain, and a Cabinet 
re-shuffle, ‘dissension, discontent and personal animosities’ abounded.37 Labor 
would not join a national government. With his own party support crumbling 
and the Country Party resurgent, a dispirited Menzies stepped down. He was 
succeeded by Arthur Fadden. In retrospect he would say that he did not believe 
his ‘rejection and, as I felt it at the time, my humiliation, would have happened 
if those three men had lived…’38
‘A hole in the fabric of government’
Many historians have been inclined to agree with Menzies’ political analysis. The 
Official Historian Paul Hasluck’s judgment cannot be disputed: ‘The loss of any 
one of these men alone would have weakened the Ministry and Parliament. The 
loss of the three together tore a hole in the fabric of government.’39 In his book, 
Air Disaster Canberra, Andrew Tink goes further, arguing that the eventual fall 
of the coalition government, and the accession of John Curtin and Labor, would 
not have occurred if Harry Gullett had not died. Gullett’s seat was lost in the 
1940 general election to an Independent, Arthur Coles, who eventually voted 
the government down. However, in the realm of counter-factual thinking many 
conclusions are possible. The overwhelming facts about Menzies’ ‘humiliation’ 
were that he had led the UAP to a disastrous election result, and that he had 
antagonised the press and too many of his own party.40 Even had Fairbairn, 
Street, and Gullett lived, there is no certainty that they would have supported 
him wholeheartedly in a divided party room in 1941.41 Moreover, the vote of one 
36 F. H. Wright to Capt. J. R. Patrick, 4 Oct. 1940, copy, Wright MSS, NLA MS8119 Series 2 Box 15.
37 Percy Spender quoted in Hazlehurst, Menzies Observed, p.242.
38 Menzies, Afternoon Light, p.18.
39 Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939–1941, p.244.
40 For Keith Murdoch’s preference for Labor in 1941 and belief that Menzies’ unpopularity around the 
country doomed him, see S. Ricketson to Murdoch, 5 Feb. 1943, copy; Ricketson to W. S Robinson, 1 Dec. 
1941, copy, for the ‘sniping campaign’ and ‘vendetta’ of The Argus and Sydney Morning Herald, Wright MSS, 
NLA MS 8119 Series 6/1.
41 There is little evidence to sustain Tink’s notion (e.g. Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 2013) that Gullett, 
Street, and Fairbairn constituted a kind of political Praetorian Guard for Menzies.
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or two Independents in Parliament would never have been crucial if so many 
men had not previously lost their seats and so many others deserted him. The 
carnage when A16-97 plummeted into Cameron’s paddock was truly a dreadful 
calamity; but it was not ‘the plane crash that destroyed a government’.42
What is undeniable is the intense emotion Menzies exhibited about the deaths 
of his colleagues. Kenneth Menzies, the Prime Minister’s older son, 18 years old 
in August 1940, would tell of how his father was devastated. ‘Not only were 
they his friends, but from the point of view of the war machine, they were 
the key Cabinet members.’ The testimony of the ABC television producer Geoff 
Crane provides further insight:
I have chatted with Heather Henderson, Sir Robert’s daughter, on a 
number of occasions through work. She was eleven at the time of the 
accident and was at boarding school in Melbourne at the time…She 
recently told me her mother mentioned that within Sir Robert there was 
a tangible personal change in him after the crash.43
Murray Tyrrell, though very young and junior at the time, was a shrewd political 
observer with an attentive ear. ‘Half your job was to…feed your minister with 
whatever information you picked up.’ The secretaries and assistant secretaries 
and other staff used to play table tennis in the basement of Parliament House. 
‘You all talked and said “Hey, have you heard this?” and then I’d go back and 
tell Dick Elford.’ Tyrrell was friendly with Peter Looker, who was courting the 
stenographer in Fairbairn’s office, his future wife Jean Withington. Through 
Looker he was privy to the moods and attitudes of Menzies. ‘I don’t think he was 
particularly close to those three,’ Tyrrell was to say, ‘I think they were close to 
him. And that is a different matter.’ What Tyrrell recognised in retrospect, with all 
the percipience of a Canberran with decades as Official Secretary and counsellor 
to successive Governors-General, was the political nature of the support that 
Menzies was receiving. His party leadership had been close fought. The nation 
was at war. ‘I think they were looking for leadership and Menzies provided it and 
I think they stuck with him.’44 But there could be no certainty about how long the 
leadership compass would continue to point in the same direction.
Distressed though he was, Menzies had another duty to perform. He must 
return to Melbourne and lead the mourners at the service in St Paul’s Cathedral. 
If there were public doubts about the safety of the RAAF’s Hudson aircraft, 
seeing the Prime Minister flying to Melbourne for the funeral would have been 
42 Tink, Air Disaster, p.280. Tink went further in a broadcast on 8 May 2013, saying that, if the crash had 
not occurred, he had little doubt that Menzies would have won the 1940 election (‘Overnight’ with Trevor 
Chappell, ABC Local Radio).
43 John Lahey, ‘The day Sir Robert committed a nation to war’, Canberra Times, 28 Aug. 1989; Geoff Crane 
to CH, (email), 16 July 2007.
44 Tyrrell interview, 7 April 1977.
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a good way to dispel them. One of No. 2 Squadron’s most experienced Hudson 
pilots would be entrusted with the responsibility of captaining such a flight. 
Ray Garrett recalled that he was that man. At 39 he had flown for 13 years 
with the CAF and the Larkin Aircraft Company in the Northern Territory before 
the war. The first civilian flying instructor with the CAF, Garrett was, he said, 
‘the only qualified instructor in the Squadron though Ryland did a lot of desk 
instruction’. This was to depreciate Jack Ryland’s undoubted greater expertise 
at the time. Still, what Garrett clearly remembered was being detailed to collect 
Menzies and several colleagues from Canberra.
A flight to Melbourne in an aircraft identical to the one that lay wrecked on 
Duncan Cameron’s farm, would have given the Prime Minister the time and 
the ambience in which to reflect on the ‘terrible hour’ that had passed two 
days earlier. He could see, hear, and feel the world as Harry Gullett, Geoff 
Street, Brudenell White, Frank Thornthwaite, and Dick Elford did in their last 
untroubled minutes. And exactly as he must have suspected Jim Fairbairn did. 
Indeed Garrett remembered, ‘he was in the 2nd pilot’s seat part of the trip’.45 
Vivid as the recollection was — and much as I wanted to believe it — Garrett’s 
memory had betrayed him. He did not fly Menzies that day, or any other day 
in the next six weeks. The Prime Minister, along with the Governor-General 
and other ministers and officials travelled to Melbourne on the same train that 
bore the coffins from Canberra. The first minister reported as taking to the air 
after the deaths of his colleagues was Sir Frederick Stewart who returned from 
Melbourne to Sydney on Saturday August 17.46
Did Menzies blame himself for the fate of A16-97 and its crew and passengers 
on 13 August 1940? It is hard not to wonder whether the enduring sentiment 
expressed in his memoirs went beyond sadness and regret at the loss of their 
companionship and political support. His brain was agile enough to rebut 
insidious doubt. If Jim Fairbairn had behaved rashly surely it was not his 
fault? What he could certainly do was try to minimise the likelihood of such 
a calamity befalling so many national leaders in the future. Immediately after 
the crash there was considerable criticism of the government for allowing so 
many important men to travel together.47 It was widely believed that Cabinet 
had decided that in future no more than two ministers should fly together. But 
this would have been an impossible requirement. In fact, as the Canberra Times 
and other papers had reported on August 15, it had been agreed that air travel 
would be limited to the smallest possible parties. A spokesman said that a hard 
and fast rule could not be laid down but: ‘Members of the Cabinet will continue 
45 Sir Raymond Garrett to CH, 26 April and 2 Nov. 1978.
46 The Argus, 19 Aug. 1940.
47 Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, 14 Aug. 1940.
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to use air transport frequently, as their work demands the utmost mobility at 
times. However, they will not travel more than one or two at a time except when 
it is unavoidable.‘
Two months later, perturbed citizens were drawing attention to the fact that four 
ministers had flown together to a meeting. About the same time, returning in a 
commercial airline DC-3 from reporting on electoral campaigning in Tasmania, 
Dick Elford’s old Argus colleague Harold Cox, then with the Sun, found himself 
sitting next to the Prime Minister:
As we came into land the motors were suddenly switched on again and we 
climbed and did a second circuit. I noticed Menzies lying back, apparently 
quite asleep except that his hand was on the armrest of the seat and I 
noticed the knuckles white and the fingers tensed and I said ‘Well, we’re 
doing a second circuit too Prime Minister!’ Menzies looked at me…48
Remembering
If Menzies could not forget the ‘terrible hour’, many others were determined 
that the nation should remember. Arthur Fadden endorsed a suggestion that an 
aerodrome in Victoria be named after Jim Fairbairn. John Curtin had proposed 
within months of the tragedy that the design of Canberra should incorporate 
a memorial garden where simple stone obelisks mounted with plaques would 
commemorate the nation’s great men — there the three ministerial victims 
would find a place amid explorers, educationists, road and railway builders, 
trade union pioneers. Although Curtin compared his idea with Westminster 
Abbey and Washington’s Arlington National Cemetery there was no mention of 
either famous generals or other servicemen who might have shared their fate.49 
The Labor leader’s idea was not taken up.
At the time of the coronial inquiry the site of the crash had been marked by the 
surveyor of the Department of the Interior, L. C. A. Hope, with a cement peg. 
Later, Cameron’s paddock had become part of the field-firing and manoeuvre 
area of the Royal Military College, Duntroon.50 Relatives of Sir Brudenell White 
eventually suggested to Senator Annabelle Rankin that a memorial might 
be erected. Senator Rankin visited the site of the crash with Jo Gullett M.P., 
accompanied by departmental officers. If other relatives concerned approved 
the idea, it was reported in March 1952, then the Minister for the Interior, 
W. S. Kent Hughes, an old comrade of Fairbairn and Street from their Young 
48 The Argus, 31 Oct. 1940; Harold Cox, interview with Mel Pratt, 6 April 1973, transcript, NLA TRC 
121/43, pp.14–15.
49 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 Aug. 1940, The Argus, 12 Oct. 1940.
50 Rural block 602 DP 554.
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Nationalist days, would submit the proposal to the National Memorials 
Committee. Provision would also be made for a plaque at Fairbairn aerodrome 
hangars.
The National Memorials Committee was suspended in 1952 because of the 
workload of its chairman, the Prime Minister. It did not meet again for 23 
years.51 The National Capital Planning and Development Committee was alerted 
informally to the proposal and recorded the opinion that ‘psychologically it 
would be inappropriate to erect a cairn at the site of the crash, or any plaque 
at the airport relating to the crash other than possible naming of the airport 
as Fairbairn’. The committee felt that ‘the memory of Sir Brudenall [sic] White 
might be recorded at the Australian War Memorial; and the parliamentarians 
concerned by an appropriate tablet at Parliament House’. The other six victims 
were not considered. In the event, Brudenell White was commemorated by his 
family with a plaque and Shrine of Remembrance in St John’s Church, Reid. The 
Wiesener family would have Dick honoured along with four other members of 
the congregation in a pair of stained-glass windows at the Homebush-Strathfield 
Congregational Church.52
On official recognition of all 10 men, wiser heads prevailed. Agreement having 
been secured from the next-of-kin, a ‘simple memorial cairn’ was approved. In 
late 1955 the Department of Works submitted a sketch plan and drawing of a 
rectangular cairn in local stone with a metal plaque. The concept was priced at 
£250 in April 1958. The plan did not proceed. As the Australian Heritage Database 
enigmatically states, between April and August 1958 ‘a change in proposal 
occurred’. On 7 August 1958, a two-metre-wide granite monolith was removed 
from the site of the Ainslie Rex Hotel to the site of the disaster. Supported by 
two smaller stones, and embedded in concrete, it became what is known as the 
Air Disaster Memorial. The plaque named the 10 men who ‘while serving their 
country lost their lives on this spot’. The cairn was dedicated by the Prime 
Minister at a private ceremony on 12 August 1960.53 Doubts were subsequently 
expressed about whether the ‘spot’ in Kowen Forest, Fairbairn Pine Plantation, off 
51 National Memorials Committee Agenda: meeting, April 1975, Archives ACT.
52 Built in 1884, the Homebush-Strathfield Congregational Church, corner Albert Road and Homebush 
Road Strathfield, is now the Sydney Korean Parish.
53 The Minister for the Interior and Works, Allen Fairhall, announced in Sept. 1958 that the cairn had been 
erected. Menzies, hearing of it on the radio, expressed his astonishment that he had been ‘disregarded in a very 
offensive fashion’. No relatives were informed and no ceremony was held. The P.M’s private secretary told Fairhall: 
‘Mr Menzies does not consider it necessary that an official unveiling ceremony should now be held.’ Eighteen 
months later H. J. Manning of the Dept of the Interior, who had written an article about the crash, suggested to 
the Prime Minister that a ceremony of remembrance be held at the site on the twentieth anniversary of the disaster. 
Menzies now agreed. Families were given nine days’ notice in a letter that avoided actually inviting them: ‘PM wants 
all notified of the event & told they would be welcome if they could come.’ Bob Hitchcock learned by telegram on 
Aug. 11 and drove to Canberra overnight on the twelfth. Charlie Crosdale’s widow was too ill to attend and her son, 
unemployed like her, could not afford the trip. Jack Palmer’s widow chose not to go. According to the official file 
neither she nor her brother Laurie could be located (NAA: A463, 1960/3940).
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Pialligo Avenue, Oaks Estate, was correctly located. Half a century later several 
versions of the plaque had been stolen or vandalised. The site of the memorial 
was off-limits because of its proximity to a military rifle range. The current plaque 
was in storage. Early in 2013, yet another replacement plaque bore witness to 
community indifference and repeated acts of vandalism.54
While the public memorial of an accident never adequately explained was 
damaged and eventually rendered inaccessible, almost all of the sources from 
which the official story of the accident could be told remained secure. The 
records of the Service Court of Inquiry, the Air Force Court of Inquiry, and other 
secret files, lay quietly undisturbed in the Australian Archives until 16 years 
later a curious historian and a succession of pertinacious research assistants 
began to prise them open.
The cairn
(Courtesy of the Australian News and Information Bureau)
54 Australian Heritage Database, Place ID, 18801, Place File No. 8/01/000/0419. I am grateful to Mark Dawson 
and Elizabeth Estberg for information and references about the cairn: Department of the Interior file PC 40/11/0 
NAA: A3032, ACT Archives. In 1996, Selma McLaren noted in a Heritage Study Proposal that the isolated and 
neglected site was in an area where 4WD vehicles raced on forest trails; it had been attacked by vandals; random 
fires had occurred and cult ceremonies and rituals held nearby; there had been assaults and allegedly a murder 
in the vicinity (File courtesy of John Myrtle). Tink (Air Disaster, opp. p.103) for a photograph of the ‘pitted and 
dented’ plaque. On 13 Aug. 2013 Andew Tink and Estelle Blackburn brought together family members of the 
victims for a ceremony to mark enhancements to the memorial and its environs (Canberra Times, 14 Aug. 2013).
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27. Aftermath
‘Both the Prime Minister and Mrs Menzies were deeply shocked by the tragedy,’ 
the Sydney Morning Herald reported on 14 August 1940. ‘They were friendly 
with all the passengers in the plane and their families and Mr Menzies could not 
conceal his grief.’ Haunting as the crash may have proved for Robert Menzies, 
its impact on him could not compare with the searing sorrow of those who, 
without warning, lost husbands, fathers, brothers, and children. It was not until 
October 10 that the newspapers reported Justice Lowe’s findings. The news was 
no longer on the front pages but the healing of time had barely begun. For some 
of the widows, grief would soften into enduring sadness. To others, bitterness 
would cling, fuelled by resentment at the perceived injustices that followed.
Audrey Elford, aware of Peggy Fairbairn’s flirtation with her husband, 
nevertheless sent a letter of sympathy and flowers to the widow of the Air 
Minister. There was no reciprocal gesture, not even a reply. The slight, for thus 
it was interpreted, rankled for decades. As Dick Elford had risen in the last 
year of his life as a young man of promise, and the boys had begun to go to 
school, Audrey too had emerged from the domestic shadows. On 13 August 
1940 she had been invited to a lunch party with Evelyn Casey, Dick Casey’s 
widowed mother. At an adjoining table she heard someone talking about a 
crash in Canberra that morning. She was assured that her husband had not 
been involved but she knew otherwise. In a faint, she was taken upstairs to Mrs 
Casey’s room. Two hours later, Sir Earle Page’s daughter and her husband Bill 
Tart from the RAAF public relations office arrived to convey the news that Dick 
was among the victims.
To Audrey’s shock was added the realisation of how much she had relied on 
Dick’s official private secretary’s salary of £508 a year and a supplementary 
allowance of £36 as liaison officer between the Minister and the Departments 
of Air and Civil Aviation. As the widow of a ministerial staff member, Audrey 
had no entitlement to a Service pension. ‘I still get furious,’ she admitted, ‘when 
I hear rumours that the Government gave me £80 000.’ She recalled receiving 
£350 in Commonwealth Employees’ compensation and £250 in securities initially 
yielding 2¼ per cent for each of her boys.1 Her solicitor, Geoffrey Cohen, did 
his best on her behalf. But they encountered Menzies at his most insensitive. 
Invited to talk to the Prime Minister at his Victoria Barracks office, Audrey 
was reminded that she was a civilian widow with no claim on the government. 
1 In fact, £200 for each of the boys was placed in trust, administered by a departmental official, until 3¼ 
per cent Treasury bonds were passed over in full and final settlement in 1954. Treasury rejected a proposal 
that the total amount of compensation be supplemented by Audrey and a sum of £1000 be invested in higher-
earning securities recommended by Ian Potter (NAA: 705, 300/1/9).
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The Treasurer Arthur Fadden had advised against granting a pension as 
recommended by the Department of Air: ‘dependants of other victims of the 
same disaster are probably not so well provided for as Mrs Elford’. Ironically, 
Fadden as Minister for Air had previously proposed a widow’s pension of 
£117 a year plus 5/- per week per child, only to meet the classic objection to 
‘establishing a new principle’ from the then Treasurer Percy Spender.
Audrey Elford was spared the humiliating bureaucratic calculations of her total 
assets of approximately £3000, including the proceeds of insurance policies 
valued at £1600 after probate duties and expenses, Dick’s bank deposit funds of 
£46, and her own ‘private means’ (£700 in Commonwealth bonds, £20 in Argus 
shares and an average of £1 a week in trust income). But she would never forget 
the long cigar on which Menzies drew while telling her he could not create a 
precedent of granting a pension to a non-Service widow: she was young and 
could go out to work to support her two sons and send them to a good state 
school. Thirty-seven years later she was to recall with shame that she blurted in 
response: ‘my children were not born to go to a state school’.
What made the apparent indifference of Menzies so hurtful was that the 
government subsequently decided that dependants of Commonwealth officers 
killed while travelling by air on official duty should receive a £1000 insurance 
payment. But the decision was not to apply retrospectively. With the pain of loss 
and grievance intermingled, Audrey would carry long afterwards the belief that 
Menzies had even objected to the erection of a memorial to the crash victims.2
Possibly prompted by the Prime Minister, the Air Department offered Audrey a 
job eight weeks after Dick’s death. It was too soon. Her family was in turmoil. 
Six days after the Canberra crash, her 30-year-old brother Geoff, a clerk, who 
had enlisted in June 1940, was discharged as a gunner. The support he might 
have given was short-lived as he re-enlisted at the beginning of October. Less 
than a fortnight after his brother-in-law’s death, another potential family 
supporter, Audrey’s younger brother, Maxwell (known as Bill), a poultry farmer 
and orchardist, had enlisted in the Army. Dick’s sister, Barbara Elford, who had 
married a Corowa farmer, Roy Pearce, in 1937, lived far away.3 Audrey’s mother, 
Alice, would in time move to Melbourne and live in an adjoining apartment to 
her daughter and grandchildren.
2 NAA: M2606, 23 for ‘bias against the P.M.’ in 1961 for not having done more for her; undated press cutting 
(ca 1992), Elford MSS.
3 Max Basham served in the ranks till the end of the war, when he was discharged as a trooper in the 9th 
Division Cavalry. After the war he worked for a while with the Olympic Tyre company before moving to Perth. 
Geoffrey Basham ended the war as a captain in the Infantry Corps after serving as a liaison officer at General 
MacArthur’s headquarters. After the war he would own and operate a soft drink factory, become a hotel 
licensee, and eventually senior partner in a jam and pickle business. For the Basham brothers’ war service see, 
http:// www.ww2roll.gov.au. Barbara Pearce had three children, owned and managed rural properties with 
her husband whom she outlived by several decades, and died aged 98 in 2006.
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Crushed by anxiety, Audrey had lost heart, finally giving up her Air Force 
job after fainting into a waste paper basket. She tried again, this time in 
postal censorship, but it was not a happy situation. Unwell, and in reduced 
circumstances, having moved into a two-room flat, Audrey had approached the 
new Labor government for assistance. The War Cabinet, on the recommendation 
of the Advisory War Council, approved an ex gratia payment of £250. A month 
later the War Cabinet revisited the matter and doubled the additional payment. 
It might have been more.4 But Archie Elford, scrupulous to the last, had included 
in a statement of his daughter-in-law’s income and assets the £4 a week he had 
been giving her as well as her one-tenth share of the trustee sale of a recently 
deceased aunt’s property in South Australia.
A year later, determined to be independent, Audrey worked briefly with 
the American Red Cross arranging accommodation for Marines on leave. The 
weekly subvention from Archie Elford was discontinued after four years, his 
own retirement income — he would die aged 94 in 1972 — not keeping pace 
with inflation. In 1944 she married a divorced Canadian-born airman, Bill 
Belfield. In poor health, her private life was troubled. The marriage ended three 
years later, after which she reverted to her previous married name.5 After the 
war Audrey worked in a real estate office for two years, then moved to the Royal 
Children’s Hospital Auxiliary as Organising Secretary. Later, she worked for Don 
Chipp organising billets for the 1956 Olympic Games. She bought, refurbished, 
and sold old houses; and for a while ran a guest house. Her resolve to maintain 
her social position was strikingly visible in a white carpet, defiantly resisting 
the trampling of her boys and their friends, and a marvel to relatives visiting 
the home. The twins were her pride. If she could not have the life that she 
had hoped to share with Dick, she would do all she could for the young men 
who were his legacy to her. Particularly galling therefore were unsubstantiated 
stories in later years that Peggy Fairbairn had paid for the education of Dick 
Elford’s sons at Geelong Grammar.6
In accordance with compensation regulations in force for the RAAF since 1930, 
Olive Hitchcock was awarded £750, of which £50 was to be held in trust for 
her son until he was 21. Under the Superannuation Act, as the widow of a 
Permanent Air Force officer she was entitled to a pension per annum of £169 
plus £13 for a child. It was not until October 1946 that it occurred to anyone in 
authority that an amendment to the Repatriation Act in December 1941 ‘would 
entitle the widow to consideration for War Pension’. A pension of £5.9.0 a 
4 NAA: A2676, 2172.
5 Married in 1944 to William Ewart Belfield, a Winnepeg-born, London-educated, pre-war building 
contractor, Audrey Elford resumed her former married name by deed poll after her divorce three years later. 
Belfield, then a flight rigger, had been seriously injured late in 1941 when caught in a roller moving a Fairey 
Battle crate at Point Cook (NAA: A705, 15 163/91/148; MT 522/1; A9301, 13041).
6 Audrey Elford, interview, 27 June 1977; Audrey Elford to CH, 30 June 1977, 11 Nov. 1978; NAA: A2676, 2172.
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fortnight was duly granted with an additional £1.15.0 a fortnight for her ‘first 
child’, backdated to the end of June 1945.7 Money had not been uppermost in 
Olive’s mind. Knowing that the inscribed American Conklin pen-and-pencil set 
Bob had been carrying in his pocket, her precious gift to him, had not been 
found, she had hoped for ‘just some little things belonging to my husband or 
some part of the plane, to forward to the Perth Museum to be placed alongside 
his father’s’. For a few weeks after the crash she had moved to Glen Iris, five 
minutes’ walk from Sheila Palmer, on whose behalf she wrote in November to 
the Prime Minister enquiring about the rosary beads Jack Palmer had with him 
when he died. Palmer’s blue mittens, balaclava, and two scarves had already 
been returned along with sundry kit and uniform items.
Olive was inconsolable for months. It was not just being forgotten by inert 
and indifferent bureaucrats. Or even, four months after Bob’s death, having 
to ask for the government’s assurance that his funeral expenses would be met 
before the bank would allow her to operate her husband’s savings account.8 The 
enduring trauma was the way in which she learned of her beloved Bob’s death. 
The Prime Minister’s office had let it be known that a ban had been imposed on 
the publication and broadcasting of the news until the relatives of the victims 
had been informed.
Mrs Menzies…played an important part in arrangements to break the 
news as gently as possible to relatives of the dead men, all of whom 
were married. She telephoned from the Lodge at Canberra to friends and 
acquaintances in Melbourne who were also acquainted with the families 
of many of the men in the plane, and they were thus spared the shock of 
receiving the news as a bald announcement.9
Not everyone was spared. According to several newspapers on August 14, Bob’s 
mother, uninformed, had a presentiment of the tragedy. She was assisting at an 
RAAF camp-comforts canteen in Perth, it was said, and became so disturbed at 
‘an entertainment’ that she left before the show ended.10 No newspaper reported 
what Bob Hitchcock’s friend Rex Taylor heard. On the morning of August 13 
Olive had an appointment at the hairdresser’s.
Immediately following the accident, broad details were announced 
over the national, and some commercial, radio stations and the names 
of the passengers along with those of the aircrew were read out…at 
7 NAA: A705, 300/1/9; A705, 166/17/1565; A705, 42/2/180.
8 NAA; A461, 700/1/392.
9 The Examiner, 14 Aug. 1940.
10 The West Australian, Barrier Miner, 14 Aug. 1940.
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that precise moment Olive was sitting in the Salon and heard the radio 
reference to her husband’s name. It was a shocking experience for her, 
and one which would haunt her for the rest of her life.
Resolved to devote herself to the careful nurturing of her child Robert Jr, 
over the next decade and more she raised him into ‘a fine youth and caring 
son’. Her nieces remembered her as a gifted dressmaker who made ‘exquisite 
gowns, beaded and embroidered…the house was always full of rolls and rolls 
of materials, beads, furs, embroidery’. Young Robert became an enthusiastic 
member of the Air Training Corps. He was, as Rex Taylor saw, ‘a source of great, 
but brief pleasure’ in his mother’s otherwise sad and grieving life. A daughter, 
Kaye, who became close to Bob, as he too came to be known, was the legacy 
of a casual encounter after the war ended. Anonymous phone calls and letters 
suggesting that her husband had been a fifth columnist who premeditated 
the crash had tormented Olive. As the years passed, distressing rumour and 
innuendo, defamatory of Bob’s character and Service reputation, was never 
entirely extinguished. Olive’s mother died in 1956. Wilfred Beecroft, who had 
sold his farm and moved with his wife to St Kilda to live with his daughter 
and grandchildren, died of cancer two years later. Olive moved to Springvale 
and nursed her father there through his final illness. Increasingly reclusive and 
paranoid, believing at times that she was being followed, she fell into recurring 
bouts of deep depression that was unrelieved by multiple electro-convulsive 
therapy sessions. Returning home one afternoon in July 1959, Robert discovered 
the body of his 47-year-old mother alone in the house. His 13-year-old half-sister 
Kaye had earlier found the doors and windows locked and was told to walk to 
an aunt’s house several miles away. After numerous failed attempts, Olive had at 
last succeeded in escaping the misery that had engulfed her.11
For Robert’s uncles, Les and Harry Hitchcock, there would be frequent reminders 
in the years ahead of the older brother they had lost. They had both, as they 
were promised, followed him into the Air Force. Harry entered as an aircraft 
mechanic, and in August 1940 was at Flemington as a sergeant instructor on 
air frames. He was commissioned as a technical officer in November 1943 and 
became the engineer officer of the Elementary Flying School at Benalla. Later 
he came under the wing of Rex Taylor, becoming his assistant engineer at No. 
2 Training Group, Wagga. After the war, promoted to Wing Commander, he 
was head of RAAF motor transport engineering. For some years Harry assumed 
responsibility for his orphaned nephew’s welfare. After the war, Les returned 
to work with West Australian Newspapers where he had been apprenticed as a 
11 Joan Richardson to CH, 5 Oct. 2009; ACdre C. R. Taylor to CH, 25 Sept., 26 Oct. 1983; Fleta Page, ‘Tragic bond 
lingers for air-crash families’, Canberra Times, 14 Aug. 2013. Kaye Hitchcock, as she was known, would spend three 
happy months with Don and Claire Beecroft before being placed in the care of a father she had barely known. Four 
years of abuse ended with his death in a car accident (Kaye Greene, telephone interview, 29 Aug. 2013).
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compositor. He had been boarding an RAAF tender to catch the train at Perth en 
route for Point Cook when news of the Canberra crash came through the Pearce 
station communications centre. Bob Hitchcock’s protégé Len Bacon, by then a 
flying officer, organised the cancellation of the travel orders so that Les could 
remain to comfort his mother. As early as 1943 when he joined No. 13 Squadron 
in Canberra preparing for duty in New Guinea and Borneo, a fellow senior NCO 
had shown him the then secret Air Court of Inquiry file.
In his later years Les proved a proud custodian of his older brother’s memory. 
Their father had been 37 years and six months old when he perished in the 
Tanami. Their mother died 23 years later, aged just 62. Separated in life they 
were at last reunited. In 1929 Violet had arranged that she would be interred 
with her husband. Henry Smith Hitchcock’s granite and marble headstone 
bears the additional inscription: ‘Also his wife Violet Elizabeth born 21-3-1890 
died 5-6-1952.’
The government ban on releasing news of the crash until the relatives were 
informed was well meant. But some families had proved harder to reach than 
those of the more distinguished passengers. Like Audrey Elford, Joan Wiesener 
— not one of the Prime Minister’s circle — would learn of her husband’s death 
in traumatic circumstances. Her daughter-in-law Diney Wiesener heard the 
story many years later from Joan’s mother, Gertrude Beale:
Joan Wiesener was at the dentist in Macquarie Street when the dentist 
received a telephone call from her home telling him what had happened. 
The dentist then told Joan that her family had called and that she had 
to go straight home. She was about 6 months pregnant with Richard but 
he sent her off by herself. In the street she saw the newspaper billboards 
for the latest editions, announcing the accident and she knew what had 
happened.
Seventy years later, the family remained baffled and outraged. ‘How she ever 
managed to get home, I will never know,’ Diney Wiesener said. ‘Why could 
that dentist not have called a taxi, and when it arrived, not seen her into it 
himself?’12 Joan’s third child, born four months after her husband’s death, was 
given his father’s names, Richard Frederick. (His older brother’s forenames were 
reversed and he became Antony Richard, known as ‘Tony’.) Her husband’s 
friend Ray Purves, later to rise to the commanding heights of the economy as 
Sir Raymond Purves CBE, chairman of Clyde Industries, became the guardian 
of her three young children. A congenital deformity of the feet had thwarted 
Purves’ earnest effort in 1939 to enlist with Dick in the Air Force. He was to 
become a brilliant entrepreneurial financial adviser and mentor to members of 
the Wiesener family, many of whom became shareholders in Clyde Engineering.
12 Diney Wiesener to CH, 1 Jan. 2010.
27 . Aftermath
643
As a widow of a war appointee with dependent children, Joan was entitled to a 
pension of around three pounds a week. Like Dick’s previous emoluments of £427 
a year, the Service pension was not critical to her wellbeing. Her father Ronald 
had sold his interest in the Beale family company. Her parents now lived close 
by and ensured that she lacked for nothing. The children had a nurse. When the 
boys were old enough, they went as boarders to the King’s School, Parramatta, 
their entry facilitated by the pastoralist Eric Hill. Richard left school at 16, learned 
accountancy, and completed his education at Columbia University before going 
on to a spectacularly successful and controversial career in business finance. 
While still a teenager he had met and would soon marry Diana (‘Diney’) Hipsley, 
daughter of his father’s contemporary at Shore, Richard Burton Hipsley.
Margot Abbey Wiesener went to Frensham in Mittagong. She would grace the 
social pages while hinting at her career with a charm bracelet in the form of a 
tiny gold typewriter with a seed pearl-studded keyboard.13 In 1962, aged 24 
and immediately after his headline-making divorce, she married the journalist 
Charles Buttrose, then an Australian Broadcasting Commission executive. 
Buttrose, whose secretary she had been, was 30 years her senior and father of 
four, including the precocious journalist Ita, and Will who was to become a 
notable banker.14 Joan’s brother-in-law Brian Wiesener, just 15 when his brother 
died, completed his Leaving Certificate at Sydney Church of England Grammar 
School in 1942, and signed on to the Air Training Corps as a cadet two and a half 
years after the accident. Studying accountancy at the Metropolitan Business 
College, he worked as a junior audit clerk until on 14 August 1943, two years 
and a day after his brother perished, he enlisted in the RAAF as an AC1. In due 
course he became a sergeant pilot and served in New Guinea and in training 
units until demobilised and discharged in November 1945. After the war, he 
worked with Ray Purves before becoming a stockbroker with Ord Minnett.15
A total of 47 exhibits had been used to assist in identifying the victims of the 
accident for the Coroner. Not one of the personal items recovered from the crash 
site belonged to Dick Wiesener. Thus, when it came to convincing the NSW 
Probate Registrar that her husband was in fact dead, Joan Wiesener’s solicitors 
had a problem. They had noted newspaper reports that the bodies were 
unrecognisable. Fortunately, the Coroner’s finding and a photostat of the record 
of the identification of Wiesener by Group Captain Wilson sufficed. Perhaps 
they might have added conclusively a copy of the condolence message from the 
King. In any event, no one in the Registrar’s office was in a position to question 
the basis, flawed as it almost certainly was, of ‘Del’ Wilson’s determination.
13 Australian Women’s Weekly, 26 October 1960.
14 Charles Buttrose, Words & Music, Angus & Robertson Publishers, London, 1984, pp.80–3.
15 James Murray, Phoenix to the World: The Story of Clyde Industries and Sir Raymond Purves, CBE, 
Playright Publishing, Sydney, 1992, pp.52–70; B. W. Wiesener, Personal File, NAA: A9301, 2002/05049050; 
J. R. Gorham and C. J. L. Hewett (eds), The Torch Bearers: War Service of Shore Old Boys 1939–1999, Shore 
Sydney Church of England Grammar School, North Sydney, 1999, p.595.
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A few months later Inez Thornthwaite, her husband’s sole executrix, encountered 
the same problem with the NSW Probate authorities. Her incredulous solicitor 
explained to the Canberra Coroner:
The Registrar has refused to grant the probate until we can give evidence 
that her late husband was actually in the plane. We have pointed out 
that Colonel Thornthwaite’s death was practically a matter of public 
knowledge, and have produced to him an official certificate of his death, 
but this will not satisfy him. He wants some evidence that Colonel 
Thornthwaite actually entered the plane at the time of the accident.16
Eventually common sense prevailed.
Inez Thornthwaite, who had turned 44 on the day the Lowe Inquiry began, was a 
woman of conviction and independent spirit. She was not going to be enfeebled 
by adversity. Her husband’s headstone at Lismore cemetery would bear the 
blithesome inscription ‘The luck of the game’. After receiving two fortnightly 
pension payments of £4.9.0 she had promptly advised departmental officials 
that she had no wish to apply for a pension. She had substantial assets and no 
children to support. Her mother died six weeks after Frank Thornthwaite’s fatal 
crash. Her parents-in-law as well as her own parents were dead, as were her 
husband’s sister and two brothers. Liberated from family responsibilities, she 
continued her active role in the local Red Cross Society, the Country Women’s 
Association, and Australian Comforts Fund. Scarcely a charity appeal went 
unheeded.17 Calamities like the bushfires in January 1944 that destroyed six of 
her station employees’ cottages were surmounted with equanimity and an open 
swipe at a Premier’s unfounded boast of ‘gratifying’ progress in rehabilitating 
burnt out areas.18 As the war went on she did not hide her opinions about the 
proper relations between government and people:
I am getting very tired of our present Government ‘asking’ various 
sections of the community to do certain things. The wharf labourers 
were ‘asked’ to return to work. The coalminers are frequently ‘asked’ 
to resume production. We are fighting 2 nations who do not ‘ask’ their 
populations to do certain things for the good of their country. Nothing 
will bring home our very serious position to some members of this 
community but strong action and enforcement of regulations which will 
ensure equal sacrifice by all to the war effort.19
16 Correspondence Feb., March, and May 1941 re proof of death, NAA: A6079/T1 and A432, 1940/764.
17 The Argus, 8 Nov. 1940; Camperdown Chronicle, 4 Jan. 1941, 20 Jan. 1942.
18 The Argus, 31 May 1944.
19 The Argus, 6 May 1943. She was rebuked the next day by another correspondent for what ‘seems quite 
the wrong attitude to any democratic-minded person’.
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After the war, Inez spent 18 months in Britain, returning ‘filled with admiration 
at the efficiency of all public services…but, above all, at the quiet determination 
with which the whole nation has gone to work, in spite of the maze of forms, 
regulations, and controls, to get the country back on to its feet’.20 In 1947, the 
Closer Settlement Board resumed ‘Larra’ and the homestead block of 1375 acres 
was sold.21 Having moved to Ocean Grove, and taken a flat in Alcaston House in 
1950, Inez lived on until 1992, an intermittent but memorable presence in the 
lives of her cousins and their children to whom she was known as ‘Dook’, after 
a comic-book character whose straight-legged walk reminded them of hers. 
Living with a companion helper, and never afflicted by financial concerns, she 
inspired a bemused affection. As one of her contemporaries said in earshot of an 
awed member of the next generation: ‘I don’t suppose she has ever had to turn 
down her own bed.’
Once the Director of Staff Duties had confirmed for the Director of Personal 
Services that both Colonel Thornthwaite and General White were on duty when 
they were killed, the Army could determine its liability to pay compensation. 
Brudenell White had been appointed to his position directly by the Cabinet, 
with a salary inclusive of allowances other than travelling allowances of £2000 
a year. The Army had no formal record of the appointment but, as a Citizen 
Force officer called back for full-time duty, it was eventually determined that 
he was a ‘Member of the Forces’ covered by Section 45 AT of the Australian 
Soldiers’ Repatriation Act of 1940. His widow and 19-year-old student daughter, 
Rosemary, were dependants. Lady White was entitled to a share of the pension 
her husband was receiving before he was recalled to duty. A war pension of £6 
a fortnight was approved to be paid in quarterly instalments.22
Proud of their husband and father, close to him as they had been, the Whites 
were devastated. Almost half a century later, his daughter Rosemary Derham 
would write:
The horror of his death haunted us, although we did not say so. He 
felt pain so much and to have been burned to death is unspeakable. Of 
course they told us that the impact killed them all and we pray that is 
what happened but we can never know.
For me, his anguish lives on.23
20 The Argus, 6 Nov. 1948.
21 Historic Homesteads of Australia, vol. two, Australian Council of National Trusts, Cassell, North 
Melbourne, 1976, p.267.
22 ‘War Pension benefit for families of Late General Sir C. B. B. White and Late Col. F Thornthwaite’, NAA; 
MP508, 66/701/27.
23 Derham, The Silence Ruse, p. 269.
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Francis and Inez Thornthwaite, together after half a century
(Courtesy of Carol Judkins)
The anguish for some had a tincture of guilt as well as sorrow. For young Geoffrey 
Fairbairn at Geelong Grammar, taken under the wing of the 26-year-old history 
master Manning Clark, there was no hiding the distress and confusion. With so 
much to live up to, his mother confided to the headmaster Dr Darling, it would 
be difficult for her son. She confessed that there was nothing she could say or 
do that was any help. Manning Clark had arrived in Melbourne to take up his 
teaching appointment three days before the Canberra tragedy. When he looked 
around his class a month later he noticed ‘one face with pleading eyes…It was 
the look of a boy telling anyone with eyes to see: don’t tell me there is any answer 
to my pain.’ ‘I remember,’ Clark wrote in an obituary, ‘showing him in 1941 at a 
time when the wound from his father’s death still hurt — it was to hurt him all his 
life — the remark by Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov: “I want to be there when 
everyone suddenly understands what it has all been for.”’24 What Geoffrey, who 
was for many years an academic colleague of Clark at The Australian National 
University, made of this, if indeed it happened, is not recorded.
24 Manning Clark, The Quest for Grace, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1991, p.123; Manning Clark, ‘Geoffrey 
Fairbairn — a conscience for “old” Australia’, The Weekend Australian, 13–14 Sept. 1980, p.4.
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Canberra aerodrome, named ‘Fairbairn’ in February 1941, would be a reminder 
to the end of Geoffrey Fairbairn’s days of 10 horrible deaths and the possibility 
that his father was somehow to blame for them. The erection of the two-metre-
high memorial cairn at the crash site and the memorial service there in August 
1960 would accentuate, not assuage, the doubts. So, too, the renaming in 1962 
of Headquarters RAAF Canberra as Headquarters RAAF Fairbairn. Even three 
decades after the crash it was evident that, in the language of the day, he had 
not found closure. For Geoffrey, and even more for his sister, Angela, who had 
been especially devoted to her father, young adulthood and later life were also 
to be indelibly marked by the absence of their mother.
Peggy Fairbairn had been bequeathed an annuity of two-thirds of the net 
annual income of her husband’s trust fund (valued at over £78 800 in Victoria as 
well as assets in Queensland and New South Wales). Understandably, she found 
her life ‘quite empty’ without Jim. She was an inveterate socialite, not made 
for reclusive widowhood.25 The family property came under the stewardship 
of her brother-in-law, Osborne. Knowing that her annuity would be halved if 
she were to wed again, in 1952 she married a British naval officer Commander 
Kenneth Kemble, ‘an English charmer’ as a niece remembered, and moved to 
England.26 There she slipped into an accent so foreign to Australian ears that her 
daughter was to say she would need a course at the Berlitz School of Languages 
to understand her. Infrequent as her visits were to be (Angela’s daughter, Mary, 
was to see her gregarious grandmother only three times), the family could rely 
on her for lively companionship on the occasions when she did re-join them.
To those of different temperament, wealth, and status there was conventional 
consolation, aid to tide them over, but limited prospects. Like Olive Hitchcock, 
Audrey Elford, and Joan Wiesener, Sheila Palmer was to be told of her husband’s 
death hours after thousands already knew. As her son John Foley learned:
Sheila was unaware of the Canberra air disaster in the morning though 
there were Herald posters announcing it in the city as she went outside 
for a sandwich for lunch. Fortunately she ran into her brother Frank 
who took her to a café where they were able to sit down as he told her.
Sheila Palmer’s sorrow, compounded by a dispute over the funeral service, 
was profound. Unusually for Catholic couples, after 15 months of marriage she 
and Jack had not been blessed with a child. During his service Jack, like all 
airmen members of the Permanent Air Force, had contributed to a compulsory 
superannuation fund at rates determined by his age and salary. An AC1 fitter 
25 Peggy Fairbairn to J. R. Darling, n.d., Geelong Grammar School Archives, A–F 1940, A–L 1941; Last will 
of James Valentine Fairbairn, and codicil, 13 April 1934, Public Record Office Victoria, VPRS 7591/P/2, 1121, 
318/135; The Argus, 5 Dec. 1940.
26 Alethea Russell to CH, (email), 22 Jan. 2009.
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would pay around 11 shillings a fortnight. With no children, Sheila Palmer 
could expect to receive a pension of £65 a year for the rest of her life. There 
would be a compensation payment of £750. It was little enough but she would 
have the support of her large family, and from 1942 she would be eligible for the 
new Commonwealth government’s widow’s pension as well.
Sheila Palmer, the widow, tall among her sisters, nieces, and ‘Grandma 
Curtain’
(Courtesy of Pat Snowball)
In 1944 she remarried. Her husband, Denis Foley, had emigrated from a small 
family farm in County Cork in 1935 after a falling out with his father and oldest 
brother. In his mid-twenties, with some experience of horse training, he found 
mostly labouring work where he could in outback Queensland and Western 
Australia and latterly in Johnny Connell’s hotel on the corner of Flinders Lane 
and Elizabeth Street. Foley sang in the choir at St Mary’s, East St Kilda; devoted 
to both Catholic faith and culture, he met Sheila not at church but at the races.
After the war Denis Foley and his wife, like four of Sheila’s brothers, were 
put into a pub as managers by the patriarch of their generation, Cyril Curtain. 
Prosperous from his expanding legal practice, Cyril had become a hotel broker 
and eventually owner of a string of suburban and country public houses. The 
Curtain brothers would remain a sustaining force in their sister’s life. Sheila’s 
son, John, born late in 1944, looked up to them as role models. Jack Palmer’s 
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mother also remained close to Sheila. ‘I well remember my mother taking 
me to meet Jack Palmer’s mother when my father was at work’, John Foley 
recalled, ‘Mrs Palmer was a kindly gentle woman and she and my mother got 
on extremely well.’ As the years went by, it was evident that Sheila’s first great 
love was proving a disturbing presence to her second husband. ‘My mother 
had many photographs of her time with Jack,’ her son remembered, and ‘many 
plans for the memorial which she approved. However this was a source of some 
friction with my father and these records have been lost.’ Sheila Foley, a lifelong 
smoker, died of lung cancer aged 62 in 1974.27
Rita Crosdale was receiving £4.4.0. a fortnight at the time of her husband’s 
death. As the authorities quickly noted, the payments would continue until 
‘the pension conditions are settled’. She could expect a pension of £109.4.0 a 
year to be supplemented by an additional pound a fortnight for her newborn 
son until he reached the age of 16. As Charlie’s was a war appointment, no 
compensation was payable.28 But her special situation called forth special 
assistance. Monsignor Ken Morrison, then Laverton’s Catholic chaplain, recalled 
the hours and days that followed the accident: ‘A.C.1 Crosdale’s wife was in the 
Queen Victoria Hospital Melbourne, expecting a child when the crash occurred. 
I was sent off immediately to see about informing her. I discussed the matter 
with a woman doctor…and questioned whether it was wise to tell her.’
Believing that it was agreed that Rita Crosdale be shielded, the priest entrusted 
the hospital with keeping reporters and newspapers away. On his return to 
break the news the next day, he ‘found other counsels had prevailed and she 
had been informed’.
Father Morrison, who had never met Charlie Crosdale, joined with Mary Daly 
of the Catholic Welfare Association in seeing to his widow’s needs. Mrs Daly 
provided a christening robe for the baby. After the baptism in Footscray she and 
Father Morrison saw Rita off by train to Newcastle. The men at Laverton had a 
‘whip round’ on the next pay day and several hundred pounds was entrusted to 
Morrison. The men knew that two years earlier the RAAF Airmen’s Benevolent 
Fund — a voluntary contribution scheme managed by the airmen themselves 
— had ceased paying cash grants to cover hardship while compensation and 
superannuation payments were being processed. The fund had run out of 
money, partly as a result of the series of accidents in 1938 that had so perturbed 
Sir Edward Ellington. The Defence Minister had approved instead a scheme that 
paid approximately the airman’s rate of fortnightly pay up to a total of £50. The 
amount was to be treated as an advance against whatever compensation — not 
27 John Foley, biographical notes on Sheila Curtain, 23 July 2009, and Denis Foley [2009].
28 NAA: A705, 300/1/9.
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more than three years’ pay at the time of death — was eventually received.29 It 
was helpful but not nearly enough. Morrison established a trust account with 
the money raised by Crosdale’s workmates and assigned the administration to a 
local priest in Cessnock.30
Two other Crosdale boys who were old enough to serve, Francis and Fred, joined 
the Army and went to Egypt and New Guinea. Doug ‘Tiger’ Crosdale, who 
had wanted Charlie to send him aeroplane photographs to show his Air League 
friends, became a career soldier, serving in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, mostly 
as an instructor, before retiring as a captain. Twelve years after her husband’s 
death, Charlie Crosdale’s widow married a local builder, James Marshall, with 
whom she was to have two children. Rita’s second husband predeceased her and 
she married a third time. The family’s tribulations had not ended with Charlie’s 
death. Rita would write to the Prime Minister in 1960: ‘I have had three nervous 
breakdowns in four years. I have never been the same since I received the shock 
from my late husband’s death.’31 Her son, Gary, born on the day his father was 
killed, was stricken with multiple sclerosis. Charlie’s youngest brother Barry 
died, aged 35, leaving two children and a pregnant wife. A fireman, Barry had 
part-time work on his day off removing rubbish from local factories. One day, 
he had emptied his load but the back lid of the truck would not close. A piece 
of cardboard was jamming it. He pulled it away and the lid guillotined him. 
Tragedy followed tragedy. Another brother was burned to death in a house fire 
at the age of 40. He had been alone. His wife was a nurse working the night 
shift; his children were staying with relatives. Sidney, the oldest brother, who 
had served as a mechanic with the Air Force in New Guinea, died of liver cancer 
at 58. In the annals of family misfortune, the Crosdales were perhaps the most 
sorely afflicted of those who lost a loved one in August 1940.
Gyp Street had been determined from the beginning of the war to once again 
‘do her bit’. She had gone down to Lismore, she said to an interviewer, to buy a 
sheep dog and learn to milk:
I am a countrywoman and the countrywoman’s place is on her property…
If she is able to assist in men’s work she had much better stay there. 
I have kept station books and helped in boundary riding and sheep 
mustering. Most of these things I have done for fun. Now I will do them 
in earnest…Some may even learn to drive tractors, and a few may even 
be capable of driving teams should the necessity arise.
29 Sec. Air Board to Sec. [Dept of Defence?], 31 Aug. 1938; Note by H. C. Thorby, 28 Oct. 1938, NAA: A705, 
42/2/212; ‘Compensation — Regulations,’ NAA: A705, 42/2/180; Crosdale C. J. A9301, NAA: A9301, 6673.
30 Msgnr K. Morrison to CH, 14 Oct. 1982.
31 R. Marshall to Prime Minister, [8?] Aug. 1960, NAA: A463, 1960/3940.
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As it turned out, it was her daughter, Tim, who mastered milking as well as 
joining her mother for hours in the saddle and exhausting days in the yards.32 
At home with Tim, who had turned 11 just two days earlier, Gyp was prostrate 
on learning of her husband’s death. Her son Tony, called to the headmaster’s 
office at Melbourne Grammar to be given the news by the chaplain, was taken 
back to Lara by Gwenda Manifold to be with his mother. The family did not 
attend the service in St Paul’s. Unusually for a man so well organised, Geoff 
Street had not made a will and it was necessary for his widow to seek letters 
of administration, a process that ran on into 1941.33 Her brother Clive Currie, 
recalled from the AIF, was entrusted with running the family estate as well 
as ‘Gala’, his own adjoining property. In due course Gyp saw her son Tony 
through Melbourne Grammar into the Royal Australian Navy in 1945–6 before 
he returned on Clive Currie’s death to take up farming at Eildon. Eventually, 
persuaded by Ford Guthrie and Chettie Manifold that it was his duty, Tony 
Street followed his father into federal politics. He was well-liked and respected 
in Canberra and held a succession of Cabinet posts in Malcolm Fraser’s coalition 
government, serving finally as Minister for Foreign Affairs 1980–83. Like his 
father, he was an enthusiastic cricketer, golfer, and flyer. Daughter Tim, like her 
mother a free spirit, fine horsewoman, golfer, and tennis player, married Gregor 
Gillespie and settled to a life on the land at Berry Bank, 10 miles down the road 
from the family property ‘Eildon’ at Lismore.
Among the large military presence at Geoff Street’s funeral, Major W. J. R. 
Scott was observed to be representing the Army Minister’s parents who were 
in Sydney. Jack Scott was Street’s cousin. He was serving in intelligence at 
Melbourne’s Victoria Barracks in August 1940 and was sent down to ‘Eildon’ 
to retrieve all of the official papers that the Army Minister had taken home. 
Gyp Street had met Scott in London during the first war. He had been in love 
with her then before she married. But she had not seen him again for over 20 
years. Their friendship was to be rekindled after 1945. Childless and recently 
divorced for the second time, Scott had spent years in Japanese captivity after 
his ‘Gull’ force battalion was captured in Ambon. Sadly his reputation never 
recovered from his alleged too-easy compliance with his captors. He had told 
Gyp that what had kept him going during his years of internment had been the 
thought of her. Touched, sorry for him, and feeling an obligation to respond to 
his proclaimed devotion, Gyp married Scott in 1948. A man of some mystery in 
his middle years, and shunned by many of his former wartime comrades, Scott 
would struggle with his demons until his death eight years later.34
32 Woman, 24 June 1940.
33 Street left personal property in Victoria valued at £639.14.10. (The Argus, 15 Jan. 1941).
34 Scott had been divorced in 1926 and on 8 February 1930 had married a widow, Andree Adelaide Oatley, née 
Kaeppel. After their divorce in 1948, on May 5 he married Gyp Street. He died in Adelaide in November 1956. I 
am grateful to Mrs ‘Tim’ Gillespie for information about her mother and Scott (telephone interview, 31 Jan. 2010).
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For Dick Elford’s parents the pain of his loss could not be masked by the 
emotional reticence of the many letters they had to write: ‘We were very proud 
of Dick and felt sure that he had a great future before him,’ his father wrote to 
Sir John Latham. ‘Every one has been most kind in trying to soften the blow as 
much as possible by bearing tribute to the high regard in which Dick was held.’ 
They appreciated the references the Prime Minister and other ministers made 
to him in the House of Representatives. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister of 
Canada, had taken the trouble to send a message to Audrey Elford saying ‘that 
he had seen quite a lot of Dick in Canada and had formed a very high opinion 
of him and had thought that he had a great future ahead of him’.35 The Geelong 
Grammar School magazine commended ‘a particularly loyal old boy’ who had 
been on the committee of the Old Geelong Grammarians’ Association since 1929.
Although Archie Elford was to tell Dr Darling that the family could not afford 
the fees, junior school places were found in 1946 for the twins. Hugh left after 
three years, his mother having been encouraged by the headmaster to guide 
him towards a non-academic path. His later life of service in employment, 
accommodation and advocacy associations for people with disabilities was 
acknowledged with an OAM. David, who was to have a distinguished career as 
a mechanical engineer and inventor, stayed at the school until 1951. He won a 
Commonwealth scholarship for university study but thought it unreasonable to 
his mother to take it. In search of a ‘career without a degree’ he was introduced 
to several of his grandfather’s business friends before finding a berth in an 
engineering firm. After many years of design innovation and business success 
while struggling with gender disphoria, he eventually emerged as the vivacious 
Dianne Boddy, whose husband Harold had been a contemporary of her father’s 
at Geelong Grammar.36
What Audrey Elford and her parents-in-law knew was that Dick had been 
longing to be set free from his civilian employment so that he could join the Air 
Force. His heart was set on becoming a combat flyer as his boss once had been, 
like the flamboyant, ever mischievous young men who were rapidly rising to 
prominence in the RAAF. The Rev. J. H. Allen, the Geelong Grammar chaplain, 
had read the burial service for both Fairbairn and Elford at the Springvale 
cemetery. But in a final loving gesture, the family decided to release Dick’s ashes 
from the air over the city. Freddie Thomas and Bob Dalkin of No. 2 Squadron, 
with a crew dressed in their best blues, took a Hudson up over the coast on 
the eastern side of Port Philip Bay. Dalkin was given the task of dispersing the 
contents of the urn. All those aboard the aeroplane learned something that day 
about the airflow over the fuselage of a Hudson.37
35 A. S. Elford to Latham, 24 Aug. 1940, Latham MSS, NLA MS 1009/54/5489.
36 Dianne Boddy to CH, (email), 9,10 Jan. 2011.
37 ACdre R. N. Dalkin, interview, 18 April 1978.
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As for the remains of Lockheed Hudson A16-97, their destiny was written on 
RAAF form E/E.88, ‘Record Card Airframes, Aero Engines and Mechanical 
Transport’. The Air Member for Organisation and Equipment approved their 
‘conversion to components’ on 27 August 1940. Not much was reusable. The 
Service Court of Inquiry had concluded: ‘Aircraft completely burnt with 
exception of portion of starboard mainplane, tail plane, stabilizers and rudder.’ 
The unserviceable residue was dumped at the Canberra tip, then in the inner 
suburb of Reid. At least one propeller found its way there, to be discovered 
and retrieved by a fossicking Commonwealth Commissioner of Patents, Harold 
Wilmot. A metallurgist, Wilmot was interested in the properties of the propeller’s 
new material, duraluminum, a blend of aluminium, copper, and magnesium. 
From Wilmot one blade of the propeller was eventually passed on together with 
his home forge to his senior public service colleague Sir Roland Wilson of the 
Treasury. Wilson would fill idle retirement moments by fashioning ashtrays and 
toys from molten slices of the metal. Sixty-seven years after the crash, the last 
blade was the centrepiece of a small display cabinet in the National Museum of 
Australia.38 In addition to whatever else could be salvaged, the Twin Row Wasp 
engines, 2845L (port) and 2853R (starboard), were ‘converted’. The Service 
Court of Inquiry had recorded that the engines were ‘completely burnt and 
of no further use except possibly for instruction’. But they had not allowed 
for the resourcefulness of the mechanics. The fate of the Wasps was to furnish 
replacement parts for their surviving but worn or damaged siblings.39
Those who remained
Of Bob Hitchcock’s fellow cadets, the stories of some of those who survived 
after 13 August 1940 tell us what might have been for him. Flight Lieutenant 
Johnny Bell was to be the first RAAF pilot who died on active service, killed 
while attempting a daring rescue of General De Gaulle’s family from northern 
Brittany in June 1940. Squadron Leader Norman Hick survived until his No. 
10 Squadron Sunderland crashed on landing at Pembroke Dock, Milford Haven 
in June 1941.40 Don Macpherson, whose distinguished pass in June 1936 was 
38 Sir Roland Wilson, interview with Cameron Hazlehurst and Colin Forster, 28 March 1984; David Wardle, 
notes of interview with Sir Roland Wilson, [8] Jan. 1990, National Museum of Australia, File 90/11, courtesy 
Daniel Oakman.
39 ‘Proceedings of Court of Inquiry–Flying Accidents, Master Copy, Vol. 1’, NAA: A98451, 318/30; Aircraft 
status card: Lockheed Hudson A16-97, NAA: A10297, BLOCK 84/180. From early 1941 log books of airframes 
and aero engines converted, written off, or assumed to be total losses, were no longer held at Air Force HQ 
but retained by units for a year and then submitted for disposal (NAA: A705, 87/4/815). A16-97’s log books 
and history sheets were with the Director of Engineering until late Oct. 1940 and then returned to Southern 
Area. Disposal action was initiated by RAAF Station Canberra in Jan. 1941 (NAA: A2408, 1 87/4/808; 334/1/1 
[3053], A705, 32/10/2733).
40 NAA: A9300, HICK AN; NAA: 705, 163/36/86.
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a harbinger of future success, became the first commanding officer of the Point 
Cook Signals School; a Wing Commander aged 28, Macpherson died when 
the MV Melbourne Star was sunk in the Atlantic in 1943. Bob’s friend Wing 
Commander Bill Keenan DFC commanded No. 13 Squadron during the war and 
retired as an honorary Group Captain in 1960.41 By late 1941 Bill Allshorn was 
CO of No. 21 Squadron in Malaya but was relieved ‘on account of unsatisfactory 
leadership in connection with air operations’. He would go on to command No. 
4 Squadron and No. 5 EFTS and end the war as a Wing Commander. Eric V. Read 
had survived a crash in bad weather in December 1936 which saw him unable 
to fly for nine months; he ended the war as a Wing Commander AFC. Squadron 
Leader G. J. Quinan, promoted temporary flight lieutenant in February 1940 
(with effect from 1 September 1939), commanded the Australian Army Co-
operation Squadron in 1941 and was senior instructor in the new Army Air Co-
operation School in 1942; he transferred to the CAF Reserve at his own request 
in February 1945 after leading both No. 4 and No. 5 Squadrons in New Guinea.42 
Ted Fyfe commanded No. 21 Squadron, was awarded a DSO, and retired as a 
Group Captain CBE in 1969 after a series of senior staff appointments.43
In a massively expanded air force, there were operational and administrative 
posts for all of the pre-war generation who survived. Gerry Buscombe, for 
example, was promoted squadron leader and, 16 days after Bob Hitchcock’s 
death, given command of the new No. 7 Elementary Flying Training School in 
Tasmania. Three years later Eric Lansell, now a Wing Commander, took over 
7 EFTS. He had previously commanded the Armament Training Station at 
Laverton. Early in 1945 Wing Commander Norman ‘Phil’ Ford was appointed 
to head the Central Flying School at Point Cook. Air Marshal Sir Colin Hannah 
would rise through operational and administrative posts during the war, reach 
the pinnacle of the RAAF in 1970 as Chief of the Air Staff, retire early, and 
then serve a controversial term as Governor of Queensland.44 After several 
41 KEENAN, William James NAA: A12372 R/342/H,P. Keenan’s DFC citation referred to his ‘conspicuous 
leadership and ability’ but his postwar career stalled with ‘below average’ assessments of his ‘inexpressive 
personality’.
42 NAA: A9300, QUINAN GJ.
43 FYFE, Edwin Glen NAA: A12372 R/340/H,P.
44 Five airmen also graduated as Temporary Sergeant Pilots in July 1936: Lou Lohse, after nine years in 
the Permanent RAAF enrolled in the Air Force Reserve in 1938 and was appointed by ANA as an instructor, 
captained DC-2s and DC-3s, joined BCPA, re-joined the RAAF, and was discharged as a F/Lt (NAA: A9301/2, 
A9300, 2002/05090488; see also the No. 22 Squadron Association web site). Kenneth Berry, mustered on 
enlistment as a W/T operator, graduated third with a distinguished pass, was discharged to the Reserve in 
1937 on appointment to Qantas; he returned as an F/O in Sept. 1939, was promoted F/Lt 1943, served briefly 
with No. 36 Squadron in Merauke before resuming civil occupation in 1945 (NAA: A9301, A9301/2, A9300, 
2002). Reginald Peverell, formerly a PMG telephone mechanic and RCA instrument adjuster, then a RAAF 
W/T operator mechanic, was discharged in 1937 ‘at own request, on payment of £24 0s 0d’ after barely 
passing the ‘ab initio’ seaplane training course; enrolled in the Reserve while a Qantas First Officer, he died 
after a motor accident in 1938 (NAA: A9301, 2002/04901212). Cliff Tuttleby DFC AFM, commissioned in June 
1941, served with Nos 7, 8 and 100 Squadrons in Beaufort bomber operations over New Guinea 1942–3, No. 
24 Squadron in B24 Liberators over Morotai, North Moluccas 1944–45; RAAF ‘mutiny’ New Guinea 1943; 
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years in the RAF, Dickie Cohen returned to Australia with a DFC and a glowing 
reputation; aged 27, he was promoted Group Captain in 1943, and held a series 
of senior training and HQ posts before beginning a public service career as 
Richard Kingsland in 1947. He became Secretary of the Departments of the 
Interior, Repatriation and Veterans’ Affairs. Knighted in 1978, he was appointed 
an Officer (AO) of the Order of Australia in 1989. He died in August 2012, the 
last of Hitchcock’s cadet contemporaries.45
A fatal decision?
In August 1940, 25-year-old Sergeant Jo Gullett of the AIF was attending a 
British Army tactical school in Cairo. He learned of his father’s death from the 
senior officer of the school, before receiving a cable from his mother who had 
been in Sydney, returning from a holiday in Queensland with her daughter 
Sue. He returned briefly to Australia, finding his mother like the other widows 
in great shock ‘accentuated…by the unavoidably public nature of the church 
services and funerals’. Assured that his father’s farm was in the hands of a 
capable neighbour, and confident that his mother ‘always kept a firm hand in 
her affairs’, he set his face again to the war. ‘I was sad to leave my mother and 
sister in the large house, but at least they were comfortable among friends. It did 
not occur to anyone that I should not return to the battalion.’46
Though their wealth was modest — Gullett’s real and personal estate was sworn 
at £13 265 — Penny Gullett and her children had been well provided for through 
her mother’s will. She would not need her husband’s gold railway pass, which 
as the widow of a minister who had served for three years, she was entitled to 
keep.47 In time, however, Orchard Cottage would prove too big and expensive 
to keep up. Staff were almost impossible to find. She moved into a flat in South 
Yarra. As Jo moved on with other Australian forces from North Africa to New 
Guinea, Melbourne was swamped by American troops. Jo’s sister Sue, like many 
impressionable young Australian women, was swept off her feet by an American 
discharged as F/Lt 1947 (NAA: A9300, TUTTLEBY CE; Recorded interview with Fred Morton, 1980, Imperial 
War Museum 9670). Douglas Edwin Morgan, enlisted in 1933 after a year in CAF, experienced in motor and 
general engineering, served at No.1 A.D. with Hitchcock; a warrant officer and flying instructor by 1938, he 
was posted to the General Reconnaissance School in April 1940; commissioned in 1942, promoted F/Lt (temp.) 
1944; Milne Bay with No. 33 Squadron 1943–44; transferred to Reserve Aug. 1945 (NAA: A9300, A9301 2002).
45 Deborah Cornwall, ‘Short straw, long straw: a deadly decision’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1990; 
NAA: A705, 163/23/53 (Bell); NAA: A9300, MACPHERSON DJ; Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story Book One, 
p.377 (Allshorn); Anne Twomey, The Chameleon Crown: The Queen and her Australian Governors, Federation 
Press, Sydney, 2006, pp.62–8, 161–76 (Hannah); John Farqhuarson, ‘Boys Own adventures in wartime and 
sterling public service’, The Age, 29 Aug. 2012 (Cohen/Kingsland).
46 Gullett, Good Company, pp.132–3.
47 The Argus, 16 Aug. 1940.
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officer, an assistant military attaché at the American legation, and went as a war 
bride to the United States. The marriage did not last. She remarried in 1948 to a 
British oil company executive, Paul Hackforth-Jones.48
A daughter departed, and anxious not to lose her son as well as her husband, 
Penny Gullett contrived to get Jo the UAP pre-selection for his father’s old seat 
of Henty for the 1943 election. To his relief, he was defeated by the sitting 
Independent, Arthur Coles. Major Gullett, as he had become, would not return 
to New Guinea but was posted to England to serve with the British Army. 
Returning from the war an infantry company commander with an MC, and 
rare personal experiences for an Australian officer of D-Day and the battle of 
Normandy, he was easily elected to the House of Representatives when Arthur 
Coles chose not to run again in 1946. Jo was not a natural parliamentarian. 
Although he became Chief Whip for the Menzies government, he was never 
completely comfortable with the sacrifice of independence that party politics 
demanded. As the Prime Minister reflected on learning of Gullett’s retirement, 
he had been ‘rather ready to reconcile the office of Government Whip with that 
of chief Government critic’.49 After a term as Ambassador to Greece he returned 
to farming at ‘Lambrigg’ on the Murrumbidgee.
Jo Gullett was to publish two acclaimed autobiographical works — a war memoir 
and a fine evocation of his early life with an admiring but believable portrait 
of his father.50 Convivial, plainspoken, a vivid writer and raconteur, Jo had 
a good ‘drinking friend’, Group Captain Dixie Chapman. They met regularly 
in the Naval and Military Club in Melbourne. Chapman, a career officer with 
a farming background, had served with mixed success through the war and 
postwar period, earning by his own admission ‘a somewhat dubious erstwhile 
reputation as a drinker’. He had been commissioned as a pilot officer in 1935 
after instruction on Wapitis by Eric Douglas who, with Charles Eaton, had 
buried Bob Hitchcock’s father in the Tanami. He was a flying instructor at Point 
Cook the following year. Promoted rapidly, he was a flight lieutenant by 1938, 
and in July 1939 became Deputy Director of Training at RAAF headquarters. On 
1 June 1940 he was made a squadron leader though he was not appointed to a 
squadron until the end of the year.51
One afternoon at the club, the conversation turned to Jo Gullett’s father and the 
events of August 1940. Chapman had an extraordinary tale. About a fortnight 
before the crash, he said, he had taken Bob Hitchcock for his annual flying 
48 Their daughter, Penne Hackforth-Jones, would enjoy a successful career as an actress and biographer of 
her great-grandmother, Barbara Baynton. Her death was announced in May 2013.
49 Menzies to Heather Henderson, 31 Oct. 1955, Heather Henderson (ed.), Letters to my Daughter: Robert 
Menzies, letters, 1955–1975, Pier 9, Millers Point, NSW, 2011, p.14.
50 Not as a Duty Only: an infantryman’s war, MUP, 1976.
51 CHAPMAN, Dixie Robison, NAA: A12372 R/335/P.
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test. Coming in to land Hitchcock had lost flying speed. Chapman told him to 
‘give it a gun’ and go round again. The same thing happened. Chapman took 
over the controls himself. Alarmed by what he had seen, Chapman failed the 
No.2 Squadron flight commander. Hitchcock, he ruled, was not to captain again 
until he had sorted out his problem. Hitchcock appealed against the suspension. 
Then, Chapman said, the Minister for Air personally overrode the decision.52
The story was startling. Nothing that would confirm it emerged from the 
archives. Could it possibly have been true? Why would Chapman, holding a 
headquarters post, have been taking Hitchcock’s flying test, normally the task 
of a senior officer at Laverton? Could the story be verified? The first and most 
obvious question is whether Hitchcock was due for a test at the time Chapman 
indicated. To that question the answer would seem to be ‘yes’. He had been put 
through his paces for the ‘RAAF Annual Confidential Report (Officers)’ in June 
1939. Unfortunately, the documents presented to the inquiries in 1940, and files 
released later to scholars, contain no such report (Form P/P. 29) by Hitchcock’s 
CO for 1940. If a flying test had not been taken it was also probably overdue. 
Hitchcock had been at No. 2 Squadron for over a year. Possibly, because of 
the heavy training and operational demands of the first year of war the annual 
assessment due in June had been deferred.53 But if a flying test had been taken 
where was the report?
Was there anything else to lend credence to Chapman’s story? Could he be 
placed at Laverton at the right time? The logical place to look was Hitchcock’s 
flying log book. There, in Hitchcock’s own hand, we find an entry for Thursday, 
25 July 1940 with several unusual names. Hitchcock had taken Hudson No. 54 
for an hour and a half. The stated ‘duty’ was ‘Cloud flying & compass swing.’ 
There were three other people with him. None had flown with him in recent 
months. They were not pupils under his command. Under the heading ‘2nd Pilot, 
Pupil or Passenger’ are three names: ‘Hilder Chapman F/L Kingwell.’ It was an 
extraordinary group. Brett Hilder was a 29-year-old former merchant marine 
officer with an Extra Master’s ticket, who had been called up from the naval 
reserve into the RAN at the beginning of the war. Appalled at the lowly status he 
was given and the exiguous pay he was receiving, Hilder effectively absconded 
from the Navy and offered his services to the RAAF. After passing a navigation 
instructors’ conversion course with ‘special distinction’ he was happily received 
into the RAAF fold on secondment on 13 May 1940. ‘Although I knew nothing 
about Air Navigation itself, my knowledge of navigation generally was possibly 
superior to that of anyone else in Australia.’ His navigation expertise, such as it 
52 H. B. Gullett, telephone interview, 19 July 1978; interview, 7 Aug 1978.
53 I have not noticed a report written in 1940 in any other personnel files. There is a gap in the reports on F/Lt then 
S/Ldr Frank Headlam between one signed in June 1939 and another for the period March 1940 to Feb. 1941 (NAA: 
A12372, R/331/P). S/Ldr K. Parsons had a report from Dec. 1939 to Feb. 1941 (NAA: A12372, R/337/P).
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was, being at a premium in the Air Force he was now assisting at Point Cook as a 
navigation reconnaissance instructor, temporary flight lieutenant, with special 
knowledge of naval co-operation.54
Flight Lieutenant Deryck Kingwell’s assignment at the time was leading the 
instructional work on the navigation reconnaissance course. Among his pupils 
were Dick Wiesener, Bob Dalkin, Bill White, and Peter Fowler. The presence of 
Kingwell and Hilder in A16-54 suggests that Hitchcock was being given some 
pointers to assist him in his own work with the young officers in his flight 
whom he was familiarising with the Hudson. Compass swinging — calculating 
the compensation required to adjust for deviations caused by the proximity of 
metal objects, magnetic fields, and electrical equipment, including radios — was 
normally done on the ground. But, as it was the Hudson’s undercarriage that was 
causing problems with the pilots’ compasses, the calculations had to be done in 
the air. Kingwell was with Hitchcock again two days later in a different aircraft 
for compass swinging and preparation of the deviation card for A16-80.55
And ‘Chapman’? In a photograph of officers of No. 2 Squadron taken by the 
squadron photographer Frank Jefferies late in August 1940, sitting in the 
front row between Flight Lieutenants Neville Hemsworth and Ray Garrett is 
a ‘Chapman’.56 However, this Chapman appears from his uniform to be a flight 
lieutenant, and was in fact F. B. Chapman of the RAAF Reserve who was posted 
to the squadron on August 17 and began his Hudson conversion course with 
Jack Ryland two days later.57 Of Squadron Leader Dixie Chapman there is no 
sign. Service records throw no light on his possible role at Laverton in those 
weeks.58
The story as Jo Gullett recalled it is impossible to verify. Was Chapman conflating 
several episodes? Remembering perhaps something that had happened at Point 
Cook in 1936 when he was a flight commander and flying instructor? Or a flight 
in August 1939 when Hitchcock was undergoing dual instruction with him in 
an NA33. Though it is possible, this seems unlikely. In the latter case, Hitchcock 
was in the air twice more the same day, three times the day after, and again twice 
54 For the tale of Brett Hilder’s self-initiated conversion from the Navy to the Air Force, see his Navigator 
in the South Seas, pp.81–5.
55 ‘Navigation Facilities Hudson Aircraft’, NAA: A705, 9/19/144; F. W. Wood and P. M. McGregor, Magnetic 
survey of compass swinging site, R.A.A.F. airfield, Laverton, Victoria, Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology 
and Geophysics, Canberra, 1953.
56 Bennett, Highest Traditions, p.112. Bennett does not date the photograph; but it cannot be earlier than 
26 August 1940 when Hemsworth joined the squadron.
57 NAA: A9300, CHAPMAN FB; Flying Log Book of J. P. Ryland, Aug.–Sept. 1940, Ryland Papers, NLA MS 
5020 Box 1. I am grateful to Martin James, Senior Historical Officer, Office of Air Force History, for help with 
this identification (email, 6 March 2008).
58 Apart from normal routine duties, as Deputy Director of Training Chapman ‘engaged in the formulation 
of the Empire Air Training Scheme plan as applicable to the R.A.A.F, examining civilian flying training 
schools…and flight testing civilian flying instructors’ (CHAPMAN Dixie Robison, NAA: A12372 R/335/H).
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three days on. Chapman does not appear to have been with him again at this time 
during which his airmanship was being assessed.59 Whatever truth there was in 
Dixie Chapman’s recollections, there is no evidence to suggest that Hitchcock’s 
flying was significantly interrupted in the weeks after he went up with him, 
together with Hilder and Kingwell, on Thursday July 25. Hitchcock’s logbook 
tendered to the Service Court of Inquiry shows him doing instrument flying, 
cloud flying, photography, local night flying, and flight formation with various 
crews on an almost daily basis from July 27 to August 11. It is inconceivable 
that so serious a matter as a recommendation to suspend a flight commander’s 
right to captain an aircraft could have been written up, endorsed, forwarded to 
a higher authority, and overruled in the space of a day.
Did Jo Gullett misunderstand what his companion said? Could Chapman have 
embellished his story? He had a reputation in later years for a ‘wingeing attitude 
re his career’ (Val Hancock) and exaggerating ‘situations and circumstances’ 
(Colin Hannah).60 But surely this was too poignant a subject of which to speak 
lightly to the son of a man who perished. Could it have been that on that July 
25 flight Chapman, then Deputy Director of Training, had been so concerned 
about what he saw that he spoke of it to No. 2 Squadron’s CO? Did he urge some 
dramatic action to improve Hitchcock’s performance? Did Freddie Thomas, 
knowing of the degree of political protection that Hitchcock had enjoyed, 
decide there was no point in taking the matter further? Thomas would, after all, 
have had the comfort of knowing that Ryland, a tough instructor, had certified 
Hitchcock as competent to fly the Hudson. Everyone knew that the Hudson 
could be tricky to handle. One imperfect episode was hardly a justification for 
blighting a man’s career.
If official records that would illuminate Chapman’s story ever existed it is easy 
to imagine why they might have been purposely mislaid. Like so many elements 
of the story of A16-97 we are left with uncertainty. Some of that uncertainty 
was undoubtedly deliberately created. The fate of the 10 men whose journeys 
ended in Duncan Cameron’s farm was poorly explained in 1940. The rush to 
conclusion suited the Air Force. It was politically convenient. For the children 
and grandchildren of the victims, for their surviving friends and comrades, for 
all who still seek answers to questions that should have been asked long ago, the 
truth about Bob Hitchcock’s last flight remains elusive.
59 R. E. Hitchcock, Flying Log Book, NAA: A705, 32/10/2729 Attachment 1.
60 NAA: A12372 R/335/H.
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Sources and acknowledgements
Scholars writing about recent history — the past that is within living memory 
— do not and should not believe everything they are told. Nor for that matter 
everything they read. They should be sceptical about motives, alert to faulty 
recall, and watchful for undeclared jealousies and enmities.
Some of my professional colleagues may cavil at reliance on some of the evidence 
deployed in this book, particularly the quotation of conversations recalled after 
40, 50, or, in some cases, more than 60 years. I am happy to acknowledge the 
likelihood that the remembered words might in many cases differ from those 
that were actually spoken long ago. This could diminish the reliability of some 
testimony. But one thing should be clear. Unlike some earlier accounts of the 
events and characters critical to the story I have told, the conclusions reached 
are not based on a bare handful of affirmations or allegations. Where there is 
conflicting testimony of roughly equivalent probability, it is all presented. As 
so much of the story turns on perceptions of personality and judgments of 
ability, it seems to me that the lesser evil is to let people speak for themselves 
wherever possible. If there is reason to doubt the essence of what they say then 
that is indicated. Vigilant readers will see a number of occasions where I have 
discounted or discarded testimony that cannot be true.
The research on which this book is based began in 1976. All of the documentary 
and newspaper sources on which I have drawn are cited in the footnotes. I 
follow therefore the precept of my late colleague and friend Allan Martin in his 
biography of Sir Robert Menzies: ‘it would be tedious, not to say pretentious, 
to list them in detail here’. The many people who responded to my enquiries 
with interviews, written recollections, telephone calls, and other informal 
conversations are also acknowledged in the footnote references. Sadly most of 
them have not lived to see the work completed. But their contributions testify 
to the unique value of the memories of men and women ‘who were there’. I am 
very conscious of the gaps that might have been filled had my research been 
more persistent and more thorough. If I knew then what I know now…Yet 
I am deeply indebted to those who shared with me their observations of old 
friends, family, and comrades; explained technical matters that were beyond 
my ken; identified locations, and recounted experiences, routine, exhilarating, 
emotional, painful, even traumatic. To all of them, for this and in many cases for 
most enjoyable hospitality and patient encouragement, I offer a candid account 
which I hope will not disappoint. Of those few who did not help, though they 
could have done so, or were economical with the truth, only they can have 
known how much better the book might have been.
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I owe particular gratitude to a number of people who were especially close to 
those who lost their lives in Duncan Cameron’s farm on 13 August 1940 and who 
shared their memories and provided access to family papers and photographs: 
James Fairbairn’s children, Geoffrey Fairbairn and Angela Mercer, their friend 
Virginia ‘Bardie’ Mercer (née Grimwade), his nieces Alethea Russell and Gillian 
Gubbins, and his grandchildren Mary Browne and Tim Mercer; Geoffrey Street’s 
son Tony Street, his wife Ricky, his daughter ‘Tim’ Gillespie, and nephew David 
Sydney Burnand, and his friend Sir Rutherford Guthrie; Dick Elford’s widow 
Audrey Elford, her twins Dianne Boddy and Hugh Elford (whose rescue of papers 
consigned to an incinerator by his Aunt Barbara ensured that some vital family 
history was not lost), Hugh’s wife, Jenny, and Audrey Elford’s granddaughter, 
Wendy Elford, and great-niece Annie Basham; Sir Henry Gullett’s son, Jo 
Gullett, and grandson, Peter Gullett, and Kate Gullett; Frank Thornthwaite’s 
widow, Inez Thornthwaite; Dick Wiesener’s widow, Joan Wiesener, his 
daughter Margot Buttrose, his son Richard Wiesener and Richard’s wife Diana, 
and granddaughter Anna Hyles; the family of Charlie Crosdale, especially his 
sister, Alice McDonald, brother Norman and Jan Crosdale, Janette Crosdale, 
and Charlie’s nieces Michelle Lake and Jeannette Turner; the family and friends 
of Jack Palmer, especially Sheila Palmer’s son John Foley, her brother Ron 
Curtain and niece Pat Snowball who supplied important photographs; Bob 
Hitchcock’s son Robert Hitchcock, his nephew Ian Hitchcock, and his brother 
Les Hitchcock; Bob Hitchcock’s friends Les Lingwood and Rex Taylor, and 
May Lingwood; members of Olive Hitchcock’s family, especially her daughter 
Kaye Greene, cousin Beryl Noske, her niece Joan Richardson (née Beecroft), and 
Helen Gregg (née Hoskings); Sir Charles Manifold’s daughter, Mary Schlicht. 
Mark Derham granted me access and permission to quote from the indispensable 
diaries of his grandfather, Sir Brudenell White, furnished family photographs, 
and generously made a press cutting collection available on CDRom as well as an 
insightful biographical essay. 
Many academic colleagues and other writers have been kind enough to share 
information with me and guide me to sources: John McCarthy, Sid Ingham, 
Steve Dyer, Rob Darroch, Jeffrey Davis, Katherine Dunbabin, Andrew Moore, 
Janet Butler, Alan Fewster, Jon Chittleborough, Alan Gregory, John Lack, 
John Poynter, Jock Given, Clem Lloyd, Robin Sharwood, Peter Gronn, Robert 
Coleman, David Maunders, David Merrett, Matthew Ricketson, Stephen Gower, 
Nick Lambert, Nicholas Black, Peter Fearon, Tony Cunneen, Mike Gibson, 
Joyce Batty, Kim Torney, Peter Dennis, David Sissons, Kosmas Tsokhas, Hank 
Nelson, Philip Selth, Jo Duflou, Kevin O’Reilly, Bronwyn and John Myrtle, 
Laurence Maher, and Marc Dierikx. I have learned much from Macarthur 
Job’s pioneering publications on Australian aviation accidents, and have had 
the benefit of conversation with him. It is impossible to over-emphasise how 
much I have been instructed by the justly acclaimed compendium of brief lives 
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in the Australian Dictionary of Biography. And I am glad also to acknowledge 
Peter Helson’s important thesis (now published) on Sir George Jones; and the 
excellent Wikipedia contributions on RAAF officers by Ian Rose.
The first instalment of David Vincent’s indefatigable research on RAAF Hudsons 
appeared two decades after I started exhuming the relevant archives. His 
second volume, part of which he generously showed me in draft, completes 
an incomparable resource. I am indebted to him as well for a thoughtful 
exchange of views on some key points and for several important photographs. 
Mark Lax brought the special understanding of an officer of ‘Air Rank’ as well 
as a scholar to answering the questions of a newcomer to RAAF history; he 
transferred a valuable interview with Paddy Heffernan from tape to CD, and 
his vigilant reading of much of the manuscript saved me from many errors and 
inconsistencies. Neither he nor anyone else can be blamed for the remaining 
blemishes.
As will be evident from the notes, I have drawn information from the published 
work of countless scholars and dedicated explorers of family, institutional, 
military, and aviation history. I salute their achievements, both celebrated and 
unsung. It was a relief to find the incisive commentaries of an official historian, 
Alan Stephens, notably his contribution on the RAAF to the Australian 
Centenary History of Defence, resonating with what I was concerned might be 
my own prejudices. Earlier work by Chris Clark on RAAF history, especially 
his study of inter-war developments, The Third Brother, has been an invaluable 
foundation on which to proceed. Clark and his colleagues Greg Gilbert, 
Steve Allan, and Martin James in the Office of Air Force History in the Air 
Power Development Centre, and Kerry Hodge in the Department of Veterans’ 
Affairs, have been patient and unfailingly thorough in responding to queries 
and guiding me to official sources I might otherwise not have located. John 
Bennett’s published history of No. 2 Squadron and Master’s thesis on No. 3 
Squadron answered important questions and prompted others. H. J. Manning’s 
‘Air Disaster at Canberra’ (Stand-To, Jan–Feb. 1962), though occasionally astray, 
was an important early account, based in part on information supplied to A. 
W. Bazley three years earlier by A. B. ‘Tich’ McFarlane, then Secretary of the 
Department of Air (NAA: A705, 32/10/2733).
Andrew Tink’s book, Air Disaster Canberra: the plane crash that destroyed a 
government, came to hand on 3 April 2013, seven months after the MS of this 
book was despatched to publishers. An early synopsis of my proposed work 
had been sent to several publishers between September 2008 and March 2009. 
My tentative conclusions were foreshadowed in ‘Evidence, deduction, and 
inference: Lockheed Hudson A16-97 and the men who died in it on 13 August 
1940’, a paper presented to a seminar at the ANU Humanities Research Centre, 
25 September 2009. Draft chapters of the book were circulated to colleagues 
Ten Journeys to Cameron's Farm 
664
from March 2011 onwards. Dr Tink’s interpretations differ from mine on a 
number of significant issues and I have drawn attention to his published and 
broadcast views at appropriate places in the text and in footnotes.
Both in the original research phase and in more recent work I have been greatly 
aided by librarians and archivists, genealogists, booksellers, film-makers, and 
other writers who have shared information and ideas. John Taylor and Ray Walls 
enlightened me on the parents and extended family of Bob Hitchcock’s wife, 
Olive Beecroft. Estelle Blackburn furnished timely contact details for descendants 
of the Crosdale and Hitchcock families. I have cause also to be grateful to the 
volunteers who sustain the work of the Williamstown Historical Society (Jane 
Ridley, Brian Haynes), Essendon Historical Society (Lenore Frost), Ku-ring-gai 
Historical Society (Jennifer Harvey), Maryborough-Midlands Historical Society 
(Margaret Walkley), Camperdown & District Historical Society (Maree Belyea, 
Ray Watson), Derrinallum & Lismore Community Association History Group 
(Avon Buchholz, Margaret Nixon), Western Australia Scout Museum (Fay Hall), 
Australian Association of Time Table Collectors (Geoff Lambert, Victor Isaacs), 
Horticultural Society of Canberra (Merylyn Condon), Royal Victorian Aero Club 
(Rex Hobson), NSW Presbyterian Church Archives (Daryl Lightfoot), Australian 
Racing Museum (Elizabeth Brown), and several independently maintained 
websites including the Lockheed file (Ron Cuskelly), and OzatWar (Peter Dunn).
Ian Mackersey generously sent me transcripts of his interviews with Barley and 
Lyle Hitchcock. Bob Landt made available diaries and unpublished memoirs 
of Joyce Batty, including notes of her conversation with Les Hitchcock. Pedr 
Davis kindly lent me his own files gathered during the writing of his books on 
the Kookaburra (with Dick Smith) and Charles Kingsford-Smith. Moya Sharp of 
Outback Family History searched sources for the West Australian background 
of the Hitchcock family. Geoff Crane of the ABC in Canberra copied his valuable 
short film on the crash for me, lent transcripts of interviews, and reminded 
me of a number of sources I had neglected. Jonathan Persse helped to check 
details of David Campbell’s RAAF career. Bernard Malloy of Antique Goodies in 
Auckland sent pictures from rare illustrated volumes on the Orient line ships 
Orvieto and Osterley. Penny Olsen and her digital camera made possible the 
inclusion of a portrait of Justice Charles Lowe. Bridget McDonnell and Jennifer 
Phipps helped with the provenance and dating of Loudon Sainthill’s portrait of 
Peggy Fairbairn.
Bob Livingstone furnished tantalising photographs of Anson aircraft which 
might have had Bob Hitchcock at the controls. Phil Vabre and Geoff Goodall 
instructed me on the history of Jim Fairbairn’s aircraft and guided me to other 
pictorial collections; and John Hopton responded generously. Gordon Birkett 
and Brendan Cowan welcomed me to the resources of ADF-Serials. Brian Hernan 
provided photographs of Jim Fairbairn’s Dragonfly VH-ADG. For photographs 
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and recollections of life at Mount Elephant, I am grateful to Fay Stokie-Ryan, the 
granddaughter of James Fairbairn’s station manager. Loftus Dun copied Henry 
Darwen’s account of the fatal crash of Donald Ashton-Shorter. Joan Priest gave 
helpful leads. Peter Lowe and Sue Thompson helped me in the search, sadly 
unavailing, for relevant papers of their grandfather, Sir Charles Lowe. So too 
Bill, Geoff, and David Bostock searched through family papers still in their 
possession with the happier result that Geoff provided a selection of pictures 
of their father. Carol Judkins responded instantly to a request for copies of her 
photographs of the Lismore cemetery headstones of Frank, Inez, and William 
Currie Thornthwaite. Edna Byrne related her own childhood memories and the 
startling crash site story of her father, Jack Butt; her son, Graham Byrne kindly 
scanned a photograph of his grandfather. John McIntyre recalled the eye-
witness account of the crash scene given by his father, Les McIntyre. Raphael 
Clothier, Bert Vest, and Max Hill shared their own memories and stories of the 
Clothier, Southwell, and Vest families. And Ann and David Brech’s quest for 
the story (www.sealikeglass.com) of Bob Hitchcock’s Point Cook contemporary, 
Robbie Watson, was the belatedly discovered source of information about the 
careers of the seven graduates of the 1935–36 cadet cohort who joined the RAF. 
Michael Collins Persse and Melissa Campbell have furnished essential material 
from the archives of Geelong Grammar School. For other Australian schools, I 
have received valuable information from Alison Field (Trinity Grammar School), 
Diana Winyard (Meriden School), Thomas Gunn (Launceston Grammar School), 
Pauline Atkins (Coburg High School Historical Group), Welwyn Petersen, 
Kate Riseley (Shore), Margaret Mason-Cox (The Hutchins School), Col Lannan 
(Geelong College), Rebecca Gabriel (St Peter’s College, Adelaide), and Gordon 
Cooper (Sydney Grammar School).
Long before the task was simplified by integrated computer catalogues and the 
internet, members of the Inter-Library Loans Unit at The Australian National 
University, especially Graeme Morriss, were untiring in the pursuit of rare 
published works. Thirty years ago Jenny Stokes, Thea Exley, and Joy Wheatley 
in Canberra and Margaret Chambers in Melbourne scoured the Australian 
Archives, as they were then known, for record series that might yield material 
I might otherwise have overlooked. Together with Richard Somerelle and Major 
C. A. W. Chant in the Defence Department, they arranged access to a number 
of files that had previously been closed. More recently, at ANU’s Noel Butlin 
Archives Centre, Pennie Pemberton, Margaret Avard, and Sarah Lethbridge 
directed me to the minute books and other records of the Australasian Steamship 
Owners’ Federation which helped provide background on the social and 
business connections of the Elford family.
Like many students of modern Australian history I am deeply indebted to 
the National Archives of Australia, the National Library of Australia, and the 
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Australian War Memorial. The sustained assistance of staff in each of these 
institutions has been critical to this project. I thank them all and, in particular, 
at the National Archives in Canberra and Melbourne: Jenny Stokes, Carolyn 
Connor, Kerri Ward, Bill Edwards, Leslie Weatherall, Pauline Maly, Karan Oberoi, 
Nancy Taylor, Laura Shannon, Diana Nguyen, Diep Nguyen, Molly ApThomas, 
Luke McKay, Carey Garvie, Tim Mifsud, Pat Kuhn, and Sarah Hall-Kearins; at 
the National Library Marie-Louise Ayres, Robyn Holmes, Kylie Scroope, Andrew 
Sergeant, Matthew Stuckings, Karen Johnson, Sharon Cullinan, Alison Weir, 
Claire Cruickshank, Lena Fox, and Lucy Nuttall; at the War Memorial Michael 
Piggott, Geoff McKeown, Jeremy Richter, Alyssa Phabmixay, Margaret Lewis, 
Jennie Norberry, Andrew Currey, Penny Hyde, John White, Paul Taylor, David 
McGill, Lauren Hewitt, Sue Ducker, Melissa Cadden, and Antoni Rudnicki. 
To Stewart Shannon at the National Film & Sound Archive and Glenn Eley of 
Cinesound Movietone Productions I owe the opportunity to examine and copy 
Cinesound Review No. 459 compiled in August 1940.
I also received exemplary aid from the Maitland City Library (Peter Woodley), 
Cessnock City Council (Simon Eade), Northern Territory Library (Louise 
Paynter and Margret Curry), Geelong Heritage Centre (Cheryl Timbury), 
Corangamite Shire (Leah Haworth), State Library of New South Wales (Arthur 
Easton), State Records Authority of New South Wales (Emily Hanna), Russell 
Fox Library, ACT Coroner’s Office (H. Tazewell), ACT Law Court & Tribunal 
Administration (Victor Rodziewicz, Michael Edwards), ACT Planning & Land 
Authority (Sharon Priestly), ACT Archives (Elizabeth Estberg, Mark Dawson), 
State Library of Queensland Heritage Collections (Simon Farley), National 
Museum of Australia (Daniel Oakman), National Portrait Gallery (Trish Kevin), 
State Library of Victoria (Lucy Shedden), Royal Historical Society of Victoria 
(Gerardine Horgan), Geelong Gallery (Veronica Filmer), Stonnington History 
Centre (Ellen Porter), Canberra Fire and Emergency Services Museum (Drew 
McLean), University of Melbourne Archives (Jason Benjamin, Katie Wood, 
Jane Beattie), RAAF Museum (Monica Walsh), University of NSW–Australian 
Defence Force Academy Library Special Collections (Wilgha Edwards, Tobie 
Garrick), Swinburne University of Technology (Nyssa Parkes), Waverley Library 
(Kimberly O’Sullivan Steward), Royal Australasian College of Physicians History 
of Medicine Library (Liz Rouse), Tamar Visitor Centre (Heidi Smith, Christine 
Phillips), State Library of Tasmania & Tasmanian Archive and Heritage Office 
(Caitlin Sutton), Murdoch University Library (Margaret Bruce), Churches of 
Christ in Western Australia (Don Parker), Warragul Church of Christ (Judy 
Farmer), Burwood Library, NSW (Kasia Malicka), Freemasons Victoria (Tony 
Morris), Geraldton Family History Society (Melody Cartwright), Lockheed 
Aircraft (Australia) Pty Ltd (G. M. Gipple), the Melbourne Club (Ronda Blyth), 
Manly Library (John MacRitchie), Battye Library (Steve Howell), ACT Heritage 
Library (Antoinette Buchanan), Local Studies Library, Queanbeyan City Council 
Sources and acknowledgements
667
(Judy Becker), Skipton and District Historical Society (Janet Walsh), Terang 
Library (Margaret McIntosh), Springvale Botanical Cemetery (Jessie Hennessy), 
Anglican Church of Australia General Synod Archives (Joanne Burgess), The 
Canberra Times (Megan O’Doherty, Fleta Page), and the Victorian Supreme 
Court Library (James Butler).
From the United Kingdom I was aided by the Bodleian Library, Oxford (Helen 
Langley), Medway Archives and Local Studies Centre (Alison Cable), the Royal 
Air Force Museum Hendon (Peter Elliott), the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry-
Princess Royal’s Volunteer Corps (Lt Liz Weston), the British Red Cross Museum 
and Archives (Sarah Cox); and from Geneva the International Committee of the 
Red Cross Archives (Magali Chahlaoui-Girod).
In exploring the British background of Dick Elford and his forebears I was 
provided with far more information than I could have discovered on my own, or 
could reasonably have expected any archivist or genealogist to supply. I record 
my thanks to Michael Riordan (St John’s College, Oxford), Robin Darwall-Smith 
(Magdalen College, Oxford), Deborah O’Brien (Devon Online Parish Clerk Co-
ordinator), Amy Collins (Oxfordshire County Council), Peter Rowe (Cirencester 
Grammar School), Dorothy Gorsuch (Coopers’ and Coborn School), and Christine 
Brown (Wolverhampton Archives & Local Studies). Liz Winney (elford@one-
name.org) has been an unfailing support. Of Dick Elford’s Australian friends, 
Balcombe Griffiths and Edgar Holt were particularly helpful.
Without the aid and guidance of many former Servicemen, aviators, and their 
families I could not have hoped to recapture the atmosphere of the RAAF of 
the 1930s and the first year of the conflict that was beginning to be called the 
Second World War. All those who helped are acknowledged in footnotes. But it 
would be wrong not to accord special mention to those who were exceptionally 
responsive to a historian they knew was exploring an unfamiliar world. With 
apologies that space is insufficient to include their decorations and final rank 
(and apologies as well for not adopting in the text the RAAF convention of 
capitalising abbreviations of rank e.g. GPCPT for GpCpt), and in no particular 
order: Paddy Heffernan, Ernie Hey, Sir George Jones, John Graham, Deryck 
Kingwell, Leon Lachal, G. U. ‘Scotty’ Allan, Sir Frederick Scherger, Sir Norman 
Brearley, Rex Taylor, Claude Browne, Sir John McCauley, David Colquhoun, 
Geoff Hartnell, Sir Raymond Garrett, Bruce Courtney, Ivon Black and Derek 
‘Jell’ Cuming, all of whom graciously answered questions that became more 
sensible under their tutelage. Harry Wrigley provided crucial information about 
Bob Hitchcock (and his son Ron Wrigley kindly facilitated access to diaries 
held in the RAAF Museum, and to his own Box Brownie photographs). Kym 
Bonython trustingly lent me his rare film of Hudsons in flight (‘Guardians of the 
Trade Routes’) and spoke to me about his No. 2 Squadron contemporaries. John 
Harrison sent personal memories and unique photographs, and traced others 
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who could help. The invaluable pictures taken at Laverton and Canberra by 
Frank Jefferies were found and copied for me by his daughter and son-in-law, 
Helen and Paul Struc. Wendy Coultas did the same for pictures in the collection 
of her father Jack McNally. Unfortunately, Harry Kuehne’s No. 2 Squadron 
ground crew photos, kindly sent by his daughter-in-law Judy, arrived too late 
for inclusion.
‘Tich’ McFarlane, Bob Dalkin, and Geoff Hartnell not only talked to me at length 
but made available flying log books and personal correspondence. Anne Kelly 
kindly allowed me to see a photocopy of the log books of her father Sir Raymond 
Garrett, the originals of which are in the RAAF Museum at Point Cook, as well 
as letters, articles, and photographs, and her own compilation of stories from 
his taped recollections. Charles Eaton sent me draft chapters from his planned 
biography of his father, ‘Moth’ Eaton; provided a cornucopia of photographs; 
and introduced me to Sally Douglas who most helpfully sent transcripts of 
her father Eric’s diary, log, excerpts from RAAF reports, and photographs of 
the Kookaburra, Bobby Hitchcock, and Keith Anderson in 1929. At very short 
notice Rob Thomas retrieved and digitised an important letter, photographs, 
and extracts from the flying log book of his father Sir Fred Thomas. Extracts 
from Bill Heath’s log book were copied for me by his son Daryl Heath. Bill 
White’s nephew, Geoffrey White, guided me through the important collection 
of letters and photographs which he has assembled. Charles Eaton, Daryl Heath, 
and Geoffrey White were valuable sources of family information. The Rev. 
Bill Gilmour and Msgnr Ken Morrison contributed the unique perspectives of 
RAAF chaplains. I learned much about the legal fraternity and their relationship 
with the Air Force in conversation with Sir George Pape, Sir Harry Winneke, 
and Sir Arthur Dean’s daughter, Ursula Whiteside. Heather Winneke kindly 
found and scanned pictures of her father-in-law Sir Harry Winneke. Sir Murray 
Tyrrell’s daughter and grand-daughter, Leonie and Kirsten McCulloch, allowed 
me to select from an enviably ample digitised family album. The life of Dr 
Duncan Mackellar was illuminated by information furnished by his son, Dr 
John Mackellar. L. P. Coombes recalled early days at the Aeronautical Research 
Laboratory. Ron Duffield, a vastly experienced civil airline pilot, gave me incisive 
commentary on the training and experience of RAAF pilots. Margaret Lodge, to 
whom scholars are indebted for the deposit of her father General Ernest Squires’ 
diaries at ADFA, brought to life his period as Chief of the General Staff.
The ghastly task of fighting the fire and retrieving the bodies from A16-97 was 
recalled by Bill Maloney and Jim Kearney.
The research for this book began over 37 years ago. At first it was carried on 
concurrently with a project on the life of Sir Robert Menzies which culminated 
in the publication of Menzies Observed in 1979. It grew out of, and in the end 
displaced, what was intended as a study of the Menzies wartime premiership. I 
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am grateful to Alan Bateman and the Hon. Humphrey Fisher of the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission (as it then was) for the original impetus, and access to 
film and sound archives; and to the Australian War Memorial for a grant which 
enabled me to assemble much of the material on the wartime political environment 
which underpinned the relevant chapters of Menzies Observed as well as the 
political background and narrative in this book. The award of a fellowship by 
the Australian Prime Ministers Centre gave me the opportunity to deepen my 
understanding of Robert Menzies’ emergence as Prime Minister in 1939. Among 
those who instructed me on the Lyons and Menzies governments, and public 
service and political life between the two world wars, I am deeply indebted 
to Dame Enid Lyons, Sir Chester and Lady Manifold, Lady White, Sir Murray 
Tyrrell, Sir Peter Looker, Sir Keith Waller, Sir Laurence McIntyre, Sir Roland 
Wilson, Sir Percy Spender, J. R. Willoughby, K. R. Ingram, Garry Armstrong, 
Colin Moodie, Sam Landau, Corbett Tritton, Hattil Foll, Sir John McEwen, Sir 
Laurence Hartnett, Charles Meeking, Sir Albert Chadwick, F. T. Hill, Sir Reginald 
Leonard, Sir Richard Randall, Sir Edwin Hicks, and Alfred Stirling.
A series of public service and academic appointments as well as private business 
commitments, deflected me from the work until 2006 when I was invited to 
an Adjunct Professorship in the Humanities Research Centre at The Australian 
National University. This beneficent privilege was all the more welcome as the 
original research had been undertaken when I held a fellowship in the History 
Department in the ANU’s Research School of Social Sciences. At that time I 
had the benefit of assistance from several able and resourceful people, notably 
Jan Brazier, Marion Stell, Carol Flanagan, Jeannette Horrocks, Brenda Willcox, 
Ann Millar, Anthea Bundock, and Pam Crichton; and I must acknowledge 
my appreciation of the rather puzzled forbearance of supportive academic 
colleagues, especially Barry Smith and Allan Martin. More recently, the 
enthusiastic interest of Ian Donaldson, Paul Pickering, and Christine Wallace 
inspired me to get on with putting into my laptop that which had long been in 
my mind; and Ian Hancock has brought his unrivalled knowledge of twentieth-
century conservative politics to reviewing draft chapters, saving me from an 
abundance of infelicity and solecism, and convincing me of the worth of the 
project.
Because of the sensitive nature of some of the information uncovered in the 
1970s and 1980s it seemed appropriate to defer completion and publication 
until the passage of time reduced the potential for offence or embarrassment. 
I am conscious that even now some of what is recounted here may dismay 
some readers. There are things they might feel were better left unsaid. In each 
case where I have thought there was potential for upset or hurtful speculation 
I have sought counsel from wise friends. None of them of course bears any 
responsibility for the outcome. All of the research and correspondence files for 
the project will be deposited in the National Library of Australia.
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In preparing the manuscript for publication I have had the reassuringly 
professional assistance of Duncan Beard and his team at the ANU E Press 
(Nausica Pinar, Beth Battrick, and Lorena Kanellopoulos). John Owen skilfully 
transformed a neat but poorly formatted WORD document, patiently explaining 
that copy-edited and re-formatted pages that looked a mess to me were exactly 
what was required. Thankfully he was right. It was a further relief to learn of a 
grant from the ANU Publications Subsidy Committee to assist in off-setting the 
copy-editing costs. Christine Fernon at the National Centre of Biography came 
to my rescue when assembling pictures into a single file threatened to defeat me.
At a time when I questioned whether the subject warranted the effort that it 
was demanding, Alan and Clara Bateman gave the kind of credible reassurance 
that only trusted friends can give. Mary Cunnane, the esteemed literary agent 
I found just in time, has been a fount of encouragement and wisdom. Melanie 
Nolan’s championing of a book that had daunted others came at a critical 
moment. Kayleen Hazlehurst — sustaining companion in travail, sensitive 
critic, profound source of strength — has always believed.
